Parreno v. COA (June 7, 2007) service.
Hence, petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future benefits
FACTS:
 Salvador Parreño (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. He retired from the Philippine
Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and received payment, of a
lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started
receiving his monthly pension. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a
naturalized American citizen.
 In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended, which provides that a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired
list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of
the AFP denied the request.
 Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly
pension, but the COA denied his claim for lack of jurisdiction.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;
2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality
of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended; and
3. Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective
effect.
HELD:
 The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed COA.
 On the jurisdiction of COA: The jurisdiction of COA over money claims
against the government does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality of validity of laws.
 On whether PD 1638 should be applied prospectively: We do not agree
with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG that PD 1638, as
amended, should apply only to those who joined the military after its
effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should
apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval.
Petitioner retired in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638, as amended.
Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to petitioner.
 On whether PD 1638 deprives him of property which the Constitution
and statutes vest in him: PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any
vested right or interest of petitioner. At the time of the approval of PD
1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in active
and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits
or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of
service.
 It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
 Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous
in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employee
participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.
 On the constitutionality pf Sec 27 of PD 1638:
 The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but
is subject to reasonable classification.
 To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
 There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the
Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization
in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. A retiree who
had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the
state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioner’s loss of
Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes
him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.
 Even when a retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a part of
the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement imposed
by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory, or
contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable
condition that is necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would
be detrimental to the interest of the state.
 There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his
Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension
in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.
 Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he
reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the
benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of
his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the
 resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with
the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits
provided he is a Filipino citizen.
KMU v. Director General
FACTS:
President Arroyo issued EO 420 ordering all GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID)
SYSTEMS. The executive order covers all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents.
ISSUES:
WON EO 420 violate the right to privacy?
WON it require legislation?
HELD:
1. No, it did not violate the right to privacy. EO 420 shows no
constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that
can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID
systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in
contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards. It does not establish a national ID card
system. EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC
which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards.
This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government. [KMU v. Director-
General GR No. 167798 April 19, 2006]
2. No, it did not require legislation. What require legislation are three
aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the
implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation
because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as
well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID
card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required
for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed.
EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing
ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the
proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420
requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of
personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In
fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the
data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO
420.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs. SOLUTA
Facts:
 Petitioners’ version: In late 1987, Coronel Maniego, GM of the Rapier
Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, Inc.
(REPISA) had been receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana,
dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in the union office at
the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate. Thus, Maniego
conducted a surveillance, with the approval of Panlilio, the VP for
Finance of Silahis, of suspected members and officers of the union. In
the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy
Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security
guard Steve Villanueva entered the union office located at the hotel
basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay and
searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic
bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of
marijuana.
 Respondents’ version: On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera, a
laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room
at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard
pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker
room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed
to recognize but was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly
opening the door of the union office. She even saw one of the men hid
something behind his back. Soon after she heard the door of the union
office opened. In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer
Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida
 narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta thus
immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer and he
fetched a locksmith to assist him in opening the door. At that instant,
men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting
Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker
room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they
called for police assistance. While awaiting the arrival of the police,
Babay and Panlilio had a meeting where Panlilio told Babay that they
proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling
incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the office could not be
opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the
door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began
searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them
if they had a search warrant. Subsequently, a plastic bag was found
containing marijuana flowering tops.
 As a result of the discovery, a complaint against 13 union officers was
filed for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). After trial,
the RTC acquitted the accused stating that the suspicious circumstance
of confiscation of the specimen and/or marijuana flowering tops
allegedly found inside the Union Office is not admissible in evidence.
 The union officers, together with the union, filed a complaint against
petitioners for malicious prosecution and violation of their
constitutional right against illegal search. After trial, the RTC held
petitioners liable for damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision with modification as to damages.
Issue:
 Whether the petitioner’s search of the union office was entirely
reasonable under the circumstances
Held:
 No. Petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late
1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and
Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the
morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged
into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite
ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of
Babay. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in
illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a
warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search
thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code.
 In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the progression of time
between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the
therein private respondents’ premises showed that there was sufficient
time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Yet they did not apply for one. They went on with the
raid and seized the goods of the therein private respondents. Under the
circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court
to the therein private respondents for violation of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
 As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures,
occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community
and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether
constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. Thus, it is
necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals
civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil
Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would
defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual
rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of
the plaintiff.
 While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or
impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be
clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to
constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a)
that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other
words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
made.
