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A Conceptual Framework for Online Business

Protest Tactics and Criteria for Their Effectiveness
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A Conceptual Framework for Online Business Protest Tactics and

Criteria for Their Effectiveness
Kelly D. Martin and Beverly Kracher
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DOI: 10.1177/0007650307299218
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Tactics and Criteria for

Their Effectiveness
Kelly D. Martin
College of Business, Colorado State University, Fort Collins
Beverly Kracher
College of Business Administration, Creighton University, Omaha,
Nebraska
In this article, the authors lay the foundation for the emerging area of
research on online protest tactics mobilized against business. The authors
offer a definition of online business protest tactics and distinguish them
from related activities such as electronic civil disobedience and cybercrime.
They also appeal to the interest-group literature as one theoretical founda-
tion for this area of research. Based on the degree to which each tactic
involves intrusion, disruption, or damage, the authors categorize the array of
online business protest tactics into a typology, providing definitions and
illustrative examples from the business press for each. They advance a dual-
istic framework to evaluate the intermediate and ultimate effectiveness of
the various online business protest tactics using a set of criteria relevant to
both online and off-line environments, and conclude by suggesting avenues
for future research.
Keywords: stakeholder activism; online protests; cyberterrorism; civil disobedience
A ctivism against business certainly is not a novel concept. Researchers

trace business protest back to the 18th century, when concerned
citizens regularly organized boycotts against perceived egregiousness
Authors’ Note: We thank the Editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
A previous version of this article won the Best Paper award at the Society for Business Ethics
annual conference in 2003. Address correspondence to Kelly D. Martin, College of Business,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1278; e-mail: kelly.martin@business
.colostate.edu.
291
292 Business & Society
committed by business (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995; Glickman,

2005; Rosenkrands, 2004). Technological advancements coupled with
globalization and global connectivity, however, have created novel and
never before fathomed methods of activism directed at business. These new
tools not only have reduced the costs of mobilizing citizen interest groups
but have facilitated their effortless and immediate response to perceived
business wrongdoing. Indeed, global and technological trends have com-
bined to endow citizen groups with increasing power, allowing them to
wield significant influence against business (Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves,
2004). Beyond the multiple societal transformations that have propelled the
causes of these citizen interest groups, the sophistication of the groups’
methods has evolved dramatically as well. No doubt the present corporate
landscape has witnessed the advancement of a host of technologically
evolved protest mechanisms, enabled in large measure by the Internet. Words
like cyberprotest, cyberactivism, and hacktivism are likely to become well
integrated into many business leaders’ vernacular.
Despite the explosion in popularity of online and technologically facili-
tated protest tactics deployed by citizen groups against business, research
aimed at providing a more fine-grained understanding of these tactics and
their effectiveness has been scarce. Extant literature on cyberprotest, as it
stands, has only tangential relevance or application to business. However,
businesses of all sizes across the globe are subject to the powerful and
potentially disruptive effects of online protests. For this reason, we believe
that an understanding of these ever-increasing and evolving tactics is cru-
cial for business academicians to advance theory. Additionally, managers
must be aware of the probable impacts of such tactics on day-to-day oper-
ations as well as the larger and potentially devastating effects on firm per-
formance (e.g., Mahon & McGowan, 1998). Even in instances where the
consequences of online protests against business have been minimal, the
ease of use of these protest tactics coupled with the increased frequency of
protest deployment make a more detailed conceptualization both timely and
critical for business leaders.
Furthermore, an articulation of online business protests as distinguished
from related activities such as electronic civil disobedience, cybercrime,
and cyberterrorism is warranted given the heightened awareness and the
preventative measures aimed at subverting these related practices. No doubt,
the threat of Internet-facilitated crime and even cyberterrorism is a serious
issue for business as well as society at large. We have entered a new stage of
technological history where terrorists can use the Internet to organize, com-
municate, and expedite attacks (Denning, 2001). With regard to business,
Martin, Kracher / Online Business Protest Tactics 293
cyberterrorists may be motivated to cause destruction to essential institutions

including finance, health care, and energy (Goch, 2002). The call has been
made for collective global action against terrorism (United Nations, 2001),
although as of yet, cyberterrorism against business exists only in specula-
tion and theory. It is imperative, therefore, that when we categorize and
evaluate the types of online business protest tactics and their effectiveness,
we do so accurately.
Online business protests, because of their ease of use, low cost of
deployment, anonymous nature, and potential frequency of enactment, war-
rant serious evaluation in the business and society literature and by business
practitioners. In this article we investigate the various ways in which the
far-reaching capability of the Internet can be used to protest business prac-
tices. We begin by offering a definition of online business protest tactics
and distinguishing them from related concepts, including electronic civil
disobedience and cybercrime. Then we appeal to interest-group theory as a
framework for understanding online business protests. Next, we categorize
the various types of online business protest tactics by proposing a classify-
ing typology. Finally, we explore the effectiveness of online business
protest tactics and identify a dualistic framework by which they might be
evaluated. We draw on real-world instances of online protest tactics mobi-
lized against actual businesses as illustrative examples throughout the text.
We conclude with recommendations for future research.
Defining and Distinguishing Online Business

