Heraclitus on Φύσις

ENRIQUE HÜLSZ PICCONE

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Abstract: Presocratic philosophy as a historical category was defined by Aristotle as

physics, or physical philosophy, because φύσις (understood as a single genus of being,
among others) was its object of study, its practitioners being since tagged accordingly
as φυσικοί or φυσιόλογοι. The central part of the paper deals briefly with the four
pioneering Heraclitean uses of the word φύσις (frs. DK B106, B1, B112 and B123),
in which the sense of the only Homeric use of the term seems to be deepened and
continued. Φύσις in Heraclitus has an ontological sense (covering the rationale of
genuine and unitary being), and appears always in epistemic contexts, as the object
of search, criterion of knowledge, basis for action and language, susceptible of show-
ing and concealing. Contrasting with Aristotle’s outlook, Plato’s Phaedo 95e ff. sheds a
different light on φύσις, suggesting Plato’s acknowledgement of a wider metaphysical
reach of Presocratic thought, and stressing historical continuity of the philosophical
project as such. In particular, the meaning of the word φύσις in Plato and Heraclitus
isn’t natural or physical reality, but reality tout court, or the nature of things (their
essential being: the what, how and why of things that are).

I. Pre-Socratic Philosophy and Φύσις

I t would be difficult indeed to find a better term than φύσις to characterize

faithfully the object of what we nowadays call “pre-Socratic philosophy.” But
even though such a characterization is solidly grounded on the testimonies of
Aristotle and Plato, it should be acknowledged that, although closely intertwined,
the perspectives of Plato and Aristotle are not the same, nor equivalent to one
another. Calling “pre-Socratic philosophers” a whole series of thinkers from Thales
to Democritus (roughly covering a period of almost two centuries, from the early
sixth to the late fifth B.C.) brings in some other problems: the words “philosopher,”
“philosophy,” and “philosophize” are not documented in the fragmentary remains

© 2013. Epoché, Volume 17, Issue 2 (Spring 2013). ISSN 1085-1968. 179–194
DOI: 10.5840/epoche20131723
180 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

of the written works of any of these thinkers, so it’s unlikely that they thought of
themselves, of their attitude and activity in these very terms (which are, however,
precisely Plato’s terms).1 And, on the other hand, the modern adjective “pre-
Socratic” is a rather vague label, somewhat inconsistently applied (conceptually as
well as chronologically), and defined only relatively to the legendary figure of the
historical Socrates, who remains a mystery in his own right. Some justifications
that should be given about the use of these terms are usually omitted and taken
for granted in many interpretive scholarly approaches to the field as a whole and
to individual figures and authors. These few pages will assume, too, that Heraclitus
is indeed a philosopher and will try to show that his pioneering philosophical
use of φύσις is primarily “metaphysical” rather than merely “physical,” and that
it provides an important part of the general background and the textual basis for
Plato’s and Aristotle’s generic historical accounts.
Ever since Aristotle the characterization of pre-Socratic philosophy as the
gradual construction of a scientific knowledge on φύσις is commonplace and
has become in fact the standard upon which the pre-Socratics are identified as
philosophers (qua natural scientists). Partly based on Plato, but relying heavily
also on his own philosophical project, Aristotle famously (and influentially)
interpreted the whole pre-Socratic tradition as a speculation on Nature (φύσις),
that is, as physics (φυσική or περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη), and its practitioners
(whom he regarded as forerunners of his own system) he called φυσικοί and
φυσιολόγοι.2 In recognizing φύσις as the object of pre-Socratic science and
philosophy, there’s no doubt Aristotle is following closely the language of Plato’s
Phaedo,3 while the other cognate terms are probably his own creation and not
attested even in Plato. More importantly, the meaning “Nature,” in the collective
sense of the class of all “natural” or “physical” substances—τὰ φύσει ὄντα,
φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι, or simply τὰ φυσικά—, defined by corporeality, change, and
having in themselves their principle of movement, in contrast to the products of
τέχνη and to non-corporeal unchanging substances, also seems to be peculiar
to him,4 and is not attested in any pre-Socratic text. In so far as φύσις is un-
derstood by Aristotle as “a single genus of being,”5 the corresponding science is
not conceived of as “first philosophy,” and his unified view of the pre-Socratics
as physicists tends to obscure the metaphysical dimension of their thought—
typically, Aristotle will insist on their naïveté, their lack of clarity, their diverging
mutually contradictory claims (mostly about material principles and bodies), and
their defective and incomplete accounts of other kinds of cause, which he finds
absent in all, with the exceptions of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, both of whom
include efficient causes in their systems besides material ones, and perhaps, in a
different way, also with the exception of an adumbration of the formal cause in
“the so-called Pythagoreans.”
Heraclitus on Фύσις 181

