ELEMENTS OF SIMPLEX

STRUCTURE
RICHARD A. PETERSON
HOWARD G. WHITE

ONE OF THE CARDINAL CONCERNS of social science is

how individual competitiveness is socially patterned. The
rules of formal organizations are important in curbing com-
petition, but competition does not often become a free-for-
all, even in those situations where the stakes are high and
there is no formal organization that enforces order. Informal
organizations must have means of coping with competition,
but what are they?
This question focused our attention several years ago on
recording-session musicians in the commercial music in-
dustry. These skilled musicians work on a free-lance basis
so that each theoretically competes with all others for the
brief, demanding, well-paying, and prestigious work of
playing the &dquo;background music&dquo; which augments the ef-
forts of star performers. Our earlier study (Peterson and
White, 1979) found that overt competition was slight and
channeled along specific lines even m the absence of formal
organizational mechanisms shaping these arrangements

AUTHORS’NOTE We gratefully acknowledge the generous help of the following

people who have provided key Insights for this article !var Berg Joel Best Richard
Brown, Derral Cheatwood, Paul DWMaggso, Kenneth Dorow Robert Falkner

URBAN LIFE Vol 10 No 1 April 198. 324

~CD 1981 Sage Publications Inc

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 4

While not formally constituted, the arrangements inhibiting

competition insured that only a few of the musicians
received virtually all of the recording-session work. Those at
the center of the system explained that the best get the
work, but independent observations showed that the active
musicians, while competent, were not always those with
the greatest musical proficiency. This observation triggered
~ the quest for the social mechanisms which were patterning
t the competition. Simplex is the name we have given to the
set of mechanisms used by the few musicians to gain an
oligopolistic position in what was designed as an open
market for recording jobs.
In all its ethnographic detail, the musicians’ simplex is
surely unique, but the same mechanisms may be found
elsewhere. Here we seek out the sorts of situations in
which the simplex can flourish.

PEERS IN COMPETITION

Two factors seem to importantly condition the simplex and

set this form off from most other sorts of informal groups.
First, the simplex is composed of peers, that is, individuals
who occupy the same position in the relevant social situa-
tion. Second, the simplex develops where each individual
would otherwise be in competition with all others. Thus, for
example, the members of a given simplex in our earlier
musician study played the same instrument.
Gerald Hage, Paul Hirsch, Michael Hughes, Charles Kadushm, Peter Manning,
Gerald Marwell, Alan Masur, Ricky McCarty, Walter Powell, John Ryan, Clinton
Sanders, Robert Stern, Ann Swidler, Michael Useem, Harrison White, Margaret
Wyszomirski, Mayer Zald, and Vera Zolberg. We are also grateful to the National
Endowment for the Arts for providing the first author with research leave while the
article was being formulated.
EDITOR’S NOTE. In their previous article (Urban Life, January 1979), Peterson and
White detailed the characteristics of the simplex, a form of association found
among recording studio musicians in the phonograph recording industry. Here
they seek the general characteristics of the simplex and suggest the situations
where it may be found among individuals, organizations, industries, and nations in
competition.

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 5

Peer-based groups are the exception rather than the rule

among human collectivities. Most sorts of groups are com-
posed of persons who are drawn to each other precisely
because of their differing talents, contacts, and knowledge
(Granovetter,1974; Kadushm, ~1 975, Fischer, 1977; Denich,
1978). And groups may accent differences among individuals
m order to increase interdependence. As Durkheim noted,
differences in the division of labor by sex are greatly
exaggerated in most societies so that men and women will
regularly need each other for a wide range of services.
In this article we trace the development of simplical
structures in three different sorts of situations;
first, where
Individuals are in competition, second, where organizations
rather than individuals are m competition, and third, where
Individuals within organizations combine in order to accom-
modate not to market-induced competition, but to the com-
petition among peers which has been induced by formal
rules.

