5G IoT Security Challenges: Mobile Cloud and Privacy

Prof Dr. Mohammed Al-Haddad

 5G IoT Security Challenges in Mobile Cloud, Privacy, And
SDN/ NFV
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Abstract: 5G is a modern technology that allows all end-user
devices and network modules to provide new interfaces. 5G can
link higher user numbers concurrently using wireless
technology to communicate with devices and have smarter,
quicker predecessors. 5G Network Infrastructure is planned to
actively expand around the globe with varying latency,
reliability, coverage, and bandwidth requirements. But 5G isn't
just a higher mobile broadband bandwidth that works on a
different portion of the radio spectrum. The definition of 5G
technology in the sense of many wireless technologies allows the
technological solution to be reworked to allow use cases outside
conventional mobile connectivity, enabling new applications to
be used in several enterprise sectors.
5G will provide broadband access everywhere, entertain higher
user mobility, and enable connectivity of a massive number of
devices (e.g. Internet of Things (IoT) ultra-reliable reliable, and
affordable way. The main technological enablers such as cloud
computing, Software Defined Networking (SDN), and Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) are maturing towards their use
in 5G. However, there are pressing security challenges in these
technologies besides the growing concerns for user privacy. In
this paper, we provide an overview of the security challenges in
these technologies and the issues of privacy in 5G. Furthermore,
we present security solutions to these challenges and future
directions for secure 5G systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to deliver a more accurate, needs-adjusted connectivity,
IoT devices must employ lower latency interaction devices, which
5G creates the foundation for understanding. Applications today
use the Internet to connect to one another, resulting in considerably
faster speeds and a more dependable connection. Mobile devices
may swiftly access the internet from anywhere in the world using
5G. Although 5G is still in its early phases, it will have a big impact
on both consumers and businesses. The IoT application's creator
uses the Internet to offer unrestricted, entirely wireless
connectivity. The commitment of wireless communication systems
to connecting to and exchanging messages with other wireless
devices and the internet raises the application's requirement for data
rate. Now, wireless communication networks allow us to link our
computers and other devices to the network. Additionally, wireless
communication has significantly changed the world in many ways,
including economics, the development of smart homes, the
transmission of massive amounts of data to mobile devices, and
many other applications. Current wireless technologies are unable
to meet the needs of 5G wireless requirements. Low-power wide
area (LPWA) technology cannot be used for protracted
communications [1]. By deploying more base stations with
increased capacity, significantly improved Quality of Service
(QoS), and extremely low latency, 5G wireless networks aim to
provide incredibly high data rates and higher coverage [2]. To
achieve the services that 5G promises, new networking, service
deployment, storage, and processing technologies will be required
envisions. Using cloud computing, operators can efficiently
maintain data, services, and applications without having to buy the
required infrastructure. Mobile clouds, which use the same concepts,
allow for the launch of several services on a single domain,
increasing flexibility and availability while lowering capital
expenditures (CapEx) and operational costs (OpEx). Wireless
communication systems have been vulnerable to security issues
since their inception. In first-generation (1G) wireless networks,
mobile phones and wireless channels were targeted for unauthorized
cloning and masquerading. In wireless networks of the second
generation (2G), message spamming became commonplace for
extensive attacks as well as for introducing false information or
propagating unwanted marketing materials. Third-generation (3G)
wireless networks' IP-based communication enabled Internet
security faults and problems to spread to wireless environments.
Due to the increasing need for IP-based communication, fourth-
generation (4G) mobile networks allowed the growth of smart
devices, multimedia traffic, and new services into the mobile space
[3]. This changed the threat landscape, making it more complicated
and dynamic. This changed the threat landscape, making it more
complicated and dynamic. Fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks
will be deployed, raising greater security issues and privacy
concerns than ever before. Because mobile networks are wireless, it
is crucial to call attention to the security concerns that provide a risk.
These issues are also raised by prospective 5G technological
requirements. In this essay, we focus on the critical 5G security
concerns that demand immediate security solutions. We also discuss
security precautions against the threats listed on this page.