In Metaphysics A, as Aristotle specifies and critically discusses the peculiar

hypotheses of the pre-Socratics as physicists (and their many shortcomings), his
treatment turns about what he calls ‘first causes’ (τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια) and ‘principles’
(ἀρχαί)6 which, from his own perspective, were mostly conceived by them rather
poorly. This talk about ἀρχαί, however, doesn’t reflect the actual language of the
different documented thinkers,7 and it looks like it’s actually framed in Aristotle’s
own technical terminology. The slip from φύσις to ἀρχαί or ἀρχή would be easy
to understand, given the overlapping meanings of “origin,” “birth,” “beginning,”
and “source” in both words. In point of fact, Aristotle occasionally uses φύσις, too,
when outlining his generic interpretation of the ἀρχαί of the physicists,8 in the
traditional sense and retaining its archaic flavor and dynamic meaning. Actual
pre-Socratic uses9 of the noun φύσις are preserved in Heraclitus, Parmenides,10
Empedocles,11 Democritus,12 Philolaus,13 and Diogenes,14 but they are absent from
the preserved fragments of Anaximander,15 Anaximenes, Xenophanes,16 Zeno,
Melissus, and Anaxagoras. The emblematic phrase περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία does
not occur in the genuine surviving fragments of any of the pre-Socratics, and is
first found in Plato (echoed once by Aristotle, in de caelo 298b2).
It will be instructive to call now upon a relevant non-philosophical antecedent.
In the only Homeric use of the noun φύσις, the word refers to the true character
of a plant, and is the object of the verb “to show”:
ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε.
ῥίζῃ μὲν μέλαν ἔσκε, γάλακτι δὲ εἴκελον ἄνθος·
μῶλυ δέ μιν καλέουσι θεοί, χαλεπὸν δέ τ’ ὀρύσσειν
ἀνδράσι γε θνητοῖσι· θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται.17
From the earth he pulled it out and showed me its nature.
It was black at the root, but with a blossom like milk.
Molu the gods call it, and it’s difficult to dig up
for mortal men. But the gods have the power for all things.
The first line presents φύσις in terms of unearthing and showing, both performed
by a god. Odysseus describes the nature of the plant first by its looks, its appear-
ance, black at the root and having a white flower, then further determines it by
recalling the plant’s divine name, μῶλυ, and finally observes that it is hard to
dig up for mortals. It may well be that φύσις means here ‘outward form,’ ‘visible
aspect,’ but things might be not so simple, since it’s clear that the Homeric context
suffices to recognize φύσις as the genuine being of a thing, which is shown and
hidden, is closely related to its name and integrates opposites, and is (for humans)
the prized goal of hard digging. The similarities with Heraclitus at every point
are remarkable, while the differences are, perhaps, a more subtle matter. It will
be worthwhile to introduce at this point a Heraclitean fragment as a parallel to
the Homeric lines just quoted:
182 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν

ὀλίγον.18
Those who search for gold, then, dig up much earth and find little.
Chances are Heraclitus intends here an analogy to suggest an epistemic frame-
work, in which, precisely in the light of Homer’s verses, φύσις would be the
primary referent of this memorable symbolism of philosophical search.19

II. Four Heraclitean Fragments on Φύσις

Heraclitus’s use of φύσις provides the necessary philosophical framework to a
better understanding of the reasons why it is such a fundamental concept for
the pre-Socratic and the classical traditions. In the genuine relevant Heraclitean
fragments (as well as elsewhere in contemporary fifth-century authors, and even
before) φύσις means “nature” in the sense of “being” or “essence” (Kirk rightly
translated it as “the real constitution of things”), although the basic meanings of
“origin,” “birth,” and “growth” need not be dissociated from the idea of nature as
what there is, that which defines what a thing really is, that which gives it its perma-
nent identity, and that which constitutes the proper object of genuine knowledge.20
Heraclitean usage of φύσις looks semantically consistent with Homer, but it surely
takes it farther, suggesting an ontological categorization which excludes neither
change nor permanence, coming as it does before the Parmenidean critique and
radical denial of all becoming. It’s worth noticing that Parmenides’s marginal use
of φύσις is restricted to a couple of fragments, DK28 B10, verses 1 (αἰθερίαν τε
φύσιν) and 5 (σελήνης . . . φύσιν), and B16 (μελέων φύσις), both of which
are usually ascribed to the Doxa section of the poem, and that it is conspicuously
absent from the ontological language of the way of Truth.
Of the four21 Heraclitean fragments that contain the word, I’ll take my cue
from DK22 B106, which reports a criticism of Hesiod:
τὰς μὲν ἀγαθὰς ἐποίησε [ἡμέρας], τὰς δὲ φαύλας, ὡς ἀγνόων ὅτι
φύσιν ἡμέρης ἁπάσης μία ἐστι [καὶ αὐτή].
He made some [days] good, some bad, thus ignoring that the nature of any
day is one [and the same].”22
In a parallel text (DK22 B57), Hesiod’s mistake was he did not know that night
and day are one.23 In both cases, the context of the intended criticism is epistemic
and Heraclitus’s point is that Hesiod’s alleged wisdom is really its opposite,24 ig-
norance, because it fails to recognize unity in duality. This very point is the target
of Heraclitus’s use of πολυμαθίη, a meaningful neologism at work elsewhere.25
B57’s conclusion (ἔστι γὰρ ἕν) and μία φύσις of B106 suggest an interesting
connection: the apparent duality of opposites in Hesiod (lucky-unlucky days,
night-day) is denied by Heraclitus, and the contrast he validates is between the
Heraclitus on Фύσις 183