BAYAN v. ERMITA (448 SCRA 227, April 25, 2006)
Facts:
 Petitioners are assailing the validity of Batas Pambansa 880 [Sections
4, 5, 6, 12, 13 (a) and 14 (a)] as well as the policy of Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR). They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no
permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy. Bayan alleges that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in
on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing BP
880. The other petitioners alleged that they were injured, arrested and detained
when a peaceful mass action on September 26, 2005 was preempted and
violently dispersed. KMU, one of the petitioners, claimed that on October 4,
2005, a rally sponsored by KMU was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge
but police blocked them along C. M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members.
Batas Pambansa 880 provides:
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required.—A written
permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold
a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom
park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in a campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act.
Sec.  5. Application requirements. — All applications for a permit
shall comply with the following guidelines:  be heard on the matter.
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets
to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the public address systems
to be used. .
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.  Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of
the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity
is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly. 
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal
mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec.  6. Action to be taken on the application. —
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. 
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. 
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification
of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must
 
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
application within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-
eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and
 record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.  Bayan contends that BP 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided
within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge
for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.
Sec.  12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. — When
the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is
required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. .
Sec.  13. Prohibited acts. — The following shall constitute
violations of this Act:  power to deny a permit independently of BP 880; that his denials of permit
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by
any leader or organizer without having first secured that written
permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or
the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than
those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person
can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or
attending an otherwise peaceful assembly; xxx
Sec.  14. Penalties. — Any person found guilty and convicted of
any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding
section shall be punished as follows
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;  xxx
CPR is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated
September 21, 2005: “The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in
force, in lieu of the maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside
while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and
inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of
mind of the national community.
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and other human right
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that BP 880
requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as to the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought. The other petitioners claim that BP 880 violates the right to peaceably
assemble and to petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition
for the valid exercise of the right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus,
the provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Respondents argue that BP 880 is content-neutral and requires only the
statement of time, place and manner of conduct of the assembly. Nothing in
BP 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally’s program
content except under the constitutional precept of the “clear and present danger
test.” CPR is simply a responsible and judicious use of means allowed by
existing laws and ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order.
Mayor Atienza, for his part submits that RA 7160 gives the Mayor
were under the “clear and present danger” rule as there was a clamor to stop
rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of people.
Issue/s:
Whether or not BP 880 is unconstitutional as it violates the right of the people
to peaceably assemble.
Whether or not the policy of CPR is void.
Ruling:
BP 880 is not unconstitutional. The Court had ruled in Primicias v.
Fugoso and Reyes v. Bagatsing that the right to freedom of speech and to
assembly in the use of streets and parks is not absolute.
BP 880 is a codification of the ruling in Reyes. BP 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to
the exercise of the right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The law is not overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and
present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There
is no prior restraint since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
For those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an
alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit
is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. Part of BP 880’s
mandate is that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within 6
months from its effectivity in 1985. Considering that the existence of such
freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the
people’s exercise of their right to peaceful assembly and petition, the Court
ruled that after 30 days from the finality of the decision, no prior permit may be
required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or
municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15
of the law. Without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect
be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the
authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
The Court ruled that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by
BP 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Maximum tolerance means
the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during the public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same.
Furthermore, if mayors do not act on the applications for a permit and
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the
rallyists can show the police an application duly filed on a given date. After
two days from said date, they can proceed with the rally in accordance with the
application without need to show the permit, the grant being presumed under
the law. The burden is upon the authorities to show that there has been a denial
of the application in which case the rally may be peaceably dispersed following
the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by law.
The Court reiterated the basic policy of upholding the fundamental
rights of the people especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.
Laws and actions which restrict the fundamental rights come to the court with a
heavy presumption against their validity.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom.
BP 880 is not unconstitutional as it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms. It merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. “Maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of the rallyists
and not the government. The delegation of the power to issue rally “permits” is
valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present
danger” standard.
The Court gave local governments a deadline of 30 days within which
to designate specific freedom parks as provided in BP 880. If after that period,
no such parks are identified, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or
city concerned shall in effect be freedom parks. No prior permit of whatever
kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will
be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow the proper
coordination and orderly activities.
GMA NETWORK v BUSTOS
Facts:
 In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) conducted the physicians’ licensure examinations.
 A certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful examinees filed a
Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the
board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As
alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking
of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations.
 As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA assigned to gather news from
courts, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus
petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated
the news coverage for the 10 pm news edition of GMA’s Channel 7 Headline
News.
 Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed
and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein respondents instituted a
damage suit against Vidal and GMA.
 Respondents alleged that Vidal and GMA, in reckless disregard for the truth,
defamed them by word of mouth. They added that, as a measure to make a
forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated
and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it
appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the
complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video
footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by
doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding
wage and economic dispute with hospital management.
 Petitioners claimed that the telecast was contextually a concise and objective
narration of a matter of public concern. They also alleged that the press
freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to
inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials.
And vis-à-vis the particular allegation on the film footages of the PGH
demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as "neutral." Pressing the
point, defendants hastened to add that the footages were accompanied, when
shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea conjured by the
plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report.
ISSUES:
1. WON the televised news report in question on the filing of the petition for
mandamus against the respondents is libelous.
2. WON the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and
personnel of PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to
warrant the award of damages to the respondents.
HELD:
1. NO
 Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a
discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches
present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or
defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
 In the instant case, the telecast basically a narration of the contents of
the aforementioned petition for mandamus and the narration had for its
subject nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper checking
and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the exams.
 Conceding hypothetically that an imputation specifically against the
respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it bears to stress
that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there
be any, are considered malicious thus supplying the ground for
actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters
considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.
 Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged
matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact.
In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the
author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the
action.
 On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice
or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the
writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the
prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To
this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks".
 the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of
privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of
the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees devoid
of any comment or remark. What at bottom petitioners Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., then did was simply to inform the public of the
mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who were
admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine.
It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job as news writer and reporter
assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of
recent developments therein.
2. NO
 The video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without
accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least,
conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.
 Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not
automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation
protects one’s interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation
"as good as one’s character and conduct warrant" in the community. It
is the community, not personal standards, which shall be taken into
account in evaluating any allegations of libel and any claims for
damages on account thereof.
 The showing of the 1982 film footage, assuming for argument that it
contained demeaning features, was actually accompanied or
simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report lifted
from the filing of the mandamus petition. As aptly put by the
petitioners without controversion from the respondents, there was
nothing in the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old
footages to create another news story beyond what was reported.
 Actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from
the fact of petitioners having dubbed in their telecast an old unrelated
video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in
 isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as
reputation impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone a false
one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of
any of the respondents, who were not even named or specifically
identified in the telecast. It has been said that if the matter is not per se
libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of publication.
 Further, the petitioners’ failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to
obtain and telecast the respondents’ side is not an indicia of malice. “A
reporter may rely on statements made by a single source even though
they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution
by a public official."
 What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or
pretence that he or all of them collectively was or were among the
demonstrating PGH doctors in the 1982 video footage. It thus puzzles
the mind how they could claim to have been besmirched by the use of
the same video in the subject news telecast.
 IN ALL, THE COURT HOLDS AND SO RULES THAT THE
SUBJECT NEWS REPORT WAS CLEARLY A FAIR AND TRUE
REPORT, A SIMPLE NARRATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS
CONTAINED IN AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
FILING BY THE UNSUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES OF THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS BEFORE THE COURT, AND
MADE WITHOUT MALICE. THUS, WE FIND THE
PETITIONERS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION AND
IMMUNITY OF THE RULE ON PRIVILEGED MATTERS UNDER
ARTICLE 354 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. IT
FOLLOWS THAT THEY TOO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES SOUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS, WHO, DURING
THE PERIOD MATERIAL, WERE HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE.
Metrobank vs. ASB Holdings (27 February 2007)
Facts:
Metrobank (petitioner) is a creditor bank of ASB Group of Companies
(respondent) owner and developer of condominium and real estate projects.
Specifically, the loans extended by petitioner bank to respondents ASB Realty
Corporation and ASB Development Corporation amounted to P523.5 million
and P1.073 billion, respectively. These loans were secured by real estate
mortgages.
The ASB Group of Companies filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a Petition For Rehabilitation With Prayer For Suspension
Of Actions And Proceedings Against Petitioners, pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A
SEC hearing panel issued a sixty-day Suspension Order (a) suspending all
actions for claims against the ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be
filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB
Group of Companies from disposing of their properties in any manner, except
in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities outstanding
as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V.
Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies.