Protest Tactics
We define online business protest tactics as deliberate, directed actions

conducted over the Internet that oppose the practices of business. Our use
of the term business includes a businessperson, a specific business firm, a
whole business industry, or the institution of business itself. Online busi-
ness protest tactics are deliberate, in the sense that they are intentional, and
directed in the sense that they are aimed at specific people such as con-
sumers or business decision makers. The goals of many citizen interest
groups and business often are necessarily antagonistic (Berry, 1995). As
such, the ultimate sociopolitical aim of online business protest tactics is to
persuade business to change some practice or policy. Conducting protest
activities over the Internet allows groups to garner public support and expo-
sure, and therefore wield the power that accompanies such support and
exposure. Business protests using online tactics communicate to managers
and firm decision makers that their constituents are aware of certain practices
and oppose them.
Only some online communications about business are online business
protests. For example, a passing negative remark about Phillip Morris writ-
ten on an electronic message board is not an online protest because it is not
an action directed at the company. However, an online petition against
Phillip Morris products distributed on an electronic message board and then
forwarded to Phillip Morris executives does constitute an online business
protest.
Our definition of online business protest tactics extends other prominent
viewpoints in the field that define online activism as the practice of using
computer technology to support or oppose an agenda or cause (Denning,
2001). Unlike this and other contemporary conceptualizations (e.g., Dunham,
Freeman, & Liedtka, 2006), we believe that it is best to distinguish two forms
of online business activism tactics, namely, those that support business
practices (advocacy) and those that oppose business practices (protests).
To illustrate examples of advocacy, the Better Business Bureau Web site
(http://www.bbb.org) showcases and supports contact with ethical businesses,
and the Responsible Shopper Web site (http://www.responsibleshopper.org)
provides detailed research on social responsibility issues applicable to indi-
vidual firms. Although we believe scholarly attention to online business
advocacy tactics is warranted, in this article we focus on online business
protest tactics.
A clearer conception of online business protest tactics can be achieved
by comparing and contrasting them to electronic civil disobedience and
cybercrime. First, some business protesters and academics consider online
protest activities an electronic form of civil disobedience (Wray, 1998).
In one sense this is correct. Online business protest tactics, like acts of
civil disobedience, are mobilized to further a social or political agenda.
However, most definitions of civil disobedience include the notion that civil
disobedience must be contrary to law, where an illegal action is performed
to expose and change what is considered to be a morally inappropriate law
(Corlett, 2003; Sabl, 2001). Yet online business protest tactics need not be
illegal and, in fact, frequently conform to the law in all respects. As such, it
is incorrect to equate online business protest tactics with electronic civil
disobedience.
Second, online business protest tactics are often viewed as cybercrimes.
We acknowledge that an online business protest may be a criminal action
depending on the national laws that govern the country in which the protest
occurs (currently there are no international cybercrime laws). However,
online business protests have a social agenda and thus are not cybercrimes
in the way that cybercrimes are conventionally understood. In stereotypical
cases, cybercrimes involve mens rea in the sense that they have criminal
intent. That is, cybercrimes are perpetuated by people with the intent to steal
or deceive using such mechanisms as identity theft, stolen credit card
numbers, or the sale of counterfeit goods over the Internet. Online business
protests are not motivated by criminal intent in this way. There is a significant
difference between the sociopolitical intent of an online business protest and
Internet thievery.
Widespread confusion over these related yet distinct concepts reiterates
the necessity for proper clarification regarding online business protest tac-
tics, electronic civil disobedience, and cybercrime for business and acade-
mics alike. In the following section we continue this discussion by
examining a conceptual foundation from which online business protests can
be understood.
Conceptual Linkages: Interest-Group Theory
The online protest tactics used by various business activists must be exam-
ined through an appropriate analytical lens. Clearly, conceptual linkages
between the mobilization of online business protests and the tenets of stake-
holder theory exist. Indeed, recent research (Dunham et al., 2006) categorizes
the types of online communities that influence business, drawing on the
stakeholder literature to suggest appropriate methods with which to deal with
these groups. We concur that appealing to stakeholder theory (e.g., Mitchell,
Agle, & Wood, 1997) to evaluate online business protest tactics is a fruitful
approach, and accordingly, we elaborate on this perspective in complemen-
