Case study on

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

By
Insp/Exe P.Jagadish Chandra
Case Study : Bhopal Gas Tragedy
 Structure of the Presentation
Structure of the Presentation
Industrial scenario in developing countries and double
standards of transnational companies
Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Union Carbide Corporation
Equipment and Safety Regulations/Norms
UCC Approach – Key Problems
Safety Measures in UCC plants - the USA and India
Legal Action Against Union Carbide
Conclusion
Lessons Learnt
 Double Standards of Transnational Companies

f The companies use differing standards in Developed and

Developing countries
• Different labour norms in its overseas operations
• Exploiting the weak legal system in host country
• Non-disclosure or compliance of environment policy
• Weak safety norms and improper implementation
• Exporting chemical wastes to other countries
 The Plant
Operator : Union Carbide India Ltd.
Half owned by Union Carbide USA (50.9%)
Plant built to produce carbonyl pesticide : SEVIN
Very successful initially - part of India’s Green Revolution
Initial staff 1000
Bhopal is a large central India
city, the Madhya Pradesh state
capital.
1961 population: 102,000
1981 population: 896,000
•Much of this growth came
from migration from
surrounding rural areas.
•Many migrants could not
afford city housing and became
squatters, creating slums and
shantytowns(slums).
•By 1984, Bhopal had 156
slum colonies were there.
 The Surroundings

Initially in quiet
suburb

Later the town

expanded around it
 Case Study:
The Bhopal Plant Disaster
• Massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide India
Limited (UCIL) chemical plant at Bhopal in December,
1984.
• Thousands killed and hundreds of thousands injured by
40 ton release of methyl iso cyanate (MIC).
• The escaping gas quickly spread in a fog like cloud
over a highly populated area of about 7 to 8 kms
mostly to the south and east of the plant.
• Caused by unsafe conditions and series of failures in
poorly maintained and understaffed plant.
VIEW OF MOUNDED MIC STORAGE TANKS FROM GROUND LEVEL
VIEW OF TOP OF MIC STORAGE TANKS
 Railway Station

Map of Bhopal showing gas affected areas

The Union Carbide plant located in Bhopal was owned
by Union Carbide (India) Ltd., or UCIL. Union
Carbide Corporation held 50.9% of the shares of UCIL.
The government of India owned ~25%, and 24,000
other shareholders owned the remainder.
 Two slums were located very near
the UCIL plant, in an area not
zoned for residential use. The
plant fence line can be seen in the
upper right.

Reprinted with permission from Chem. Eng. News, 63(6), p. 63.

