US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

US Army Command and General Staff School

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
F100: Force Management

F106: Army Force Integration

F106RA: Reading Anticipation Guide

Read the True/False questions below and answer based on your current knowledge. After reading the
assigned text, review the questions to see if any of your assumptions/knowledge changed. Correct
answers are at the end of the reading.

Before T/F Question After T/F

The Army has three documents that establish priorities for the Army that
influences funding, personnel and readiness.
The Army G3 is responsible for managing personnel authorizations
within Army organizations defined as Manpower Management.
The Branch Assignment Officer determines which positions will open for
assignment by branch.
Army Materiel Command is responsible for managing equipment
distribution and redistribution.
The Army G1 is responsible for determining the percentage of personnel
fill for units.
ARFORGEN is the process the Army uses to manage trained and ready
units for the Army.

What is Force Integration?

Effective force integration is a demanding process that involves coordinating many complex and unique
procedures and data systems. Force integration is the synchronized, resource-constrained execution
of approved force development plans and programs to achieve systematic management of change.
Planning for force integration begins early in the Force Management process after the DOTMLPF-P
solutions are identified.

Force integration is the enabling process of force management. The scope of force integration includes
the functions of structuring organizations, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing,
and funding the force during the introduction and incorporation of approved organizational or force
structure changes. It also includes the function of minimizing adverse impacts on force readiness during
the introduction and incorporation of change. Force integration synchronizes these functional
activities to produce combat ready organizations. Force integration focuses Army management actions
towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, personnel,
training, equipment, and doctrine in the Army. An effective force integration process relies on
professional application of priorities, stewardship of resources, expert knowledge and ethical decision
making.

Throughout the reading, you will see Major rank insignia on slides. This indicates where O4 positions
exist within the generating force to perform force management positions.

F106 Reading A 1 June 2021

The following chart illustrates an example timeframe for deliberately building an Army organization from
identification of capability gaps, through organizational design, equipment and personnel acquisition and
finally assembling the organization – the red block on the chart. Force Integration execution begins
when equipment and personnel arrive at an organization and ends after collective training and
readiness certification. At this point, units are then available in the global force pool to be provided
to a Combatant Commander for missions in support of National Security Objectives.

Figure F106RA-1: Timeline to build an Army organization.

(Ovals represent the F100 class)

How does the Army prioritize to meet operational demands?

The Army produces three primary Army wide prioritization documents. These influence how the Army
allocates funding, personnel and equipment. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is responsible for integrating and
synchronizing Army Force Integration current and future force priorities. The Army Campaign
Plan Forum is the body that reviews and updates Army priorities within 3 priority documents. Currently,
this forum meets monthly but updates to the ARPL and IRPL are rare. Most updates are to the DARPL.
These documents are explained below.

a. Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM) is the classified Joint priority document that globally
prioritizes current Joint operations with long-term readiness to hedge against long-term threats. The
FADM depicts the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), which characterizes
and prioritizes missions and other activities to optimize near-term risk, and establishes additional criteria
for the distribution of force allocation across categories to hedge against mid- and longer-term threats or
problems. Example: The DoD priority 2.c: Deter Russian Aggression in Europe. (Example for instruction
purposes only.)

F106 Reading A 2 June 2021

 X
ARPL eliminated in 2020 – IRPL now includes the 3 strategic categories.

Figure F106RA-2: Army Prioritization Documents.

b. Integrated requirement priority list (IRPL) is a secret document that provides a micro view of each
of the ARPL categories. It provides capacity and capability level of detail by Standard
Requirements Codes (SRC) (both generating and operating) within each ARPL category. Recently,
the HQDA G3/57 changed the IRPL from a 1-year document to one that covers the POM years as the
priorities of the Army will not change dramatically over the short term but may be updated, as required.
Example: The Army will support annual Defender Exercise (ARPL Priority 15/FADM Priority 2.c) with
an Armored BCT from CONUS. (Example for instruction purposes only). The G357 has an OPT that
includes members of ASCCs, ACOMS, ARSTAFF. The IRPL is published as an annex to the Army
Campaign Plan and (along with the DARPL) guides building the ACMG (active component manning
guidance).

c. Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL) is a classified document that provides detailed
tactical prioritization of specific unit UICs to IRPL missions over time. The DARPL is a prioritized
list of UICs aligned to missions. The DARPL influences modernization schedule, manning, funding,
training, etc., but does not establish any specific resource fill level. Resource fill levels are done by other
means. HQDA G3/57 updates the DARPL twice each FY, at the beginning and midpoint of the
resourcing process, but may be updated, as required. Example: 1/1Cavalry Division will support Defender
22 rotation #6 in June 2022 (example for instruction purposes only). An unclassified piece is for
personnel and equipment distribution. The unit G3 or FA50 will have access to this as needed.

