Section 4.
Theory
Mind Structure and Ego States
Jenni Hine
Abstract
In this article ego states are seen to have
their place in the current exciting conver-
gence of views on the way the mind struc-
tures itself through the repetitive processing
of incoming perceptions. As the receptors in
the mind assimilate the similar and filter out
the dissimilar, generalized representations
of experience are built up and stored. It
appears that this fundamental neural pro-
cess builds up coherent networks of repre-
sentations that function as wholes, interlink-
ing with each other in increasing mental
complexity. Ego states appear to be an
evolved example of this impressively power-
ful process of structuration.
The aim of this article is to show how a mind
structuring process such as the formation of
generalized representations (GRs) can give
understanding to the evolution of ego state
systems and their complexity in maturity. This
effort is a contribution to discussions on the
nature of ego states that have appeared in the
Transactional Analysis Journal in recent
issues. (Drego, 1993; Erskine, 1988, 1991;
English, 1994; Novey, 1994a, 1994b, 1997a;
Rath, 1993). It is based on Berne's structural
model of ego states (Berne, 1961, 1977), by
which the author understands ego states to be
discrete systems of mental activity that build
up progressively from lived perceptual experi-
ence and that have continuity, coherence, and
a certain stability over a lifetime.
In his recent theoretical overview of transac-
tional analysis theory, Rath (1993, p. 205)
pointed out that in Berne's desire to make
psychotherapy more human, the behavioral
expression and phenomenological experience
of ego states took priority over the theoretical
construction of the psychic organs that underlie
the ego state functions (inner experience plus
external behaviors). Rath wrote that it is
278
nevertheless necessary to have a theoretical
understanding of these underlying psychic
organ structures, since these give rise to the
three types of ego state phenomena.
In this article, the nature of this structural
framework of three psychic organs is discussed
in light of recent research-independently of
how they are named, that is, whether they are
called "psychic organs," "ego state systems,"
or "ego state networks" (Gilbert, 1996). Here
the word "system" will be used to mean a
coherent set of interacting entities (structures),
which in tum are systems with a certain degree
of autonomy.
I will present three interlocking themes:
1. Concepts ofgeneralized representations
and schema. Generalized representations
(GRs) are chunks of memory that are activated,
for example, when seeing a face, recognizing
an image, or processing a stroke; they are
characterized by the fact that the component
parts, such as the nose, mouth, and eyes, inter-
act with each other to produce a stable and
predicable output.
The concept of GRs, which in psychoana-
lytic literature are often called schema or
schemata, adds to our understanding of the
nature and development of ego states. This
article proposes that ego states form progres-
sively out of the generalized representations
that develop as the individual interacts with the
environment and with his or her perceptions of
self and others through the period of infancy
and childhood.
2. Converging theoretical views. There is
and has been for some time a converging view
of the manner in which mental activity evolves
and becomes structured, similar to the one
being presented here. This seems true across
fields, from the neurological to the psychoana-
lytic, including the cognitive, experimental,
ego, and self psychologies. The picture of the
mind's functioning that has emerged is one in
which incoming stimuli is scanned for cues to
Transactional Analysis Journal

previous experience, with similar aspects being
assimilated and dissimilar aspects being fil-
tered out in a self-reinforcing process on a
continuing basis, thus progressively building
up generalized representations of experience.
3. Hypotheses about ego stateformation and
differentiation. In the hypotheses put forward
in this article, differences in the characteristics
of the three major ego states are shown to be
the result of the way in which each of their
underlying ego state systems formed and the
way the perceptions that gave rise to each
system were processed and organized. Once
formed, ego state systems continue to exist,
playing a part in regulating and modulating the
individual's responses to challenges and condi-
tions. In other words, ego state systems are to
be understood as adaptive mechanisms that
help the individual to survive.