tary work. The core of this article, however, is the link between interest-group
theory, business protests, and the Internet’s impact on them.
Early citizen interest groups benefited and flourished in large part
because of the accessibility of mass communication devices such as direct
mail technology and toll-free telephone availability (Walker, 1991).
Organizers of citizen movements used these technologies to create aware-
ness and garner monetary and membership support at accelerated rates,
making citizen interest groups the largest interest factions proportionally
(Berry, 1995). Furthermore, mass communication technology allowed citi-
zen group membership to be dispersed geographically. The common thread
of the groups’ interests and beliefs united widely scattered populations of
members, and technology facilitated the groups’ communication of a coher-
ent message. Not surprisingly, interest-group activities such as gauging
opinion, lobbying, and fund-raising were even further streamlined with the
development of computer-based mailing and automated response process-
ing systems (Cigler & Loomis, 1991).
Not since the advent of direct mailing systems has technology impacted
citizen interest groups in comparable scope and scale to the Internet. Citizen
interest groups, in contrast to occupational or government-sponsored interest
groups, rely on such technologies primarily because their membership base
is ill-defined and not readily identifiable (Walker, 1991). Citizens seeking
information about issues of personal importance often rely on the Internet
as a way to access relevant activist groups as well as to join or participate
in citizen group activities. Once a person becomes a member of a citizen
group, the Internet and supporting technology allow for frequent commu-
nication between group organizers and members. Amnesty International,
for example, sends notice of important and relevant issues to its members
using text messages to members’ mobile phones and personal digital
assistants (PDAs), and has even augmented the technology by allowing
members to sign and send petitions using their wireless devices.
The Internet has fundamentally changed many of the components essen-
tial to formulating citizen interest-group strategy. To demonstrate this point,
we consider the significant factors determining interest-group strategy
success as set forth by Walker (1991). Of these factors, we argue that the
Internet has in one form or another impacted citizen interest groups’ inter-
nal organizational resources, the character of their memberships, and the
principal sources of their financial support.
First, internal organizational resources are increasingly acquired and
augmented through the Internet, including the maintenance of local offices,
headquarters, or other subunits (Walker, 1991). As a result of the prepon-
derance of virtual workspace and real-time meetings, the need to maintain
a central base or other physical locations has diminished. Scarce resources
that were devoted to the upkeep and staffing of citizen group headquarters
can be deployed elsewhere and utilized more effectively.
Second, citizen group membership characteristics have also changed,
becoming more geographically, occupationally, and culturally diverse. Walker
(1991) posits that group membership character profoundly affects the
choice of strategies available to interest groups. We concur that the ubiquity
of the Internet has important implications for the range and diversity of cit-
izen group membership character and, therefore, impacts the potential
group strategies deployed.
Third, the Internet has enhanced and expanded citizen groups’ sources of
financial support. The increased ease and trustworthiness of Internet payment
with credit cards and personal payment systems such as PayPal allow concerned
parties to make instantaneous contributions and donations to worthy causes.
Web sites have even emerged as central funding services for various citizen
causes. Take, for instance, RTMark (http://www.rtmark.com), the Web site that
hosts multiple protest projects undertaken by interest groups. Citizen organiza-
tions may post and elaborate on information about their cause on the site, which
also solicits financial support from investors to assist in project or protest devel-
opment and funding. RTMark provides the added benefit of shielding protest-
ers from legal ramifications under the limited liability protection of its brand. A
key segment of the projects sponsored by RTMark involves anticorporate
protests, with which this article is primarily concerned.
We have seen that the Internet has impacted citizen interest groups’ orga-
nizational structure, membership, and financial support. Each of these is
necessary for organizing and mobilizing the audience for and participation
in citizen interest groups’ protests. Thus, the Internet has had a profound
effect on mobilizing and organizing both off-line and online protests (Vegh,
2003). Furthermore, the Internet has had equal significance on the protest
tactics themselves (Denning, 2001; Gurak & Logie, 2003; Vegh, 2003). The
focus of this article is on the tactics used in online protests, particularly the
novel methods and activities that have provided the ability to communicate
with business. In the next section, we advance a typology of the array of
online business protest tactics and elaborate on each.
Online Business Protest Tactics: A Typology
To differentiate various online business protest tactics, we advance a per-