true single nature and the deceiving appearances. B106 clearly implies φύσις is
at once the true being of things and the object of genuine knowledge, which in
turn implies intimate connection with truth. The explicit notion of a single and
common φύσις recalls many other fragments. Following the thread of the idea
of unity (ἕν), one could point to a couple of texts that link true wisdom and unity
(DK22 B32, B41, both employing the locution ἓν τὸ σοφόν), some others on
the invalid claims to wisdom of Homer, Archilochus, Pythagoras, Xenophanes,
and Hecataeus (DK22 B56, B42, B81, B129, B40), and yet still others concerning
λόγος (B1, B2, B50, B108).
At the opening of his book,26 λόγος is introduced as being always the same (lit-
erally,“always this”) and as that “according to” which (κατά) “all things” happen:
DK22 B1: τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι
καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων
γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι πειρώμενοι
καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτεων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν
διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. . . .27
From the λόγος which is this always men become devoid of understanding,
both before having heard and once they have heard it. For, about all things that
happen according to this λόγος, they are like the inexperienced experienc-
ing words as well as deeds such as those I am describing according to nature
dividing each thing and showing it as it is.
Against the background of men’s generalized epistemic negligence, Heraclitus
describes his own procedure. What we can call his philosophical method, he
presents as the unfolding of the objective λόγος,28 itself closely linked to being
as φύσις. The second sentence offers a self-portrait of the philosopher in ac-
tion. The subject-matter of his discourse (“words as well as deeds,” the primary
referents of πάντων) is the same as the object of men’s ignorance and oblivion,
and it operates as a link between “I” and “they.” The things which inexperienced
men experience, these are the very things Heraclitus describes in detail. The ad-
verbial phrase κατὰ φύσιν (in ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction, just as ἀεὶ in the first
sentence) can be taken both with the preceding (ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κατὰ φύσιν,
“things such as I describe according to nature”) and the following (κατὰ φύσιν
διαιρέων ἕκαστον, “dividing each thing according to nature”) clauses, and it
can modify even the entire third and last clause, καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. Not
only can each of the three clauses serve as a formulation of philosophy as method,
but taken together they make a complex and powerful image of Heraclitus’s
philosophical project, which can be fairly said to consist in a meticulous cognitive
process: describing, explaining, discerning and showing what things really are
“according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν). So, in point of content as in point of form,
φύσις is presented as the one common link between description, analysis and
184 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

verbal manifestation of what each thing really is. The parallelism with κατὰ τὸν
λόγον τόνδε thus supports a strong ontological and epistemic reading of both.
What would later be called philosophy is here laid down as a rational knowledge
(διήγησις, διαίρεσις, and φράζειν) about what things really are, about φύσις.
Further evidence on Heraclitus’s notion of φύσις comes from a remarkable
ethical fragment:
DK22 B112: σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη καὶ σοφίη: ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ
ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.
Being of a sound mind is the greatest merit and wisdom: to speak what is true
and to act according to nature, understanding [it?].
In spite of scholarly doubts concerning its allegedly Stoic flavor, and some rather
vague suspicions about the language and the style, there’s nothing in the text to
warrant a dogmatic denial of its authenticity.29 The fragment is the only explicit
statement about moral virtue (ἀρετή), a theme rooted in poetic tradition and
with far-reaching consequences in later philosophy, and it contains the only extant
Heraclitean use of ἀληθέα (neuter plural of ἀληθές). At the level of content, the
terminology is consistent enough with the rest of the fragments (even in spite of
the two hapaxes),30 as is the praise of sound thinking,31 equated with wisdom32 and
pervading speech and action.33 The generic position can be loosely (and rightly)
termed ethical intellectualism. From the point of view of form and syntactic
structure, B112 bears the marks of Heraclitus’s characteristic style, being itself
divisible in several dynamic and variable semantic units which make possible
different combinations and readings.34 One can punctuate after μεγίστη, or after
καὶ σοφίη,35 so the statement can be read as two separate claims about sound
thinking and about wisdom, or as a continuous single claim about sound think-
ing, which begins by putting it at the highest point, then equates it with wisdom,
and finally specifies its concrete meaning. The virtue of sound thinking consists
in the unity of true speech and correct action, the latter term (or even the pair
λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν) being further modified by the adverbial phrase “according to
nature,”36 and enriched with the participle ἐπαΐοντας (itself ambiguous: “giving
an ear to,”“perceiving,”“understanding”). The expression κατὰ φύσιν,“according
to nature,” can be read as modifying the three verbs, ”to speak,” “to act,” and “to
understand” and, lastly, if ἐπαίω is taken in the sense of “hearing,” κατὰ φύσιν
ἐπαΐοντας recalls Heraclitus’s own methodical procedure and his appeal to the
λόγος heard but unattended by other men in B1. If λόγος and φύσις are objec-
tive descriptive explanatory principles, they have also a prescriptive side. Moral
virtue is deeply rooted in φύσις.
The last fragment of this brief survey is perhaps the pearl of the crown and
the best known of the four:
DK22 B123: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ.
Heraclitus on Фύσις 185

Nature is wont to be hidden.

