Unveiling the

Bhopal Tragedy:
Analyzing the
Causes, Impacts,
and Lessons Learned
By -
Anindya
Ghosh
Assistant Professor
Introduction
T h e B h o p a l disaster or B h o p a l g a s
tragedy was a chemical accident on the night
of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide
India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in
Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. Considered the
world’s worst industrial disaster, over
500,000 people in the small towns around
the plant were exposed to the highly toxic gas
methyl isocyanate (MIC).
Industrial Background
T h e U C I L factory in Bhopal, U C C , wa s
establis hed in 1969 to p ro d u c e Sevin, a
pesti cide, u s i n g m e t hy l isocyanate (MIC) as
a n intermediate. In 1979, a n M IC
p rod u c ti on p lan t wa s a d d e d to t h e U C I L
site. T h e c h e m i c a l proc es s u s e d in t h e
B h o p a l plant involved m e t hy l a m i n e
reac ti ng w ith p h o s g e n e to form MIC,
w h i c h wa s t h e n reacted w it h 1-naphthol to
form carbaryl. This proc es s diff ered f r o m
MIC-free routes u s e d elsewhere, w h i c h
involved c o m b i n i n g raw materials in
diff erent orders. D es p ite d ec reas ed
d e m a n d , p rod u c ti on conti nued, le a d in g to
u n u s e d M IC at th e B h o p a l site.
 Methyl
Isocyanate

Properties
Chemical formula C2H3NO
Molar mass 57.051 g/mol
Appearance Colorless liquid
Odor Sharp, pungent odor
Density 0.9230g/cm3 at 27 °C
Melting point −45 °C (−49 °F; 228
K)
Boiling point 38.3–41 °C (100.9–
105.8 °F; 311.4–314.1 K)
Solubility in water 10% (15°C)
Vapor pressure 57.7 kPa
Structure Dipole moment 2.8 D
 Catastrophic
Event
At 25 °C, in excess water, half of the M I C is
consumed in 9 min.; if the heat is not efficiently
removed from the reacting mixture, the rate of the
reaction will increase and rapidly cause the MIC to boil.
Such a reaction triggered the Bhopal disaster after a
large amount of water was introduced to a MIC storage
tank. The consequence of the out of control exothermic
process was a runaway reaction and the direct release of 42
tons of MIC to the atmosphere.In the early hours of
December 3, 1984, a leak of methyl isocyanate gas from
the plant resulted in the gas quickly spread through the
surrounding areas, causing widespread devastation.
 Causes of the Tragedy

B h o p a l U C I L facility h o u s e d three u n d e r g r o u n d liquid M IC

storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. Liquid MIC production was in
progress, but safety regulations required no tank to be filled more than
50%. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas to keep
impurities and moisture out. In late October 1984, tank E610 lost most of
its nitrogen gas pressure, causing the liquid MIC contained within to not
be pumped out. MIC production was halted, and parts of the plant were shut
down for maintenance. Production resumed in late November using MIC
stored in the two tanks. However, an attempt to re-establish pressure in
tank E610 failed on 1 December, preventing the pumped out 42 tons of
liquid MIC.
 Tragedy Continues.....
In December 1984, a plant in the UCIL refinery experienced a runaway exothermic reaction due to
malfunctioning safety systems, poor valves, and out-of-service vent gas scrubbers. A leak in tank
E610, which contained 42 tons of MIC, led to a critical state with temperatures exceeding 25°C and
pressure reaching 4 0 psi. The reaction was exacerbated by three malfunctioning safety devices: a
refrigeration system, a flare tower, and a vent gas scrubber. The leak caused about 30 tonnes of
MIC to escape into the atmosphere, increasing to 4 0 tonnes within two hours. The plant’s alarm
system was activated, triggering two siren alarms, one inside the plant and one directed to the
exterior, alerting the public and the city of Bhopal. The plant’s safety systems were not
functioning properly, and the gas concentration was difficult to tolerate. The incident highlighted
the need for improved safety measures and proper maintenance of safety systems.
Environmental Impact
The methyl isocyanate disaster in Bhopal,
India, resulted in thousands of deaths due
to coughing, eye irritation, suffocation,
and vomiting. The Indian Council of
Medical Research (ICMR) was prohibited
from publishing health effect data until
1994. The affected area expanded to
700,000 citizens, causing 558,125
injuries. Long-term health effects include
chronic conjunctivitis, cornea scars,
respiratory tract impairment, neurological
system impairment, psychological
problems, and increased death rates in
children. Bhopal now has high birth
defects and a miscarriage rate 7x higher
than the national average.
 Legal and Ethical
Ramifications
The Bhopal Gas Leak Act in 1985 involved
Union Carbide (UCC), the US and Indian
governments, local authorities, and disaster
victims. UCC initially offered a $5 million
relief fund, but the Indian government
rejected it. In 1986, UCC proposed a $350
million settlement, which was later
transferred to Indian courts. The Indian
Supreme Court agreed to pay $470 million
for damages. In 1991, the Indian Supreme
Court upheld the original decision, ordering
the government to fund a hospital in
Bhopal.
 Further Legal

