IMMANUEL KANT

Praaical philosophy

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

MARY J. GREGOR

GENERAL INTRODUCTION BY

ALLEN WOOD
Ytzle University

UCAMBRIDGE
V UNIVERSITY PRESS
The first paragraph of Kant's Groundwork; helpful as an intro, perhaps

Seaion I
Transition from common rational to
philosophic moral cognition

It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even

beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good
will. Understanding, wit, judgment3 and the like, whatever such talents of
mind' may be called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one's
plans, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable for
many purposes,' but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will
which is to make use of these gifts of nature, and whose distinctive
constitution" is therefore called character, is not good. It is the same with
gifts offortune. Power, riches, honor, even health and that complete well-
being and satisfactionv with one's condition called happiness, produce bold-
ness and thereby often arrogance"' as well unless a good will is present
which corrects the influence of these on the mind and, in so doing, also
corrects the whole principle of action and brings it into conformity with
universal endsx - not to mention that an impartial rational spectator can
take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced
· with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a good will seems to
constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy.
Some qualities are even conduciveY to this good will itself and can

'Geistes. Compare Kant's use of Geist in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (T225)
and of Geisteskriifie in The Metaphysics ofMorals (6:445).
' in mancher Absicht, perhaps "in many respects"
"Bescha./fenheit, occasionally translated as "character." "Constitution" is also used to translate
Einrichtung and sometimes Anlage, which is used rather loosely in the Groundwork.
v Kant uses a great variety of words for what could be called "pleasure" (Lust) in the most

general sense. Although he later draws broad distinctions among pleasures in terms of their
origins (e.g., between the pleasure of taste and that of sensation, and between both of these and
moral pleasure), these distinctions still leave a number of words problematic, Within the
Groundwork (4:396) he suggests a distinction between Zufriedenheit or "satisfaction" in general
and reason's own kind of Zufn"edenheit, which in that context I have translated as "content-
ment." However, his vocabulary is not consistent, and I have not attempted to make it so.
w Mut .. . Ubermut

x allgemein-zweckmiijlig mache

Y beforderlich. Compare The Metaphysics ofMorals (6:407-9). Befordern is usually translated as

"to further" or "to promote."

49
Idea 1: the categorical imperative
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative. For, how such an

absolute command is possible, even if we know its tenor, will still require
special and difficult toil, which, however, we postpone to the last section.
When I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know
beforehand what it will contain; I do not know this until I am given the
condition. But when I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what
it contains. For, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the
necessity that the maxim* be in conformity with this law, while the law 4:421
contains no condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with
which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law as
such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents
as necessary.
There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this:
aa only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it become a universal law.
Now, if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this single impera-
tive as from their principle, then, even though we leave it undecided
whether what is called duty is not as such an empty concept, we shall at
least be able to show what we think by it and what the concept wants to
say.
Since the universality of law in accordance with which effects take
place constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense
(as regards its form) - that is, the existence of things insofar as it is
determined in accordance with universal laws - the universal imperative
of duty can also go as follows: aa as if the maxim ofyour action were to become
by your will a universalla_w of nature.
We shall now enumerate a few duties in accordance with the usual
division of them into duties to ourselves and to other human beings and
into perfect and imperfect duties.t
1) Someone feels sick of life because of a series of troubles that has
grown to the point of despair, but is still so far in possession of his reason 4:422
that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to

"A maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the ol!Jeaive
principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the practical rule determined by
reason conformably with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or also his
inclinations), and is therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject acts; but the
law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance
with which he ought to aa, i.e., an imperative.
tit must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties entirely for a future Metaphysics of
Morals, so that the division here stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of
arranging my examples). For the rest, I understand here by a perfect duty one that admits no
exception in favor of inclination, and then I have not merely external but also internal perfoa
duties; although this is contrary to the use of the work adopted in the schools, I do not intend
to justifY it here, since for my purpose it makes no difference whether or not it is granted me.

