and computation; it leaves learning

Special Section as an unexamined primitive.

The Four Causes of Behavior

ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES
Peter R. Killeen1
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona Aristotle (trans. 1929) described
four kinds of explanation. Because
of mistranslation and misinterpre-
Abstract reduction of information to dis- tation by “learned babblers” (San-
Comprehension of a phe- position. Automata theory pro- tayana, 1957, p. 238), his four “be-
nomenon involves identifying vides a grammar for models of causes [aitia]” were derogated as
its origin, structure, substrate, conditioning and information an incoherent treatment of causal-
and function, and representing processing in which that con- ity (Hocutt, 1974). Although an-
these factors in some formal sys- straint can be represented. cient, Aristotle’s four (be)causes
tem. Aristotle provided a clear provide an invaluable framework
specification of these kinds of Keywords for modern scientific explanation,
explanation, which he called ef- associations; automata; causal- and in particular for resolution of
ficient causes (triggers), formal ity; explanation; models the current debate about learning.
causes (models), material causes In Aristotle’s framework, effi-
(substrates or mechanisms), and cient causes are triggers, events that
final causes (functions). In this bring about an “effect.” This is the
Judging whether learning is bet- contemporary meaning of cause.
article, Aristotle’s framework is
ter explained as an associative or Philosophers such as Hume, Mill,
applied to conditioning and the
computational process requires and Mackie have clarified the crite-
computation-versus-associa-
that we clarify the key terms. This ria for identifying various efficient
tion debate. The critical empiri-
essay provides a framework for causal relations (e.g., necessity, suf-
cal issue is early versus late
discussing explanation, association, ficiency, insufficient but necessary

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 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
events in the context of otherwise
sufficient events). Efficient causes
identify the early parts of a se-
quence that are essential for the
later parts; they tell us what ini-
tiates a change of state. Jachmann
and van den Assem’s (1996)
“causal ethological analysis” of the
courtship behavior of a wasp ex-
emplifies this meaning of cause.
Material causes are substrates.
These are the most common kinds
of causal explanation in use today,
exemplified by most of neuro-
science and brain-imaging re-
search. Once the machinery has
been identified, many people con-
sider the phenomenon explained.
Exclusive focus on machinery is
known as reductionism.
Formal causes are models. New-
ton’s great achievement was to give
credibility to such models absent
material causes: For him, there were
no “hooks and eyes” to gravity—
“Hypothesis [concerning underlying
mechanism] is no part of my de-
signe”—just naked math. This was a
difficult position for Newton to
adopt, for as a mechanical philoso-
pher he abhorred occult (and thus ad
hoc) accounts. Newton would gladly
have equipped his theory with
hooks and eyes—material causes—
but could devise none sufficient to
hold the planets in their orbits.
Formal causes are logical maps.
Aristotle’s favorite form was the syl-
logism, just as the modern physi-
cist’s favorites are differential equa-
tions. Such equations describe the
course of change from one state to
another; in concert with initial condi-
tions (efficient causes), they describe
the complete trajectory of change.
No matter how successful for-
mal models are, they are not ma-
chines: Mathematical equations de-
scribe the trajectories of baseballs
and planets, but those bodies do
not solve equations to project their
moves. The formal models of the
contributors to this Special Section
are mute concerning efficient
cause, substrate, and function. It is
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137
possible to speculate about under- ary pressures and varieties of strate-
lying mechanisms, and to generate gies adequate for that function),
formal models of them; but with- even though the wings are not ho-
out direct data on those mecha- mologues (i.e., are not evolved from
nisms, the models are unverifiable the same organ in an ancient for-
conjectures and typically subject to bear). Analogical-functional analy-
change as fads come and go—they ses fall victim to “the analogical fal-
are occult. lacy” only when it is assumed that
Final causes are functional expla- similarity of function entails simi-
nations. “To recognize an actual larity of efficient (evolutionary his-
machine, we have to have some tory) or material (physiological)
idea of what it is supposed to do” causes. Such confounds can be pre-
(Minsky, 1967, p. 4). Questions like vented by accounting for each type
“What is it for?” and “Why does it of cause separately.
do that?” call for functional (final) Efficient causes, then, are the
causes; survival of the fittest, opti- initial conditions for a change of
mal foraging theory, and purposive state; final causes are the terminal
explanations in general provide rel- conditions; formal causes are mod-
evant answers. Most of modern els of transition between the initial
physics can be written in terms of and terminal conditions; material
functions that optimize certain vari- causes are the substrate on which
ables, such as energy. All laws these other causes act.
