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Study of Tank Farm of Fire Modeling on Oil and Gas Industri

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 Study of Tank Farm of Fire Modeling on Oil and Gas Industri
1
Idral Amri,2 azridjal azis
1
Chemical Engineering Department, University of Riau
2
Mechanical Department, University of Riau
Idral_amri@eng.unri.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Oil and gas company in Indonesia have explorated the oil for a long periode. Oil
is usually storage in the tanks. To avoid the tanks accident as firing, collaps and
etc. Need to review and simulate that tanks to protect the fire accident. The aims
of that research to give recomendation and safety scenario to company for
upgrading of fire protection facility and safety processes. Research Methodology
was doing to collect that data and do simulate with NdV Phast. Based on
simulation, with oil composition, wind speed, bund capacity of inlet of oil to
tanks. Simulation Results shown that with ....oil composition, ...wind speed and
bund capacity......, need to upgrade the fire protection pump, fire detector and
cctv to watch out that process going safety.

Key words; bund capacity, Modeling, NdV Phast, oil and gas, tanks, wind speed,
Simulation

1. INTRODUCTION

Most of the oil and gas company in Indonesia using Tank Farm for storing of the oil feed
before loading to the ship. The existing tanks have aged and designed a long time ago, where
that safety is not first consideration during that construction. By the time, technology
invention should be comply to safety requirements.
Currently, tank farm facilities oil and gas companies in Indonesia should be concerns
on fire protection of existing tank farm and plans to analyze the potential consequence of fire
such that the required fire protection facilities could be implemented for the tank farm.
This research covers fire modelling consequence for Tank Farm facility. That facility
includes crude oil storage tank, electric booster pumps, and shipping pumps. Figure 1.1
shows the schematic of Tank Farm Facility.
 Figure 1.1 Schematic of Tank Farm Facility

2 OBJECTIVE

The major objective of this resaerch is as follows;

• Identify possible fire scenario in facility

• Consequence modelling of identified fire scenario using computer simulation
• Identify potential blast/explosion scenario and its modelling
• Qualitative identification of risk event, and prioritize corresponding protection
• Review available and suistaibility of existing fire protection
• Identify minimum requirement for fire protection
• Recommend spacing and safe distance to public amenities

3 METHODOLOGY

The study has been carried out based on the following overall methodology:

Data Gathering and Assumption

•Site visit familiarization and gather relevant data for the facilities
•Compile data and identify critical missing information

Process Safety Information

•Based on site visit and Company's data, the information pertaining the process safety is
identified (process hydocarbon, equipment in the process)

Process Hazard Analysis

•Isolatable sections based on process operating condition are identified
•Process related hazards are identified
•Based on the identified hazards and isolatable section, consequence modelling is performed
•The extent of the consequence is investigated

Preventive & Mitigative Measures

•Preventive measures such as requirements for early detection mechanism are investigated.
•The preventive measures currently in place is also studied for its adequacy (e.g. bund
capacity etc)
•Mitigative measures such as providing fire suppression/fighting facility is also investigated
•These would take into account the type of hazards, its consequences and any international
standard requirement

4 BASIS AND ASSUMPTION

4.1 Process Hydrocarbon

There are 2 types of incoming oil to Dumai Tank Farm. Brief properties of the incoming oil
to Dumai is summarized in Table 4. 1.

Table 4. 1 Incoming Oil

API Grafity 32 - 34
Pour Point, oF 95 - 98
Temperature, oF 90 - 100

Based on the flash point of 154oF [Ref. 14] DC is classified as Class IIIA whilst SLC is
classified as Class I with flash point of ranging from 80oF – 168 oF[Ref.14,19,20] per NFPA
30. Oil within Dumai Tank Farm is stabilized crude.

4.2 Process Equipment

The major process equipments will studies are as follows;

• Shipping Tank

The tanks will store the incoming oil prior shipping. The facility consists of 6 tank farms,
with 2-3 tanks per farm. The tanks have been divided to store certain type of oil as per table
below.
Table 4. 2 Tank Farm

The flow of the oil from the incoming source is directed to or from the tanks with series of
motor operated valve (MOV). All tanks are fixed cone roof type. Each is equipped with the
safety valve on the tank roof and on the tank incoming/outgoing line as per P&ID [Ref. 15].
The tank dimension and capacity is summarized below.

