Indonesian Politics 1965-7: The September 30 Movement and the Fall of Sukarno

Author(s): Donald Hindley

Source: The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 8 (Aug., 1968), pp. 345-356
Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394159
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 ALGERIA
war of liberationhas endowedher policywitha revolutionary vigour
whichcan uniquelycontribute to thestrength
oftheThirdWorld.
Unlikeothernations,we havenotlostallillusions.We arestillspurred
by faith,by bya flame,bya fire.It wouldbe regrettable
conviction, if
thisflamewentout.We havepaiddearlyforourideals,butwe cannot
givethemup merely forthisreason.5
Algeriafeelsa closeemotional linktotheThirdWorld,whereshewishes
to contributein theshapingofnewand betterideals.As M. Bouteflika
soliloquizedinhisspeechofio February :
Acrossthistiers-mondebetweentheincomparable heroismofVietnam
andthetenaciousrevolutionary prideofCuba, Algeriaconstitutes
an-
otheranti-imperialist
bastion,a staff ofhope,anda carrier
ofthetorch
ofliberty.
Returning to the practicallevel,M. Bouteflika admittedthatmistakes
hadbeenmadeand thatAlgerialackeddiplomatic buthe in-
traditions,
sistedon thevalueofherrevolutionary élanand youthfulidealismin a
cynicalold world.
8 Interview
reportedin The Times,31 January1968.

Indonesian politics 1965-7

The September 30 Movementand the fallof Sukarno
DONALD HINDLEY

At the beginningof 1965,PresidentSukarnoreignedsupremeover

Indonesia'spolitics,as he had done fortheprecedingeightyears.His
charisma,charm,superboratory, and profound understanding thathis
countrymen's yearning formodernization wascoupledwithan umbilical
attachment to elementsof traditional culturehad gainedhim a wide
followingand,especiallyamongtheethnicJavanese, deep loyalty.But
thesequalitieswould not have been sufficient to ensurehimthe pre-
ponderant politicalpositionifhe had notalso possessedtheskillsto ex-
ploitthenumerous cleavagesthatdividedthepoliticalforcesaroundhim.
By early1957, Indonesia'sfragmented politicalpartieshad proved
incapableof providingauthoritative and purposeful government.1 To
1 For a detailed
analysis of the 1949-57 period, see HerbertFeith, The Decline
ofConstitutionalDemocracyin Indonesia(Cornell U.P., 1962).
Dr Hindley is Associate Professorof Politics at Brandeis University,Massa«
chusetts; author of The CommunistParty of Indonesia, 1951-63 (University of
CaliforniaPress, 1964) and otherworks.He did fieldworkin Indonesia in 1959-60
and spent seven monthstherein 1967 under RockefellerFoundation auspices.

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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968

replace the ineffective parliamentary system,Sukarno constructed

GuidedDemocracy.The linchpinwas Sukarnohimself.Balancedbe-
neathhimon theone handwerethearmedforces,basicallyanti-com-
munistand prevented fromthemselves seizingthepoliticalinitiative
by
rivalriesand by thediffuseness
inter-service of commandand loyalties
withinwhatgrewintothe300,000-man army;and on theother,threeof
the fourlargestpoliticalparties:the PKI (IndonesianCommunist
Party),the PNI (IndonesianNationalistParty),and the conservative
MuslimNU (MuslimScholars'Party).Of theseparties,thePKI was
themostimportant forSukarno.It was thelargestand by farthebest
organized and most aggressive of thethree;2further, it was, although
neverstatedpublicly,themostuncompromisingly Guided
anti-military.
Democracywas formally institutedby Presidentialdecreein July1959
withthereintroduction ofthe1945Constitution.
Between1959 and 1965,significant changeshad takenplace in the
balanceof the politicalforces,mostof themto the PKFs advantage.3
Sukarno,hisauthority risento Olympianheights, enforcednationalad-
herenceto theprincipleof Nasakom(nationalist-religious-communist)
unity;anti-communist activitywasbannedas treasonto theRevolution.
In January 1965,thePresident wentso faras totella foreigncorrespon-
dentthat'ofcourse'hewouldhavenoobjectionwereIndonesiatoevolve
intoa communist State.4Takingadvantage ofthearmedforces'disunity
and theirgeneraldislikeof politicalparties,Sukarnodissolvedgroups
hostileto himselfand the PKI : the modernist MuslimMasjumi,the
IndonesianSocialistParty(PSI), and theLiga Demokrasiin i960, and
the anti-communist BPS (Body forthe Promotionof Sukarnoism)in
1964.The leftistbutanti-PKIMurbaPartywas declaredinactiveearly
in 1965. At the same time,and at Sukarno'sinsistence, the PNI in
November1964affirmed itsadherenceto Marxism,6 whilepositionsof
leadershipweregivenincreasingly toyounger menemotionally attracted
to thePKI. In short,thepoliticalpartieswerebeing,or had been,de-
nudedoftheircapacityto blocka communist bid forpower.
