The ARG/MEU: Is It Still Relevant?

Jonathan D. Geithner

August 2015

Distribution limited to DOD agencies only

 This document contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the sponsor.

Distribution

Distribution limited to DOD agencies only. Specific authority: N00014-11-D-0323.

Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information
Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section
at 703-824-2123.

Photography Credit: globalmilitaryreview.blogspot.com

Approved by: August 2015

Mr. Jonathan Geithner, Director

Tactical Naval Issues Team
Operations and Tactics Analysis

Copyright © 2015 CNA

Abstract
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the only combined-arms ground force in the
world embarked on ships and forward-deployed as a presence and crisis response
force. Its use over the years, however, suggests that much of its utility has derived
from its component parts vice employment as a battalion-sized marine air-ground
task force (MAGTF). The introduction of the F-35B could alter the character of the
ARG/MEU in fundamental ways. This presents an opportunity to examine the
purpose of the ARG/MEU, the tasks it should be capable of performing, and the
capabilities necessary to execute them. We offer a couple of simplified alternative
ARG/MEU constructs as well as a more structured approach for guiding future
analysis.

i
This page intentionally left blank.

ii
Executive Summary
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the only combined-arms force routinely
embarked on amphibious ships and deployed overseas to promote peace and
stability. No other Service offers this capability either as an organizing principle or
one readily available for immediate response. We wanted to understand how it has
been used and how to ensure it remains relevant.

The ARG/MEU concept

The Marine Corps conceived the MEUs in the late 1950s as part of a broader concept
for integrating air-ground operations. The MEU would be deployed forward to deter
and if need be respond to small crises, and it would be trained and equipped to
conduct amphibious assaults to “establish a force on a hostile or potentially hostile
shore.” Later the Marine Corps would envision the MEU as both an enabler for, and a
building block of, larger Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and/or joint
forces. The concept endures today.

ARG/MEUs initially were deployed as a counter to Soviet influence and then as a

hedge against post–Cold War instability. Along the way, the Marine Corps adapted
the MEU to fit the needs of the times, both rhetorically and substantively. What
started as a conventional amphibious enabling force became one also capable of
conducting designated maritime special operations, and more recently, a jack-of-all-
trades. These roles are not mutually exclusive, but they forced tradeoffs between
broader conventional and more specialized capabilities.

Historical ARG/MEU employment

ARG/MEUs most often have been employed to protect Americans overseas, help end
ideological or ethnic violence, and ease suffering. These are considered lesser crises
along the conflict spectrum known as the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). At
other times the ARG/MEU has served as a signal of U.S. resolve, providing time and
options for foreign-policy officials and military planners. ARG/MEUs have supported
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and on occasion have had to apply their own
“special” capabilities.

iii
While the MAGTF is a unique discriminator of Marine capabilities, what really makes
the MEU special is the ability to operate free of the constraints of land bases; this has
been important in most crises involving ARG/MEUs. Routine, lengthy, and
simultaneous deployments are other positive characteristics.

On the other hand, the ARG/MEU generally has not been employed as a full MAGTF,
enabling force, or building block. One notable exception was the employment of two
MEUs in the early fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Most often, however, the
formation is split apart (or disaggregated) by the geographic Combatant
Commanders (CCDRs) to conduct independent operations. Sometimes the MEU
operates ashore for extended periods of time without support from the ARG.

ARG/MEUs also have participated in less frequent mid- and high-end crises. When
facing more capable adversaries, however, the U.S. tends to build up a big force over
time, somewhat diminishing the contribution of the MEU. This approach is consistent
with the principles of overwhelming force and a national aversion to casualties.

Opportunity for change

The CCDR’s habit of breaking up the ARG/MEU suggests a coverage problem, where
smaller forces are needed in more places to handle lesser crises. Instead of preparing
and deploying ARG/MEUs to conduct the rare battalion-sized amphibious assault,
should the Marine Corps produce smaller embarked Marine forces capable of
conducting more common lower-end missions? Ironically, the MEU’s “excesses” in
depth and variety enable the ARG/MEU to support CCDR’s broad geographic needs.
Yet the Marine Corps has been resistant to splitting up the ARG/MEU on the grounds
that it undermines the capability of the whole MAGTF.

Making more ARG/MEUs configured for low-end missions has both limits and risks.
The limits chiefly are imposed by the existing capacity of the amphibious fleet. The
risks involve degrading the Corps’ preparedness for major conflict.

Nonetheless, change may be both inevitable and logical. The most compelling reason
is the F-35B, whose size and advanced capabilities will make it very attractive to
CCDRs while displacing assault support aircraft critical to the ground forces’
traditional amphibious mission of projecting power ashore. The question isn’t
whether the F-35B will alter the ARG/MEU, but by how much and in what ways.

There are other reasons for thinking differently about the ARG/MEU. One is the
Special Purpose (SP) MAGTF for Crisis Response, which is also built around an
infantry battalion. SPMAGTFs thus far have been land-based because of amphibious
ship shortages, constraining their freedom of action. But they are trained to execute
many of the MEU’s tasks and are equipped with long-range MV-22 as well as fighter

iv
aircraft in some cases. Another reason is that the mix of amphibious ships will
change over the next fifteen or so years, forcing differences in the composition of
every MEU. A third factor is that the ships and elements of the MEU are far more
capable than their earlier counterparts.

Thinking differently
We offer two simplified alternative constructs. The first would separate the high-end
capabilities of the F-35B on the big deck (LHA or LHD) amphibious ship from
company-sized formations on the two smaller ships (the LPD and LSD). The big deck
might serve as a light carrier to backfill or supplement carrier strike group (CSG)
presence. The LPD and LSD, each with a company landing team and the balance of
the aviation assets, would focus on lesser missions such as maritime interdiction,
embassy reinforcement, humanitarian operations, and disaster relief. The ground
force would be oriented towards smaller raids instead of assaults, perhaps even
against high-end threats when coupled with the big deck.

Another option is to tailor forces for different regions with different geography,
access, and threats. CENTCOM accounts for much of the current forward presence
commitments, but the North Arabian Gulf is a small region with reasonably good
access; the Mediterranean is fairly small as well though with more restrictions on
land-based forces. In contrast, Africa and Asia are big maritime regions.

Many of the threats in CENTCOM and AFRICOM relate to ideological or religious

differences that call for protecting Americans, countering terrorists, ensuring
freedom of navigation, and partner engagement/training. The focus in Asia mostly is
about reassuring allies and countering China. Why not continue to deploy SPMAGTFs
to Europe and the Middle East while shifting some of the CENTCOM ARG/MEU
presence to Asia and Africa? The Marine’s distributed posture in Asia will demand
lots of lift; in Africa, the need might be one or two ships and Marines to work with
special operations forces against terrorists and pirates. A variation of this approach
might be to alternate ARG/MEU and SPMAGTF presence in CENTCOM.

A more structured approach

Our analysis was intended to explore the origins and employment of the ARG/MEU.
Any changes to the ARG/MEU obviously would have to be based on far more careful
study. Below we outline an approach.

 Define the problem. We already have noted the CCDR’s coverage issue, the
fact that the ARG/MEU is a big force for what it generally does, and that the

v
 decades-long practice of deploying the same force to the same regions has
drawbacks. But this step in the process also has to acknowledge other “non-
military” pressures the Marine Corps faces when considering alternatives to
the ARG/MEU.

 Revisit tasks, and capabilities. What capabilities (ground, aviation, and

logistics) are required for what crises? Should the ARG/MEU focus more on
raids vice amphibious assault?

 Revisit SOC. The choices are supporting SOF, substituting for SOF, or a
combination of both. Also, which type of SOF would the ARG/MEU support
(e.g., the “raiders” or Special Forces)?

 Revisit training. Can we trade some predeployment training (PTP) for

presence or MEB training? What training is required for each task? How is 31st
MEU able to truncate the integration phase of PTP?

 Revisit individual assets and prepositioning. Which assets are common to the
broadest range of tasks? What might replace less frequently used assets?
How can pre-positioning reduce risk at the high-end?

 Revisit command and control. What planning, intelligence, and other

personnel and systems should be replicated on each ship to facilitate
distributed operations?

 Consider differences between the ARG/MEU and SPMAGTF. Is the SPMAGTF

redundant or complimentary? Are both forces needed in the same places?

 Consider implications for the Single Force concept. How would changing the
ARG/MEU impact force-scaling?

Final thoughts
The Marine Corps is confronted with an old problem: Balancing the prevalence of
smaller crises against preparedness for more rare larger ones. Combatant
Commanders (CCDRs) may want greater numbers of smaller MAGTFs in more places,
but they might need a more capable force when confronted with a sophisticated
adversary. Thus in many ways the ARG/MEU has been an ideal balance.

The F-35B will force the Marine Corps to revisit this balance. The aircraft will
dramatically improve the warfighting capabilities of the ARG/MEU, but also may
dilute current capacity to respond to more frequent lesser crises. At the same time,
however, there are many opportunities for ensuring the ARG/MEU’s continued
relevance across the conflict spectrum.

vi
This page intentionally left blank.

vii
Contents

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
Background........................................................................................................................... 1
Scope.................................................................................................................................... 2
Caveats ................................................................................................................................ 2
Organization ......................................................................................................................... 2

The MEU..................................................................................................................................... 3
MEUs compared to MEBs/MEFs ....................................................................................... 3
The ARG .............................................................................................................................. 5
Forming and training ARG/MEUs .................................................................................... 5

A brief history .......................................................................................................................... 7

1960s and 70s: Countering Soviet expansion ............................................................... 8
1980s: Growing regional instability ................................................................................ 9
The 1990s: The “peace” dividend and low intensity conflict ................................... 11
2000s: Creating stability in an unstable world ........................................................... 12
Where we are today ......................................................................................................... 14

Balancing identity and relevance ....................................................................................... 15

Expressions of purpose .................................................................................................. 15
Descriptions of amphibious operations ....................................................................... 18
The MEU(SOC) program .................................................................................................. 19
The ESG experiment ........................................................................................................ 22
Has the ARG/MEU really changed? ............................................................................... 23
Key characteristics of the ARG/MEU ............................................................................ 24

ARG/MEU presence ............................................................................................................... 25

Split/disaggregated operations ..................................................................................... 28

ARG/MEU crisis response .................................................................................................... 32

Narrowing the dataset ..................................................................................................... 34
The contexts for ARG/MEU response ........................................................................... 35

viii
 Situations by location...................................................................................................... 36
ARG/MEU responsiveness .............................................................................................. 36
Role in supporting national objectives......................................................................... 38
Full vs. partial MEUs ........................................................................................................ 39
Infantry companies ashore ...................................................................................... 40
The ARG/MEU as enabler................................................................................................ 42
The ARG/MEU (and MEB) as a building block.............................................................. 43
ARG/MEU endurance ....................................................................................................... 45
Importance of the ARG ................................................................................................... 45
Importance of “special” capabilities ............................................................................. 46
Importance of individual MEU assets ........................................................................... 48

Observations and insights ................................................................................................... 50

Thinking differently ........................................................................................................ 51
Separating low and high-end capabilities ............................................................. 52
Different forces for different regions .................................................................... 52
A more structured approach.......................................................................................... 52
Define the problem ................................................................................................... 52
Revisit capabilities and tasks .................................................................................. 55
Revisit training .......................................................................................................... 56
Revisit individual assets and prepositioning ....................................................... 57
Revisit command and control ................................................................................. 57
Consider differences between the ARG/MEU and SPMAGTF ............................. 57
Revisit the building-block approach ...................................................................... 58
Closing thoughts .............................................................................................................. 58
Harder questions ...................................................................................................... 59

Appendix A: ARG/MEU Responses to Crises (1983-2013) ............................................ 60

Appendix B. Amphibious ships presence vs. crisis levels/locations......................... 64

Reference................................................................................................................................. 66

ix
List of Figures
Figure 1. Presence vs. inventory (1990-2003)..................................................................... 26
Figure 2. Amphibious inventory vs. percent of ships deployed (1990–2003)............... 27
Figure 3. Average ARG/MEU deployment duration (1989–2014) .................................... 28
Figure 4. Events involving full or partial ARGs (1983–2013) ........................................... 30
Figure 5. Situations involving ARG/MEUs (1993–2013) .................................................... 35
Figure 6. Crises involving ARG/MEUs by location/type (1984–1993) ............................ 36
Figure 7. ARG/MEU response times in days (1983–2013) ................................................ 37
Figure 8. ARG/MEU role in supporting military objectives (1983-2013) ....................... 38
Figure 9. Situations involving all or most of the MEU (1983–2013) ............................... 39
Figure 10. Rifle companies ashore by ROMO category (1983-2013)............................... 41
Figure 11. MEU/MEB/MEF responses to crises (1982-2013)............................................. 44
Figure 12. Duration of ARG/MEU response (days) (1983-2013) ...................................... 45
Figure 13. When amphibious ships were important (1983-2013) ................................... 46
Figure 14. MEU tasks and the ROMO ................................................................................... 55
Figure 15. Comparison of ARG/MEU and SPMAGT-CR-CC tasks .................................... 58
Figure 16. Amphibious ship presence vs. ARG/MEU events (EUCOM/AFRICOM) ........ 64
Figure 17. Amphibious ship presence vs. ARG/MEU events (CENTCOM) ...................... 65
Figure 18. Amphibious ships presence vs. ARG/MEU events (PACOM) ......................... 65

x
This page intentionally left blank.

xi
List of Tables
Table 1. Comparison of notional MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs (GCE and ACE) ........................ 4
Table 2. MEU lineages and other key dates .......................................................................... 7
Table 3. Different expressions of ARG/MEU capabilities ................................................. 17
Table 4. Evolving USMC descriptions of amphibious operations.................................... 19
Table 5. Changes to ARG/MEU composition ...................................................................... 23
Table 6. An alternative way of viewing ARG/MEU responses .......................................... 33
Table 7. Iraq/Afghanistan events excluded from our analysis ....................................... 34
Table 8. Frequency of ARG/MEU amphibious operations (1983-2013).......................... 42
Table 9. Evolution of SOC tasks for the MEU ..................................................................... 47

xii
This page intentionally left blank.

xiii
Glossary
AAV Assault Amphibious Vehicle
ACE Aviation Combat Element
AFRICOM Africa Command
ARG Amphibious Ready Group
ARG/MEU Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit
BLT Battalion Landing Team
CAR Central African Republic
CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CE Command Element
CENTCOM Central Command
CINC Commander in Chief
COB Close Quarters Battle
CONUS Continental United States
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CPXs Command Post Exercises
CQB Close Quarters Battle
CRO Clandestine Recovery Operations
DA Direct Action
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group
EUCOM European Command
FCE Forward Command Element
FDNF Forward-Deployed Naval Force
FMFLANT Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic
CCDR Geographic Combatant Command
GCE Ground Combat Element
GOPLAT Gas and Oil Platform
GPF General Purpose Forces
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps
IHR In-Extremis Hostage Rescue
LAR Light Armored Reconnaissance
LCAC Landing Cushion Air Craft
MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAF Marine Amphibious Force
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

xiv
MARSOC Marine Corps Special Operations Command
MARSOF Marine Special Operations Force
MAU Marine Amphibious Unit
MCDP Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
MCO Marine Corps Order
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MET Mission Essential Task
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEU(SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MEF Marine Expeditionary Unit
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force
MRF Maritime Raid Force
MSALT Marine Survey and Liaison Team
MSE Major Subordinate Element
MSPF Maritime Special Purpose Force
MSSG MEU Service Support Group
NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NORTHCOM Northern Command
O-FRP Optimized Fleet Response Plan
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
QRF Quick Reaction Force
OPNAVINST OPNAV Instruction
PACOM Pacific Command
PEI Principle End Item
POTUS President of the United States
R&S Reconnaissance and Surveillance
RLT Regimental Landing Team
SD Specialized Demolition
SEAL Sea-Air-Land
SLF7F Special Landing Force Seventh Fleet
SOC Special Operations Capable
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOFLE Special Operations Liaison Element
SOUTHCOM Southern Command
SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force
TRAP Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TSC Theater Security Cooperation
WESTPAC Western Pacific

xv
xvi
Introduction
The Marine Corps’ signature organizational construct is the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF), a reinforced infantry unit with aviation and logistics assets. For much
of the Corps’ recent history there have been three varieties: the Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU). The smallest of the three, the MEU is the only MAGTF routinely embarked
on amphibious ready group (ARG) ships and forward-deployed. We wanted to know
more about why the ARG/MEU was created, how it has evolved, and ways it has been
used. We use this to inform future discussions about how the ARG/MEU might
evolve.1 Other CNA-initiated analyses have addressed similar aspects of the MEB [1, 4]
and the Special Purpose (SP) MAGTF [2]. We assume the reader has some familiarity
with the Marine Corps and MAGTF organizations and operations.