Theme 1: Generalized Representations
a) Development ofGeneralized Representa-
tions. This is an exciting time in the under-
standing of how the brain functions. New
methods of scanning the brain and computer
simulations of neural networks, plus better
understanding of neurotransmitters and syn-
apse functioning, have brought much insight
into how the brain actually works (e.g., Chan-
geux, 1983; Churchland, 1995; Edelman,
1992).
A generalized representation of an event is
the knowledge, and reactions to that knowl-
edge, that are synthesized from perceptions of
several different occurrences of similar events
until it becomes the expected stereotype for
future occurrences of the same experience.
An "event" should be thought of as the
occurrence of an extremely wide variety of
different types of mental or even physical
experiences. It may be an affective experience,
a cognitive experience, a somatic experience,
an interaction, an internal reaction, or a passive
perceiving, to name only a few.
Figure 1 illustrates the kind of brain func-
tioning discussed in this article. It is an ambig-
uous image, which can be recognized as a duck
or a rabbit depending on the way you look at it.
The image sends cues to the whole range of
Vol. 27. No.4. October 1997
MINDSTRUCTURE AND EGO STATES
Figure 1
An Ambiguous Representational Figure
GRs, including ducks and rabbits, held in the
brain, allowing the viewer to "see" one or
another of the possibilities. Once recognition is
achieved, the ambiguity disappears and either
can be seen with ease.
It is the parallel scanning of incoming stim-
uli by many different mental representations,
or GRs, that permits the mind to perceive
different things or give different meanings to
the same input. This is a continuing process of
searching for meanings in the environment and
is a capacity that has importance for us both as
therapists and as theorists. It allows both stabil-
ity and change.
GRs-for example, those of duck, or rabbit,
or mother, or washing up-s-can be thought of
as the building blocks of mental structure and
activity. I first came across this term in Daniel
Stem's (1985) book, the Interpersonal World
ofthe Infant, and I use it often in this article.
Figure 2, adapted from Stem (1985) and
from Nelson and Gruendel (1981), shows one
step in the process of formation of a general-
ized representation.
Figure 2 shows a stimulus from a specific
experience in the here and now looping around
and cuing into remembered experience stored
in the generalized representation. The general-
ized representation of that experience is
evoked, the stimulus is compared to it, and if
the similarities are sufficient, the new experi-
ence both reinforces the GR and becomes
279
lENNI HINE
Figure 2
Generalized Representations:
Updating from Experience
(Adapted from Stern, 1985, Figure 5.1, p. 112)
integrated into it. Any slightly new aspects also
somewhat modify the GR in the process la-
beled "update" in Figure 2. This then becomes
an amalgam of past experience and the similar
aspects of the current experience.
Figure 3 shows the continuing formation of
the GR, its refinement, and the reinforcing
generalization, as well as its activation. The
sign (n) represents the number of repetitions of
the experience that have already occurred and
indicates the level of generalization that has
been reached. In the third circuit this figure
shows that when there is no cue match the
experience does not become integrated into
that GR. For instance, when Figure 1 is not
recognized as a duck, it may be picked up by
the rabbit GR, which is scanning the experi-
ence simultaneously, since the cues are there
for both.
This process is repeated over and over,
producing a generalized picture or structure so
that any details that are unexpected exceptions
to the event are filtered out. These unexpected
exceptions are often not even perceived, as
when one fails to see one's misspellings in a
familiar text that one is rereading for the third
time.
In transactional analysis, the internal mecha-
nism of discounting that preserves a specific
frame of reference by ignoring or deforming
stimuli describes this "generalizing" process
well, although in transactional analysis the
280
GRs that result from it are generally reserved
for describing rigid or problematic "over"
generalized representations such as a "nega-
tive" self/other life position.