The armedforcesdid not remainunaffected. Pro-communist sym-
pathiesspreadwithinthe navyand the air force.Omar Dhani, com-
manderoftheairforceanda devoteddiscipleofPresident Sukarno,was
2 On the development and natureof the PKI in the post-1950 period,see
Donald Hindley,The Communist Partyof Indonesia,1951-63(University of
CaliforniaPress,1964); andJustusMariavanderKroef,TheCommunist Partyof
Indonesia:its History,Programand Tactics(VancouverPublicationsCentre,
TTnivftrsitvof RriticVi P.niiimhia TnfieY
8 For a perceptivetreatment of the firstyearsof Guided Democracy,see
HerbertFeith,'The DynamicsofGuidedDemocracy/pp. 309-409in RuthT.
McVey(ed.), Indonesia(New Haven,Connecticut, H.R.A.F. Press,1963).On
the 1957-9 period,see Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to GuidedDemocracy:
Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (CornellU.P. 1966).
4 AntaraNewsBulletin(Cologne.Germany), specialissue. 17 February1065.
6 See P.N.I. PenegakPantjasila! (Djakarta,1965).

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 INDONESIA
knowntobe particularly warmtowardsthePKI, atleast(partly)because
ofinter-servicejealousyofthecovertly anti-communist armyleadership.
Andifthecentralcommandofthearmyslowlyincreaseditscontrolover
theregionalcommands, sympathy forthePKI increasednotablywithin
the Diponegoro(CentralJava) Division.Under officialsponsorship,
communist cadresgaveindoctrination coursesin all thearmedforces.
One of theirmainpurposeswas to demonstrate thatonlythePKI was
capableof analysingand providing solutionsforIndonesia'smanifold
politicaland economicproblems.
Underthesecircumstances, manynon-communists, includingmem-
bersofthePNI, thebureaucracy, andtheofficer corps, came toregardthe
PKI as thefuturegovernment. The first eightmonthsof 1965appeared
toconfirm thatpoliticalinitiativewasmovingeverfurther intothehands
oftheCommunist Party.In scattered areas,thepartymobilizedpeasants
againstlandlordsand local authorities forthe implementation of the
agrarianlawsof 1959and i960. Sukarnocontinued pressure on thePNI
untilmanyofitsmorestubbornly anti-communist leaderswerepurged.
As the Djakarta-Peking axis strengthened,8 Indonesialeftthe United
Nations,andvirulent anti-nekolim (neo-colonialist-imperialist)agitation
wasaccompaniedbydirectaction.Military confrontation withMalaysia
wasintensified, despitethesilentopposition ofthearmycommand, and,
withtheallegationof U.S. supportforMalaysia,thePeace Corpswas
evicted,the U.S. Information Serviceclosed,and Americanoil com-
paniesand plantations seized.AndwhilethePKI gavenoisysupportto
Sukarno'spolicies,it quietlyreaped the politicalharvestfromthe
economicchaosthattheyhelpedto produce.
Of thegreatestlong-term politicalsignificance,PKI chairmanD. N.
Aiditused theexcuseofimperialist encirclement (one ofSukarno'sfre-
quentcharges)to revivehiscall forthearmingoftheworkers and pea-
santsin a FifthArmedForce,alongsidethearmy,navy,air force,and
police.For the firsttime,Sukarnoagreedto the creationof the Fifth
Force,and hintedat supportfortheintroduction ofa systemofpolitical
commissars withinallthearmedforces.Notonlydidthisplacethepower
basisofthearmycommandinjeopardy;thelastimportant barrierto a
communist victorywas in dangerof beingbothpenetrated and out-
flanked.
The steadypoliticaldevelopment inthePKFs favourcametoa sudden
haltin August1965. On accountof a seriousturnin the President's
health,Aiditwasrecalledfroma visittoPekingbySubandrio,Sukarno's
FirstDeputyPrimeMinister.On hisowninitiative Aiditbroughtwith
hima teamof Chinesedoctorswhoreportedly informed himthat,given
Sukarno'swayoflife,thePresidentfacedimminent paralysisor death.
• The extentof PKI influence
on Sukarnois indicatedby his agreement
to
opposeSovietparticipation
in Afro-Asian
conferencesand organizations.