Copyright 1985 American Chemical Society.
 Information
The Bhopal Plant
about the plant :
- Built in late 1960’s to process pesticides
- Expanded in 1970’s to add production capability
- Production cut in 1980’s due to market forces and decision to sell
plant
Ownership and Operation
- Union Carbide owned controlling share (50.9%) of UCIL
- Plant managed and staffed locally by UCIL
Climate
- Plant initially welcomed at Bhopal for its economic potential
- Located 2 miles from city center; surrounding population
expanded significantly between construction and disaster
- Government classified plant as “general” (not “hazardous”)
industry in 1976, even after approving MIC-based processes at
plant and establishing a “hazardous industry” zone which is to be
15 miles away from city
 Union Carbide Corporation
Started in 1969 in Bhopal, situated at the northern edge of
Bhopal city.
Phosgene, Monomethlyamine, Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) and
the pesticide Carbaryl, also known as Sevin were
manufactured here.
Gas leakage from its facility in 1984.
Taken over by DOW Chemicals in 2001.
DOW refused Union Carbide’s Liabilities in Bhopal, India.
The company still operates under the ownership of Dow
Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal
disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage".
Toxic Materials in Soil and Water
 The Disaster: Contributing Factors
Human Error
- Critical isolation valve not closed before pipes were
flushed with water, causing the fatal pressurization of
tank containing MIC.
-Flare for flame neutralization of escaping gas was shut
down
Inadequate Safety Equipment
-Reach of sprayer for water neutralization of escaping
gas was inadequate. Plant managers were aware of
deficiency.
-Flare system lacked capacity for major gas leak.
Failure of Safety Equipment
- Stack scrubber, activated by operator during leak,
failed.
.
Poor Maintenance
-Tank refrigerators inoperable
-Blockage in pipes meant to drain
water that pressurized tank
-The gas leaked from a 30 m high chimney and
this height was not enough to reduce the
effects of the discharge
 The Disaster: Contributing Factors
(cont.)
Inadequate Staffing
- Union-Carbide-trained supervisors had left Bhopal by 1984
- Staffing in MIC unit had been cut below half of
recommended level
- Second-shift maintenance supervisor position eliminated
weeks before disaster
Lack of Evacuation Plans
- Visiting Union Carbide engineers repeatedly stressed need for
a plan to alert and evacuate population in the event of a gas
leak
- UCIL claimed to have developed such plans
- City and state officials claimed no knowledge of such plans
Inadequate Response
-Warning siren activated upon leak, but only
for a few minutes
-Public response panicked, evacuation slow
and uncoordinated
-Response of medical workers hampered by
lack of info about MIC
 Equipment and safety regulations
Unlike Union Carbide plants in the USA, its Indian
subsidiary plants were not prepared for problems.
 No action plans had been established to cope with
incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing
local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals
used and manufactured at Bhopal.
The flare tower itself was improperly designed and could
only hold one-quarter of the volume of gas that was leaked
in 1984.
To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system, designed
to inhibit the volatilization of MIC, had been left idle—the
MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius , not the 4.5 degrees
advised by the manual, and some of the coolant was being
used elsewhere.
The steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was
out of action for unknown reasons.
Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water
from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC
tanks through faulty valves were not installed.
Their installation had been omitted from the
cleaning checklist.
The MIC tank had been malfunctioning for roughly
a week.
Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even
though they corrode when exposed to acid.
 On the night of the disaster, a leaking carbon steel
valve was found, allowing water to enter the MIC
tanks. The pipe was not repaired because it was
believed it would take too much time and be too
expensive.
 Many valves and lines were in poor condition. Tank 610 contained
42 tonnes MIC, much more than safety rules allowed i.e 20 tonnes.
 During the nights of 2–3 December, a large amount of water entered
tank 610. A runaway reaction started, which was accelerated by
contaminants, high temperatures and other factors. The reaction
generated a major increase in the temperature inside the tank to over
200°C (400°F).
 This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC
holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. The reaction
was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless
steel pipelines.
 It is known that workers cleaned pipelines with water. They were
not told by the supervisor to add a slip-blind water isolation plate.
Because of this, and of the bad maintenance.
 UCC maintains that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connected a
hose to a pressure gauge.
 UCC's investigation team found no evidence of the suggested
connection.[
Map of Bhopal showing gas affected areas
 Bhopal Gas Tragedy – Sad Statistics

Happened in the night of 2nd & 3rd December

1984 when a pesticide plant of Union Carbide
India Limited’s (UCIL) spewed about forty to
forty five tons of highly lethal MIC gas in
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India.
One of the worst industrial disaster in human
history
Among people, who were exposed to the gas:
-25,000 people died
-558,125 injured
 Scrubber systems are a diverse group of air pollution control devices that
can be used to remove some particulates and/or gases from industrial
exhaust streams.

Gas Vent Scrubber Gas Vent Scrubber Stack

Haphazard Dumping of Hazardous Material
BHOPAL : THE LESSONS OF
A TRAGEDY
BHOPAL:THE LESSONS
OF A TRAGEDY
BHOPAL : THE LESSONS OF
A TRAGEDY
BHOPAL : THE LESSONS OF
A TRAGEDY
 Legal Hassle – 1984 to Till date

The cases are still pending in the district court of United States, and also
in the District Court of Bhopal, India, on the employees, including
Warren Anderson who was CEO of UCC at the time of the disaster.
Seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were
convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to
two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the
maximum punishment allowed by law in June 2010.
One former employee who was also convicted died before judgment was
passed.
 UCC Approach – Key Problems
The various problems in the plant that were ignored:
The alarms of MIC tank had not worked since past four years
Only single manual back-up system as compared to USA where four-
stage system was used
The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for
five months before the disaster due to which flare tower could only hold
a quarter of the gas that leaked during the incidence
The refrigeration system was idle and the MIC was kept at 20 degrees
Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees as suggested by the manual
Due to absence of Slip-bound plates, the water leaked into the MIC
tanks from pipes being cleaned
Faulty valves were not installed by the operators
the MIC tank pressure gauge was not functioning properly for roughly a
week before the accident.
On the night shift, no maintenance supervisor was in place to record
instrument readings.
 Legal Action Against Union Carbide