In Figure 4, clusters of GRs are shown
integrated into a network or linked into exist-
ing networks. In the models shown by Church-
land (1995, p. 49), he considers more and more
complex examples of an increasingly holistic
character with an emerging hierarchical struc-
ture. In the schematic view (Figure 4) we begin
to see GRs forming into a hierarchical structure
of recognizable categories. This type of struc-
ture also has the features of generalization and
GR(n) is a Generalized Representation formed
from 'n' successive confirming experiences
GR(n)
becomes
GR(n+1)
GR(n+1)
becomes
GR(n+2)
cues to emory
GR(n+2)
unchanged no cue
match
GR(n+2)
\
and many more such matching or
irrelevant experiences lead to
~
\ Input stimulus
Current
R
Possible Output
Figure 3
Birth and Growth of a
Current Generalized Representation
Transactional Analysis Journal

....... __ ...•...•..........•... __ .. _. __ .... ,.
~
. ,... - - - - - - --
U
I
I"--~~;
I -,
- Inle";~~ed)J:
.,. ........ _•••
simple GRs mak~
a complex GR \.
•• _•• _••••••• :-:-:-:-:-:-:-: •••••••
Figure 4
Interconnected Complex GRs Make a Higher Level Complex GR
coherence. Smaller, more specialized "levels"
of interconnected GRs can lie within larger and
larger ones, similar to a Russian babushka doll,
forming a hierarchy of increasingly complex
structure.
The dotted, porous boundaries of the more
complex GRs in Figure 4 indicate that parallel
scanning of outside input by the simpler GRs
occurs constantly. Parts can be activated on
their own or a part can activate the whole
system. At a neurological level this hierarchi-
cal view of GRs involving many types of
mental activity finds confirmation in the stud-
ies of Morris Moscovitch (1994), a neuro-
psychologist at Toronto University. He shows
that the perception of stimuli making up a
generalized experience occurs in widely sepa-
rated areas of the neocortex at the same time
(e.g., sound in the auditory cortex, sight in the
visual cortex, etc.), while it is the limbic sys-
tem that binds these dispersed perceptions into
a single experience, making possible a coordi-
nated reaction or output.
Vol. 27. No.4. October 1997
MIND STRUCTURE AND EGO STATES
~
•
\
I Input from
I other GRs or
.l:::;;:>t-::;::;:::~g:;;e~
I
•
_-"________ : g~t~~~ t~ other
~ envtronment
1~
I
J
•..-.J"'"
}
:
:
The level of neural interconnectedness is
vital to the functioning of neural networks.
This also appears true in networks of GRs and
ego state networks (Gilbert, 1996). Overdense
connectedness within a system leads to many
opposing signals. These signals begin to block
mental activity and prevent the network system
from being reactive to incoming signals. This
is because the high level of generalization
produces too much rigidity, and high discount-
ing leaves too many stimuli ignored, as in
obsessional states. In contrast, too few neural
connections leads to anarchic, random, or
semirandom thinking, less generalization, and
an inadequate level of discounting so that
stimuli are responded to somewhat chaotically,
as in psychotic states (Hine, 1990, pp. 36-38).
b) Specialist Neural Groupsand Generalized
Representations. The theoretical model of GRs
fits well with the growing understanding of
how early, low-level neural capacities are
developed in the newborn to permit recogni-
tion of such basic distinctions as edges of
281
lENNI HINE
objects and lines. Churchland (1995) recently
reviewed the relevant neurological research.
Using face recognition as an example, he
reported that "the face coding region of the
human brain is at least five synaptic steps and
five neuronal populations downstream from
the retina" (p. 5). At each step, rudimentary
representations are being cued for different
aspects of the visual input so that, in the case
of face recognition, all the visual input that
does not represent a face has been filtered out
and is not even presented to the repre-
sentations-of-faces recorded in the face-coding
region of the brain.
Whereas representations that allow the
recognition of edges or faces can only be built
up from experience of edges and faces, the
representations associated with the expression
of basic drives such as sex or stroke hunger
appear to be innate.