Background
One reasons for taking a closer look at the ARG/MEU is the current roles-and-
missions debate. Such discussions have followed every U.S. conflict and, after nearly
a decade of land wars, some are again questioning whether the U.S. will ever again
conduct large-scale opposed amphibious operations. Others doubt the viability of
amphibious warfare in future crises due to advancements in anti-access/area denial
(A2AD) technology. The Marine Corps’ participation in this dialogue has taken many
forms: focused working groups, concept papers, articles, editorials, exercises, and
war games. Little has been spared in these discussions, but MEUs largely have
escaped scrutiny.

Another reason is that the Navy is not planning on increasing the current inventory
of amphibious ships. At the same time the Corps has established rotations of
forward-based SPMAGTFs that might compete for such lift.

1
An earlier version of this paper was published under the title, “Historical ARG/MEU
Employment. [3]” This paper provides a little more context for some of the ARG/MEU changes
as well as a way to think about future ARG/MEUs.

1
Scope
ARG/MEUs spend only a fraction of deployed time responding to crises. The rest of
the time ARG/MEUs are transiting, conducting training, exercising with allied or
partner countries, calling at ports, or simply being present. We focused solely on
responses to real-world events.

We mainly used designated (named) operations since they are more fully
documented. Post-deployment briefs and other source material routinely mention
activities that could have been included but lacked detail. Missions like “theater
reserve,” though an important ARG/MEU role, were too vague. Nevertheless we
believe the data to be representative.

The MEU has operated as a land force independent of the ARG throughout much of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The MEU contributed to these efforts, but we
wanted to better understand the importance of ARG/MEU in other situations.

Caveats
It is very difficult to fully capture the complexity of ARG/MEU operations and to
distinguish the efficacy of the whole from the individual parts. But this should not be
an excuse to ignore what data there are and the insights they may provide.

Our understanding of all of the factors that have influenced Marine Corps thinking
over the years and how the ARG/MEU is reflected in that thinking is incomplete. We
hope instead to provide a flavor of some of the dynamics and pressures with the
realization that the full story contains far more nuance

We did not evaluate the dollar costs of creating and deploying ARG/MEUs to the
alternatives.

Organization
The first part of the paper provides a brief history of the MEU. The second section
offers more detail on the evolution of the MEU’s purpose, missions, and specialized
capabilities. We use that to develop a generalized set of characteristics the Marine
Corps has used to describe the ARG/MEU. In the third and fourth sections we
examine which of these characteristics are supported by employment data. We end
with alternative ways of thinking about the future ARG/MEU. Several appendices
provide amplifying detail.

2
The MEU
Like all MAGTFs, the MEU consists a headquarters coupled with ground, air, and
logistics elements [5]. The command element (CE) executes command and control
functions such as planning, communications, and intelligence. Augments include
reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and other specialized capabilities.

The ground combat element (GCE) is built around an infantry battalion of three line
companies and one weapons company reinforced with reconnaissance, scout sniper,
tanks, light armor, amphibious assault, artillery, and engineering assets. As an
augmented seaborne force, the GCE is referred to as a battalion landing team (BLT).

The air combat element (ACE) is a composite of a full squadron of medium lift MV-
22s and detachments of heavy lift CH-53s helicopters, utility (UH-1) and attack
helicopters (AH-1), and light attack jets (AV-8Bs). The size of the detachments can
vary depending on expected mission and other factors. Two KC-130 aerial
refueling/transport aircraft are “tethered” to the MEU during deployments to move
parts, equipment, and personnel over long distances.

The combat logistics element (CLE) provides supply, maintenance, transportation,

and other services to the MEU beyond the organic capabilities of the other elements.

The MEU is “self-sustaining” for 15 days.

MEUs compared to MEBs/MEFs

The MEU essentially duplicates MEB and MEF-sized units in smaller scale. Table 1
illustrates the differences in scale of the GCE and ACE. The numbers for the MEB are
from the 2024 Baseline MEB [6].

3
Table 1. Comparison of notional MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs (GCE and ACE)

Not all MEUs are created equal.2 East and West coast MEUs are more uniform, while,
the 31st MEU based in Okinawa differs in the types of equipment it embarks, how it is
created, and the length of deployments. 31st MEU has no tanks, but carries more
small boats than its counterparts. Many of the units that make up the BLT are rotated
from CONUS twice a year. Finally, rather than deploy for six months or more at time,
31st MEU typically conducts two four-month patrols annually [8].

MEBs and MEFs vary dramatically in size; MEBs have been as small as 600 personnel
and as large as 20,000 and are commanded by a Brigadier or Major General [1]. The
current “baseline” or notional MEB consists of about 17,000 personnel and serves as
the basis for determining the minimum number of amphibious ships (38) needed to
lift the assault echelons of two MEBs [9]. The Navy and Marine Corps agree on this
number, but have “accepted risk” with a fleet of about 30 ships. I MEF, the largest of
the Corps’ three MEFs, is commanded by a Lieutenant General and has more than
50,000 personnel [10].

Another way to think about MEBs and MEFs is as command elements. Sometimes a
Marine general officer is desired independent of the size of the force. That helps

2
The differences largely are in how the Marine Corps sources III MEF [7].

4
account for the significant variation in MEBs [1]. As the size of the force approaches
the level commanded by any one of the MEF’s major subordinate commands, a MEF
commander typically takes over.

The ARG
MEUs deploy on amphibious ships, and the modern ARG has three ships: an
amphibious assault ship, or “big deck” (LHD or LHA), an amphibious transport dock
(LPD), and a dock landing ship (LSD). ARGs are commanded by an amphibious
squadron (PHIPBRON) commander (a Navy Captain). At times a Navy admiral may
embark as the amphibious group (PHIBGRU) commander.

Most of the MEU’s aircraft and aircraft maintenance capability are on the big deck,
but the LPD can also carry helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft. The LSD has a small
flight deck, but no hanger. The GCE and LCE are split between all three ships and the
configuration can change depending on specific ships available within each class and
mission demands.

While the ships of the ARG were designed for conducting amphibious operations,
they have evolved largely to meet the needs of the MEU operating together as a whole
entity. That means that while there is some flexibility in what Marines and equipment
are loaded, there are limitations; these become important when the commanders of
the ARG/MEU face different threats and/or are directed to operate the ships
independently.

Forming and training ARG/MEUs

U.S.-based MEUs follow a deliberate 18-month deployment cycle—six months to
reconstitute following the most recent deployment, six months of for pre-
deployment training (PTP), and six months deployed. The PTP phase is broken down
into three phases—basic, intermediate, and advanced—to “enable the ARG/MEU to
fully realize its inherent combat power [11].” The key is for the individual MAGTF
elements to learn to work as one and for the PHIBRON and MEU staffs to develop
relationships and confidence [12].

31st MEU is a mix of forward-based and rotational forces. The ships are permanently
forward-deployed in Sasebo, Japan. The infantry battalion of the GCE deploys for six
months from the West Coast as part of the Unit Deployment Program (UDP), while
the remainder of the BLT’s ground units (artillery, assault amphibious, light armored
reconnaissance, and combat engineer platoon) are garrisoned on Okinawa. All of the
ACE aircraft are based in Japan (Okinawa or Iwakuni), but the pilots for some rotate

5
at six-month intervals from California. The LCE and most of the command element
are based on Okinawa.

Force rotations leave only about three weeks for the entire 31st MEU to reconstitute,
and the integration phase of training (where the MEU and the ARG start to work
together) often occurs at the front-end of the actual deployment [8].

Regardless of these differences, all ARG/MEUs undergo a series of mission

competency exercises before deploying.

6
 A brief history
There currently are seven numbered MEUs.3 Table 1 depicts the lineage of today’s
MEUs.

Table 2. MEU lineages and other key dates

1960 1962 1967 1970 1971 1976 1977 1979 1982 1984 1985 1987 1988-
MCO
CMC Order East 3
describes 3120.3 Coast standin
different defines MEU MAU g MEU
MAGTFs MEU MEU HQs established as required (SOC) rotation CEs Perm. CEs
Temporary
act. as
17th MAU Redesignated as 11th MAU 11th MEU
13th MAU act.,
second MEU(SOC) 13th MEU
Act. as
15th
Temporary activation as 15th MAU through 70s and 80s MAU 15th MEU
Temporary activations as 32d Redesignated as 32d MAU and activated for Redesignated as 22d MAU, third 22nd
MEU continuous ops MEU(SOC) (1986) MEU
Temporary activations as LF-
Caribbean and later as 34th 34th Deac
MEU for ex/ ops in Med and MAU tivat Reactivated for Redesignated as 24th MAU, first
Caribbean act. ed continuous ops MEU(SOC) (1985) 24th MEU
Temporarily
activated as Activated as
26th MAU permanent HQs 26th MEU
1967: SLF Alpha activated 31st MEU
1970: Redesignated as SLF Bravo, then SLF Alpha, then 31st MAU (1970) Deactivat react. In
1970s: Routine deployments as 31st MAU in WESTPAC, Indian Ocean, and Med ed 1992

The first mention we found of the MEU was a 1960 Marine Corps Gazette article on
the Marine Corps Commandant’s (CMC) decision to designate air-ground teams as
MEUs, MEBs, MEFs, and the Amphibious Corps [14]. Marine Corps Order (MCO)

3
While Marines have operated from ships since the founding of the Corps as part of the ships’
company, it wasn’t until 1947 that the U.S. began to do so regularly. The first deployments
found Marines embarked aboard cruisers, battleships, and destroyers [13].

7
3120.3, in which CMC outlined Marine Corps policy on the organization of MAGTFs,
followed in 1962 [15].4 The MCO emphasized the “close integration of air and ground
operations” and the need for a separate headquarters to coordinate them. Under
each CE would be a GCE, ACE, and MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). The MCO
further recognized that the impermanence of these separate headquarters was a
limitation. The Marine Corps would address this in subsequent years.

Neither the Gazette article nor MCO mention the conceptual basis for the four levels
of MAGTFs. The rationale later was described as a building-block approach within a
“Single Force” (or composite MAGTF) concept, where a MEU or MEUs can form a MEB
and/or multiple MEBs to make a MEF [12].

The impetus behind ARG/MEU then and now was the need for a present and
responsive force. During the Cold War it was a force that could counterbalance Soviet
influence and later to address the byproducts of regional turmoil [16]. Since the
1990s it has been a force for uncertainty in an unstable world.

The ARG/MEU has changed over the years as the result of desires to enhance
capacity, cohesion, and relevance. Together these changes have greatly improved
ARG/MEU capabilities. But the ARG/MEU’s story is not just about a capability for a
crisis. It is closely linked to roles and missions debates during periods of austerity
and expansion, recurring doubts about the wisdom of opposed amphibious
operations, and the operating concepts and technologies to overcome those doubts.
What we found is a narrative of the Service’s best guess about the capabilities and
capacity it felt was needed and how that guess has played out in crises.

1960s and 70s: Countering Soviet expansion

ARG/MEUs were created as needed as a response to growing Soviet influence and
small crises [17]. The 32nd and 34th MEUs were deployed from the East Coast
episodically for exercises and operations in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. In the
Western Pacific, Seventh Fleet established a near-continuous forward-deployed
amphibious capability in 1960 that consisted of a BLT called Special Landing Force
Seventh Fleet (SLF7F) and ARG Alpha. According to one source, SLF7F was to be a
theater reserve, but also was ready to respond to crises elsewhere in Southeast Asia
[18].

4
That order references CMC ltr AO3H-jeb of 31 May 1960, on which the Gazette article
presumably was based.

8
Seventh Fleet added a second landing force (on ARG Bravo) in the late 1960s to
increase the fleet’s capacity for operations in Vietnam.5 The term “MEU” was changed
to Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) over sensitivities about the French use of the term
“expeditionary” for their forces in Vietnam and its connotation of colonialism or
permanence [1]. SLF7F was re-designated as a MAU in 1972. The size of the ARG
varied from two to five vessels, and the ships mostly transported Japan-based
Marines to and from exercises, seldom operating together.

Each of the command elements were drawn from MAB and MAF headquarters and
thus lacked habitual relationships with subordinate MEU elements. For most of the
first two decades of the ARG/MEUs existence, at most two ARG/MEUs were deployed
at any one time, and then only by coincidence.

Defense spending dropped and the Marine Corps downsized at the end of the
Vietnam War [4]. The concurrent shift from a two major war strategy to a one-war
strategy left the Marine Corps needing to justify its endstrength; they did so in part
by advertising “the very real capabilities of the MAB to NATO and to a congressional
audience [20].” Two MEUs were permanently activated in the later 1970s.

The Marine Corps fielded MEBs several times throughout the 1960s, sometimes as
advanced elements of MEFs. During a non-combatant evacuation (NEO) in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, the MEB comprised a MEU and other forces, and the
commanding officer of the MEU was designated as the regimental landing team (RLT)
commander [1]. To execute the evacuation of Americans and refugees from Vietnam
in 1975, 9th MEB was created by compositing three MAUs, with a MAU commander for
each subordinate functional element.

1980s: Growing regional instability

The 1980s were most notable for conflict in the Middle East including the failed
rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. A few years later a suicide bomber blew up the Marine
barracks in Beirut where a MEU had been deployed to keep the peace during the
Lebanese civil war. The mutual targeting of oil tankers by Iraq and Iran later in the
mid-1980s was another reminder of the nation’s interests in the region (mostly oil).
Whereas the ARG/MEUs focus had been the Western Pacific and Mediterranean, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff would increasingly direct them to the Indian Ocean and North
Arabian Gulf [21].

5
These MEUs conducted numerous amphibious landings during the war [19].

9
The Marine Corps expanded significantly during the Reagan military build-up, taking
advantage of the funding climate to recover structure it had lost the previous decade
[20]. At least three factors justified the expansion. One was the prevailing view that
we were moving away from big wars to smaller regional crises. This argued for
greater presence, and the ability to quickly deploy and assimilate follow-on forces.
The tragedy in the Iranian desert argued for more special operations forces and
better coordination between them and conventional forces.

The answer to the problem of quickly deploying forces was the MEB, which was
thought to be more appropriate than MEFs for the growing threat of regional crises,
and by prepositioning brigade-equipment sets ashore and afloat.6 Six standing MEB
headquarters were created to rectify “the old problem of relying too much on hastily
constituted, ad hoc command elements formed at a time of crisis [20].”

The forward presence problem was addressed by activating additional MEUs and by
establishing routine deployment cycles from both coasts. Between 1987 and 1992,
the Marine Corps stood-up the current seven permanent MEU command elements.
The Marine Corps also resurrected the term “expeditionary” to emphasize that the
Marine Corps would be capable of a wide spectrum of operations in littoral areas
around the world.

Meanwhile, the LKAs, LPHs and LSTs started phasing out in favor of LPDs and LSDs.
These larger and more capable ships would lead to the standard three-ship
configuration common today. Four of these ships ultimately would be based in Japan
to provide near continuous presence in the Western Pacific. Finally, more advanced
connectors like the LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushioned) were added and an AV-8B
detachment was tethered (on call) to the MEU when forward-deployed [23].

The Marine Corps, however, did more than add MEUs and newer equipment; they
created a MEU capable of conducting select maritime special operations. This would
be the Corps’ contribution to the increasing prevalence of non-state actors and their
terrorist and asymmetric tactics. The result was a transition from a largely
conventional force for conventional threats to one also capable of executing select
maritime special operations.