The relatively simple syntax and straightforward style of the statement conceals a
couple of surprises. In point of form, as Serge Mouraviev has shown, an attentive
reader can find a reversed anagram of the word φύσις,37 hiding in plain sight and
looking right back at him in the eye:
ΦΥΣΙΣ ΚΡΥΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ ΦΙΛΕΙ
It looks like Heraclitus is actually doing here precisely what he promised at the
outset: describing in detail, analyzing and showing how a thing is κατὰ φύσιν.
Since the subject here is precisely φύσις, this particular statement might very well
be read as an oblique reference to the nature of φύσις. This λόγος says nature
is hidden, at the same time it silently makes nature present. The graphic image
is double and it runs in opposite directions, and the form mirrors the primary
explicit meaning. So the solution to the enigma (or the punch-line of the joke or
simply the point of the statement) is that the nature of φύσις lies not just in its
hiddenness, but also in its bright presence.38
B123 has been once and again translated as “nature loves to hide,” sometimes
even appending an “itself ” or “herself.” In a 2003 article, Daniel Graham has argued
persuasively (and conclusively, in my opinion) that this familiar translation is
not right. His main argument is that in the Ionic of Heraclitus’s time, φιλέω +
infinitive doesn’t ever mean “love to” (there’s not a single documented use with
this sense in Herodotus, whom he quotes abundantly), but always means “to be
wont to,” “to be used to” (Latin soleo),39 admitting even of impersonal uses. So
he validly concludes that “we are not justified in positing the idiom as even a
secondary meaning for the Greek phrase.”40 I do further agree that the saying
could be well rendered in English simply as “nature hides” or “nature is hidden”
(this latter interpretation of κρύπτεσθαι as passive being Graham’s preferred
choice). I also share Graham’s rejection of a reflexive reading of κρύπτεσθαι
(such as Kirk’s “hides itself ”). But, whereas he bases this rejection on a denial
of an unlikely personification of φύσις, I would rely on other implicit epistemo-
logical grounds. Nature’s concealment or hiddenness is primarily relative to the
viewer, and since human doxa is prone to cover up its owner’s shortcomings,41
nature’s concealment can very well be read as a metaphor for ignorance, rather
than as a dogmatic claim about what φύσις really is, in and by itself. Finally, I
share Serge Mouraviev’s reservations about how unlikely a personification would
really be. Graham himself admits that it “would be no more startling than many
striking images he (sc., Heraclitus) uses.”42 Even setting aside the possibility of
a personification, φύσις is no doubt used here in a general sense (i.e., not as the
nature of this or that kind of thing) as the true being of all things and the genuine
object of knowledge proper.
186 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

III. Epilogue: Φύσις in Phaedo 96a

A famous Platonic passage (Phaedo 95e ff.), one of the precious few recorded
views about the first Greek philosophers before Aristotle, often read as Socrates’s
“intellectual biography,” aims at a formulation of the idea of philosophy as method,
sketched against a historical setting. Since the speaker is Socrates, and the cli-
max of this narrative section is a sharp distinction between his own approach
and the methods employed by all others, it is also the earliest text that presents
a unified view of all previous philosophers as literally ‘pre-Socratic.’ The earlier
tradition is referred to as “that wisdom (σοφία) which they call an investigation
about the nature of things (ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία),”43 its general background
being the metaphysical problem of change, generation and corruption of things.
Plato’s Socrates defines this philosophical concern with φύσις (that he himself
passionately embraced from his youth) as “knowing the causes of each thing: why
each comes-to-be, why it ceases-to-be and why it is (such as it is).”44 Leaving aside
interpretive concerns with the notion of αἰτία, one can see that the semantic range
the Greek φύσις bears here is first specified in the notion of “coming-to-be.” In
fact,“genesis” or “origin” is the basic meaning of the word (as is also the case with
the Latin translation natura). The idea of genesis then flows, in true pre-Socratic
vein, into that of “passing away,” death, or “ceasing-to-be,” and is finally extended
to include the notion of “being” (conveying the senses of “existence” and “life,”
as well as “essence”). Thus φύσις is conceived as the proper object of the search:
the cause, the reason why anything comes to be, ceases to be, or is such as it is.
Socrates adds that “often I turned myself upside down examining . . . these
things.”45 It’s not hard to imagine the platonic Socrates fully concerned with this
kind of questions, engaging in dialectical discussion with the early thinkers and
thriving in it, even if, later on, ironical emphasis is laid on the existentially nega-
tive effects of the many aporiai, a narrative move that tends to obscure Socrates’s
deeper affinities with early philosophy. I submit that, after all, an investigation
about φύσις is an apt description of Socratic-Platonic ‘philosophy.’ Although what
later would come to be called physics is by no means excluded (as the immediate
context eloquently shows), Plato’s seminal phrase is to my mind best rendered not
as an investigation into “nature” tout court, but as a research into “the nature of
things,” so the expression refers not only to physical or natural science, but rather
to philosophy as science of reality and knowledge. The focal term here is φύσις
(though only for a short while, up to 96c2) and ἱστορία46 is quietly dropped, be-
ing in context assimilated to σκέψις. It will be duly noted that the formula περὶ
φύσεως ἱστορία comes close to Heraclitus’s language, and especially to the
characterization of his own method as describing, analyzing and showing what
each thing is κατὰ φύσιν (B1). Socrates’s exposition is thematically-oriented,
and references to individual authors are mostly left implicit (except in the case of
Heraclitus on Фύσις 187