Such "specialist or innate neural groups" are
formed by natural selection because they give
a mental and behavioral advantage to creatures
who develop them. For instance, specialist
neural groups that are sensitive to cues coming
from faces-such as eyes, noses, and mouths
-permit an individual to recognize an enemy
from a friend and help separate things into
"self' and "non-self," a capacity that is vital
for self-preservation when in danger.
Theme 2: Converging Views
a) A Historical Perspective. There are many
historical antecedents for this convergence of
theories on the structuration of mental activity.
The following are earlier formulations in the
vocabulary of different approaches.
In psychoanalysis, Freud (1923/1981) gave
us precursors in the psychophysiological field
when he set out drive theory and the three
types of structure or determinants: id, ego, and
superego. These Freudian structures have the
features of GRs, with complex structuring of
the type shown in Figure 4. Freud did not,
however, describe a self-organizing process
such as that sketched in above to explain the
development of these structures.
In the 1930s such a developmental mecha-
nism began to emerge on memory schemata,
282
with Bartlett (1932) writing that "perception
and meaning seem to be organized in chunks,
clusters, or outlines rather than in isolated
particles" (p. 201).
Piaget (1993) furthered this picture early in
cognitive psychology: "Every schema of
assimilation is extended sooner or later to
combining generalizing assimilation and rec-
ognition assimilation. The nursling, from the
second week of life, is capable of finding the
nipple and differentiating it from the surround-
ing teguments; therein lies the proof that the
schema of sucking in order to feed begins to be
differentiated from the schemata of empty
sucking or of random sucking" (p. 251).
Tomkins (1962), a contemporary of Berne,
began to evoke the idea of a hierarchical sys-
tem when he described that incongruity be-
tween novel material and expectations, in self-
relevant situations, may evoke a higher level of
activity across many networks and generate a
density of neural firing effect.
In more recent cognitive work, other theo-
rists, such as Greenberg (Greenberg & Safran,
1987) and Greenspan (1989), have contributed
to the converging view of interactive mental
components. Nelson and Gruendel (1981)
postulated a feedback loop that led to their
formulation of generalized event representa-
tions (GERs) similar to the Stem diagram
shown in Figure 2. They wrote that these GERs
are the "the basic building blocks of cognitive
organization" (p. 150). "Whatever is repre-
sented at this first level direct memory of the
event is subject to schematization over time
and thus the production of a more generalized
event representation-in the case of highly
routinized events, a script is formed" (p. 152)
(a script for that event, not a script for a life
plan as in transactional analysis terms). Their
work is based on experiments in the verbal
recall of small children of specific events, such
as lunch at the day-care center or a birthday
party; they recorded in their accounts what the
children recalled and did not recalled over
time. Nelson and Gruendel's research on
infants' cognitive recall of events was a study
of representations formed only from cognitive
perceptions of a banal event made by the small
Transactional Analysis Journal

child itself. Affective factors were not in-
cluded.
The work by Stem (1985), grounded in
observations in the field of mother and baby
interactions, spelled out the details of the
reinforcing stimulus/response loop in Figure 2.
To these he gave the term of RIGs (representa-
tions of mother and baby interactions that have
been generalized), although in his most recent
book (Stem, 1995) he used the term "schemas-
of-being-with" for this concept. He stressed the
formative importance of the motherlbaby
interactions for normal development of the
personality. He was considering interactions or
exchanges of stimuli that build up representa-
tions of a higher level of complexity than those
described by Nelson and Gruendel. These
representations combine perceptions of stimuli
coming from (m)other together with percep-
tions of internal reactions coming from within
the child, both somatic and adaptive, in the
generalizations that are built up.
In recent psychoanalytic literature we have
a similar picture. Rumelhart (1980, p.180), in
person schema theory, said, "When the fea-
tures of a schema fit a situation sufficiently
well, that schema is activated, and the newly
adopted schema guides further perceptions of
the situation" (p. 180). In addition, Horowitz
(1991), who was a trainee of Berne's before
becoming a psychoanalyst, talked of multiple
self schemas and states of mind: "A state-of-
mind is a coherent set of features.... In other
words the features of a specifiable state-of-
mind tend to occur together" (p. 177).
