People of Bhopal, capital town of the Indian state Madhya Pradesh, were sleeping

through a cold, intervening night on 2nd and 3rd December1984. Nothing was out
of ordinary and the night seemed like any other silent, shivering, winter night of
the region. But that was only superficial. Somewhere, in the eastern part of the
city, something nightmarish was happening inside a pesticide plant of the Union
Carbide India Limited (UCIL).

An industrial disaster of incomparable magnitude was about to happen. The

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) plant was established in 1969. 51% was owned
by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and 49% by Indian authorities. The factory
used to produce a pesticide which UCIL had branded as Sevin. A chemical called
Methyl isocyanate (MIC) was used for producing this pesticide. Therefore, the
factory stored a large amount of MIC inside its premises.

On December 2, 1984, it was a routine day at the UCIL factory. MIC was stored in
an underground tank. The pipeline washing started at 9:30 p.m.as a routine
maintenance operation. Between 10:30 - 11:00 p.m, workers engaged in pipeline
washing became aware of a leak. However, nothing was done considering it a
normal leak. By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of
minor exposure to MIC gas and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45
p.m. and reported to the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. A decision was
made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime,
employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. In the five minutes after
the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the pressure in the MIC tank rocketed up to 55
Psi, water had begun to leak into tank E610 containing 42 tones of MIC.

The resulting exothermic reaction increased the temperature inside the tank to
over 200°C (392 °F). One worker witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack.
About 12: 50 a.m., the emergency relief valve burst open and large quantities of
MIC gas leaked into the atmosphere. The workers at the factory realized the risk
of a massive disaster. They tried to activate the safety systems available at the
factory at about 12:50 a.m. There were 3 safety systems: first, was the vent gas
scrubber, which was considered the mainline of defense. The scrubber was
supposed to spray causticsoda on escaping vapours to neutralize the MIC.
However, It was not in an operational condition. Then, the workers tried Turning
on the flare tower to burn off toxic gas. This system was also not in working
condition as a piece of the pipeline leading to the tower had been corroded and
had not been replaced.

The workers then tried Transferring the MIC from the tank into a nearby spare
tank. The gauge of the spare tank indicated that the tank already contained
something. This gauge indicator was found defective, later on. After the failure in
all the three safety systems, the workers attempted to douse the leaking gas with
water spray. The water spray reached a height of 100 ft. from the ground, while
the leak was at 120 ft. above the ground. At 1.00 a.m., the workers realized that
nothing could be done to stop the leak. Most residents of Bhopal were sleeping
when the gas began to leak. Many woke up only because they heard their
children coughing or found themselves choking on the fumes. As people jumped
up from their beds, they felt their eyes and throat burning.

Some choked on their own bile. Others fell to the ground in contortions of pain.
As on three sides, the UCIL plant was-surrounded by slums and other poor
settlements, the people living in these colonies were the worst sufferers. There
was no warning or guidance to the general public around this time. There were
two types of alarms in the factory, one mild siren for workers and one loud public
siren. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so
that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while turning off the
public one, and this is exactly what was done: the public siren briefly sounded at
12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid
alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.

The public siren was started only at about2:30 a.m. Since the gas leaked out from
a 30-meter chimney, it was not high enough for the people to escape the effects.
It was not long before that the entire city was enveloped by an invisible but
extremely toxic gas. People who were cozily lying inside their home a few minutes
ago; they now began to feel suffocation, cough, and burning eyes and vomiting.
Streets became crowded with people running here and there for help. The chaos
went on throughout the night. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the
patients, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas
was involved and what its effects were. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were
littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds.

About 3,000 people died immediately on that night and another 6,000 died in the
next one week. Yet another 15-20,000 people died over a longer period of time
due to effects of the poisonous gas. Still, about 500,000 people were directly or
indirectly affected with 38,000 temporary partial and roughly 3,900 permanently
disabling injuries. Investigations into the tragedy showed that there were many
shortcomings at all levels. The UCIL factory used three tanks to store68,000 liters
of liquid MIC and it was to be kept under pressure using inert nitrogen which
helped the pumping of MIC when needed and also kept impurities at bay.

The safety regulations specified that a maximum50% of the tank should be used
for storage and the MIC was to be stored at 0 degree Celsius at all times to keep it
inert. But the storage tanks at the UCIL were filled much over the specified limit of
50% and moreover the refrigeration system used to maintain the temperature of
liquid MIC was not in working condition since January 1982, due to cost-cutting
measure.

