FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE

METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785)

(in part)
By:
IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

Translated by: T.K. Abbott

Additions, corrections, and footnotes by Barry F. Vaughan1

SECTION I

TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY TO THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without
qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however
they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly
good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and
mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called
character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, and the
general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and
often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this
also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not
adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give
pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable
condition even of being worthy of happiness.

There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action,
yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies
the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good.
Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many
respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from
deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by
the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the
coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more

1
This text is taken from Project Gutenberg's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, by Immanuel
Kant, www.gutenberg.org.
I have also changed UK spellings to US spellings where appropriate, as well as made clarifications in translation
noted with brackets and added explanatory footnotes and emphases in italics. This text is intended for academic or
personal use and may not be sold or used for profit.
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abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of
some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by
itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination,
nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavor of
fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to
accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain
only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then,
like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its
usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were,
only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it
the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to
determine its value.

There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no
account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the
idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and
that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will.
Therefore, we will examine this idea from this point of view.

Reason is the Guide of the Will

In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of
life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also
the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper
object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit
upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the
actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct,
would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby
much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this
favored creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its
nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but
not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the
purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into
practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of
happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of
the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.

And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the
enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this
circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology,
that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it,
because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of
common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the
understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather
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than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of
men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on
their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgment of those who would very much lower the lofty
eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or
who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with
which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgments the idea that our existence
has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and
which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for
the most part, be postponed.

For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction
of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted
instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as
a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature
generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must
be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason
was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the
supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness....

The First Propositions of Morality

We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good
without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding,
requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions
always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take
the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions
and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it
out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter....

On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct
inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic
worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not
because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away
the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or
dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it-not from inclination or fear, but
from duty-then his maxim has a moral worth.

To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically
constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy
around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I
maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, bas
nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honor,
which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and
consequently honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the
moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the
mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot
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of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their
trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead
insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has
his action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature bas put little sympathy in the heart of this or
that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings
of others, perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and
fortitude and supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same - and such a man would
certainly not be the meanest product of nature - but if nature had not specially framed him for a
philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth
than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth
of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent,
not from inclination, but from duty.

To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under a
pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to
transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and
most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in
one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some
inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction of
all of them which is called happiness. It is not then to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite
both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to overcome
such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, and to
suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on this occasion at least, be has not sacrificed the
enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed
to be found in health. But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not influence his will,
and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this calculation, there yet
remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from
inclination but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth [this is the first
proposition of morality].

It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we
are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded,
but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay, are
even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological—a
love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense—in principles of action and not of
tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.

The Second Propositions of Morality

The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose
which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not
depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the
action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the
purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the
will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is
not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the
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principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands
between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between
two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it that it must be determined by the formal
principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been
withdrawn from it.

The Third Propositions of Morality

The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus: 'Duty' is the
necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my
proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an
energy of will. Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at
most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favorable to my own
interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect—what does
not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its
calculation—in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a
command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it
every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law,
and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this
law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of
action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects—
agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others—could have been
also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a
rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The
pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law
in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the
expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts
accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result.

The Ultimate Principle of Morality: The Categorical Imperative

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying
any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and
without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from
obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general,
which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also
will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in
general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its
principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common
reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the
principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with
the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question
may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may
undoubtedly of be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present
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difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter
spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all
my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be
much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered
whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and to make it a
habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a
maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be
truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very
notion of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to
see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle
of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very
advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an
unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is
to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false
promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? and should I be able to
say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from
which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the
lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no
promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those
who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin.
Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself....

SECTION II

THE TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF

MORALS

Morality Derived from Reason, not Empirical Observation

If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our practical reason, it is by no
means to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical notion.2 On the contrary, if we attend to the
experience of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves allow, just complaints that one
cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty. Although many things are
done in conformity with what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done
strictly from duty, so as to have a moral worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers who
have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at all in human actions, and have ascribed
everything to a more or less refined self-love (e.g., Ethical Egoism and Hedonism). Not that they have
on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of morality; on the contrary, they spoke with
sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature, which, though noble enough to take its rule
an idea so worthy of respect, is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to give it the law
only for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations, whether singly or at the best in the
greatest possible harmony with one another....

When we add further that, unless we deny that the notion of morality has any truth or reference to any

2
By “empirical notion” Kant means an idea derived from sensory perception.
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possible object, we must admit that its law must be valid, not merely for men but for all rational
creatures generally, not merely under certain contingent conditions or with exceptions but with absolute
necessity, then it is clear that no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such
[uncontestable] laws. For with what right could we bring into unbounded respect as a universal precept
for every rational nature that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity? Or
how could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the determination of the will of
rational beings generally, and for us only as such, if they were merely empirical and did not take their
origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason....

