CHAPTER V

SURVIVING IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS

Surviving Concepts

Pantjasila

By far the most important ideological concept that has survived the upheaval
of Gestapu and the decline of Sukarno is the concept of Pantjasila which seems to
have taken deeper root in the thought and emotions of the Indonesian people than
any of the other parts of Sukarno’s Indonesian philosophy. The Five Principles
(Ketuhanan = Belief in God; Kebangsaan = National Consciousness; Perikemanusiaan ^
Humanism; Keadilan Sosial ® Social Justice; Demokrasi = Sovereignty of the People)
of Pantjasila which Sukarno claimed to have perceived, during the earliest days
of the Republic, with the help of a mind of divine inspiration has, in fact, been
%

designated the criterion for political acceptability in "New Order" Indonesia and,
having survived the shock of September 30, 1965, has played an important role in
the political language of the country ever since.

Sukarno had maintained and used this extremely vague early creation of his,
all through the period of his political ascendency, but had rather relegated it
to the background during the later years. According to his interpretation Pantjasila
provided justification for "Guided Democracy," "Guided Economy" as well as all his
extreme nationalistic and internationally pro-Communist policies, as well as for his
latter-day indulgence and encouragement of the domestic Communists. He had always
been ready to demonstrate his loyalty to the belief in one God, first principle of
the Pantjasila, by using Moslem expressions and accepting the title of "Leader of
Islam." However Aidit, the leader of his latter-day ally, the PKI, had made the
mistake of declaring that the Pantjasila would no longer be appropriate and nec­
essary once socialism had been achieved in Indonesia. After Gestapu, Pantjasila
became the main ideological rallying point. The PKI was now condemned not only
because of its involvement in the murderous and treacherous Gestapu, but as being
hostile to Pantjasila. The central most important principle of the Pantjasila
became a belief in one God. Communists and Communism were now accused of being
hostile to religion, to religious people, to the rights of religious people, and
pf having planned to eliminate Moslem religious leaders. Not only was Indonesian

- 201-
Communism now condemned as atheistic, but its entire ideological background of
Marxism, Leninism, international Communism and Maoism-were Included in the condemn­
ation. The main argument against any readmittance of any reformed Communists or
^|arxists into Indonesian political life was now that their beliefs are necessarily
fundamentally in contrast to the national philosophy of Pantjasila.

The second point of PKI's definition as anti-Pant.jasila, was that its actions,
strategy and tactics had necessarily been immoral because of their irreliglgus
attitude; here Pantjasila was equated with morality. They were supposed to have
used torture, kidnapping, murder and planned murder, slander, the smearing of
political rivals and perhaps even the attempt to monopolize power because they were
irreligious. Proof was their slogan "the ends justify the means." The condemna­
tion of the PKI and of Communism as being anti-Pantjasila drew after it the condemn­
ation of Nasakom and then socialism, Marhaenism as socialism or Marxism h la .
Indonesia, as Incompatible with Pantjasila. However although the concept of
Marhaenism has considerably suffered in prestige (Marhaenism of course was another
one of Sukarno's creations), it has been valiantly defended by the PNI who still
uses it.

A third use of Pantjasila became its use as a general yardstick for morality
in political behavior. Several days after Gestapu, appeared the first appeals in
the name of Pantjasila to avoid revenge, destruction, burning, looting,, and in
a never clearly spelled out way (as the outright killing of Communists has never
been admitted in the press), also murder. There followed arguments against racism
in the name of Pantjasila; avoid anti-Chinese pogroms, they are racist and racism
is against Pantjasila. However, there appeared also frequent arguments that a
particular anti-Chinese activity did not fall under the heading of racism and
therefore did not clash with Pantjasila. Appeals to avoid religious Intolerance
such as anti-Christian pogroms or Incitement against the "Chipese religion,"
also used the argumpnt that Pantjasila means religious tolerance.

Pantjasila was used especially during 1968 as the central concept in the
dispute between the observant Moslem groups and the other political groups.
Observant Moslem groups urged the acceptance of the 1945 Djakarta Charter as the
preamble for a new constitution, arguing that it was a true expression of
Pantjasila. The argument ran as follows: Pantjasila is the principle of belief
in one God, therefore all Indonesians should properly adhere to their religion;
 -209-

the Djakarta Charter obliged all Moslems to keep Moslem laws. The great majority
of Indonesians were Moslems. The Moslems had no objection to the constitution
obliging also all members of the Christian minority to keep-their religious rules
and regulations.

As this obviously left' no room either for the practice of the nominally
Moslem, Javanese sincretlsm of the majority of the Javanese population, or for
the secularism of an urban educated minority, the opposition to the Djakarta Charter
was fierce. This opposition was also in the name of Pant j as list; Pantjasila means
religious tolerance, being a religious nation, all believing in God, but certainly
not a Moslem state. "Moslem State" proved to be a sufficiently tainted concept
which had been associated with fanaticism, rebellion and disloyalty in the past.
One curious aspect of the use of Pantjasila as criterion for political respect­
ability was its use in combination with the old concept "Revolution": After Gestapu
political behavior was designated as either in accordance or in contrast with "our
Pantjasila Revolution."

Pantjasila now also served as a yardstick for proper internal governmental

and party political arrangements: Indonesia should have a Pantjasila democracy.
Within this rather vague framework began the discussion about the desired character­
istics and institutions of Indonesian democracy. All groups agreed that Pantjasila
democracy should not admit the PKI, that it should be favorable to religion and
religious groups, that it should hot use immoral and violent means, that it should
be properly Indonesian and not tied to foreign powers and foreign ideologies.
However, while the PNI press continued to reject the practices, institutions and
the banned political parties of "liberal democracy," and considered Guided Democracy
as-,in accordance with Pantjasila, the action fronts of Kami and Kappi started
gradually condemning more and more aspects of Guided Democracy as parts of the now
condemned Old Order.

The 1945 Constitution

A second old concept which is rather akih to Pantjasila and which also
survived is the concept of the 1945 Constitution. From 1958 to 1960 Sukarno had
used the slogan of "return to the 1945 Constitution," for his campaign for
superceding the existing constitution bf "liberal democracy." He claimed that
while "liberal democracy" was alien and unsuitable to the character and needs of
 -210-

the Indonesian people, the first constitution of 1945 had expressed the truly ' -■
(<

Indonesian and timly revolutionary spirit of the beginning of the Republic. He =

never went into details, emphasizing only one element of the 1945 Coristitutidri—‘ ■
the strong president. It is curious that that same 1945 constitution later -served ‘
to legitimize the criticism, condemnation and gradual and partial dismantling of
Sukarno's edifice of "Guided Democracy." Not one single, group called, for the
return to the constitution of the liberal period. The action fronts and, to a
lesser degree, the Moslem groups, began criticising a number of features of Sukarno's
Old Order as not in accord with the 1945 constitution;

1. Unconstitutional, illegal, and extra^legal activities

of Government and its agencies. In the name of the
1945 Constitution they demanded strict adherence to
constitutionality and legality.

2. Parliament and the MPRS did not fulfill their function of

properly discussing issues—they were bodies of yes-men.
In the name of the 1945 Constitution they demanded an end of
yes-manship.

3. Parliament and the, MPRS were not properly representative

because not elected; the Constitution of 1945 served as
a justification for the demand for general elections.

Both these older concepts, Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution, probably
were quite valuable in serving as unifying symbols and providing this period of
rapid change with some continuity, however, both also proved to .be very unsatis-
fact.pry in pr.oviding positive guidance about urgent national problems.

Part of the words and concepts used in the post-Gestapu press are old indeed
but did not come from the dictionary of Sukarno's Indonesian Ideology 6r from the
language of nationalism in general; These were older concepts, mainly religious
ones. Such words as God, religious, good and bad, justice and truth, appear now
in political pronouncements of Moslem leaders, generals, as well as in official army
speeches, and General Soeharto's style abounds in them. Justice and truth became
in fact one of the central slogans of the New Order anti-Sukarnd forces. The
Moslem leadership and their ppess indulged freely in the use of such expressions
as "the religious people," "the Moslems," "in accordance with Islam," "in.
accordance with the Holy Qur'an" Moslem newspapers publish treatises of
scriptural excegeses in order to prove that Communism and Nasakom are in conflict
with Holy Scripture.
 - 211-

The Moslem leadership have demanded, since 1966, the abolition of such
concepts as Hero of Islam which had been bestowed by some of their leadership
on Sukarno; they gradually began to criticise Sukarno in the moral language of
Islam for having acquired one wife too many as well as for indulging in extra­
marital sexual adventures. Sukarno was now condemned because he had claimed to
be a Moslem. However, a Moslem who has transgressed the way Sukarno did can no
longer be recognized as a Moslem.

Even before 1965 there had been charges that the Communists’ attitude
to Pantjaslla was not what it should be. They were accused of making innovations.
The Moslem paper, Duta Mas.jarakat, mused on July 11, 1964: "It is not clear if
new versions of the Pant.jasila are allowed—if not—they should be banned to end
confusion . . . these are attempts to weaken Pantjaslla." The Moslem groups
had a somewhat proprietary attitude to Pantjaslla. Thus on September 7, 1964
Duta Masjarakat declares: "Pantjaslla is our basis and guide in how to be a
complete revolutionary;" and during the heated discussion about the PKI's demand
to ban all American films, Duta Masjarakat offers the following criterion for
"good films:" "They must not conflict with Pantjaslla.!'

However all the political groups used the Pantjaslla as the most venerable
national ideological concept; thus the independent paper Merdeka when discussing
the problems of Indonesian education stresses that this education should include
*
Pantjaslla. Usually the Communist press was very careful not to offend the
devotees of Pantjaslla.

It was not by accident however that the Moslem groups were sp fiercely attached
to the concept of Pantjaslla and that they tended to throw doubts on the PKI's
loyalty to it. By far the, most important of this collection of extremely vague
concepts -- 1) belief in God; 2) national consciousness or nationalism;
3) humanism or internationalism; 4) social justice or socialism or "a just and
prosperous society" and 5) democracy — was for them the first one, interpreted as
religious belief and religious observance. Therefore Aidit’s reported remark at
a Party Congress in 1964 about his ideas about the future of Pantjaslla caused
a storm of outrage in the Moslem camp. The PNI, which by then was„ heavily
iltrate.d by the PKI, rose to Aidit’s defense. Its paper, Suluh Indonesia,
argues on October 23, 1964: "Aidit’s reported remark, ’The Pantja Sila is a tool

Merdeka, July 11, 1964.

 - 212-

for unity and when Indonesians become united we won't need it any more'—is surely
a mistake, a slip of the tongue or a misunderstanding by reporters. Let not a
slip disturb our unanimity. The Pantja Sila is not open to debate."

Immediately after the Coup the Army command in its first official communiques
put the Pantjasdla as the first and most important national symbol: "Praise be to
God that the Armed Forces of. the R.I., which is loyal to the Pantjasila, the Nasakom
and the Sapta Marga [the soldier's oath of loyalty], and which is always loyal to
the Supreme Commander of the ABRI/Great Leader of the Revolution, Bung Kamo,
firmly and correctly has performed its duty in the Interest of the nation's and
country's glory and prestige. ..." And "We, through the help of the people,
have established order in the capital and saved the Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia and its Pant.jasila . . and ". . .we appeal to all political
parties/Pant.jasila mass organizations and Manlpolistic mass organizations to help
the Armed Forces in eliminating the September 30 Movement entirely. ..." On
the same day the' United Action Front to crush the September 30 Movement is being
established . . . "for maintaining and safeguarding Pant.lasila.