6
The conceptual underpinnings for this thinking were embodied in the “composite MAGTF” or
“Single Force” concept, where smaller MAGTFs could be combined to build larger MAGTFs, each
smaller unit enabling the next larger force [22]. An Advanced Amphibious Study Group was
tasked with developing and communicating the doctrinal aspects of this new concept. Their
July 1985 report described a new MAGTF building block approach that the Marine Corps would
adopt to ensure a rapid and sequential flow of combat ready forces into a theater of
operations.

10
The 1990s: The “peace” dividend and low
intensity conflict
The 1990s were unsettling years for the military. Defense spending dropped after the
Soviet Union imploded and the Services again had to justify what they did and the
share of dollars they should receive to do it. This meant making tough structure
choices as planners tried to divine what would replace the order imposed by decades
of Soviet-American competition. While there had been a certain tamping down of
disruptive forces, there was still uncertainty. But much more was to come. This
argued even more strongly for peacetime engagement and crisis response.

In his 1994 Naval War College thesis, LCDR Granger (USN) summarized the major
security shifts that accompanied the end of the Cold War.

…the most significant change in the past forty years has been the
virtual disappearance of the single overarching security threat that
has defined theater force requirements. Todays’ focus of effort has
changed completely from that of containing a coordinated
conventional Soviet threat backed by nuclear weapons to the dizzying
array of low intensity conflicts and operations-other-than-war in
areas around the world. An analysis of U.S. military involvement over
the past decade has reinforced this transition of our national security
policy and strategy to one of peacetime engagement and discriminate
response through forward presence and regional crisis response [17].

Even more prescient was Martin van Crevald, quoted in Maj Suddreth’s 1996
Command and Staff College thesis.

In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom
we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will
undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their
organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather
than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by "professionalism"
than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties [22].

Amid this kind of thinking, CMC General Gray chartered the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force Master Plan to establish the operational foundation for mid-range force
development (1992-2002) [11].7 The results reflected an emphasis on operations at

7
The working group was actually established in 1989.

11
the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The Marine Corps was no longer able to
afford the additional MEB headquarters structure and they were eliminated.

Around the same time the Navy published From the Sea, heralding a “fundamental
shift” away from open-ocean warfighting to joint operations in the littorals. This
flowed from the contraction of the vast network of overseas bases required to
maintain forward presence as well as the political constraints imposed by host
nations. Future naval forces instead would exploit the natural freedom of
international waters to project and sustain power from the sea.

The Marine Corps’ analog was Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and the
“associated tactic” of Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) [24]. These were creative
updates to earlier sea-basing and vertical envelopment concepts that emerged after
World War II over doubts about future D-Day-like operations. Those same doubts
coupled with emerging anti-ship threats had driven investment in aircraft like the
MV-22, the high-speed replacement for the AAV, and even the Joint Strike Fighter [7].

The Corps also began to formally experiment and innovate, standing up the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab in 1995 to explore these new amphibious warfighting
concepts and technologies [25].

Throughout the decade, ARG/MEUs played important roles in countering instability

in North Africa and Southern Europe, especially in Somalia and Kosovo. They also
responded to events in no fewer than eight other African countries, some of them
deep within the continent like Congo, the Central African Republic, and Rwanda.8
Finally, ARG/MEUs helped enforce sanctions against Iraq and bring stability to East
Timor in the Western Pacific.

With the transition from the LPH to the larger LHD/LHA class ships, AV-8Bs became a
more or less permanent fixture. Whereas special operations had gotten the attention
of the Marine Corps the previous decade, competition over declining defense dollars
would shine a bright light on the Marine’s role in this area. We discuss this in greater
detail in the next section.

2000s: Creating stability in an unstable world

War in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated this decade and ARG/MEUs played important
roles – as the first conventional forces on the ground in Afghanistan, as part of the

8
The combat in Mogadishu (Somalia) in particular, would lead the Services to focus intently on
operations in urban environments.

12
Iraq invasion force, and subsequently as an augment to enduring stabilization
efforts. In this capacity the ARG/MEU was much like a utility force or jack-of-all-
trades, but it also was available to respond to other crises throughout the world
when much of the U.S. military was embroiled in the Middle East.

Military thinking at this point was firmly focused on ways of dealing with the “savage
wars of peace.” Rather than just being present, the military could conduct activities
that might prevent conflict through engagement and by building partnership
capacity. Military forces had been doing this for decades, but such activities were
now cast as potentially creating stability and assuring access to deal with instability.
The targeting of terrorists and violent extremists also was a growth industry.
According to the Marine Corps’ 2006 Operating Concepts for a Changing Security
Environment:

Sea-based Naval forces can assist the host nation by training security
forces, assisting in the provision or restoration of essential services
and infrastructure, enhancing economic development, and
conducting related information operations in order to establish an
environment that promotes governance and enables social, economic
and political development. Doing so will require an increased ability
to interact with host nation forces and indigenous populations;
improved language capability and cultural awareness; increased
ability to conduct foreign military/internal defense training; more
capable small units led by mature noncommissioned officers; the
addition of construction engineer capabilities; and more health
services capability.

Some of the implications of having to function in this new world was reinforced in an
update to the MOC in 2010 [26]:

The basic building block of our MAGTF, the Marine expeditionary unit
(MEU), has rarely, if ever, deployed all desired assets within the space
constraints of amphibious shipping. Commanders are challenged
with configuring the force with a greater emphasis on space
constraints as opposed to strictly on mission analysis. Thus, there is
a requirement to tailor MAGTFs for the most likely missions while
accepting risk against the least probable.

Whether these concepts led to or reflected new behavior is less important than the
fact that the ARG/MEU had to adapt. Ships and Marines increasingly spent much of
their deployments geographically separated and responding to an increasingly
diverse set of crises, at times simultaneously.

In the mid-2000s, the MV-22 began replacing the CH-46s as the core of the ACE,
greatly expanding the 200-mile combat radius of the helicopters to over 1,000 miles

13
[27]. The Marine Corps is still thinking through the full-range of capabilities that the
aircraft offers. Around the same time the Marine Corps yielded to growing pressure
to establish its own special operations branch.

Where we are today

The atmosphere that accompanied the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan was again alarming to the Marine Corps. Defense Secretary Gates’ fired
one of the first shots when he publicly cast doubt on the need to ever again land
large numbers of Marines and soldiers against a well-defended beach and cancelled
the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) program, a high-speed replacement for the
aging AAV [28]. Defense budgets fell and endstrength decreased. In 2011 the Navy
eliminated one of three MPF squadrons and additional amphibious ships. The Navy
and Air Force, for whom OIF and OEF had not been as all-consuming, were focused
on the threat of advanced A2AD technologies, leaving the Marine Corps and Army to
explain how they also could be part of the solution.

At the same time the world envisioned by van Crevald was unfolding. Iraq and
Afghanistan are now dominated by ideological conflict and similar dynamics are
playing out in the rest of the Middle East, the Levant, and Central Africa with the
Arab/Winter Springs and rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Marine
Corps adopted a two-front response, one focused on renewed innovation and the
other on the utility of amphibious warfare, by:

 Creating an Amphibious Capabilities Warfare Group (ACWG) and

subsequently the Ellis Group to study amphibious warfare in future conflicts.

 Shrinking the size of the amphibious MEB and debating the possibility of
bringing back standing MEB headquarters.

 Exploring alternative platforms for embarking Marines, such as surface

combatants, high-speed vessels, the maritime landing platform (MLP), and
allied amphibious ships, as well as the potential reactivation of previously
mothballed and antiquated amphibious ships.

 Deploying land-based SPAMGTFs to Europe, the Middle East, and South

America.

In the next section we explore some of the challenges the Marine Corps faced in
adapting the ARG/MEU to changes in the budget and security environment.

14
Balancing identity and relevance
The ARG/MEU was conceived as a conventional forward presence and crisis response
force and it remains largely so today [29]. However, evolving security needs created
pressure to upgrade ARG/MEU capabilities. These adaptations were reflected in
expressions of the MEU’s purpose, missions, and descriptions of amphibious
operations. The SOC program was one of the more significant changes, but they all
were intended to ensure the relevance of the ARG/MEU.

Expressions of purpose
MCOs establish, modify, or clarify policy. Between 1962 when MEUs were first
articulated and 1985, there was one order. Over the subsequent years the
Commandant would publish no fewer than six, each motivated by the need to explain
one change or another and/or concern that the combatant commanders (CCDRs)
weren’t “getting the MEU.”

The earliest reference we found to the ARG/MEU’s purpose is in a quote from Sir B.
H. Liddell Hart’s Deterrent of Defense (1960) contained in Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication (MCDP) 1-0:

An amphibious force of modern type, operating from the sea and

equipped with helicopters, is free from dependence on airfields,
beaches, ports, land-bases—with all their logistical and political
complications. The use of an airborne force, or of a land-based force,
is a more irrevocable step, since its commitment is more definite and
its withdrawal more difficult. A self-contained and sea-based
amphibious force, of which the U.S. Marine Corps is the prototype, is
the best kind of fire-extinguisher—because of its flexibility, reliability,
logistic simplicity, and relative economy…. Amphibious flexibility is
the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses [5].

When the services were downsizing and restructuring after the Cold War,
Commandant Mundy published MCO 3120.8A (1992), acknowledging that there may
be better ways to organize and describe what the MEU provides to the unified
commanders, highlighting the Corps’ efforts to institute an aggressive SOC training
program to allow “a MAGTF to execute the full range of conventional and selected

15
maritime special operations missions [30].” Yet the Corps’ views of the MEU
continued to closely resemble those Hart expressed in 1960:

A deployed MEU is a vital element of our National Military Strategy

requirement to maintain a capable forward presence. It is capable of
conducting amphibious operations of limited duration, acting as an
advance force for a larger follow-on MAGTF and providing an
immediate response capability to a wide spectrum of
crises/contingencies by conducting maritime-oriented missions [5].

A subsequent MCO published in 1994 was driven by continuing changes in the

security environment and the recurring need to update Marine policy regarding the
MEU(SOC) program [31]. While the order used familiar words to describe the purpose
of the MEU as a “self-sustained, amphibious, combined-arms air-ground task force
capable of selected maritime special operations,” it also stated that, “[t]he
amphibious raid is the primary focus of the deployed MEU.” This appeared to re-
emphasize conventional operations. The 1997 update to MEU(SOC) policy similarly
noted that the MEU would have one basic mission: “to plan for and conduct those
conventional and maritime operations assigned…” [31].9

The Marine Corps would again update MEU policy in 2001 to reflect the shift in
emphasis toward low intensity conflict embodied by the term “military operations
other than war,” and to emphasize “the continued utility of the MEU in assisting
“joint force commanders in integrating complementary capabilities of assigned
forces” to meet the new challenge.

Other MEU(SOC) orders published in 2009 and 2012 were needed to ensure “a
common understanding within the United States Marine Corps, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands when addressing MEU and MEU(SOC)
missions, characteristics, and capabilities.” The 2009 order was motivated by the
earlier establishment of MARSOC (in 2008), the short-lived deployment of MARSOF
with MEUs, and to clarify the fact that the SOC in MEU was embarked MARSOF.

Expressions of capabilities

9
We were not able to get a copy of this Order, but it is quoted extensively in Love, “An Analysis
of the Twenty-Nine Capabilities of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable)” [31].

16
Each of the orders noted above also described what the MEU was capable of doing.
Table 3 provides a sample from each of the past three decades. There are several
others we didn’t include [17, 29-30, 32-38].

Table 3. Different expressions of ARG/MEU capabilities

MCO 3120.9 MCO 3120.9B MCO 3502.9B

1994 2001 2012
Conventional capabilities Core capabilities Conventional capabilities
Amphibious raid Amphibious ops Amphibious Operations
NEO Maritime special ops Amphibious raid
Military ops other than war
Show of force Amphibious assault
(MOOTW)
Reinforcement Supporting ops Maritime interdiction ops
Security ops Essential Tasks Advance force ops
Training teams Amphibious assault Support to other operations
Civic action, HA/DR Amphibious raid NEO
Fire support planning/control Amphibious demonstration Humanitarian assistance
Counterintelligence Amphibious withdrawal Stability ops
Initial terminal guidance Direct action ops TRAP
Electronic warfare TRAP Joint/combined ops
Aviation ops from
MOUT/enhanced urban Security ops
expeditionary airfields
C4I Humanitarian/disaster relief Theater Security Cooperation
Ingress/egress NEO Airfield/port seizure ops
st
Locate/fix enemy Peace ops Add’l 31 MEU capabilities
Engage enemy C4 Small boat raid (31st MEU)
R2P2 Fire support planning SOC
Joint force interop Limited exped. airfield ops Direct action ops
Tactical deception Enhanced urban ops FID
Airfield/port seizure Enabling ops Special recon
SOC Airfield/port seizure ops
In-extremis hostage rescue Non-lethal weapons
TRAP Tactical deception ops
Clandestine recovery Information ops
GOPLAT Intel, surveillance, recon (ISR)
Direct action Anti-terrorism
Close quarters battle (CQB) R2P2

17
 MCO 3120.9 MCO 3120.9B MCO 3502.9B
1994 2001 2012
Specialized demo
Clandestine R&S
Maritime interdiction ops
(MIO)
Visit, Board, Search, Seize
(VBSS)

Between 1994 and 2012, MEU missions were consolidated from 29 to 13. A closer
look at the individual tasks, however, suggests that earlier MEUs were capable of
doing largely the same thing as later MEUs; GOPLAT and VBSS in 2004 are what
“MIO” was in 2012. Certain other tasks like in-extremis hostage rescue were deleted.
Mostly though, what had changed was whether the task was special or not, and if
special, who would conduct it. [17]. Curiously, 31st MEU, the most ad hoc of MEUs
and the one with the shortest pre-deployment work-up, actually has one more task
than the other MEUs.

Changes to missions and tasks may have obscured rather than clarified what
ARG/MEUs do. As one author noted, the evolution of MEU missions, particularly
those associated with SOC capabilities, “confuses CINC staffs, Naval commanders (to
whom they are embarked and work for), and allies whom they exercise with [17].”

Descriptions of amphibious operations

While all operations from ships are amphibious, the Marine Corps traditionally has
thought of these operations as assaults or raids. The definition now encompasses a
wider variety of actions taken from ships.

The evolution of the term “amphibious operations” reflected an expanded set of

specialized capabilities that allowed the MEU not only to project forces onto a hostile
shore, but into a hostile environment. For example, the 2001 MEU(SOC) order
described amphibious operations as a core MEU(SOC) capability, and defined them as
“an attack launched from the sea … on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.…” Tasks
relating to this role were assaults, raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals. In the
2009 order, the description of amphibious operations was simultaneously limited to
assaults and raids and expanded to include maritime interdiction operations (MIO)

18
and advance force operations—the latter to better understand/shape the battlespace
in preparation for the main assault.10

Marine Corps doctrine published in 2011 added “support to other operations” to the
description of amphibious operations. Presumably this was to capture all of the other
things ARG/MEUs were capable of doing (or were doing) from amphibious ships,
such as theater security cooperation. This “other” category had been a part of joint
doctrine since at least 2001 [39]. Table 4 summarizes these changes.

Table 4. Evolving USMC descriptions of amphibious operations

2001 2009 2012

Assaults Assaults Assaults
Raids Raids Raids
Demonstrations
Withdrawals
Advanced force ops Advanced force ops
Other supporting ops

The MEU(SOC) program

The Marine Corps began laying the foundations for the MEU(SOC) program in 1984,
and started to train and certify MEUs to deploy with the SOC designation soon after
[7] The push into special operations began several years earlier after the failed
attempt to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran, which led Defense Secretary Weinberger to
direct the services to develop expertise to meet current and future low-intensity and
terrorist threats [13].