Table 4. 3 Tank Dimension & Capacity

No Tank Diameter, ft Height, ft Capacity, bbls (1)

1 T-101 180 48 217,500
2 T-102 180 48 217,500
3 T-103 180 48 217,500
4 T-104 180 48 217,500
5 T-105 180 48 217,500
6 T-106 180 48 217,500
7 T-201 160 48 217,500
8 T-202 180 48 217,500
9 T-203 180 48 217,500
10 T-204 180 48 217,500
11 T-205 160 48 217,500
12 T-206 160 48 217,500
13 T-301 297 56 690,000
14 T-302 297 56 690,000
15 T-303 297 56 690,000
16 T-304 297 56 690,000

Note: 1. Capacity is based on P&ID [Ref.15]. Currently, each tank has dedicated dike/bund
area.

• Electric Booster Pump

Oil is boosted with the Electric Booster Pump prior pumped with Shipping Pump for
shipping to the wharf. Each EBP is dedicated for each tank farm as presented below;

Table 4. 4 Electric Booster Pump

FARM TANK EBP

Tank Farm A T-101/2/3 P-201
Tank Farm B T-101/2/3 P-202
Tank Farm C T-101/2/3 P-203
Tank Farm D T-101/2/3 P-204
 Tank Farm E T-101/2/3 P-207/8
Tank Farm F T-101/2/3 P-205/6

EBP is a centrifugal pump with capacity of 21,000 gpm each.

• Shipping Pump

The shipping pumps are sheltered in the pump house. There are 4 diesel engine shipping
pumps, with capacity of 21,000 gpm each.

5 RESULT

This section presents the results; consist of data analysis, scenario identification, fire and
explosion modeling result, review and recommendation for the preventive and mitigative
measure within the tank farm.

5.1 Analysis of Available Data

The following critical information Data is follow:

• Current tank farm operation and operating condition (pressure, temperature, fluid
properties)
• Existing passive fire protection data (bund/dike, coating , spacing and layout)
• Existing active fire protection equipment data (foam system, monitor, hydrant, portable fire
extinguisher, hose)
• Existing firewater system data (pump, piping, firewater source)
• Existing fire and gas detector data

The missing data is assumed to provide input for the study.

5.2 Isolatable Section

Isolatable section is defined to determine the process hydrocarbon inventories and the
physical properties of the inventory, as an input for the consequence modeling. In order to
determine this, the process system are split into sections, where in the event of failure i.e. leak
the process can be isolated by shutdown valves to minimize the release inventory. No credit
has been given to isolation by non-return valves (check valves) in the system since these are
not considered reliable as leak-proof barriers. P&IDs [Ref. 15] is reviewed to identify the
process inventories, which would be isolated between SDV’s. In the absence of SDV, the
following is used to define the boundary of isolatable sections:

1. Change of process condition (pressure, temperature)

2. Volume inventory limitation

The following figure shows the isolatable section for the tank farm scenario previously.
 Figure 5.1 Tank Farm Isolatable Section

The characteristic process parameters e.g. pressure, temperature, composition, molecular

weight of each section is determined from the heat and mass balance sheets that generated
with composition derived from Laboratory Analysis [Ref.19,20,21]. This is presented on
Attachment A. Inventory for each isolatable section includes the equipment inventory and
inventory within the piping. Equipment inventory is calculated from equipment size based on
PFDs/ P&IDs while the associated piping inventory is calculated based on Piping Plan
Layouts [Ref 17]. The representative operating condition and inventory of each section is
presented below;

Table 5.1 Tank Farm Operating Condition

Section Description Pressure, Temperature, API Inventory,
o
psig F m3
1 Receiving System-1 16 110,000 20,4 507
2 Receiving System-1 16 94,000 33,8 513
3 Receiving System-1 16 94,000 32,2 356
4 Shipping Tank T-1 0,05 110,000 20,4 34,614
5 Shipping Tank T-2 0,05 110,000 20,4 34,614
6 Shipping Tank T-3 0,05 110,000 20,4 34,651
7 Electric Booster Pump- 20 110,000 20,4 28
1
8 Electric Booster Pump- 20 93,35 33,22 25
2
9 Electric Booster Pump- 20 93,35 25
3
10 Shipping Oil Pump-1 100 110 20,4 287
11 Shipping Oil Pump-2 100 110 20,4 287
12 Shipping Oil Pump-3 100 93,42 33,22 287
5.3 Hazard Identification