The declarations of loyalty which poured in during the following weeks from
all over the country tended to put a stress on adherence to Pantjasila. Student
organizations appealed to "all Pantjasilistic and Manlpolistic progressive revolu-
tionary students. Already on October 7, 1965, appears the charge that the
September 30 Movement had "undermined the Pantjasila." And this charge is repeated
by the provincial press, "the Pantjasila has been violated by the Coup."^^^^

The Army Command was quick to,Identify the PKI as the "mastermind" of the Coup.
The discovery of the mutilated bodies of the murdered generals aroused a wave of
popular revulsion against the tactics of the PKI. Angkatan Bersendjata, in its
editorial on October 9, 1965, drives home .its idea about the PKI's plans: ". . .
in the future not only seven generals but eight or ten generals will be terrorized
and hundreds and even thousands of people will be destroyed and the PAntjasila

>> ~

Angkatan Bersendjata, October 4, 1965.

**
Berita Yudha, October 4, 1965.
A**
Ibid.
A***
Pelopor, October 7, 1965.
# Angkatan Bersendjata, October 7, 1965.
AA
Ibid., October 14, 1965.
 -213-

Revolution will be destroyed too and replaced by a kind of revolution a la PKI,

& la Aidit. ..."

I have mentioned above the attempt by the Catholic paper, Kompas, on'
October 13, 1965, to prevent the Ideological polarization. It points out that all
the groups- " have formally accepted the Pant.jasila. ..." Two Surabaya papers
base their claim for the continued validity of Nasakom on-the Pant.jasila; "The
ttue face of our Revolution is Nasakom. This is evident from our Pant.jasila. . . ."

But their view was not accepted. The other political parties emphasize that
they are different from the PKI, which has loyalties to outside powers and outside
ideologies; "The parties in Indonesia, parties of the Pantjasila are loyal to Bung
A*
Karno and Indonesia only. And Angkatan Bersendjata, in its editorial of
October 19, 1965, makes it quite clear who are the enemies who are not included
in the Pant.jasila camp; "Their loyalty is to another side and not the Pant.jasila.
They are guided by another Ideology which is not the Pantjasila." Already on
October 9, 1965, Angkatan Bersendjata had reminded its readers of Aidit's famous
remark; "Aidit said that the Pant.jasila was only a tool for uniting the
Indonesian’people, and once the Indonesian people have been united, the Pant.jasila
is nq longer necessary." The political opponents of the PKI now declared themselves
to be the real defenders of the Pantjasila; "Acfcording to the Atjeh Police Chief
. . . the September 30 Movement has strengthened the power of the supporters of the
Pant.jasila." And "according to Partindo, Atjeh, the September 30 Movement was
instigated by the PKI and its mass organizations and it resulted in a struggle
between the defenders of Pantjasila against the anti-Pantjasila."***

With the rise of hostility towards Peking, Pantjasila is even being used
as a guide for foreign policy which is fully in the national interest; "Indonesia
in pursping the. real policy of Pant.'|asila, will pursue a policy which is one
hundred percent for Djakarta, for this is ideptical with a policy which is pro
New World."
By November 1965 the PKI have been labeled the doubters. Manifesto (S)
reports on November 2, 1965 a speech by the military commander of East Java, who
said that "those who doubt the truth of Pant.jasila as a State philosophy of the

A
Suara Rakjat. editorial, October 30, 1965. And similarly Mimbar Rakjat,
editorial, November 1, 1965.

Api, editorial, October 18, 1965.

AAA
Media, November 4, 1965.

Api, editorial, October 21, 1965.

 -214-

Indonesian people, will inevitably be thrown out of the cburse of the Revolution.
The Armed Forces which have been Pantajasilaists since their birth have become
stronger and capable of foiling every effort of any group to divert the course of
the Revolution and to replace Pantjasila with another ideology." While this
chorus of anti-Copnunist declarations in the name of Pantjasila gathered strength,
the Information Minister, Achmadl, a man .close to Sukarno, sounded a discordant
note. For him the antl-Pantjasilaists were not the PKI and affiliated newspapers,
but those newspapers which had started to use the new political situation to
criticise Bung Kamo's advisors: "Newspapers whose loyalty to Pant.jasila,
Manipol and the President's teachings is doubted, should be re-examined."
Nevertheless, Army commanders and Moslem leaders continued to use the Pantjasila
as a weapon against the PKI and its sympathizers and to emphasize more and more
the religious aspect of the "state philosophy."

Officers in charge of anti-PKI forces must be guided by the Pantjasila only

and they must believe in God." And "A genuine Indonesian soldier is a soldier-
patriot of the Pantjasila, the defender of the State ideology and believer in the
One God. And "Col. Susatyo ; . . said that the September 30 Movement
was instigated by the PKI which has trampled the Pantjasila and thrown out the
principles of nationalism and the belief in God."

The Pantjasila appears now also as a religious moral guideline for the poli­
tical behavior of the enemies of Communism. "For patience, and not wanting to take
revenge, those attitudes are found only with people who are religious, people who
.M#
believe in God, individuals or groups endowed with the genuine spirit of Pantjasila;
and, "thanks to their belief in Pantjasila and God fhey know that terrorist action
must not be resisted with terrorist actions.

In spring 1966 political and military, leaders attempted to use the Pantjasila
as a criterion in the many pressing party political, constitutional and economic
problems which faced Indonesia. As a result of anti-Communist pressure the PNI

Information Minister Achmadi's remarks on the current state of the press in

Mimbar Revolusi, October 26, 1965.
**
Api, October 28, 1965.

Angkatan Bersendjata, November 7, 1965

L

Bukit Barisan, November 3, 1965.

# Angkatan Bersendjata, October 8, 1965.

Surabaya Post, October 20, 1965.

 -215-

had split into* two factions. On April 2, 1966, Suara Rakjat reports a statement
expressing "appreciation for General Soeharto's initiative to bring the two factions
[PNI/Marhaenist "Front^ in a reunification meeting for the sake of Pant.jasila

and the Revolution." Angkatan Bersend.jata on April 4, 1966, reports the attempt
of Drs. Usri Sastadiredja, vice chairman of Sidoardjo National Front, to clarify
the rather vague attitude of the Pant.jasila to the desired economic and political
patterns of Ipdonesian society: "Pant.jasila is a revolutionary doctrine which
clearly opposes any form of imperialism and capitalism. . . . Pant.jasila also
opposes Communism because the social justice of the Communists is like rationing
in a zoo, while their democracy is centralized democracy or dictatorship in which
people are herded like ducks," i.e., Pant.jasila is opposed to mechanistic equali-
tarianism and to political dictatorship.

Pant.jasila was also called upon to serve as a guideline for a reformed

foreign policy. "Where is Indonesia going? We return to an active and independent
foreign policy based on Pant.jasila, serving national interests." And "As to
Malaysia, the government will continue its confrontation policy, but as a state
based on the Pant.jasila, the government will always open the door to peaceful
settlement."

While the most important umbrella political organization in the pre-Coup days
had been the 'National Front,' soon after the Coup the 'National Front,' which had
been largely controlled by the PKI, was diminished in importance and a new federa­
tion of political groups, the Pant.jasila Front-, took oyer. The PNI, which had
been one of the main powers in the National Front, objected to this shift in control
fp thp Moslem groups. The Moslem leaders and their press fought back in the name
of Pant.jasila. "If the National Front is an apparatus of the State, the Pant.jasila
Front is an exedutor of the National Front. Anyone who disagrees with the exist­
ence of the Pant.jasila Front is anti-Pantjasila and pro-Nekolim, and is therefore
a Gestok/PKI lackey, said Col. Sudjono [Asst. Pepelrada of Kediri and Madiun]." ^
The Catholic paper Kompas on April 7, 1966, suggested a rteform of the old National
Front: ". . . to set up an Ampera-style National Front Secretariat comprising all

*
Kompas, April 5, 1966.

Angkatan Bersend.jata and Berita Yudha, and Kompas. April 8, 1966.

Duta Masjarat. April 6, 1966.

 -216-

P*^litical partiss, mass organizationsj functionary groups which are progressive,

revolutionary and genuine Pantjasilaists." Suara Rakjat on April 12, 1966,. comes
to the defense of the Pantjasila Front under the title "Pant.jasila is a gift
from God : "If there are people who say the Pant.lasila Front turns the Revolution
to the right, such people are PKI men."

The Pantjasil'a served also as a justification for antl-Chinese-minority

policies (especially economic discrimination and limitations on free movement).
For example: This decision, to close down the Chinese schools, was taken oh the
grounds of consideration that all schools within the Republic of Indonesia must
bd endowed with, founded on and adhered to the Pantjasila identity."

asila also served as a basis for the rejection of the aggressive class
war attitude of the Communists: ". . . Our ultimate aim is a socialist Pantjasila
society, full of humanism and with no room for the hate that the Communists used
to agitate among us."

However during this period the concept of Pantjasila was most often used by
the press as a vague, positive, blanket slogan, i.e., "The New Order, struggling
to solve the many problems we face, is best based on the Pantjasila. especially
the belief in God. Or "Since the New Order has been active among the people,
we see an intensification of efforts to defend the Pantjasila." Or, "Only
by reference to the Pantjasila can differences be solved.Or, "Now we need to
indoctrinate the Pantjasila as a counter-ideology, to extract the poison of the
Old Order." Or, "We have had difficult experiences, but the alertness of faithful
Pantjasila patriots has enabled us to overcome them.Or the East Java Commander's
New Year message: ". . . We must convince ourselves of the rightness of Pantjasila

*
Angkatan Bersendjata. editorial, April 6, 1966.

Ibid.. editorial, September 9, 1966.

Merdeka. editorial, September 9, 1966.

Ibid.. editorial, September 14, 1966.

//
Ibid.. editorial, October 6, 1966.
##
Suluh Marhaen. editorial, September 14, 1966.
### Ibid.. editorial, December 31, 1966.
 r,

-2L7-

in order that our activities will reflect the conscious wishes of the people."*

Nevertheless, when the vagueness of the concept and its lack of relevance
s ,

in the developing discussion about the proper political institutions and practice
for the New Order became heated, the press made some efforts to define the meaning
of Pantjasila in relation to this problem: "There are now many conflicting ideas
among our people about the practice of a Pantjasila democracy. In coordinating
these ideas, we must reject all concepts of ’meat-cleaver democracy,' of 'fight
f^^^or with terror' as Subandrlo and the PKI have advocated." And "in practical
terms we can call Pantjasila democracy a working democracy whose highest ideal is
'all for all.'"***

Around the turn of the year there appear also next to the rather vague
concept of P^ntjasila the more practical emphasis dn carrying out the decisions
of the MPRS and the Ampera Cabinet. The desperate economic situation at last
put some urgency in the declarations of policy by the press. "But no less essen­
tial is it to make all Pantjasilaist, progressive revolutionary people realize that
we have to race against time in order to make the Ampera Cabinet's program a

success.

Several inter-group conflicts now are clearly reflected in the use of the
concept Pantjasila. The Moslem organizations mount their attack against the PNI's
favorite concept of Marhaenism—Sukarno's socialism A la Indonesia. "HMI [the
Moslem students' organization] has rejected the concept 'Marhaenism -is identical
with Pantjasila.

In the fall of, 1967 the tension between Moslem and Christian groups came to
a head and several anti-Christian incidents took place. The use of the concept
Pantjasila during these months reflected this problem of the status of the
Christian minority as well as the attempt of the Moslem group to have the "Djakarta

A
Berita Yudha, January 3, 1967.

Merdeka, editorial, October 13, 1966.

Ibid., editorial, November 12, 1966.

Djawa Pos, December 31, 1966.