Figure 1: Number of 5G-IoT Journal Articles by
year in IEEE and Science Direct
 contributions to the IoT in the future by bringing together a number
of smart applications and delivering continuous connection,
greater capacity to connect everyone and everything globally,
including different applications like machines, objects, and devices
to create actual massive IoT applications that provide LPWAN
(Low Power Wide Area Network), in which smart 5G Network
operate at the highest bandwidth (mm-Wave) between 24 and 48
GHz. In order to improve your working and playing experiences,
5G wireless technology offers higher data rates, extremely low
latency, reliability, huge network capabilities, and increasing
Figure 2: Timeline toward 5G availability. The Internet of Things (IoT) connects various
computing equipment and offers the capability of data interchange
or network data transfer without the need for human-to-computer
The article's remaining sections are organized as follows: Part II interaction. The upcoming launch of the new network, 5G (i.e.
fifth generation) of cellular mobile communication (5G Network),
includes an overview of 5G and IoT security solutions for the
needs the ability to support massive IoT and mobile IoT devices,
problems highlighted in Section III after an overview of the main
which have the ability to provide greater flexibility, a wider range
security challenges. The essay's conclusion is presented in Part IV. of speed, fast data rate, bandwidth and quality of service
requirements.
II. OVERVIEW OF 5G AND IOT
The 5G mobile wireless technology is intended to deliver high
speed and bring new capabilities that will increase the potential of
people, businesses, and society. The transition to 5G, or the next
generation of mobile networks and cellular technology, requires a
change in the way people live and work. The 5G Network will take
a sizable chunk of the IoT market by offering low-power
applications, affordable solutions, and a faster processing
communication network structure. Future 5G networks will focus
on the Internet of Things and promise that cutting-edge 5G
services, including smartphones, laptops, and IoT, will increase
income production in the future. When connected to the internet,
the strength of the 1G, 2G, 3 G, 4G, and 5G signals affect the link's
speed. The term "generation" refers to a collection of networks that
explain the technical implementation of a specific mobile phone
system. buses. The ability of 5G to serve as a global entry point for
the Internet of Things will likely be its major competitive
advantage over 4G and other technologies. Because of the
anticipated substantial change in how our world network will Figure 3: Architecture
function with 5G IoT high-density implementation, 5G networking
captions are predicted to be more suitable than 4G. The primary
competitive benefit of 5G over 4G and other technologies will
likely be its capacity to act as a global entry point for the Internet
of Things. Because of the anticipated significant shift in how our
global network will operate with the adoption of 5G IoT high-
density, 5G networking captions are projected to be more
appropriate than 4G. 5G networking captions are projected to be
more appropriate than 4G due to the anticipated significant change
in how our global network will operate with the adoption of 5G
IoT high-density. The 1G, 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G signal strength
when connected to the internet affects the speed of the link. An
explanation of the technical implementation of a certain mobile
phone system is provided by a group of networks collectively
referred to as a "generation." bus. The strength of the 1G, 2G, 3
G, 4G, and 5G signals when linked to the internet affects the link's
speed. A group of networks that describe the technical
implementation of a certain mobile phone system is referred to as
a "generation." bus. Generally speaking, 5G facilitates widespread
communication in the digital sphere. The new technology,
spectrum, and frequencies of 5G make it superior to 4G in a
number of ways. The 5G network will be built in such a way that
IoT devices may connect to it, bringing with it the performance Figure 4: Technologies associated with 5G-IoT
required for huge IoT as well as a variety of advantages, including
support for online gaming and AR/VR gadgets. The performance
of the 5G network will improve in terms of network properties
including mobility, energy, speed, range of services, improved
dependability, lower latency, and faster throughput (higher
bandwidth). Elevate the mobile network to connect new sectors
and connect not only networked individuals but also
interconnected objects and gadgets.
The 5G mobile network will increase network capacity and make
 III. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 5G
Critical infrastructure that will be connected by 5G will need
stronger security to secure both its own safety and the safety of
society as a whole. For all the electrical and electronic equipment
on which society depends, a security compromise in the online
power supply systems can be disastrous. In a similar vein, we are
aware of the importance of data in decision-making, but what if the
crucial data is distorted during transmission through 5G networks?