Gilbert (1996), in her paper "Ego States and
Ego State Networks," forcefully presented the
significance of underlying generalized repre-
sentations for the understanding of ego state
network structures and showed how close the
meaning of schema is to that of generalized
representation.
These selections are given to highlight over
a broad theoretical field the similarities that are
sometimes difficult to identify because of the
use of the same terms with different meanings
(e.g., the word "script") as well as the wide
range of different terms that are used to label
similar phenomena. Some confirmation of the
Vol. 27, No.4, October 1997
MINDSTRUCTURE AND EGOSTATES
accuracy of the observations of these authors is
now available in network simulations and brain
scanning results as reported by Churchland
(1995), Edelman(1992), and others.
b) Ego States and the GR Model-An Evolv-
ing Understanding. Berne's ego state theory
(1961) can be viewed as an early and particu-
larly clarifying model, which, together with
state-of-mind theory and self-schema theory,
are consistent with the GR model. The con-
verging theoretical models of brain function
provide a basis for understanding the formation
of ego states.
Ego states exhibit several characteristics of
GR systems, including:
1. Ego states become comparatively stable
and coherent systems, as do GRs.
2. In ego states the mental activity can be
broad and can include thinking, feeling,
and behaving. This is similar to the make
up of a "generalized experience" as de-
scribed by Moscovitch (1994).
3. Once systems such as these are formed,
they continue to exist in the brain, ready
to be activated at any time.
4. A whole ego state system can become
active at one time.
5. The ego state systems are processing
incoming stimuli in parallel with each
other, even if only one is activated.
6. In ego state systems the ego states have
their own characteristic styles and give
their own meaning to internal sensations
and external perceptions.
A major contribution of Berne in developing
ego state theory was the identification of class-
es of ego states with discrete and coherent
behavioral manifestations accompanying con-
sistent thought and affect content. This allowed
Berne to define three major modes of psycho-
logical activity present in people throughout
life.
Previous to Berne's formulation, theorists
did not provide any detail about the content of
the schema, representations, or networks they
described. They stopped short at the schema
level, with little attempt to classify or interpret
the interlinking between clusters. This left a
serious gap for both research and practice as it
283
JENNIHINE
provided little guidance on how observation
and analysis could proceed.
c) The Present Status ofEgo State Theory.
An ego state was defined by Berne (1961) as a
coherent system of thoughts and feelings
linked to a corresponding set of observable
behaviors. In other words, it is an interlinked
system or network that has become generalized
through the self-organizing processes de-
scribed earlier, one with consistently common
features. Thus the ego state concept is consis-
tent with some definitions of schema, general-
ized representations, and senses of self.
These ego state networks can activate reactions
in the motor, the sensory/affect, and the cogni-
tive areas of the brain. Ego state theory was an
early integration of drive theory (wired-in
networks) and self-schema theory (networks
developed mainly in the self-other relation-
ship). It has proved such a powerful model that
it permitted the classification of other, more
complex repetitive and problematic behavioral
patterns, such as self-disserving script, game
experiences, and racket systems.
Today there is little reason to doubt that the
three major ego states are phenomena that are
consistently observable and also consistently
experienced over a wide range of the popula-
tion. This is supported by the considerable
number of documented research projects. A
complete compilation of doctoral dissertations
from 1963 to 1980 was given by Wilson
(1981). Specifically, ego states were the sub-
ject of 22 dissertations. An almost equal num-
ber of dissertations on ego states has appeared
since 1980. These are referenced in the TADA-
TA database (Novey, 1995/1997b). In addi-
tion, a large and coherent data set collected by
Kahler (1990) was based on the observation of
personality styles that result from the predomi-
nant activation of specific ego states.