^^Front Revolusioner. January 4, 1967.
 -218-

Charter" accepted as a preamble to the new constitution. On October 19, 1967

Sinar Harapan declared "... the Makassar incident [an anti-Christian outbreak]
on October 1 was a national tragedy since it obviously undermined the Pant.jaslla."
A number of suggestions were made in order to abate the fears of the Moslems
about the usually very successful missionary activities of the Christian churches.
Regarding one of the suggestions Sinar Harapan reports on November 1, 1967,
"Nelson Parapat, of the Medan Praesidium, said that demarcation of separate areas
for churches and mosques may not be permitted—this would be a violation of, the
Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution." On October 20 1967 Kompas states that the
Christians were in favor of a strong Pantjasila state because it would protect
them. "The MPRS has affirmed that our State is a Pantjasila State. The Moslems,
on the other hand, then point to the Djakarta Charter, which is the inspiration
of the 1945 Constitution, or to a 'complete Pantjasila.In spite of the Moslems'
argument that the Djakarta Charter was in accordance with Pantjasila. the opposition
of all the non-devout Moslem groups was sufficient to stalemate the discussions
about the preamble for the Constitution.

During 1968 Pantjasila remained an important Ideological concept and its

users continued to emphasize its use as an ideological weapon against Communism
and against unbelief and immorality; i.e., "The Pantjasila has saved the Nation
from the clutches of Communism." And "Can belief in God—one of the Pantjasila's
points—go hand in hand with the dishonesties of many officials?" Or, " . . .
the question of moral integrity is not a relative matter, buf a fixed one based
on the Pantjasila and on which the Nation is founded."

In discussions about the proper forms of democratic life fot Indonesia,

the concept Pantjasila Democracy appeared frequently in the press. ". . . Soeharto's
appointment of sixty-seven new M.P.'s and the dismissal of sixty-seven old ones,
an action out of good intentions to mold the voices prevailing in society and to
develop a sound Pantjasila Democracy. ..." On Match 29, 1968 Berita Yudha

*
Berita Yudha. March 6, 1968.

Kompas. June 1, 1968.

Mertju Suar. June 20, 1968.

Djakarta Times, editorial, February 10, 1968.

 -219-

warns "We should not repeat old dictatorial ways of reaching agreement. This
political psychosis has to be eliminated In order to get to consensus with less
tension. Only then will we have democracy according to Pantjasila." Or, "The
democratic principles of the -Pantjasila do not allow a dictatorial composition."

The concept Pantjasila seems not to have been especially helpful in the
search for satisfactory answers to the difficult problems of the relationship
between the military and civilian authorities, the when and how of general elections
just as it had not been very satisfactory as a basis for resolving the tensions
between different religious and ethnic groups, the proper representation of differ­
ent groups until the elections, or the elimination- of corruption. It seems to me
that there is a hint of impatience with the concept when used by political leaders
or in the editorials of the Indonesian press in 1968.

There appears also some impatience and criticism of the way in which the
concept Pantjasila has frequently been used: "Such practice as labeling enemies
anti-Pantjasila and casting them into jail on such vague accusations is not only
unjustifiable but a crime against Pantjasila. Or, Pantjasila forms the
State philosophy and is not meant to be used as a political instrument. Or,
"Let us accept the Pantjasila and move on towards building the Nation." Or,
"The virtue of the Pantjasila . . . should not blind us to the possible lessons
that can be taught by others [the Soviet or the U.S. political systems].

To sum up, the concept of Pantjasila as Indonesia's "state philosophy"

is the central ideological concept which has survived several major political
changes: The change from the revolutionary period to the liberal ffferlod, from the
liberal to Sukarno's Guided Democracy, as well as finally the transfer of power
from the "Old Order" to Soeharto's New Order. It still is venerated and sacrosanct.
The defense of Pantjasila has been made the central issue in the official view
of the history of the Coup and the emergence of the New Order. Roeslan Abdulganl,

Sinar Harapan, June 4, 1968.

itit
Duta Masjarakat, June 3, 1968.

Berita Yudha, June 1, 1968.

Suluh Marhaen, June 3, 1968.

%usantara, June 19, 1968.
 -220-

who had been in the past the chief propagator of Sukarno's Indonesian Ideology
and now serves as the New Order's Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
gave the following version of these historic events in hi^ speech to the Speakers
Research Committee for the United Nations on June 5, 1968:

These shots [the shots that killed the six generals] also
tried to kill our Pantjasila, or Five Principles: Belief
in God, Humanitariani'sm, Nationalism, Democracy and Social
Justice, our philosophy and Identity as a State and Nation. . .
this fight [against Gestapu/PKI] had been initiated by all
those forces who tried to safeguard the Pant.jasila ideology.
Around this banner flocked all militant forces of the Army,
Navy, the Police and the Air Force, joined by nationalist
and religious political parties, with the youth and the
students as the vanguards.

Thus while the use of the concept of the Pantjasila is declining as a slogan
supposedly relevant to the concrete problems of the day, its importance in the
ideological justification for the establishment of the 'New Order' will make it
endure.

Central New Concepts

Old Order - New Order

The most important two new concepts were those of the Old Order and the
New Order. These two have been used in the old sloganist way providing a dichotomy,
dividing friend from foe. While in the first period after Gestapu, personalities,
groups, associations and newspapers were criticised as being involved in Gestapu,
or protecting Gestapu/PKI, gradually a new and broader stigma became that of the
Old Order and the enemy became an Old Order force. The rallying cry for political
activism became that of the establishment of a New Order. The concept of the
Old Order permitted a rather thorough criticism of many of the weaknesses and the
evils of Indonesian government, administration, and political culture during the
Sukarno years. While using this new slogan the young action front activists
mounted a radical attack against the entire practice of sloganism and "idle talk"
of the old regime. They criticised it for its unreality, for the constant
practice of deceiving the people, for its empty dreams of national glory, for the
waste of money on prestige projects while the masses went hungry, for the
colossal mismanagement. Inefficiency and corruption that took place behind the
smokescreen of Sukarno's Indonesian ideology.
 - 221-

To return to Weatherbee and his view of the post-Coup political culture.

He has considered the criticism launched by th^ urban educated youth against the
old political culture, as an unimportant minority manifestation. We can now
conclude that this criticism had a lasting and deep effect on the style and language
of Indonesian politics. Whereas Weatherbee thought that the existence of a gap
between ideology and reality was of little importance as long as the ideology was
coherent in itself, the Indonesian post-coup experience shows that when the
existence of such an abysmal gap became apparent to the politically literate public
the old ideology came gradually tumbling down. The revulsion against sloganism,
against deceptive pomp and circumstance and to a certain degree even against the
use of "word magic" in general, was shared not only by the Western-influenced urban
students and intellectuals, but by much wider circles. Most newspapers explicitly
praised Soeharto's new style; No pompous rallies, no electrifying new slogans,
but a rather dry and matter-of-fact report to the MPRS on Independence Day..
While according to Indonesian tradition Cabinets still have a special name, they
have become much less exuberant. Instead of the Dwlkora Cabinet (two-pronged
attack), the cabinet of the long drawn out period of the uneven decline of Sukarno's
power was called the Ampera Cabinet (message of the people’s suffering), and in
summer 1968 a new cabinet was given the simple name of thd Development Cabinet.
The element of unreality, of deception, of inability to face the truth of Sukarno's
ideologizing and sloganmongering style, has been clearly understood. It is not by
accident that the rallying cry of the New Order Forces became "justice and truth."
The emphasis was now on sobriety, efficiency, technical and economic skill, the
rentability of economic, projects, realistic prices, balanced budgets, a realistic
attitude to foreign powers based on real economic national interests, an international
stance in harmony with Indonesia's real economic capability.

It should however not be assumed that well-entrenched habits of word magic

and number magic disappeared overnight. As an example, Sukarno was accused of
causing the three national tragedies and the press demanded that he give an account
of his responsibility for those three tragedies. As I have expounded above, both
the old concepts of Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution as well as the focal
concept PKI/Gestapu and the pair of new concepts. Old Order-New Order, were
extensively used in the old word magic ways. But while during the years of guided
democracy and to a certain extent in the early months after Gestapu, the use of
ideology, slogans and word magic had nearly completely obscured the mass media's

Donald E. Weatherbee, "Ideology in Indonesia."

 -222-

attempts to inform^ to discuss issues, or to criticise the Government, it had by

1967 become apparent that the Indonesian press is ^capable of providing considerably
improved information, discussion, and criticism, simply because of a significant
decline in the use of ideological concepts, slogans and word magic.

The dichotomy of Old Order versus New Order was the most Important ideological
innovation after the Coup. By summer 1966 the concept of Old Order had come into
use and had come to symbolize several now-rejected aspects of Sukarno's foreign and
domestic policy as well as Sukarno's personal supremacy in general and the
political style he stood for. "The Dwikora Cabinet was formed as a sort of a
'War Cabinet' during the effort to crush Malaysia. As part of the Old Order,
that is behind us now. The old Cabinet does not fit our new needs as we look
ahead, for these men still remind people of the pre-Gestapu era. We need a new
Cabinet, and we would rather it does not have a special naite, for we are already
fed up with sloganlsm." However, the concept of the New Order Itself soon
developed into a slogan and it was propagated first and foremost by the student and
youth Action Fronts who tried to rally around the standard of the New Order all
those interested in a thorough change. Soon the concept of the Old (jrder was also

freely used—in the old word magic tradition—to condemn any person or group who
opposed their views and demands. On Independence Day 1966 the new concepts were
used to full effect by the students. "Many members of student political grbups
walked off the field during President Sukarno's Independence Day speech. They
said it was out of keeping with the New Order. Furthermore he did not mention
the Old Order much less curse it. ..."

In the following weeks the two concepts enter into general use in the press
and the differences between the negative characteristics of the Old Order and the
positive goals of the New Order are being worked out by the different political
groups in Indonesia. The Abrl leadership accepts its role as the deposer of the
Old Order and leader of the New Order. "It is clear that the MPRS decision endorsing
the turnover of authority to Soeharto is a vote of no confidence in the Old Order."

Angkatan Befsendjata, editorial, July 6, 1966.

Ibid., editorial, August 19, 1966.

Ibid., editorial, September 9, 1966.

 -223-

While the Abri leadership agreed with the now rather widespread condemnation
of the Guided Democracy system as being identical with the Old Order, it nevertheless
did not want to endorse the sympathy of somd' political leaders and part of the
Intellectuals for the 'liberal' period. . . The Old Order of the "Guided Era' was
*
far worse than the 'Liberal -Period. In the New Order we support neither." Then
follow criticisms of the economic and fiscal policies of the Sukarno era. "Our
tax structure needs to be improved, to eliminate the bureaucracy and corruption
of the Old Order . . . surely we will not continue special taxes like the compul-
sory 'contributions' of the Old Order." Or, "The current inflation is tremendous.
***
It is surely a legacy of the Old Order. More negative features of the Sukarno
era are being pinpointed as characteristics of the Old Order that has to be abolished.
". . .We will carry on our task of wiping out the Old Order, living without
personality cult, without oppression or Intimidations, or slanders, as in the days
****
of Subandrio and the PKI. And, The Old Order had a special characteristic
of spreading suspicion among the people of all but their own ideas.And "Surely
the New Order is contra the warped Communist concepts of the Old Order. We must
crush anything coming from the Old Order. . . .If the Old Order returns, our fate
is already sealed!" As to the ideological remedy for the ills of the Old Order,
we quite frequently meet the simple word magic recipe of using Pantjasila. "Now we
need to Indoctrinate the Pantjasila as a counter-ideology, to extract the poison
of the Old OrderOr, "The New Order, struggling to solve the many problems
we face is best based on the Pantjasila, especially the belief in God.
However, soon a new formulation of the Ideals of the New Order becomes more popular.