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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968
The PKI wasthrust intoa positionoftheutmostgravity. Aiditcouldno
longercounton moreyearsofprotection andassistance fromSukarnoin
theextension anddeepening oftheparty'sorganization andsupport, and
in the continuedundermining of the anti-communist forces.Worse,
Aiditwas forcedto presumethatthearmyleadershiphad devisedcon-
tingency plansfortheelimination ofhispartyin theeventofSukarno's
deathor incapacitation. In short,he was compelledto act withgreat
speedin orderto forestall theanticipated armyinitiative. The choices
opentohimwerefew.He knewwellthathismassfollowing andevenhis
cadres,gathered and trained under a national united front strategyof
class alliances,lackedthe militancyrequiredforsustainedstrikeor
sabotageactionagainstdetermined authorities, let aloneforimmediate
rebellion. The geographical characteristics ofJava,thestronghold ofthe
PKI, further militatedagainst a decision for civil
war, as did thememory
ofthebloodyfailureoftheMadiunrebellionof 1948.7Aiditalso knew
that,despitethe enforcedespousalof Nasakomunityin recentyears,
anti-communist feelingwas stillstrong.The party'senemiescomprised
mostof the officercorps,the devoutMuslims,mostof the better-
educatedclassesand bureaucrats, and evena majority ofthePNI.
Aidit'sresponseto thecrisiswas theSeptember30 Movement.8 For
severalyearsthePKI, likeotherparties,hadbeendelicately probingthe
politicalsympathies ofindividualofficers, cultivating thosewhoproved
moreresponsive. A secretBiroChusus(Special Bureau),directly sub-
ordinateto Aidit,had been establishedin November1964in orderto
intensify theseefforts.Aiditnowinstructed theBiro Chususcadresto
contactcertainofficers who had shownthe greatestreceptivity to the
party'sadvances.Withthem,theplansforthemovement wererefined.
In essence,a smallforceofarmyandairforcetroopswastoassassinate the
membersof the anti-communist army central command, on thestated
groundthattheywerehigh-living CIA agentson the brinkof imple-
mentinga plan forthe overthrow of PresidentSukarno.Supporting
military actionwas plannedforcitiesoutsideDjakarta,notablyMedan,
Semarang,and Jogjakarta. Once the generalshad been disposedof,
Sukarnowas to be askedto appointa newarmyleadership chosenfrom
personsmoreresponsive to hiswishesthantheirpredecessors. In order
to reducetheriskoftheplans'exposure, probably no more than thefull
membersof the Politbureau and thehighestcadresoftheBiroChusus
wereinformed ofthemin advance.To reducethepossibility of a wide,
7 On the Madiun rebellion,see D. N. Aidit,AiditAccusesMadiun Affair
(Djakarta,1955), and George McT. Kahin, Nationalismand Revolutionin
Indonesia(CornellU.P. 1952),pp. 285-303.
8 GerakanTiga Puluh Septembre,abbreviatedby the anti-communists to
Gestapu.A largepartoftheinformationusedinthefollowingbriefanalysisofthe
September 30 Movementwasobtainedfromunpublished trialandinterrogation
madeavailabletotheauthorbylawyer-officers
records ofthearmy.
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 INDONESIA
anti-communist reactionagainstthe movement, overtcommunist par-
ticipationwas keptto a minimum;theparty'smasseswereto be used
afterthesuccessoftheoperation to providepopularlegitimacy and to
discourage counteraction.These plansfittedAidit'soverallpoliticalap-
proach- thepiecemealdestruction ofthemostmilitant - and
opposition
werein accordwiththe objectivenatureof Indonesia'spoliticalcon-
This was nota coupto establisha communist
stellation. government; it
was an 'internalarmyaffair'to eliminatethosegeneralswhowereex-
pectedto takethe initiative towardscrushing thePKI shouldSukarno
be removedfromthe politicalscene.
The September30 Movementcamecloseto success.On themorning
of1 October,six generalsofthearmycentralcommand, includingLt.-
GeneralAhmad Yani, the commander-in-chief, were murderedin
Djakarta.The radiostationsin Djakartaand Jogjakarta wereoccupied.
LeadershipoftheDiponegoroDivisionandtheJogjakarta regionalarmy
commandwas seized.And Sukarnogladlyconsentedto appointMaj.-
GeneralPranotoReksosamudro, theplotters'choice,as caretaker
com-
manderofthearmy.But closewas notenough.GeneralNasution,the
Ministerof Defence,escapedtheassassins;and Maj.-GeneralSuharto,
the heretofore politicallyquiescentcommanderof KOSTRAD (the
StrategicArmyReserve,withheadquarters in Djakarta),methodically
gatheredinformation as to the dispositionof the movement'stroops,
assembledloyalunitsbeneathhiscommand, andthenmovedto destroy
theopposingforces.By the morningof 2 October,Suhartohad suc-
ceeded.Aidit'shastily
conceived totheexpecteddeathofSukarno
reaction
hadfailed; andwithitsfailure, theeraofGuidedDemocracycameto a
bloodyend.