SCHOOLS

Not all groups composed of peers form simplexes. Other

groups composed primarily of peers include what have been
termed &dquo;schools,&dquo; &dquo;circles,&dquo; and &dquo;brokerage&dquo; systems. These
will be examined briefly in order to better detail the condi-
tions conducive to simplex-formation.
Sometimes competing peers collectively gain control over
the evaluation of their own performance by successfully
asserting that they alone can interpret and propagate a
single authoritative body of knowledge based on science,
religion, or tradition. Examples Include contemporary phy-
sics, medieval craft guilds, the French Royal Academy of
Arts, the free professions m this century, and the Roman
Catholic Church
Under such conditions which Crane (1976) characterizes
as having an independent reward system, competition ts

regulated by a small academy of elder peers who evaluate

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6

and reward new recruits and junior members through a set

of career stages. Thus, individuals compete only with others
at their own level, and there is increasing security with each
step up the ladder.
While academies espouse a single orthodoxy, disputes,
alternative interpretations, and factions regularly arise with-
In the elite peer group. These have profound effects on
the patterns of competition because senior academy mem-
bers coach, protect, and reward those junior peers who
support their particular position.
Such vertically bonded chains of sponsors and clients
have been observed in the full range of professional and
academic systems (Hall, 1948; Lipset et al, 1 956; White and
White, 1965; Podhoretz, 1968; White, 1970; Clark, 1973;
Blume, 1974; Zuckerman, 1977). Among sociologically ori-
ented scholars at least, the metabolism of schools has not
been well studied. Most work has focused on the process of
establishing academies (Clark, 1973; Adler, 1979) or their
demise (White and White, 1965) rather than on the conse-
quences they have for competition, and the influences they
have on the quality of production. It seems plausible,
however, that each of the schools within an academy may
function much like a simplex (see especially Clark’s [1973]
discussion of the establishment of sociology in the Nine-
teenth Century French academic world).

CIRCLES

If schools evolve In the context of academic orthodoxy,

quite a different form of organization develops where there
is open-market competition over the very nature of the work
to be produced. The paradigmatic situation of this sort is the
avant-garde marketplace for art and literature which re-
placed the academic system m the latter half of the nine-
teenth century (White and White, 1965)
1-i this increasingly faddish art world, competing to more
completely overturn convention became the mark of crea-

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 7

tive excellence (Guerard, 1966; Adler, 1975; Becker, 1978).

A set of interests, including dealers, critics, museums,
patrons, galleries, and scholars developed m this hyper-

competitive art world to merchandise, evaluate, advertise,

and explain &dquo;the new&dquo; (White and White, 1965; Rosenberg
and Fliegel, 1965; Shapiro, 1976; Walters, 1978, Zolberg,
1980). Parallel periods of competition among ideas penodi-
cally occur in science, politics, and religion (Heirich, 1974)
when, for one reason or another, the fundamental premises
of routine work are successfully challenged.
When the institutional supports of any conventional sys-
tem fall, each creator must compete for attention with all
others, but as McHugh (1966)has observed, where there
are so many competitors each may feel a shared fate with
those around and share information, ideas, and emotional
support. Such links tend to coalesce into the sort of network
which Kadushm (1976) calls the &dquo;circle.&dquo;
He characterizes the circle as having no clear boundary
because each member knows some, but not all others. Cir-
cles have no clear criteria of achievement, and so they have
no agreed ranking of members. The circle may have one or
more regions of greater interaction, but there are no officers
and no formal rules. Such networks are typically associated
with a particular place of congregation, a cafe, a gallery,
theatre group, political club, publishing firm, or neighbor-
hood (Naughton, 1979).
The circle of French impressionist painters (White and
White, 1965; Rogers, 1970), literati of the Bloomsbury
group (Arney, 1978; Morgan, 1978; Edel, 1979), and the
scientists responsible for developing recent models of gene-
tic structure (Watson, 1969) have received the most atten-
tion ; but numerous other circles among painters (Ridgeway,
1978), politicians (Wyszomlrskl, 1979), scientists (Crane,
1972; Mullins et al., 1977), and writers (Nelson, 1971 ) have
been identified
Typically, circles are like social movements Beginning as
loose confederations of competitors, they evolve a perspec-