Theme 3: Differentiation of the Ego States
a) Hypotheses about the Different Modes of
Formation. Why are the three ego states differ-
ent from each other? In this article I propose
the following hypotheses:
1. Differences in the characteristics of ego
state styles are due to the way each ego state
284
system forms and how the perceptions that
give rise to each system are processed and
organized. I suggest that there is, in fact, a
different perceptual mode involved in the
construction of each ego state network.
2. Their formation is a natural process, and
once formed ego state systems have enduring
existence.
3. Ego state systems form because each one
gives adaptive advantages to us as human
beings. This hypothesis is not readily tested,
although it offers clients in transactional ana-
lytic treatment insight into normal ego state
functioning and helps them to understand
behaviors.
b) Discussion of These Hypotheses from a
Developmental Viewpoint. These ideas will be
explored further from the perspective of ego
state development.
The Child ego state develops gradually as
the baby's perceptual capacities develop. The
earliest to appear is the Somatic Child eCI ) .
Starting at birth, I see the C, (the somatic
Child) as a specialist subsystem especially
sensitive to internal stimuli. It is unlike the
other parts of the Child ego state, which begin
their development later and are more taken up
with mother/child interaction. C, begins form-
ing at birth, if not before, by building up GRs
from body and emotional stimuli coming from
both internal sensation and external stimula-
tion.
The Parent in the Child (P t ) is a primitive
Parent system that forms when the infant has
acquired more awareness of self and not-self
during the early months of development. It
forms into what I see as a subsystem especially
sensitive to external stimuli, primarily coming
from mother and the caretaking environment.
In PI' the infant is conscious of its own reac-
tion to stimuli coming from the caretaker. For
example, if a Don't Trust injunction is being
built up through the child's experiences of
being hit, then the child's fear reaction to this
experience becomes incorporated into the
Don't Trust GR. The injunction GR does not
form, or stay, in conscious awareness, but
when it is activated in later life the whole force
of the child's past emotional reaction comes to
Transactional Analysis Journal

life in an almost unstoppable process. As
Berne said, it is like an electrode.
The Adult in the Child (AI) is a prelogical
cognitive system, which I see as a system
especially sensitive to the urgency of incoming
stimuli. Its activation lends weight to the
activation of either C 1 or PI according to great-
est need. It is reactive to cues of urgency in the
stimulus, such as pain in the stomach (internal
stimulus) or mother leaving the room (external
stimulus), whichever has the most stressful
meaning to the infant. This description of
second-order A j functioning was first proposed
by Cornell (1975).
The mature Child ego state (C z) is made up
of these three subsystems and their interac-
tions: C I , AI, and PI' While some of the per-
ceptions that lead to the formation of this
mature and coherent Child ego state system are
endogenous, the perceptions of the external
world stocked in the C z mainly arise from
within the parent/child relationship or are
considerably colored by that relationship. We
see this confirmed in Stern's (1985, 1995)
research on mother/infant interactions in the
preverbal representations (senses of self) and
the internalization of the early caretaker/infant
relationship that he describes.
The perceptual mode in the Child ego state
(C). I see these perceptions of interactions
with (m)other as the Child ego state's special
mode of organizing perceptions during its
formation, and the later specific features of the
Child system are seen as due to this interactive
mode of formation (Hypothesis I).
Specific features of the Child ego state.
When C z is activated, its prelogical thinking,
sensorimotor perception, and early emotional
and relationship experiences are still percepti-
ble. From this we get the distinct features of
the Child ego state when activated later in life:
more intuitive thinking, less cognitively con-
trolled behavior, with more perception of body
needs and emotions.
The mature Adult ego state system (Az) is a
network of GRs that forms at a later stage of
cognitive development. The greater mobility
and independence of the growing child facili-
tates the formation of the "cause-and-effect"
Vol. 27, No.4. October 1997
MINDSTRUCTURE AND EGO STATES
thinking that we find in A z. This formation
occurs while the child is exploring its environ-
ment in an active and more conscious manner.