Questions for Understanding

1. Why is Force Integration important you as a BDE officer?
2. Who is overall responsible for synchronizing Force Integration?
3. What are the types and purpose of each Army Priority Document?

F106 Reading A 3 June 2021

 Who is the lead agent for Force Integration in the Army?

The HQDA G-3/5/7 Force Management Division (DAMO-FMD) manages the integration of the
Army’s current and future force. DAMO-FMD provides policy management/oversight for numerous
force development and documentation processes to achieve systematic management of change through
the introduction of DOTMLPF-P solutions to generate capabilities on schedule. They also provide
management oversight of the Army’s Force Design Update (FDU) and Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). The
FMD conducts periodic sessions with planners in TRADOC (D, T, L), Army G-3/5/7 Force
Development (O), AMC (F), Army Futures Command, Army G8, and AMC (M), HQDA G1 (Per) and
HQDA Staff (Pol) to coordinate timelines, funding, and ensure actions are completed IAW priorities.
This is where staff subject matter experts assess integration actions across the nine Force Integration
Functional Areas (FIFA) to assess suitability, feasibility and acceptability of solutions. At the macro
level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FIFA determines the ability for the
force to be manned, trained, equipped, sustained, and stationed.

The main management and decision forum for Force Integration is the Army Synchronization Meeting.
This is held weekly with the DAG357 as the chair. The purpose of the meeting is to integrate and
synchronize the Army, execute decisions, and review decisions for Army Senior Leader consideration.
Members include the DA G8, AFC, AFC-FCC, TRADOC-CAC, AMC, FORSCOM, ASA(AL&T) and
ASA(FM&C) for fiscal input.

Organizational EDATEs are the target for all force integration functions. Actions such as personnel
assignments, materiel delivery, doctrine staffed and approved, new training courses established, and
facilities renovated or constructed. ALL have target completion dates based on the Effective Date
(EDATE) established by DA G3/5/7 and published in the ARSTRUC and FMSWeb. Individual, team
and collective training generally occur after the EDATE. EDATES for TOE units are generally 16 th of
the Month while TDA units have EDATES of 1st of the month.

How does the Army prioritize and distribute personnel?

How does the Army prioritize and distribute personnel?

Military human resource management (MHRM) follows a life-cycle that is derived from the Army’s
Organizational Life Cycle Model discussed in F101, “Personnel Structure, Acquisition, Training,
Distribution, Development, Deployment, Compensation, Sustainment, and Transition.” This reading will
focus primarily on the officer distribution process; more specifically, how the Army prioritizes and
distributes personnel to meet authorized strength levels and operational requirements.

In a previous lesson, you learned how the Army projects its strength requirements and attains personnel
authorizations to meet those requirements through Total Army Analysis (TAA). Manpower
management, which manages personnel authorizations (MTOE/TDA), commonly referred to as
“spaces,” is a G-3 function. Whereas personnel management, a G-1 function, deals with the actual
Soldiers, commonly referred to as “faces,” which are assigned to fill authorizations in the approved
Army force structure. It is important to differentiate between these two terms, because frequently there
are not enough personnel (faces) available to fill all authorizations (spaces). (Figure F106A3 below)

The Army G1 manages the Active Army Total Strength which is the total of all Soldiers in the Active
Army component. OCAR and NGB manage their own strengths within Total Army policy due to
fluctuations throughout the year caused by recruiting and retention, retirements, and personnel shifting

F106 Reading A 4 June 2021

between personnel manning categories. This number changes during the year for many reasons. For the
Active Component, the total strength is comprised of two categories: Operating Strength, which is the
total number of Soldiers available to fill spaces in MTOE & TDA organization, and the Trainees,
Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account, which is all those Soldiers not available to fill
spaces in units. TTHS includes basic and advanced individual training, officer basic course, CGSC,
Soldier recovery units, retiring, etc. Therefore, Total Strength equals Operating Strength plus TTHS.

Throughout the year, the total strength (TS) of the Army will change based on actions such as
enlistments, commissioning source graduations, and retirements. The Army must manage the total
strength to meet a specific End Strength set by Congress and must report its end strength (ES) to
Congress at the end of each fiscal year. This number is a snapshot in time of how many people are in the
Army as of 30 Sep each year. The end strength set by Congress plays a key role in the TAA process as a
resource constraint.

