Annexation of

Junagadh

Junagadh was a princely state of the

British Raj, located in what is now
Gujarat, outside but under the suzerainty
of British India.
 Annexation of Junagadh

The State of Junagadh in 1947

Date 1947
Location Junagadh State
Result Indian victory
Territorial Junagadh Annexed
changes
Pakistani control withdrawn
 Belligerents
India Pakistan
Junagadh State
Commanders and leaders
Jawaharlal Nehru M. A. Jinnah
Vallabhbhai Patel Liaquat Ali Khan
Mahabat Khan

In the independence and partition of

British India of 1947, the 565 princely
states were given a choice to either join
the new Dominion of India or the newly
formed state of Pakistan.
The Nawab of Junagadh, Muhammad
Mahabat Khanji III, a Muslim whose
ancestors had ruled Junagadh and small
principalities for some two hundred
years, decided that Junagadh should
become part of Pakistan, much to the
displeasure of many of the people of the
state, an overwhelming majority of whom
were Hindus, about 80%. The Nawab
acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan on
15 August 1947, against the advice of
Lord Mountbatten, arguing that
Junagadh joined Pakistan by sea. The
principality of Babariawad and Sheikh of
Mangrol reacted by claiming
independence from Junagadh and
accession to India,[1] although the Sheikh
of Mangrol withdrew his accession to
India the very next day.[2] Muhammad Ali
Jinnah waited for a month to accept the
Instrument of Accession. When Pakistan
accepted the Nawab's Instrument of
Accession on 16 September, the
Government of India was outraged that
Jinnah could accept the accession of
Junagadh despite his argument that
Hindus and Muslims could not live as one
nation. Home minister Vallabhbhai Patel
believed that if Junagadh was permitted
to go to Pakistan, it would exacerbate the
communal tension already simmering in
Gujarat.
The princely state was surrounded on all
of its land borders by India, with an
outlet onto the Arabian Sea. The
unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led
to a cessation of all trade with India and
the food position became precarious.
With the region in crisis, the Nawab,
fearing for his life, felt forced to flee to
Karachi with his family and his followers,
and there he established a provisional
government.
Vallabhbhai Patel offered Pakistan time to
reverse its acceptance of the accession
and to hold a plebiscite in Junagadh.
Meanwhile, tensions were simmering in
the regional areas and in major cities
such as Bombay against Nawab's
decision. 25,000 - 30,000 people
belonging to Saurashtra and Junagadh
gathered in Bombay, proclaiming to
"liberate" Junagadh from the Nawab's
regime. Samaldas Gandhi formed a
government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat
(lit. Temporary government) of the
people of Junagadh. Eventually, Patel
ordered the forcible annexation of
Junagadh's three principalities.
Junagadh's state government, facing
financial collapse and lacking forces with
which to resist Indian force, invited the
Government of India to take control. A
plebiscite was conducted in December, in
which approximately 99.95% of the
people chose India over Pakistan.[3]
Scholars have observed that India
annexed Junagadh through force[4][5][6][7]
with scholars viewing the annexation as
part of a wider programme by the Indian
state of getting the rulers of princely
states to accede into a unified post
colonial India.[8][9]
Background
After the announcement by the last
Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 3
June 1947, of the intention to partition
British India, the British parliament
passed the Indian Independence Act
1947 on 18 July 1947. As a result, the
native states were left with these choices:
to accede to either of the two new
dominions, India or Pakistan or to remain
an independent state.
The constitutional adviser to the Nawab
of Junagadh, Nabi Baksh, and Junagadh's
ministers gave the impression to
Mountbatten that Junagadh intended to
accede to India.[10] However, Muslim
League politicians from Sindh had joined
Junagadh's executive council since May,
and the state's diwan was away for
health reasons, leaving the charge with
Shah Nawaz Bhutto.[a] Bhutto met Jinnah
in July, who advised him to hold out till
15 August under any circumstances.[11]
Accordingly, the state continued to give
the impression till the last moment that it
was intending to join India along with
other Kathiawar states.[12]
Four days
before independence, under the
influence of the Muslim League
politicians, the Nawab decided to join
Pakistan, and sent a delegation to
Karachi to negotiate terms with
Pakistan,[13][14] disregarding
Mountbatten's contiguity principle.[15]
Mountbatten's contention was that only
states bordering Pakistan should accede
to it. Evidently, it was not a constitutional
requirement, only a political one.[16] The
Nawab and Pakistan reasoned that
Junagadh was close enough to Pakistan
and linked by a sea route (Veraval to
Karachi).[17]
Junagadh, under the amendments done
to the Government of India Act 1935, had
political bonds with the neighboring
states of Mangrol and Babariawad. In
1943, The latter states were tied to
Junagadh through an attachment
scheme, but when the act was adopted
in 1947, the amendments had not carried
over, and this lapse was the base on
which VP Menon argued that Junagadh
did not have a say in the affairs of
Mangrol and Babariawad states.[18]
Nehru strategised that if Junagadh didn't
recognize the accession of Mangrol and
Babariawad and withdraw its forces from
the latter, then he would send in forces,
information of which he sent to Pakistan
and Britain. Meanwhile, a study case of
India regarding Junagadh was made in
the international opinion through press
communiques that provided information
on Junagadh's geographical contiguity to
Indian landscape and its
demographics.[18]
Instrument of accession