To identify the possible hazard in Tank Farm a Process Hazard Analysis is required. A PHA
analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or
flammable chemicals, and major spills of hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on
equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions (routine and nonroutine), and external
factors that might affect the process. There are several methods for hazard identification such
as What If, Checklist, HAZOP, FMEA, FTA. For this study, such hazard analysis is not
available; hence a simplified hazard identification is developed to determine the potential
hazard. To identify the potential hazard the following scheme is used.

Figure 5.2 Potential Hazard Determination

For each isolatable section, the potential hazards have been identified based on the scheme
above. These are shown in the Table 5.2. The hazards identified would provide a basis for the
consequence modeling.

Table 5.2 Hazardous Event Identification Section

Section Description Cause Fire Events

1 Receiving System-1
2 Receiving System-1
3 Receiving System-1
4 Shipping Tank-1
5 Shipping Tank-2
6 Shipping Tank-3
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
 over pressure)
7 Electric Booster Pump-1 Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
8 Electric Booster Pump-2 Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)
9 Electric Booster Pump-3 Leak (due to Mechanical failure / Pool Fire
over pressure)

5.4 Consequence Modeling

The consequence modeling is performed for the identified hazard as per Table 5.2. Fire
consequence modeling will provide estimation of fire size, duration and distance to critical
thermal radiation levels. The consequence modeling of the hazard scenario is performed with
the following methodology:
• Based on the scenario identified, the release rate for each inventory is calculated. This is
based on the probabilistic hole sizes (small, medium and large) represented by a 10mm,
50mm and 100mm diameter release respectively.
• From the release rate, the consequence of the identified scenario is determined using the
Phast DNV Software. The result will provide the extent/consequence of the identified
scenario (e.g. pool fire, explosion etc) within the location of release.
The following impact criteria are used in the modeling:
1. Impact Criteria on Human

The table below presents typical human impact criteria as applied in fire modeling.

Table 5.2 Human Impact Criteria

Event Parameter Impact Description
Sufficient to cause pain to
personal. If unable to reach cover
4 kw/m2 within 20s; however blistering of
the skin (second degree burns) is
likely; 0% lethality (Ref.6).
Maximum radiant heat intensity in
areas where emergency actions
lasting up to 30 s can be required
by personal without shielding but
Jet fire/Spray Fire/Pool
6,31 kw/m2 with appropriate clothing (consist
Fire
of hard hat, long-sleeved shirts
with cuffs buttoned, work gloves,
long-legged pants and work shoes
(Ref.1)
Significant chance of 50% fatality
12,5 kw/m2
for extended exposure (Ref.4)
Significant chance of 100%
37,5 kw/m2 fatality for people expose
instantaneously (Ref.4)
2. Impact Criteria on Facility
Both jet fires and pool fires can lead to structural failure of items. The pool fire will take
several times longer than for a jet fire to affect a structural failure. The table below presents
indicative failure times under hydrocarbon fire impact conditions, where times to failure refer
to burn through or loss of load–bearing capacity [Ref. 4].

Table 5.3 Structure Failure Times in Fires (Indicative)

Item Time to Failure (min)
Jet Flame Pool Fire
Unprotected structural Steel Beam (load bearing) 10 10
Unprotected steel Plate (non load load bearing) 5 10
A 60 Fire wall 15 60
H 120 Fire wall 60 120

The consequence modeling basis and assumption details is provided in the Assumption
Register as presented in Attachment B.

5.4 Leak Rate Calculation

The leak rates are calculated for each of the isolated sections. The leak rate will be the initial
release rate of each of the isolatable section contributing to the fire event.