Anaxagoras) and possibly include at least Archelaus, Anaximander, Anaximenes,

Alcmeon, Empedocles, Diogenes, and Zeno. Illustrations of the characteristic
problems concerning the nature of things are woven together with the thread
of causality in all generation and corruption, and the tone is often humorous.
Plato’s Socrates presents first a “genetic” type of approach that focuses on living
beings, going from biological and physiological processes to perception, thought
and knowledge,47 adding that next he examined “the ceasing-to-be of these things,
and what happens in the sky and on the earth,”48 until he finally came to realize
he was altogether “lacking in nature (ἀφυής) for that kind of investigation.”49
As proof of his own inability, Socrates says that he was blinded by this investiga-
tion to the point where he unlearned the things he (and everybody else) thought
before that he knew with certainty and took for granted,50 like why a man grows
(96c), or why someone is taller than another (96d), or even why two is one plus
one (96e–97b). He sums his experience by confessing that
οὐδέ γε δι’ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ’
ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι’ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον
τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλά τιν’ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω,
τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.
Neither do I know the reason why the one [or: the unit] is generated, nor can
I any longer convince myself that, in a word, I understand why anything else
comes to be or ceases to be or is, according to this procedure of the method
which in no way I allow, although I have jumbled another procedure of my own.51
Socrates’s narrative doesn’t follow chronological guidelines and is structurally
complex, but it singles out Anaxagoras’s theory (on Nous) apart from all others.
There are some lingering aspects of pre-Socratic methods which seem to be appro-
priated by Socrates for his own project. Reference to Anaxagoras seems to suggest
an alternative “teleological” model of explanation as the crucial difference with
the “genetic” type of approach and as the way out of aporia (and into the theory
of Forms), so it would seem that Socrates would hardly abandon it completely in
his own methodical procedure. Towards the end of the passage, he gives a very
different characterization of generic pre-Socratic method, presented neither as
“genetic” nor as “teleological.” Instead, he shifts to an image (εἰκών) couched
in the language of vision, within which what he avoids is the risky procedure of
looking directly at the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) themselves, contrasted with the
safer detour of his own “second sailing.”52 Socrates’s method is still oriented to
knowledge of “the truth of things” (τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἀλήθεια), but proceeds indi-
rectly through λόγοι as images of things.53 His final caveat (“Perhaps I compare
this in an unfitting way, for in no way do I agree that he who looks in λόγοι at
the things that are, looks at them in images more than he who [looks at them]
in facts”) leaves enough room for inclusion of ἔργα, side by side with λόγοι, as
188 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

objects of method. However one interprets the relationship of the Platonic Socrates
to the pre-Socratic tradition, it’s advisable not to do without the deeper affinities
and basic agreement and continuity, which are recurrently highlighted. If the
methods can be very different and reciprocally contrasting, the vital disposition
of searching and the goal remain the same (Socrates’s σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν
ἀλήθειαν is not that far away from the initial περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία). The fact
that Socrates characterizes his method around the notion of a λόγος chosen as
strongest (100a), and an indeterminate plurality of λόγοι which may or not agree
with it and with each other, suggests interesting connections with later formula-
tions of Plato’s method of dialectic (such as Rep. VI–VII, Phaedrus 265–266), as
well as with some other anticipations of it (cf. the ambivalence of the idea of a
τέχνη λόγων in the Gorgias, and Socrates’s description of his method in Crito
43b–e in terms that look forward to the Phaedo). But it is fair to conclude that
Plato’s view of philosophy as knowledge of the nature of things and a rational
method of explanation also strongly recalls Heraclitus’s words and outlook.54