December 1984: Legal proceedings were started against UCC, the

United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities.
March 1985: Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in
March 1985, making the GOI to act as the legal representative for
victims of the disaster that helped in leading to the beginning of legal
proceedings.
1985: The US government called for inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, by
Henry Waxman, a Californian Democrat.
March 1986: UCC offered a settlement figure, providing a fund for
Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million over a period of 20 years
May 1986: US District Court transferred the litigation to Indian courts
from US.
 Legal action against Union Carbide

1988: US$ 350 million was claimed by The Government of

India from UCC.
November 1988: Indian Supreme Court told both sides to
come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate".
1989: UCC agreed to pay US$ 470 million for damages
caused in the Bhopal disaster.
October 2003: The Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and
Rehabilitation Department awarded the compensation to
5,54,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of
those killed.
June 2010: 7 ex-employees of the company were sentenced
to two years imprisonment and fined Rs. 1 lakh approx 2000$.
The UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the
pesticide Sevin (UCC's brand name for carbaryl)
using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate.
 A MIC production plant was added in 1979.
 After the Bhopal plant was built, other
manufacturers, including Bayer, produced carbaryl
without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing
cost.
Bayer also used the UCC process at the chemical
plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West
Virginia, in the United States.
 Conclusion
All the disasters that occurred in developed countries were neither due to
the managerial operations nor due to the safety regulations.
However these were the biggest component in the Bhopal gas tragedy as
the  management gave only lip service to process and personnel safety
and the governments did not ensure compliance with the regulations.  
There is a need for the improvements in method of safety.
New legislation, stricter enforcement and personnel training should be in
place.
Elementary R&D is needed in the causes of accidents and in
industrialized processes used in the chemical process industries.
All the stakeholders need to play their part in building a safety culture.
 Lessons Learnt
National governments and international agencies should focus on widely
applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident
prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced
industrial nations .
Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be
situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over
time.
Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local
communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to
reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial
accidents.
Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when
hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants.
 Lessons Learnt

Legislation and regulation needs to evolve in active

consultation with all stakeholders laying emphasis on
emerging requirements, and increasing standards with
appropriate emphasis on actual functioning of safety
mechanisms and inculcation of an active safety
culture.
Multinationals, by virtue of their global purpose,
organization, and resources, should be treated as
single, monolithic agents, rather than as a network of
discrete, non- interdependent units.
 BHOPAL WAS AN
EXAMPLE OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL
IRRESPONSIBILITY.
Real emergencies always
occur on Friday evenings
or over weekends…Sunday, 2
nd

Dec 1984
Thank You
The Sevin Process

SEVIN manufactured from

Carbon Monoxide (CO)
Monomethylamine (MMA) } imported by truck

Chlorine (Cl2)
Alpha-Napthol (AN) }
made on site

Process route
CO + Cl2 COCl2 (Phosgene)
COCl2 + MMA MMC + MIC
MIC stored in three 15,000 gal tanks
MIC + AN SEVIN
 Process
Plant used to produce a pesticide ‘SEVIN’.
This plant was to cater the demand of not only
India but also of East Asia.
The principal ingredients required for the
Production are alpha-napthol and methyl
isocyanate (MIC)
Company was manufacturing MIC at site
while alpha napthol was being imported.
 THE WEATHER EGGED ON THE
PROCESS…
• The high moisture content (aerosol) in the discharge when
evaporating, gave rise to a heavy gas which rapidly sank
to the ground.
• A weak wind which frequently changed direction, which
in turn helped the gas to cover more area in a shorter
period of time (about one hour).
• The weak wind and the weak vertical turbulence caused a
slow dilution of gas and thus allowed the poisonous gas to
spread over considerable distances.
 THE POSSIBLE REASONS…
• One of the main reasons for the tragedy was found
to be a result of a combination of human factors
and an incorrectly designed safety system.