The Adult ego state system is being formed
from perceptions of stimuli occurring mainly
outside the influence of the motherlbaby rela-
tionship, outside the baby's drive for attach-
ment-often when mother is not present. For
instance, it is being formed when the small
child is playing in the next room exploring the
books in the bookcase and fmding out how the
lamp switches on and off. The child's attention
is often absorbed by objects and events outside
of itself while the GRs in this ego state are
forming.
Theperceptual mode ofA 2' It is this increas-
ing autonomy that is the special perceptual
mode of the Adult ego state system. It forms
out of the striving for mastery and understand-
ing of the external world, as well as mastery of
one's own organism in order to survive in the
external world. It is this mode that gives such
a different quality to the experience of being in
the Adult as compared to being in the Child
ego state (Hypothesis I).
Specific features ofA 2' One perceives a more
autonomous state when one observes oneself
and others in the Adult state of the ego. A
person is more focused and more concentrated
when the Adult ego state network is activated,
and they experience less emotional reaction
and more sense of separateness. In this ego
state the person can be like an observer, a self
who can think about its own ego states and
observe other people's ego states. This is a
very different experience from the inquisitive-
ness, reactiveness, and attention seeking of the
Child ego state.
In the structural model of ego states the
Parent ego state (P z) is formed from the
unconscious introjection of aspects of the ego
states of our parent figures. Here the word
introjection is used to describe the taking-in
process. It is not used here to discriminate
between dysfunctional introjects and functional
internalizations, which is the meaning attrib-
uted to it in the integrated Adult model of ego
states.
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JENNIHINE
The Parent is a network that is being built up
in a passive, sponge-like process in which the
personality and ways of being of the parental
figures are absorbed as they unfold from day to
day in the presence of the infant and growing
child. In this process both the functional and
the dysfunctional traits are unselectively ab-
sorbed.
Specific perceptual mode of P2' It is this
unselective absorption process that is the
specific mode of taking in perceptions in the
formation of the Parent ego state (Hypothesis
I). I believe that this process occurs outside the
attention of the child, who is unaware of the
information that he or she is receiving on a
continuous basis, unaware that any event is
happening, and having little emotional reaction
to the perceptions being taking in. This is
unlike the highly interactive mode of formation
of the PI subsystem in the Child. For this
reason, I believe that little personal sense of
self and little personal emotional reaction is
incorporated into the GRs of the Parent system.
We see confirmation of this process in Par-
ent interviews in which the client is able to
"be" his or her father or mother. It is as though
there is another person inside the client who is
expressing himself or herself. In Parent inter-
views this "parent figure" can sometimes
express a great deal of painful emotion. The
client herself or himself seems able to snap out
of the interview completely once it is over,
surprised at what she or he has heard, and not
having felt any personal suffering in the pro-
cess.
Specific features of P 2' This inattentive
absorption little marked by any "self' experi-
ence on the part of the child is seen to lead to
some of the characteristic features of the Parent
system when it is active in later life. When the
Parent system is active a person's attention
seems divided between scrutiny of other peo-
ple and what they are doing and scrutiny of his
or her own internal Child. This appears to
come from a drive to control and protect one-
self and others from the uninhibited impulsive-
ness of the Child ego state system and the
possible dangers to which this might lead. This
drive to control "self' or others is more like a
286
master or an overseer than is the insight and
"self-understanding" that was described when
considering the Adult. People become so
identified with these borrowed GRs when they
are active that they seem unaware that they are
in a different state of mind and behaving in a
different style. This state is often more appar-
ent to others than to themselves, unlike the
Adult, which, as we have seen, is self-aware.
c) The Adaptive Advantages ofEgo States
(Hypothesis 3). The Child ego state has many
ways of making its needs known and getting
the attention of its mother during the vulnera-
ble first years of relative helplessness. All the
subsystems-s-Cj, PI' and Al help in this adap-
tive process. The CI's uninhibitedness and
sensitivity to self-functioning call mother's
attention to its needs in an imperative way, the
AI's intuitive attention to urgency guides the
child's attention to important stimuli, and the
PI'S focus on the caretaking environment-
each of these favors adaptive behaviors that
will keep the caretaker involved. These are all
survival factors in childhood and later.