Figure F106RA-3: Army Manning G1 & G3 Roles.

The Army’s operating strength is simply its End Strength minus TTHS which is historically ~13%
of the force. The USAR and ARNG do not utilize TTHS accounting due to various personnel categories
– AGR (full-time manning), M-Day/TPU (mobilization day/ troop program unit – assigned to MTOE
units), and IRR (individual ready reserve) to name a few. The Operating Strength is also knows as the
distributable inventory. The goal is to match the authorized number of positions within MTOE and TDA
units to the operating strength of the Army. The Force Structure Allowance (FSA) is the total number
of MTOE and TDA positions approved in TAA. Unpredicted changes in retention rates (OS total
changes) and seasonal surges in TTHS are two reasons the Operating Strength number fluctuates. (Figure
F106A4)

F106 Reading A 5 June 2021

 Figure F106RA-4: Manning Spectrum.

As mentioned earlier there are not enough available Soldiers to fill the Force Structure so the Army must
establish priorities. In addition to guidance from senior leaders, the DARPL, and the ReARMM (covered
later in this reading), the Army G-1 uses approved force structure (ARSTRUC), which you learned about
in F105, to determine the Active Component Manning Guidance (ACMG), which details the Army
personnel priorities for upcoming fiscal years. Approved by the G3, the intent of the ACMG is to man
the Army in accordance with the CSA’s priorities as articulated by the HQDA G-3/5/7 and in conjunction
with the approved end-strength published annually by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The purpose is to optimize personnel readiness by aligning the ACMG to specific CSA priorities
and the DARPL. The ACMG prioritizes levels of personnel fill for all organizations within four
categories. Using the ACMG, HRC fills the faces into the right spaces.
- Category ASL Directed Fill – positions within units that senior Army leadership directed to
be filled at 100% by skill and grade.
- Category A – Units assigned to the highest national requirements as identified in DoD, Joint,
and strategic documents as directed in the IRPL and DARPL.
- Category B – units assigned to support regional conflicts and follow-on requirements in
LSCO.
- Category C – Units assigned to support day-to-day operations with Allies/Partners Training,
Cooperation, generating force operations.
The OCAR (Office, Chief Army Reserve) and CNGB (Chief, National Guard Bureau) also publish
manning guidance memorandums through the Army G-1 to HRC. Usually, these memorandums are
published on a biannual basis.

Army HQDA G-1 establishes levels of personnel fills for units to meet DARPL targets and ReARMM
Readiness timelines established by the Army G-3. Human Resources Command (HRC) assigns Officer
Personnel during two manning cycles each year. During these cycles, HRC reviews the personnel
available for movement based on several factors as well as unit personnel authorizations to determine
where and when Soldiers will be assigned. Units will have different manning levels depending on their
projected module in the ReARMM process and Army Active Component Manning Guidance. The
Account Manager in the HRC Operations Division, will determine in coordination with the unit, which
F106 Reading A 6 June 2021
unit shortages will be open by branch to meet manning guidance and unit priorities. During each
manning cycle, HRC conducts a Manning Conference where the HRC Unit Account manager
advocates for the unit priorities of fill and the Assignment Officer identifies the available
population and advocates on behalf of the officer to meet PME, KD, and personal goals. After this
conference, HRC Operations Branch validates the spaces requirements for the Army that will be filled
that cycle. At this point, assignment officers place their population (faces) against the validated
requirements (spaces), taking into account AIM02 inputs such as officer and gaining unit preferences.

Figure F106RA-5: Army Officer Assignment Process.

Unit ReARMM status (explained below) provides one factor for personnel assignments. Other factors
include the professional development requirements of the individual. Each enlisted Soldier and officer
must complete key developmental (KD) jobs to qualify them for the next higher grade. Personnel also
require professional education in order to prepare them for future assignments. HRC seeks to assign
enlisted and officer personnel in units or on installations in order to provide them these opportunities
within their timeline for advancement. Each branch identifies key developmental positions for their
personnel along with career paths for specific specialties: DA Pam 600-3 for Army Competitive
Category, DA Pam 600-4 for AMEDD and DA Pam 600-25 for Non-Commissioned Officers.

Questions for Understanding

1. What are the roles of G1 and G3 in Manning?
2. What makes up the AC Total Strength?
3. What is the purpose of the Active Component Manning Guidance?
4. What is the Manning Conference and what is the role of the Account Manager?