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8

tive, theory, method, or style which is in opposition to the

established conventions. Most of these groups fail, but
some few succeed in the marketplace for symbolic products.
Success may be due to any one of a number of extrinsic
factors having little to do with aesthetics (Walters, 1978) or
scientific merit (Fleck, 1979), but once established, the
circle is attacked by fledgling movement/circles. Observing
a generation of rock music, Melly (1971) identifies such an
evolution from what began as an anguished revolt against
the established forms of popular music, but which with
success became a mere style, and was in turn attacked by a
younger generation of rock artists.
Circles seem to flourish where there is near perfect
competition and no stable or clear criteria for success. A
circle succeeds insofar as it is able, for awhile, to provide
such criteria. But in a marketplace thirsting for new prod-
ucts, they cannot succeed for long. As Adler (1976) notes,
the process that continually seeks innovation in art works,
as surely makes individual artists obsolete.

BROKERAGE
The hyper-competitive environment which produces cir-
cles can also produce quite different forms of association, if
conditions are changed slightly. Recall that circles develop
in a competitive market, one where there are many persons
competing to provide services, no one group controls the
definition of quality, and there are many purchasers of
services.
If there are many sellers but only a few large buyers, the
market is called oligopsonistic. In such a market, forms of
association quite different from the circle tend to emerge.
The simplex is found in an oligopsonistic market, but so is a
form of association that splits rather than brings together
competing peers. This is the system of &dquo;brokerage.&dquo;
Many types of commercial artists employ personal bro-
kers to help them find buyers for their works or labor. The
title for these persons is usually &dquo;agent.&dquo; The literary agent

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 9

has the oldest and most highly developed tradition among

brokers of talented persons in Western society (Madison,
1974; Powell, 1978). Actors (Steiner, 1977; Friedman,
1978), singers, entertainers, commercial photographers
(Rosenblum, 1973), and Illustrators usually employ agents.
Publishers sometime serve commercial songwrrters m much
the same capacity (Rumble, 1980).
In common, these agent-brokers keep abreast of the
needs of buyers and they coach their client-artists on the
best way to present their talents or products. They serve
the buyer by, in effect, prescreemng the numerous competi-
tors who would otherwise besiege purchasers. The broker
vouches for the technical competence and the social relia-
bility of the craftsperson.
The agent, in turn, relieves the craftsperson of the need to
seek out buyers and &dquo;sell&dquo; his/her work. Thus, the agent
makes possible an exchange of money for services and
products between two incompatible worlds, the one of
universalistic profit-seeking and the other of egotistic/artis-
try (DiMaggio, 1977).
While they facilitate the flow across these boundaries,
agents go to great lengths to prevent direct communication
between buyers and craftpersons or among craftspersons-
such contacts would greatly reduce the need for an agent.
Simpson (1978) describes the world of contemporary fine
art painters in the Soho district of New York these terms. m
Rather than relate primarily with other artists, forming
circles, or link directly with buyer-patrons, as earlier gener-
ations of New York painters had done (Rosenberg and
Fliegel, 1965; Bystryn, 1978), the successful among these
visual artists are oriented primarily to the dealers who run
commercial galleries. These dealers place artists under
exclusive contract, advise them on what to produce, and
show their work to influential private buyers and museums
whose support brings notoriety and financial success.
Brokers are also found at the blue collar level where the
need for unskilled labor is irregular The shape-up of day
workers as stevedores working on the waterfront, and labor

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10

contractors among migrant farm workers

are two cases in
point (Peterson, 1973). In form, these brokers perform the
same services as the agents discussed above. They bring a
klnd of order and predictability to an otherwise chaotic
market for labor.
In all these cases where brokers play a crucial role in an
oligopsonistic market, the producers-peers seem to have
lost most of their control over the definition of the quality of
their work. In this regard, the broker system contrasts most
sharply with the academy system described above where
the peer group alone is arbiter of quality (Hagstrom, 1965;
Crane, 1976). The musicians’ simplex stands between these
two extremes. The marketplace success or failure of phono-
graph records is the final test of the product, but the peer
group rather than agents or producers certifies the com-
petence of Individual performers (Faulkner, 1971, 1976;
Peterson and White, 1979).