stated in terms of such optima con-
cern final causes. Common exam-
ples are light rays following paths
that minimize transit times, animals EXPLAINING CONDITIONING
behaving in ways that maximize ge-
netic representation in succeeding Skinner (1950) railed against for-
generations, and humans behaving mal (“theorizing”), material
in ways that maximize the benefits (“neuro-reductive”), and final
for a population. Final causes were (“purposive”) causes, and scien-
given a bad name (teleology) because tized efficient causes as “the vari-
they were treated as errant formal, ables of which behavior is a func-
material, or efficient causes. A rea- tion.” He was concerned that
son giraffes have long necks is to let complementary causes would be
them browse high foliage; this final used in lieu of, rather than along
cause does not displace formal with, his functional analysis. But of
(variation and natural selection) all behavioral phenomena, condi-
and material (genetic) explanations; tioning is the one least able to be
nor is it an efficient cause (Lamarki- comprehended without reference
anism). But none of those other to all four causes: The ability to be
causal explanations make sense conditioned has evolved because
without specification of the final of the advantage it confers in ex-
cause. Biologists reintroduced final ploiting efficient causal relations.
causes under the euphemism “ulti-
mate mechanisms,” referring to the Final Causes
efficient and material causes of a be-
havior as “proximate mechanisms.” Conditioning shapes behavioral
Two systems that share similar trajectories into shortest paths to
final causes may have quite dissimi- reinforcement (Killeen, 1989).
lar substrates. Analyses of evolu- When a stimulus predicts a biologi-
tionary analogues—such as wings cally significant event (an uncondi-
in insects, birds, and bats—provide tioned stimulus, US), animals im-
useful functional information (con- prove their fitness by “learning
cerning, e.g., convergent evolution- associations” among external
Copyright © 2001 American Psychological Society
138
events, and between those events
and appropriate actions. Stable
niches—those inhabited by most
plants, animals, and fungi—neither
require nor support learning: Tro-
pisms, taxes, and simple reflexes
adequately match the quotidian
regularities of light, tide, and sea-
son. However, when the environ-
ment changes, it is the role of learn-
ing to rewire the machinery to
exploit the new contingencies. Bet-
ter exploiters are better repre-
sented in the next generation. This
is the final—ultimate, in the biolo-
gists’ terms—cause of condition-
ing. Understanding learning re-
quires knowing what the learned
responses may have accomplished
in the environments that selected
for them.
Efficient Causes
These are the prototypical kinds
of causes, important enough for sur-
vival that many animals have
evolved sensitivity to them. Parame-
ters that are indicators of efficient
causes—contiguity in space and
time, temporal priority, regularity of
association, and similarity—affect
both judgments of causality by hu-
mans (Allan, 1993) and speed of con-
ditioning (Miller & Matute, 1996).
Material Causes
The substrate of learning is the
nervous system, which provides an
embarrassment of riches in mecha-
nisms. Development of formal and
efficient explanations of condition-
ing can guide the search for opera-
tive neural mechanisms. In turn,
elucidation of that neural architec-
ture can guide formal modeling,
such as parallel connectionist mod-
els—neural nets—that emulate
various brain functions. Each of the
four causes is a resource for under-
standing the others.
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VOLUME 10, NUMBER 4, AUGUST 2001
Formal Causes ditionals—such as the probability
of becoming ill after experiencing a
Models are proper subsets of all particular taste—often start small,
that can be said in a modeling lan- so that one or two pairings greatly
guage. Associationist and computa- increase the conditional probability
tional models of learning are formu- and generate taste aversions. Ear-
lated in the languages of probability lier pairings of the taste and health,
and automata, respectively. Their however, will give the prior condi-
structures are sketched next. tionals more inertia, causing the
conditional probability to increase
more slowly, and possibly protect-
Associative Models ing the individual from a taste
aversion caused by subsequent as-
Material implication, the suffi- sociation of the taste with illness.
cient relation (if C, then E; symbol- More common stimuli, such as
ized as C→E), provides a simplistic shapes, may be slow to condition
model of both efficient causality because of a history of exposure
and conditioning. It holds that that is not associated with illness.
whenever C, then also E; it fails Bayes’s theorem provides a formal
whenever C and E. When the pres- model for this process of updating
ence of a cue (C, the conditioned conditional probabilities. This ex-
stimulus, or CS) accurately predicts emplifies how subsets of probabil-
a reinforcer (E, the US), the strength ity theory can serve as a formal
of the relation C→E increases. The model for association theory. Asso-
conditional probability of the US ciative theories continue to evolve
given the CS—p(E|C)—generalizes in light of experiments manipulat-
this all-or-none relation to a proba- ing contextual variables; Hall
bility. Animals are also sensitive to (1991) provided an excellent his-
the presence of the US in the ab- tory of the progressive constraint
sence of the CS, p(E|ⵑC); only if of associative models by data.