On 4 Octoberthemutilated corpsesofthegeneralswerediscovered
outsidethecapital.The armyclosedthePKI newspapers, whilearousing
anti-communist fervour toa frenzybyaccountsofcommunist participa-
tionintheallegedatrocitiesperpetratedon themovement's and
victims,
bytheas-yet-unsubstantiated accusationthattheSeptember30 Move-
mentwas a PKI coupattempt. Army-sponsored killingof communists
beganalmostimmediately in Atjeh,and spreadwitheagerMuslimin-
volvement to East JavaandadjacentpartsofCentralJava.The butchery
wasas intensein non-MuslimNorthSumatraand Bali. By thetimethe
killingabated,earlyin 1966,perhaps500,000PKI membersand sup-
portershaddied,amongthemAiditandfourofthesevenfullmembers of
thePolitbureau.9Startingwiththereplacement ofPranotobySuhartoas
armycommander on 1c October,a purgeofthearmedforcesbegan.More
9As of1 October
1965thereweresevenfullandtwocandidatemembers ofthe
PKI Politbureau.
It appearsthatfiveofthesehavebeenkilledwithouttrial,two
havebeencaptured,tried,andgiventhedeathsentence,oneis awaiting
trial,and
one,JusufAdjitorop,was safelyin Pekingwhenthekillingscommenced.
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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968
than1,000oftheDiponegoroDivisionwereeventually imprisoned.
Evenbeforethearmy'sintentions hadbeenmadeclear,civiliansbegan
toorganizenewanti-communist groups.The first wastheKAP-Gestapu
(ActionFrontfortheCrushing oftheSeptember30 Movement), led by
SubchanoftheNU andformed arounda Muslim-Catholiccore.Bythe
end of October,themosteffective 'radical'movement had been estab-
lished:the university students'KAMI (IndonesianStudents'Action
Front).Both KAP-Gestapuand KAMI maintained close liaisonwith
like-minded officersin thearmy,and wereto co-ordinate theirdemon-
strationsand demandsagainsta wideningrangeof targets.The initial
demandwas fortheabolitionofthePKI anditsmassorganizations, and
forthepurgeofGestapuelements fromgovernment positions.
Sukarno'sreactionto the army'sinitiative in eradicating the Com-
munistPartyopenedthewaytohisultimate removalfrompowerandthe
presidency.Whetherbycoincidence ornot,he actedin accordancewith
therecommendations containedin a letterof6 Octobersentto himby
Aidit,thenin EastJava:10he ordereda haltintheactionsagainstthePKI
andtheSeptember30 Movement, tookthesolutionof'theinternal army
affair'intohis own hands,and soughtto restorethestatusquo anteof
Nasakomunityand anti-nekolim confrontation.In publicstatements he
declaredhisunshakenadherenceto theNasakomprincipleand hisun-
changing admiration fortheCommunist Party'slongrecordofnationalist
struggle.He evenattempted to shelterPolitbureau memberNjoto.11
ByDecember1965thePKI laybroken.Aidit'srelianceon Sukarnoto
salvage the situationhad provedmisguided.But the radical anti-
communists were not yet satisfied.Their targetshifted.Alreadyon
1 October,manyciviliansand a smallnumberof officers were anti-
Sukarno.By his stubborndefenceofthePKI and ofhis Nasakomand
anti-nekolim policies,Sukarnopersuadedmanymore,especiallyin the
officercorps,thathispowermustbe considerably reduced.Whilethere
wasasyetnoopencriticism ofthePresident himself,theradicalsbeganto
level theirattacksagainsthis closestaides, especiallySubandrioand
ChairulSaleh,theThirdDeputyPrimeMinister.Sukarnonowopened
a counter-offensiveagainstthosewhodisregarded hiswishes.He called
fortheformation ofa massiveSukarnoFront,to whichwouldbe sub-
ordinatedall civilianpoliticalgroups.Nationalistyouthsand students
wereexhorted to smashdowntheKAMI supporters. Insteadofbowing
beneaththe presidential anger,KAMI on 10 January1966 issued its
ThreeDemandsofthePeople: thedissolution ofthePKI and itsmass
10A shortenedversionof theletterwas presentedas evidencein thetrialof
Subandrio.See MahkamahMiliterLuar Biasa,PerkaraHadji Dr Subandrio.. .
(Djakarta,typedcoov. io66i. Vol. 1. do. 4.17-18.