• A portion of the safety equipment at the plant had

been non-operational for four months and the rest
failed.
 UNION CARBIDE’S VERSION..
• “ A disgruntled plant employee, apparently bent on
spoiling a batch of methyl isocyanate, added water
to a storage tank”.
-------B. Browning Jackson
(Vice President)
 LAPSES ON THE PART OF THE
GOVERNMENT
• The Madhya Pradesh State government had not
mandated any safety standards.
• Union Carbide failed to implement its own safety
rules.
• The Bhopal plant experienced six accidents
between 1981 and 1984, at least three of which
involved MIC or phosgene.
 WHY DID THE PEOPLE STAY
QUITE??
• The country needed pesticides to protect her
agricultural production
• MIC is used to produce pesticides that control
insects which would in turn, help increase
production of food as a part of India’s GREEN
REVOLUTION.
• Initially, India imported the MIC from the United
States.
• In an attempt to achieve industrial self-sufficiency,
India invited Union Carbide to set up a plant in the
state of Madhya Pradesh to produce methyl
isocyanate.
• To the people of the city of Bhopal, Union Carbide
was a highly respected , technically advanced
Western company.
• This coupled with political power and scientific
expertise worked together to changed the people’s
perception of what was dangerous and more
importantly what was safe.
 UNION CARBIDES AMERICAN PLANT
• Dr. Paul Shrivastava, an Associate Professor of
Business in New York University conducted studies
that revealed that Bhopal was neither an isolated
incident nor the first of its kind in the corporation.

• There had been many accidents of similar nature in

UCC's American plants prior to the Bhopal accident.

• He found that 28 major MIC leaks had occurred in

UCC’s West Virginia plant during the five years
preceding the Bhopal incident, the last one occurring
only a month before.
 THE WATER WASHING THEORY
• The media played a significant role in establishing the WATER WASHING
THEORY as a plausible explanation.

• According to this story, an MIC operator was told to wash a section of a

subheader of the relief valve vent header ("RVVH") in the MIC manufacturing
unit.

• Because he failed to insert a slip-blind, as called for by plant standard operating

procedures, the water supposedly backed up into the header and eventually found
its way into the tank.

• Because he failed to insert a slip-blind, as called for by plant standard operating

procedures, the water supposedly backed up into the header and eventually found
its way into the tank and flowed 400 feet to the tank which would require a
massive pressure head and as indicated my reports would take some time to build
up

• Conclusive reports indicated that 2000 lbs of water entered the tank and for this
water to build up and have an instantaneous exothermic reaction would not be
possible
 THE DIRECT-ENTRY THEORY
• During the shift change -- that a disgruntled operator entered the storage
area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to
Tank with the intention of contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents.

• He unscrewed the local pressure indicator, which can be easily

accomplished by hand, and connected the hose to the tank. The entire
operation could be completed within five minutes.

• Minor incidents of process sabotage by employees had occurred

previously at the Bhopal plant.

• The water and MIC reaction initiated the formation of carbon dioxide
which, together with MIC vapours, was carried through the header system
and out of the stack of the vent gas scrubber by about 11:30 to 11:45 p.m
 Equipment and safety regulations
Unlike Union Carbide plants in the USA, its Indian subsidiary plants were
not prepared for problems.
 No action plans had been established to cope with incidents of this
magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or
dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.
The MIC tank alarms had not worked for 4 years.
The flare tower itself was improperly designed and could only hold one-
quarter of the volume of gas that was leaked in 1984.
To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system, designed to inhibit the
volatilization of MIC, had been left idle—the MIC was kept at 20 degrees
Celsius , not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual, and some of the coolant
was being used elsewhere.
The steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was out of action for
unknown reasons.
Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being
cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks through faulty valves were
not installed. Their installation had been omitted from the cleaning
checklist.
The MIC tank had been malfunctioning for roughly a week.
Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they
corrode when exposed to acid.
 On the night of the disaster, a leaking carbon steel valve was found,
allowing water to enter the MIC tanks. The pipe was not repaired
because it was believed it would take too much time and be too
expensive.
In November 1984, most of the safety systems were not
functioning. Many valves and lines were in poor condition. Tank
610 contained 42 tonnes MIC, much more than safety rules
allowed.
During the nights of 2–3 December, a large amount of water
entered tank 610.
A runaway reaction started, which was accelerated by
contaminants, high temperatures and other factors.
The reaction generated a major increase in the temperature
inside the tank to over 200°C .
This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC
holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. The
reaction was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding
non-stainless steel pipelines.
It is known that workers cleaned pipelines with water. They
were not told by the supervisor to add a slip-blind water isolation
plate. Because of this, and of the bad maintenance, the workers
consider it possible for water to have accidentally entered the
MIC tank.
UCC maintains that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately
connected a hose to a pressure gauge.
UCC's investigation team found no evidence of the suggested
connection.[
VIEW OF TOP OF MIC STORAGE TANKS
MIC Storage Tank
 STORAGE FACILITY
The tank farm at the Bhopal site had facilities for storage
of the following hazardous & toxic substances.
- Carbon monoxide CO
- Methyl iso-cyante MIC
- Chlorine Cl2
- Phosgene COCl2
amine (CH NH ) to form MIC.2 Finally, MIC is mixed with
3 2
  to produce carbaryl.
naphthol
MIC is moderately solu-ble in water, and hydrolyzes to form
carbon dioxide and methylamine.
When MIC is pyrolyzed between 427 ° C and 548 °C, it
3
decomposes to hydrogen cyanide and carbon dioxide.
 MIC irritates the skin, eyes, and respi-ratory mucus membranes.
It reacts with water to pene-trate tissues, including skin4; interacts
with protein; and