CMC responded by tasking Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (FMFLANT) to assess

potential Marine Corps contributions. Commander, FMFLANT (LtGen Gray, who
would soon become CMC) concluded that the Corps was well-positioned to conduct
special operations in a maritime environment. General Gray ultimately created a
program in which MEUs would be trained and evaluated on 18 special operations
missions (in addition to their existing conventional missions) over a 26-week period

10
MIO was known earlier as Maritime Interception Operations.

19
[31].11 Those who passed would deploy with the SOC qualification. As Maj Lawrence
Nicholson noted in his Command and General Staff College thesis, ”What was
intended was to make the MEUs more capable, lethal, and, most of all, responsive to
a wider variety of crises than before” [13]. Over the next 25 years the majority of
MEUs deployed SOC-qualified.12

To realize these new capabilities, the Marine Corps developed the Maritime Special
Purpose Force (MSPF), a specialized subunit drawn from the rest of the MEU [36]. The
core of the MSPF was the Force Reconnaissance platoon, augmented with command,
assault, security, reconnaissance and surveillance, and support elements [40]. From
1986 to 2005, the MSPF, along with embarked Navy SEALs, would be the SOC in
MEU(SOC).13

Instead of creating a capability that would fall under SOCOM, the Marine Corps’
forces remained separate. Rather than object, SOCOM was mainly interested in the
potential use of amphibious ships, “interest that has remained given increased force
protection considerations and the greater potential for denied basing and staging
rights in certain areas of the world” [41].

As the use of SOF increased, and under pressure from Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, the Marine Corps began fielding its own special operations personnel in
2005 and formally established Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
in 2008, largely with Force Reconnaissance personnel [41]. That meant these Marines
would not be available for MEU deployments.

To keep the SOC designation, the Corps defined the MEU as being SOC when MARSOF
were deployed with it [37]. This did not work out too well since SOCOM viewed
MARSOF as its own asset (as it did the SEALs), and more often than not the units
were pulled from the ARG/MEU once in theater [42]. Following a high-profile rescue
of the American captain of the Maersk Alabama from Somali pirates by national
mission forces, the Marine Corps established the Maritime Raid Force (MRF).14 The

11
There is some evidence that the PTP portion of the cycle before this time was two-months,
but was extended to six months to accomplish the more specialized training.
12
Trying to determine whether all MEU’s deployed as SOC-qualified between 1985 and 2005
was difficult. In some references, all MEUs continue to carry the designation.
13
According to MCO 3120.9B, the MEU(SOC) was required to demonstrate interoperability with
the embarked Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (SEALs) prior to deploying. Other sources
suggest that the SEALs stopped deploying with MEUs shortly before 2001.
14
According to some, the genesis of the MRF was CNO concern that national mission forces
might not be available in similar future situations.

20
Marine Corps and SOCOM have since agreed that a special operations liaison element
(SOFLE) will embark select MEUs to facilitate integration of MEU and SOF elements.

The MEU/SOC program was heavily debated both within and outside the Marine
Corps.15 External critics wondered how Marines could claim proficiency in complex
missions like hostage rescue (and simultaneously many others) when entire SOF
units existed solely for this purpose [17].

Marines expressed two different concerns. One was that the training demands on the
MSPF for Direct Action and other “special missions” made them unavailable to
support the development of conventional reconnaissance capabilities, degrading the
effectiveness of the BLT [7, 43]. The workaround was to use SEAL and scout/sniper
platoons. A Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center analysis of the MEU’s
noted the struggles to “balance the competing interests of conventional and
MEU(SOC) training” [7]. Others argued that the MEU(SOC) program had become
specialized to the point where it was no longer capable of conducting enabling
missions in support of the Single Force concept [12]

Some Marines also criticized the SOC program as a distraction from more general
preparations for large-scale amphibious operations, or for simply being confusing.
One author observed that PTP increasingly was focused on passing the SOC
certification exercise rather than providing a capability suited to CCDR requirements
[7]. Another pointed out that “although Marines remain rhetorically dedicated to
amphibious principles,” priorities clearly have “shifted to the raiding capabilities of
forward deployed MEUs” [44].16 The same article cited then-BGen Newbold, a former
MEU commander, as saying, “while the Corps can offer a wide range of forces on
short notice to construct a professional crisis response force…they are not packaged,
trained, examined, or known in ways that make them the logical choice for
expeditionary action.”

True or not, the Marine Corps very much understood the growing importance of
counter-terrorism and the SOCOM’s dominance in this area. Yet the MEU’s potential
role in such activities was altered by the removal of MARSOF from MEUs. Rather than

15
The intensity of that debate was reflected in the 1998 Gazette’s editorial summarizing
arguments for and against the MEU(SOC) concept that appeared in more than two dozen
articles published between 1996 and 1997.
In this case the authors’ refer to the Marine Corps Raiders of World War II and later conflicts
16

who conducted guerrilla-like operations behind enemy lines.

21
a force capable of executing SOF-like missions, the MEU would instead be capable of
integrating with special operations forces [45].17

The ESG experiment

A second and far less contentious chapter in the ARG/ MEU history was the
expeditionary strike group (ESG). Driven by shifts in thinking away from a strategic
focus to projecting power in the littorals, the Navy decided to combine the
capabilities of surface action groups, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft with
the traditional ARG/MEU [7]. Doing so would provide great combat capability to the
CCDR and would better allow it to employ naval forces in support of the global war
on terrorism (GWOT). Navy officials in 2003 touted the deployment as a
demonstration of the benefits of augmenting an amphibious ready group with
surface combatants and a submarine, noting that the additional ships would provide
capabilities similar to that of a carrier battle group.•

The ESG CE, consisting of both Navy and Marine Corps personnel,
provides a greater range of amphibious or expeditionary warfare
planning capabilities for the execution of a variety of missions in the
operational environment, including the ability to conduct and
support operations ashore and from a sea base [38].

Navy and Marine Corps staffs were created over Amphibious Squadron and MEU
commanders led either by a one-star Marine general or navy admiral. The first ESG
deployed in 2003. The Navy decided to do away with the concept in 2009. In
between, all of the ARG/MEUs adopted the ESG title instead of the big deck
amphibious ship and MEU (e.g., BOXER ARG/13th MEU). An ARG/MEU can still be an
ESG if commanded by a general or flag officer [35].

One reason for the demise of the ESG may have been that amphibious ships and
combatants didn’t work closely enough during training or while deployed to justify
sailing together [47]. If so, the Navy may have faced the same pressures that led to
split/disaggregated ARG/MEU operations over the years.

17
The Marine Corps and SOCOM are still working out what “integration” and other terms used
to describe general purpose force and SOF interactions mean [46].

22
Has the ARG/MEU really changed?
The discussion above suggests that the ARG/MEU was adapting to world
circumstances. Today’s MEU Marines are equally comfortable boarding pirated
vessels, securing embassies, and rescuing downed airmen as they are fighting
insurgents in an urban setting or providing a quick reaction force for SOF counter-
terrorist operations. Also, the ships are bigger and more capable, aircraft can carry
more and fly further and faster, and Marines are better equipped (table 5).

Table 5. Changes to ARG/MEU composition

ARG/GCE/ACE 1960s 2001 MCO 2009 (OEF) Future ACE?

ARG
Amphibs 4-8 3 3
MEU GCE
BLT 1 1 1
AAV 11 x LVTP-5 15 x LVTP-7 0
LAV None 7 8
Artillery 6 x M10A1 6 x M198 6 x M777A2
Mortars/EFSS 60/81mm 8 x 81mm Unkn
Tanks 5 x M483A 4-5 x M1A1 0
MEU ACE
24 x UH-34D
HMM 12 x CH-46E 12 x CH-46E 10 x MV-22
then CH-46As
HMH 0 4 x CH-53D/E 4 x CH-53E 4 x CH-53K
2-3 x UH-1N, 3 x UH-1N/Y, 3-4 UH-1Y,
HMLA 3 x UH-1E
4 x AH-1W 4 x AH-1W 4 x AH-1Z
VFA/VMFA 0 6 x AV-8B 6 x AV-8B >6 x F-35B
VMGR 0 2 x KC-130 2 x KC-130J 2-4 x KC-130J

In other ways, however, the ARG/MEU remains indistinguishable from its original
form and purpose; the MEU still embarks several amphibious ships, is built around a
BLT, and has most of the same types of assets. Questions over whether the ARG/MEU
is different or unchanged aside, employment data will help us understand the role it
has played and which of its characteristics have been the most valuable.

23
Key characteristics of the ARG/MEU
From the previous discussion we might characterize the ARG/MEU in the following
ways:

 Most appropriate for the low to mid-end of the conflict spectrum.18

 Forward present and able to quickly respond to crises.

 Most capable when employed as a whole.

 Inherently mobile/free of the constraints of land-basing (i.e., amphibious).

 Capable of conducting designated maritime special operations and/or

integrating with special operations forces.

 An enabler for a larger Marine or joint force, for example by conducting

assaults or raids.

 Building block to a larger MAGTF (MEU to MEB to MEF).

In the next section we examine the degree to which these characteristics have been
manifest in the use the ARG/MEU.

18
Marine Corps doctrine refers specifically to “crisis response and limited contingency
operations.” Examples include consequence management, foreign humanitarian assistance,
NEOs, strikes and raids, embassy defense, recovery operations, defense support of civil
authorities, peace operations.

24
ARG/MEU presence
We calculated annual amphibious ship presence by geographic combatant command
beginning in 1990.19 Figure 1 shows the results for PACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and
AFRICOM—by far the most concentrated areas of ARG/MEU presence. We also show
changes to the active amphibious fleet over the same time period, simply for
perspective.20

Amphibious ships almost always deploy with Marines and most often with MEUs.
Exceptions include the movement of Marines for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts
as well as the periodic UNITAS, CARAT, and African Partnership Station exercises.
For our purposes we assumed that three amphibious ships equal an ARG, and that
when ARGs deployed, MEUs were embarked on them.

19
ARG/MEU presence and response data came from a series of databases CNA has created and
maintained over the years, augmented with prior CNA crisis response analysis and
participation in real-world events.
20
Figures 2 and 3 don’t account for improvements in amphibious ships.

25
Figure 1. Presence vs. inventory (1990-2003)

25 70
PACOM presence
CENTCOM presence
EUCOM presence 60
Number of deployed amphibs

20

Amphibious ship inventory

AFRICOM presence
Total amphibious ships 50

15
40

30
10

20
5
10

0 0
1991

1998

2005

2012
1990

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2013
ARG/MEUs mostly have deployed to the Western Pacific (WESTPAC), Mediterranean,
and Arabian Gulf. Over the 20-plus-year period studied, these areas have averaged a
near continuous presence of one or more ARG/MEUs. Also evident is the shift in
ARG/MEU presence from EUCOM to CENTCOM around the start of OIF in 2002.

Over the same time period, the number of amphibious ships in active service has
decreased by half (from around 60 to 30), yet the pace of deployments has remained
steady. This means that a larger share of the fleet is forward at any one time. Figure
2 compares the percent of the fleet deployed to the inventory.

Among other things, the figure shows that the Navy has been able to surge more of
the inventory (and/or extend deployments) when needed. This happened most
dramatically in 1991 (for the first Gulf War) and in 2003 (for OIF-1).

26
Figure 2. Amphibious inventory vs. percent of ships deployed (1990–2003)

What are the implications of the relationship between amphibious inventory and
deployed ARGs? One is that the amphibious inventory in the early years exceeded
that required to meet forward presence demands. Alternatively, scheduled
maintenance meant that extra ships were needed to maintain enough ready vessels.
The answer lies somewhere in between. There were more ships than necessary to
meet the ARG/MEU rotation cycle, and with the drawdown following the Cold War
the Navy cut ships. But the cuts may have been too deep. In 2014 the Navy
transitioned to a 36-month cycle, known as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-
FRP), with eight-month deployments (Figure 3) [48].

27
Figure 3. Average ARG/MEU deployment duration (1989–2014)

300

250
Deployment duration (days)

200

150

100

50

0
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year

Both the surges and decreases in the ship inventory have come at the cost of
maintenance-related decreases in availability [49]. Today there are just enough ships
for training and deploying MEUs with a nearly negligible balance to meet other
Marine Corps training desires.

Split/disaggregated operations
The Marine Corps recently published an employment concept for disaggregated
operations [50]. The concept document notes that the CCDR’s “requirements for
ARG/MEU capabilities often exceeds that which can be provided if the organization
operates as a single entity.” As a result, “operational necessity may, on occasion,
demand that an ARG/MEU be divided into smaller, more widely separated
formations,” but that doing so “imposes risk and is not the preferred method of
employment.”21 This implies that most of the time ARG/MEUs operate as one.

21
The document defines risk as the inability of individual elements to perform the full range of
ARG/MEU missions.

28
ARG/MEUs may be separated in two different ways. It is split when it must function
apart for various durations and at various distances, but under the same CCDR.22 It is
disaggregated when it must function separately and independently, regardless of
time and distance, with elements under a command relationship that changes/limits
the ARG and MEU commanders’ control of their forces. This can occur when
ARG/MEUs remain within one CCDR’s area or responsibility (AOR), or when assigned
to multiple CCDRs.

The “risk” incurred when an ARG/MEU is split or disaggregated has three

dimensions. One is opportunity costs—that is, if you’re not whole, you lose synergy
among the different parts; in what ways and to what degree is difficult to say.
Another is the time it takes to come back together (or re-aggregate)—perhaps less
time when split than when allocated to two different CCDRs. A third is difficulty
supporting the maintenance needs of aircraft and other equipment that are
consolidated on the big deck.

While it’s normal for formal operating concepts to lag established practice, the
interval in this case dates to the inception of the MEU 55 years ago. Situations in
which ARG/MEUs have operated in close proximity as an entire unit and from
amphibious ships appear to have been as much the exception as the norm.

We looked for evidence of split/disaggregated events in post-deployment briefs and

command chronologies. Then we examined crisis-response data for situations in
which less than the full ARG/MEU was employed. The latter is an imperfect proxy for
the frequency of split/disaggregated operations, but assuming the ARG/MEU is
pulled apart to do something, it might be a lower bound.23

Some of the accounts of the earliest ARG/MEU activity note that they rarely operated
together [21]. In WESTPAC the ships were used to move Marines about the theater to
conduct training and engagement activities [21]. Other literature suggests that

22
The term “distributed” has been synonymous with “split,” and may be resurrected again to
reflect a new agreement between ARG/MEU commanders and CCDRs whereby the former will
retain OPCON of all forces even though subordinate elements may be tasked to conduct
missions in other regions.

23
A good example of this was the near simultaneous flooding in the Philippines and earthquake
in Indonesia in 2009. The MEU already was in the Philippines for an exercise and was called on
to respond when the Indonesian earthquake occurred. To support both, the ARG/MEU had to
split.

29
“splitting” the ARG/MEU has been so frequent and widespread that MEUs have long
planned for it.24

Three recent examples stand-out. The first involved 15th MEU/PELELIU ARG’s
simultaneous support in 2008 to strike operations in Afghanistan, counter-piracy off
Somalia, and disaster relief efforts in Pakistan [51]. In 2010, the 26th
MEU/KEARSARGE ARG’s was disaggregated in support of Odyssey Dawn in Libya and
OEF in Afghanistan [52]. The 22d MEU/BATAAN ARG found itself in a similar
situation in 2011–2012 [53].25

The frequency of “split-ARG” operations is reflected in our dataset. Of about 130

responses to crises, over half involved fewer than three ships.

Figure 4. Events involving full or partial ARGs (1983–2013)

8
Full ARG
Events involving full vs. partial ARG

7
Less than full ARG
6

0
1999
1983
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

The split/disaggregation concept highlights three enduring and related tensions. The
first is between the CCDR “requirement” for ARG/MEUs and what they may need at
the time. The second is between the long-standing Marine Corps policy of forming

24
In their 2000 Gazette article, “The MEU(SOC) Program in Transition,” Maj Denny and Capt
Greenwood noted that “the likelihood of splitting the amphibious ready group (ARG) for
simultaneous operations (split-ARG ops) requires each MEU to maintain duplicate force
capabilities” [43].
25
11th MEU/BONHOMME RICHARD’s 2009 post-deployment brief notes that the ARG was split
for 192 of 208 days [47].