Angkatan Bersendjata, editorial, September 14, 1966.

A*
Ibid., editorial, September 23, 1966.
***C 1 •

Merdeka, editorial, December 14, 1966.

AAA*k
Angkatan Bersendjata, editorial, September 29, 1966.
»

#
Suluh Marhaen, editorial, September 14, 1966.
##,
Merdeka, editorial, December 14, 1966.
###
Suluh Marhaen, editorial, September 14, 1966.
####
Merdeka, editorial, September 9, 1966.
 -224-

"The special chatacteristics of the New Order are truth and justice'." While this
formulation obviously could also be accepted without commitment to any practical
.policy, the Youth Action Fronts and several of the Moslem leaders and their press
became more specific about these attributes of the New Order. "The New Order is
based on the Constitution, which makes it stronger than the Old Order's arbitrary
way." 'Justice' becomes strict adherence to legality and constitutionality;
'truth' becomes the symbol for the demands of the abolition of censorship and for
truthful relations between government and people. "The new press law fits the
New Order." And "In the New Order, both the people and the government should
be open to speak and to hear the truth as they see it. Only thus can true democracy
be built." And, in the words of Dr. Hatta: "The important thing in the
New Order is to preserve a pure and honest spirit; 'Don't cheat the people, all
the difficulties of the State should be known to the people.

Sukarno obviously underrated the popularity of the new concept. "President

Sukarno called the New Order contrarevolutionary!" reports Merdeka in an editorial
on December 6, 1966, outraged. The conflicts between the different groups making
up the so-called "New Order Forces" is increasingly reflected in the use of the
new New Order concept in the press. The PNI was during this period under much
pressure because of its past connections with the PKI. Suluh Marhaen on
November 29, 1966 reports humbly in its editorial: "Great effort by the leaders
and the masses have resulted in rebuilding the Party in line with the New Order."
However, the Surabaya paper Djawa Pos, makes a serious charge on December 31, 1966:
"The pure struggle of the New Order has been diverted by the counterrevolutionaries
to eliminate the Pantjasila Socialist Revolution."

The "Generation of '45" used to be enthusiastic supporters of Sukarno.

Merdeka warns them in its editorial of August 29, 1966: "Now the generation of '45

Suluh Marhaen, editorial, September 14, 1966.

Duta Masjarakat, editorial, October 21, 1966.

Ibid., editorial, November 12, 1966.

Ibid., editorial, November 29, 1966.

^'^Angkatan '66, January 9, 1967.
 -J

-225-

needs to examine itself deeply and correct itself as necessary, to be in tune with
the New_Ordgr." The Moslem Duta Masjarakat does not like one aspect of the New
Order, its more liberal attitude towards manifestations of the West. In an
editorial of October 27, 1966 it states, "The ban against decadent music, such as
from the Beatles, is right and must be maintained, lest we lose our way in the
New Order. We should not allow ourselves to relapse into decadence. The
Government must set the example by RRI—TV." Early in 1967 the pressure against the
remaining influence of Sukarno and his supporters was stepped up in the press.
Mahaslswa Indonesia, first week, January 1967, quoted the decision of the Sundanese
Community. Conference on December 24, 1966: "[The Conference} urged General Soeharto
... to immediately purge the State/Government apparatus of Old Order elements."
Nusa Putera on January 3, 1967 declares "The political guerrilla warfare is launched
by the Old Order as it is already on the brink of its own destruction." And
Mertju Suar on January 4, 1967 quotes a resolution: ". . . that stem action be
taken against Bung Kamo accused by the people of being the last fortress of the
Old Order, mastermind of Gestapu/PKI, against the '45 Constitution and Pantjasila."

By fall 1967 a new domestlq problem arose: tension 'between Moslem and
Christian groups caused anti-Christian incidents in several parts of Indonesia.
Both Christian and Moslem political leaders had been enthusiastic supporters of
the New Order. But now cracks in the front of the New Order forces appeared.
While some editorials exhort their readers in the old word magic fashion to guard
"the unity of the New Order," others condemn the activities of their opponents
because they may lead to a rift in the New Order forces. "Negative statements regard­
ing the 1966 generation actions are not laudable, they may lead to a rift in the
New Order forces; they are free propaganda for the PKI, the Old Order and the Chinese
Communists." The Catholic paper Kompas. in an editorial on October 20, 1967,
has more reasbnable and thoughtful comments on the ever more apparent antagonistic
IpterestS and claims that tend to destroy the temporary coalition under the banner
of the New Order. "If riot cleared up, the religious problem will hamper
political stabilization and endanger the struggle for the New Order. . . . There

*
Api Pantjasila. editorial, October 27, 1967.

Mert.ju Suar. October 25, 1967.

 -226-

should be a change in the structure of political life so that there will be a

proper political organization for each group; passion for power politics should be
avoided, a common platform for all components of the New Order should be created.
. . . Also important is a continuous exchange of thoughts among those who call
themselves components of the New Order, organized in existing united action commands,
the PNI, religious organizations and the like. There should be a rededication to
the ideals of the New Order in every field and on all levels to free the State
and Nation from apathy and fatigue, and to revive vitality and enthusiasm no
matter how difficult our daily life is." What Kompas suggests here seemp to be a
revitalization of the political parties and of Parliament.

It was obvious that different military commanders had divergent views on

the role of the political parties within the New Order. The Sumatra inter­
regional military commander, Maj. Gen. Kusno Utomo, "froze" the PNI/FM in Sumatra,
stating "that the PNI/FH is iil-lntentioned toward the New Order."* It should be
remembered that Soeharto had recently stated that "political parties are one of the
Important instruments of democracy . . . because they are the means by which the
people channel their political aspirations."** The habit of demanding the firing

of persons or the abolition of institutions as belonging to the Old Order instead

of going through constitutional channels had become quite widespread, e.g., "A
large delegation of North Sumatri KAMI Issued a statement . . . and served an
ultimatum demanding all trade guilds to be abolished as uneconomical, unconstitutional
and in the interest of the Old Order,"*** or "Medan ISKI demand the recall of Darwls

from the North Sumatran Legislature; he has been known as an exponent of the Old

A military commander, Maj, Gen. Kemal Idris, of Kostrad, exhibited a rather

blunt and purely military attitude to the-New Order. "Every violator against the
O^^der will be firmly dealt with. All acts of treachery against the New Order,
regardless of where they originate, will be severely dealt with. Past virtues will
not l)e of any help in such a case. This warning should also be heeded by members of

*
Suluh Marhaen. editorial, October 19, 1967.
**
Ibid.

Mert.ju Suar. October 31, 1967.

Waspada, November 1, 1967.

 -227-

the New Order themselves."

The chairman of the MPRS, Gen. Nasution, made an attempt to explain the cause
of the current rifts and difficulties within the New Order camp. "Gen. Nasution
indicated the rising danger of vested Interests among the New Order."*** President

Soeharto in his Inaugural address' on March 27, 196a attempted to pinpoint those
principles of the New Order which might unite the warring political, ethnic and
religious groups of the Indonesian people. "[He promised that he] would always
maintain the principles of the New Order which were to upgrade the people's
welfare and to uphold the constitutional life in which sovereignty of the people
and the improvement of democratic institutions were included." In the same address
he also put emphasis on Indonesia's most basic problem, that of economic under­
development and elevated the goal of development into the current central meaning
of the New Order. 'With the adoption of the Five Year Development Plan,
fndonesia's New Order has entered a new chapter called the Development Chapter."

Gestapu/PKI and Communism

Several days after the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, the concept
Gesta£u, short for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (September 30th Movement), was
coined-by an editor of the Djakarta paper Api and gained immediate acceptance by
both press and public. Ahgkatan Bersendjata declared on October 8, 1965, "the
armed gang of the Gestapu adventurers, masterminded by Aidlt/PKI starts playing
their shifty game. Ever sincej Gestapu is one of the most common concepts used
in the Indonesian press. It is a concept of great negative symbolic value. As
the concept Gestapu was from its Inception explicitly associated with the PKI
and Communism, the question may be asked, whether what has happened in the field of
the political ideology of Indonesia was not simply the supplanting of Sukarno's
Indonesian Ideology with a new official antl-Communist ideology. I shall take
up this question later on.

The introduction of the acronym Gestapu instead of the full factual

(September 30th Movement) title which had been used in the first few days and was

*
Bukit Barisan. March 15, 1968 and Bintang Indonesia. March 15, 1968.

Bintang Indonesia.. March 15, 1968.

 -228-

used by part of the press for several weeks later, was motivated consciously by
the similarity of the sound "Gestapu" to "Gestapo." Gestapo had negative and
frightening connotations for many Indonesians, as unlike many other Asian popula-,
tlons, the educated elite of the then Dutch East Indies had been relatively well
Informed of the horrors of the ,Nazi regime. During the first few days the perpe­
trators of the attempted coup were accused of trying to subvert the legal government
and of kidnapping several-top, generals; after the discoveries of the bodies of
the generals in Lubang Buaya in the ground of the Halim Air Force Base, those
responsible were accused of foul, sadistic, obscene murder.

The discovery of the mutilated bodies in the holes of Lubang Buaya was
described in full detail in the press and on RRI and shown on television. This
scene made a deep and lasting impression on the Indonesian public. Gestapu, for
the mass of the people, stood for a group of extremely frightening immoral and
murderous people. Thus, the abortive coup became in the memory of the Indonesian
public not just one, somewhat more ruthless than usual, incident in a long chain
of incidents in the internal Indonesian power struggle. It was etched into the
memory of the Indonesian public as a case of arch-treason, of demonic immorality,
and of sadistic murder of the best sons of the Revolution.

The well-publicized discovery of Lubang Buaya produced a kind of mass

hysteria, a crop of frightening rumors, which swept the countryside during October
and early November. The recurring motif is that of holes that were found in
different.places in the country. On October 8, 1965 Angkatan Bersendjata reports
the first Instance of such a discovery: "Since the purpose of these holes is still
unknown, and the people have come to believe that they are for burying people,
butchered like the Seven Heroes of the Revolution . . . the digging of these
horrible holes, resembling graves, was done not only by the Aidit/PKI people, but
also by Partindo people. Those two parties are obviously very close in this
area. ..." On October 15, 1965 Harlan Takari reports: "Pemuda Pantjasila found
a bundle of BTI (Communist peasant organization) documents which had been buried
in a hole with two mysterious snakes guarding the hole. The youth killed the snakes
and took the documents." Api, on October 28, 1965, carries a report of the situation
in West Java: "Holes and empty graves for would-be victims have been found, like
those of Lubang Buaya, in which six generals and one lieutenant were burled by
Gestapu." On October 30 Suara Rakjat reports an action of the armed forces in
the Girilaja and Simo Wagean areas which resulted in the arrest of 45 Gestapu leaders
and the confiscation of documents, "sharp weapons," bamboo spears, and scores of
fire arms, "Holes, resembling the Lubang Buaya holes in Djakarta were available
there. Their plan to kidnap a G. P. Ansor (Moslem Youth Movement) leader and then
bury him in one of the holes, failed. The Ansor leader was invited to a meeting
at the house of the R.K'. (Kampong Society) chairman and according to plAn he
should have been murdered and buried. Fortunately, the law enforcement agents
discovered the plan and foiled it. The Gestapu hangman who conceived the plan has
been arrested." Suara Rakjat published a correction to this sensational story
on November 2, 1965. "The Kampong Society chairman of Girilaja Baru . . . denied
that there were holes designed for evil purposes in his area. . . ." Nevertheless
the spate of hole stories continued in the provincial press. In the Surabaya area
Obor Revolusi on November 1 records: "On the outskirts of Magelan, PKI has dug
holes which would have been used for evil purposes had the September 30th Movement
not failed. The five by ten meter holes were dug in Kerik, Takeran, and Bangsri—
predominantly PKI villages. Seeing this alarming phenomenon the Army commander of
Magelan, Major Mardjono, has taken appropriate measures." On the same day Obor
Revolusf reports, "Workers of Simpang hotel 'in this city united in S.B.H.R.T,/Sobsi
some time ago dug holes in the hotel compound. Suspicious, some government
officials staying in the hotel have checked out. In the opinion of informed people,
the holes were designed for use as Djakarta's Lubang Buaya. The excavation was
done without the knowledge of the hotel management." Also on November first, in
far away Medan, Takari reports from Central Tapanuli; "It is also known that they
have made several holes to bury officials, leading figures in Central Tapanuli
and Sibolga who were ailti-Communists and whom they did not like. . . .There were
seventy-seven persons on their blacklist."