PEER SYSTEMS COMPARED

We have reviewed four sorts of competitive situations

among peers and found that the simplex emerges in only
one of these. If controls over the definition of, and reward

for, excellence is in the hands of the peer group, academies

and schools emerge. If these factors are located m an
avant-garde marketplace, circles emerge. Where middlemen
can interpose themselves to make evaluations, a brokerage

system emerges. From this review, together with the evi-

dence of the musician study, It is now possible to suggest
the boundary conditions for the emergence of the simplex.
The simplex emerges In conditions mandating perfect
competition among peers In which the definition of the
quality of work IS made by the purchases of services, but the
peer group IS able to control the definition of the proficiency
of Its members and would-be members
In this sense, the simplex stands between the school and
the circle While the school controls the definition of quality

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 11

work and the proficiency of workers, the circle tries but does
not control either for long. In the brokerage system, as in the
simplex system, the peer group does not control evaluations
of the quality of product. In the brokerage system the
dealer-broker screens producers, while in the simplex sys-
tem it is the peer group which evaluates and ranks itself.
Having stated the conditions necessary for the emer-
gence of the simplex, and having shown what different
sorts of informal structures, ranging from schools to broker-
age systems, emerge when one or more of these conditions
are not present; we will now seek out situations beyond the
music recording studio where structures like the musicians’
simplex are found.

INDIVIDUALS FORMING SIMPLEXES

Several commentators have noted that research in organ-

izations has tended to focus either on the foibles of formal
organization or on the behavior of individuals within formal
organizations (Burns, 1955; Tichy, 1973; Peterson and
White, 1977). The recurrent structure of Informal organiza-
tion has received scant attention.
For example, the contemporary way of producing movies
and television shows, which brings together many sorts of
freelance technical experts for short periods of time, seems
to have the requisites of simplex formation, but the available
literature, both technical and popular, only hmts at their
presence. Instead, these works take either an individual, or
organizational perspective m research on directors (Cantor,
1971), musicians (Faulkner, 1971), scriptwriters, composers,
stuntmen (Stump, 1970), or on the full range of occupation-
al media occupations (Shanks 1976; Burns, 1977). It is
almost as if informal meant aformal. Given the foci of past
research, it is understandable that our search of the litera-
ture for examples of simplexlike structures has been only
partially successful. Perforce then, we must rely on tenta-
tive inferences as much as on solid case studies.

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12

Alan Mazur has suggested in private correspondence

that the simplex may be found among some professional
athletes-and is most easily seen among those in individual
competition, such as race car drivers or tennis and golf pros.
The first author knows from personal experience that pro-
fessional sailboat racers, persons who compete against
amateurs and each other in regattas while working for a
boat builder or sailmaker, do form a set of overlapping
simplexes. Even white competing with each other, they
monitor fair play (which is often quite different from follow-
ing the rules) within their own ranks, they exchange many
tips on techniques, and they act quite blatantly to prevent
undesired rivals from joining their ranks.
Research on organized crime, more than research on any
other context, has shown the operation of simplical struc-
tures. In the realm of organized crime, a market of perfect
competition, with its attendant high rates of violence, is
rationalized by a small group of criminals who coalesce into
invisible families to protect each other and eliminate rivals.
While ethnic inspiration (Blok, 1974; Light, 1977), the
conception of &dquo;family&dquo; is sociological not biological (lanni,
1972, 1974; Brown, 1976).
While the violent death or deposition of a family-head
occasions the greatest newspaper coverage, these studies
document numerous parallels to the structure and func-
tioning of the musicians’ simplex. These parallels extend
even to the destabilizing consequences of technology, and
the introduction of new sorts of products. Much as the
introduction of new musical styles and new techniques of
record-making make it possible for rival simplexes to suc-
cessfully challenge the established musicians, likewise, the
introduction of new drug sources and new means of import-
ing drugs have allowed rival gangs to successfully chal-
lenge the existing system (Cannon, 1979).
Simplexes may operate at two levels in the world of
organized crime. In addition to the simplexes formed of