30
and training ARG/MEUs as coherent MAGTFs for amphibious operations and how
they are often employed.26 The third tension is meeting CCDR needs while adhering
to doctrinal MAGTF precepts. Marines embarked on a single ship operating some
distance from the others might still have MAGTF qualities, but they’re not an
ARG/MEU [54].

In the next section we examine the different ways ARG/MEUs have been used in crisis
situations.

26
In referring to disaggregated operations, 22nd MEU’s post-deployment brief notes that under
such conditions the “sum of the parts does not equal the whole. [53]”

31
ARG/MEU crisis response
Much of the literature on ARG/MEU employment describes specific activities (e.g.,
peacekeeping, maritime interdiction operations, disaster relief, and so forth). But this
is what they do not why they do it.

We divided ARG/MEU events into the six categories shown in Table 6. Each military
response had a military objective, and the ARG/MEU played a specific role (and
applied different capabilities) in helping to achieve that objective.

To describe the ARG/MEU role we used a mixture of terms from the MEU mission-
essential task list (METL) as well as joint doctrine [37, 55]. We did this because
neither sufficiently captures all of the activities ARG/MEUs performed. For example,
joint doctrine on foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), while largely about helping
people, excludes domestic situations [55]. The definition of FHA also doesn’t
distinguish between made-made and natural disaster–induced suffering where the
circumstances can be very different and require different tools. Natural disasters are
about showing up as quickly as you can with what you have. Privation resulting from
violence (religious, ethnic, or religious) often means you have to stop the fighting
first, or provide relief in the midst of it, narrowing the response options.

One of the more important roles performed by ARG/MEUs has been to provide
options to decision makers.

32
Table 6. An alternative way of viewing ARG/MEU responses

Military
response U.S. military ARG/MEU role Specific ARG/MEU
context objective capabilities employed Examples

Safety of Protection NEO Security force Lebanon

Americans Evacuation Show of force Aviation assets Liberia
overseas Amphibious op Grenada

Localized Stop violence Stability ops MEU or select assets Kosovo

instability Provide relief Humanitarian asst. Somalia
Enforce sanctions Haiti
Rwanda

Threats to Punish Major combat MEU Afghanistan

international Evict Amphibious ops Iraq
security Stabilize Stability ops Libya
Enforce sanctions

Options
Piracy and Safety/freedom MIO Aviation assets Horn of Africa
other maritime of movement Air recon Raid force Gulf
security
concerns

Pursuit of Rescue Support to SOF Security force Yemen

terrorists Capture/kill MIO Aviation assets Somalia
Deter Air strikes Raid force Kenya
QRF/TRAP

Natural Save lives Disaster relief Aviation assets Philippines

disaster Provide relief Logistics assets Pakistan
Security force Bangladesh

Focus of analysis Insufficient data

Safety of Americans overseas refers to situations in which there is concern over the
security of American property and personnel abroad, including the President and
other senior U.S. government officials. The military objective is to protect and/or
evacuate personnel. ARG/MEUs were asked to conduct a “show of force,”’ a NEO, or
both. Examples include Lebanon and Liberia. In extreme cases the ARG/MEU executed
an amphibious assault, as in Grenada in 1983.

Situations where there is localized instability typically result from the breakdown of
law/order putting civilians or those of a particular ethno-religious group in danger.
The military objective is to stop the violence and ease suffering. The ARG/MEU has
played important roles in these scenarios by enforcing sanctions, helping to stabilize
the situation, and providing humanitarian relief. Examples are Kosovo, Somalia, and
Rwanda.

33
Threats to international security are when actions by a head of state and/or
government threaten international security. The military objective is to forcibly
remove, or facilitate the removal of, the leader(s) from power. Doing so also can
involve efforts to create enduring security once the regime is toppled. Examples are
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.

Piracy threatens the safe passage of seaborne traffic. The objective is to deter or
respond to hostile acts. The other two categories are self-explanatory.

We were not able to determine the specific capabilities used to execute a given role.
But we were able to approximate when most or all of the ARG/MEU was employed,
versus one or more of its subcomponents, as well the number of infantry (or line)
companies that went ashore.

Narrowing the dataset

More than one-quarter of ARG/MEU events involved the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In preparing for or as part of the initial combat actions, the ARG/MEU
seemed to play a role that could not have been executed easily or effectively by
another Marine unit (e.g., a raid or amphibious assault). We included these. Later the
MEU frequently was folded into the larger ground force rotation. We excluded these
cases because the MEU did not provide a unique capability. Sometimes, however, the
MEUs supported the conflict from amphibious ships like strike sorties or assault
support; we included these since they may not have been planned prior to
deployment. 27 Table 7 shows which types of events we included in our subsequent
analysis of ARG/MEU employment.

Table 7. Iraq/Afghanistan events excluded from our analysis

Number of discrete
MEU or ARG/MEU role MEU or ARG/MEU
(chronological) events Included
Sanctions enforcement 8 Yes
Amphibious ops (invasion) 5 Yes
Ensuing stability operations
13 No
(planned rotational)

Even when MEUs were part of the broader conventional or irregular effort, was keeping the
27

MEU as a MAGTF important? Some say it was [56].

34
 Surge (planned augmentation) 3 No
Later support to stability
4 Yes
operations (largely unplanned)

In the rest of this section we use ARG/MEU employment data to determine the type
of operation, response time, duration, and other potentially useful information. We
also highlight instances in which amphibious shipping provided a base from which to
project or sustain forces. We do this to better understand the advantages of having
the means to function largely unhindered.

The contexts for ARG/MEU response

ARG/MEUs were employed most often to protect Americans, create stability, and
relieve suffering following man-made and nature-induced strife (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Situations involving ARG/MEUs (1993–2013)

40

35
Events involving ARG/MEUs

30

25

20

15

10

0
Safety of Localized Natural Int'l security Pursuit of Piracy
Americans instability disaster threats terrorists concerns

ARG/MEU participation in large conflict was less prevalent and we address these
instances separately. Finally, the ARG and/or MEU have been used to resolve hostage
situations, support efforts to capture or kill terrorists, and counter threats to
maritime safety and security. We did not research other situations where the
ARG/MEU wasn’t among the U.S. military capabilities employed; however, our list
strikes us as pretty diverse and that the ARG/MEU is a versatile tool.

35
Situations by location
ARG/MEUs have responded most frequently and to the widest variety of crises in
CENTCOM (Figure 6). Natural disasters are the dominant impetus in PACOM, whereas
intervention in EUCOM/AFRICOM mostly has followed ethnic/religious strife and
concerns over Americans’ safety.

Figure 6. Crises involving ARG/MEUs by location/type (1984–1993)

60
Safety of Americans
1.0 avg
50 ARG/MEU Localized instability
presence Natural disaster
.7 avg
40
ARG/MEU Int'l security threats
1.6 avg
presence Terrorists/hostages
30 ARG/MEU
presence Piracy concerns
20

10

0
CENTCOM PACOM EUCOM AFRICOM SOUTHCOM NORTHCOM

ARG/MEUs also have responded most in regions where they have routinely been
deployed. But there’s more to it. Presence objectives determine deployment locations,
but ARG/MEUs can (and have been) shifted to crises elsewhere. We described three
examples of this earlier involving the 15th, 26th, and 22nd MEUs. See appendix B for
presence and crisis data by COCOM.

ARG/MEU responsiveness
We calculated how much time elapsed between when an ARG/MEU was directed to
respond and when it arrived at the specified location. We had these details only for
about half the events in our dataset. Figure 7 depicts both the average and range of
response times by situation.

36
Figure 7. ARG/MEU response times in days (1983–2013)
131 days
20
18
Average
16
Min
14 Max
12
Days

10
8
6
4
2
0
Pursuit of Piracy Safety of Localized Natural Int'l
terrorists concerns Americans instability disaster security
threats

Arrival times were quickest (within two to six days) when there have been risks to
Americans or extensive human suffering. This responsiveness is attributable both to
the regions where ARG/MEUs routinely deploy and where they are positioned once
there.28

In piracy or terrorist incidents the ARG/MEU already was on-scene or nearby, which
is why there are no data for these events. The availability of the ARG/MEU in piracy
cases is a credit to the CCDR’s decision to put it where it could respond quickly. The
pursuit of terrorists also involved being in position before the operation was
launched. In both types of situations the ARG/MEU provided capabilities that would
have been difficult to achieve with an alternative force or from land bases.

The interval between the onset of crisis and actual operations when international
security is threatened has been much longer, but also is misleading. While in such
cases we built up forces over many months, significant military presence arrived
almost immediately. Operation Desert Shield is an important example of Marines
responding quickly when needed most (two MPF MEBs were deployed within
days/weeks along with lighter Army forces to deter Iraq).

28
There have been cases where the ARG/MEU was not able to respond quickly enough to make
a difference (e.g., after a natural disaster, where being on scene immediately is crucial), but
they are few.

37
Role in supporting national objectives
Figure 8 shows the roles ARG/MEUs played in supporting military objectives. The
“amphibious ops” category differs from thee others in that such activities support a
larger purpose. We limited event-types in this category to assaults, raids,
demonstrations, and withdrawals to distinguish them from all of the other things
Marines and sailors are able to do from ships. Our objective was to understand when
MEUs may have enabled other Marine or joint efforts. The remaining roles would be
considered “support to other operations.”

Figure 8. ARG/MEU role in supporting military objectives (1983-2013)

40
Safety of Americans
35
Pursuit of terrorists
Number of ARG/MEU events

30 Piracy concerns
25 Natural disaster
Localized instability
20
Int'l security threats
15

10

0
Stability Provide Disaster NEO Amphib SOF Enforce MIO Show of
ops options relief op support sanctions force

One of the important roles performed by ARG/MEUs is to “provide options;” that is,
being available to respond or when just showing up yields the desired effect. Thus the
ARG/MEU provides options regardless of whether its forces are employed. For the
most part ARG/MEU’s were ordered to stand by when instability threatened security
of Americans. Definitions for the rest of the terms may be found in Marine Corps
Order 3120.9C [37].

38
Full vs. partial MEUs
We wanted to know when the full MEU vice one or more of its component parts was
employed (Figure 9).29 We excluded natural disasters because in certain cases an
entire MEU was in the vicinity, but it was difficult to identify the specific capabilities
used. For the same reasons we excluded “provide options” since the event was never
executed

Figure 9. Situations involving all or most of the MEU (1983–2013)

40
Partial MEU
35
MEU
30

25

20

15

10

0
support
NEO

Provide
Disaster

MIO
Stability

Amphib op

sanctions

Show of
options
Enforce
relief

force
SOF
ops

Full MEUs were used most often to conduct amphibious operations and as stability
forces (in places like Kosovo and Somalia).

Another point worth emphasizing is that not every amphibious operation involved a
full MEU. 13th MEU’s two raids during Operation Desert Storm were with a company
or less. 26th MEU’s operation in Irbil/Mosul during OIF-1 included two companies
(Bravo and Charlie) [57].

29
We distinguish the MEU from the ARG because in some cases the ARG served more as vehicle
to deliver the MEU, vice platforms from which to operate.

39
A variation of cases where partial MEUs were used involved detaching one or more
assets for a specific purpose and varying periods of time. There were very few
examples of this, but they had to involve calculations of risk. All but one involved
CH-53s, and most of these were to provide additional heavy lift to forces in Iraq.

The MEU’s ability to apply specific capabilities vice the entire package is one of its
strengths.

Infantry companies ashore

If the core of the MEU is the BLT, how often and under what circumstances have the
infantry (or “line”) companies been sent ashore? We binned MEU operations based on
where they fell within the range of military operations, or ROMO. The distinguishing
variables in ROMO are scope, purpose, and conflict intensity [58]. Events at the low
end of the spectrum generally aren’t violent and include disaster relief, permissive
NEOs, and shows of force. Major operations fall at the high-end. The less violent the
situation and smaller the force, the closer it is to the mid-range.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is a good example of an event in the mid-range;

the potential for violence was thought to be relatively high, yet the number of forces
the U.S. was prepared to commit was relatively low. Somalia also is noted for having
morphed from one type of operation to another; it started off a straight-forward
humanitarian effort and then became a stability operation [59]. The ARG/MEU in this
case was ideal not only because of its lack of reliance on shore infrastructure, but also
for its ability to handle the transition.

In some descriptions of the ROMO, counter-insurgency operations aren’t thought to

be as combat-intensive as major war. Making a judgement based on the Marines
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, we put both at the high-end. The fighting in
Somalia also was at times significant, but as a stability operation we put it at the
mid-level. Kosovo might also belong in the middle.

We counted partial companies as whole companies to be conservative. An example

would be a security element formed around an infantry platoon. Figure 10 shows the
results. We realize that sending one or two infantry companies ashore (or a partial
company) may have been possible since there was additional reinforcing combat
power available.

40
Figure 10. Rifle companies ashore by ROMO category (1983-2013)

120
High
100 Med
Low
80
Grenada
60 Balkans
Lebanon
Somalia
40 Iraq/Afgh

20

0
0 1-2 >2

Most ARG/MEU events in recent history have occurred exclusively at the low end of
the ROMO. And in the majority of those cases the MEU’s rifle companies remained
embarked. (Between 2003 and the present, we found no instances in which any
infantry companies went ashore.) All three of the line companies went ashore six
times: In Albania and Kuwait for NEOs, Turkey/Northern Iraq and Somalia (HA), and
twice in Kosovo (to foster stability).30

Many fewer ARG/MEUs responses have been at the high end (Iraq and Afghanistan),
and about the same within the mid-range. Events in the mid-range where all of the
MEUs rifle companies debarked include Grenada and Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in
1993-94. Both were stability operations. We note that the Navy and Marines Corps
have had the ARG/MEU capacity to execute multiple operations in different parts of
world around the same time.

Figure 13 does not tell us whether other Marine and/or other Service forces
participated at the time the ARG/MEU was employed. We address this below.

Only two of the ARG ships were available to sail to Somalia. The third company apparently
30

was embarked on an aircraft carrier.

41
The ARG/MEU as enabler
Table 8 shows when and where ARG/MEUs have conducted assaults, raids,
demonstrations, or withdrawals.

Table 8. Frequency of ARG/MEU amphibious operations (1983-2013)

Grenada Lebanon Kuwait/Iraq Somalia Afgh

Amphibious op (1983) (1984) (1991) (1995) (2001) Total
Assault 1 2 1 1 5
Demonstration 1 1
Raid 2 2
Withdrawal 1 1 2
Total 1 1 5 2 1 10

The five amphibious assaults involving MEUs were in Grenada in 1983, Somalia in
1992, and Afghanistan in 2001 (by two MEUs), and Iraq in 2003.31 32 33 13th MEU
conducted a “deception” mission off the coast of Kuwait at the start of the ground
war during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. ARG/MEUs conducted two raids in 1991
both against Iraq. 22nd MEU conducted an amphibious withdrawal from Lebanon in
1984, and the 13th MEU conducted one at the end of UN operations in Somalia in
1995.

These conflicts fall at the mid- to high-end of the conflict spectrum. We discuss the
significance of this later.

31
According to two accounts of early operations in Afghanistan, the bulk of the assault force
was launched from ships and pre-staged in Pakistan [60]. But others note that a company-sized
helicopter assault force was inserted directly into the objective area from the ships [61].
32
15th MEU aircraft provided assault support to the British, to whom they were attached, during
the initial push in to Iraq in 2003. At this point, however, most of 15th MEU was ashore. At least
some of the 15th MEU’s helicopters remained embarked, but it’s not clear if they belonged to
the MEF’s ACE commander at this point [62]. 24th MEU also was ashore as part of the larger
ground force.
33
To be conservative, we included 26th MEU’s push into Irbil and then Mosul in mid-April during
OIF-1 as an assault. Some we have spoken with don’t believe it was.