spective inspired by Denning (2001) that online protests can be classified
by the severity of the means used to further an end. Specifically, means of
a protest can be categorized on continua of intrusion, disruption, and dam-
age. We define intrusion as an act of entering a business computer or net-
work system without permission or welcome. Disruption refers to an
interruption of normal business activities. Online business protest tactics
range from not disruptive to extremely disruptive on a continuum. Damage
refers to destruction of person or property, which includes computer
systems and information. Damage can be either physical or nonphysical,
potentially involving bodily harm or even loss of life, or perhaps financial
harm and damage to reputation.
Online business protest tactics can take the form of informational protest
Web sites, blogs, e-mail campaigns, online petitions, spoofs, parasites, and
Figure 1
Typology of Online Business Protests
Online Business Protests
Informational
protest websites
Hacking
Blogs Spoofs Parasites
E-mail Online petitions
campaigns
Hacktivism Cyber-terrorism
Hijacking E-mail bombs Defacement Graffiti Virtual sit-in
Client-side Server-side Client-side Server-side
hackings. The two forms of hacking, as represented in Figure 1, are hacktivism,

which has several subcategories, and cyberterrorism.
Informational Protest Web Sites

Informational protest Web sites are created to publicize perceived
corporate wrongdoing and encourage off-line action against business
(Rosenkrands, 2004). They are nonintrusive and nondisruptive. This type of
protest tactic is a form of publication where people can retrieve information
and find references to additional related information (Denning, 1999). Some
informational protest Web sites are directed at particular companies. For
example, www.saigon.com/~nike encourages people to boycott Nike products.
Other informational protest Web sites are watchdogs of multiple companies.
One example is the Web site for Infact (http://www.infact.org), a nonprofit

organization designed to expose perceived inappropriate corporate influ-
ence on public policy and decision making. Their site boasts a well-known
“Hall of Shame,” which highlights undesirable transnational corporate
practices. The Hall of Shame can be somewhat damaging to a company’s
reputation and, as the site creators note, has proven useful for changing
business practice.
Blogs
Emerging only recently, yet having a profound impact on business, blogs
are personal Web-based journals (Weblogs) that provide a source for pub-
lishing opinions, facts, ideas, and other conjectures by both individuals and
organizations (Dearstyne, 2005). Because of their ease of use, low start-up
and maintenance costs, and highly interactive nature, many businesses
attest to the imperative of monitoring the blogs of their customers and other
constituency groups and responding as appropriate through their own orga-
nizational blogs (Schwartz, 2005). Indeed, the popular press has echoed
this imperative, stipulating the necessity of firms’ taking the pulse of their
core customers and other interest groups through awareness of those
groups’ blogging communications (e.g., Baker & Green, 2005; Kirkpatrick
& Droth, 2005). Blogs have been used as online business protest tactics, par-
ticularly to expose and provide commentary about perceived business wrong-
doing. They are nonintrusive and nondisruptive protest tactics that can
damage a firm’s reputation. One example includes the Business Ethics Blog
(http://www.businessethics.ca/blog/), which provides links to a number of
resources and includes comprehensive highlights regarding current issues
and other pertinent business ethics topics.
E-mail Campaigns and Online Petitions

E-mail campaigns are another form of nonintrusive and nondisruptive
protest and are frequently used in online business protests. E-mail cam-
paigns involve posting form letters on Web sites for activists to complete
and electronically send to objectionable companies. For example, the
GrassRoots Recycling Network (http://www.grrn.org) uses e-mail cam-
paigns as a primary protest tactic against perceived weak recycling policies
of corporations such as Coke and Pepsi. They want large numbers of pro-
testers to send e-mails through their Web site to influence corporate deci-
sion makers to strengthen their recycling policies.
Similar in nature to e-mail campaigns, online petitions have become a

standard tool for online business protests. An online business petition is a
protest message sent to a corporation that contains multiple electronic sig-
natures of individuals who protest that company’s practices. The petition is
often housed on an activist Web site or circulated via e-mail to friends and
acquaintances. One of the first successful uses of an online petition was the
protest of the famous Intel Pentium chip defect. It demonstrated that world-
wide online petitions could be somewhat damaging to a company’s reputa-
tion or sales and thus be useful for changing business practice. As a result
of the popularity and ease of participation in online petitions by large
numbers of people, The Petition Site (http://www.thepetitionsite.com) has
emerged as a central resource featuring thousands of ongoing petitions
against businesses and other organizations (Vegh, 2003). Boasting 10,000
signatures a day, this site allows citizen groups to feature information about
ongoing protests and provides seemingly effortless access to participants to
cast their support for a cause.
Spoofs and Parasites

When used as online business protest tactics, spoofs are Web sites filled with
humorous, satirical, or shocking messages of protest against business. Spoofs
are nonintrusive and nondisruptive. Spoofers intend for Web users to acciden-
tally access the spoof Web site when trying to get to a company’s official Web
site, but they also rely on word-of-mouth popularity to stimulate interest. Some
spoofs bear a strong resemblance to the actual company Web site they imitate;
this resemblance is facilitated by software such as Reamweaver, which allows
spoof creators to automatically construct parody Web sites (Vegh, 2003). One
example of a successful spoof is the mock travel Web site that is part of an
online campaign against Lufthansa, protesting the company’s involvement in
countries’ deportation practices (http://www.deportationclass.com). Another
spoof site that has drawn widespread attention is the mock World Trade
Organization (WTO) Web site (http://www.gatt.org), which was created by a
group of individuals called the Yes Men and is barely distinguishable from the
official WTO site (http://www.wto.org). Indeed, visitors to the mock WTO site
regularly have requested speaking engagements from WTO officials, unaware
that the persons with whom they are actually communicating are Yes Men—
significant adversaries of the WTO. Although the deportation and Yes Men Web
sites have appearances that nearly mirror the look of the original sites that
inspired the parodies, not all spoofs bear a strong resemblance to the actual
company Web sites. For instance, the spoof Web site www.adiosbarbie.com,
which objects to the Mattel, Inc. Barbie doll featured on www.barbie.com, does
not mimic the appearance of the actual Mattel Web site, nor do its creators aim
to grab attention by its resemblance to the original site.
To lure unintentional visitors to their spoof Web sites, protesters have used
the parasitic method of obtaining a universal resource locator (URL) that is
almost identical to the URL of the protested company. The parasitic method is
nonintrusive and nondisruptive, and can be used with spoofs as well as other
forms of online protest—for example, informational protest Web sites and
online petitions. The parasitic spoof Web site www.huntingdonsucks.com is of
this nature, aiming to shock visitors with horrific images of animals allegedly
being tortured in Huntingdon Life Science laboratories, whose company Web
site URL is www.huntingdon.com. Parasites can be slightly to somewhat dam-
aging because they can negatively affect the sale of products or services of the
businesses that are being protested (Spinello, 2000).
Hacking
Hacking is a tactic that can be used by online business protesters to gain
unauthorized access to a business computer or networked system to stage a
protest. Hacking can take many forms. Current research on hacktivism pri-
marily has focused on online protests against government and political orga-
nizations (e.g., Jordan & Taylor, 2004). The rapid acceleration of hacktivist
techniques and the preponderance of hacktivist resources, however, should
make this increasingly popular protest tactic of critical concern for business.
Broadly, hacktivism is the use of technology to advance a social cause (Cult
of the Dead Cow, 2001). More specifically, hacktivism “is a combination of grass-
roots political protest with computer hacking” (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, p. 1).
Hacktivism includes several subcategories of activities that are sometimes
intrusive, slightly to somewhat disruptive, and slightly to somewhat damaging.
We also consider cyberterrorism, which is an extreme strain of hacking.
Hacktivism
Currently, there are at least five primary methods of hacktivism used
as online business protest tactics: hijacking, e-mail bombs, defacement,
graffiti, and virtual sit-ins or jamming.
Hijacking. The first method, hijacking, involves protesters actively redi-