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 13

individuals bonded together as families, there may be a

higher-order simplex in the world of crime

well. Since as
there is a continual threat that each family will compete
with the others to increase its sphere of criminal activity,
the heads of families have, more or less successfully,
combined in a simplex of simplexes to arbitrate rivalries
among families, collectively keep out nonmembers, and
negotiate with the authorities about the permissible scope
of illegal activity.
Some of the literature on the American ruling class
suggests that this may be a fertile arena in which to look for
simplexes. Whatever else it may be or do, the ruling class
elite is a set of competing peers who do cooperate to
maintain their established position (Baltzell, 1958, 1964).
There are numerous studies of clique-formation which
operate through formal associations, such as corporations
and banks (Allen, 1974; Mariolis, 1975; Miller, 1978), or
cultural organization boards of directors (Meyer, 1979;
Steine, 1979). Links are also cemented through fraternal
associations such as the secret societies at Yale (Rosen-
baum, 1977), recreational associations such as the Bohemi-
an Grove in northern California (Domhoff, 1974; Kramer,

1977) and political groups in Washington (Bonacich and

Domhoff, 1978) and cultural institutions (Useem, 1979).
When examined in detail, many of these are not so much
tight groupings of rival peers as they are loose collections
who have different resources and skills which they hope to
pool for mutual benefit. In form, these groups look less like
simplexes and more like circles as described above Sim-
plexes seem more likely to emerge m segments of the ruling
class which are discriminated against for reasons of region,
religion, or ethmoty. Their cultural homogeneity is not only
the basis of discrimination against them, but IS also the
basis for defining a tightly bounded simplex structure
Birmingham, (1976) provides an excellent case in point In
his study of the rise and flowering of the German Jewish
elite In New York City between 1837 and 1929

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14

Numerous situations m which individuals compete might

be examined for simplex-formation, but this part of the
presentation will conclude with one final illustration, which
is drawn from the animal world. Studies have long noted
the existence of hierarchical pecking-orders within a num-
ber of different species of mammals and birds living m close
proximity. These hierarchical arrangements make for a
continuing low level of tension but greatly reduce the
frequency of senous violence among band members All
captive and most free-living primate bands of any size show
some degree of hierarchy at least among adult males.
Serious threats and fighting tend to occur only between
animals of adjacent or nearly adjacent ranks.
Hall and DeVore (1965), however, report that among
some baboon bands the high ranked males exhibit another
sort of behavior. When any of their number is attacked by an
outside baboon, all the rest of the high ranking baboons
attack the rival In unison. Using this collective self-defense,
the dominant group members are able to keep their high
rank collectively long after their individual fighting ability
has waned. Imanlshi (1963) and Kaufman (1967) report
similar patterns of collective self-defense among the domi-
nant males of Japanese macaques and rhesus monkeys.
Why does the simplical structure emerge among some, but
not all band-living monkeys and apes (Kaufman 1967;
Chance and Jolly, 1970)? Answers to these questions may
provide clues to the process of simplex-formation among
humans (Masur, 1973).

GR~r~ ~ TE S FORMING SIMPLEXES

If individuals of the species may find themselves compet-

ing, so may organizations of various sorts. There are numer-
ous situations m which organizations of like kind combine to
form associations of the simplical sort.
Near-perfect competition has characterized the early
stages of almost every industry in the United States. Over