Table 5.4 Leak Rate

Isolatable Section Hole Size (mm) Leak Rate (kg/s) Resulting Scenario
Section 1 10 0,73
50 18,30 Pool Fire
100 73,19
Section 2 10 1,83
50 45,74 Pool Fire/Spray Fire
100 182,94

5.4.2 Pool Fire Modeling

The unobstructed pool fire diameter has been determined for a release of hydrocarbon liquid.
The pool geometry and radiation contour resulting from pool fire event is shown below.

Figure 5.3 Pool Fire Radiation Contour

Prior to being ignited, the liquid release will continuously form the liquid pool. The liquid
pool will grow until it finds a physical barrier or evaporation or burning occurs. For
continuous release, the pool size will remain constant when the burning rate is equal to
release rate. This would be applicable to liquid hydrocarbon leaks through a specific hole
size. For tank rupture, it is considered that an instantaneous release of the complete tank
inventory and contained within the bunded area (prior to ignition). The pool fire size and
flame length for the isolatable sections where pool fire is possible are shown as follows;

Table 6.5 Pool Fire Geometry

Note:
1. Based on API 2218, a sustainable pool fire is not feasible to extend more than 12m from
the source. Therefore, the maximum pool diameter from any leak sizes is limited up to 24m.

The heat radiation extent for the isolatable sections where pool fire is possible due to leak is
shown as follows;

Table 6.6 Leak Pool Fire Radiation Extent

Note:
1. Heat radiation distance is from the edge of the pool

The radiation coverage area is superimposed on the plant layout and provided as Attachment
C for pool fire radiation extent. The output result from PHAST is provided in Attachment D.
The heat radiation extent for pool fire due to tank rupture is shown as follows;
Table 6.7 Tank Rupture Pool Fire Radiation Extent

From the analysis, each of the contours is provided in Attachment C. In the worst case
scenario, a tank rupture will occur, causing the maximum extent of radiation. However, the
radiation/wind direction can be towards any give direction, hence a locus of radiation is
plotted for a tank rupture condition taking the origin at the edge of the bund wall for each
tank.
With the probable fire occurring for each of the tank, a composite overlapping the extent of
damage/radiation contour of each tank rupture scenario is generated in the diagram as shown
below;
Figure 6.4 Tank Rupture Radiation Coverage Composite Diagram

The composite diagram above will be used to identify the expose area and its corresponding
radiation dosage. From the above, the following is observed;
• Public area (outside the control of the tank farm) can be impacted by the radiation causing
death. This includes the fenced area under the vicinity of the main office
• Part of the main office building itself is within heat radiation intensity
• Adjacent Pertamina storage tanks are also effected a tank fire within Chevron, and may
cause escalation in Pertamina facility.

6.4.3 Spray Fire Modeling

For isolatable section on Dumai tank farm, the unobstructed flame length has been
determined for a release of hydrocarbon liquid.

Figure 6.5 Spray Fire Contour

The flame length for the isolatable sections where spray fire is possible is shown as follows;
Table 6.8 Spray Fire Flame Length

The radiation extent for the isolatable sections where spray fire is possible is shown as
follows;
Table 6.9 Spray Fire Radiation Extent

Graphical representation of radiation contour for each isolatable inventory is provided in

Attachment E. The output result from PHAST is provided in Attachment F.

6.5 Preventive Measures

The preventive measures available in Dumai Tank Farm are reviewed, and any additional
requirements based on design standards, regulation and operation requirements are identified;
• Fire and Gas detection system (including tank area, pump area, and operator room).The fire
and gas detection is the main and primary preventive measure in a facility. This will allow the
shutdown/isolation of the process to limit the release, and to prevent further escalation.

6.5.1 Existing Gas and Fire Detection

Based on the site visit performed, the existing fire and gas detection is not available.
Detection of fire is by operator via CCTV.
6.5.2 Fire Detection Requirements
Tank Farms The tank farm will typically have pool fire, which can be contained within the
tank or resultant from a spillage from the tanks.

