Dr.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC SESSION:2022-2023

LAW OF EVIDENCE

CASE ANALYSIS: PANNEERSELVAM V. STATE OF TAMIL

NADU

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Dr. Vipul Vinod Saddhvi Nayak

Associate Professor (Law) 200101114

RMLNLU 5th semester (Section B)

B.A.L.L.B(Hons.)
 CONTENTS

S.NO. Topic Pg.NO.

1. Declaration 3

2. Acknowledgement 4

3. Case Analysis 5

4. Facts of the Case 5-7

5. Issues Involved 7

6. Law on Point 7

7. Ratio Decidendi 7

8. Judgement 8-9

9. Author’s Opinion 9-13

10. References 13-14

 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project work entitled “Case Analysis:

Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu” submitted to the Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow is a
record of an original work done by me under the guidance of
Dr. Vipul Vinod, faculty of law, the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya
National Law University and this project is submitted in the
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the
degree of B.A.L.L.B (Hons.). The results embodied in this have
not been submitted to any other University or Institute for the
award of any degree or diploma.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research paper would not have been accomplished without the
generous contributions of individuals. First of all, I express my gratitude
to the Almighty, who aided me with his strength, wisdom and patience to
complete this project as a term paper.

Additionally, I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher Dr.

Vipul Vinod for giving me the freedom to work on “Case Analysis:
Panneerselvam v. Stae of Tamil Nadu” and also for his exemplary
guidance, monitoring and constant encouragement throughout the
course of this research paper.

I would also like to thank the authorities of Dr. Madhu Limaye Library
who provided the remote access of the library to provide the research
material.

Moreover, I also thank all my batchmates and seniors who aided me

along the way, and my family and friends for their constant
encouragement without which this assignment would not have been
possible.

I know that despite my best effort some discrepancies might have crept
in which I believe my humble professor would forgive.

THANKING YOU ALL.

Saddhvi Nayak.
 CASE ANALYSIS

CASE NAME: Panneerselvam v. State of Tamil Nadu.

CITATION: (2008) 17 SCC 190.

CORAM: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, P. Sathasivam and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.

TYPE OF CASE: Criminal Appeal.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants were five in number in all these appeals, arrayed as A-1 to A-5
respectively. A-1 was the Head Constable, while A-2 was a Constable. A-3 was a
Writer, and A-4 was a Para Constable. All of them were attached to Ammapet
Police Station, and they were on duty on 14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. A-5 was a
native of Udaiyur Kovil Village, to which place the deceased also belonged to. On
14.12.1992, A-1 and A-2 brought the deceased and P.W.2 at 11.00 P.M. and 11.30
P.M. to the Police Station for the purpose of enquiry.

On coming to know about this, P.W.1 and others came to the Police Station, and
they made a request to A-1 to leave them, so that they may be enquired next
morning to which course A-1 was not amenable. Thereafter, P.W.1 and others left
the Police Station. A-1 asked P.W.1 to lie outside, and the deceased was asked to
be in the Police Station. At about 1.30 A.M. on 15.12.1992, a distressing cry was
heard by P.W.2, who was actually lying outside the Police Station. He then, got
inside along with A-4 who was lying nearby him, to see the deceased with burn
injuries and the fumes and flames also. All of them made attempts to quench the
fire. Thereafter, A-1, the Head Constable registered a case at 2.00 A.M. under
Sec.309 of I.P.C. alleging that it was an attempt of self-immolation by the deceased
by pouring petrol.

Then, the victim was taken to the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet,
where P.W.3, the Doctor, was on duty. The deceased made a statement to P.W.3,
which was recorded and, in which he deposed that he had poured petrol on himself
and set himself on fire. From there, he was sent to Thanjavur Medical College
Hospital, Thanjavur, where he was admitted by P.W.4, the Doctor to whom also he
made a similar statement. Following the same, he was examined by P.W.6,
another Doctor, to whom also he made a similar statement. The matter was then
brought to the notice of the Collector, pursuant to which directions have been
issued to P.W.14, the Revenue Divisional Officer, to conduct an enquiry in that
regard.

On 16.12.1992 at about 00.10 hours, P.W.14, the Revenue Divisional Officer,

Kumbakonam, went to Thanjavur Medical College Hospital, Thanjavur, enquired
the deceased between 11.30 A.M. and 1.15 P.M. and recorded his statement.
According to the statement, which was the dying declaration, A-5 only poured
petrol on his hip at about 11.30 P.M. and further at the time of occurrence, but he
did not know who set fire on him, because of which he sustained injuries. At that
time, P.W.5, the Doctor, was also present. The Doctor also made an endorsement,
to the effect that he was conscious enough and having mental frame also to give
such dying declaration. Despite treatment, he succumbed to burn injuries on
20.12.1992 at 12.10 A.M. The case was committed to Court of Session, and four
charges were framed against all the five accused. Both the trial Court as well as
Hon’ble High Court of Madras found all the appellants/accused guilty and were
awarded punishments accordingly. Hence, these appeals have arisen in the present
case.

ISSUE INVOLVED:

The main issue that was involved in this criminal appeal was that whether the
dying declaration of the accused should be admitted or not and can all of the
accused be conviction on the sole basis of the declaration.