11Njoto,one of Aidit'stwo mostprominent colleagues,attendeda cabinet
meeting,as MinisterwithoutPortfolio, as late as 6 November1965. Shortly
thereafter
he wasseizedandmurdered bythearmy.
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 INDONESIA
organizations, thelowering ofprices,andthereorganization andpurgeof
thecabinet.Mountingdemonstrations in Djakartaand Bandungbacked
the demands.Confrontation was unavoidable.Pro-Sukarnoofficers
madecalculations as to whichbattalions wouldbe loyalin a showdown.
Andon21February Sukarnoannounced thecomposition ofa newcabinet
thatexcludedNasutionandconsisted largelyofhisoldhenchmen, many
ofwhomhadbeenclosetothePKI. KAMI wasbanned,12 theUniversity
ofIndonesiaclosed.The leadersofall politicalpartieswerecalledto the
presidential palaceinDjakartaandtherecompelled, underthe
reportedly
threatofphysicalviolence,to condemnthestudentactions.Thatwason
io March.The armyradicalswerefacedwiththedestruction of their
civilianallies- unlesstheythemselves acted.The nextday,troopsof
KOSTRAD and the élite RPKAD (armypara-commando regiment)
approachedthepalaceinsupportofthestudentdemonstrators. Sukarno
fledto Bogor,forty milesto thesouth.Therea three-man delegationof
prominent generals,knownfortheirloyalty, persuadedhimto signthe
March11 Order.The President feltcompelledto authorizeSuharto'to
takeanystepsconsideredas necessary to ensurethesecurity,calm,and
stability ofthe Government machinery and theprocessof theRevolu-
tion. . . [and]thepersonalsafetyand authority ofthePresident.. .'13
Sukarnosoon let it be knownthathe consideredthe transferof
authority to be a temporary measure.Suhartoand mostarmycomman-
dersthought otherwise. The intensely loyalTjakrabirawa Regiment was
disbandedas Sukarno'spalaceguard,to be replacedby military police
underthecommandofSuhartoofficers. The PKI was formally banned
alongwithits massorganizations, and an intensified purgeof itssym-
pathizers waseffected inthearmedforcesandcivilianagencies.A cabinet
reshuffle followed thearrest offifteenMinisters, includingSubandrioand
ChairulSaleh. The nationalleadershipof thePNI was replacedin its
entirety atan army-enforced congressheldinApril.
Purgedofitscommunists, fellowtravellers,andintenselypro-Sukarno
nationalists, the ProvisionalPeople's Consultative Congress(MPRS)14
reconvened at theendofJune.Its conclusions werea seriesofsuccesses
forthosewishingto reduceSukarno'spower.The Congressratified the
March11 Order,therebymakingit impossibleforthePresidentto re-
vokeit; Suhartowasnamedbothas formateur ofa newcabinetandas the
12WhenKAMI was banned,highschoolstudents formed theKAPPI (Action
FrontofIndonesianYouthand High SchoolStudents)in orderto continuethe
demonstrations
againstSukarno.In all,abouttenactionfrontsare nowin exis-
tence,themostvocalbeingKAMI, KAPPI, KASI (university anda
graduates),
ofKAPPI calledKAPI (highschoolstudents).
splinter
13AntaraNewsBulletin
(Cologne,Germany),Vol. 17, No. 3644 (14 March
1966).
14Underthe 1945 Constitution,the MPRS electsthe Presidentand Vice-
anddetermines
President, themainlinesofnationalpolicy.The Vice-Presidency
has remainedvacantsinceMohammadHatta'sresignation in November1956.
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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968
successorto SukarnoshouldthePresident be unableto fulfil hisduties.
The propagation of Marxismand Leninismwas banned,to Sukarno's
vocaldisgust,and thePresident's'progress report'to theCongresswas
termedinadequate.He was orderedto presenta fullreporton national
issues,in particulartheSeptember30 Movementand itsepilogue,and
theeconomicand moraldeterioration ofthecountry underhis rule.
The new cabinetwas announcedon 25 July1966,withSuhartoas
chairman ofthecabinetpresidium. Few Sukarnoloyalists remained. But
thecivilianradicals,notablyin KAMI and theFrontPantjasila(there-
namedKAP-Gestapu),as wellas thoseinthearmy,wantedmore.Many
desiredSukarno'shumiliation and removalfromoffice;some wished
himto be broughtto trial.Suharto,however,refusedto be rushedby
theirdemonstrations and demands.He knewthatnotonlyweremany
ethnicJavanesein Centraland East Javastilldeeplyattachedto the
President, butalsothatmanyofficers, whilepreparedtostripSukarnoof
power,werestrongly opposedto anyschemeto evictthenationalleader
fromoffice.Precipitate actionagainstSukarnocould have led to civil
war.Put differently, thePNI andtheofficer corpswereeagerto destroy
thePKI, butmanywerestillboundbydeepemotions to Sukarnoas the
chiefsymbolof Indonesia'sstruggle forindependence. Suharto,there-
fore,moved cautiouslybut nonethelessrelentlessly to undermine
Sukarno'spositionfurther.