42
The ARG/MEU (and MEB) as a building block
Figure 14 shows other forces involved in ARG/MEU events, whether Marine or joint.
We wanted to know three things:

 When MEUs have been involved in high-end crises.

 When MEUs have participated within the mid-range of the ROMO without
MEBs or MEFs, but perhaps with joint forces.

 When “MEBs” were made up of MEUs vice other Marine forces. We use quotes
since MEBs can range in size.

 When MEUs or MEBs led, or enabled, larger forces.

The bubbles represent relative differences in the size of the force—MEU, MEB, MEF,
or combinations. The ones that are offset reflect when MEUs led MEBs and/or when
MEBs led MEFs. For mid and high-end events we also depict whether the operation
was joint. There is no significance to where we placed the circles within each ROMO
category. For all of these reasons the picture is very stylized.

43
Figure 11. MEU/MEB/MEF responses to crises (1982-2013)

Desert
MEF plus events

shield
Desert OIF 1
Storm
MEB events 9 w/ and

MEF
HA /DR and other
w/out MEEUs

(mostly 3d MEB)
Somalia ‘92
MEB
Grenada‘83

TF-58 MEU
Leb ‘83 Panama ‘88 OEF Afghanistan
Joint
Force

Libya
Only MEU events

Somalia ’93-‘94

Low Med High

Many of these were joint
operations to one degree ROMO
or another

Working right to left (from the high-end of ROMO), MEUs have participated in each of
the largest U.S. military actions since the early 1980s, but never alone. They are not
intended to in these situations. TF-58’s actions in Afghanistan remain the only recent
example of multiple MEUs working together under a general officer-led task force
without significant additional conventional forces available. Put another way, they
helped create the conditions for introducing a larger force. They enabled [60].

There have been a similar number of events in the mid-range of the ROMO than at
the high end, but here again MEUs have almost always worked in concert with a
larger conventional joint force. The one exception was Lebanon when a MEU was
inserted under the command of a one-star Marine general officer [63]. The other two
cases (Panama and Somalia) also involved general officer-led command elements over
smaller forces [1].

The figure also tells us a lot about MEBs, which are designed to operate in the gray
area between smaller and larger crises (or as a lead element of a larger force). While
they have been employed at this level, they’re more apt to be used for low-end crises,
and almost always are comprised of a MEU. In many of these cases the general officer
has been a signal of strong U.S. interest and has coordinated the activities of

44
additional non-MEU Marines.34 Operation Desert Shield remains the lone, yet
important, example of an MPF MEB leading a MEF.

ARG/MEU endurance
Figure 13 plots the average and maximum duration of ARG/MEU participation by
role. ARG/MEU support typically doesn’t last very long; it goes in quickly, deals with
the crisis, and moves on. When necessary, however, it can also stay for a long time
off-shore, on land, or a combination of both.

Figure 12. Duration of ARG/MEU response (days) (1983-2013)

200
180 Average duration
160 Max duration
140
120
Days

100
80
60
40
20
0
SOF NEO Stability Provide Disaster Show of MIO
support ops options relief force

Importance of the ARG

Amphibious ships make it easy to put a MEU closer to where it’s needed and able to
operate free from land bases. As Liddell Hart said, “Amphibious flexibility is the
greatest strategic asset that a sea-based force possesses. [5]” This flexibility has been

This was particularly evident in 3d MEB’s coordination of various disaster relief events where
34

Marine forces beyond the MEU participated.

45
important in all roles played by the ARG/MEU (Figure 13). Beyond going after
terrorists or pirates, the ARGs were key during relief operations following natural
disasters and when providing security for or evacuating Americans.

The ARGs also have figured prominently in U.S. efforts to facilitate regime change or
stop ethno-religious violence. This was true during Odyssey Dawn (Libya), when MEU
AV-8Bs flew strike sorties and MV-22s executed a TRAP mission. All other U.S. and
coalition fixed-wing aircraft had to be based ashore in Europe. Having a seabase was
also significant during operations in Somalia. In other stability operations (e.g.,
Kosovo and Lebanon), MEUs disembarked the ships for long periods of time. Whether
and to what extent they relied on support from the ships while ashore is unclear.

Figure 13. When amphibious ships were important (1983-2013)

45
All Other
40
Number of ARG/MEU events

Ops from ARG

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Stability Provide Disaster NEO SOF Enforce MIO Show of
ops options relief support sanctions force

Importance of “special” capabilities

Some argue that the entire ARG/MEU is a “special unit,” so debates over the
distinction between its capabilities and SOF miss the point [33]. At the same time the
Marine Corps has put a lot of effort into defining a very specialized subset of overall
ARG/MEU capabilities and developing the skills to execute them. We did not try to
match these SOF-like skills to those in SOF doctrine. Instead we focus on how the
Marine Corps has described them.

General Kelley’s 1985 Gazette article cast the MEU as capable of performing two
broad types of special operations missions when combined with other naval forces:

46
intelligence gathering and direct action (DA). Beneath each was a list of things the
MEU(SOC) could do, such as close-air and assault support, amphibious raids, civic
action, visual reconnaissance, and mobile training teams. The Marine Corps
subsequently would differentiate between conventional and special missions/tasks.

The first MEU(SOC) Order to do so was published in 1994 [32]. It defined ten SOC
tasks. The current MEU(SOC) policy issued in 2012, however, added a task and
merged or deleted others. The rest were assigned either to the MEU or MARSOF,
implying only MARSOF would execute them, though likely with support from the
ARG/MEU (Table 8).

Table 9. Evolution of SOC tasks for the MEU

Since TRAP and MIO currently are not designated as “special,” we assume that special
capabilities weren’t required to execute them. We did not have any data on close
quarters battle (CQB), special demolition (SD), clandestine recovery operations (CRO),
or direct action (DA).35

The tasks for which we have data include the now non-special tasks of MIO and
TRAP, and the recently deleted special task of in-extremis hostage rescue (IHR). The
ARG/MEU, or ARG combined with SOF, executed these tasks on ten occasions:

35
We are aware of at least one instance where SOF embarked the ARG to conduct a DA mission,
but the details are classified.

47
  (MIO) ARG/MEU x 6: In 1996, the 15th MEU/Peleliu ARG conducted a VBSS
with the MSPF and SEAL platoon on a foreign-flagged vessel off the Iraqi
coast as part of Operation Southern Watch. 15th MEU/Peleliu ARG also
conducted an opposed VBSS with the MRF and Navy personnel to rescue the
crew of the German-flagged M/V Magellan Star in 2010. The crew was hiding
in the ship’s safe room from Somali pirates. On at least four other occasions
during the first Gulf War, ARG/MEUs were involved in the destruction or
takedown of oil platforms.

 (TRAP) ARG/MEU x 3: The TRAP rescues of Air Force pilot Scott O’Grady in
Bosnia in 1995, and another Air Force pilot in Libya 2011. Launch and
recovery was conducted from the sea. In 2001, 15th MEU recovered an Army
Blackhawk helicopter downed in Pakistan in the early stages of OEF while
afloat off the coast.

 (IHR) ARG/SOF x 1: The killing of Somali pirates who had captured the
captain of the Maersk Alabama in 2009 by SEAL snipers from the fantail of
the USS Boxer.

The only special mission we have a record of being executed of the five described
above is IHR, and involved only the ARG and SEALs. ARG/MEU support to SOF for
national missions may well have involved preparing or executing these and other
special missions, but we do not have the data.

Importance of individual MEU assets

The Marine Corps has long-debated the relevance of select pieces of equipment (i.e.,
principal end items, or PEIs) to the things MEUs do. During the 1980s and 1990s, the
topic was the need for tanks given their size and weight [64]. But the notional MEU
load-out has remained remarkably consistent, even as individual MEU commanders
took more of some items and fewer of others.

Descriptions of past ARG/MEU operations provide very limited insight into the utility
of individual MEU assets. However, some assets appeared in the narratives more
frequently than others. Excluding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, assets most
often mentioned are the CH-53s, KC-130s, and to a lesser extent the H-1s (Hueys and
Cobras). More recently it has been the MV-22s given their range and speed. This isn’t
surprising; the CH-53s and KC-130s are equally as effective in disaster relief
operations as they are in combat. Some events have included only KC-130s, such as
during relief efforts in Myanmar in 2008 or to fly the MEU’s forward command
element (FCE) or Marine Survey and Liaison Team (MSALT) to a distant embassy for
NEO planning. The H-1s supported MIO and stability operations in over-watch or
reconnaissance roles.

48
At the other end of the spectrum are assets best suited for combat, such as AV-8Bs,
tanks, and artillery. Marines considered some of these essential in places like
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kosovo [65]. The AV-8Bs supported SOF,
Marines in Afghanistan and Iraq, and operations in Libya. Tanks were used in
Lebanon in the early 1980s and in Somalia in the early 1990s along with artillery.

We can’t say much about ground mobility assets except that when needed in large
number they are moved ashore by surface connectors or unloaded pier-side. 36

36
Assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) have been used in disaster relief and other operations.

49
Observations and insights
Is the ARG/MEU still relevant? The answer is a qualified yes. The ARG/MEU has been
a reliable source of stability, security, and assistance for decades. Yet while it has
adapted in some ways, the MEU retains its BLT-centric origins. The better question is
whether the ARG/MEU can be made even more relevant.

Much of ARG/MEU’s utility has long been part of the story:

 The only afloat combined-arms task force in the world.

 Continuously deployed to conduct theater engagement activities and to

reassure allies, and with the organic skills and mobility to quickly respond to
a wide-range of crises.

 Able to shift quickly between trouble spots and remain off-shore for long
periods of time free of the political and geographic constraints of land-
basing.

 A provider of many different options to decision-makers and time to make

them.

Other characteristics of the ARG/MEU, however, haven’t figured as prominently. The

ARG/MEU has not often had to enable or serve as a building-block. And its recent
utility has been defined as much (or even more) by its individual and varied
capabilities—conducting different missions in different places—than by its
coherence as a BLT-size MAGTF. This should not diminish the overall concept.

For one, versatility is one of the ARG/MEU’s strengths. This versatility is hard-wired
into both the capabilities of the ARG/MEU and the concept of task organization.
Deployed for long periods of the time, the MEU’s depth and variety allow it to
configure for a broader range of missions.

Second, the ARG/MEU is the only routine and practical mechanism for building
amphibious expertise. The Marine Corps has attempted to broaden this expertise at
higher levels through exercises like Bold Alligator, Ssong Yang, and Dawn Blitz, but
the size of the amphibious fleet and ARG/MEU rotation cycles make it difficult to get
enough ships together at one time. Further, these events do not provide the hands-on
planning and execution of larger-scale amphibious events for MEB-size headquarters.

50
MEF-level command post exercises (CPXs) like Ulchi Focus Lens and Key Resolve are
even more removed.

Third, ARG/MEU follows a predictable manning, maintenance, and training cycle.

This simplifies the sourcing and scheduling of the individuals, units, and ships.

Fourth, the lengthy and deliberate pre-deployment training helps the ARG/MEU
function either as a coherent whole or when split/disaggregated. We just don’t know
how important that role is. A corollary and significant benefit is having the entire
ARG/MEU as an option.

Finally, neither the MEU/PHIBRON staffs nor the ships were not designed or
equipped for split/disaggregated operations.

These considerations notwithstanding, change may be both inevitable and logical.

 More than six F-35Bs will be required for the ARG/MEU to operate against an
A2AD threat, reducing the number of assault support aircraft [27]. The same
threat may push ARG ships further from land, effectively precluding a
surface assault. If distance isn’t sufficient reason, the time it would take to
clear any mines might be. Both factors point to lifting more of the assault
force by air [67].

 The crisis response SPMAGTF for CENTCOM recently deployed for seven
months with around 2,300 Marines, conducting small operations in different
geographic areas simultaneously, including embassy reinforcement, theater
security cooperation, foreign training, and air strikes. These are MEU
missions.

 The mix of amphibious ships will change over the next fifteen years. Two of
the big decks (LHA 6/7) won’t have well-decks and the LSD replacement
might have aviation spaces similar to the LPD-17. The phasing in and out of
these ships will mean that every ARG/MEU will be a bit different.

 The MEU MSEs are far more capable than their earlier counterparts.

Thinking differently
All things equal, is the current BLT-centric ARG/MEU the best crisis response force?
We offer the broad outlines of two alternative constructs. The details are less
important than the idea of change.

51
Separating low and high-end capabilities
One alternative would be for the big deck to serve as a light carrier with twenty or so
F-35Bs to backfill or supplement carrier strike group (CSG) presence. The LPD and
LSD, each with a company landing team and the balance of the aviation assets, would
focus on MIO, NEO, embassy security, TRAP, QRF, HA, and DR operations. If the ships
are paired together, the GCE also could conduct platoon or company-sized raids.

Different forces for different regions

Another option is to tailor forces for different parts of the world. CENTCOM
accounts for much of the current forward presence commitments, but the North
Arabian Gulf is a small region with reasonably good access; the Mediterranean is
fairly small as well though with more restrictions on land-based forces. In contrast,
Africa and Asia are big maritime region.

The nature of conflict also varies by region. Many of the threats in CENTCOM and
AFRICOM relate to ideological or religious differences that call for protecting
Americans, countering terrorists, ensuring freedom of navigation, humanitarian
assistance, and partner engagement/training. The focus in Asia is mostly about
reassuring allies and countering China. Why not deploy SPMAGTFs to Europe and the
Gulf while shifting some of the CENTCOM ARG/MEU presence to Asia and Africa?
The Marine’s distributed posture in Asia will demand lots of lift; in Africa, the need
might be one or two ships working in conjunction with SOF against terrorists and
pirates. A variation of this approach might be to alternate ARG/MEU and SPMAGTF
presence in CENTCOM.

A more structured approach

What follows is a series of steps that could help guide discussion about whether and
how the ARG/MEU should evolve.

Define the problem

If we had to sum up the biggest opportunity confronting the Marine Corps it would
be the F-35B. But there are many other facets to consider, some of which have wider
implications for Marine Corps operating concepts.

52
A big force for low-end crises
The MEU has capabilities and capacity that exceed the low-end of the crisis spectrum.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides great versatility and allows the
ARG/MEU to more easily combine with similar forces to make bigger forces.

Ironically, these “excesses” in depth and variety enable the ARG/MEU to

simultaneously execute many of the same tasks in different places. Yet there is great
resistance to disaggregation on the grounds that it violates the integrity of MAGTF.
Thus at one level the dilemma is how to reconcile what CCDRs need’s short of major
war versus the Corps’ concept for addressing all types of crises. The F-35B will only
magnify differences between ARG/MEU capabilities and the typical crisis.

The same capability for all regions

The Navy and Marine Corps have deployed the same force to the same regions for
decades. Simplicity is one of the Marine Corps’ strengths; MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs are
all MAGTFs of varying sizes. This makes what the Marine Corps offers easier to
describe, create, scale, and employ. Yet threats, crises, geography, and U.S. interests
vary widely across the world. If the world is so uncertain and complex, are we
reaching a point where the cost of simplicity outweighs the gains (where a single
approach no longer is the best approach)? One could reasonably argue the exact
opposite. The answer will require a careful examination of the future environment
and its military significance.

Finite amphibious capacity

The amphibious fleet only is sufficient for ARG/MEU rotations and Forward-
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF). Increasing maintenance will continue to reduce
availability, leaving little if any extra capacity to embark SPMAGTFs or support MEB
training.

Since the ARG ships already operate some distance from each other, any alternative
construct would have to (1) improve the ARG/MEUs ability to conduct independent
operations and/or (2) generate more ships with Marines on them. Even then the gains
in coverage might not outweigh the risks to preparedness of a more significant fight.

There are only so many ways of creating more afloat time short of building new
ships:

 Increase deployment lengths,

 Increase deployment frequency (i.e., shorten the inter-deployment cycle),

 Base more ships overseas and rotate crews, or relax overseas homeport
policy.