LAW ON POINT

 Punishment for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Wrongful confinement to extort confession, or compel restoration of
property under section 348 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to
screen offender under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Acts done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention under
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the
Court in its correctness. Where there is more than one statement in the nature of
dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred.
 JUDGMENT

The judgment of this case was delivered by Justice Arijit Pasayat. This is a case
where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The
situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene
and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for
this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed
with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in
miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in
a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a
scrap of evidence.

Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note

that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for
eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason that the
Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire
full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that
the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting
or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased
was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the
assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary,
undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot
form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the High Court has
erroneously discarded the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that
the deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set himself on fire. As
rightly contended by learned Counsel for the appellant, even though one police
official was present when the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large
number of relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW1 who had taken him
to the hospital were present also. Additionally, the High Court has misconstrued
the dying declaration. The deceased had categorically stated therein that he did
not know who set him on fire. The High Court observed, as if, the deceased had
said that either A-1 or A-5 did so. The conclusions have been arrived at by
misreading the evidence.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore, held the impugned judgment of the High
Court unsustainable and hence is liable to be set aside. And also acquitted the
appellants of all the charges in each case thereby, allowing the appeals.

AUTHORS’ OPINION
Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the general rule against
hearsay. Sub-section (1) of section 32 makes the statement of the deceased
admissible which is generally described as ‘dying declaration”.1 Dying
declarations are statements oral or documentary made by a person as to the cause
his death or as to the circumstances of the transactions resulting in his death.
There are basically two grounds of admission of a dying declaration. Firstly,
necessity, for the victim being generally the only principle eye-witness to the
crime, the exclusion his statement might defeat the ends of justice; and secondly,
the sense of impending death which creates a sanction equal to the obligation of
an oath.2

1
Ravi Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2006 SC 1448: (2006) 9 SCC 240
2
Chief Justice M. Monir, The Law of Evidence, 170 (10th ed. Universal Law Publishing 2015)
The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they
are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and
when every of this world has gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced
and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak truth; a
situation so solemn and so awful is considered by law as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of
Justice.3

If the truthfulness of a dying declaration is accepted, it can always form the basis
of conviction of the accused,4 and if a dying declaration is acceptable as truthful
event in the absence of corroborative evidence, court may act upon it and
convict.5 A truthful, coherent and consistent dying declaration needs no
corroboration and conviction may be based on it. 6 Thus, if the dying declaration
passes the test of scrutiny it can be relied on as the sole basis of conviction.7

In Paniben v. State of Gujarat8the Supreme Court on the basis of its own earlier
decisions has summed up certain guidelines to be followed by the courts while
dealing with the dying declarations:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration
cannot be acted upon without corroboration.9

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary
it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.10

3
Id
4
Vithal Somnath More v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 519: (1978) 1 SCC 622
5
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416: (1985) 1 SCC 552
6
Id
7
Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 5 SCC 272
8
AIR 1992 SC 1817: (1992) 2 SCC 474
9
Munnu Raja and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 3 SCC 104: AIR 1976 SC 2199
10
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav,AIR 1985 SC 416: (1985) 1 SCC 552
 (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify
the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.11

(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence.12

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying
declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.13

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis
of conviction.14

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the
occurrence, it is not to be rejected.15

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.

On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.16

(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit
mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical
opinion. But where the eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit
and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion
cannot prevail.17

11
K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618: AIR 1976 SC 1994.
12
Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264: AIR 1974 SC 332
13
Kake Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) Supp SCC 25: AIR 1982 SC 1021
14
Ram Manorath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 654
15
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurty Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617
16
Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505
17
Nanhau Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 912
 (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the
dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.18

(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying
declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if
the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and
reliable, it has to be accepted.19

The Supreme Court, in the case at hand held that it cannot be laid down as an
absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of the
conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a
rule of prudence.

In the present case the dying declaration furnished by the accused is highly
suspicious because first he told all the three doctors, PWs. 3, 4, and 6, that he had
set himself on fire while in the declaration made to the Revenue Divisional
Officer he said that it was A-5 who poured petrol on him. So there is an
inconsistency in these declarations and there is a possibility that one of them
might be tutored. Hence, the declaration cannot be a sole basis of conviction and
it has to be corroborated with the evidences, if any.

Also, there was no other eye-witness other than the accused himself, and although
P.W.2 was present at that time he was lying outside the Police Station and only on
hearing the distressed cry of the deceased, he came only to see the fumes and
flames, so it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that he is a competent
witness.

18
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519
19
Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700
Merely because the accused was in a fit state of mind the declaration made by him
would not be admitted and it has to pass the basic test of scrutiny and the statement
deposed by him was highly dubious and hence liable to be rejected.

The Supreme Court very rightly opined that even though one police official was
present when the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large number of
relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW1 who had taken him to the
hospital were present also. So the declaration made was in fact voluntary. Also, the
High Court misconstrued the dying declaration. The deceased had categorically
stated therein that he did not know who set him on fire. The High Court clearly
erred in its judgment because it observed, as if, the deceased had said that either A-
1 or A-5 did so.

So in the case at hand I completely agree with the reasoning applied by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court by not admitting the declaration made to the Revenue
Divisional Officer and acquitting all of the accused.

REFERENCES

Law Reporters:

(i) Supreme Court Cases

(ii) All India Reporter

Books:

Chief Justice M. Monir, The Law of Evidence, (10th ed. Universal Law Publishing
2015)
Web Sources:

(i) http://www.manupatrafast.in/pers/Personalized.aspx
(ii) http://judis.nic.in/Judis_Chennai/content.asp