recting Internet users to a protest site by hijacking the domain name of
another Web site. This practice is intrusive. Hackers are able to achieve the
hijack only by compromising one of the domain name registries, such as

Net Solutions. Once hackers gain access to one of these registries they sim-
ply enter a new Internet Protocol (IP) address to be associated with the
intended URL of a Web site. Hijacking is slightly to somewhat disruptive
and damaging. For example, suppose that a Web user types in “nike.com”
but the page that appears instead is the home page of s11, an Australian
grassroots protest organization promoting fair employment practices. A
Web user may not even initially realize this redirecting has occurred
because the protest site often looks like the original. Both the compromised
company and the domain name registry must take time to correct the hijack,
significantly increasing the likelihood of lost business.
E-mail bombing. E-mail bombing is a second type of hacktivism; it is

sometimes intrusive and slightly to somewhat disruptive and damaging.
E-mail bombs involve sending massive quantities of e-mail or an extraor-
dinarily large individual message to an e-mail inbox. Client-side e-mail
bombs are not intrusive because they involve groups of people sending
e-mail messages from their own mailboxes. Server-side e-mail bombs are
intrusive, however, because they involve hacking into other people’s e-mail
systems and using their systems to further send and forward e-mail. In
either case, messages are sent to a particular businessperson’s or collective
company’s e-mail inbox. The intent is to flood the e-mail inbox and disrupt
business communication. This disruption can result in some damage
because, again, business may be lost.
Defacement and graffiti. A third type of hacktivism tactic useful for

online business protest is defacement. Defacement is the practice of alter-
ing the content of an existing Web site to display protest messages on that
site. Similarly, graffiti occurs when a hacker splashes protest messages
across a Web site. However, unlike defacement, graffiti does not require
that the original content of the Web site be altered; rather, the existing con-
tent is covered up. Both of these forms of hacktivism are intrusive because
they involve gaining unauthorized access to a computer system. It is likely
that managers would consider tactics such as defacement and graffiti
slightly to somewhat disruptive and damaging when deployed as online
business protest tactics. Usually there is downtime and a degree of loss
experienced by the company as a result of defacement or graffiti activity. If
the business has archived a copy of its original Web site, however, any dis-
ruption or potential damage can be minimized or corrected relatively
quickly by its information technology department.
Virtual sit-ins. The virtual sit-in or jamming is perhaps the best-known