It is rather doubtful that the PKI had really prepared blacklists to eliminate
their enemies all over the country. However in Djakarta the Coup constituted a
very realistic threat for the military leadership. If successful, the Coup would
have eliminated those who were known anti-Communists—politically and in all
likelihood also physically. It is quite conceivable that they would have added
to the original list of about ten generals marked for execution.

The Moslem leadership also saw in the threat of a Communist takeover a serious
challenge, to their power and .influence and to the continuation of Moslem observance
and instruction. And possibly even a threat to the lives of the Moslem, religious
leaders. Anti-Communism was well entrenched in both the military and the Moslem
 leadership. Consequently, thes^ two groups, the Army leadership around General
Soeharto and the NU Moslem leadership, used this opportunity to eliminate the PKI
for good. They built up Gestapu, and the PKI which was claimed to have "master­
minded" it, as the main issue, as the main threat to the Indonesian people. Soon
the new slogan, "Crush Gestapu!" overtook in emphasis and frequency the previous
slogans Crush Nekollm! or Crush Malaysia!" In this they were successful in spite
of all Sukarno's personal.efforts and the efforts of his ministers, of government
offi^^isls and PNI leaders all over the country, to head off such a campaign and to
re-emphasize the old slogans, justifying this attitude by the need to leave Bung
Karno in an atmosphere of peace and quiet to find a "political settlement for the
September 30th affair." In order to counteract the extremely negative and
inflammatory connotation of "Gestapu," another acronym, "Gestok" (for movement of
October 1st), was introduced by circles near to Sukarno, to be repudiated soon by
the anti-Communlst press and dropped from use after several weeks.
I

During the following weeks the press reports an innumerable number of state­
ments by the dozens of political, social, religious and occupational organizations
of Indonesia, volunteering or responding to the prodding of the military author­
ities, stating their attitude to Gestapu. as well as suggesting, and later also
demanding, a course of action against Gestapu.

In addition to these statements the press reported the occurrence of dozens

of mass meetings, more often than not organized by Moslem leaders, all over the
country under the slogan "Crush Gestapu!"

In the years of Guided Democracy, "crushing" (Gangjang) and having a settle­

ment were not necessarily incompatible. The objects of "crushing," Nekolim or
Malaysia were rather intangible remote objects. The situation with Gestapu. once
it was identified with PKI, was significantly different. There were hundreds of
thousands, and even millions, of PKI party members, not to mention members of
Communist-led mass organizations, unions, and plain sympathizers, known to their
many neighbors. What did "crushing" them mean? The expropriation, and often
partial destruction, of their ubiquitous office buildings, which were often festooned
with the many signboards of PKI affiliated organizations, was one obvious and easy
method of "crushing"—declaredly in order to search for weapons and documents
proving their involvement in Gestapu. A veritable orgy of destruction broke out all
over the country. "Thousands of Sidolga youths have wrecked buildings of PKI,
Sobsi, Lekra, Baperki, and PPI, in the town as expression of anger at the
 -231-

PKI." Or, "Like the people of other areas, people of all parts of Banguwangi
Regency have been condemning and crushing Gestapu^ Everywhere offices of the PKI
and affiliated organizations served as targets of the people's anger, and no houses
of their leaders are Intact. Every day, one political party or mass organization
II**

after another issued a statement condemning the counterrevolutionary movement.

The press either stood neutral, "the people's anger manifested itself in
actions .which are regrettable but understandable," or tried to avert the worst
with advice, like, "voluntary removal of signboards of PKI serves to reduce the
targets of the people's anger.. The raiding of PKI buildings often led to their
burning down, and in the process Pemuda Rakjat youths, for instance, got hurt.
Often Moslem m^ss meetings ended not only in attacks on PKI offices but also in a
little anti-Chinese pogrom. Chinese stores and godowns were ransacked: after
all, everybody knew that the rich Chinese merchants had supported PKI financially
and thus shared the guilt for Gestapu.^'^

Soon, property was not enough. The mass meetings now started with hanging
Aidlt in effigy. What about the local little Aidits? The regional official phrase
was that all progressive revolutionary Indonesians should help the armed forces to
"crush those Involved in Gestapu." But what constituted involvement? What
constituted proof of involvement? And how is the culprit to be crushed? Could he
repent and be absolved? Should he lose his job—temporarily or permanently? Or
should the civilians bring him to the military or police authorities for interro­
gations? Or should he be physically crushed by ,the masses?

In Djakarta, where Gestapu actually had taken place, hundreds of Pemuda

Rakjat and Gerwani, men, youngsters, and girls, who were supposed to have been
involved—directly or not—with the kidnapping, torture, and killing of the generals,
were promptly arrested and some interrogations began. But what constituted
"involvement" in the rest of the country? Some PKI members in positions of power

Proklomasi, October 25, 1965.

Harlan Umum, November 2, 1965.

Surabaya Post, October 20, 1965.

^^ “ff
Dinamika, October 21, 1965. *
^^Whereas some incidents of destruction of Chinese property and later the
'confiscation' and 'handing-over' of Chinese schools to the local authorities were
reported in the press, the extensive massacre of Chinese was not reported at all.
 J

-232-

had left their places of residence shortly before the Coup and presumably moved
to places of rendezvous, to PKI strongholds which'were supposed to serve as
military bases for the takeover of the country. Such actions constituted reasonable
grounds for charges of Involvement. Here, for instance, is the story of the Mayor
of Surabaya:

The Mayor of Surabaya had disappeared from the city at the time of the Coup
and was relieved of his office a few days later, a military man replacing him
temporarily. The ex-mayor was then accused of attempting to "rebuild the strength
of the Gestapu gang." On October 30 Harian Umum came out with a detailed charge
against him. He is claimed to have used 324 million Rupiahs for financing Gestapu!
Gestapu elements, serving as the Mayor's assistants, had succeeded in collecting
compulsory contributions from shop owners in the city at the rate of RP 25>,000 per
month. More was collected from bigger shop owners. If the money had been properly
used, the city government would have a balanced budget of RP 5 billion this year."
The ex—Mayor was later apprehended and became a Gestapu prisoner.

Against some other PKI members in positions of power in local or regional

government tangible charges of "involvement" in Gestapu were brought." Fellow local
dignitaries testified that the PKI personalities had approached them, attempting to
recruit them for the establishment of regional "Revolutionary Councils." How
reliable such testimonies are is hard to attest. Presumably only a small number of
high ranking PKI leaders in the prc5vinces had any access to advance knowledge of
the attempted Coup. Could the hundreds of thousands of rank-and-file members, and
mere sympathizers, be held responsible for the decisions and actions that a handful
of their leaders in Djakarta had undertaken without their knowledge? Unfortunately,
the realistic relationship between the Gestapu Incident and PKI, the mass political
party, was never openly aired by the press. The demonic concept Gestapu had been
firmly attached to the PKI. Some editors and speakers warned against vengeance,
but none spoke out specifically enough.

In the Medan area of North Sumatra, some sort of process of de—Gestapu—ization

was established. First, declarations against Gestapu were demanded of all organiza­
tions, including PKI, its mass organizations, and labor unions. With the intensi­
fication of the "Crush Gestapu!" movement, the rank-and-file, the thousands of
village branch members and rubber estate workers who were members in the Sobsi-
affiliated unions, were offered a way out of being tainted as Gestapu: The press
reports large numbers of village PKI branches which disbanded voluntarily and
 -233-

thousands 'Of Sobsi members who handed in their union cards declaring that they had
been deceived by their leaders about Gestapu, and therefore had decided to break
all ties with PKI. This was, apparently, accepted as satisfactory. In North
Sumatra no mass killings took place. However, PKI and allied representatives were
removed from all local government bodies. Youth Front and National Front boards,.
In Central and East Java events took a different turn.

In the Surabaya press no stories appear about voluntary mass resignations

and of the mere renjoval of representatives from positions of power. Here we find
a systematic removal of all civil, servants with PKI connections—down to the
humblest. In the first days.some criteria of "involvement in Gestapu" were
mentioned, i.e., those who had left their jobs during the first few days, without
valid explanation and permission were to be suspended as Involved. Even this clause
soon disappeared. Tens of thousands of civil servants and teachers were declared
Gestapu leaders" or "Gestapu elements," i.e., PKI members or sympathizers and most
of them were arrested. Apparently the shortage of white collar jobs played a
role here. A few months later in several areas of Central Java PNI civil servants
were declared suspect of being sympathizers of the- Gestapu, underwent a similar
purge in turn and marty lost their jobs af least temporarily.

The great majority of mass physical clashes took place in the coimtryside,
proper. Onlv a few echoes of the numerous armed clashes and of the massive civil
massacre found their way into the provincial press. Manifesto reports on
November 1, 1965 "a joint patrol consisting of members of Uterpra (Army), police
and Hanslp (civil defense corps), in discharging their duty to give information
and preserve peace and order at Pdnggok, Srengat (Blltar), on October 28th was
attacked in Karanganjar village by people who had been provoked by Gestapu elements.
The attack was conducted by five hundred people." On’ October 30, 1965 the Djakarta
Angkatan Bersendjata reports laconically, "military action is to be taken in Solo
region against Gestapu." Seemingly, in the clashes between PKI sympathizers and
the military police or hostile civilians, the PKI sympathizers were often armed
mainly with bamboo spears. In one Instance the discovery of "instruments which
the Chinese use for gouging out eyes" is reported, but surprisingly few firearms
are mentioned. There were alBo some clashes between anti-Gestapu vigilantes.

*
Approximately 60,000 or half of all the elementary school teachers of
Central Java were among the estimated 250,000 people arrested after the Coup.
 -234-

suspected to -be out on a looting expedition, and the police who tried to intervene
and lives were lost in the process. These were the rare cases when details were
given in the press, such as the numbers of casualties, their funeral, and expres­
sions of regret about misinformation" and loss of life. There were isolated
reports, such as one about a police officer killed by an assassin. I found only
one instance of a report about a Gestapu prisoner who had been "held for questioning"
in a local police station, and was shot dead "while attempting to escape from
custody."

It is the massive loss of life among rural "Gestapu elements," jpst anonymous
rural folk who had made some enemies, which, according to all calculations, went
into the hundreds of thousands and which occurred in Central and East Java, and
somewhat later in Bali, about which the press is most curiously silent.

Months later, the following indirect allusion to the massacre appears in

Duta Mas.jarakat on April 6, 1966: ". . . Col. Sudjono said, he too had relatives
but he is not mad because they were -Gestapu/PKI followers who betrayed
the country, people, and him, a member of the Armed Forces."

attempts to gain a factual 'and general picture of both the military

clashes and the civilian massacre, which followed the failure of the Communist
attempt at a takeover in September 1965 were undertaken not by the Indonesian press
but by foreign journalists. The authorities never attempted to establish a list
of the casualties, much less of those responsible.