From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a
priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the
highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore
merely contingent, knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve
as our supreme practical principle, and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract
from their genuine influence and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not only of the greatest
necessity, in a purely speculative point of view, but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive
these notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to determine the
compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge, i.e., to determine the whole faculty of pure
practical reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of
human reason, though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be
necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature, we must derive them
from the general concept of a rational being....

The Difference between Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting
according to the conception of laws—that is according to principles—i.e., have a will. Since the
deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason
infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively
necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason
independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does
not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular
impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in
itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which
objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will
according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is
not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of
reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of
reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.

All imperatives are expressed by the word ‘ought’ [or ‘shall’], and thereby indicate the relation of an
objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by
it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will
which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good,
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however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from
subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such.
It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from
merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason,
which holds for every one.

A perfectly good will would, therefore, be equally subject to objective laws (viz., laws of good), but
could not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully, because of itself from its subjective
constitution it can only be determined by the conception of good. Therefore, no imperatives hold for the
Divine will, or in general for a holy will; ought is here out of place, because the volition is already of
itself necessarily in unison with the law. Therefore, imperatives are only formulae to express the
relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational
being, e.g., the human will.

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical
necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might
possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of
itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is
practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which
is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If the action is good only as a
means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and
consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is
categorical....

Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible
or actual. In the first case it is a problematical, in the second an [asserted] practical principle. The
categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself, without reference to
any purpose ... is valid as a [demonstrated] (i.e., practical) principle....

The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: The Universal Law

....There is, therefore, but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Now if all imperatives of duty can
be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided
what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand
by it and what this notion means....

Four Illustrations of the Universal Law

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to
others, and into perfect and imperfect.

1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in
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possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself
to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of
nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration
is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on
self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it
should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence
that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly
inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.

2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to
repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite
time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not
unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" Suppose however that he
resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want
of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now
this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future
welfare; but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal
law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at
once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For
supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to
promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would
become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider
that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.

3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in
many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure
rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however,
whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence,
agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such
a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to
devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to
enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in
us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be
developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and
that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven
pleases, or as be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish
to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of
thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in
a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into
practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates
them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that
maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature.
For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one
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would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from
his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into
two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our
action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally.
Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as
a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. In others this
intrinsic impossibility is not found, but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to
the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the
former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has
been completely shown how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of
the action) on the same principle.

The Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: Rational Agents as Ends-In-Themselves

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of
certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as
the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must
hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of
the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is
the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence the distinction between subjective
ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being.
Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material when they
assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to
himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their
relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot
furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say
practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth,
something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone
would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to
be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other
rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have
only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their
object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from
having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal
wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is to be
acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on
nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore
called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them
out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far
therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely
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subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends....

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it
must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone
because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a
universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man
necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human
actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle
that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical
law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be
as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in [your] own person or in that of any other, in every
case as an end [itself], never as means only. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried
out.

Four Illustrations

To abide by the previous examples: Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who
contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity
as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person
merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is
to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered
as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate
him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to
avoid all misunderstanding, e. g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to
exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking
of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a
mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such
a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and,
therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in
other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For
then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a
means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is,
as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.

Thirdly, as regards contingent (i.e., meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does
not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are
in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to
humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance
of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end.

Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end which all men have is their own
happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all this would
only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if every one does not also
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endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end
in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to have its full effect with me.

The Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: The Autonomy of the Will

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself (which is the supreme
limiting condition of every man's freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it
is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of
determining anything about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end to men
(subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an
objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends,
let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all
practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of universality which
makes it capable of being a law (say, e. g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end;
now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in
itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its
harmony with universal practical reason, viz.,: the idea of the will of every rational being as a
universally legislative will.

On this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the will being itself universal
legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded as itself
giving the law and, on this ground only, subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)....

Thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all its maxims gives universal laws, provided
it be otherwise justified, would be very well adapted to be the categorical imperative, in this respect,
namely, that just because of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on interest, and therefore it
alone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional. Or still better, converting the proposition, if
there is a categorical imperative (i.e., a law for the will of every rational being), it can only command
that everything be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will which could at the same time will
that it should itself give universal laws, for in that case only the practical principle and the imperative
which it obeys are unconditional, since they cannot be based on any interest.

Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of morality, we need not wonder
why they all failed. It was seen that man was bound to laws by duty, but it was not observed that the
laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving, though at the same time they are universal,
and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will; a will, however, which is designed by
nature to give universal laws. For when one has conceived man only as subject to a law (no matter
what), then this law required some interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, since it did not
originate as a law from his own will, but this will was according to a law obliged by something else to
act in a certain manner. Now by this necessary consequence all the labor spent in finding a supreme
principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from a
certain interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, in any case the imperative must be
conditional and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command. I will therefore call this
the principle of autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other which I accordingly reckon as
heteronomy.