F106 Reading A 7 June 2021

 How does the Army distribute and redistribute equipment?1

Army Materiel Command (AMC) is the Lead Materiel Integrator (LMI) responsible for all Army
new/recapitalized equipment distribution and redistribution of on-hand equipment. AMC’s
subordinate command, Army Sustainment Command (ASC), is the executive agent for AMC. ASC
utilizes the unclassified, web based collaborative Decision Support Tool (DST) software program to
lead Army materiel stakeholders through the planning and execution of Army materiel distribution
and redistribution. DST is the authoritative Army Equipment on-hand Common Operating Picture
(COP) to visualize the equipping status of Army units and to make recommended actions to fill
equipment shortages. This is often referred to as LMI-DST. The COP for Equipment Readiness reporting
is the Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army (DRSS-A). The LMI DST pulls data from the
Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW) which receives data from sources such as Global Combat
Support System – Army (CGSS-A), Army Equipping Enterprise System (AE2S), and other Accountable
Property Systems of Record. LMI DST uses the LIW data and other factors such as Unit
MTOE/TDA and future authorizations, equipment readiness codes (repairable or not), DARPL,
ReARMM status of a unit, equipment due-in to the unit and other data to determine the best
solutions to increase equipment readiness as needed for the Army. The Army G-8 retains Army Staff
responsibility to plan and program for new materiel equipping and retains responsibility for component
(COMPO) level allocations of new and recapitalized equipment (upgraded equipment that goes beyond
refurbishment and rebuild and inserts additional capability – think certified used cars in civilian world).
The Army Reserve and National Guard use DST for equipment allocations.

AMC distributes new material based on guidance published in the Army Modernization Strategy (AMS)
(2019) and updated as part of Annex 2 of the Army Planning Guidance during each POM cycle. The
AMS describes how the Total Army will transform into a multi-domain force by 2035 to meet its
enduring responsibility as part of the Joint Force and retain its position as the globally dominant land
power. To achieve this end state by 2035, the Army will modernize how we fight, what we fight with, and
who we are. This approach integrates the elements of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader
development and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) within the Army, with other
Joint Force elements, and alongside allies and partners. How we fight is the realm of concepts, doctrine,
organizations, and training. What we fight with is characterized by materiel development and
procurement, guided by the Army’s six materiel modernization priorities. Who we are encompasses
leader development, education, and 21st century talent management. The Army Modernization strategy
enables prioritization of effort and resourcing decisions by synchronizing force modernization.
Implementation of the Army’s Modernization Strategy (AMS), will provide leaders increased options in
the great power competition.

Over the past 20 years, unit redesigns, deactivations and activations, unit re-stationing, deployments, and
to some extent a lack of funding to move the items, have resulted in some equipment not in the correct
place needed to reach Equipment on Hand (EOH) readiness goals. Force structure changes, such as the
recent decision to convert two BCTs in 2020 can also generate shortages. In other cases, funding
decisions may require that the Army not buy to a full procurement level which leads to equipment
shortages.

1
Army Modernization Strategy (17 Oct 2019), HQDA G8
F106 Reading A 8 June 2021
 Figure F106RA-6. Equipment Distribution/Redistribution Process.

The LMI DST distribution/redistribution process aims to increase EOH readiness. ASC vets DST
Proposed Sourcing Decisions (PSD) actions with appropriate stakeholders (FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR,
the PM, ASC, G-8 and others) before approving the action. When HQDA needs to modify priorities, or
adjust the DARPL based on emerging demands of Senior Leader decisions, the Army G-3/5/7 will
publish an EXORD to all Army MACOMs to codify this adjustment.

Prior to 2011, the HQDA G8 hosted the Equipping Conference to ensure units were equipped (via
Distribution & Re-distribution) prior to their deployment and after redeployment. Attendees at the
Equipping Conferences included: AMC, PMs, G-4, G-8, G-3, etc., with the intent to ensure a sourcing
solution was provided for any shortage. Additionally, PMs synchronized New Equipment Training/New
Equipment Fielding (NET/NEF) with unit training calendars. Equipping Conferences were conducted as
early as 2004. The system was not holistic and mainly used for the rapid turn of force generation
requirements to support OIF/OEF.