IoA of Junagadh, first page

Mountbatten and Ayyangar both agreed

that the issue of geographical contiguity
had no legal standing and that
Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was
strictly and legally correct. But Sardar
Patel demanded that the matter of the
state's accession should be decided by its
people instead of the ruler.[19] Nehru laid
out India's position which was that India
did not accept Junagadh's accession to
Pakistan.[20]
Later at the United Nations Security
Council, India's argument revolved
around the wishes of the people which it
accused the Nawab of ignoring. India's
representative at the UNSC was also
advised to avoid legalistic arguments
about the Instrument of Accession
because of the effect it could have on
Kashmir.[21]
Provisional government
(Aarzee Hukumat)
Upon Menon's advice[22] Mahatma
Gandhi's nephew, Samaldas Gandhi,
created a provisional government in
Bombay with the provincial government's
backing.[23][24] This government received
support from the 'Gujarat States
Organisation' and also received
sponsorship from the Kathiawar States'
Political Conference.[25][22][b]
Samaldas Gandhi, U. N. Dhebar and
members of Junagadh People's
Conference met at the office of Gujarati
daily Vande Mataram in Bombay on 19
August 1947. He was specially invited to
attend Kathiawar Political Conference on
25 August 1947. A five-member
committee called Junagadh Committee
was formed on 15 September 1947.
Gandhi met V. P. Menon and proposed to
formed the a government-in-exile the
Aarzi Hakumat or Provisional Government
of Junagadh State. On 25 September
1947, the Aarzi Hukumat headed by
Samaldas Gandhi was declared in a
public meeting at Madhavbagh in
Bombay.[29]
The five member ministry of Aarzi
Hakumat went to Rajkot. Gandhi became
the Prime Minister and also held ministry
of foreign affairs. Aarzi Hakumat
captured 160 villages in forty days, from
30 September to 8 November 1947.[29]
India allowed the provisional government
to take control over outlying areas of
Junagadh.[30][23] India later at the UN
Security Council denied ever having
supported the provisional
government.[31][32] Pakistan objected to
India's indifference to the actions of
Junagadh's provisional government.[33]
Nehru wrote to Pakistan that the
provisional government was "a
spontaneous expression of popular
resentment" to the state's accession to
Pakistan by Junagadh's local population.
Blockade and Indian
annexation
To force the Nawab of Junagadh to
change his decision, the Provisional
Government (Aarzee Hukumat) and the
volunteer forces in the surrounding
regions of Kathiawar implemented a
blockade.[31][23] India later denied ever
having blocked Junagadh's supplies.[32]
The blockade compelled the state's ruler
to leave for Pakistan,[34] who left the
state's administration to Sir Shahnawaz
Bhutto. Menon claimed that the Nawab
had delegated the state's destiny to
Bhutto, which is not implausible since it
was primarily Shah Nawaz Bhutto who
had taken the decision to accede to
Pakistan, under the close influence and
mentorship of Jinnah. Bhutto requested
the regional commissioner for
administrative assistance "pending an
honourable settlement of the several
issues involved in Junagadh's accession."
Diwan Bhutto waited till November for
Pakistan to send help, but none came.
The provisional government, nationalistic
volunteers from the Indian side, and the
Hindu residents had started to agitate
and tensions were simmering. Meanwhile,
the state of Junagadh had raised a force
of 670 Muslim men, who had been
stationed at various places to ensure
retaliation, if any. Fearing an outbreak of
communal violence, on 9 November
1947, the Indian Government assumed
the state's administration to re-establish
peace.[35] Nawab's soldiers were
disarmed, with Diwan Bhutto leaving for
Pakistan a day before.[36]
Nehru telegrammed Liaquat Ali Khan:
In view of special circumstances
pointed out by Junagadh Dewan
that is the Prime Minister of
Junagadh – our Regional
Commissioner at Rajkot has
taken temporary charge of
Junagadh administration. This
has been done to avoid disorder
and resulting chaos. We have,
however, no desire to continue
this arrangement and wish to
find a speedy solution in
accordance with the wishes of
the people of Junagadh. We have
 pointed out to you previously
that final decision should be
made by means of referendum
or plebiscite. We would be glad
to discuss this question and
allied matters affecting
Junagadh with representatives
of your Government at the
earliest possible moment
convenient to you. We propose
to invite Nawab of Junagadh to
send his representatives to this
conference.[37]

