Corazon C.

Aquino (1986-1992)
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that:
1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Fidel Ramos (1992-1998)

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSN VS RAMOS

G.R. No 127882
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of
mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or
technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995, in Malaya and Manila Times, two
newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This
was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the
DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days
from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null
and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null
and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines,
Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, that a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral
processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance
agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert
the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial
and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing
provisions and cannot stand on their own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement.
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial
and technical assistance agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Joseph Estrada (1998-2001)

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on
the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these
terms are combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on
the validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.
RULING:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize
cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s
reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a
saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of
strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute
in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.
On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the
plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010)

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
G. R. NO. 220598
FACTS:
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager
Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and
Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective
demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to
commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx
Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly
or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less,
[by raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied
by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired
to commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence.
Substantive:
Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte;
Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there
evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than
P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved
by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the
demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings,
and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction
they may then appeal the conviction and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do
so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court
that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or
mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure
to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to,
during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy
among all of the accused was by express agreement or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002,
377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information
alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy,
however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080
as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of
all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable
all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015,as the mastermind
despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no
evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against
each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was
adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at
not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of
the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even
the remotest possibility that the CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to
either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec.
1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis,
by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the
word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by
the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good,
substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs
when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment
or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially.”
The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken.
Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use
of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property
taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that
GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and
September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO
AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners;
and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

Benigno Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III (2010-2016)

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III
G.R. NO. 209287
FACTS:
In a privilege speech, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada revealed that he and his fellow senators received 50-million-
peso incentive because of their vote to impeach Chief Justice Corona.
Sec. Abad responded to the speech saying that it is part of the Spending Acceleration Program.
1. The Spending Acceleration Program is also known as the Disbursement Acceleration Program
[DAP].
2. Abad also said that the money was given in response to several funding requests from the senators.
The money used for the DAP are taken from:
1. Unreleased appropriations under personnel services;
2. Unprogrammed [sic] funds;
3. Carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
4. Budget for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects.
The Department of Budget and Management [DBM] released a claim on its website saying that the
money used for the DAP are savings from:
1. Pooling of unreleased appropriations, and
2. Withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
The legal bases of DBM in implementing DAP vis-à-vis the use of savings are as follows:
1. Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, which granted the President the power to augment an
item for his office in the general appropriations law,
2. Administrative Code of 1987’s Book VI, Chapter 5, Sections 38 (suspension of expenditure
appropriations) and 49 (Authority to use savings for certain purpose),
3. 2011-2013 General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) which provides for (a) use of savings, (b) meanings
of savings and augmentation, and (c) priority in the use of savings.
With regard to unprogrammed [sic] funds, the legal bases of DBM are the 2011-2013 GAAs.
Araullo, et al., filed a petition to the Supreme Court assailing the Constitutionality of National Budget
Circular [NBC] No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP.
ISSUES:
1. WON the certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the Constitutionality and
validity of the DAP, NBC no. 541, and other issuances implementing the DAP?
a) WON controversy is ripe for judicial determination; and
b) WON the petitioners have locus standi?
2. WON the DAP violates Article VI, Sec. 29 of the Constitution, which provides, “[n]o money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”?
3. WON the DAP, NBC Bo. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP
violate Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution insofar as:
c) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government
agencies as “savings” as the term used in Sec. 25 (5), in relation to 2011-2013 GAAs,
d) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the
Executive Departments, and
e) They augment discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs?
4. WON the DAP violates (1) the equal protection clause [EPC], (2) the system of checks and balances,
and (3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the Constitution that it authorizes the release of
funds upon the request of legislators?
5. WON factual and legal justification exists to issue a TRO to restrain the implementation of DAP and
other executive issuances implementing DAP?
HELD:
1) Yes, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the Constitutionality of DAP.
Since certiorari and prohibition are large in scope and the issues involved the limitations of the
Executive’s spending power, the said remedies are proper.
A. The case is not moot and academic even if the President has terminated the DAP. The fact that huge
public funds have been allocated, disbursed, or utilized by reason or on account of the challenged
executive acts gave rise to an actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication. Even if assuming that the
DAP has mooted the case, this case still falls under the exception to the requirement of ripeness:
i. There is a grave violation of the Constitution,
ii. The case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest,
iii. When the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
Bench, the Bar, and the public, and
iv. When the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
B. The petitioners have legal standing to assail the Constitutionality of the DAP. Considering that the
issue involves the expenditure of public funds and the present case is of transcendental importance, the
petitioners do have a legal standing to raise the issues before the Court.
2) No, there is no violation of the provision since DAP is not an appropriation measure but a program
of prioritizing spending. Congress’s duty vis-à-vis treasury is to allocate funds in the treasury in a
particular fund.
3) Yes. The term “savings” does not include unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments under the DAP because “savings” refers to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in the GAA free from any obligation or encumbrance, which are:
A. Still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorize,
B. From appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absences without pay, and
C. From appropriations balances realized form the implementation of measures resulting in improved
systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs, and services approved in the GAAs at a lesser cost.
Mere declaration of the DBM will not ripen the status of the funds under the DAP to the categories
considered as savings. It is necessary that these funds must be released first and not merely withheld.
On the other hand, the term “augment” means to enlarge or increase the allotment for an item in the GAA
wherein the current appropriation for the said item is deficient.
The Constitution also limits the augmentation within the office of the President; hence, savings of the
Executive branch must be augmented only to an item under the executive. In the present case, the
“savings” of the Executive were augmented to the members of Congress. Therefore, the Constitutional
provision was violated.
4) The Court did not pass upon a judgment over the alleged violation of the EPC because the
contentions of Luna and COURAGE are speculative. As regards to the violation of separation of powers
and the public accountability, the Court has already addressed the issue in the discussion of other issues.
5) No, the doctrine of operative fact applies. A legislative or executive act is presumed to be
constitutional such that when it is declared void for being unconstitutional does not give rise to any right
or obligation. The Court recognized that the result of the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored and be undone. The Court also declared that the doctrine of operative fact is not confined to
statutes and rules and regulations. The doctrine can be invoked only in situations where the nullification
of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice.

