OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V.

OSCAR MALAPITAN

G.R. NO. G.R. NO. 229811, APRIL 28, 2021, THIRD DIVISION (LEONEN, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The condonation doctrine was abandoned on April 12, 2016, when Carpio Morales v. Court of
Appeals attained finality. Nonetheless, despite its abandonment, the doctrine can still apply to
pending administrative cases provided that the reelection is also before the abandonment. As for
cases filed after April 12, 2016, the impleaded public official can no longer resort to the
condonation doctrine.

FACTS

Malapitan was the Caloocan City First District Representative from 2004 to 2007. He was
reelected from 2007 to 2010 and again from 2010 to 2013. In 2013, he became the Caloocan City
mayor, and was reelected in 2016. He was reelected again in 2019 which makes him the
incumbent mayor of Caloocan.

On February 16, 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman's Public Assistance and Corruption
Prevention Office filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against Malapitan. The complaint arose from the allegedly anomalous use
of Malapitan's Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) worth P8,000,000.00 committed
in 2009 during his reign as district representative.

The criminal complaint also contained an administrative charge for grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service against three officials.
Malapitan was not impleaded in the administrative complaint. On January 22, 2016, the Public
Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office filed a Motion to Admit Attached Amended
Complaint, asking that Malapitan be impleaded in the administrative complaint after he had been
inadvertently left out as a respondent. On February 22, 2016, the Office of the Ombudsman's
Task Force PDAF granted the motion.

The denial of Malapitan’s Motion for Reconsideration prompted him to

file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA). On August 31,
2016, the CA granted the Petition. It revisited the history of the condonation doctrine in
jurisprudence until it was abandoned in Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals on November 10,
2015. It pointed out that such abandonment applied prospectively. It then ruled that since
Malapitan's alleged misconduct was committed in 2009, the condonation doctrine is applicable.

The Office of the Ombudsman contends that the condonation doctrine was not applicable to
Malapitan since it was already abandoned in Carpio Morales. Furthermore, the said doctrine
should no longer be applied to cases that are still pending before its abandonment.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

(1) Did the CA err in ruling that the condonation doctrine is applicable to Malapitan?

(2) Did the CA err in ruling on the administrative liability of Malapitan when the latter raised the
issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman when it grated the
Motion to Admit Attached Amended Complaint?

RULING
(1) NO. Since the act constituting the administrative offense was allegedly

committed in 2009, and he was reelected in 2010, the condonation doctrine would still apply.

In Crebello v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court declared the exact date of the
abandonment of the condonation doctrine:

“The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation took

effect on April 12, 2016, when the Supreme Court denied with finality the OMB's Motion for
Reconsideration in Morales v. Court of Appeals.”

Here, the amended administrative complaint was admitted on February 22, 2016; hence, the
condonation doctrine was not yet abandoned. The alleged acts imputed to respondent were
supposedly committed in 2009. He was reelected as member of the House of Representatives in
2010. This immediately succeeding victory is what the condonation doctrine looks at. That
respondent was later reelected in 2013, 2016, and 2019 would be irrelevant.

Although the administrative complaint was filed against respondent after the 2010 elections, it
would not change the fact that the alleged act was committed in 2009, and the electorate
reelected him in 2010, the immediately succeeding election.

The Court took the opportunity to clarify the effect of Carpio Morales. In Crebello, the Court
upheld the Office of the Ombudsman's argument that since the abandonment became effective
only on April 12, 2016, "it would no longer apply the defense of condonation starting on April
12, 2016 except for open and pending administrative cases." Thus, after Carpio Morales became
final, the condonation doctrine's applicability now depends on the date of the filing of the
complaint, not the date of the commission of the offense. Had the case been filed against
Malapitan on April 13, 2016, for instance, he could no longer rely on the condonation doctrine.

However, since the case was filed in January 2016, and was admitted in February 2016, it was
already an open case by the time the condonation doctrine was abandoned.

(2) NO. Generally, courts are limited to the issues raised by the parties before it. However, since
Malapitan invoked the condonation doctrine, and it was ruled that the doctrine is applicable in
his case, then there the CA did not err.
For administrative cases filed after April 12, 2016, the date when the condonation doctrine was
abandoned, the rule is that courts should refrain from interfering with investigations conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman, being an independent body authorized by no less than our
Constitution and Republic Act No. 677077 to handle complaints against public officials and civil
servants.

For clarity, Malapitan is absolved only of administrative liability based on the condonation
doctrine. The Court makes no pronouncement on the criminal complaint against him.
VILLAMOR v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 169865, July 21, 2006, Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
May 13, 2004: PET VILLAMOR was proclaimed Mayor of Carmen, Cebu by Municipal Board
of Canvassers in the 2004 elections over his opponent, RESP BATAO.

May 17, 2004, RESP BATAO filed a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of PET VILLAMOR
alleging as grounds: illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings.