 
 Introduction of water into a methyl isocyanate (MIC [CH –
3
N=C=O]) storage tank re-sulted in an uncontrollable reaction, with
liberation of heat and MIC gas.
 Safety systems—such as a flare tower (for the burning of excess
gas), a caustic soda scrubber (for neutralization), and a refrigeration
1
unit—did not contain the reaction.
MIC is an intermediate product in the manufacture of carbaryl
(Sevin ), a carbamate pes-ticide.
As is shown in Table 1, a mixture of carbon monoxide (CO) and
chlorine (Cl2) forms phosgene (COCl2). Phosgene is then combined
with monomethyl-
cluded several toxic decomposition byproducts such as hydrogen
cyanide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monox-ide. Contaminants such
as phosgene and monomethyl-amine, which were used in the
manufacture of MIC, might also have been present in the cloud.
 Air monitor-ing was not possible at the time of the incident, nor was
it attempted subsequently.
The estimated mean MIC concentration in the cloud was 27 ppm—
1,400 times the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion’s (OSHA) workplace standard (Table 3).
 Properties of MIC

Water reacts exothermically to produce heat and carbon

dioxide.
The tank pressure will rise rapidly if MIC is
contaminated with water.
Aqueous sodium hydroxide solution will react with
MIC quite rapidly.
 Properties of MIC

Purified MIC will react with itself under the

influence of a catalyst to form a cyclic trimer or a
high molecular weight polymer.

 Strong bases such as sodium hydroxide, sodium

methoxide and sodium acetate, certain metal
chlorides such as ferric chloride and stannic
chloride catalyse trimerisation.
Contamination of MIC with traces of the catalysts
can cause violent reactions.
The controversial antidote
Was it ? Or phosgene? Or a mixture of both? Or some other gas like
M IC hydrogen cyanide?
It was confusion confounded. Amazingly, even as hundreds
died in Bhopal, the confusion over what it was that was killing them
persisted right through the horrendous first week and after.
Nobody knew anything, including experts at the Union ministry of chemicals in
New Delhi.
At first, the majority of doctors in Bhopal plumped for phosgene,
partly the result of the prompting of local Carbide officials, who kept
on insisting that is only an irritant and not lethal
 LEGAL TIMELINE December 3, 1984:

Gas leaks from the Union Carbide Factory in

Bhopal India. In three days about 8,000 people die.
December 7, 1984 - Prime accused Warren
Anderson amongst nine others arrested in India –
Anderson is released on bail of 25,000 rupees,
upon a promise to return.
 December 1, 1987 - Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) files charge sheet against
Warren Anderson, chairman of UCC, and eleven
other accused
 LEGAL TIMELINE December 3, 1984:

October 3, 1991 - Supreme Court of India revoked

criminal immunity granted to UCC and all other
accused in the Bhopal gas leak disaster case in
response to review and writ petitions filed by
BGPMUS(Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog
Sangthan), BGPSSS (The Bhopal GasPeedit
Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti) and others.
November 11, 1991 - Criminal cases against all
the accused revived in the CJM's Court at Bhopal.
 LEGAL TIMELINE December 3, 1984:

November 11, 1991 - Criminal cases against all

the accused revived in the CJM's Court at Bhopal.