NOTES
1. For this point, see Laks 2002. Although Heraclitus DK22 B35 is often quoted in this
connection, the words φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας in that text are probably Clement’s,
not Heraclitus’s; cf. Marcovich 1967. If these words were truly from Heraclitus, we
would be facing the earliest use recorded in Greek, and a hapax legomenon in the
pre-Socratic tradition. The story in Diogenes Laertius (I, 12; VIII, 8 from Heraclides
Ponticus) that Pythagoras called himself φιλόσοφος is more likely an elaboration
built on Plato (cf. Phaedrus 278d) than a historically reliable anecdote. I refer to all
fragments of the pre-Socratics by Diels-Kranz numbering.
2. Cf. Met. 986b14, 989b31, 990a3, 992b5, 1023a21, 1062b22, 1067a6, 1071b27, 1078b19;
Phys. 184b17, 187a12, 203b15, 205a5, 26, 206b23, 213b1, 265a3; Pol. 1335b1, De gener.
animalium 741b10, 742a1, 742a16, 756b17, 763b31, 769a7, 778b7; De anima 426a20;
De caelo 297a14; Eth. Eud. 1235a10; Eth. Nic. 1147b9, 1154b7; De partibus animalium
641a7, 647a11; Poet. 1447b19; De sensu et sensibilibus, 441b2, 442a30.
3. It’s instructive to note how much Plato’s Phaedo is in the back of Aristotle’s mind
throughout Metaphysics A. Cf. 983b13–15 (Σωκράτης μουσικός), 984b15–19
(νήφων Ἀναξαγόρας), 985a18–21: Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ
νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν
γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν. 991b3–4: ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς καὶ τοῦ
εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν. Cf. 983a1–2 about platonic anamnesis:
θαυμαστὸν πῶς λανθάνομεν ἔχοντες τὴν κρατίστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
4. Pace Calvo’s (2000, pp. 37–38) contention that “the definitive consummation—and
the farthest-reaching philosophically—of this distinction between beings that
belong to nature and beings that do not” takes place already in Plato, supported by
a reference to Philebus 58e–59a. I doubt that this really is the right application of
Heraclitus on Фύσις 189

the term φύσις at 59a2 (εἴ τε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις ζητεῖν) or that φύσις
refers to the “realm of generated things,” especially in view of the characterization of
eternal being at 58a2–3 as τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς
πάντως.
5. Metaphysics, Γ 1005a34: ἓν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις. 1005b1–2: . . . ἔστι
δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρώτη. I am simplifying, for Aristotle uses
the term in various senses; cf. Met. Δ 1014b16 ss., where it’s noteworthy the semantic
ambivalence in the definition of φύσις as ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν
φύσει ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχει, 1014b.20–21. Translations into English
are my own, unless otherwise specified.
6. Met. A, 981b 28–29: . . . τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ
τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες.
7. Plato had made good metaphysical use of the term in the divided line (Resp. VI
510b–c), where the objects of knowledge are identified as ἀρχαί. Among the pre-
Socratics the exception could be Anaximander, arguably credited by Simplicius with
the introduction of the term ἀρχή, which couldn’t have meant the same as in Aristotle;
cf. Kirk in KR pp.107–8, and Calvo 2000: 24–7. The only pre-Socratic who actually
uses the terms ἀρχαί and ἀρχή in the sense intended by Aristotle is Philolaus (B6
and B13). On Philolaus’s use of the term, see Huffman 1993: 78–92.
8. For instance, Met. 983b10–13: . . . τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι
μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν
ὄντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς
τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης. (Italics indicate typical Aristotelian
terms, while the heavier type shows a language closer to the originals.) See Met. Δ
1014b16–1015a19 for a wider range of meanings which cover different shades of
both Aristotelian matter and form.
9. These obviously do not include the commonly attributed title περὶ φύσεως to any
of the pre-Socratic writings, which is a post-Aristotelian practice. On the meaning
of φύσις, cf. Lovejoy 1909 and Calvo 2000.
10. DK28 B10, vv. 1 and 5, and B16.
11. DK31 B8, vv. 1 and 4; B63.4; B110.5.
12. DK68 B21, B33, B168, B176, B183, B242, B267, B277, B278, B297 (B300,17.5).
13. DK44 B1, B6, B9, B11.
14. DK64 B2.
15. See, however, Theophrastus apud Simplicius Phys. 9, 24, 17 (DK12 A9) ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν
τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον and the parallel passage in Hippolytus Ref. I 6, 1–2 (DK12 A11)
φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου, which might reflect Anaximander’s language (in spite of
the impression one gets from Aristotle Phys. 203a16–18: οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως πάντες
[ἀεὶ] ὑποτιθέασιν ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων).
16. But cf. φύονται in DK21 B29, πέφυκε in B32, and ἔφυσε in B38.
17. Od. 10.303–306.
18. DK22 B22: Perhaps it’s just a mere coincidence, but the letters marked in heavy type
at the final phrase καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον (keeping the hard breathing over the
upsilon together with the kappa) form an anagram of the word χρυσόν, “gold,” a
190 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