Investigating and highlighting the key security issues in 5G
networks as well as providing a general overview of any
prospective solutions that can result in safe 5G systems are
therefore of utmost importance. The following are the fundamental
difficulties with 5G that Next Generation Mobile Networks
(NGMN) [6] noted and were extensively debated in the literature:
• A High number of end-user devices and novelties in flash
network traffic (IoT).
• Radio interface security: Keys for radio interface encryption
delivered across unsecured routes.
• The cryptographic integrity of the user data plane is not
protected. Network security that is mandated: Service-driven
constraints on the security architecture that make the adoption
of security measures optional.
• Security risks with roaming arise from the fact that user-
security parameters are not updated while moving between
operator networks.
• Attacks that cause a denial of service (DoS) to the infrastructure
Unencrypted control channels and the visibility of network
control elements.
• Signaling storms: Distributed control systems that demand
coordination, such as the Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) protocols' Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer.
• Operating systems, programs, and configuration data on user
devices are not secured against DoS attacks.
A. Mobile Clouds- Security Challenges
Since users share a variety of resources in cloud computing
systems, it is possible for one user to distribute malicious traffic in
an effort to degrade system performance, consume additional
resources, or covertly access the resources of other users. Similar
to this, interactions can result in disputes in network configurations
in multi-tenant cloud networks where tenants execute their own
control logic. Cloud computing ideas are transferred into 5G
ecosystems via mobile cloud computing (MCC). This results in a
wide range of security issues, the majority of which are brought on
by the planning and building of the infrastructure. adjustments to
5G. As a result, the MCC's open design and the adaptability of
mobile terminals produce security holes through which attackers
could launch attacks and compromise mobile clouds' privacy [5].
Figure 5: 5G network and the threat landscape.
In this work, we divide MCC risks into front-end, back-end, and
network-based mobile security threats depending on the targeted
cloud components. The client platform, which comprises of the
mobile terminal on which applications and interfaces are needed to
access cloud resources, is the front end of the MCC architecture.
The threat environment for this market segment can range from
application-based threats, where adversaries use malware,
spyware, and other harmful software to obstruct user applications
or gather sensitive user data, to physical threats, where the actual
mobile device and other integrated hardware components are
primary targets [17], [18]. Along with virtual machines,
hypervisors, cloud servers, and data storage systems, the back-end
platform also includes the protocols required to deliver cloud
services. On this platform, mobile cloud servers are primarily the
target of security worries. These risks may include data replication
and HTTP and XML DoS (HX-DoS) assaults [8], [9].
Radio Access Technologies (RATs), which connect mobile devices
to the cloud, are the focus of network-based mobile security
concerns. This could be conventional Wi-Fi, 4G Long Term
Evolution, or other cutting-edge RATs that will accompany 5G.
Wi-Fi snooping, DoS attacks, address impersonation, and session
hijacking are examples of attacks in this area [6], [8]. Another
important topic for consideration while examining the security
issues in 5G mobile clouds is Cloud Radio Access Network (C-
RAN). The industry's capacity expansion requirements for greater
mobility in 5G mobile communication systems may be met by C-
RAN [10]. However, due to the centralized architecture of C-RAN
and the risk of a single point of failure, it is vulnerable to inherent
security issues with virtual systems and cloud computing
technology. Significant threats to the system also come from other
dangers like intrusion attacks, in which enemies breach the virtual
environment to watch, alter, or use software routines on the
platform covertly [10].
B. 5G- Security Challenges
Data, location, and identity could present serious privacy issues
from the user's standpoint [11]. Before being installed, the majority
of smartphone applications demand specifics of the subscriber's
personal information. Or firms hardly ever explain how the data is
stored and how it will be utilized. The location privacy of
subscribers is primarily the target of threats such as semantic
information assaults, timing attacks, and boundary attacks [12].
Access point selection algorithms in 5G mobile networks have the
potential to reveal location privacy at the physical layer level [13].