53
This is why the Navy and Marine Corps have been exploring non-traditional and
allied platforms for embarking Marines.

The “myth” of the middle

Joint doctrine describes crises as occurring on a spectrum of increasing conflict
intensity. It is quite easy to recognize crises at either extreme, but more difficult for
middle cases. Some crises can start out as relatively benign and then deteriorate. The
problem with the ROMO, however, is that we tend to stay out of the middle.

The employment data suggest that crises generally demand less than a MEU or more
than a MEF. For the Navy it is either a surface combatant (or CSG) or a very large
share of the fleet. This phenomenon is consistent with principles of overwhelming
force and a national desire to minimize casualties. In many of the “middle” cases, the
military was pulled out when events on the ground reached a level of violence that
did not justify the sacrifice. Events like Somalia and Lebanon (even Iraq and
Afghanistan) often are invoked as crises to avoid. Is there any reason to think that
the future will be different? The answer may be no, or we might still have an
obligation to prepare for them.

The ROMO as a frame of reference

Throughout this paper we have described the ARG/MEU as a “low-end” force. This is
because the Marine Corps uses the ROMO construct to explain its different size
MAGTFs. When the Marine Corps began using the term “middle weight” to
distinguish itself from SOF and heavier conventional (Army) forces, some thought it
meant a force for the middle of the conflict spectrum, or even that the MEB was the
middleweight force within the middleweight Service. Rather than a scale based on
scope, duration, and conflict intensity, perhaps the ROMO should also reflect the
sophistication of the threat. After all, ARG/MEUs may have to conduct NEOs or
humanitarian crises in the face of advanced anti-air and ship weapons. These
situations likely will be more prevalent in the future.

Other considerations
There are other considerations beyond the largely military questions posed above.

 Will the alternative undermine arguments for more (or at least no fewer)
amphibious ships?

 Is the alternative more or less likely to be used?

 How closely does the alternative resemble a capability that could be

provided by another service?

54
  What is the impact on communities whose assets are not embarked the
ARG/MEU?

Any alternative to the current ARG/MEU will have to be vetted through these filters.

Revisit capabilities and tasks

What capabilities and tasks are appropriate for what crises? The analysis might start
by identifying the frequency with which the ARG/MEU has conducted individual
tasks and the capabilities used to execute them. This is an imperfect approach since
multiple tasks can be executed during a single operation. Also, the same task may be
executed in different ways. Raids can be small or large and conducted by air or from
boats or both. Nonetheless, we have to have a starting point for discussing which if
any tasks might be deemphasized, clarified, or eliminated.

Figure 14 shows which tasks the ARG/MEU has executed, what part of the GCE was
involved, and whether the tasks are more closely associated with the low or high-end
of the ROMO. A more complete picture would have to capture specific GCE as well as
ACE and LCE contributions.

Figure 14. MEU tasks and the ROMO

No. of inf
Current MEU tasks Executed companies Comments
Amphibious assault Y BLT
Mostly
Advance force ops Y N/A associated
Aviation ops from expeditionary airfields Y BLT with high-end
of ROMO?
Airfield/port seizure ops ? BLT
Potential cut line
Amphibious raid Y Co+
Maritime interdiction ops (VBSS) Y MRF
NEO Y Variable
Humanitarian assistance Y Variable
Mostly
Stability ops Y Variable associated
TRAP Y Platoon with low-end
of ROMO
Joint/combined ops N/A HQs function
SOF: Direct action (DA) N/A Variable
SOF: Foreign internal defense (FID) N/A N/A
SOF: Special recon N/A N/A

55
Another challenge is that some of tasks, like amphibious assault, involve most if not
all of the ARG/MEU. Retaining this task argues for keeping the ARG/MEU as is.
Emphasizing smaller amphibious raids might lead to a different conclusion. In that
case how big would the raid force be and would it need to be delivered by both air
and surface means? The answer to the size part of the question might depend on
preparation time and intelligence quality.

Another important part of the analytic process is distinguishing between those

activities the ARG/MEU should be able to execute on its own vice with other forces
that have similar or complimentary capabilities.

Regardless of the outcome, scrubbing the task list would improve clarity. Most of the
terms are easy to grasp, but others are confusing. VBSS is described as a subset of
MIO where the target could be ships or sea-based platforms like oil rigs. Is there
more to MIO than VBSS? Does the existence of the SOFLE obviate the need for the
three SOF tasks in the current MEU order? If not, what part of ARG/MEU PTP is
involved to support these missions?

Revisit SOC
The Marine Corps originally viewed the MEU(SOC) as a substitute for SOF, creating
the MSPF for missions such as VBSS, hostage rescue, and direct action. The MRF was
created as a substitute force as well, and both units conducted independent
operational missions. More recently ARG/MEUs have supported SOF by providing
TRAP and QRF.

As far as we know, the current GPF-SOF discussion emphasizes “integration” vice

substitution, with SOFLE as the enabling mechanism [46]. Less clear is whether
integration ultimately will include SOF supporting GPF. Either way, The Marine Corps
will need to understand the specific relationship envisioned to identify the skills and
capabilities required, as well as the pre-deployment training needed to develop those
skills.

Revisit training
PTP consumes a quarter (six months) of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and an
even greater share of the inter-deployment period to ready the ARG/MEU staffs,
units, and ships’ personnel. We were told (but have not verified) that ARG/MEUs
underwent two months of PTP in the years that preceded the MEU(SOC) program. The
additional four months presumably were added to develop specialized skills, some of
which are no longer MEU tasks.

56
31st MEU comes together just before the integration (and final) phase of PTP before
being certified to deploy, and completes it in a fraction of the time. As one analysis
noted, “The 31st MEU seems to have devised an extremely efficient system for
integrating its Major Subordinate Elements (only requiring approximately six weeks
of training prior to its SOC evaluation). [7]” Perhaps having to repeat the cycle twice a
year helps compensate for the compressed schedule.

All things equal, could a shortened PTP be traded for more afloat time, either to
extend deployments or free up ships or MEB training? Determining the feasibility and
wisdom of this would require far more study and would have to factor in the results
of the task review.

Revisit individual assets and prepositioning

The ARG/MEU is equipped with the Marines Corps most sophisticated weapons.
Some assets like tanks and artillery aren’t used very frequently and take up a lot of
space. Discussions about replacing these or other assets need to consider what
would replace them, as well as the significance of the loss of personnel in provisional
roles. Past work on these questions notes the dearth of ground mobility assets for
the infantry [7]. Prepositioning is one way to hedge against mission degradation, but
what should be prepositioned and where, and how long would it take to reconstitute
the capability?

Revisit command and control

Splitting up or disaggregating the ARG/MEU improves coverage (and reduces
vulnerability). This creates challenges in command (exertion of authority/direction of
forces) and control (ability to communicate). What planning, intelligence, and other
functional personnel and systems will need to be replicated on each ship?

Another consideration is the potential need for the ACE to have both F-35B and
assault support leadership. The impetus for an ACE commander with F-35B
experience likely would grow with increases in the number of airframes.

Consider differences between the ARG/MEU and

SPMAGTF
The Marine Corps is still sorting through strategic messaging, sourcing, and other
aspects of the SPMAGTF. However, the most recent commander of the CENTCOM unit
described the SPMAGTF and ARG/MEU as complimentary, enhancing or improving
naval crisis response capabilities. A quick review of the tasks suggests that the
primary difference is the ships (Figure 14).

57
Figure 15. Comparison of ARG/MEU and SPMAGT-CR-CC tasks

We do not want to make too much of the apparent redundancy between the
SPMAGTF and the ARG/MEU since being land-based is far more constraining. The
bigger issue is whether both forces are needed in the same space.

Revisit the building-block approach

The MEU is central to the Marine’s Single Force concept. Recently the Marine Corps
resurrected the standing MEB headquarters, believing that crises in the littorals could
occur without much warning and be too big for a MEU [67]. The quickest response
would be to deploy a MEB Headquarters over one or two forward-deployed
ARG/MEUs and other forces/equipment aboard non-traditional shipping. How would
changing the ARG/MEU impact force-scaling?

Closing thoughts
There are a few relatively straightforward issues the Marine Corps should address (or
continue to explore) independent of a more in-depth review of the ARG/MEU.

 The MEU Command Element and PHIBRON staff and equipment needed to
more effectively execute split/disaggregated operations.

 The use of non-traditional vessels to supplement amphibious ships,

particularly in support of non-contiguous ARG/MEU operations.

58
  The exact combinations of amphibious ships that will support each ARG/MEU
deployment over the next 15-20 years.

Harder questions
The Marine Corps might have little difficulty absorbing the F-35B without
significantly altering the ARG/MEU, and reap significant benefits at the same time.
But the specific impact on the GCE and missions/tasks will depend on the actual
number of F-35B embarked. The Corps’ also will have to weigh the risk that CCDRs
limit the big deck’s availability to support the activities of the other ships, and
determine how sensitive the limits might be to the number of aircraft; e.g., a six-
plane detachment versus 8-10 aircraft versus a strike-heavy big-deck filling in for a
carrier.

Another potential decision is whether to trade SPMAGTF presence in the

Mediterranean and North Arabian Gulf for greater ARG/MEU presence in other
regions.

Configuring the ARG/MEU around a raid force and other “lower-end” tasks raises
more difficult questions. The first question is why? The primary justification for
creating this type of force would be because (1) you could make more of them and (2)
having more of these forces would accrue some benefit measurably greater than the
existing ARG/MEU capacity. The most important issue, however, is whether such a
force might weaken the Marine Corps’ ability to fight the most capable adversaries?

59
 Appendix A: ARG/MEU Responses to
Crises (1983-2013)

Rifle
Cos
Index MEU Yr Event COCOM Location Situation ashore
1 22 1983 Urgent Fury SOUTHCOM Grenada Safety of Americans 3
2 22 1984 JTF Lebanon EUCOM Lebanon Safety of Americans 3
3 15 1989 San Francisco NORTHCOM San Francisco Natural disaster
4 22 1990 Sharp Edge AFRICOM Liberia Safety of Americans 2
5 26 1990 Sharp Edge AFRICOM Liberia Safety of Americans 2
6 11 1991 Sea Angel PACOM Bangladesh Natural disaster 1
7 15 1991 Desert Storm CENTCOM Iraq/Kuwait Int'l security threats 3
8 15 1991 Fiery Vigil PACOM Philippines Natural disaster 1
9 24 1991 Provide Comfort EUCOM Turkey/Iraq Localized instability 3
10 13 1991 Desert Storm CENTCOM Iraq/Kuwait Int'l security threats 1
11 13 1991 Desert Storm CENTCOM Iraq/Kuwait Int'l security threats 1
12 13 1991 Desert Storm CENTCOM Iraq/Kuwait Int'l security threats
13 13 1991 Eastern Exit CENTCOM Somalia Safety of Americans
14 11 1991 Ethiopia CENTCOM Ethiopia Safety of Americans
15 24 1992 Hot Rock EUCOM Sicily Natural disaster
16 15 1992 Restore Hope AFRICOM Somalia Localized instability 3
17 22 1992 Republic of Congo AFRICOM Congo Safety of Americans
18 11 1992 Impressive Lift CENTCOM Somalia Localized instability
19 24 1993 Restore Hope AFRICOM Somalia Localized instability 3
20 26 1993 Provide Promise, Deny Flight EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability
21 22 1993 Restore Hope AFRICOM Somalia Localized instability
22 22 1993 Provide Promise, Deny Flight EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability
23 22 1993 Provide Promise EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability
Continued Hope, Show Care,
24 13 1993 More Care AFRICOM Somalia Localized instability
Rwanda, Uganda,
25 15 1994 Support Hope AFRICOM Kenya Localized instability
26 15 1994 USLO Withdrawal CENTCOM Somalia Safety of Americans
27 15 1994 Vigilant Warrior CENTCOM Kuwait Localized instability
28 26 1994 Somalia CENTCOM Somalia Safety of Americans
29 24 1994 Continue Hope, Quickdraw AFRICOM Somalia Localized instability 3
30 24 1994 Deny Flight EUCOM Adriatic Localized instability
31 22 1994 Provide Promise/Deny Flight EUCOM Adriatic Localized instability
32 22 1995 Provide Promise/Deny Flight EUCOM Adriatic Localized instability
33 13 1995 United Shield CENTCOM Somalia Localized instability 3

60
 Rifle
Cos
Index MEU Yr Event COCOM Location Situation ashore
34 24 1995 Provide Promise, Deny Flight EUCOM Adriatic Localized instability
35 15 1996 Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
36 13 1996 Desert Strike CENTCOM Iraq Localized instability
37 22 1996 Assured Response AFRICOM Liberia Safety of Americans 1
38 22 1996 Quick Response AFRICOM CAR Safety of Americans
Sharp Guard, Deny Flight,
39 26 1996 Joint Endeavour EUCOM Adriatic Localized instability
40 26 1996 Contingency positioning CENTCOM Red Sea Localized instability
41 15 1997 Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
42 13 1997 Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
43 26 1997 Silver Wake EUCOM Albania Safety of Americans 3
44 22 1997 Noble Obelisk AFRICOM Sierra Leone Safety of Americans
45 31 1997 Bevel Incline PACOM Indonesia Safety of Americans
46 26 1997 Guardian Retrieval AFRICOM Zaire Localized instability
47 22 1997 Guardian Retrieval AFRICOM Zaire Localized instability
48 13 1997 Silent Assurance CENTCOM Qatar Safety of Americans
49 15 1998 Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
50 11 1998 Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
51 15 1998 Resolute Response CENTCOM Kenya Safety of Americans
52 31 1998 Desert Fox/Southern Watch CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats 3
53 24 1998 Desert Thunder CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
54 15 1998 Contingency Positioning CENTCOM Kuwait Safety of Americans
55 11 1998 Safe Departure CENTCOM Eritrea Safety of Americans
56 22 1998 Autumn Shelter AFRICOM Congo Safety of Americans
Determine Falcon/Deliberate
57 26 1998 Guard EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability
58 24 1998 Silver Knight
59 22 1998 Silver Knight / Balkan Calm EUCOM Albania Safety of Americans 1
Noble Anvil, Allied Force,
60 24 1998 Steel Knight EUCOM Adriatic Safety of Americans
61 26 1999 Avid Response EUCOM Turkey Natural disaster 1
62 31 1999 Stabilize PACOM East Timor Localized instability
63 13 1999 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti CENTCOM Eritrea Safety of Americans
Shining Hope; Noble Anvil;
64 26 1999 Allied Force EUCOM Albania Localized instability 2
65 26 1999 Joint Guardian EUCOM Kosovo Safety of Americans 3
66 13 2000 Bold Samaritan PACOM East Timor Localized instability
67 31 2000 Stabilize PACOM East Timor Localized instability
68 15 2000 Stabilize PACOM East Timor Localized instability
69 26 2000 POTUS Support EUCOM Israel Safety of Americans
70 24 2000 Dynamic Response EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability
71 11 2001 Stabilize PACOM East Timor Localized instability
72 26 2001 OEF CENTCOM Afghanistan Int'l security threats
73 15 2001 Stabilize PACOM East Timor Localized instability
74 15 2001 OEF CENTCOM Afghanistan Int'l security threats 6
75 15 2001 OEF CENTCOM Afghanistan Int'l security threats
76 11 2002 East Timor PACOM East Timor Localized instability