73
 IMMANUEL KANT

himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his
action could indeed become a universal law of nature. His maxim, how-
ever, is: from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its
longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness.
The only further question is whether this principle of self-love could
become a universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a nature
whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling
whose destinationd is to impel toward the furtherance oflife would contra-
dict itself and would therefore not subsist' as nature; thus that maxim
could not possibly be a law of nature and, accordingly, altogether opposes
the supreme principle of all duty.
2) Another finds himself urged by need to borrow money. He well
knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be
lent him unless he promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time.
He would like to make such a promise, but he still has enough conscience
to ask himself: is it not forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out
of need in such a way? Supposing that he still decided to do so, his maxim
of action would go as follows: when I believe myself to be in need of
money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know
that this will never happen. Now this principle of self-love or personal
advantage is perhaps quite consistent with my whole future welfare, but
the question now is whether it is right. I therefore turn the demand of
self-love into a universal law and put the question as follows: how would it
be if my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could
never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but
must necessarily contradict itself. For, the universality of a law that every-
one, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he
pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and
the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe
what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain
pretenses.
3) A third finds in himself a talent that by means of some cultivation
4:423 could make him a human being useful for all sorts of purposes. However,
he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to give himself
up to pleasure than to trouble himself with enlarging and improving his
fortunate natural predispositions/ But he still asks himself whether his
maxim of neglecting his natural gifts, besides being consistent with his
propensity to amusement, is also consistent with what one calls duty. He
now sees that a nature could indeed always subsist with such a universal
law, although (as with the South Sea Islanders) the human being should

d Bestimmung

'bestehen
f Naturanlagen

74
 GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS

let his talents rust and be concerned with devoting his life merely to
idleness, amusement, procreation- in a word, to enjoyment; only he can-
not possibly will that this become a universal law or be put in us as such
by means of natural instinct. For, as a rational being he necessarily wills
that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are
given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.
Yet a fourth, for whom things are going well while he sees that others
(whom he could very well help) have to contend with great hardships,
thinks: what is it to me? let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can
make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do
not care to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need!
Now, if such a way of thinking were to become a universal law the human
race could admittedly very well subsist, no doubt even better than when
everyone prates about sympathy and benevolence and even exerts himself
to practice them occasionally, but on the other hand also cheats where he
can, sells the right of human beings or otherwise infringes upon it. But
although it is possible that a universal law of nature could very well subsist
in accordance with such a maxim, it is still impossible to will that such a
principle hold everywhere as a law of nature. For, a will that decided this
would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one
would need the love and sympathyg of others and in which, by such a law
of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the
assistance he wishes for himself.
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least of what we take to
be such, whose derivationh from the one principle cited above is clear. We 4:424
must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law: this
is the canon of moral appraisal of action in general. Some actions are so
constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction
as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become
such. In the case of others that inner impossibility is indeed not to be
found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the
universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself.
It is easy to see that the first is opposed to strict or narrower (unremitting);
duty, the second only to wide (meritorious) duty; and so all duties, as far as
the kind of obligation (not the object of their action) is concerned, have by
these examples been set out completely in their dependence upon the one
principle.
If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find
that we do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law,
since that is impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should

g Teilnehmung
h reading Ableitung instead of Abteilung, "classification"
'unnachlajllich

75
Idea 2: never lie

On a supposed right to lie from

philanthropy a

In the journal Frankreich im Jahr 1797, Part VI, No. I, "On Political
Reactions" by Benjamin Constant contains the following (p. 123).
"The moral principle 'it is a duty to tell the truth' would, if taken
unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible. We have proof of
this in the very direct consequences drawn from this principle by a Ger- The
"German
man philosopher, who goes so far as to maintain that it would be a crime
philosopher"
to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is is Kant
pursuing has taken refuge in our house."*
The French philosopher rebuts this principle as follows (p. 124): "It is
The "French
a duty to tell the truth. The concept of duty is inseparable from the philosopher"
concept of right. A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds is Constant
to the rights of another. Where there are no rights, there are no duties. To
tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to one who has a right to the
truth. But no one has a right to a truth that harms others."
The Jt:QWtoV 1\JcuOol;h here lies in the proposition "To tell the truth is a
duty, but only to one who has a right to the truth."
It is to be noted, first, that the expression "to have a right to the truth" 8:426
is meaningless. One must instead say one has a right to his own truthful-
ness (veracitas), that is, to the subjective truth in his person. 4 For to have a
right to a truth objectively would be tantamount to saying that, as in the
case with what is yours or mine generally, it is a matter of one's will
whether a given proposition is to be true or false; and this would give rise
to an extraordinary logic.
Now the first question is whether someone, in cases where he cannot
evade an answer of "yes" or "no," has the authorization (the right) to be
untruthful. The second question is whether he is not, indeed, bound to be