Metrobank filed a Comment/Opposition to the Rehabilitation Plan wherein it
objected to the Plan of Rehabilitation. Metrobank claimed that the arrangement
“is not acceptable” because: (1) it does not agree with the valuation of the
properties offered for dacion; (2) the waiver of interests, penalties and charges
after April 30, 2000 is not feasible considering that the bank continues to incur
costs on the funds owed by ASB Realty Corporation and ASB Development
Corporation; and (3) since the proposed dacion is not acceptable to the bank,
there is no basis to release the properties which serve as collateral for the loans.
Petitioner thus prayed that the Rehabilitation Plan be disapproved.
The CA ruled the approval of the Rehabilitation plan by SEC was proper. Thus
a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC.
Issue:
Whether the Rehabilitation Plan compels petitioner bank to waive the interests,
penalties and other charges that accrued after the SEC issued its Stay Order.
Whether the Rehabilitation Plain is in violation of the constitutional mandate
on non-impairment of contracts and due process.
Ruling:
No. The SC was not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan
impairs petitioner bank’s lien over the mortgaged properties. Section 6 [c] of
P.D. No. 902-A provides that “upon appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation” of ailing corporations which affect
suspended.” the public welfare.

By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the Rehabilitation

Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend the
actions for claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner bank’s
preferred status over the unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is
retained, but the enforcement of such preference is suspended. The loan
agreements between the parties have not been set aside and petitioner bank may
still enforce its preference when the assets of ASB Group of Companies will be
liquidated. Considering that the provisions of the loan agreements are merely
suspended, there is no impairment of contracts, specifically its lien in the
mortgaged properties.

As we stressed in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate

Appellate Court,] such suspension “shall not prejudice or render ineffective
the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured
creditor,” for what P.D. No. 902-A merely provides is that all actions for
claims against the distressed corporation, partnership or association shall be
suspended. This arrangement provided by law is intended to give the receiver a
chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for
doing so, without being unnecessarily disturbed by the creditors’ actions
against the distressed corporation. However, in the event that rehabilitation is
no longer feasible and the claims against the distressed corporation would
eventually have to be settled, the secured creditors, like petitioner bank, shall
enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors.

Likewise, there is no compulsion on the part of petitioner bank to accept a

dacion en pago arrangement of the mortgaged properties based on ASB Group
of Companies’ transfer values and to condone interests and penalties. The
acceptance was voluntary.

The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the company to gain new

lease on life and thereby allows creditors to be paid their claims from its
earnings. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the financially distressed
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency. ] This
is in consonance with the State’s objective to promote a wider and more
meaningful equitable distribution of wealth to protect investments and the
public.] The approval of the Rehabilitation Plan by the SEC Hearing Panel,
affirmed by both the SEC En Banc and the Court of Appeals, is precisely in
furtherance of the rationale behind P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, which is “to

People vs. Rapeza
Facts:
An unidentified woman went to the Culion Municipal Station and
reported a killing that had taken place. SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas, sent to the
victims’ house which was the scene of the crime. The victims were identified
as Priscilla Libas and Cesar Ganzon. Upon information supplied by Mr. Dela
Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to
look for appellant. He found appellant fishing and invited the latter for
questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make a confession in the
presence of a lawyer. Appellant was brought to the police station after which
SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel Alcantara to provide appellant with a
lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty.
Roberto Reyes, the only available lawyer in the municipality. At the house of
Atty. Reyes, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of
appellant who was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised
that he was being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon.
Appellant presented a different story during the trial.
Appellant was asked by SPO2 Gapas to sign a document so that he
will be released. When appellant replied that he did not know how to sign his
name, SPO2 Gapas took appellant’s thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on
the document. Appellant further denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or
meeting Abad, the alleged interpreter. He never left the jail from the time he
was arrested except to attend the hearing before the MTC. When appellant was
brought to the MTC, nobody talked to him during the hearing nor did counsel
assist him.
On the basis of appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the RTC found
him guilty of both crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
Issue: whether the extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
Held:
No. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the
testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible
and must perforce be discarded.
Appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was “invited”
by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in
the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before
his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant
should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already
considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the
mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators
started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of
Atty. Reyes. Already being held as a suspect as early as 21 October 1995,
accused should have been informed of his constitutional rights.