Liaquat Ali Khan replied:

Your telegram informing that
your Government had taken
charge of Junagadh was
received by me on November 10,
1947. Your action in taking over
State Administration and
sending Indian troops to state
without any authority from
Pakistan Government and
indeed without our knowledge,
is a clear violation of Pakistan
territory and breach of
International law.[38]
Reports arrived of widespread murder,
rape and looting of Muslims in Junagarh
following the arrival of Indian troops.[39]
Many Muslims from Junagarh began
migrating to Pakistan.[40]
After India assumed administration in
Junagadh, India's Ministry of Law stated
that the accession of Junagadh to
Pakistan had not been invalidated by
plebiscite and that Junagadh had not yet
acceded to India. But India went ahead
with the referendum because it believed
the result would be in its favour.[41]
Plebiscite
On 24 September, legal adviser Walter
Monckton told Mountbatten that
Pakistan's consent would be needed for
any plebiscite India wished to conduct in
Junagadh because of the Nawab's
accession to Pakistan.[42]
Nehru had shifted from his earlier
position of allowing a plebiscite under
the UN and now said that it was
unnecessary for a plebiscite to be held
under the UN though it could send one
or two observers if it wished to do so.
However, India also made it clear that it
would not under any circumstances
postpone the plebiscite so as to allow the
UN or Pakistan to send observers.[43] A
plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948,
in which all but 91 out of 190,870 who
voted (from an electorate of 201,457)
voted to join India, i.e. 99.95% of the
population voted to join India.[44]
Douglas Brown of the Daily Telegraph as
well as Pakistani newspaper Dawn
expressed concerns about the propriety
of the plebiscite's arrangement. On 26
February, Pakistan termed India's
proceeding with the plebiscite a
'discourtesy to Pakistan and the Security
Council'.[45] In the plebiscite India polled
222,184 votes and Pakistan 130 out of a
total population of 720,000 of Junagadh
and its feudatories.[45]
Only 15 percent (21,606) of Junagadh's
Muslim population voted while 30
percent (179,851) of the non-Muslim
population voted. The total number of
voters on electoral rolls was 200, 569 and
less than 10,000 Muslims voted for
India.[45] In Manvadar, 276 out of 520
Muslims voted for India, in Bantwa 19 out
of 39 and 79 out of 231 in Sardargarh. In
Bantwa and Babariawad the number of
voters who cast their votes in India's
favour was less than the number of non-
Muslim voters there, which meant that
even some non-Muslims did not vote for
India.[45] According to scholar Rakesh
Ankit, India took liberties with facts and
laws as it acted as the "judge, jury and
executioner" of the entire situation.[46]
Later arrangements
After six months administration by
Government of India, three civilian
members (Samaldas Gandhi,
Dayashankar Dave and Pushpaben
Mehta) were inducted for the
administration of Junagadh on 1 June
1948. The election of the seven
constituencies of the Junagadh region
for the Constitution Assembly of
Saurashtra was declared in December
1948. All seven members of Indian
National Congress were elected
unopposed and they all voted to merge
Junagadh State with Saurashtra State.
The merger was completed in January
1949.[29]
On 1 November 1956, Saurashtra State
was merged with Bombay State. Bombay
State was split into the linguistic states of
Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, and
Junagadh district is now one of the
districts of Gujarat.
Pakistan brought the case of Junagadh
to the United Nations in January 1948.
The UN Security Council commanded its
commission on Kashmir to examine the
conflict over Junagadh.[23] The Kashmir
conflict eclipsed the matter of Junagadh
at the United Nations Security
Council,[47] where Junagadh's case is still
unresolved.[23][48] Pakistan's official maps
show Junagadh, Manavadar and Sir
Creek as Pakistani territory.[49][50][51]
See also
Instrument of Accession (Jammu and
Kashmir)
 Bantva Manavadar
Pathans of Gujarat
Notes
a. Shahnawaz Bhutto was a politician from
Sindh, and the father of the later Pakistan
prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
b. The Kathiawar Political Conference
(Kathiawar Rajkiya Parishad) was
established in 1921 to coordinate the
peoples' movements in the princely states
of Kathiawar.[26] Its goal was to achieve
some participation of the states' subjects
in the governance of the states.[27] It
became a member of the All India States
Peoples' Conference when the latter was
 founded in 1927, and remained so until
its dissolution in April 1948, after which it
merged with the Indian National
Congress.[28]