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 15

time, the less successful firms are eliminated or absorbed,

but perfect monopoly ts not reached due, m large part, to the
operation of federal anti-trust legislation (Pffeffer and Sala-
nik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979). Instead the market comes to be
dominated by a few firms. The auto industry IS a classic case
in point (Scherer, 1970; Vernon, 1972).
The evolution toward oligopolistic markets has been most
often noted in manufacturing and consumer services (Ver-
non, 1972), but at the local level the same process can be
observed in professional service industries as well. MacRae
(1978) has shown how the leading law firms of a city
operate m concern to divide up the most desirable law work
leaving the more risky, declasse, and low profit work to the
marginal firms, partnerships, and solo lawyers.
Much the same process has been described for social
welfare agencies of another city by Gerald Hage (m private
communication). The various agencies did not compete m
the 1950s. Each had a well-defined niche, receiving money
from and servicing a special community defined along
religious and ethnic lines. Intense competition came with
the infusion of large amounts of Federal &dquo;war on poverty&dquo;
money in the mid-1960s. When last observed m 1970,
competition was again muted. A slightly altered set of
agencies worked together to jointly lobby for increased
welfare funding and to shut out the competition from other
agencies.
This cycle of oligopoly followed by competition, followed
in by reenollgopollzatlon has been charted by Peterson
turn
and Berger (1975) In the commercial music mdustry. The
trend toward greater concentration in the music mdustry
has been due in part to the actions of the firms m competi-
tion with each other, but the leading firms also cooperate m
various ways to reduce the competition from rising indepen-
dent firms. For example, the leading firms have manipulated
fears about immorality in music to reduce competition from
the more free-wheeling independents (Leonard, 1962;
Sanjek, 1972). And a similar tactic has been used at some

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16

time or another in each of the commercial entertainment

industries, including movies, comics, radio, and television
(Peterson, 1976). The manipulation of capital, patents,
government regulations, and pricing policies among the few
leading firms to etiminate competition has been best de-
tailed in the case of the pharmaceutical industry (Murray,
1974; Hirsch, 1973; Peterson, 1980).
In the field of international business, combinations of
leading producers can be more explicit and formalized
because there are no anti-trust regulations. The oit cartel,
OPEC, is just the most consequential of many simplexlike
cartels. They take many forms, ranging from the DeBeers
interests who control the world’s supply of fine diamonds
(Gibson, 1979) to CERT, the organization of American
Indian tribes which controls lands with fuel deposits.
Not-for-profit organizations often cooperate to reduce
competition for scarce resources and promote common
interests as we have already seen for the case of welfare
agencies above. The National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (Stern, 1979) and the World Council of Churches
(Heirich, 1974) have recently been studied from this per-
spective.
In all these competitive spheres of organizational action,
something like the simplex seems to emerge, Groupings of
like-type organizations form to reduce competition between
members and cooperate toward common goals. The degree
to which these simplexes of organizations actively operate
to prevent or discourage rival nonmembers is not clear in all
cases (Heirich, 1974), but is dramatically strong where it
has been a focus of attention (Peterson and Berger, 1975;
Sanjek, 1972; Stern, 1979).
Some of the combinations of organizations just discussed,
notably OPEC, the NCAA, and the World Council of Churches,
have become formally constituted organizations seeking
public legitimacy. As they do so, they can incorporate more
members and exercise social control through formal mech-
anisms. And yet, informal means of control continue to be

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 17

quite important as well (Stern, 1979); just as many of the

mechanisms of control within secret college societies con-
tinue to operate when the groups become formalized as
fraternities and sororities (Rosenbaum, 1977). lf informal
mechanisms are used within formal organizations, IS there
any utility in looking for the simplex m such structures? This
is the question to which we turn m focusing again on
Individuals rather than organizations as the units of analy-
sis.

IMBEDDED IN ORGANIZATIONS

Persons at the same organizational level do not compete

with each other in a market context. Nevertheless, organi-
zations are usually structured so that employees do com-
pete for favorable evaluations, promotions, and pay raises.
When evaluation IS clearly individualized, as in the case of
executives, the competition-reducing patterns of associa-
tion tend to link individuals vertically (White, 1970; Blau,
1977; Kanter, 1977; Wyszomirski, 1979). When evaluation
and sanction are shared more or less equally by entire
groups, however, peer groups tend to predominate. Exam-
ples of peer-bonding include blue collar work groups (Whyte,
1949; Roy, 1952; Babchuk and Goode, 1951), enlisted men
m combat (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Little, 1964; Shibu-

tanl, 1978), and prisoners (Sykes and Messinger, 1960).