By spring 1966, the mass outbursts against the PKI had subsided; the concept
Gestapu or Gestapu/PKI was by now deeply entrenched and had become the new central
figure in the Indonesian demonology. On April 6, 1966 Angkatan Bersendjata writes,
"Nekolim, Gestapu/PKI. and Satan, let's do away with them!" And Berita Yudha
writes-on the same day, "After Gestapu, the mentality and ideology of our people
. . . has been poisoned, endangering the life of our state, nation and revolution."

The pressure the press exerted on the government to purge the PNI of its
leftist elements, employed the charge of the involvement of these elements in
Gestapu. The mounting opposition to the retention of Sukarno as president pointed
his vague pronouncements on Ges tapu and later to the growing evidence of his
direct involvement in the Coup. The use of the concept of Gestapu was by no means
restricted to factual connections with the September 30th Coup. It was used as a
 -235-

negative connotation for all those associated in any form with the PKI as well as
for those advocating any views that were related to the ideology of the PKI.
Merdeka in April 1966 justified the closing down of all the Chinese-character
papers by the contention that these papers had had "pre-Gestapu thinking" and had
to be closed in order "to guard the unity of thought of the people." Whereas
Gestapii setved as a powerful tool to make Communist, Marxist, and even plain
socialist, ideas taboo, fortunately the examination of the pre-Coup period did riot
stop at the eradication and condemnation of those "involved in Gestapu"; Already
in April 1966 Malik tried to prod the politicized public to" undertake a more thorough

critique of Guided Democracy. The advent of the new pair of ideological concepts,
"Old Order—New Order", served well for a certain period as a'framework for
criticism of the past and a reform program for the future.

Nevertheless, the conc.ept Gestapu remained alive. A tangible legacy of the

Coup and its aftemiath were the large numbers of Gestapu prisoners, an estimated
250,000 at the outset, and feeding them was a recurrent headache which was period­
ically mentioned in the press in 1967. Attempts to release some of fhe political
I

prisoners raised opposition in the provinces where released prisoners were often
rearrested. Gestapu now appears nearly exclusively in the copnotation of the threat
of a PKI comeback. Armed rebellion on N. Kalimantan, organized by the remnants of
the units originally organized by Sukarno for infiltration and subversion against
Malaysia, and sporadic trouble in Central and East Java and seemingly successful
attempts of remaining PKI activists to set up small bases in remote areas and to
recruit new members from among the armed forces, as well as the infiltration of
ex-PKI members into Javanese mystical sects with private armies and all-such restless
activities certainly gave credence to the claims concerning the seriousness of the
danger.

The continued Gestapu threat served to buttress the position of the armed
forces. Unfortunately it also served as an incubus which prevented honest dis­
cussion of both past and present. It is obvious that the taboo on the examination
of the post-Coup massacre has severely handicapped attempts to establish legality
and respect for the individual’s right to life, liberty and property—which are
among the avowed aims of the New Order.

According to Robert Shaplen, New Yorker, May, 1969, "between sixty and eighty
thousand [political prisoners] are still in jail . . . though of these only about
five thousand are said to be hard-core PKI members and another fifteen thousand
 ) 5

-236-

to be solid supporters. The rest are accused to having 'participated in one way or
another' in the coup attempt or are among the thirty-three thousand described as
'unclassified'." This was nearly four years after the Coup. In 1969 the news of
plans to transfer large numbers of Gestapu prisoners to remote islands were reported
in the press without details.

Large numbers of Indonesians were and are still being denied their freedom
due to gullt-by-association or to their having held opinions which later became
taboo. The PKI had been a completely legal political mass party for many years.
The teaching of its views had been a legal activity. Clearly, turning legal
activity and association into a crime overnight and in retrospect is a poor
foundation on which to build legality and freedom of opinion. The taboo aspect
of gestapu also prevents an open discussion of possible means of turning ex-
Communists and enemies of the regime*into law-abiding citizens. Other political
parties were expressly forbidden to accept ex-PKI members into their ranks. It
seems that the only organizations which readily accepted or extended help to ex-PKI
people and the dependents of political prisoners, were Christian missionary organiza­
tions (they also accepted considerable numbers of Indonesian Chinese tainted
collectively by Gestapu.) They were soon charged with sheltering Gestapu elements.
The only treatment of the problem of the reform of the ex-Communist which appears
in the press was the rare plea to accept him when he wants to return to the right
path meaning religion, meaning Islam; even this is rare. The common advice is
to counter the bad Communist indoctrination of the past with "Pantjasila indoctrina­
tion." Religious instruction of some sort is mandatory now in all Indonesian
schools. The dubious value of counter-indoctrination as a means of fighting
ideology has not been discussed openly in the press for obvious reasons.

During 1967 there appeared in the press several voices stating in a rather
general way that the danger of Communism in Asia could not be averted by military
means alone, that the root of Communism in Asia lay in the poverty of the masses.
These statements appeared in the form of advice given to the U.S. government, yet
It IS obvious that they were meant to apply equally to Indonesia. Since 1968 the
Indonesian liberals and the intelligentsia in general have been preoccupied with
problems of economic development which certainly is the only long-term means of
raising of the standard of living of the population at large. The prevalent
attitude of the advocates of Intensive economic growth is to leave all 'security
problems' in the hands of the military. Due to the Gestapu taboo it is indeed
 -237-

easier not to discuss the method used by the military to combat rural unrest.
This seems to me to be rather short-sighted and unfortunate. For the success of
economic development in rural ar^as demands the Immediate winning of the confidence
of the rural population and not their alienation by needlegsly ruthless handling.
An example of Abrl’s handling of PKI rural pockets came to light early in 1969.
I quote again Robert Shaplen, New Yorker, ^y 19,69: "Earlier this year a new scandal
arose when Haji Princen, deputy chairman for the Indonesian League of Human Rights,
travelled through the Purwodadl area of Central Java and reported that between two
and three thousand suspected Communists had recently been killed by the military, or
had killed themselves to avoid being murdered. The government Issued a strong
denial, but Princen is well regarded, and neutral observers believe there is at
least some truth to his report." A certain growth of civil dourage on the
part of the press appeared in the reaction to the Princen report, a certain shaking
off of the weight of the Gestapu taboo. A good number of Djakarta papers printed
^^i^cen s report and a few added editorials on it. ■*

The grand structure of Sukarno's "Indonesian Ideology" crumbled surprisingly ■

easily. It started out with the collapse pf those concepts that clashed most obviously
with reality: "Nasakom" in, the domestic scene and "Afro-Aslan solidarity" and
"Malaysia" and "Nekolim" as enemies on the foreign scene. The central concepts of
Guided Democracy and "Manipol/Usdek" just faded away. The longest s.urviving more
well-entrenched ideological concept, that of "The Indonesian Revolution," took
nearly two years to follow suit. The linch-pin of the republic, the father figure
of the new nation, Sukarno, who had been considered indispensable even under the new
regime, was finally dropped into oblivion.

But what happened to Indonesia's political culture? Has there been any change
in the Indonesian tendency to give praptical problems vague Ideological treatments?
Has there been any decline in sloganism and word-magic? The use of vague ideological
concepts for the treatment of practical problems has certainly not disappeared,
and ip still more prevalent than in most western countries. It is, however, no
longer as all-pervasive as it used to be. The surviving ideological concepts which '
served as positive points of reference for the new regime were "Pantjasila" and
the "1945 Constitution." "Pantjasila" provdd to be rather unfruitful in the
production of positive goals and in addition encouraged dogmatism, intolerance, and
the putting of a taboo on minority and temporarily unpopular opinions. The "1945
Constitution" proved to be a rather poor and empty ideological guideline for the
 -238-

construction of a new constitution. The central new, negative ideological concept

Gestapu did do the job, however gruesomely, of arousing the masses to prevent a ^
Communist takeover. It has, however, left a large legacy of constraint on free
political discussion and opinion. A somewhat more fruitful pair of political con­
cepts, the Old Order and New Order served for the first two years of the post-Coup
period as a framework for the examination of the many negative features of guided
democracy and for the final ousting of some of them. It also served with somewhat
lesser success as a framework for the drafting of a reform program for the future.
The unifying power of the New Order concept rapidly proved insufficient to contain the
obvious clashes of opinion and interest among the supporters of the new regime.

Pantjasila and Gestapu are still going strong, and prove an inhibiting factor
for the pragmatic and honest treatment of several burning problems. Over all, the
quantity of *ideological exhortation published in the press is constantly on the
decline. The Pantjasila ritual has recently been eliminated from the daily TV
program—as a result of criticism against this kind of 'sloganism.' While word-
magic and even number-magic have not yet disappeared, they have declined, and have
also met with open opposition. 'Empty talk' and 'sloganism' are negative words in
the Indonesian vocabulary nowadays, and 'realism' and 'pragmatism' and 'know-how'
are positive. One cannot avoid noticing the vast improvement in the Indonesian
press in the areas of objective reporting and critical comment over the last few
years, in spite of the traditional Javanese predeliction to not call a spade a
spade and to offer criticism and suggestions as vaguely and in as general terms as
possible, and in spite of the heavy hand of the taboos and the semi-military regime.

The Conceptual Image of the Major Institutions of the New Regime

Political Parties

The attitude of the press to the political parties is of importance as an

indicator of the acceptance of a politically pluralistic society. During Sukarno's
Guided Democracy the old established and important Moslem progressive party,
Masjuml, and the small but Influential socialist party, PSI, had been banned,
having been accused of being involved-in rebellion and being agents of American
imperialism. The remaining major political parties, the Nationalist Party—PNI,
the conservative Moslem party—NU, and the Communist Party—PKI, all had benefited
 239-

from the outlawing of thfe two "^banned" parties, and none of' their leaders had ever
spoken out against this suppression of two important and representative political
These three parties as well as a host of minor ones had completely
accepted the role that Sukarno considered appropriate for political parties,
namely that of competitors in loyalty to his regime and competitors as propagandists
of his Indonesian Ideology.

Naturhlly the banning of the two opposition parties, the abolition of popular
elections, and the introduction qf an appointed parliament and congress (MPRS)
made up of representatives of the political patties as well as representatives of
'functional groups,' had seriously diminished the image of apolitical party as
the Instrument of expression of, the people's will. We should howevqr not forget
that the prestige of the parliamentary system, based on free competition between
several political parties, had been declining for some time before Sukarno's
abolition of the liberal regime, as a result of much partisan bickering between
Djakarta party cliques.

During the pre—Coup period we find in the press a general agreement of the
Importance of the existence of political parties as well as Inter-party accusations
of the other party's sheltering-subversive elements. Duta Masjarakat. for instance,
on July 11, 1964, raises the problem of "How will subversi,ve elements among the
political parties be eliminated?" The PKI during 1965 was successful in getting
its old rival, the small left wing Murba Party, banned as being an agent of the CIA-.*
It routinely accused political personages of whom it wanted to be rid of sympathies
for the banned parties or some of the other banned political configurations.
The Education Minister, whose retooling is demanded by the revolutionary masses .
never assumed a firm attitude towards persons of banned political parties BPS
Manikebu, etc.

Let us now examine laow the concept of the 'political party', after years of
loss of stature, fared under the new regime. When, after the failure of the September
30 Coup, the military gained the upper hand, the entire future existence of the
political parties was in doubt. However the military leadership seems to have
immediately decided to enlist the cooperation of the great majority of the parties
in their campaign against the PKI, Partindo and their affiliated mass organizations.