References
1. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
India 2010, pp. 35, 38.
2. Bangash, A Princely Affair (2015, p. 113);
Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
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of Junagadh (2016, p. 377)
3. Gandhi, Rajmohan (1991). Patel: A Life.
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5. Lorne J. Kavic (1967). India's Quest for

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6. Stephen P. Cohen (28 May 2013).
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7. Francis Pike (28 February 2011). Empires

at War: A Short History of Modern Asia
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85773-029-9.
8. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016)
9. Ian Talbot (28 January 2016). A History
of Modern South Asia: Politics, States,
Diasporas (https://books.google.com/boo
ks?id=sXsmCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT136) . Yale
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300-21659-2. "Accession was made more
difficult in cases like Hyderabad,
Junagadh...Patel and V.P. Menon bullied
rulers to accede"
10. Banerji, Arun (2007). "Border" (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=Nyk6oA2nOlgC
&pg=PA206) . Aspects of India's
International Relations, 1700 to 2000:
South Asia and the World. Pearson
Education India. p. 206.
ISBN 9788131708347. "The decision on
Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was
announced on 15 August."
11. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
India (2010), pp. 31–32; Ankit, The
accession of Junagadh (2016), p. 374
12. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
India (2010), pp. 31–32: "Junagadh in
turn managed to mislead Delhi and other
neighbouring states by issuing
proclamations of Kathiawar unity."
13. Banerji, Arun (2007). "Borders" (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=Nyk6oA2nOlgC
&pg=PA206) . Aspects of India's
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ISBN 9788131708347.
14. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016),
p. 374; Bangash, A Princely Affair (2015),
p. 108
15. Copland, The Princes of India 1997,
p. 260.
16. Copland, The Princes of India 1997,
p. 260, footnote 120.
17. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
India (2010), pp. 31–32: 'Jinnah assured
Bhutto that he would not allow Junagadh
to be “starved out or tyrannized and that
Veraval was not far from Karachi.”'
18. Ankit, Rakesh (July 2016). "The accession
of Junagadh, 1947–48: Colonial
sovereignty, state violence and post-
independence India" (http://journals.sage
pub.com/doi/10.1177/00194646166511
67) . The Indian Economic & Social
History Review. 53 (3): 371–404.
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19. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 381): While Ayyangar and
Mountbatten concurred that Junagarh's
geographical contiguity could not have
'any standing in law', that is, it was
'strictly and legally correct' for it to have
joined Pakistan, Patel retorted by arguing
that people of a state should decide and
not its ruler.
20. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh 2016,
p. 383.
21. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 401): Ayyangar reminded to Vellodi on
24 February the need 'as far as possible
to avoid being drawn into legalistic
arguments as regards validity of
Junagadh's accession to Pakistan' for its
impact on Kashmir.
22. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh 2016,
p. 381.
23. McLeod, John (1996), "Junagadh" (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=L-X-XYB_
ZkIC&pg=PA613) , in James Stuart Olson;
Robert Shadle (eds.), Historical Dictionary
of the British Empire, Greenwood
Publishing Group, p. 613, ISBN 978-0-
313-29366-5
24. Bangash, A Princely Affair 2015, p. 112:
"The second tactic was the Arzi Hukumat
(provisional government), which was set
up under the leadership of Samaldas
Gandhi, a nephew of Mahatma Gandhi,
under the auspices of the Government of
India in Bombay [sic]."
25. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern
India 2010, pp. 39–40.
26. McLeod, Sovereignty, Power, Control
1999, pp. 37–38.