Subandriowasputontrialon 1 October,OmarDhanion 5 December.
The proceedingsat leastcastincreaseddoubton Sukarno'sinnocence
withregardto the September30 Movement.The removalof pro-
Sukarnoofficers fromkeypostswas continued ; mostnotably,Ibrahim
Adjiewas replacedin Julyas commander ofthe Siliwangi(WestJava)
Division.UnderMaj.-GeneralDharsonothisstrongest of Indonesia's
divisionsbecamethebackboneofthemoreunequivocally anti-Sukarno
elements inthearmy.The purgeofthebureaucracy wasintensified.And,
inthefaceofmilitary 'showsofforce',Sukarnoon 10January 1967pre-
sentedhisreport, as requiredbytheMPRS. The toneandcontents were
insulting.The civilianradicalsimmediatelymadenoisyrepetition oftheir
demandthathe be put on trial.The finalshowdowncamein a special
sessionoftheMPRS at thebeginning ofMarch.
Despite thedemands of theanti-Sukarnoextremists, Suhartohad his
waywiththe Congress.He was,afterall, bothhead ofthecabinetand
commander ofthearmy.In hisspeechof7 March,15 he pointedoutonce
morethatalthoughSukarnohadcommitted gravepoliticalerrors, many
persons'irrationallyandwithgoodintentions . . . hopethatBungKarno
willnotbe treatedunjustly'forhe was,whatever else,motivated by 'his
convictioninandardentlovefortheunityandonenessofthewholeofthe
peopleof Indonesia'.He warnedthatvindictive actionagainstSukarno
15Antara News Bulletin
(Djakarta), 11 March 1967/A.
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 INDONESIA
woulddrivepowerful forcesfromthesideoftheNew Orderandintothe
armsoftheOld Order.As a compromise betweentheanti-andthepro-
Sukarnogroups,theMPRS dulyappointedSuhartoas ActingPresident,
whilecarefully avoidinganyreference totheremoval ofSukarnofromthe
presidency. Sukarnowas orderedto be politically non-active untilafter
the nationalelectionsthenscheduledforJuly1968. Sukarnoat last
meekly stoodaside. It is speculatedthathe had cometo realizethathis
enemiesinthearmywouldassassinate himifhe attempted a come-back.
Byoncemoreavoidingtoogreatprovocation ofthepro-Sukarnoists,
and by maintaining strictdeference towardsSukarnohimself, Suharto
again averted the of
possibility a civilwar. But work continued towards
makinga Sukarnorestoration impossible.Strongmilitary pressurewas
appliedto thePNI, themainpro-Sukarno civilianorganization: bythe
end of the year,regionalarmycommanders had 'frozen'the party
throughout Sumatraand demonstrations of armypowerhad broken
whatever willto fighttherehad beenamongthenationalists of Central
andEastJava.Onlythemostpliablemembers weretolerated inpositions
of leadership.And manybranchesacrossthe nation'voluntarily* dis-
solvedthemselves. The PNI fellintoutterdisarray.
FromAprilto theendofJuly1967,passionately anti-Sukarnoofficers
wereappointedto important commandpositions : Jasinas commander in
East Java,Sarwo Edhie in NorthSumatra,Ishak Djuarsa in South
Sumatra, WitonoinWestKalimantan, andKemalIdrisas commander of
KOSTRAD. In Julythearmycommanders inJavainitiated whatwasto
becomeanirregular seriesofmeetings todiscussandco-ordinate policies
todealwiththenationalpoliticalsituation; theygenerally lentsupportto
theradicalpositionwhichat thattimecalledforstrongmeasuresagainst
thePNI andfurther activemeasurestodestroy whatwasleftofSukarno's
prestige.Towards the end ofthe year,several highnationalpoliceofficers
werearrestedon the chargeof attempting to preparea Sukarnocome-
back.
As ActingPresident,Suharto'spolicytowardsSukarnowas, funda-
mentally, to makehiman unperson.Duringthe remaining monthsof
1967,Sukarno'snumerous honorifictitleswererevoked, hispicturewas
ordertobe removedfromall publicplaces,anditwasannouncedthathe
mustnolongerbe referred toas President, thatthetitleDr wassufficient.