Each of the tanks will be fitted with bi metallic wire heat detectors for detection of tank fire
for operator intervention. In addition to the wire heat detectors, the tank farm will be fitted
with triple IR flame detector. This type of detector is recommended as IR responds to energy
radiated from a flame in two adjacent bands of the mid-infrared spectrum. which, permit this
detector to discriminate between flames containing hydrocarbon based material and spurious
stimuli from ultraviolet and other spectral radiation sources, such as welding areas, sunlight,
and flashing lamps. This type of detector does not require cross zoning, as opposed to UV
flame detector. Triple IR (IR3) detectors are suggested, as detector utilizes a combination of
three IR sensors of extremely narrow band response. One covers the typical CO2 emission
spectral band, and the two other sensors cover different adjacent specially selected spectral
bands. While the CO2 emission band sensor is responsible for the detection of the flame
radiation, the other sensors are sensitive to all other non fire radiation sources. Pump Station
Pump house will be fitted with triple IR flame detector to be able to detect any fire present.

6.5.3 Gas Detection Requirements

No gas detectors are recommended, as the inventory of the tank farm is stabilized crude,
which will not generate significant flash gas for effective detection.

6.6 Mitigative Measures

The mitigative measure for a fire event such as passive and active fire protection/suppression
is also identified as part of the study.

6.6.1 Passive Fire Protection

6.6.1.1 Spacing and Layout

Spacing and layout provide a fundamental aspect of risk management. It separates sources of
potential fire, explosion, or toxic incidents from adjacent areas that might become involved in
the incident or be harmed by its potential consequences. Storage tanks of Dumai Tank Farm
(which stores liquid from Class IC and IIIA) operating at low pressure needs to meet the
minimum criteria for spacing [NFPA 30 sec 2.3 with table 2.3.2.1.1 (a)(b)]. Based in the
below table, the existing tanks meet the requirement of spacing from the important building
and public way.
Table 6.10 Spacing with Respect to Important Building and Public Way

Note:
1. Minimum distance from nearest side of any public way of from nearest important building
on the same property.

The tank to tank spacing will be based on NFPA 30 sec 2.3.2.2.1 table 2.3.2.2.1.
Table 6.11 Minimum Tank to Tank Spacing

The spacing between tanks meets the standard requirement based on the above table.

6.6.1.2 Containment

Dikes, drainage, and remote impounding should be provided in accordance with NFPA 30.
This is to prevent the spread of spills and releases of flammable/combustible liquids. Spills
that become fires need to be controlled to limit the fire spread to other storage areas and
process units.

The volumetric capacity of the diked area shall not be less than the greatest amount of liquid
that can be released from the largest tank within the diked area, assuming a full tank [NFPA
30 sec 2.3.2.3.2].
Table 6.12 shows the capacity of the diked/bund area within the Dumai tank farm.
Table 6.12 Diked Area Capacity

From the table above, the existing dike capacity is less than tank volume. As the dike
capacity cannot accommodate the full tank capacity, the following options are possible
depending on company decision;

1. Limit the inventory of the storage tank. This will however impact the storage capacity and
the plant availability. This can be achieved by resetting the HH trip point for all the tanks to
match the bund capacity. If Company standard required additional margin, the tanks HH level
trip may need to be further reduced.
2. Sharing bund. The bunds can be shared by more than one tank, with the bund capacity
sufficient for the largest tank inventory. However, it is noted that with a larger potential pool
fire, more land will need to be demarcated for safe distance. This may even require the
moving of adjacent Pertamina facility or main offices
3. Upgrading of the bund capacity by increasing the height. Detailed design should consider
the accessibility, and also excessive height can hamper firefighting efforts.

6.6.1.3 Structural Passive Fire Protection

Based on the site visit performed, no structural support above ground which during a pool fire
can fail and impact escape route. Hence based on API 2218, no passive fire protection is
required.