27. Ramusack, Congress and the People's

Movement in Princely India 1988, p. 381.

28. Ramusack, Congress and the People's

Movement in Princely India 1988, p. 395.
29. Jani, Shashikant Vishwanath (1 January
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30. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 384): Finally, New Delhi agreed to the
provisional government taking over
administration in the outlying pockets of
the state.
31. Bangash, A Princely Affair 2015, p. 112.
32. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 401): "It continued to claim that New
Delhi had given 'no support at all to the
so-called provisional government' and
even denied stopping supplies to
Junagadh."
33. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 386): In response, Karachi protested
against New Delhi's 'indifference' to the
provisional government of Junagadh and
its activities.
34. Copland, The Princes of India 1997,
p. 261-262.
35. Bangash, A Princely Affair 2015, p. 117.
36. Yagnik & Sheth, Shaping of Modern
Gujarat (2005), pp. 222–224.
37. Nehru, Jawaharlal (1949), Independence
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important speeches, from September
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38. Bangash, A Princely Affair 2015, p. 118.

39. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 397)

40. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,

p. 396)
41. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,
p. 395): A note by Ministry of Law made it
clear that Junagadh's accession to
Pakistan had not been nullified by
referendum and the state had not
acceded to India yet. However, New Delhi
went ahead because 'it was almost likely
that the referendum will be in our favour'.

42. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,

p. 380): "So far so good, but Monckton
had also informed Mountbatten that as
Junagadh had signed an instrument of
accession to Pakistan...Pakistan's
recognition of any plebiscite that India
may conduct had to be obtained."

43. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,

p. 401)
44. Noorani, A. G. (13 October 2001), "Of
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45. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh (2016,

p. 402)

46. Ankit, The accession of Junagadh 2016,

p. 403.

47. Lesley G. Terris (8 December 2016).

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50. Philip Jagessar, Pakistan, India and

mapping the contested accession of
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51. "After Nepal, Pakistan unveils new
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Pakistan, 1947-1955 (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=PzdvrgEACAAJ) ,
Oxford University Press, USA,
ISBN 978-0-19-906649-0
Copland, Ian (2002), The Princes of
India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-
1947 (https://books.google.com/book
s?id=h0QKqCA-QHIC) , Cambridge
University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-
89436-4
McLeod, John (1999), Sovereignty,
Power, Control: Politics in the States of
Western India, 1916-1947 (https://book
s.google.com/books?id=jXpzWlPpE1cC
&pg=PR7) , BRILL, ISBN 90-04-11343-
6
Pande, Aparna (2011). Explaining
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping
India(https://books.google.com/book
s?id=ceg-kSmft94C) . Taylor & Francis.
ISBN 978-1-136-81894-3.
Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and
Peace in Modern India (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=EbtBJb1bsHUC&
pg=PA101) , Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. 101–, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
Ramusack, Barbara N. (1988),
"Congress and the People's Movement
in Princely India: Ambivalence in
Strategy and Organization" (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=QfOSxFVQa
8IC&pg=PA387) , in Richard Sisson;
Stanley Wolpert (eds.), Congress and
Indian Nationalism: The Pre-
independence Phase , University of
California Press, pp. 377–404,
ISBN 978-0-520-06041-8
 Yagnik, Achyut; Sheth, Suchitra (2005),
Shaping of Modern Gujarat (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=FYDviPFeoS
AC&pg=PA222) , Penguin UK,
ISBN 978-8184751857
Further reading
Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide:
Britain, India, Pakistan (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=MC2UoAEACAA
J) , London: Hutchinson,
ISBN 9780090971503
Menon, V. P. (1956), The Story of
Integration of the Indian States (https://
hidf1.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/the-
 story-of-the-integration-of-the-indian
-states-by-v-p-menon.pdf) (PDF),
Orient Longman

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