There are currently two working groups used to help facilitate unit equipping issues:

 Army Modernization & Equipping Conference (AMEC) (formerly the Army Equipment
Reuse Working Group (AERWG)) meets semi-annually to address holistic Army Command’s concerns,
make recommendations for policy changes, and review equipping issues for the next 21-month
distribution cycle. This is Co-hosted by Army G-8 and AMC with Program Managers, Army G-4,
ASCCs/DRUs, OCAR, NGB, ACOMs and ASA(AL&T) participating. The AMEC focus is strategic
equipping issues and challenges the Army must resolve due to policy, force structure draw-downs,
inactivations, reorganizations, conversions, realignments, implementation of ReARMM, issues with
industry, and funding constraints. Additionally, the AMEC addresses equipment distribution issues and
conducts equipment scrubs of MTOE documents to prevent disconnects between equipment distributed
and equipment documented on MTOEs/TDAs.

F106 Reading A 9 June 2021

AMEC objectives are:
a) Equip deploying units,
b) Build army equipping readiness and support transition to ReARMM,
c) Improve synchronization of equipping distributions with MTOE modernization,
d) Distribute/Redistribute/Divest equipment to support Army structure decisions,
e) Identify/resolve conflicts or friction points,
f) Promote information flow.

 Unit Equipping Reuse Working Group (UERWG) is a unit-level process to fill equipping
shortages for large unit deployments with a Latest Arrival Date (LAD) mission. These are generally held
at the Division level upon order by FORSCOM. The UERWG is responsible for filling essential
shortages for subordinate units designated for deployment from internal assets and resetting the
unit after deployment for future missions. In other words, if the unit is in the Mission Module for a
Train and Advise small unit training mission to USARAF but is missing 10 Fuel tankers, the unit may not
receive the tankers until later because the tankers will not be utilized in the upcoming mission
deployment. This is the meeting where Field Grade officers will make the most impact to fill their unit
shortages through cross leveling and accurate equipment on-hand reporting and property accountability in
GCSS-A.

All the processes discussed above are important to Army readiness but the majority of fixes are the
responsibility of units/organizations. The Army Campaign on Property Accountability began in July
2010 and has resulted in $12.2B in equipment being recovered to Army accountable records.
Additionally, the Army has internally redistributed $328B in equipment to fill Army shortages 2. This
helped grow Army readiness and saved the Army money. As of the 23 Feb 2017 AMEC, the Army
determined that without buying any new equipment, Army equipment readiness can improve by 13% by
properly moving misaligned equipment in the inventory. This can be accomplished by conducting
property book adjustments to correctly align property at unit level (6%); internal lateral transfers within
the ACOM/ASCC (5%) and external Lateral Transfers between ASCC/ACOMs (2%) 3. Since the
beginning of FY17, the Army has laterally transferred ~612K pieces of equipment to fill critical shortages
and increase readiness and has also divested just over 1M pieces of obsolete materiel.

Your responsibilities as a field grade officer and steward of our resources are to ensure that you and your
subordinates are addressing excess removal from your organizational property books. Methods include
ensuring adjustments are done to properly align equipment to authorizations on property books, transfer
equipment within your command, and making sure all equipment is accounted for because it may be
needed elsewhere in the Army.

As an organizational leader, you must understand that just because you have a shortage on your
MTOE/TDA that does not mean that the item will be filled in accordance with your needs. The Army
must balance readiness and needs of the whole Army.

As the Army introduces new equipment into the force via these processes, any displaced equipment is
either divested by the Army or cascaded to Active, National Guard or Reserve Component units.
Equipment divested from the inventory ends Phase 5 of the DAS – Operations and Sustainment.
Example: As the JLTV was fielded to units in FY19, displaced up-armored HMMWVs were sent to
Active, USAR, and NG units to replace older HMMWVs as needed and the remainder disposed of IAW
HQDA G4 instructions. The Army determined the disposal process when HMMWVs were developed in
the 1980s while looking at the separation phase in the Army Life Cycle Model that was discussed earlier
in the course.

2
Phonecon between Mr. James Kennedy, Author and LTC Nathan Goubeaux, HQDAG4 ref COPA, 29 March 2016.
3
AERWG 23 Overview Brief, Slide 3, dated 11 Feb 2016,
https://akoapps.hqda.pentagon.mil/g8site/aerwg/pdf/Day1_1Intro_&_Due_Outs_Update.pdf
F106 Reading A 10 June 2021
 Questions for Understanding
1. Who is the Army’s Lead Materiel Integrator and what is the Equipping COP?
2. What is the purpose of the AMEC and the UERWG?

What happens to the COTS/non-standard equipment the Army buys?