September 13, 1996: In response to petitions by

the Indian accused Keshub Mahindra and others,
the Supreme Court brings down the charges from
304-2, punishable by 10 years of imprisonment, to
304-a, punishable by only two years or fines. 304-a
is "death due to negligence".
 LEGAL TIMELINE December 3, 1984:

January 29, 1998: Accused Assistant Works

manager R.B. Roy Choudhury dies.
February 6, 2006: Keshub Mahindra and other
Indian accused presented their statements before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate in which they denied
any role or knowledge of the disaster, after
deposition of 178 witnesses .
 Side Effects of Inhaling Methyl
Isocyanate
Effects at 0.4ppm Effects at 21ppm
- Breathlessness (incident time
- Choking - Pulmonary Edema
- Asthma - Emphysema
- Throat Irritation - Hemorrhages
- Eye Irritation - Bronchial Pneumonia
- Skin Damage - Death
- Vomiting
- Muscular Weakness
- Altered Consciousness
Safety Measures in UCC Plants - the USA and India
UCC plant in West Virginia was better equipped compared to the plant in Bhopal. There
were a number of critical differences in levels of design and operations of the Bhopal
and Institute plants.
Institute, West Virginia, USA Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

High production of MIC matched with high processing capacity. MIC not High production capacity of MIC but low processing capacity. MIC stored
stored for long periods of time. in large quantities for long periods of time.

MIC storage tank equipped with emergency scrubbers (to neutralize any No emergency caustic scrubber to neutralize any MIC leak.
escaping MIC) designed to operate under emergency conditions.

Computerized monitoring of instruments (gauges, alarms, etc) and No computerized monitoring of instruments and processes. Relied solely
processes to support visual observation. on manual observation.

MIC field storage tanks used a cooling system based on chloroform MIC tanks used a cooling system based on brine (highly reactive with
(inert and nonreactive with MIC). MIC).

Refrigeration unit to control temperature in the tanks was never turned Refrigeration unit had been turned off since June 1984.
off.

MIC was always maintained under nitrogen pressure. MIC tanks had not been under nitrogen pressure since October 1984.
Safety Measures in UCC plants - the USA and India
Institute, West Virginia, USA Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Emergency plan An elaborate four-stage emergency plan to deal with toxic
releases, fires, etc, including a general public alert linked to
community police, river and rail traffic and local radio
stations. Various emergency broadcast systems in place to
alert and disseminate appropriate information to the public.
No system to inform public authorities or the people living
adjacent to the plant. No emergency plan shared with
communities living adjacent to the plant; no system to
disseminate information regarding emergency to the public
with the exception of a loud siren.

Maintenance programme A maintenance programme to determine and evaluate No evidence of an effective instrument maintenance
replacement frequency for valves and instrumentation and programme. Safety valve testing programme largely
alarm systems. Weekly review of safety valves and reviews ineffective and no proper records maintained of reviews of
and maintenance recorded extensively. instruments, valves and alarm systems, etc.

Lab analysis A lab analysis of MIC was conducted to test quality and check No lab analysis of quality was undertaken. MIC stored for
for contamination prior to storage, processing or distribution. long periods without testing for contamination.

Training Extensive employee training programme to ensure high level Operators put in charge without sufficient training.
of training and information among all employees of normal
and emergency procedures.

Protective equipment Extensive provision of appropriate personal protective Personal protective gear and breathing air equipment not
equipment to employees including protective clothing, air easily accessible, inadequate and of poor quality.
respirators, etc.
Lessons Learnt
• National governments and international agencies should focus on
widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident
prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced
industrial nations .
• Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be
situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use
over time.
• Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to
local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary
services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of
industrial accidents.
• Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account
when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants.
Lessons Learnt
• Legislation and regulation needs to evolve in active
consultation with all stakeholders laying emphasis on
emerging requirements, and increasing standards with
appropriate emphasis on actual functioning of safety
mechanisms and inculcation of an active safety culture.

• Multinationals, by virtue of their global purpose,

organization, and resources, should be treated as single,
monolithic agents, rather than as a network of discrete, non-
interdependent units.
BHOPAL WAS AN EXAMPLE OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL
IRRESPONSIBILITY.
What’s the situation now?

• To this day, the Union Carbide location in Bhopal is

not remediated.
• The plant still leaks toxic chemicals such as:
– Mercury
– Trichloroethane
– Chlorinated organics
– Lead
 Real emergencies always
occur on Friday evenings or
over weekends …Sunday, 2nd Dec 1984
Bhopal Tragedy Videos
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