Sukarnohimselfwas placed in the Bogorpalace,but his freedomof
movement was increasingly restricted untilit coveredonlythe cityof
Bogor. Contact withhisloyalists wasbroken.Heavypressure wasputon
thePNI to renounceMarhaenism, theSukarno-formulated ideology,as
thebasisof the party.AndAdamMalik,theForeignMinister, under-
tookto correctthe generalbeliefthatSukarnowas thesole creatorof
Indonesia'sStatephilosophy, the Pantjasila.To add supportforthese
actions,thecommanders ofthearmedforceswarnedthatanyattempt to
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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968
restoreSukarnowouldbe metbyinstant force.
As of the end of 1967,Suharto,evermethodicaland cautious,still
refusedtogivewaytodemandsforthetrialofSukarnoandthebanningof
thePNI. He was awarethatto bringSukarnobeforethecourtswould
give the formerpresidentthe aura of martyrdom, while profoundly
antagonizingmillionsofJavanese ; itwasbettertolethimjustfadeaway.
The questionofthePNI was morecomplicated. Some partymembers
hadshowna willingness to co-operate withthePKI ; almostall retained
respectand love for Sukarno;manywere unable to abandonanti-
nekolimsloganeering in favourof whatthe armydeemeda rational
examination ofIndonesia'sproblems;andallresented militarycontrolof
thegovernment. AndyetSuharto,as a Javanese himself, believedthatit
was politically
dangerous, and therefore foolish,to removeall political
representationfrom the 25 million or so ethnicJavanesewhoseloyalties
hadforyearsbeenfocusedon Sukarnoand eitherthePNI or the PKI.
No othersecularpartyevincedanycapacityfororganizing and repre-
sentingthese millions,and it seemed that Suharto considered thesuit-
ablyreformed PNI to be the only available,although farfrom perfect,
partycapable of providingnon-communist representation for the
majorityofJavaneseand formanynon-devout, non-Javanesefromthe
OuterIslands.

The September30 Movementsignalledthe rapiddisintegration of

Sukarno'scarefully balancedsystemof Guided Democracy.The first
blowwas thedestruction ofthePKI, untilthenIndonesia'slargestand
bestorganizedpoliticalparty.ButSukarnohimself alsofell,albeitmore
slowly.His intransigent defenceofthecommunists, continued longafter
thePKI organization hadbeenshattered, notonlygavetheformerly sub-
merged anti-Sukarnoists theopportunity to extend their attacks against
his Ministersand thenagainstthePresidenthimself;it persuadedim-
portantsectorsoftheofficer corpsthathisauthority had to be severely
curbed.It is difficultto explainthisself-destructivestubbornness. Per-
hapsSukarnowas too old to adjustto a radically alteredsituation - and
somehavesuggested thathehadbecomeverydependent ontheadviceof
thecommunist leaders.Perhapshe calculatedthateitherthePKI or a
neo-PKI was absolutely essentialifhe was to preventarmydominance;
eventshave showntheultimatetruthof such an assessment.Perhaps,
too,theadulationandsuccessofthepreceding yearsled himto an over-
estimation ofthepowerofhischarismaand ofhismanipulatory skillsin
restoring at least a semblanceof the pre-i Octoberconfiguration of
politicalforces.
Suharto,as commander oftheunitsthatdestroyed theSeptember30
Movement,was thrustprecipitately into a positionof greatpolitical
strength. To theprestige gainedas theheroof1 Octoberwasaddedcom-
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 INDONESIA
mand of the only organization capable of maintaining governmental
authority throughout the nation.The politicalpartieswereinept,the
bureaucracy enmeshedin the corruptimmobilism of countlesspetty
fiefdoms. ButSuhartoapparently decidedonlywithgreatreluctance that
Sukarno'sauthority mustbe drastically curtailedif the PKI was to
remaininoperative andifthecountry wastoadoptrational economicand
foreign policies.Flanked on the one sideby radicalcivilians and officers
whodemandedstrongmeasuresagainstSukarno,andontheotherbythe
numerous elements inthearmedforcesandcivilianpopulation thatmight
be sparkedintorevoltbysuchaction,Suhartomovedwithcircumspec-
tion.The President was givenampleopportunity to retainhispost,and
evenconsiderableauthority, on conditionthathe condemnthe PKI,
acceptnon-sycophantic, competent, and development-oriented Minis-
ters,and agreeto enlargedarmyparticipation in themakingofnational
policy.Sukarnowould not or could not acquiescegracefully in the
diminution ofhispoliticalrole.Andso Suharto,assistedbytheradicals,
undertookthe steadyerosionof the President'sremainingbases of
politicalstrength.The endcamein March1967withthetermination of
Sukarno'smorethantwenty-one yearsas Indonesia'sfirstpresident.