Over the past 19 years, the Army has purchased a significant amount of equipment outside of the standard
development and acquisition process. These decisions were made for mission accomplishment to get
needed equipment to the user in the field quickly. No later than one year after nonstandard equipment is
fielded in response to an urgent/emergent operational need, the Army will conduct an assessment to
determine disposition of the equipment. The revised process, as of June 2015, to meet this goal is the
semi-annual Nonstandard Equipment (NSE) Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)
Process. The purpose of the NSE AROC process is to retain the most capable and cost-effective
non-program of record capability solutions that meet urgent/emergent operational needs or
enduring capability requirements.4 Though most NSE equipment from operations since 2003 has gone
through this process for retention or disposal, when used the NSE AROC conducts a thorough review of
the total costs to the Army and reviews potential strategy changes to inform disposition determinations.
Retained NSE capabilities will be included in new Army Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review for
prioritization. NSE capability solutions and initiatives will be reviewed by AFC Futures and Concepts
Center for documentation via DOTmLPF-P Change recommendations. In partnership with the Army G-
3/5/7, G-8 Capability Integration manages this process to assess non-standard systems to determine
whether or not they should become:
1) systems of record and be fielded to the entire Army;
2) niche systems for certain theaters; or
3) discontinued.
Participants include HQ TRADOC, AFC FCC, HQDA G-2, G-3/5/7, G-4, G-6, G-8, Office of The
Surgeon General (OTSG), Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), ASA (ALT), Army Materiel
Command (AMC), Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Operating Force (ASCCs). Operational Army
unit input, through survey responses, is the basis for the recommendations. The intent of the process is to
enter the formal developments process at a later stage, reducing time from the development cycle. Once
an item is approved for retention in the Army as a program of record, the Life Cycle model and
DAS are reverse engineered, and the equipment has to meet the standard of Army Equipment.
IAW AR 71-32, Force Development and Documentation Consolidate Policies (and DA PAM 71-32
Procedures), approved former NSE equipment will now be picked up on CTAs or TDAs. If items are not
approved, these are disposed IAW provided instructions from the Army G4 or the program manager.

What are options for receiving equipment for a mission?

Prior to covering these specific processes, it is important to know the difference between fielding and
equipping. Fielding applies to a solution for the entire Army and generally goes through the
DOTMLPF-P integration as well as the materiel processes. Equipping refers to solutions (usually only
commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] materiel) provided to a single unit for a single mission. While
equipping is generally a much faster solution, there is normally no accompanying doctrine, training, or
sustainment integration concurrent with receipt of the system. Sometimes this is okay (i.e., metal
detecting wands for security checkpoints), but sometimes it creates problems—especially in the long-
4
Interim Policy Memorandum – Nonstandard Equipment (NSE) Army Requirements Oversight Counsel (AROC) Process, HQDA G3/57, 4 June
2015.
F106 Reading A 11 June 2021
term. As an example, the Army rapidly acquired the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP)
without creating a program of record (POR) funding due to urgency. The Army then equipped both
deployed and deploying units without the usual accompanying integration, training, sustainment, and
doctrine for their use in Iraq and Afghanistan. These integration actions were developed after MRAP
issue.

The following are brief explanations of current Army processes, both deliberate and rapid, the goal of
which is to provide units with the right amount of materiel, in the right amount of time.

Deliberate

Total Package Fielding (TPF) is the Army’s standard fielding process developed to provide Army
materiel systems to units in a coordinated/consolidated package of end items, support items and
technical documentation. Nearly all systems that go through the deliberate DAS process are fielded
using TPF methods. The intent of TPF is to relieve the gaining command and subordinate units from
much of the workload associated with fielding new systems. Under TPF, the program manager (PM) is
required to:
 program funds for initial issue materiel to be provided;
 requisition the initial issue materiel;
 provide new equipment training for operators and maintainers as needed
 deliver all the TPF materiel to the unit in a coordinated manner and pay for all cost associated
with deprocessing and fielding of the TPF materiel; and,
 provide customer documentation.

TPF has been the Army’s standard fielding process since 1987. It is a recognized method for successful
fieldings, specifically known for its ability to adjust to changes in production and fielding schedules. As
an S-3 or executive officer, you will more than likely work with materiel fielding teams and new
equipment training teams to integrate new capabilities into your unit under the TPF process.