hacktivism tactic useful for online business protest. Virtual sit-ins are anal-
ogous to 1960s sit-ins where activists blocked people’s physical access to
buildings. Virtual sit-ins or jammings are often referred to as distributed
denial of service (DDoS) protests, which simply means that Web users are
denied access to the targeted Web site. One of the most famous virtual busi-
ness sit-ins was conducted by the Electrohippies in 1999 against the WTO.
Virtual sit-ins are disruptive and damaging to the extent of the downtime
caused to the Web sites being jammed.
Virtual sit-ins are either client-side or server-side in origin. Client-side
sit-ins require mass participation by multiple users whereas server-side sit-ins
do not. When staging client-side sit-ins, protesters use special software
designed specifically for client-side jamming. Although new technologically
advanced methods are constantly being developed, currently the most fre-
quently used software is known as a “pinging” program, which allows each
protester to continuously request access to a business Web site. These
requests substantially slow the server hosting the Web site. When multiple
users activate this process a server may be brought to a halt. Client-side
protest tactics differ from server-side protest tactics in that one or two indi-
viduals can launch a server-side protest. These individuals are called “crack-
ers” rather than “hackers” because they break into servers and drop software
programs that modify the server and, when activated, continually ping the tar-
get (Jordan & Taylor, 2004). Client-side sit-ins are nonintrusive, we argue,
whereas server-side attacks are intrusive. Both client-side and server-side sit-
ins are slightly to severely disruptive because Web users must wait consider-
able time to access a business Web site being protested or, perhaps, cannot
gain access at all because a server has crashed. It follows that a business con-
ducting its transactions and communication entirely through the Internet can
be severely damaged by virtual sit-in protest tactics because of lost sales and
the inability to conduct other transactions.
Cyberterrorism
As previously stated, hacking can take the form of hacktivism or cybert-
errorism. Hacktivist tactics are sometimes intrusive, slightly to severely dis-
ruptive, and slightly to severely damaging. Cyberterrorism tactics are
always intrusive, severely disruptive, and severely damaging. As a means of
online business protest, cyberterrorism currently exists only in theory
(Denning, 2001). As of yet, terrorists have limited their use of the Internet
to distribute propaganda, communicate with one another, raise funds, and
lure new recruits (Conway, 2002). Currently, we can only surmise that the
purpose of cyberterrorism against business likely would be to create such
terror—through chaos, havoc, and the fear that innocent life could be lost
at any time—that business leaders would be forced to change policies or
practices. If online protest tactics were executed to create cyberterrorism
toward a business, it is likely that viruses or worms would be the protest
tactics of choice. To ensure timely, disruptive protests, cyberterrorists
would need to hack into and thus invade business computer systems to
activate viruses or worms.
Known for their destructive and reproductive capabilities, viruses and
worms currently cost companies significant amounts of money in both pre-
vention and recovery. For example, the typical British business of relatively
small to medium size loses approximately US$1,400 for every virus with
which it becomes infected. If a virus hits every small- to medium-size busi-
ness in the United Kingdom, it would amount to a total loss of approximately
US$3.5 billion among all businesses for that one virus alone (Hayday, 2002).
Again, although the extent of their damage and prevalence in corporate
society is great, viruses and worms have not yet been launched as online
protest tactics against business but instead as a means of cybercrime or just
to show that they can be created and used. At present, we can only speculate
about the destructive and potentially deadly forms that cyberterrorism could
take when mobilized as protest tactics against business.
Effectiveness of Online Business Protest Tactics:

An Evaluative Framework
The impact of citizen groups’ actions is generally considered to be the

most difficult to assess in analyzing organized interest-group effectiveness
(Cigler & Loomis, 1991). Off-line business activist groups and the businesses
they target have famously disagreed about the success rates of large-scale
product boycotts and other off-line protest tactics (Davidson et al., 1995).
Similar to off-line protest tactics, quantifying or appreciating the effective-
ness of online business protest tactics is not easy. Much like trying to mea-
sure interest-group wins and losses in legislation formation, any approach to
conceptualize the effectiveness of online business protests “is likely to be a
blunt instrument” (Berry, 1995, p. 74). It is no surprise, then, that there is con-
siderable disagreement between business leaders and the online protesters
themselves about the effectiveness of various online business protest tactics.
On the one hand, some say that denial-of-service protest tactics are not
effective. They are “more of a nuisance than anything else” (CNN Webmaster,
personal communication). In addition, the impact of online petitions arguably
has been diluted because of the sheer volume of e-mail and online communi-
cations to which business leaders have become accustomed (e.g., Gurak &
Logie, 2003). On the other hand, there is evidence that businesses have
responded positively to online protests against them, supporting the notion
that at least some online business protests have been successful (e.g.,
Cornfield, 2002; Deri, 2003). Ultimately it has been demonstrated in the lit-
erature that a range of social and political issues, such as those represented by
online protest tactics, can have profound impacts on business and therefore
warrant careful managerial attention (Mahon, 2002).
We offer a dualistic method with which to evaluate the effectiveness of the
various online business protest tactics that we have identified in this article.
We suggest that our framework for gauging the effectiveness of online busi-
ness protest tactics is equally applicable to off-line business protest tactics
mobilized by citizen interest groups. Given the conceptual and thematic con-
tinuities between the protest characteristics of online and off-line protests, we
argue that any evaluative criteria proposed must possess generalizability
appropriate for business protest tactics in both domains.
We propose that there are two degrees of business protests’ success.
First, we suggest that an online business protest tactic can be labeled effec-
tive if it achieves its ultimate end. The ultimate end of any online business
protest is to prompt change in objectionable business policies or practices.
It follows that an online business protest tactic is effective when it does just
that. Such protests are ultimately effective. Second, even if an online busi-
ness protest does not change business practice, it can be considered an
effective means of achieving an intermediate goal of capturing business
leaders’ attention. Such protests are intermediately effective. For example,
an e-mail campaign can be considered effective when its 500 e-mails gar-
ner coverage on a local news broadcast, which grasps the attention of key
business decision makers. This attention is a first, necessary step in achiev-
ing the ultimate end of changing business practices and may engender and
encourage further support for the cause (Vegh, 2003). Managerial aware-
ness incubates heightened concern for an issue and, perhaps eventually, cat-
alyzes change in policy or practice.
Appealing to interest-group theory (Walker, 1991), we advance several
core criteria useful for determining the intermediate and ultimate effective-
ness of online business protest tactics: support, public impact, and disruption.
Support can be significant or not and refers to the quantity or authority of the
participants in the protest. When quantity is the issue, the support can be
small or great in number. When authority is at stake, the support is a matter