The Mic was kept at 15-20 degree Celsius instead of the recommended 0 degree
Celsius. In the last days, October 1984, the tank E610 lost its ability to maintain
the nitrogen pressure which halted the production of MIC in the plant. The
production was soon started again despite a failed attempt of the
reestablishment of the system. Moreover, the UCIL factory did not have much
information about the safe storage of these highly toxic gases. The medical
fraternity did not have the requisite know how to deal with such kind of
contamination and at this scale.

There was a lack of coordination between the factory and emergency services.
There were also not many trained professionals in that factory. Cost-cutting had
its impact on the safety of the plant, its employees and the people living around
the plant. The plant was also in a densely populated area of the city which went
against most known norms. There have been several theories on the reason for
the entry of water into the tank.

The workers claim that because of the bad maintenance of leaking valves, it was
possible for the water to climb from the point where the pipeline washing was
performed to tank E610. While the Union Carbide said that this was not possible
and that it was an act of sabotage by a "disgruntled worker" who introduced
water directly into the tank, although there has never been any proof of this. The
most important factors leading to the mega-gas leak were plant design, the
economic pressure, and cutting back on. Though, there were early warning signs
of trouble ahead, signs that were ignored.

On December 25, 1981, a leak of phosgene killed one worker at the plant and
severely injured two others. On January 9, 1982, twenty-five workers were
hospitalized as a result of another leak at the plant. During the "safety week"
proposed by management to address worker grievances about the Bhopal facility,
repeated incidents of such toxic leakage took place and workers took the
opportunity to complain directly to the American management officials present.
The Union Carbide sent a team of US experts to conduct a routine safety audit at
the Bhopal plant.

The report, which was sent to Carbide’s US management, stated leaking valves;
“potential for the release of toxic materials;” 61hazards, 30 of which were major
and 11 of which were in the MIC/phosgene units. However, nothing was done to
address the report’s suggestions; instead remedial measures were then taken at
Union Carbide’s identical MIC plant in West Virginia, USA, but not in Bhopal.

In August 1982, a chemical engineer suffered30% burns over his body on coming
in contact with liquid MIC. Several leaks occurred between 1982-1984 which were
largely ignored. In the wake of these incidents, workers at the plant demanded
hazardous duty pay scales commensurate with the fact that they were required to
handle hazardous substances. All of the requests were denied as a result it leads
to the worst industrial disaster of all time. On December 7, 1984, Warren
Anderson, the CEO of Union Carbide, was arrested in Bhopal but later released on
bail upon a promise to return.
 In December 1987, the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a charge sheet
against Anderson and other accused. In 2003, the ministry of external affairs sent
a request to the United States for Anderson’s extradition. However, this and
further requests were turned down. Warren Anderson never returned to India
and lived a comfortable life in the Hamptons until his death in 2014. In June 2010,
seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in
Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment
and a fine of about $2,000 each. An eighth former employee was also convicted
but died before judgment was passed.

A compensation of nearly 470 million USD was paid by the union carbide to the
government of India but legal delays including identifying the victims slowed the
payout rate to a crawl. The only memorial ever built in Bhopal was privately
funded, designed by a daughter of Holocaust victim. In bold letters, the inscription
reads, “No Hiroshima, No Bhopal, We Want To Live.” Many years down the road
after the Bhopal disaster in 1984, some basic clean-up efforts had taken place but
a lot of the contamination is still there. The local people have to live with this
environmental pollution every single day. More than 100 thousand people are still
suffering from the debilitating effects of the gas which includes respiratory
problems, cancer, congenital birth defects, blindness and many other diseases.

It has resulted in many children being born with genetic defects and mutations
and mental retardation. It has also had a long term impact on the reproductive
cycle of affected women and the quality of their breast milk. Besides the effects
on people, the impact it has on the environment of that area is also far-reaching.
There are still hundreds of tons of toxic waste alone, which could lead to a
continuous poisoning of the soil as well as groundwater. Some areas in and
around the factory are still so polluted that someone entering that area is likely to
lose consciousness in less than ten minutes.

In November 1999, International environment watchdog Greenpeace tested soil,

groundwater and wells in and around the Union Carbide factory and found 12
volatile organic chemicals and mercury in quantities up to six million times higher
than expected. While the Bhopal disaster has certainly received the lot of
international attention, not much progress has been achieved to improve people's
lives in the area. The tragedy is a burning example of one of the deadliest disaster
caused by human negligence in the maintenance. I hope I've shed some light on
the event and the aftermath of the disaster.