*
II _ Djalan Rakjat, June 24, 1965 and June 25, 1965 whete the slogan was.
Dissolve the Murla Party! Crush the Trotskyites!" And Bintane Tlmul on
September 25, 1965 calls them "The Rockefeller Murbas." ----------- ------------
•kit
Harlan Rakjat. September 28, 1965.
 -240-

On October 4, Angkatan Bersendjata prints the following statement; "NU, PSII,

Catholic Party, IP-KI, Muhairanadijah, University Students' Army, National Front,
Gasblindo, Moslem Youth Movement, KBGI ... in their joint statement . . . appealed
to the Indonesian people, political parties, mass organizations, functional groups,
to take an active part in assisting the authorities to restore security and make
every effort in order that the life of the Nation will become normal again. . . ."
In the following weeks among the political parties it was especially the NU and all
the other Moslem organizations which enthusiastically took up this opportunity to
get rid of the much hated Communists. Here are some typical examples of NU press
appeals to Moslem feelings: "Let us with our nationwide mass actions crush the PKI,
the brain and mastermind of the counterrevolutionary September 30 Movement, as
described and announced heroically by the powerful NU Party. The entire Moslem
people are requested to arise and crush the guilty and wicked."

NU organized mass rallies of Moslems, often in the form of prayer meetings,

all over the country. Here are two typical reports: "A Moslem mass rally was held
in Medan on October 12, said to be attended by 1,640,000 Moslems. [Its resolutions
were] . . . condemn the September 30 Movement . . . exterminate those responsible
.• . . ban the PKI and its sub-organizations . . . all North Sumatra political
parties and mass organizations without reserve stand behind Bung Karno, Hero of
Islam. . . . And "A mass rally sponsored by NU, Pertl, PSII and Muhammadljah
was held at the Imam Bondjol Stadium in Padang on October 12. Hundreds of thousands
of Moslems associated with 52 Islamic political parties and mass organizations
took part. [The resolutions were] ... for the second A—A Conference, pray for the
fallen generals, against the September 30 Movement, against the PKI because of its

Involvement in the September 30 Movement." In some places the authorities

organized joint meetings of all the political parties, in some provincial places
including even the PKI for some weeks after the Coup. Thus for instance Bukit
^®ports on October 12, 1965 that "On October 8, the North Sumatran Pepelra
Commander/Defense Area "B" Commander, held a meeting with nine regional political
parties in Medan, including the PNI, PARTINDO, IPKI, PSII, NU, PERU, PARKINDO,
PARTAI KATOLIK and PKI. Representatives of the regional authorities were also
present. Three questions were put to each of the parties:

*
Mimbar Revolusi. editorial, October 8, 1965.

Duta Rakjat. October 13, 1965.

Ibid., October 14, 1965.

(\
 -241-

1. What can your party do for Bung Kamo?

2. What is your party's position vis-a-vis the September 30 Movement?
3. To what extent is your party willing to help the Armed Forces
maintain security?"

Or Duta Mas.jarakat on October 13, 1965, reporting "One hundred and five political
organizations and mass organizations in South Kalimantan have jointly issued a
statement of October -6, 1965." However among the political parties the initiative
clearly was with the Moslem groups and especially NU.

During those weeks it became obvious that underneath the surface acceptance
of Sukarno's Indonesian Ideology and of his many foreign and domestic campaigns
there had continued to exist a well organized and powerful Moslem sub-culture.
The leaders of this sub-culture did not see themselves as members of the still
rather artificial "Indonesian Nation," but as members of the Community of Islam.
Their main purpose was the protection and the strengthenings of Moslem observance
within the observant Moslem (Santri) population. They had,,succeeded during the
entire period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy in keeping alive their way of life,
especially through the network of Islamic schools and youth movements. The NU
leadership, which was by no means held in -high regard by many of the Moslems
because of its limited education and provincial narrowness as well as because of its
extreme opportunism and 'yes-manship' during the Sukarno years, nevertheless tried
now to reap the benefit of the changed political climate and to claim the allegiance
,of all Ipdonesian Moslems. ". . . It is right and correct for the NU to request
the President to speedily dissolve the PKI, the Pemuda Rakjat, all mass organiza-
tions which are under the protection of the PKI." And, "... Indonesian Moslems,
especially the 11 million male and female Moslems under the protection of the NU
**
banner. ..."
* I

Meanwhile regional authorities 'suspepded' their local PKI organizations.

Here is a description of what this suspension involved; "[The decree] . . .
requires leaders of the political party and iriass organizations suspended . . . tp
report every other day to local military commanders and to show up anytime,they are
summoned by the .authorities . . temporarily prohibited from holding a public or

* i

Mimbar Revolusi, editorial, October 8, 1965.

Ibid., editorial, October 16, 1965.

 { -242-

closed meeting . . . closing and seizure of the offices . . . remove their

respective signboards. ..." This of course was the orderly procedure; in many
localities parts of the population, especially members of Moslem youth organizations,
often inflamed by the speeches at mass rallies, took the initiative into their own
hands and ransacked the local PKI and allied offices as well as the houses of PKI
and Pemuda Rakjat leaders, as well as the houses and godowns of Chinese merchants
rumored to have supported' the PKI, "searching for documents and weapons."

In many localities the main enemies of the PKI pressed for a systematic
purge of all public employees who could be suspected of "involvement in Gestapu,"
i.e;, sympathies for the PKI. "Employees in various departments have received
instructions to fill out a questionnaire giving among other things their party
affiliation." The newspapers bring many reports about criteria for "Involvement
in Gestapu" being used in different localities: Having been absent without suffi­
cient explanation during the days of the Coup, PKI membership, Partindo membership,
membership in any of the affiliated mass organizations of the PKI or trade unions
under its control. In some areas members of the PNI were also declared suspect.
The PKI activists still at large spread the rumor that the military leadership
was about to abolish all political parties. "They [the PKI] spread rumors
that the Armed Services do not like political parties, that political parties
should be outlawed. The Armed Services have special Interests in the existence
of political parties. . . it is our duty to promote the life of political parties,
which are Pantjasilaist, Manipolist, and Nasakomist," assures Angkatan Bersendjata
on November 3, 1965. The military leadership tried to calm the fears of a complete
military takeover.

The PNI which had been heavily infiltrated by the PKI and which included
secret PKI leaders among the members of fts central committee, came under strong
suspicion and attack and split into a right and a left wing. With the decline
of the National Front and the establishment of the Pantjasila Front and the
various Action Fronts against Gestapu in which respectively Moslem groups and
student groups provided the leadership, the PNI lost much of its influence.
Some regional military commanders went so far as to freeze PNI in their area

Djawa Pos, November 1,' 1965.

Duta Rakjat, October 25, 1965.

 -243-

outright. Duta Masjarakat asks on April 9', 1966, "In West Sumatra PNI and Perti
have been frozen. In Bandung masses demand the dissolution of Partindo and Baperki.
Does this mean the beginning of the simplification of political parties?" In
June 1966 under the direct pressure of the military the PNI convened‘a conference
which reunited the Party, purging those who were still openly in favor of fighting
for Sukarno's return to authority. The PNI press continued for some months to
fight a rear guard battle against the final and complete ouster of Sukarno. While
they now officihlly declared themselves part of the New Order forces, they were
still treated with a good deal of suspicion and even hostility by Moslem leaders,
student activists and some of the regional military commanders. Suluh Marhaen
complains in its editorial of August 29, 1966, "People are still 'black-sheeping'
us in the PNI family with gossip and charges." And on November 29, 1966 the same
paper in its editorial states defiantly, "To those who had hoped the PNI would
not recover, we reply that the Marhaenists are not afraid of anything in the per­
formance of their role in history."

The hostility towards the PNI continued all through 1967. Berita Indonesia
reports on October 26, 1967 on the occasion of 'Youth Pledge Day' that the
"alternate chairman of KAPSU said that the obseinrhnce of Youth Pledge Cay will
feature the crushing of PNI—Marhaenist Front, because the PNI is Marxism as
adopted for Indonesia." The next day the paper reported the 'Pantjasila Front'
demanding the "removal of those holding high posts in the Forestry Department who
are members of the PNI." Angkatan Bersend.jata, on November 2, 1967, reports
"KAPI demanding the removal of PNI edements from government offices in general."
The PNI/FM remained 'frozen' in Sumatra. On October 19, 1967 Suluh Marhaen
devoted its editorial to this hostile attitude of some regional authorities
to the PNI and used the opportunity .to discuss in general the attitude of the
government to the political parties and their future. "Outsiders, namely foreign
countries interested in the latest political developments in Indonesia, are giving
special attention to this problem and analyzing it from various angles. The role
of regional authorities in acting aga.inst the PNI/FM’is another interesting, aspect
in the context of the overall effort of the government to bring about a political
renewal in this country." The paper quotes the Sumatra Inter-Regional Military
Commander's statement that "The PNI/Ffl is ill-intentioned toward, the New Order,
it is behind the times, and, more Impojrtantly, it should switch its activities to
the functional field, or cease to be a political party." The paper remarks
 "One wonders whether actions against the PNI/FM are part of a design to reduce
the role of political parties and promote that of functional groups* ..."
The PNI paper continues "We adhere, however, to the statement of Acting- President
General Soeharto who recently stated that ’political parties are one of the Important
instruments of democracy in addition to functional groups, because political
parties are the means by which the people channel their political aspirations.'
The Acting President hopes that political parties will no longer concentrate on
ideological matters but will compete in formulating programs toward promoting the
people's welfare. ..."

Soeharto's above mentioned statement expresses well the rather complex

attitude of the military leadership to the role of political parties and of repre­
sentative democracy in general in the future governmental structure of Indonesia.
While the military leadership declared its intention to return to elective democracy
and to carry out general elections, they nevertheless had no intention of abolish­
ing Sukarno's innovation of representation for functional groups. While the date
for general elections was being postponed Soeharto undertook the 'refreshing'
of the MPRS and Parliament by means of appointments of new representatives insfead
of the missing representatives of the PKI and its S3nnpathizers as well as- repre­
sentatives that had been recalled by their respective groups; these new represent-
^bives were chosen from the ranks of the leadership of the existing political
parties as well as from the leadership of the different functional groups.
Thus, for instance, the students gained in representation. The main reason for this
upholding*of Sukarno's principle of combining political parties with functional
groups lay in the desire of the military leadership to retain for the military a
sizeable representation in any future legislature. In fact the military leadership
it be known that it claimed a third of the membership of such a future body
for its own representation.

Soon after the Coup jthe first cautious mentlonings of a possible revision
of the status of the "banned parties" had been heard. However the rehabilitation
of the previously banned parties was by no means automatic or even easy. The ban
of the Murba party, which had been decided at the express instigation of the PKI only
shortly before the Coup, was carried out in some provinces only after the Coup.
When the authorities carried out the decree for dissolution in East Java, the
Murba leadership protested in the following statement in Djawa Pos on October 22, 1965
The dissolution is a result of an evil provocation and slander launched by the PKI
 -245-

and associates. In view of that and of the September 30 affair [the Murba Commissioner]
requested the revision of the above mentioned presidential decree." The press was at
this time divided about Murba's case. Patriot on October 8, 1965, in reporting a
speech ,to the Medan city 'Youth Front' still Includes the 'neo-Murba' among the
'counterrevolutionaries' that the Youth Front members should help the Armed
Forces to exterminate. On the other hand Obor Revolusi in its Corner Column of
October 25, 1965, printed the following sarcastic remark: "In the past GMNI
[PNI university students' association] pulled down and paraded Murba Party sign­
boards after that party's suspension. What are they going to do now?" It took
until October 1966 for the Murba Party to be legally reinstated. On October 21,
1966 Angkatan Bersend.jata supports the decision in its editorial: "The Murba
Party [nationalist communist] has been reinstated. As we all know, it was formed
in 1948 after the PKI-led Madlun rebellion, from the enemies of the PKI. Over
the years it has struggled against the PKI and finally in 1965 it was banned
following PKI accusations that it was a tool of the CIA. The decision to rehabili­
tate it is right, and the condition that it must not teach Marxism-Lenlnlsm-
Communism will not be difficult, for this is a very nationalistic group."