of quality (ranging from people and groups who receive no respect to highly
respected authorities). Public impact ranges in degree and is conceptualized
by the number of people who are informed about the reason for the business
protest. Public impact could include mere awareness among a community or
business constituents, or it could be expanded to include the actual change
that is effected by the protest. Disruption to the business is a matter of degree
as well and refers to interruption of normal, daily business activities.
If an online business protest has significant support, considerable public
impact, and is at least slightly disruptive to the business being protested, it
will have intermediate effectiveness. In other words, the protest stands a
good chance of gaining the attention of the business decision makers to
whom it is directed.
However, online protest tactics may possess only one or two of the pre-
viously described dimensions and still be intermediately effective. For
example, business advisors as well as the popular press have urged business
leaders’ attention to the information disseminated on various constituency
groups’ blogs (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Droth, 2005). Blogs, as indicated by the
business press, have demonstrated effectiveness in gaining the attention
of business leaders (Baker & Green, 2005). In the scope of our proposed
effectiveness framework, a blog is likely to possess significant support
when maintained by an authoritative figure or group. In addition, the reach
of the Internet and its readily available access allow many blogs to attain
considerable public impact. Conversely, few blogs in and of themselves dis-
rupt the day-to-day operations or processes of a business. Nonetheless,
many researchers now argue that blogs are effective tools with which inter-
est groups can gain the ear of business (e.g., Dearstyne, 2005). This
example reinforces the complexity surrounding accurate analysis of the
effectiveness of the various online business protest tactics available.
Although preliminary evidence advises that online business protests can
be intermediately effective through support, public impact, and/or the abil-
ity to disrupt business, the next question is whether these criteria can
explain the ultimate effectiveness of some online business protests. We pro-
pose that they can. A case in point is when Procter & Gamble discontinued
its sponsorship of Dr. Laura Schlessinger’s syndicated television show after a
gay-rights activist listed the company as “bad guys” on his StopDrLaura.com
Web site. In conjunction with this, visitors to his Web site forwarded thou-
sands of protest e-mails to Procter & Gamble. Activists, along with the
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), objected to
Dr. Schlessinger because of her antigay statements and her characterization
of homosexuals as “biological errors.” Ultimately, loss of sponsorship from

Procter & Gamble and eventually others resulted in the television show’s
cancellation. Dr. Schlessinger also lost $30 million in corporate advertising
revenue for her radio show (Cornfield, 2002). We propose that the signifi-
cant support and degree of disruption to the show through loss of revenue
explains both the intermediate and ultimate effectiveness of this online
business protest.
Additional evidence illustrates that our criteria can elucidate how online
business protest tactics can be, as a matter of fact, ultimately effective
at influencing change in business policy. For example, dissatisfied with
California native grocery chain Trader Joe’s stance toward genetically mod-
ified food, activist groups and consumers mobilized an Internet campaign
after the company was unresponsive to the group’s concerns. Subsequent to
taking their protest efforts online, the collective group of citizens gathered
additional off-line support of individual Trader Joe’s customers to launch
an even larger Internet protest. Trader Joe’s then surveyed its customers and
found that they were aware of the protest and agreed with it because they
had a passion for not purchasing genetically modified foods. Shortly there-
after, Trader Joe’s publicly announced its revised company policy regard-
ing genetically modified products, setting in place rigorous standards for
jettisoning all genetically modified ingredients from their private-label
products by 2003 (Deri, 2003). In this case, the quantity of support and
public impact from the protest serve to explain both the intermediate and
ultimate effectiveness of the online business protest.
Even in light of these examples, we acknowledge the difficulty in sepa-
rating online business protests from off-line circumstances to delineate the
intermediate and ultimate effectiveness of the online business protest itself.
Importantly, online business protest tactics often augment off-line protests
including demonstrations at company headquarters, physical protests at
shareholder meetings, and product boycotts. For example, with regard to
the Trader Joe’s protest, it is difficult to determine how much Trader Joe’s
awareness of their customers’ objections to genetically modified food was
because of the online petition as opposed to the off-line protest. In addition,
although the online petition might have been the explanation for Trader
Joe’s awareness of the issue as well as change in company policy and prac-
tice, it is possible that the online petition created the awareness whereas
their own customer survey ultimately led them to make actual changes.
Other extraneous marketplace factors unique to protests waged against busi-
ness—as opposed to nonprofit organizations or governments, for example—
can further obfuscate an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of online
protest tactics. In particular, online business protests are sometimes coincidental