point noticed by Mouraviev (2002: 292–4, with further reference to B123, B30, and
B52, and 2006, ii ad F22) and a remarkable literary move to which I’ll return later.
19. Compare the richness of the language and the style with the much flatter DK22 B35
(χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι, where only
the words in heavy type can be reasonably attributed to Heraclitus, see note 1, above).
Notice that a seemingly shared axiological context is also present in DK22 B9: ὄνους
σύρματα ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἤ χρυσόν (“Asses would rather have sweepings than
gold”) and B90: πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα, καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων, ὅκωσπερ
χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός (“All things are an exchange for fire
and fire for all things, just as wares for gold and gold for wares”). Mouraviev (2006)
keeps ἀνταμείβεται (“are exchanged”) from the mss. of Plutarch, instead of Diels’s
ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ, without change in the sense.
20. Cf. Curd 2004: 42–8.
21. I don’t take into account the Derveni papyrus in my approach, since I’m not convinced
that the quotations of B3 and B94 form a continuous genuine Heraclitean fragment
including the phrase κατὰ φύσιν linking them. Cf. Hülsz Piccone 2012.
22. I quote the text of B106 following Mouraviev’s reconstruction (his Fragment 106);
he argues for the authenticity of the reference to Hesiod’s lucky and unlucky days,
reestablishes the saying to direct style and makes a couple of sensible additions. At
the very least, the words in italics seem immune to objections about authenticity
(put in direct style, φύσις ἡμέρης ἁπάσης μία ἐστι).
23. DK22 B57: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος· τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα
εἰδέναι, ὅστις ἡμέρην καὶ εὐφρόνην οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἕν (“Teacher of
most [men] is Hesiod. Him they recognize as knowing plenty, he who didn’t know day
and night, for they are one”). Mouraviev’s version differs only slightly in punctuation,
and keeps Hippolytus’s reading, εὐφροσύνην. Further implicit criticism of Hesiod’s
good daemons (extending to Theognis’s 165 evil ones) may be perhaps implied by
B119: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.
24. It will be noticed that contraries appear concretely, and that opposition in the level
of the expressive form mirrors its contents.
25. B40, in opposition to νόος, and B129, where it is coupled with another neologism,
κακοτεχνίη, both predicated of the false wisdom of Pythagoras.
26. Or, at least, near the beginning. That fragment DK22 B1 is the ἀρχή of the book
relies on the authority of Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus, and is widely accepted
(Mouraviev’s ordering [2009 and 2011], where it is the tenth fragment in the sequence,
preceded by B50 among other texts, is one exception). Some scholars have held that
at least DK22 B114 and B2 (in that order) could belong together near here as well.
27. I quote DK22 B1 in Marcovich’s reading, keeping the punctuation in my translation
at the minimum. Mouraviev’s version excludes ἕκαστον from the quotation, based
on Hippolytus’s reading.
28. For a more detailed interpretation of Heraclitus’s λόγος, see Hülsz Piccone 2011.
29. On this point, I side with Mouraviev 2006: iii.
30. Cf. for ἀληθέα DK22 B1 (λανθάνω and ἐπιλανθάνω in the last sentence), and
notice ἄριστος, ἄριστοι in B49 and B29, for ἀρετή.
Heraclitus on Фύσις 191

31. Cf. B2 ἰδίη φρόνησις, B114 ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας, B113 τὸ φρονεῖν, B116 γινώσκειν
ἑαυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.
32. Cf. B129: ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην; σοφόν in B32, B41, B50, B108.
33. Cf. B1, καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων, B48, ὄνομα-ἔργον, B73, ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.
34. See Mouraviev 2006: i–iii ad F112.
35. Which is in ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction.
36. Again κατὰ φύσιν (and καὶ ποιεῖν) in complex ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction: ἀληθέα
λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν / καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν / κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας.
37. See Mouraviev 2002: 293 and 2006: ii. This is a remarkable fact, which implies a writ-
ten book, since the anagram could only be visually perceived. There’s no question the
anagram is in the text, so the issue at hand is if this is due to deliberate design and
not to mere chance. All things considered, I believe that the probability of the first
alternative outweighs that of the second.
38. Compare with DK22 B16: τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς ἄν τις λάθοι (“How could that
which never sets be hidden to anyone?”), where φύσις and/or λόγος seem to be the
reference of the oblique image of a hyper-sun.
39. Cf. DK22 B87: βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλεῖ (“A stupid man
is wont to be excited at every λόγος”).
40. Graham 2003: 178.
41. Cf. DK22 B17: οὐ γὰρ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι ἐγκυρεῦσιν, οὐδὲ
μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι (“Many men don’t understand
such things as they encounter, nor do they know them after having learned, but they
believe they do”).
42. Ibid., 175. There is a personification of φύσις in Epicharmus (DK23 B4) that might
be an echo of Heraclitus; see Hülsz Piccone 2010.
43. Phaedo 96a6–8: ἐγὼ γάρ . . . νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς
σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. The passage goes on up to 101d.
44. 96a9–10: εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί
ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι.
45. 98a10–98b1: πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ
τοιάδε. Note the Heraclitean echo of DK22 B60.
46. Popular with post-Aristotelian doxographers, the word ἱστορία is not a frequent one
among Presocratic authors. Interestingly, in fact, within the philosophical tradition
proper, it occurs only in Heraclitus (DK22 B129; B35 uses ἵστορας), but is absent
from the original fragments of all others (from Anaximander to Diogenes of Apol-
lonia). There are only three uses of ἱστορία in Plato: besides the one under focus
here, see Crat. 437b and Phaedr. 244c.
47. Phaedo 96b 2–8: Ἆρ’ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ,
ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ
φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ’ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ
τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων
δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν,
κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; (“Are living beings nurtured when some pu-
192 Enrique Hülsz Piccone