*"J. D. Michaelis of Gi.ittingen' put forward this extraordinary opinion earlier than Kant.
The author of this paper himself told me that the philosopher spoken of in this passage is
Kant." K. F. Cramert'
ti hereby grant that I actually said this somewhere or other, though I cannot now recall
where.3
a aus Menschenliebe
b original falsity

611
 IMMANUEL KANT

untruthful in a certain statement which he is compelled' to make by an

unjust constraint, d in order to prevent a threatened misdeed to himself or
to another.
Truthfulness in statements that one cannot avoid is a human being's
duty to everyone,* however great the disadvantage to him or to another
that may result from it; and although I indeed do no wrong to him who
unjustly compels me to make the statement if I falsity it, I nevertheless do
wrong in the most essential part of duty in general by such falsification,
which can therefore be called a lie (though not in a jurist's sense); that is, I
bring it about, as far as I can, that statements (declarations) in general are
not believed, and so too that all rights which are based on contracts come
to nothing and lose their force; and this is a wrong inflicted upon human-
ity generally.
Thus a lie, defined merely as an intentionally untrue declaration to
another, does not require what jurists insist upon adding for their defini-
tion, that it must harm another (mendacium est folsiloquium in praeiudicium
alterius).'sFor it always harms another, even if not another individual,
nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right
unusable.
Such a well-meant lie can, however, also become by an accident (casus)
8:427 punishable in accordance with civil laws; but what escapes being punish-
able merely by accident can be condemned as wrong even in accordance
with external laws. That is to say, if you have by a lie prevented someone
just now bent on murder from committing the deed, then you are legally!
accountable for all the consequences that might arise from it. But if you
have kept strictly to the truth, then public justice can hold nothing against
you, whatever the unforeseen consequences might be. 6 It is still possible
that, after you have honestly answered "yes" to the murderer's question as
to whether his enemy is at home, the latter has nevertheless gone out
unnoticed, so that he would not meet the murderer and the deed would
not be done; but if you had lied and said that he is not at home, and he has
actually gone out (though you are not aware of it), so that the murderer
encounters him while going away and perpetrates his deed on him, then
you can by rightg be prosecuted as the authorh of his death. For if you had

*I here prefer not to sharpen this principle to the point of saying: "Untruthfulness is a
violation of duty to oneself." For this belongs to ethics, but what is under discussion here is a
duty of right. The doctrine of virtue looks, in this transgression, only to worthlessness,
reproach for which a liar draws upon himself.
'notigt
d ungerechter Zwang
' a lie is speaking falsely in prejudice to another
fauf rechtliche Art
g mit Recht

h Urheber

612
 ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE FROM PHILANTHROPY

told the truth to the best of your knowledge, then neighbors might have
come and apprehended the murderer while he was searching the house
for his enemy and the deed would have been prevented. Thus one who
tells a lie, however well disposed he may be, must be responsible for its
consequences even before a civil court and must pay the penalty for them,
however unforeseen they may have been; for truthfulness is a duty that
must be regarded as the basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the
law of which is made uncertain and useless if even the least exception to it
is admitted.
To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred com-
mand of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by
any conveniences. i
In this connection Constant makes a well-considered and also correct
remark about the decrying of principles so strict that they allegedly lose
themselves in impracticable ideas and are thus to be repudiated. "Every
time," he says (at the bottom of p. I 23), "that a principle proved to be true
seems inapplicable, this is because we do not know the intermediary princi-
ple/ which contains the means of application." He adduces (p. 121) the
doctrine of equality as the first link in the formation of the social chain:
"namely, (p. 122) that no human being can be bound except through laws
to the formation of which he has contributed. In a very closely knit society
this principle can be applied in an immediate way and needs no interme- 8:428
diary principle in order to become a common one. But in a very large
society one must add a new principle to the principle that we have here
put forward. This intermediary principle is that individuals can contribute
to the formation of laws either in their own person or through representa-
tives. One who wanted to apply the first principle to a Iarge society without
adopting the intermediary one in order to do so would inevitably bring
about its ruin. But this circumstance, which would only testifY to the
ignorance or incompetencek of the legislator, would prove nothing against
the principle." He concludes (p. 125) with these words: "A principle
recognized as true must therefore never be abandoned, however apparent
is the danger present in it." 1 (And yet the good man himself had aban-
doned the unconditional principle of truthfulness because of the danger
to society it brought with it, since he could discover no intermediary
principle that would serve to prevent this danger, and here there is actu-
ally no such principle to be inserted.)
If we are going to keep the names of persons as they were specified
here, "the French philosopher" confused an action by which someone