with broader economic effects such as market downturns or start-up com-
plications. Again, potential confluence of these forces makes it difficult to
separate and subsequently measure the specific effectiveness of the online
protest tactic in bringing about awareness of issues and changes in business
practice. For example, consider eToys.com, the upstart online toy store that
lost significant market share and nearly collapsed during the 1999 holiday
season. Some experts speculated that the cause of the market share loss was
not the global online protest in which eToys.com was entrenched, but rather
the fact that the company had not developed its production capability to
match the volume of orders placed for Christmas (Weisenburger, 2001).
The biggest hurdle for determining the effectiveness of online business
protest tactics in these instances is acquiring the relevant business informa-
tion to differentiate broader market effects from the unique impacts created
by the online protest.
Conclusion and Future Research
Online protest tactics are a new vehicle of activism increasingly utilized by

citizen interest groups to communicate with business. A significant benefit of
protest tactics against business that are conducted in cyberspace is the sheer
scope of participation that is possible. The Internet enables citizen groups to
communicate a concern and subsequently garner support for that concern from
around the globe. An anecdote surmising that “history might have been very
different if Karl Marx had been able to send e-mails” (BBC Online, 1999)
alludes to the magnitude and the potential power of online protest tactics.
We have demonstrated how an accurate conceptualization and evaluation
of the effectiveness of online business protest tactics is critical. As online
protest tactics continue to be mobilized against business, future inquiry is
needed. We recommend four avenues for developing this new line of
research. First, we have argued that our effectiveness criteria for online busi-
ness protests are universal in the sense that they may be applied to off-line
forms of interest-group activism. However, specific facets of Internet
communication may imply special concerns and attention. For this reason,
the comparison between off-line and online business protests must become
richer and deeper. Second, information regarding the impact of online protests
on firm performance, including stock value metrics, likely will become increas-
ingly available. In the vein of stock market analyses, such as those conducted
by Davidson and colleagues (1995), we recommend empirical examination of
firm performance in the wake of various online business protest tactics.

Third, though we have used interest-group theory as our framework in this
article, the stakeholder approach would also be a valuable foundation from
which to understand and develop online business protest theory. The stake-
holder approach is a prominent means for exploring business’s relation to its
communities, and vice versa. Fourth, because being effective is not synony-
mous with being morally responsible, a discussion of the moral legitimacy
of the various online business protest tactics is in order. This research would
augment our current discussion of the effectiveness of online business
protest tactics. Ultimately, effectiveness and moral legitimacy criteria com-
bined could help managers differentiate those online protest tactics appro-
priately characterized as egregious from those that warrant further dialogue
with citizen groups and stakeholders.
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Kelly D. Martin is an assistant professor of marketing in the College of Business at Colorado

State University. Her research interests include marketing strategy with ethical implications,
interfirm marketing relationships, and the role of marketing in society. Her research has
appeared in the Academy of Management Journal and the Journal of Business Ethics.
Beverly Kracher is an associate professor of business ethics and society in the College of
Business Administration at Creighton University. Her research areas include moral reasoning
in business, e-commerce ethics and online trust, and business ethics pedagogy. Her research
appears in such journals as Business Ethics Quarterly, Business & Society, Journal of Business
Ethics, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, and Teaching Business Ethics.
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A Conceptual Framework for Online Business

Article in Business & Society · September 2008

Kelly D. Martin Beverly Kracher

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A Conceptual Framework for Online Business Protest Tactics and

The online version of this article can be found at:

International Association for Business and Society

Email Alerts: http://bas.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Tactics and Criteria for

Keywords: stakeholder activism; online protests; cyberterrorism; civil disobedience

A ctivism against business certainly is not a novel concept. Researchers

committed by business (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995; Glickman,

cyberterrorists may be motivated to cause destruction to essential institutions

Defining and Distinguishing Online Business

We define online business protest tactics as deliberate, directed actions

Conceptual Linkages: Interest-Group Theory

Online Business Protest Tactics: A Typology

To differentiate various online business protest tactics, we advance a per-

Online Business Protests

Hijacking E-mail bombs Defacement Graffiti Virtual sit-in

Client-side Server-side Client-side Server-side

hackings. The two forms of hacking, as represented in Figure 1, are hacktivism,

Informational Protest Web Sites

One example is the Web site for Infact (http://www.infact.org), a nonprofit

E-mail Campaigns and Online Petitions

Similar in nature to e-mail campaigns, online petitions have become a

Spoofs and Parasites

Hijacking. The first method, hijacking, involves protesters actively redi-

hijack only by compromising one of the domain name registries, such as

E-mail bombing. E-mail bombing is a second type of hacktivism; it is

Defacement and graffiti. A third type of hacktivism tactic useful for

Virtual sit-ins. The virtual sit-in or jamming is perhaps the best-known

Effectiveness of Online Business Protest Tactics:

The impact of citizen groups’ actions is generally considered to be the

small or great in number. When authority is at stake, the support is a matter

of homosexuals as “biological errors.” Ultimately, loss of sponsorship from

protest tactics. In particular, online business protests are sometimes coincidental

Conclusion and Future Research

Online protest tactics are a new vehicle of activism increasingly utilized by

firm performance in the wake of various online business protest tactics.

Kelly D. Martin is an assistant professor of marketing in the College of Business at Colorado

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