By capturing the IMSI of the subscriber's user equipment,
international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) catching attacks can
be used to discover the identity of a subscriber (UE). Such attacks
may also result from the installation of a phony base station that the
user equipment (UE) perceives as the preferred base station,
prompting users to react with their IMSI.
Additionally, there are several actors involved in 5G networks,
including network infrastructure suppliers, Virtual MNOs, and
Communication Service Providers. Security and privacy are not
equally important to any of these entities. A hurdle in the 5G
network will be coordinating the disparate privacy policies of
different entities [14]. In prior generations, mobile operators had
complete access to and command overall system elements.
However, because they will rely on new actors like CSPs, 5G
mobile carriers are losing complete control of the systems. As a
result, 5G operators will no longer have complete control over
security and privacy [15]. In shared environments, where the same
infrastructure is shared by many entities, such as VMNOs and other
rivals, user and data privacy is gravely threatened. The 5G network
also has no physical limits because it uses NFV and cloud-based
data storage. As a result, the data storage location in cloud
environments is not directly under the control of 5G operators.
Privacy is compromised if user data is kept in a cloud in a foreign
nation since different countries have varying levels of data privacy
safeguards depending on their chosen context [16].
C. SDN and NFV- Security Challenges
Network control platforms are centralized and made programmable
in communication networks thanks to SDN. These two disruptive
characteristics, however, make the network vulnerable to intrusion
and hacking. DoS assaults, for example, will favor centralized
control, and exposing the crucial Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) to malicious software can bring the entire network
to a standstill [19]. The SDN controller alters the data path's flow
rules, making it simple to identify the controller traffic. Due to its
visibility in the network, the controller becomes a popular target for
DoS assaults. Due to saturation attacks, as described in [20], [21],
the centralization of network control can also turn the controller
into a bottleneck for the entire network. Since the majority of
network functions can be implemented as SDN applications, if
given access, rogue applications can cause havoc throughout a
network [22].
Future communication networks will benefit greatly from NFV, but
it also presents some fundamental security challenges, including
those related to confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and non-
repudiation [23], [24]. According to [25], [26], the current NFV
systems do not adequately provide security and isolation to
virtualized telecommunication services from the perspective of
their application in mobile networks. The dynamic nature of Virtual
Network Functions (VNFs), which can result in configuration
errors and consequent security lapses, is one of the key obstacles
still standing in the way of the implementation of NFV in mobile
networks [27]. Table 1 highlights additional issues, but the primary
issue that requires immediate attention is that if the hypervisor is
exploited, the entire network could be at risk [28].
A. Mobile Clouds-Security-Based Solutions
In MCC, the majority of proposed security solutions center on the
strategic application of virtualization technologies, the redesign of
encryption techniques, and the dynamic distribution of data
processing sites. Therefore, since each end node connects to a
particular virtual instance in the cloud via a Virtual Machine,
virtualization presents itself as a suitable solution for protecting
cloud services (VM). Separating each user's virtual connection
from that of other users, offers security. The service-based
restriction will also make it possible to employ cloud computing
technologies securely. For instance, the authors of [29] presented
"Protect Sharing and Searching for Real-Time Video Data in
Mobile Cloud," a system that uses 5G technology and a cloud
platform to secure cloud services and let mobile users share real-
time films on the internet. This architecture limits access to just
authorized viewers, unlike previous options, where anyone with
shared connections may view such online video broadcasts.
Generic methods are less effective than learning-based systems for
addressing specific security issues like HX-DoS, for example [30].
For instance, the learning-based system [31] examines a certain
number of packet samples for a variety of known features in order
to identify and reduce hazards.
The usage of anti-malware software could potentially increase the
overall resistance to malware attacks in order to secure mobile
terminals. Anti-malware programs can be downloaded and
installed on mobile devices or they can be hosted and delivered
directly from the cloud [32], [33]. A public verifiable data
possession scheme, some lightweight compromise resilient
storage outsourcing, and energy-efficient mechanisms for the
integrity verification of data and storage services will make up the
security architecture for MCC data and storage. Some
frameworks for application security have been proposed, and they
include Mob iCloud, a secure cloud framework for mobile
computing and communication, lightweight dynamic credential
generation for user identity protection, in-device spatial cloaking
for privacy protection, and securing elastic applications on mobile
devices for cloud computing [34], [35].