WiththeremovalofthePKI and Sukarno,deep cleavagesappeared
amongtheanti-communist forces.FromOctober1965therehad been
radicalswithinthearmedforcesandthecivilianpopulation. Likeallanti-
communists, theysoughtthecompleteeradication of the PKI and its
sympathizers. They wereradicalin thattheydefinedthe communist
sympathizers broadly,to includeall thosenon-communists who had
co-operated enthusiastically,as theysawit,withthePKI duringtheera
ofGuidedDemocracy.Theywereradicalin thattheywerethefirstto
pressdemandsagainstSukarno'schiefaides,thefirstto demanda new
cabinet, topressfortheremoval ofallauthorityfromSukarno, todemand
his dismissaland trial.Untilthe time,during1967,when Sukarno's
restoration becamean impossibility, theradicalswereSuharto'snatural
allies.OncehebecameActingPresident, however, theirdemandsquickly
outstripped hisdesires.
AllcivilianradicalswereunitedbehindthedemandthatSuhartotake
promptand publicactionto punishcorruptofficials and to chastisethe
PNI. Butwiththeelimination ofSukarnoand thePKI, a fundamental
divisionappearedon thequestionofIndonesia'sfuture politicalsystem.
The Westernized and secularizedintellectuals and studentsconstituted
a largepartofthevocaland activeleadershipoftheradicalmovement,
butonlya minutepercentage ofthetotalIndonesianpopulation.In their
efforts to bringdown Sukarno,theyhad employedsloganssuch as
Restoredemocracy'and 'implement the 1945 Constitution in a pure
manner*. Theynowcametorealize,however, thatgeneralelectionsheld
undertheexisting partysystem would,infact,onlyreturn toParliament
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THE WORLD TODAY August 1968
theleadersoftheoldparties, forexampletheNU andthePNI. Andwith
muchjustification, theyconsideredthemto be corrupt, obsessedwith
ancientfeuds,andtotally devoidofanycapacityfortherationalanalysis
and solutionof thenation'smanifest economicand politicalproblems.
Bytheendof1967theseradicalshadcometoadvocateanindefinite post-
ponement ofgeneralelectionsand a purgeofexisting bodies.
legislative
Theywerealsodiscussing, withincreasing openness,thedesirability ofa
temporary military dictatorship or a government-enforced one-or two-
partysystem.The Muslims,whohad providedthenumerical majority
of the radicalmovement, tookviolentobjectionto thisattackon the
electoral
systemandtheexisting parties.Theyardently hopedthattheir
numerical strengthwouldbe translated through electionsintoa majority
positionwithinParliament. And in partas a reactionagainstthemass
conversions to Christianitythatfollowed thefailureoftheSeptember 30
Movement,16 theydemandeda haltto foreign and IndonesianChristian
missionary activity.In Makasar,Christian churcheswereburned.The
Muslims'aggressive self-assertivenessarousedfearamongothercivilians
andantagonism inthesecularized officer
corps.
Suhartowishedto moveslowlyin boththe economicand political
spheresin orderto reducedislocation andpreventthegrowth offurther
antagonisms within Indonesian society.Moreover, he had acted con-
withintheletterofthe1945Constitution,
sistently apparently motivated
in partbya genuinedesireto re-establish constitutionalism.The radical
officers,
many of whom now occupiedpowerful command held
positions,
viewssimilartothoseofthenon-Muslim civilianradicalsonthequestion
ofthepartyand parliamentary system.At first, duringSuharto'sinitial
monthsin the presidency, thereseemedto be no urgencyforpressing
himon thismatter.Their own positionsbroughtpower,status,and
materialrewards;Sukarno'sremaining sourcesof supportwerebeing
progressivelydestroyed ; andtheeconomy wasslowlybutsurelystabiliz-
ingundertheguidanceofWestern-trained economists.
Then,in thelastweeksof1967,therateofinflation oncemoresoared
meteorically.Hungerwasreported fromseveralpartsofthearchipelago.
Parliament groundtowardselectionlawsthatfavouredtheold parties.
Amongtheradicalofficers theconviction strengthened thatdrasticaction
wasimperative inordertobreakoutoftheeconomicandpoliticalmalaise.
Suhartomighttaketheinitiative, ifhe so desired.If not,otherswere
girdingtheircourageandtheiralliestomovedespitehim.
16In October1967,thesecretary
oftheIndonesianBibleSocietyclaimedthat
therehad been400,000convertsto Christianity
duringtheprevioustwoyears;
AntaraWartaBerita(Djakarta),13 October1967/A.There are approximately
10millionIndonesianChristians
in a totalpopulationofaboutno million.

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