It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2
Gapas had informed appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any
statement he made could be used in evidence for or against him, that he has a
right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot afford the services of
one, the police shall provide one for him. However, there is no showing that
appellant had actually understood his rights. He was not even informed that he
may waive such rights only in writing and in the presence of counsel. In order
to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be
meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant,
as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since
comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In this case, it was
established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was
not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of
scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly
communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the
person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in
the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the
interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears
the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist
appellant in making the alleged confession. SPO2 Gapas could not say for
certain if appellant had indeed understood his rights precisely because he did
not explain them to appellant. In any event, SPO2 Gapas would be incompetent
to testify thereon because appellant’s alleged confession was made through an
interpreter as he did not understand Tagalog. Without the testimony of Abad, it
cannot be said with certainty that appellant was informed of his rights and that
he understood them. Not having been properly informed of his rights prior to
questioning and not having waived them either, the alleged confession of
appellant is inadmissible.
Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter
should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such
waiver. Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be
grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for
purposes of the custodial investigation. The standards of “competent counsel”
were not met in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence for the
prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellant’s counsel
and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he assisted
appellant. The confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2
Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his
constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify
thereon whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. His participation in the
proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellant’s confession. Such
participation is not the kind of legal assistance that should be accorded to
appellant in legal contemplation. Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant’s
counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through
the barangay officials.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that
leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements. And in the event the
accused desires to give a confession, it is the duty of his counsel to ensure that
the accused understands the legal import of his act and that it is a product of his
own free choice. It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station
overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was
not informed of his rights and there is no evidence that he was assisted by
counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having been subjected to trickery and
intimidation at the hands of the police authorities, as he claims, cannot be
entirely discounted.
Rodriguez vs. Judge of RTC Manila
Facts:
The US government through the DOJ filed a petition for extradition against the
Rodriguez couple on March 12, 2001. After their arrest, petitioners applied for
bail which the trial court granted on Sep. 25, 2001, set for one million pesos
each. After the MR was denied by the Trial Court, the US government filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC.
Thereafter, the SC directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail which,
according to its November 28, 2001 Order shall be subject to whatever ruling
that this Court may have in the similar case of Mark Jimenez entitled
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan. In compliance with
the decision on Mark Jimenez, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of another
warrant of arrest. Since Mr. Rodriguez voluntarily went to the US to face trial,
only Mrs. Rodriguez questions the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES:
First, in an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing required before bail is
cancelled? Second, what constitutes a “special circumstance” to be exempt
from the no-bail rule in extradition cases?
HELD
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before
his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been
issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is
that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from
justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once
bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight
risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner
has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no
flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had
already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner
is entitled to provisional release.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a
clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to
our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein.
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be
cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing,
the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
ART. III, Section 13, Right to Bail
PEOPLE v. FITZGERALD
FACTS:
 An Information filed with the RTC charged Fitzgerald (respondent),
an Australian citizen, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 .
 It was alleged in the information that Fitzgerald unlawfully and
feloniously induced a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution
 by her with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal
knowledge.
 The trial court found Fitzgerald GUILTY
 Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied. Court is of the
considered view that the circumstances of the accused indicate
probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may
commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.
 A month after, the accused filed for a motion for new trial on the
ground that new and material evidence not previously available had
surfaced.
 The CA granted the Motion for New Trial in a Resolution and
remanded the case to the RTC.
 Petitiones People filed a MR, while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix
Bail with Manifestation.
 Both Motions were denied by the CA
 In denying Fitzgerald's bail application the CA said that the maximum
imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610 otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the
evidence of guilt is strong, hence, We hold that his motion for bail
cannot be granted at this point.
 Despite such denial, Fitzgerald again filed another motion to fix bail
which eventuall was granted by the CA.
 In granting bail, the CA said that “we have taken a second look at
appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact
that appellant is already of old age and is not in the best of health.
Thus, it is this Court's view that appellant be GRANTED temporary
liberty premised not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in
the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial
granted in this case.”
 Fitzgerald was then granted bail allowed temporary release.
 Petitioner people filed the present petition for certiorari and argues that
the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail
despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also
questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering
that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.27
 Respondent Fitzgerald counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt; and
justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an
extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.
ISSUE 1: Whether the CA, granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on
respondent's Motion to Post Bail.
HELD: When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the
trial court convicting the accused and the judgment of the CA affirming it, and
remands the case to the trial court for reception of newly-discovered evidence
and promulgation of a new judgment,33 at times with instruction to the trial
court to promptly report the outcome. The Court itself does not conduct the
new trial for it is no trier of facts.
However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ,
notwithstanding Sec. 1,36 Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides for uniformity in appellate criminal procedure between this
Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions of fact and
mixed questions of fact and law. Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec. 14,
Rule 124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered
evidence under Sec. 12,38 or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for
reception of such evidence under Sec. 15. In either case, it does not relinquish
to the trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to
resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.
CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case, even as it delegated to the
RTC the function of receiving the respondent's newly-discovered evidence. The
CA therefore retained its authority to act on respondent's bail application.
Moreso that the the original records of the case had yet to be transmitted to the
RTC when respondent filed his bail application and the CA acted on it.
ISSUE 2: Whether the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.
HELD: The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It
is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he enjoys,41 be allowed provisional liberty upon
filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions.
Implementing Sec. 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and
procedural rules on the disposition of bail applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail
is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of
discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary ? Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is
a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he
has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party,
review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section
5, par. (a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which
carries the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by
the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial. As
already discussed, the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as
it ordered the remand of the original records thereof to the RTC for reception of
evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its own September
27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. In fact, in
its August 31, 2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized: “As we have pointed out
earlier, the propriety of appellant's conviction of the offense charged as well as
the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during the appreciation of the
new trial after considering the new evidence which appellant insist would prove
his innocence.”
The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said
Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six
years.
Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the
existence of strong evidence of the guilt of respondent. These findings were not
overturned when the CA granted a new trial. Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the
grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-discovered evidence but
maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a
finding that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless,
upon another motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the
evidence against the accused has remained strong. In the present case, no new
evidence had since been introduced, nor hearing conducted as would diminish
the earlier findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of strong evidenc
against respondent.
In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not
a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be
exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114.
And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the
existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein such as those
indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused
may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted
respondent to bail based, "xxx not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail
xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of old age and is not
in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it is, the
evidence of guilt is strong xxx." The Resolution disregarded substantive and
procedural requirements on bail.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in
the Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim
of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to
permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on
findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases. But, in this particular
case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment
of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently
impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in
the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the latter's state
of health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000,
respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area
xxx."
Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent
committing a similar offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that
the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would commit a
similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal. The RTC explained its
findings thus:
Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that
phedophilia is a state of sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is
intense and recurrent. The possibility of the commission of a similar
offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused
will be exposed to "stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.
PETITION GRANTED.
Santos vs. How
Facts:
- An administrative complaint was filed by Santos against Judge How for
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Partiality and Serious Misconduct.
- The administrative complaint arose from a criminal case filed against the
petitioners who were local public officials who were planning to ambush
the two sons of an assistant City Prosecutor of Manila.
- During the commencement of the case, hearing was conducted upon the
filing of a petition by petitioners to determine whether or not bail should be
granted.
- During such hearing, the court accepted the testimonies of several
witnesses presented by the prosecution pinning responsibility of the
commission of the crime against the defendants-petitioners. However,
respondent judge refused to receive evidence that the defense wanted to
present in support of its petition for the granting of bail.
- Soon after, based only on the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
judge denied the petition granting bail.
- Complainants assail the order for being based on a one-sentence
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong, without any supporting
evaluation or consideration of the issues raised.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts committed by Judge How constitute gross ignorance of
the law, manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
Held:
On Gross Ignorance of the Law
Stressing our ruling in Basco v. Rapatalo, we held that when the grant of bail is
discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains
with the judge. This discretion may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not
duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise
of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the
court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal.
Respondent, in effect, deprived the accused with their right to present rebuttal
evidence which to our mind is a clear violation of their right to due process and
equal protection of the law. As aptly observed by the OCA, dictates of fair play
should have at least reminded respondent to inquire first of the nature of the
evidence proposed to be presented, determine whether or not it will be essential
for the purpose of ascertaining entitlement to bail, before discarding any
evidence outright. This is in keeping with procedural due process, given
established rules and jurisprudence on bail. It is clear from the foregoing that
respondent is remiss in his responsibility to endeavor at all times to avoid such
actions as would impress upon litigants the disregard of due process.
However, although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action
for every erroneous order or decision he renders, relative immunity is not a
license to be negligent, abusive or arbitrary in the performance of his
adjudicatory prerogatives.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he
must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
However, good faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so
simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margins of error.
In this case, respondent's act of cutting short the hearing after the
prosecution presented its evidence, without affording the defense to adduce
evidence in rebuttal together with his outright denial of complainants’ request
to offer proof, is a clear disregard of the right of the accused to disprove that the
evidence of guilt is strong. It is of no moment that respondent required
complainants to submit their memorandum. What is significant is that
complainants were deprived of their constitutional right to present evidence
during the hearing which the respondent may intelligently appreciate and
evaluate in the light of the circumstances then obtaining.