61
 Rifle
Cos
Index MEU Yr Event COCOM Location Situation ashore
77 31 2002 East Timor PACOM East Timor Localized instability
78 22 2002 Pakistan CENTCOM Pakistan Safety of Americans
79 11 2002 JSOTF-CRE CENTCOM Djibouti Safety of Americans
80 15 2003 OIF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats 3
81 24 2003 OIF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats 3
82 31 2003 East Timor PACOM East Timor Localized instability
83 26 2003 OIF CENTCOM Iraq/Kuwait Int'l security threats 2
84 24 2003 Dynamic Response EUCOM Kosovo Localized instability 3
85 26 2003 Shining Express AFRICOM Liberia Safety of Americans
86 31 2005 United Assistance PACOM Indonesia Natural disaster
87 15 2005 United Assistance PACOM Indonesia Natural disaster
88 31 2006 Southern Leyte PACOM Philippines Natural disaster
89 31 2006 Typhoon Durian PACOM Philippines Natural disaster
90 24 2006 JTF Lebanon CENTCOM Lebanon Safety of Americans
91 22 2007 Sea Angel II PACOM Bangladesh Natural disaster
92 11 2007 Sea Angel II PACOM Bangladesh Natural disaster
93 22 2007 OIF/OEF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
94 22 2007 Bowsprit CENTCOM Djibouti/Somalia Piracy concerns
95 26 2007 POTUS Support EUCOM Albania Safety of Americans
96 26 2007 Somalia/HOA CENTCOM Djibouti Localized instability
97 31 2008 Caring Response PACOM Burma Natural disaster
99 11 2008 OIF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
100 26 2008 OIF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
101 15 2008 M/V Gem (Singapore Flag) CENTCOM Arabian Sea Piracy concerns
102 11 2008 POTUS Support CENTCOM UAE Safety of Americans
103 31 2009 HADR PACOM Philippines Natural disaster
104 31 2009 HADR PACOM Indonesia Natural disaster
105 13 2009 OIF CENTCOM Iraq Int'l security threats
106 13 2009 POTUS Support CENTCOM Egypt Safety of Americans
107 13 2009 Not named CENTCOM Gulf of Aden Piracy concerns
108 22 2010 Unified Response SOUTHCOM Haiti Natural disaster
109 24 2010 United Response SOUTHCOM Haiti Natural disaster
110 26 2010 Pakistan flood relief CENTCOM Pakistan Natural disaster
111 26 2010 NEO/Stability Ops CENTCOM Bahrain Safety of Americans
112 15 2010 Pakistan flood relief CENTCOM Pakistan Natural disaster
113 15 2010 M/V Magellan Star (MRF) CENTCOM Somalia Piracy concerns
114 26 2010 National Mission Tasking AFRICOM Somalia Pursuit of terrorists
115 26 2010 National Mission Tasking CENTCOM Gulf of Aden Pursuit of terrorists
116 31 2011 Tomodachi PACOM Japan Natural disaster
117 31 2011 Sea Angel II PACOM Bangladesh Natural disaster
Odyssey Dawn/Unified
118 22 2011 Protector AFRICOM Libya Localized instability
119 13 2011 National Mission Tasking CENTCOM Gulf of Aden Pursuit of terrorists
120 22 2011 National Mission Tasking CENTCOM Yemen Pursuit of terrorists
Odyssey Dawn/Unified
121 26 2011 Protector AFRICOM Libya Int'l security threats

62
 Rifle
Cos
Index MEU Yr Event COCOM Location Situation ashore

122 24 2012 Sandy NORTHCOM New York Natural disaster

CENTCOM Theater
123 24 2012 Reserve/AFRICOM Support CENTCOM Gulf of Aden Safety of Americans
CENTCOM Theater
124 24 2012 Reserve/AFRICOM Support CENTCOM Red Sea Safety of Americans
125 24 2012 Not named EUCOM Med Safety of Americans
126 31 2012 POTUS Support PACOM Burma/Cambodia Safety of Americans
127 15 2012 NEO CENTCOM Sudan/Eritrea Safety of Americans
128 13 2013 Not named; new normal CENTCOM Red Sea Piracy concerns
RED Sea/Gulf of
129 13 2013 Not named; new normal CENTCOM Aden Pursuit of terrorists
RED Sea/Gulf of
130 13 2013 National Mission Tasking CENTCOM Aden Pursuit of terrorists

63
Appendix B. Amphibious ships
presence vs. crisis levels/locations
Figures 16-18 compare amphibious ship presence to ARG/MEU responses in
EUCOM/AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. The higher amphibious levels in PACOM
result from the FDNF ships based in Japan and the transit time of West Coast
ARG/MEUs on their way to CENTCOM.

Figure 16. Amphibious ship presence vs. ARG/MEU events (EUCOM/AFRICOM)

12
11
AFRICOM/EUCOM presence
Amphibious presence vs events

10
9
8 ARG/MEU events
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1994

1999

2004
1990
1991
1992
1993

1995
1996
1997
1998

2000
2001
2002
2003

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

64
 Amphibiuos presence vs events Amphibious presence vs events

10
11
12

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9

7
10
11
12

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1990
19…
1991
19…
1992
19…
1993
19…
1994
19…
1995 19…
1996 19…
1997 19…
1998 19…
1999 19…
2000 20…
2001 20…
2002 20…

65
2003 20…
2004 20…
2005 20…
2006 20…
2007 20…
2008 20…
2009 20…
20…
2010
Figure 18. Amphibious ships presence vs. ARG/MEU events (PACOM)

20…
2011
Figure 17. Amphibious ship presence vs. ARG/MEU events (CENTCOM)

20…
ARG/MEU events

2012
20…
CENTCOM presence

ARG/MEU events
PACOM presence

2013
Reference
[1] Broyles, David A. 2013. Historical MEB Employment. Unclassified. CNA
Corporation. DRM-2013-U-005714-Final.

[2] McQuaid, Julia. 2014. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces in
Africa: Development, Performance, and Challenges. Unclassified. CNA
Corporation.

[3] Geithner, Jonathan D. 2015. Historical ARG/MEU Employment. Unclassified.

Center for Naval Analyses. DRM-2015-U-009984-Final. doi: Feb 2015.

[4] Deal, Kim et al. 2003. Total Force Marine Corps. For Official Use Only, Limited
Distribution. The CNA Corporation. DRM-2013-U-005121-Final. doi: August
2013.

[5] Command, Marine Corps Combat Development. 2011. Marine Corps Doctrinal
Pub 1-0. In Marine Corps Operations: Department of the Navy, Headquarters
Marine Corps.

[6] MacLeod, Ian. 2013. Baseline vs. Provisional MEB. Secret. The CNA
Corporation. DFM-2013-C-004180. doi: March 2013.

[7] Berris, William, Ellia, Matthew, James Fallon, Raymond Kendoll, George
Markeit, and Michael Prosser. 2005. Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
Operations Capable) Relevancy in the Near Term. Unclassified. Marine Corps
University, Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center. doi: Jan 2005.

[8] Damren, Paul, Col, USMC. 2010. “31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU):
Overview and Issues.” Unclassified. III MEF Headquarters, 2010.

[9] Office, Congressional Budget. 2011. An Analysis of the Navy's Amphibious

Warfare Ships for Deploying Marines Overseas. In A CBO Study. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Budget Office.

[10] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 1998. Organization of Marine Corps Forces.

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[11] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 2012. Marine Corps Order 3502.3B. In Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and MEU (Special Operations Capable) (SOC) Pre-
Deployment Training Program (PTP). Washington, D.C.: Deparment of the
Navy.

66
[12] Papaj, Christopher J. 2000. Can the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) Enable A Marine Expeditionary Brigade?

[13] Nicholson, Lawrence D. 1994. An Analysis of the Twenty-One Missions of the

Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable).

[14] Unknown. 1960. “Fleet Marine Force.” Marine Corps Gazette. July 1960.

[15] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 1962. Marine Corps Order 2130.3. In The
Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

[16] Morrissey, W.J., Major, U.S. Army Reserve. 1992. “The USMC Special
Operations Capable (SOC) Concept: An Alternative Approach.” U.S. Army
Command and Staff College.

[17] Granger, Dennis E. 1994. The Marine Expeditionary Unit: A Limited

Conventional Response Force; Not a SOF Substitute.

[18] Gilbert, Ed, ed. 2006. US Marine Corps in the Vietnam War: III Marine
Amphbious Force 1965-1975. UK: Osprey Publishing.

[19] Alpha, SEVENTHFLT Landing Force. 1963-1969. SEVENTHFLT Landing Force

Alpha Command Chronologies.

[20] West, Michael B., Major, USMC. 1999. Evolution of the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade.

[21] McCaffree, Burnham C., RADM, USN (Ret.). 1995. Seventh Fleet Amphibous
Forces 1983-1993 and Marine Corps Forces in Japan. Unclassified. The CNA
Corporation. CIM 349. doi: Feb 1995.

[22] Suddreth, Stephen L, Major, USMC. 1996. “MEU (SOC): Answer To The Most
Likely Threat Into The Twenty-First Century.”

[23] Bartels, W.E and Schmidt, J.W. 1990. “MEU(SOC): Smarter Operations and
Fully Capable.” Marine Corps Gazette 74, 1. doi: Jan 1990.

[24] 1986. “The U.S. Marine Corps: The View from the Late 1980s.” James L. and
Jehn George, Christropher, ed. In 1986 Sea Power Forum, Washington, D.C.,
The Center for Naval Analysis.

[25] Laboratory, Marine Corps Warfighting. 2015. “Overview.” Marine Corps

Warfighting Laboratory. Accessed 14 June 2015.
http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/About.aspx.

[26] Command, Marine Corps Combat Development. 2010. Marine Corps

Operating Concept. In Assuring Littoral Access...Proven Crisis Response.
Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

[27] Nickerson, Charles S. and Brown, Andrew H. 2015. Aviation in the Future
ARG/MEU. Unclassified. The CNA Corporation. DRM-2015-U-010366-Final.
doi: May 2015.

67
[28] Defense, U.S. Department of. 2010. “Secretary of Defense Speech.”
Defense.gov. 3 May 2010. Accessed 23 May 2015.
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1460.

[29] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 1962. Marine Corps Order 3120.3. In The
Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Navy.

[30] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 1992. Marine Corps Order 3120.8A. Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[31] Love, John K., Maj USMC. 1997. “An Analysis of th Twenty-Nine Capabilities
of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable).” U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College doi: 5 Jun 1998.

[32] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 1994. Marine Corps Order 3120.9. Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[33] Kelley, Paul X. Gen, USMC. 1985. “The Marine Corps and Special Operations.”
Marine Corps Gazette. Oct 1985.

[34] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 2001. Marine Corps Order 3502.3A. In Marine
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training
Program (MEU(SOC) PTP). Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[35] Operations, Chief of Naval. 2010. OPNAV Instruction 3501.316B. In Policy for
Baseline Composition and Basic Mission Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and
Naval Groups. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[36] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 2001. Marine Corps Order 3120.9B W/CH 1. In
Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)).
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[37] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 2009. Marine Corps Order 3120.9C. In Policy for
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)). Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[38] Operations, Chief of Naval. 2007. OPNAV Instruction 3501.316A. In Policy for
the Composition and Mission Capabilities of Strike Forces, Strike Groups, and
OTher Major Deployable Units. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy.

[39] Staff, Joint Chiefs of. 2001. Joint Publication 3-02. In Doctrine for Amphibious
Operations. Washington, D.C.

[40] Powers, Jeffrey A, LtCol USMC. 1995. Maritime Special Purpose Force: What
Force for What Purpose? edited by Mark D. McMannis, Maj USMC. Quantico,
CA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

[41] Murray, Susan. 2006. “United States Marine Corps and Special Operations
Command: A Nineteen Year Convergence Towared a Marine Component.” U.S.
Army War College doi: 6 March 2006.

68
[42] Robinson, Mathew et.al. 2011. MARSOC Futures Study, Vol. 2: Case Study
Analysis. The CNA Corporation. D0025134. doi: Jun 2011.

[43] Denny, Darrin, and Daniel Q Greenwood. 2000. “The MEU(SOC) Program in
Transition.” Marine Corps Gazette 84 (6).

[44] Editorial. 1998. “Editorial: MEU(SOC)s.” Marine Core Gazette. March 1998.
[45] Corps, U.S. Marine. Undated. Amphibious Ready Group and Marine
Expeditionary Unit Overiew. Unknown. Original edition,
http://www.imef.marines.mil/news/meuoverview.aspx.

[46] Schroden, Jonathan and Broyles, David. 2015. Defining and Visualizing SOF-
GPF Integration for Crisis Prevention and Response. Unclassified. CNA. DRM-
2015-U-10304-Final. doi: April 2015.

[47] Unit, BONHOMME RICHARD Amphibious Ready Group 11th Marine

Expeditionary. 2009. “WESTPAC 09-2 Post Deployment Brief.”
SECRET/NOFORN.

[48] Gortney, Bill, ADM, USN. 2014. “Optimizing the Fleet Response Plan.”
Unclassified. 15 Jan 2014.

[49] Kurtz, James S. 2008. Analysis of Amphibious Ship Force Closure for Major
Combat Operations. Unclassified. The CNA Corporation. CRM D0016403.A2.
doi: Mar 2008.

[50] Command, Headquarters Marine Corps and United States Fleet Forces. 2014.
Disaggregated Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expditionary Unit Concept
of Employment.

[51] Learned, Marine Corps Center for Lessons. 2010. “15th Marine Expeditionary
Unit Collection December 2010.” Unclassified/For Official Use Only. Dec
2010.

[52] Benbow, Robert C. 2011. “Reconstruction of Operation Odyssey Dawn:

Expeditionary Operations.” Secret/NOFORN. Briefing, Apr-May 2011.

[53] ARG, 22nd MEU/Bataan. 2012. “BATAAN Amphibous Readiness Group/22nd

Marine Expeditionary Unit Post Deployment Brief.” Secret. 16 Mar 2012.

[54] MEU, 22d. 2012. “Post-Deployment Brief.” Unclassified. 2012.

[55] Staff, Joint Chiefs of. 2014. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Washington,
D.C.

[56] Mundy, Carl E. Sam, and Robert B. Sotire. 2008. “MEU Plus MSOC.” 92: 50.
EBSCOhost.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edo&AN=33112703
&site=eds-live.

[57] Jarvis, James D., Capt, USMC. 2003. “26th MEU (SOC) strives to bring stability
to Mosul.” 21 April 2003. Accessed 14 April 2015.

69
 http://www.26thmeu.marines.mil/News/tabid/2715/Article/516199/26th-
meu-soc-strives-to-bring-stability-to-mosul.aspx.

[58] Staff, Joint Chiefs of. 2011. Joint Publication 3-0. In Joint Operations.
Washington, D.C.

[59] Shubert, Frank N. 2013. Other Than War: The American Military Experience
and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Defense.

[60] North, James. 2002. 15th MEU Operations in Afghanistan: Reconstruction and
Analysis. Secret. The CNA Corporation. CRM D0006652.A1/Final. doi: July
2002.

[61] Unknown. 2014. U.S. Amphibious Operations, 1990-2013 (Updated 19 June

2014). MCCDC (not published).

[62] Benbow, Robert C. et. al. 2003. Amphibious Operations During Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF): Implications and Key Takeaways (U). Secret. The CNA
Corporation. CME D0013565.A1 Final.

[63] Frank, Benis M. 1987. US Marines In Lebanon, 1982-1984. Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps.

[64] Turner, David L. 1996. “Tanks with the MEU: A Team for Success.” Marine
Corps Gazette. Dec 1996. doi: Dec 1996.

[65] Mancini, Richard, Maj USMC. 1995. “Placing the M1A1 Common Main Battle
Tank Aboard Deployment Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations
Capable Forces.” Unclassified. Marine Corps Command and Staff College doi:
1995.

[66] Dundord, Joseph, Gen, USMC. 2015. Statement of General Joseph Dunford,
Commandant, United States Marines Corps, Before the Senate Arms Services
Committee. 10 Marcy 2015. Accessed.

[67] Corps, Headquarters Marine. 2014. Expedionary Force 21. Unclassified. doi: 4
Mar 2014.

70
 The CNA Corporation
This report was written by CNA Corporation’s Operations and Tactics
Analysis (OTA) division.

OTA analyzes potential system improvements, upgrades, or replacement;

the efficient, effective use of shared fiscal resources; and issues relating to
integration between the Navy and Marine Corps. Areas of focus include
combat systems, operational policy and training, warfare capabilities and
employment, and tactical naval issues.
DRM-2015-U-009984-2Rev

CNA Corporation is a not-for-profit research organization

that serves the public interest by providing
in-depth analysis and result-oriented solutions
to help government leaders choose
the best course of action
in setting policy and managing operations.

Nobody gets closer—

to the people, to the data, to the problem.

www.cna.org ● 703-824-2000

3003 Washington Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201