' Convenienzen
i mitt/ern Grundsatz
k Ungeschicklichkeit
1
wie anscheinend auch Gefahr dabei sich befindet

613
 Idea 3: God and immortality

IMMANUEL KANT

the latter into its domain, while the latter would extend its boundaries over
everything and, when its need required, would try to include the former
within them. But one cannot require pure practical reason to be subordi-
nate to speculative reason and so reverse the order, since all interest is
ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only conditional
and is complete in practical use alone.

5:122 IV.
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL AS A
POSTULATE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

The production of the highest good in the world is the necessary object of
a will determinable by the moral law. But in such a will the complete
conformity' of dispositions with the moral law is the supreme condition of
the highest good. This conformity must therefore be just as possible as its
object is, since it is contained in the same command to promote the
object. Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is, however,
holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is
capable at any moment' of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required
as practically necessary, it can only be found in an endless progress' toward
that complete conformity, and in accordance with principles of pure practi-
cal reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real
object of our will.
This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposi-
tion of the existence and personality of the same rational being continu-
ing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul). Hence the
highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the
immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the
moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I under-
stand a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such,
insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid
praaicallaw).
The proposition about the moral vocation of our nature, that only in an
endless progress can we attain complete conformity with the moral law, is
of the greatest usefulness, not merely in regard to the present supplement
to the incapacity of speculative reason but also with respect to religion. In
default of it, one either quite degrades the moral law from its holiness by
making it out to be lenient (indulgent) and thus conformed to our conve-
nience, or else strains ones's calling as well as ones's expectation to an
unattainable vocation, namely to a hoped-for full acquisition of holiness of

'or "fitness," Angemessenheit

' Zeitpunkte
'Or "a progress to infinity," ins Unendliche gehend

238
 CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

will, and SO gets lost in enthusiastic theosophical dreams that quite contra- 5:123
diet self-knowledge;" in both cases, constant effort to observe precisely and
fully a strict and inflexible command of reason, which is yet not ideal but
true, is only hindered. For a rational but finite being only endless progress
from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible. The eternal
being, v to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what is to us an
endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holi-
ness that his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable
with his justice in the share he determines for each in the highest good is
to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of
rational beings. All that a creature can have with respect to hope for this
share is consciousness of his tried disposition, so that, from the progress
he has already made from the worse to the morally better and from the
immutable resolution he has thereby come to know, he may hope for a
further uninterrupted continuance of this progress, however long his exis-
tence may last, even beyond this life;* and thus he cannot hope, either
here or in any foreseeable future moment of his existence, to be fully
adequate to God's will (without indulgence or dispensation, which do not
harmonize with justice); he can hope tO be SO only in the endlessness of 5:124
his duration (which God alone can survey).
You could stop here, or read
on, if you're brave...
v.
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AS A POSTULATE
OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON

In the preceding analysis the moral law led to a practical task that is set by
pure reason alone and without the aid of any sensible incentives, namely
that of the necessary completeness of the first and principal part of the

*Conviction of the immutability of one's disposition in progress toward the good seems,
nevertheless, to be in itself impossible for a creature. Because of this the Christian religious
doctrine has it come only from the same spirit that works sanctification, i.e., this firm
resolution and with it consciousness of steadfastness in moral progress. But even in a natural
way, someone who is aware of having persisted through a long portion of his life up to its end
in progress to the better, and this from genuine moral motives, may very well have the
comforting hope, though not certitude, that even in an existence continuing beyond this life
he will persevere in these principles; and although he is never justified here in his own eyes,
and can never hope to be justified even given the future increase of natural perfection to
which he looks forward - but with it of his duties as well - nevertheless in this progress
which, though it has to do with a goal endlessly postponed, yet holds for -God as possession,
he can have a prospect of a future of beatitude; for this is the expression that reason employs
to designate complete well-being independent of all contingent causes in the world, which,
like holiness, is an idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and
hence is never fully attained by a creature.
" Selbsterkenntniss
v Or "The Infinite Being," Der Unendliche