On manifest partiality and serious misconduct.
Nothing in the records suggests that respondent was motivated by malice or
corrupt motives to deny the application for bail. Complainants failed to
substantiate their other allegations with competent proof besides their own bare
allegations. Respondent did what he thought was right under the law and
established principles.
Moreover, for serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should
be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard
of well-known legal rules. The records are bereft of any evidence to this effect
to warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On denying bail based on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt
is strong.
We agree with the OCA that although there was no categorical discussion on
how the conclusion, that the evidence of guilt is strong, was reached, the same
does not make it less a reasonable conclusion. The inadequacy of expression of
the questioned Order is outweighed by its substantial compliance with the
requirements for an Order granting or denying bail.
In sum, the act of respondent in denying the complainants the right to present
evidence constitutes simple ignorance of the law; but in the absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part of the respondent, the
penalty of reprimand recommended by the OCA is just and reasonable.
Gov’t of HK vs. Olalia
FACTS:
RP and then British Colony of Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for
the Surrender of the Accused and Convicted Persons”. Private respondent
Muñoz was charged before the HK Court with 3 counts of the offense of
“accepting and advantage as agent” as well as 7 counts of conspiracy to
defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him.
The DOJ received a request for the provisional arrest of Muñoz from
the HK Department of Justice. DOJ forwarded the request to the NBI which, in
turn filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest and Muñoz
was arrested and detained that same day. Muñoz filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest. CA declared the Order of Arrest void which the
SC overruled.
Meanwhile, the HK Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
a petition for extradition of Muñoz. Muñoz filed in the same case a petition for
bail. RTC issued an order denying petition for bail holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a “flight
risk”. Upon MR, Muñoz was allowed to post bail. HK Special Administrative
Region filed an urgent motion to vacate the above order but it was denied.
ISSUE: WON the constitutional provision on bail applies to extradition
proceedings.
HELD:
Yes.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. The
Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While
this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,
have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our
eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why
it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there
is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual
is not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted
of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding.
Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object
is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized
by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6
of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
“immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best
serve the interest of justice.” We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;” and that release from
provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if
a request for extradition is received subsequently.”
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,
bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
In the case at bar, Muñoz has been detained for over 2 years without
having been convicted of any crime.By any standard, such an extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact,
it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her
from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process
is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption
in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
“temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
“clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Since there is no showing that Muñoz presented evidence to show that
he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis
of “clear and convincing evidence.”
People vs. Galvez
Facts:
Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo Francisco and
Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside
the copra kiln in the farm of Perez. When Enojarda stood up from the circle
where they were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the
ground shouting “Dan ya tupa comigo” (Dan, I am hit). Rellios reported the
incident to the barangay captain and they brought Enojarda’s dead body to his
family. An Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Murder.
The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell,
the rest of the group took cover and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw
Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their
direction; Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize
them as well as the firearms they carried because they were approximately nine
meters away. Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He presented
Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his
hands showed that there was no nitrate present; and Police Inspector Lemuel
Caser, Ballistic Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the
crime were not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.
Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still
convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez was seen by two
witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his
unidentified armed companions. The trial court also held that the offer of
Galvez to have the case settled out of court is an indication of his guilt.
Issue: whether, in finding him guilty, the accused was denied the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Held: Yes.
The Court resolves to acquit Galvez. Conspiracy must be alleged in
the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his
co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information,
an accused can only be made liable for acts committed by him alone and such
criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. Since conspiracy was
not alleged in the Information, it is imperative that the prosecution prove
Galvez’s direct participation in the killing. This, the prosecution failed to do.
It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the
sole author of the shot that killed Enojarda. The “incriminating circumstances”
do not point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The presence of the
three armed men raises the probability that any one of those men inflicted the
fatal shot. The prosecution witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez who
shot Enojarda. It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction
even if the commission of the crime is established.
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does
not prove that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident as it was possible
that he used another gun, should also be struck down. It is the prosecution
which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than the one
issued to him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that killed
the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility adverted
to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence. That Galvez was a
police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime
with a lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak.
Although an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi, the burden still rests on
the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt. Unless the prosecution overturns
the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption
remains. Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on
facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus
of his identity and culpability. Conviction must be based on the strength of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation is upon
the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the
accused to prove his innocence. The prosecution’s job is to prove that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, when the evidence for the
prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the
accused absolved and released at once.
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our
criminal law and procedure is not to send people to jail but to render justice.
Under our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether
the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.