The group of journalists known as the BPS Group had for several months
during 1964 tried to put up a^ ideological opposition to the PKI's claim of monopoly
on interpreting Sukarno's Indonesian Ideology and had subsequently been banned
with the usual PKI accusation of being CIA agents. This group had not been a
political party but rather a loose journalistic movement. When on the eve of the
Coup the PKI attacked the HMI [a Moslem students' association], they called them
'f-ollowers of the BPS.''' After the Coup, when the Information Minister Achmadi
tried to tone down the new political spirit of the press, he considered the concept
of the BPS still to have sufficient negative connotation to declare that "Some
papers even smell neo-BPS." One leader of the Medan City Youth Front included
the neo-BPS together with neo-Murba and the September 30 Movement in the camp of
counterrevolutionaries whom he wanted to exterminate. But evidently the majority
of the Indonesian journalists (who had not been purged following the Coup for
PKI sympathies) came out resolutely in defense of their persecuted fellow journalists.

A
Harlan Rakjat, September 30, 1965.
**
Mimbar Revolusi, October 26, 1965.

Patriot, October 8, 1965.

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By the beginning of April 1966 their pressure was successful.

Duta Masjarakat on April 4, 1966, reports approvingly in its editorial: "The
Djakarta Raya High Prosecution Office dismisses [the case against] BPS [Body for
Disseminating Sukarnoism] for lack of evidence. . . . Comrades in Arms and BPS
who face up to the atheists, know of the plots of the Communists, and- can spotlight
PKI s activities. ... The BPS is now rehabilitated. They are not traitors to
their people, they are only fighters for upholding freedom." Api Pantjasila on
April 8, 1966, reports a typical.decision by the Medan branch of the PWI (journal­
ists* association) that they "welcome the decision to rehabilitate all the newsmen
who had been suspended as Involved with BPS." While the BPS issue was thus reversed
after a relatively short time, the rehabilitation of the two important political
parties Masjuml and PSI—proved to be a much more difficult matter.

Masjumi and PSI had not been banned as a result of PKI agitation, but
because they were the main political obstacle in the way of Sukarno while estab­
lishing Guided Democracy.’ As several of their leaders had in desperation
joined the PERMESTA rebellion they were tarred with the same brush as rebels and
traitors to the unity of the Indonesian Republic. While among the growing anti—
Sukarno forces there clearly existed strong s3nnpathies for the banned Masjumi
and PSI, and as early as October 23, 1965 according to Berita Yudha. some newspapers
had reported that Masjumi signboards had again been displayed in Djakarta, there
nevertheless continued to exist a powerful opposition to their rehabilitation.
First and foremost Sukarno and his chief associates called anybody even suggesting
the slightest change in attitude to the banned parties a traitor. Among' military
*^i^cles there were a considerable number of high officers who were not ready to
forget or re-examine the treason charge. The most vocal and long drawn out
opposition to their rehabilitation however came from the PNI and its press.
The Masjumi had been the most serious political competitor of the PNI. The PNI
press tried consistently to accuse the critics and opponents of Sukarno of being
connected with the 'rightist* Masjumi and PSI. For instance Suluh Marhaen states
on January 4, 1967, "[the students* action front] claimed to back the Armed
Forces Statement of December 21, but defended the PSI and Masjumi." They not only
stridently opposed their rehabilitation but demanded of the Armed Forces commanders
that they "purge any Masjumi and PSI . . . PERMESTA elements and their lackeys
from all levels of the government." And again on January 4, 1967 Suluh Marhaen

Suluh Marhaen, December 31, 1966.

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asserts "Even if Masjumi, PSI . . . wanted to revive- themselves, the police and
the Armed Forces in general would deal with them firmly. . . The question of
the rehabilitation of Masjumi was shelved again and again not only because of the
long memories of the military and the fierce opposition of the PNI, but apparently
also because of the reluctance of the NU leadership to give up their position as the
only major Moslem party. Mertju Suar prints the following on January 3, 1967:
"According to the chairman of Muhammad!jah (the mass social organization of
Masjumi which had been banned), North Sumatra, N. D. Pane, the Rehabilitation of
Masjumi is being feared by a certain group. The group is afraid of being over­
shadowed by Masjumi, but it forgot to take into account that with the Masjumi
rehabilitated the unity of the Islam in Indonesia would become stronger."

In the course of 1967 the demand for the rehabilitation of Masjumi changed
into the demand for the establishment of a new party, the Indonesian Moslem Party
(PMI)'. On October 20, 1967, Kompas writes "There are Masjimi members, virtual
'pariahs,' who are not permitted to rehabilitate their party. There is an attempt
to establish a new party, the Indonesian Moslem Party, where Masjumi members can
affiliate and move legally to channel their political aspirations." During the
fall of 1967 religious clashes mainly aimed at Christian minorities, churches, and
missionaries occurred in several areas, and the government was rather embarrassed
by them. The causes of this religious tension were discussed in the press, The
frustration of their political ambitions was cited as one of the reasons for Moslem
aggressi-yeness. A new concept appeared at this time in the press, the concept of
the bowl or receptacle: Each major group within the population should have its
political party to serve as a receptacle. This argument was used to demand the
continued and unharrassed existence Of the PNI as well as the .establishment of a
major and upited Moslem Party. The latter would serve as a' receptacle for the more
'modern,' i.e., more, educated and politically more progressive parts of the observant
Moslem population. After prolonged consultations among the different.Moslem groups,
the PNI was at long last established at the beginning of 1968. Unfortunately,
however, all the .above mentioned opposition forces against Masjumi seemed to have
pressured the Soeharto government into demanding the removal of all the prestigiour.
old Masjumi leaders from the leadership of the new party. This left the leadership
in the hands of either NU leaders or of younger men possessing little prestige and
trust of the Moslem rank and file. Mertju Suar describes the situation on
March 15, 1968 as follows: "A. R. Bandedan, a former junior Minister in Sjahrir's
 J

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Cabinet, explained that the undemocratic actions undertaken by PMI's leaders

following its formation and the lack of attention given to the Moslem Community
were all responsible in making the PMI unattractive and unable to establish branches
in the provinces."

As to the PSI, no serious effort has been made to attempt its rehabilitation.
The Indonesian Socialist Party had at the end of the liberal period been a very
small party which, however, had disproportionate influence because it had in its
ranks a large part of the small Indonesian intelligentsia. During the years of
Guided Democracy the party had been banned and so had its press, and some of its
leaders and journalists had suffered by losing their positions and spending years
in imprisonment; some had emigrated, others had chosen semi-retirement instead
of opposition and still others had managed to continue to keep up their connec­
tions with the government and to exercise some influence in spite of their previous
PSI membership. Immediately after the Coup the Influx of ex-PSI intellectuals
into positions of authority in the government started and has continued up to
date. Several well-known exiles returned. PSI members who were political
prisoners were released, among them the well known spokesman for freedom of the
press, Mochtar Lubis. In 1969 Mochtar Lubis finally started republishing his
famous newspaper, Indonesia Raya, which expresses the liberal, pro-Western viewpoint
which was typical of the PSI.

It is obvious that all the political parties—NU, PNI, the new PMI, and the
other small parties—lead a rather artificial existence as long as they do not have
to compete for votes. Since 1956 there have been no elections in Indonesia.
Already in the spring of 1966 the demand of a return to constitutionality was
vbiced by the press. For example, Duta Masjarakat in an April 9, 1966 editorial:
"People begin to demand an immediate gdneral election. In fact, we do not have
not only an elected MPRS but an elected Parliament. The present Parliament was
appointed according to a Presidential decree, and therefore peoples' sovereignty
does not really exist in Ihdonesia." And Nuta Putera, on April 9, 1966: A
general election is necessary to give us an MPRS and a Parliament which do not
consist of yes-men."

The leadership of Parliament suggested the holding of general elections to

the government. However, some groups showed signs of anxiety. Mertju Suar
 -249-

writes in its editorial of April 7, 1966 "Viewed superficially a general election

will truly meet the requirements of democracy. However, wrong timing could have an
adyerse result," By August the new Ampera Cabinet declared as pa,rt of its program
its intention to carry out general elections. By this time Duta Mas.larakat had
developed second thoughts. In its editorial of August 5, 1966 it declares:
"The proposal for' general elections makes us uneasy, not because it is not needed,
but because if not carried out properly the wrong people could-win." However,
both Merdeka and Suluh Marhaen came out in favor of the speedy holding of
elections. Rejecting the argument of the cost and the lengthy technical prepara­
tions involved, Suluh Marhaen on October 21, 1966', in its editorial, declares
"We need national discipline so we can face the general elections responsibly.
The cost of the elections is not only money; it is mental and spiritual capital." And
Merdeka in its editorial of December 24, 1966, goes so far as to suggest "An
emergency general election or plebesclte to make plain the'will of the people."
Nevertheless, the proposed date for a general election,, which had first been
1968, was subsequently postponed to 1971. The reasons given were not only
the money and the administrative preparations needed, but mainly political and
security reasons. The continuing threat of PKI resurgence served as an argument
for the postponement of elections until the establishment of full iptemal sec­
urity; the long-shelved establishment of a successor party to Masjumi and the
unsatisfactory solution of this problem also postponed the preparation of gen­
eral elections... When in 1968 an MPRS Commission was established to write a
preamble for a new constitution, considerable tension resulted and the Commission
was deadlocked. The NU members had suggested that the 'Djakarta Charter'
which originates from the time of the 1945 revolution Should serve as sUch a
preamble. As the Charter requires Moslems to keep Moslem laws it,, naturally
raised much anxiety in the minds of both non-Moslems and non-observant Moslems.
It is interesting that while the Christian press spoke up in defense of the
rights of the small Christian minority, I haVe not' found a clear exposition of
the rights of- the non-Santri majority who are only -formally Moslem to keep
or not to keep any of the diverse religious, rules or practices existing among
the Indonesian population. As to outright secularism, it is not being
defended by any group, in spite of the existence of a de facto secularized
urban group.
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The Soeharto government and its ambassadors and emissaries assert their

intention of returning to the practice of representative democratic govdmmferit.

However thh degree of acceptance of genuine religious ideological, social and

political pluralism, which is necessary for the re-establishment of a successful

parliamentary democracy is still rather small. In 1969 the military were still

preoccupied with the establishment of internal security and the rehabilitation

of internal communications. The intellectuals were preoccupied with the

drawing up of plans for the vital economic development of the country. In this

situation the fate of the political parties, their development and their

internal relations and structure, which seem so important in preparation for

a resumption of representative government, have been rather neglected.

The Armed Forces (ABRI)

From the beginning of Indonesian Independence its Armed Forces, Abri,

have had considerable Influence on the political life of the country. Since the

end of the liberal period military influence grew and the Armed Forces became one

of the two pillars upon which Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" rested. From 1959 to

1963 the'Armed Forces seemed to be stronger than the second pillar—the PKI, The

Armed Forces were by no means restricted to the ordinary duties of training soldiers

defending the country against threats to its external security, and combating

dangers of internal rebellion. Especially in the Outer Islands Army commanders

fulfilled many administrative functions. Military commanders managed large numbers

of economic enterprises and held important import-export monopolies. From 1963

onward their relative power seemed to decline somewhat, And that of the PKI whs