Rodrigo Roa Duterte (2016-2022)

DE LIMA V. PRES. DUTERTE,
G.R. NO. 227635, OCTOBER 15, 2019
PRINCIPLE OF IMMUNITYFROM SUIT.DOCTRINE: Unlike its American counterpart, the
concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does
not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither
does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit.
FACTS:
By petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima seeks
to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, from
committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security.
Citing certain jurisprudence, De Lima argues that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity
from suit, especially from the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data because
his actions and statements were unlawful or made outside of his official conduct; that to
consider and determine the issue of whether or not the President is immune from suit is premature
considering that President Duterte has yet to invoke the same in his verified return; that until
and unless President Duterte invokes the immunity himself, the issue may not even be
considered; that the immunity of the President does not automatically attach every time he
issued; that in the United States of America (USA), proper balancing of interest — on the one hand,
the private interest to be served, and, on the other, the danger of intrusion unto the authority
and function of the Executive Branch— must first be made.
On its part, the OSG seeks the immediate dismissal of the suit. It submits that the immunity of the
sitting President is absolute, and it extends to all suits including petitions for the writ of
amparo and writ of habeas data; XXXX that the present suit is the distraction that the immunity seeks to
prevent because it will surely distract the President from discharging his duties as the Chief
Executive.
ISSUE/S:
May the incumbent Chief Executive be haled to court even for the limited purpose under the Rules on
the Writ of Habeas Data?
RULING:
NO. The petition must be dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from
suit.
Section 15, Article VII of the 1973Constitution, as amended, provided for immunity at two
distinct points in time: the first sentence of the provision related to immunity during the tenure of
the President, and the second provided for immunity thereafter. As the framers of our Constitution
understood it, which view has been upheld by relevant jurisprudence, the President is immune
from suit during his tenure.
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental
and constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of
the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. Accordingly, the concept is clear
and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding such
office. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it
applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as
President. Furthermore, no balancing of interest has ever been applied to Presidential immunity under
our jurisprudence. We are not prepared or willing to recognize such a test without constitutional,
statutory, or jurisprudential basis.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for the writ of habeas data on the ground that
respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the incumbent President of the Philippines is immune
from suit during his incumbency.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Front page………………………………………………………………...

II. Corazon C. Aquino…………………………………………………….....

III. Fidel V. Ramos…………………………………………………………....

IV. Joseph Estrada…………………………………………………………...

V. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo……………………………………………….

VI. Benigno Simeon Cojuangco Aquino III…………………………………

VII. Rodrigo Roa Duterte……………………………………………………..

VIII. References………………………………………………………………...
 REFERENCES
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
https://lexclassrooms.com/featured-case-85-lawyers-league-for-a-better-philippines-vs-aquino/

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSN VS RAMOS

G.R. No 127882

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2020/09/la-bugal-blaan-tribal-association-v-ramos-gr-no-127882-
january-27-2004-first-case-decision.html

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE

SANDIGANBAYAN,

G. R. NO. 220598

https://dianbautista82.wordpress.com/2016/07/27/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-et-al-vs-people-of-the-
philippines-and-the-sandiganbayan-g-r-no-220598-19-july-2016/

ARAULLO V. AQUINO III

G.R. NO. 209287

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_209287_2015.html

DE LIMA V. PRES. DUTERTE,

G.R. NO. 227635, OCTOBER 15, 2019

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/oct2019/gr_227635_2019.html