6.6.2 Active Fire Protection

6.6.2.1 Portable Fire Extinguisher

The portable fire extinguisher (manually initiated) use will be discussed based on location
specific requirements within the area within the Dumai tank farm facility. The selection of
the fire extinguisher is based on the NFPA fire classes (which differs to European Standard
EN2:1992 or ISO7165). This is presented below.
Table 6.13 Fire Classification

Tank Farm Location The storage tank area will not require portable fire extinguisher.
However, 2 x 20lbs of dry chemical portable fire extinguisher is available on each tank
(located at bottom and top of tank staircase). The existing portable fire extinguisher location
within the tank farm is shown on Attachment G. Pump Station The pump station should be
provided with portable fire extinguisher as a support means of fighting small fire. The
minimum fire extinguisher size would be at least 40lb Class B/C fire extinguisher for high
hazard [NFPA 10 section 3-3.1]. The minimum distance/placement for high hazard area is a
40-B fire extinguisher located no more than 9.15m (30ft) from location of potential fire
[NFPA 10 section 3-3.11]. 40lbs Class B/C fire extinguisher is already available in the pump
station together with 20 lbs Class ABC fire extinguisher.The existing portable fire
extinguisher is already sufficient and the location is shown on Attachment G.

6.6.2.2 Fire Extinguishment

For fire extinguishment in Dumai Tank Farm, fixed foam system is recommended. A foam
system is designed to protect the equipment from hazard inside the vertical tanks (primary
protection) and small spill fire at tank adjacent area (supplementary protection). It is used
principally to form a cohesive floating blanket on the fuel surface that extinguishes the fire by
smothering and cooling the fuel as per deluge system. Foam also prevents re-ignition by
averting formation of combustible mixtures of vapor and air above the fuel surface [Ref. 3].
At Dumai tank farm, extinguishment of fire is depending on the firewater/foam monitor. For
fixed-roof tanks over 60ft diameter, monitor nozzles shall not be used as the primary means
of protection as per NFPA 11 section 5.2.4.1.1. Top side foam application for protection of
tank internal fire is recommended. This will require foam chamber to expand the foam and
deliver foam directly onto the surface of a flammable or combustible liquid. The application
rate and number of foam chamber is as per NFPA 11 section 5.2.5.2.

In the case of hydrocarbon liquid, the recommended foam concentrate is Aqueous Film-
Forming Foam Concentrate (AFFF) [Ref.9]. AFFF is a concentrate based on fluorinated
surfactants plus foam stabilizers to produce fluid aqueous film for suppressing hydrocarbon
fuel vapors and usually diluted with water to a 1%, 3%, or 6% solution. Concentrates for use
at 3% are normally preferred to those for use at 6% because their efficiency in use, storage,
and handling [Ref. 3]. Hence, AFFF 3% is to be used for fire protection A foam system
consists of a water supply, a foam concentrate supply, bladder tank, proportioning equipment,
a piping system, foam chamber with integral foam makers and discharge devices designed to
distribute foam effectively over the hazard. The foam is applied to the surface of the liquid.
The schematic of foam system is shown in the following figure.

Figure 6.6 Foam System Schematic

In addition to the internal foam as primary protection system, external foam (supplementary
protection) is also required as protection for small spill fires. This supplementary protection
may be either fixed or portable hose stream with a minimum flow rate of 50 gpm (189 L/min)
per nozzle. The minimum number of fixed or portable hose streams required shall be
specified in NFPA 11 Table 5.9.2.2 and shall provide protection of the area.
Based on above recommendation, the fire water and foam requirement is summarized as
follows;
 Table 6.14 Firewater and Foam Requirement for Extinguishment

The largest requirement for fire extinguishment is from T-301/302/303/304 fire event, due to its largest diameter within the tank farm. Detail
calculation is presented in Attachment H.

6.6.2.3 Fire Exposure Protection

Essentially, exposure protection is provided for large flammable gas or liquid inventories which are liable to be exposed to a fire. The purpose of
providing such protection is to cool the metal and so prevent loss of strength. It is normal to provide the tank or vessel with pressure relief but,
even if the relief operates, it will not prevent failure if the wall temperature is allowed to rise too high. In the event of one tank under fire, the
cooling rate for adjacent tanks is summarized below.
Table 6.15 Firewater Requirement for Cooling

Detail calculation of cooling rate requirement is shown on Attachment H. Cooling of the

tanks will be from the tank top via a deluge ring. The deluge ring will be activated from a
manual valve connected to the firewater ring main outside the tank bund.

6.7 Engineering Improvement

As part of upgrades, the required firewater demand for extinguishment (using foam monitor
and foam chamber) and exposure protect during the fire of each tank rupture scenario is
shown below.
Table 6.16 Total Firewater Requirement

Note:
1. One monitor with capacity of 500gpm is added as support for extinguishment or cooling.