A cloud-based framework called C-RAN is suggested for
enhancing and offering safer Radio Access Networks (RANs) for
5G clouds. The authors of [36] explained how C-RAN can
dynamically improve the end-to-end performance of MCC
services in the following wireless network generations.
Nevertheless, in order for C-RAN to satisfy this demand, it must
offer a high level of reliability in comparison to conventional
optical networks like Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH). One
way to accomplish this is through the widespread adoption of
mechanisms like fiber ring network protection, which are
presently primarily found in the industrial and energy sectors [37],
[38].
B. Privacy in 5G- Security-Based Solutions
5G must implement privacy-by-design methodologies, which
take into account privacy from the system's very beginning.
Mobile operators must be able to store and process highly
sensitive data locally and less sensitive data in public clouds as
part of a hybrid cloud-based strategy. Operators will have greater
access to and control over data in this fashion, and they will be
able to choose where to distribute it. Similar to this, service-
oriented privacy in 5G will result in a more workable privacy
preservation approach [39].
Better systems for access control, data minimization,
accountability, transparency, and openness will be needed with
5G. Strong privacy laws and regulations should therefore be
taken into consideration while standardizing 5G. Three
categories can be used to categorize the regulatory approach. The
first type of regulation is at the level of the government, where
laws are often made at the national level through international
organizations like the United Nations (UN) and the European
Union (EU) [40]. The second is the industry level, where
different sectors and organizations like 3GPP, ETSI, and ONF
work together to provide the finest guidelines and procedures for
privacy protection. The third category is consumer-level
legislation, which guarantees desired privacy by taking into
account customer needs [41].
Anonymity-based solutions, in which the subscriber's real name
could be concealed and replaced with pseudonyms, must be used
for location privacy [42]. Practices based on encryption are also
helpful in this situation; for instance, messages can be encrypted
before being sent to a provider of location-based services (LBS).
Obfuscation is a technique that can be used to safeguard location
privacy by lowering the quality of location data. Additionally,
location cloaking-based algorithms can effectively defend
against several of the most common location privacy assaults,
including timing and boundary attacks.
C. SDN and NFV- Security-Based Solutions
Through a cycle of gathering intelligence from the network
resources, states, and flows, SDN promotes speedy threat
identification due to the logically centralized control plane with
a global network view and programmability. In order to support
network forensics, the modification of security policies, and the
insertion of security services, the SDN architecture provides
extremely reactive and proactive security monitoring, traffic
analysis, and response systems [43]. By modifying the flow
tables of SDN switches, security systems like firewalls and
intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be employed for specific
traffic, whereas consistent network security policies can be
installed across the network due to global network visibility [44].
In accordance with the ETSI NFV design, a security orchestrator
is used to secure VNFs, as shown in [45]. In a multi-tenant
context, the suggested architecture offers security to both the
physical and virtual components of a telecommunication
network. [46] makes the suggestion of using trusted computing,
remote verification, and integrity checking of virtual systems and
hypervisors to offer hardware-based protection to private
information and identify fraudulent software in virtualized
environments.
 IV. CONCLUSION
In order to address the issues of huge connectivity, flexibility, and
prices, 5G will leverage mobile clouds, SDN, and NFV. These
technologies have many advantages, but they also come with
built-in security risks. As a result, we have emphasized in this
article the key security issues that, if not effectively resolved,
could become more dangerous in 5G. We have also discussed the
security measures and answers to those problems. However, the
security threat vectors cannot now be completely realized because
to the limited standalone and integrated implementation of these
technologies in 5G. Similar to this, as more consumer devices,
such as IoT, are connected and new, diversified sets of services
are made available through 5G, the issues associated with
communication security and privacy will become more apparent.
In conclusion, it is very likely.
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