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), are strategically positioned critical war-fighting stocks that are
forward positioned afloat and land-based at worldwide locations. APS contributes to be an agile
stance by optimizing expeditionary power projection. In addition, they enable Joint Force commanders to
reposition forces to other priority missions secure in the knowledge that APS is available to equip next-to-
deploy forces should the need arise. The use of APS is primarily driven by CCDR OPLAN
requirements. In this capacity, they provide forward-positioned equipment and sustainment supplies to
equip early arriving BCTs and support formations. APS unit sets have the same MTOE as like units
minus any non-MTOE COTs items purchased by units. More specifically, the land-based sets provide a
robust, forward presence to deter potential hostile forces and should deterrence fail, provide combat
capability to defeat the enemy. Afloat equipment sets are multi-apportioned for planning, strategically-
agile and provide full spectrum capability. In addition to priority OPLANs, APS supports an array of
CCDR operations and exercises. The Army G3 can approve APS use for exercises, training or
mission.

Rapid

The Rapid Equipping Force (REF), under the authority of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), harnessed current and emerging technologies to provide immediate solutions
to the urgent challenges of U.S. Army forces deployed globally. During the past 16 years (2005-2021),
the REF has met challenges as diverse as defeating improvised explosive devices, increasing tactical-level
operational energy efficiency, gathering blast effect data to better understand traumatic brain injury and
improving intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities in austere locations. The REF responds
to Army units of all types to rapidly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and enemy tactics.

F106 Reading A 12 June 2021

REF deactivated in April 2021 with much of its mission being picked up by the Army Rapid Capabilities
and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) which will rapidly and efficiently research, develop,
prototype, test, evaluate, procure, transition, and/or field critical enabling technologies and capabilities
that address near-term, and mid-term threats. The RCCTO will produce or acquire materiel solutions
consistent with the Army’s modernization priorities that maximize Soldiers’ capabilities to deploy, fight,
and win on future battlefields. The RCCTO reports to a Board of Directors (BoD) led by the Secretary of
the Army, and including the Chief of Staff of the Army, Under Secretary of the Army, the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army, Army Acquisition Executive, and the Commander of Army Futures Command. All
decision-making authority related to the Office’s projects resides within the BoD.

Operational Needs Statements (ONS) are Army capability requests to HQDA constituting a request
for a materiel and/or non-materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability
impacting mission accomplishment. ONS are only authorized for a specific mission and a set time
frame. At the end of the mission or timeframe, the equipment is to be turned in the Army for
redistribution. Prior to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s operational needs
statements were requests through DA G-4 to access equipment in war reserves. The advent of rapid
acquisition systems (i.e. REF) necessitated a mechanism to make changes to MTOE equipment levels as
well as to request non-MTOE equipment. The ONS is requested by Army headquarters to support
deployed Army units, deploying units, and units conducting their assigned missions. An ONS is
adjudicated in accordance with Army priorities. The ONS provides an opportunity to the field
commander, outside of the acquisition, capability development and training development communities to
obtain needed materiel solutions faster outside the JCIDS processes. Operational units normally route
ONS through their chain of command to the DA G-3 Army Requirements & Resources Board
(AR2B) via the Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) SIPR Website. The AR2B routes
the approved to HQDA G8, AMC, HQDAG4, or ASA(ALT) for resourcing, assuming the desired
equipment is available. There might be some confusion about the earlier DST Equipment Readiness COP
and the ONS Equipment COP. The DST is used to manage routine sourcing of equipment to fill unit
authorizations on MTOEs primarily at home station to increase readiness. The ECOP is only for
equipment NOT on the MTOE that is required for an ongoing mission.

The Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)-initiated
request that was first used in 2004 emulating the success of the Army’s Rapid Equipping force program.
The JUONS is a joint request used to “break through the institutional barriers of providing timely,
effective support” to operational commanders and provide a resource for two or more services. It does
not attempt to introduce a new acquisition or procurement process, instead it justifies and expedites a joint
commander-identified urgent need through the existing DOD processes to meet certified operational
critical DOTMLPF-P requirements. The goal is to act on requests within 14 days to designate or decline a
JUONS as an immediate warfighter need, so that a contract is awarded and goods and services are
delivered within four months to two years. All incoming requests for an urgent operational need must be
validated and prioritized by the combatant command before forwarding to the Joint Staff via SIPRNET.

Questions for Understanding

1. What are the different Deliberate and Rapid equipping methods?
2. What decision body approves and sources Operational Needs Statements?
3. What is the difference between an ONS and a JUONS?