Current fire water system piping is inadequate to handle such capacities. In addition, the
existing pump capacity is 17,700 gpm (consist of 3 x 5000 gpm and 2 x 1350 gpm diesel
engine pump). This is insufficient for most of cases above. However, it is awaiting Company
to decide whether the tank cooling provision is required or otherwise. If this is not required, a
much reduced firewater capacity is required (with additional sparing).

7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the study, the following have been concluded;

• The tank dike/bund is insufficient for the tank size within the Dumai Tank Farm
• Firewater piping system is located within the bund area, which cannot be access during
emergency such as tank rupture
• Insufficient fire extinguishing capacity, as no fixed foam system is available
• The tanks are sufficient large, and requires foam injection to the tanks for fire protection
• Insufficient capacity for firewater system if cooling is required

Based on above conclusion the Fire Protection within Dumai Tank Farm requires
improvement. The followings are recommended;
• To accommodate tank capacity, the tank dike/bund is need to be upgraded. Three options
are provided and awaiting company decision.
1. Limit the inventory of the storage tank. This will however impact the storage capacity and
the plant availability.
2. Sharing bund. The bunds can be shared by more than one tank, with the bund capacity
sufficient for the largest tank inventory.
3. Upgrading of the bund capacity by increasing the height.
• Install fixed foam system to increase extinguishment capacity. Foam system will consist of
a foam concentrate supply, bladder tank, proportioning equipment, a piping system, foam
chamber with integral foam makers and discharge devices. This will allow top side foam
application for protection of tank internal fire.

Upgrade the firewater system which includes the fire water line and fire water pump to the
meet the largest firewater requirement. It is awaiting Company to decide whether the tank
cooling provision is required or otherwise. If this is not required, a much reduced firewater
capacity is required (with additional sparing).

8 REFERENCE

1. API RP 521, Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, 5th edition, 2007.

2. API 2218, Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Plants, 2nd edition,
1999.
3. API 2021 Fighting Fires in and Around Flammable and Combustible Liquid Atmospheric
Storage Tanks, January 1991
4. A guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for offshore installations, CMPT, 1999.
5. Cox, Lees and Ang, Loss Prevention Handbook, 1990.
6. Centre of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) - Guidelines For Fire Protection in Chemical,
Petrochemical, and Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities, American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, 2003.
7. NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, 1999.
8. NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Extinguishers, 2000.
9. NFPA 11, Standard for Low Expansion Foam, 2010.
10. NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed System for Fire Protection, 2001.
11. NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2000.
12. NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Service Mains and Their
Appurtenances, 2000.
13. NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 2000.
14. Certificate of Analysis – Crude Oil Analysis, Chevron IndoAsia Business Unit, TS
Laboratory Team, dated 18 November 2011.
15. Dumai Tank Farm Piping and Instrument Diagram, Dwg No. HA-TF00-DMAI-PI-0001
to HA-TF00-DMAI-PI-0008, dated 3 August 2009
16. Dumai Tank Farm Plot Plan Key Map, Dwg No. HA-TF00-DMAI-PI-0001, dated 24
August 2009
17. Dumai Tank Farm Piping Key Plan, Dwg No. HA-TF00-DMAI-PP-0001, dated 1
November 2009
18. Fire System Tank Farm Dumai, Dwg No. HA-TF00-DMAI-PP-0101, dated 25 August
2009
 19. 33.8 oAPI SLC Incoming Duri Chevron Pacific Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian dan
Pengembangan Teknologi Minyak dan Gas Bumi LEMIGAS, Research Report No. LRP -
040/2010, December 2010.

20. 32.2 oAPI SLC Incoming Bangko Chevron Pacific Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian dan
Pengembangan Teknologi Minyak dan Gas Bumi LEMIGAS, Research Report No. LRP -
041/2010, December 2010.
21. 20.4 oAPI Duri Crude Oil Chevron Pacific Indonesia, Pusat Penelitian dan
Pengembangan Teknologi Minyak dan Gas Bumi LEMIGAS, Research Report No. LRP -
042/2010, December 2010.

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