239
 IMMANUEL KANT

highest good, morality; and, since this can be fully accomplished only in
an eternity, it led to the postulate of immortality. The same law must also
lead to the possibility of the second element of the highest good, namely
happiness proportioned to that morality, and must do so as disinterest-
edly as before, solely from impartial reason; in other words, it must lead to
the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect, that is,
it must postulate the existence of God as belonging necessarily to the possi-
bility of the highest good (which object of our will is necessarily connected
with the moral lawgiving of pure reason). We shall present this connection
in a convincing manner.
Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of
whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will, and rests,
therefore, on the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as with the
essential determining ground of his will. Now, the moral law as a law of
freedom commands through determining grounds that are to be quite
independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as
incentives); the acting rational being in the world is, however, not also the
cause of the world and of nature itself. Consequendy, there is not the least
ground in the moral law for a necessary connectionw between the morality
and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part
of it and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will
be a cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot
by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical princi-
5: 12 5 ples. Nevertheless, in the practical task of pure reason, that is, in the
necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is postulated as
necessary: we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must
therefore be possible). Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature,
distinct from nature, which contains the ground of this connection,
namely of the exact correspondence of happiness with morality, is also
postulated. However, this supreme cause is to contain the ground of the
correspondence of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational
beings but with the representation of this law, so far as they make it the
supreme determining ground of the will, and consequendy not merely with
morals in their form but also with their morality as their determining
ground, that is, with their moral disposition. Therefore, the highest good
in the world is possible only insofar as a supreme cause of nature having a
causality in keeping with the moral disposition is assumed. Now, a being
capable of actions in accordance with the representation of laws is an
intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being in accor-
dance with this representation of laws is his will. Therefore the supreme
cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is
a being that is the cause of nature by understanding and will (hence its

w Zusammenhang

240
 CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

author), that is, God. Consequently, the postulate of the possibility of the
highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality
of a highest original good, namely of the existence of God. Now, it was a
duty for us to promote the highest good; hence there is in us not merely
the warrant but also the necessity, as a need connected with duty, to
presuppose the possibility of this highest good, which, since it is possible
only under the condition of the existence of God, connects the presupposi-
tion of the existence of God inseparably with duty; that is, it is morally
necessary to assume the existence of God.
It is well to note here that this moral necessity is subjeaive, that is, a
need, and not objeaive, that is, itself a duty; for, there can be no duty to
assume the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical
use of reason). Moreover, it is not to be understood by this that it is
necessary to assume the existence of God as a ground of all obligation in
general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently shown, solely on the auton- 5:126
omy of reason itself). What belongs to duty here is only the striving to
produce and promote the highest good in the world, the possibility of
which can therefore be postulated, while our reason finds this thinkable
only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence; to assume the exis-
tence of this supreme intelligence is thus connected with the conscious-
ness of our duty, although this assumption itself belongs to theoretical
reason; with respect to theoretical reason alone, as a ground of explana-
tion, it can be called a hypothesis; but in relation to the intelligibility of an
object given us by the moral law (the highest good), and consequently if a
need for practical purposes, it can be called belief" and, indeed, a pure
rational belief since pure reason alone (in its theoretical as well as in its
practical use) is the source from which it springs.
From this deduaion it now becomes comprehensible why the Greek
schools could never solve their problem of the practical possibility of the
highest good: it was because they made the rule of the use which the
human will makes of its freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this
possibility, without, as it seemed to them, needing the existence of God
for it. They were indeed correct in establishing the principle of morals by
itself, independently of this postulate and solely from the relation of
reason to the will, so that they made it the supreme practical condition of
the highest good; but this principle was not on this account the whole
condition of its possibility. The Epicureans had indeed assumed an alto-
gether false principle of morals as supreme, namely that of happiness, and
had substituted for a law a maxim of each choosing as he pleased accord-
ing to his inclination;' they proceeded, however, consistently enough in this
by demeaning their highest good in the same way, namely in proportion to

x Or "faith," Glaube
Y der beliebigen Wahl nach jedes seiner Neigung

241