this probability is zero is a cause
said to be necessary for the effect. Computational Models
Unnecessary effects degrade condi-
tioning, just as unexpected events Computers are machines that
make an observer question his associate addresses with contents
grasp of a situation. (i.e., they go to a file specified by
Good predictors of the strength an address and retrieve either a da-
of learning are (a) the difference tum or an instruction). Not only do
between these two conditional computers associate, but associa-
probabilities and (b) the diagnostic- tions compute: “Every finite-state
ity of the CS, p(E|C)/p(E), which is machine is equivalent to, and can
the degree to which the cause (CS) be ‘simulated’ by, some neural net”
reduces uncertainty concerning the (Minsky, 1967, p. 55). Computers
occurrence of the effect (US). As is can instantiate all of the associative
the case for all probabilities, mea- models of conditioning, and their
surement of these conditionals re- inverses. For the computational
quires a defining context. This may metaphor to become a model, it
comprise combinations of cues, must be restricted to a proper sub-
physical surroundings, and his- set of what computers can do; one
tory of reinforcement. Reinforce- way to accomplish this is via the
ment engenders an updating of the theory of automata (Hopkins &
conditionals; speed of conditioning Moss, 1976). Automata theory is a
depends on the implicit weight of formal characterization of compu-
evidence vested in the prior condi- tational architectures. A critical
tionals. The databases for some con- distinction among automata is
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
memory: Finite automata can dis-
tinguish only those inputs (histo-
ries of conditioning) that can be
represented in their finite internal
memory. Representation may be
incrementally extended with exter-
nal memory in the form of push-
down stores, finite rewritable
disks, or infinite tapes. These am-
plified architectures correspond to
Chomsky’s (1959/1963) context-
free grammars, context-sensitive
grammars, and universal Turing
machines, respectively. Turing ma-
chines are models of the architec-
ture of a general-purpose com-
puter that can compute all
expressions that are computable by
any machine. The architecture of a
Turing machine is deceptively sim-
ple, given its universal power; it is
access to a potentially infinite
memory “tape” that gives it this
power. Personal computers are in
principle Turing machines, silicon
instruments whose universality
has displaced most of the brass in-
struments of an earlier psychology.
The Crucial Distinction
Memory is also what divides the
associative from the computa-
tional approaches. Early reduction
of memory to disposition requires
fewer memory states than late re-
duction and permits faster—reflex-
ive—responses; late reduction is
more flexible and “intelligent.” An-
imals’ behavior may reflect compu-
tation at any level up to, but not ex-
ceeding, their memory capacity.
Most human behaviors are simple
reflexes corresponding to finite au-
tomata. Even the most complicated
repertoires can become “automa-
tized” by practice, reducing an
originally computation-intense re-
sponse—a child’s attempts to tie a
shoe—to a mindless habit. The ad-
aptation permitted by learning
would come at too great a price if it
did not eventually lead to auto-
matic and thus fast responsivity.
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139
Consciousness of action permits correlated with early versus late re-
adaptation, unconsciousness per- duction of information to action.
mits speed. The challenge now is to identify
In traditional associative theory, the class and capacity of automata
information is reduced to a poten- that are necessary to describe the
tial for action (“strength” of associ- capacities of a species, and the ar-
ation between the CS and US) and chitecture of associations within
stored on a real-time basis. Such fi- such automata that suffice to de-
nite automata with limited memo- scribe the behavior of individuals
ries are inadequate as models of as they progress through condi-
conditioning because “the nature of tioning.
the representation can change—the
sort of information it holds can be
influenced by [various post hoc op- Comprehending Explanation
erations]” (Hall, 1991, p. 67). Rats
have memorial access to more of Many scientific controversies
the history of the environment and stem not so much from differences
consequences than captured by in understanding a phenomenon as
simple Bayesian updating of dispo- from differences in understanding
sitions. Miller (e.g., Blaisdell, Bris- explanation: expecting one type of
tol, Gunther, & Miller, 1998; see explanation to do the work of other
also this issue) provided one com- types, and objecting when other
putational model that exemplified scientists do the same. Exclusive
such late reduction. focus on final causes is derided as
If traditional associaters are too teleological, on material causes as
simple to be a viable model of con- reductionistic, on efficient causes
ditioning, unrestricted computers as mechanistic, and on formal
(universal Turing machines) are causes as “theorizing.” But respect
too smart. Our finite memory for the importance of each type of
stores fall somewhere in between. explanation, and the correct posi-
Automata theory provides a gram- tioning of constructs within appro-
mar for models that range from priate empirical domains, resolves
simple switches and reflexes, many controversies. For example,
through complex conditional asso- associations are formal constructs;
ciations, to adaptive systems that they are not located in the organ-
modify their software as they ism, but in our probability tables or
learn. The increased memory this computers, and only emulate con-
requires is sometimes internal, and nections formed in the brain, and
sometimes external—found in contingencies found in the inter-
marks, memoranda, and behavior face of behavior and environment.