Responsibility
Warren Anders on, a former e m p lo ye e of
Union Carbide Corporation, was charged with
manslaughter in 1991 and declared a fugitive
from justice in 1992. The U.S. declined to
extradite him, and the Indian Supreme Court
ordered the release of settlement funds. In 2010,
seven former employees were convicted of
causing death by negligence, and a U S federal
class action lawsuit was dismissed in 2012.
Anderson died in 2014, and the Indian Supreme
Court dismissed his petition for enhanced
compensation.
Community
Resilience
T h e I ndian g o v e r n m e n t focused o n
increasing hospital-based services for gas
victims after the disaster, leading to the
construction of hospitals like Bhopal
Memorial Hospital and Research Centre
(BMHRC) in 1998.
However, the management faced issues
with strikes and disputed
quality of care. The government also
proposed a water-supply improvement
scheme and incinerated toxic waste in
Germany. The state government invited
Indian architects to develop a m emorial
complex for gas victims. Occupational and
habitation rehabilitation efforts included
building work sheds and fl ats, but faced
challenges in water access and sanitation.
Lack of Negligence
in the Industry
T h e disaster at th e I n dian C h e m i c a l
C o m p a n y (UC C ) wa s c a u s e d b y a
c o m b i n a ti o n of u n d e r- m a in ta in e d
faciliti es, a w e a k safety atti tude, a n d a n
under-trained workforce. Workers
accidentally allowed water to enter th e
M IC tan ks w ith out proper safeguards.
T h e I nd ian g o v e r n m e n t took ac ti ons to
h id e this possibility, c l a i m i n g it wa s n ot
physically pos s ible for water to enter th e
tank. T h e disaster wa s att ributed to
u n d e r i nv e st m e n t in safety, poor
m ain tenan c e, a n d u nd ers ized safety
devices. T h e p lan t also experienc ed a
g ra d u a l deteriorati on of safety practi ces,
w ith only six of th e original 12 operators
sti ll wo r k in g w ith MIC.
 Call to
SAction
i n c e 1984, acti vists in B h o p a l h a v e
been actively involved in the aftermath of the
Bhopal gas leakage. Satinath Sarangi, a
m etallurgic engineer, founded several activist
groups and the Sambhavna T rus t, a clinic for
gas affected patients. When government aid
was ineffective, activists like Zahreeli Gas
Khand Sangharsh Morcha mobilized to
counter governmental and company efforts.
International NGOs and organizations have
also been involved, including the
International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal
(ICJB), Bhopal Medical Appeal, Sambhavna
Trust, and the Bhopal People’s Health and
Documentation Clinic.
 Conclusion
T h e s t a n d s a s a sta rk r e m i n d e r of t h e d e v a st a ti n g
c o n s e q u e n c e s of industrial disasters. B y a n a l y z i n g its ca uses,
i m p a c t s , a n d l e ss o n s learned, w e c a n strive to p re ve n t sim ila r
t ra g e d i e s a n d p r o m o t e a safer, m o r e s u sta i n a b l e future.
Thanks!