How does the Army build capable forces to meet operational requirements?5

5
Emails between LTC Altenburg, DAMO-TR, DAG3 and lesson authors, Feb-Mar 2016. Emails with authors.
F106 Reading A 13 June 2021
The Army’s new force generation model is the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model.
The intent of ReARMM model is to achieve operational balance for soldiers with predictable, dedicated
periods for missions, training, and modernization. This seeks to reduce back-to-back brigade rotations in
favor of task-organized battalion task force. This is a new model that is in initial phases of planning with
implementation in AY22. F106 Reading C contains more information on ReARMM.

Application of Ethics

There are hundreds of ethical challenges within the force management processes and a few are explained
below to give the reader an idea of where ethics apply. From the CGSC L100 block, there are three
different types of ethics in the Ethical Triangle – Principle based (rules), Consequences (Ends justify the
means) or Values (Why we decide).

Throughout Force Management and specifically Force Integration, leaders have ethics decisions to make.
Just a few are listed below.
- How we decide against which threats we will plan capabilities?
- How much money we allocate to certain programs during acquisition and PPBE?
- Why we make certain requirements higher priority than others in the DARPL?
- Why we approve the tradeoff between cost, schedule, and performance in the acquisition of
new materiel?
- Why we approve some requirements identified and disapprove others?
- How and why we decide which units and how many of each to have in the force during Total
Army Analysis?
- Why we decide which units will receive new equipment training in which order?
- What tasks will be trained in AIT or OBC and which will not be trained?
- What topics will be covered in NCOES or OES to include CGSC?

All these decisions are the choice between two rights and the basis of those decisions give credibility and
builds trust between the leader and led.
Example: When fielding MRAPs in 2007, the Army had an ethical challenge. Soldiers were being
wounded on the battlefield because of IEDs.
- A consequences-based ethics leader would look at what was the greatest good for the greatest
number. Only a few Soldiers were being wounded, but a materiel solution would cost significant
money and training time, which would negatively impact the Department of Defense. A
consequentialist could say – we will continue as is because this is war because just a small
percentage of people are hurt, and the cost of new materiel is so high or they could say yes to new
equipment because the ends justify the means of spending more money to save lives.
- In principles-based ethics, a leader looks at the rules to see if what we do should become a
universal law. If we get MRAPs to protect Soldiers, we should do this in every case of danger no
matter the financial, international, or human cost. It is the right thing to do because we don’t want
Americans to die.
- For the virtues-based leader, they would look at the “why” when making their decision. For the
MRAP challenge, the why is our obligation to protect Soldiers to the best of our ability. It is how
our country will be judged by the people and future Soldiers on how we treat our all-volunteer
force. A virtue-based leader will decide this knowing that it is America’s sons and daughters and
our greatest national treasure riding in the. Financial and mission accomplishments are not as
important as our obligation to protect our Soldiers. The adage of “If you had to explain to your
mom or the newspaper, would you have done the right thing within the Army values and virtues of
our country” applies here.

F106 Reading A 14 June 2021

No leader will use only one method, but all are possible. There is no right or wrong answer, just strong or
weak justification.

Conclusion

The purpose of this reading was to give you a brief overview of how the Army prioritizes and integrates
capabilities, primarily personnel and equipment, into operational units to meet global requirements. How
the Army Runs defines force integration as the synchronized, resource constrained execution of approved
force development plans and programs to achieve systematic management of change. In more simple
terms, force integration actions are what link the generating force management processes you explored
earlier in the course to the Operating Force by providing the DOTMLPL-P solutions to generate
capability.

At this point, go back and review the Anticipation Guide questions at the beginning of the reading.
Answers are: F, T, F, T, T, F.

Additional Resources:

US Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A
Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2019-2020. Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 29 January 2020.

The authors want to thanks to numerous experts from Army G1, Army Sustainment Command, Army
G35/7, and Army G4 that provided input and updates to our lesson materials. Their support continues to
ensure that we have the latest and best information available to our students.

Equipment Common Operating Picture (COP) Reference

Name Owner Purpose

Decision Support Tool Army Sustainment Equipment distribution/redistribution to fill shortages
(DST) Command on MTOEs – Equipment On Hand COP
Equipment Common Army G3/57 Fill equipment shortages for a unit during contingency
Operating Picture (ECOP) operations for equipment NOT on an MTOE –
Equipment COP but ONLY for ONS
Defense Readiness Army G3/57 Equipment Readiness (Mission Capable – FMC)
Reporting System – Army Reporting – USR – Equipment Readiness COP
(DRSS-A)

F106 Reading A 15 June 2021