Only m the latter situation do peer groups resemble the
simplex. Only In prison do the more powerful men band
together for their mutual benefit against the other prisoners
and the prison administration Perhaps this is not surprising
because prisoners are involuntary organization members
and the mmate &dquo;community&dquo; IS more nearly m the condition
of competition than are any other organization-peer groups
which have been studied.
Why has the simplex not been identified imbedded In
formal organization? Two possibilities suggest themselves.
It may be that researchers have not looked for the simplex,

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18

and It may be that it is not there. We have traced the

patterns of research on organizations, suggesting that 60
years of empirical work, diverse as it surely is, has focused
on formal organization and the short-run accommodations
individuals make to rule-based organizations (Peterson and
White, 1977). The relatively few studies that have examined
the form of Informal organization see it as shaped by outside
forces, such as the operation of formal rules (Shils and
Janowitz, 1948), individual careers (Hall, 1948; Kanter,
1977), machine technology (Sayles, 1958), or episodes in
organizational politics (Burns, 1955). It may be that the
structunng consequences of formally constituted complex
groups may be so great that the simplex form does not
survive. If so, the simplex may literally be alternative to

complex organization.

ELEMENTS OF SIMPLEX STRUCTURE

This review has ranged widely in order to assay both the

characteristics and the extent of the simplex. Given the
state of the literature, the question of its extent is still very
much open. The scattered reports on informal groups in
occupations and in organizations, however, are suggestive.
With this wide range of information to temper and sup-
plement the observations made in the study of the musi-
cians’ simplex, it is possible to identify seven characteristics
which seem to be common to all simplexes. These are:

(1) The simplex is an informal group that functions without a

constitution, officers, or any of the normal trappings of for-
mal or complex organizations-thus the name &dquo;simplex&dquo; is
used to counterpose it to &dquo;complex&dquo; organization.
(2) A simplex is composed of a small set of peers who know
each other personally They assess and rank each others’
ability while acclaiming their collective excellence relative
to all nonmembers
(3) Simplex members discipline and reward each other through
gossip and the exchange of favors

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 19

(4) Simplex members seek to control the relevant people m the

task environment by shaping the flow of information both
about how the job can best be done, and also about the abil-
ity of persons inside and outside the simplex to satisfactor-
ally perform the work
(5) The simplex is a set of mechanisms for rejecting, recruiting,
and rewarding prospective members so that most aspirants
support, rather than challenge, the simplex
(6) Simplex structures are surprisingly stable, some surviving
for more than a decade with a gradual but complete turnover

membership.
in

(7) Although powerful and long-lasting, simplexes remain in-

visible to most observers. What is ordinarily seen is individ-
ual acts of ranking, favors, and contacts while the collective
nexus we call the simplex goes unobserved.
Our quest, which begun with observations of the unanti-
cipated cooperation among recording studio musicians, has
led us both far and wide. From the evidence of the journey,
the simplex form of association emerges only in rather
special environing conditions. At the same time, there are
numerous signs that these conditions can be found not only
among some individuals in competition, but also among
firms in an industry, organizations in a market, and even
groups of nations.
Above all, this review highlights the need for more careful
comparisons of the numerous sorts of groupings such as
circles, schools, simplexes, and the like. Together they may
well form a class of associations standing between the
intimate primary group and the formal rule-conditioned
complex organization. While large numbers of case studies
can be cited, the systematic charting of this fascinating
domain has hardly begun.

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RICHARD A PETERSON, an industrial sociologist at Vanderbilt University inter-

ested in the production of culture, has researched genres of commercial music
ranging from jazz to disco, and is currently completing a monograph on the
commercialization of country music m Nashville A year’s research leave with the
Research Division of the National Endowment of the Arts has opened a line of
research dealing with contemporary American lifestyles and patterns of cultural
choice
HOWARD G WHITE is Professor of Sociology and Social Science at Chicago City-
Wide College of the City Colleges of Chicago He received his master’s from
Columbia University and his doctorate from the University of Kansas Continuing
his investigation of &dquo;simplex structures,&dquo; at present, he is undertaking a study of
Chicago chefs

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