May 24, 2004: RESP BATAO also filed an election protest with RTC of Danao City.
 PET VILLAMOR filed his Answer to the Petition with Counter Protest

June 24, 2004: RTC of Danao City dismissed RESP BATAO’s election protest for lack of
jurisdiction because it was filed one-day late.
 Sec. 3, Rule 35 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure: Election protest should be filed within
10 days from the date of proclamation of election results.
 PET VILLAMOR was proclaimed on May 13, 2004, RESP BATAO had until May 23 to
file an election protest, but he only filed the same on May 24.

July 23, 2004: RESP BATAO’s Motion for Reconsideration was granted by RTC of Danao City
because it found that the election protest was actually filed on time.
 Since the last day to file the protest fell on May 23 which was a Sunday, thus, under Sec.
1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the time should not run until the next working day
which was May 24.

PET VILLAMOR appealed the RTC Order to the COMELEC.

 COMELEC Second Division dismissed PET VILLAMOR’s appeal for lack of merit.
Also, COMELEC En Banc denied PET VILLAMOR’s MR.

May 9, 2005: COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution, dismissing RESP BATAO’s
Petition to Annul the Proclamation of PET VILLAMOR.

ISSUE and RATIO:

(1) W/N the trial court prematurely admitted RESP BATAO’s election protest pending a pre-
proclamation controversy- YES

SC: As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto.
  The filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the
abandonment of one earlier filed.
o In such case, COMELEC is already deprived of the authority to inquire into and
pass upon the title of or the validity of the protestee’ proclamation.
 The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.

SC: However, not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the
period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto.
 ITC, RESP BATAO’s Petition to Annul the Proclamation rested mainly on the alleged
illegal composition of the municipal board of canvassers and its proceedings which is an
issue that may be properly raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.
o Par. (b) of Sec. 5, Rule 27 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure: If the petition
involves the illegal composition of the board of canvassers, it must be filed
immediately when the board begins to act as such, or at the time of the
appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it
comes after the canvassing of the board, or immediately at the point where the
proceedings are or begin to be illegal.

In Laodenio v. Commission on Elections, Court ruled that when case involves illegal
composition of the Board, it cannot be questioned after proclamation of the winner:
“Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5 par. (a)(1) of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure also allow filing of a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the
issue involves the illegal composition of the Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule
requires that it must be filed immediately when the Board begins to act as such, or at
the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to
if it comes after the canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where the
proceedings are or begin to be illegal.

ITC, RESP BATAO’s Petition to Annul PET VILLAMOR’s proclamation based on the alleged
illegal composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should
have been filed prior to PET VILLAMOR’s proclamation.
 However, RESP BATAO filed the petition on May 17 only or 4 days after PET
VILLAMOR’s proclamation.
 SC: As such, RESP BATAO’s filing of the Petition to Annul the Proclamation of PET
VILLAMOR did not suspend the running of the reglementary period within which to file
an election protest and inevitably, it did not suspend the latter's period to file an Answer
with Counter Protest.
Accordingly, the subsequent filing of the election protest on May 24 by RESP BATAO
amounted to the abandonment of the pre-proclamation controversy earlier filed.
(2) W/N trial court can act on a motion for reconsideration in an election protest- NO

PET VILLAMOR asserts that a motion for reconsideration of the election protest filed by RESP
BATAO was a prohibited pleading thus its filing did not toll the running of the period to appeal.
 Consequently, when RESP BATAO failed to appeal within 5 days from the June 24
Order of RTC of Danao City, the dismissal of the election protest became final.

RESP BATAO alleges that a motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited pleading and claims
that even if the motion was not filed, the RTC of Danao City could reinstate the petition motu
proprio before the said order became final.

SC: We agree with PET VILLAMOR.

Under Sec. 256 of Omnibus Election Code, the trial court cannot entertain a motion for
reconsideration of its decision in an election contest affecting municipal officers filed by the
aggrieved party.
 Aggrieved party, however, may appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
COMELEC) within 5 days after the receipt of a copy of the decision.

Sec. 19, Rule 35 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure, implementing Sec. 256 provides:
“Sec. 19. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the Court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall
become final five (5) days after its promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.”

ITC, RESP BATAO received the Order dismissing her election protest for lack of jurisdiction on
June 25, 2004. Thus, she had until June 30 within which to file an appeal with the COMELEC
but failed to do so.
 Instead, RESP BATAO filed a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.
As such, it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.

In Veloria v. COMELEC, a case involving candidates for municipal mayor, vice-mayor, and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, who instead of perfecting an
appeal within 5 days as provided by law, filed a motion for reconsideration, we held that:
“The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners in the trial court on March 20, 1990 did not suspend the period to appeal
since a "motion for reconsideration" is prohibited under Sec. 256 of Omnibus Election
Code. x x x Said resolution had become final and unappealable.”