(“gesturing facilitates the produc- Final causes are not time-reversed
tion of fluent speech by affecting efficient causes. Only one type of
the ease or difficulty of retrieving explanation is advanced when we
words from lexical memory,” determine the parts of the brain
Krauss, 1998, p. 58). Context is of- that are active during conditioning.
ten more than a cue for memory— Provision of one explanation does
it constitutes a detailed, content- not reduce the need for the other
addressable form of storage lo- types. Functional causes are not al-
cated where it is most likely to be ternatives to efficient causes, but
needed. Perhaps more often than completions of them.
we realize, the medium is memory. Formal analysis requires a lan-
The difference between associa- guage, and models must be a
tionistic and computational models proper subset of that language. The
reduces to which automata they signal issue in the formal analysis
are isomorphic with; and this is of conditioning is not association
Copyright © 2001 American Psychological Society
140
versus computation, but rather the
circumstances of early versus late
information reduction, and the role
of context—both as a retrieval cue
and as memory itself. Automata
theory provides a language that
can support appropriate subsets of
machines to model these processes,
from simple association up to the
most complex human repertoires.
Comprehension is a four-footed
beast; it advances only with the
progress of each type of explana-
tion, and moves most gracefully
when those explanations are coor-
dinated. It is a human activity, and
is itself susceptible to Aristotle’s
quadripartite analyses. In this arti-
cle, I have focused on the formal
analysis of explanation, and formal
explanations of conditioning. Com-
prehension will be achieved as
such formal causes become coordi-
nated with material (brain states),
efficient (effective contexts), and fi-
nal (evolutionary) explanations of
behavior.
Recommended Reading
Miller, R.R., Barnet, R.C., & Gra-
hame, N.J. (1995). Assessment of
the Rescorla-Wagner Model. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 117, 363–386.
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VOLUME 10, NUMBER 4, AUGUST 2001
Uttal, W. (1998). Toward a new behav-
Aristotle. (1929). The physics (Vol. 1; P.H. Wick-
steed & F.M. Cornford, Trans.). London: Hei-
iorism: The case against perceptual nemann.
reductionism. Mahwah, NJ: Erl- Blaisdell, A., Bristol, A., Gunther, L., & Miller, R.
baum. (1998). Overshadowing and latent inhibition
Wasserman, E.A. (1993). Compara- counteract each other: Support for the compar-
tive cognition: Toward a general ator hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
understanding of cognition in be-
ogy: Animal Behavior Processes, 24, 335–351.
havior. Psychological Science, 4, Chomsky, N. (1963). On certain formal properties
of grammars. In R.D. Luce, R.R. Bush, & E.
156–161. Galanter (Eds.), Readings in mathematical psy-
Wasserman, E.A., & Miller, R.R. chology (Vol. 2, pp. 125–155). New York: Wiley.
(1997). What’s elementary about (Original work published 1959)
associative learning? Annual Re- Hall, G. (1991). Perceptual and associative learning.
view of Psychology, 48, 573–607. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Young, M.E. (1995). On the origin of Hocutt, M. (1974). Aristotle’s four becauses. Philos-
personal causal theories. Psy- ophy, 49, 385–399.
chonomic Bulletin & Review, 2,
Hopkins, D., & Moss, B. (1976). Automata. New
83–104. York: North Holland.
Jachmann, F., & van den Assem, J. (1996). A causal
ethological analysis of the courtship behavior
of an insect (the parasitic wasp Nasonia vitrip-
Acknowledgments—This article was writ-
ten with the support of National Science ennis, hym., pteromalidae). Behaviour, 133, 1051–
1075.
Foundation Grant IBN 9408022 and Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health Grant Killeen, P.R. (1989). Behavior as a trajectory
K05 MH01293. through a field of attractors. In J.R. Brink &
C.R. Haden (Eds.), The computer and the brain:
Perspectives on human and artificial intelligence
(pp. 53–82). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Note Krauss, R. (1998). Why do we gesture when we
speak? Current Directions in Psychological Sci-
1. Address correspondence to Peter
ence, 7, 54–60.
Killeen, Department of Psychology, Miller, R.R., & Matute, H. (1996). Animal ana-
logues of causal judgment. In D.R. Shanks,
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ D.L. Medin, & K.J. Holyoak (Eds.), Causal
85287-1104; e-mail: killeen@asu.edu. learning (pp. 133–166). San Diego: Academic
Press.
Minsky, M. (1967). Computation: Finite and infinite
machines. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
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