trefaction takes on the hot and the cold, as some say? And whether that with which
we think is the blood, or air, or fire? Or none of these, but rather the brain is that
which supplies us with the perceptions of hearing, seeing and smelling, and from
these come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion that has taken on
stillness, by these things knowledge is produced?”). It is at least conceivable that the
obscure reference at 96b8 might be to digestion of food and sustenance of life in an
already existent living being, rather than to the origin of the first animals and life
itself—with which, however, the name of Archelaus has been often connected by
editors and commentators, following Burnet’s notes. The pair of the hot and the cold
as contrary originative powers is quite common (Melissus B8, Anaxagoras B8, B12,
Diogenes B5, Democritus B9, etc.) and could go as far back as Anaximander (DK12
A10); it is already documented as early as Heraclitus (DK22 B126).The best candidate
for the blood as the organ of thought is Empedocles (DK31 B105), while Diogenes of
Apollonia certainly held the identity of air and thought (DK64 B4: ἄνθρωποι γὰρ καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα ζῶια ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῶι ἀέρι. καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ
νόησις). In spite of the common opinion to the contrary, as far as the most reliable
evidence goes, Heraclitus didn’t hold that we think with fire (the notion of a humid
fire in DK22 B117 makes no sense at all, and B118: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη
καὶ ἀρίστη doesn’t really back up that attribution, nor is it made more likely by the
immediate context of B64–65: λέγει δὲ καὶ φρόνιμον τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πῦρ καὶ τῆς
διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ “χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον.” But
cf. Mouraviev, Heraclitea III.3.B, who includes the underlined words in Hippolytus
as fragment 63A in his edition). Although it would take more argument than I can
afford here, the frequent interpretative identification of ψυχαί / ψυχή with fire on
the basis of B36 is certainly questionable and possibly false. The theory alluded to
might refer to Empedocles or even Parmenides. Alcmaeon of Croton is probably the
alluded author of the theory of the brain as supplier of perceptions; as for the view
about knowledge as a process developing in distinct stages from perceptions, memory
and a (stabilized) opinion, until it reaches its truer and fuller form and becomes
knowledge proper, it looks decidedly Platonic (although bits and pieces may come
from different origins) and provides the backbone of the first chapter of Aristotle’s
Met. A.
48. 96b8–c1: καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε
καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη. Further illustrations include mathematical-ontological puzzles
about unity and duality, and their becoming such (96e–97b, possibly with reference
to Zeno of Elea); the phrase looks forward to cosmological-astronomical references
to Anaxagoras’s theory of Nous (98b–99b), and (anonymously and obliquely) to
astronomical theories of Empedocles, Anaximander (97e, 99b) and Anaximenes
(97e, 99d).
49. τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι ὡς
οὐδὲν χρῆμα, 96c1–2. Compare Arist. Metaph. 987b: Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ
ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν.
50. 96c2–7: τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς
ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς
Heraclitus on Фύσις 193

σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ
ᾤμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ κ.τ.λ.
51. 97b3–7.
52. δεύτερος πλοῦς, 99c9–d1.
53. 99d4–100a9: Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἦ δ’ ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τὰ
ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα
θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι
τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ.
τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοήθην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν
τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν
αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους
καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν
ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς]
λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν [τοῖς]
ἔργοις. ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν
ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι
ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων [ὄντων], ἃ
δ’ ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι
γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα (“Well,
said he, it seemed to me next, since I wearied looking at the things that are, I must
take care that I didn’t suffer what happens to those who watch and look at the sun
during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes, unless they look at its image on
water or something of that sort. I too had something like this in mind, and I feared
that I could become blinded in my soul by looking at things with my eyes and trying
to apprehend them by each of the senses. So it seemed to me I ought to have recourse
to logoi and in them look at the truth of the things that are. Perhaps I compare this
in an unfitting way. For in no way do I agree that he who looks in logoi at the things
that are, looks at them in images more than he who [looks at them] in facts. But this
is how I started, and hypothesizing each time that logos which I pick out as being the
strongest, the things which seem to me to agree with it I put forward as true, about
the cause as well as about all other things [that are], and those which do not [agree
with it, I lay down] as not true. I want to make it clearer to you what I say. For I think
now you don’t get it. I don’t, by Zeus, said Cebes, not by far”).
54. The presence of Heraclitean ideas in previous passages of the Phaedo has been widely
recognized at least in the first argument on immortality (the so-called “cyclic argu-
ment”). I’ve suggested elsewhere (Hülsz Piccone 2003) that the Heraclitean idea of
human unawareness of the immediately manifest reality (i.e., generalized epistemic
negligence about λόγος and φύσις) might well be a motif in Platonic recollection,
already in the Meno.

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