The survival value of the Adult is in mastery
of the surrounding environment. Searching for
food, finding out how to do things, finding
one's way about are aspects of the adaptive
advantages of an Adult system. The capacity of
the Adult to evaluate danger and choose up-
coming action plans based on past experience
gives humans an enormous advantage over
other creatures, many of which are bigger,
faster, and stronger. This was the great evolu-
tionary leap forward made by humans, and it is
mainly due to Adult functioning.
The passive and unconscious mode of for-
mation is the key to the survival value of the
Parent system. A body of knowledge is passed
from one generation to the next without any
intentional learning process or possibility of
refusal on the part of the child receiver. Care-
taking behaviors and values are handed on in a
stable way, which greatly increases the chances
of the survival of the next generation.
c) Changing Our Thinking about Ego States.
There is an ambiguity in the Child ego state
concept that needs clarification. This ambigu-
ity is strengthened by the use of the term
Transactional Analysis Journal

"archaeopsyche." Berne (1961) indicated that
the Child ego state contained "fixated" mate-
rial and also that it was spontaneous and in
contact with endogenous affect and hungers.
The word "archaeopsyche" suggests "fixated"
material only, that is to say, a structure con-
taining GRs that are so overgeneralized as to
be rigid and possibly dysfunctional in the here
and now. This has led to considerable confu-
sion. I suggest that the word "endopsyche"
better describes the mental structure underlying
the Child ego states as discussed in this article.
Another ambiguity was introduced by the
evolution of Berne's thinking about the ego
state concept. At first these were classified as
coherent states of mind, or ego states, which he
perceived as different categories of Freudian
"ego" functioning, using Federn's (1952)
description of the development of the "ego
system" in which "phenomena of experiencing
and behavior are perceptible as states of the
ego in the here and now" (p. 34).
This suggested that the ego state model was
a model of the "ego" only and therefore an
incomplete model of psychological function-
ing, describing secondary process but not
including unconscious "id" or "superego"
functions. However, by the last pages of chap-
ter 20 in TA in Psychotherapy, Berne (1961)
strongly equated the transactional analysis
determinants of the Parent-Adult-Child to the
Freudian determinants of id, ego, and super-
ego, suggesting that by then he had experi-
enced the model as a complete picture. In my
opinion. the psychic organ concept is sufficient
to describe a complete model of personality,
especially if we introduce the word "endo-
psyche" as a substitute for archaeopsyche.
In light of the emerging picture, I suggest
that it would be helpful to start consistently
conceptualizing ego state manifestations as the
product of three underlying neuropsycho-
logical network hierarchies, which could be
called "ego state networks" or the endo, neo,
and extero ego state networks. Ego state net-
works could be seen as made up of a myriad of
self-organizing generalized representations,
with identifiable, semiautonomous subsystems
in the Child and the Parent. These three major
Vol. 27, No.4, October 1997
MIND STRUCTURE AND EGO STATES
networks are all capable of receiving and
processing stimuli in parallel, each one having
some features specific to it alone. I believe that
the propensity to build up these major ego state
networks is a natural, innate process and that
each one has a different adaptive function
either for the individual or for the species.
Since each ego state system is seen here to
exist and maintain its own characteristic style
on a continuous basis throughout life (Hypoth-
esis 2), we need terms to describe mature
healthy ego state functioning. When using the
conceptualization of ego states as network
systems, I suggest that it would be helpful to
introduce the term "interacting ego state
networks" when we refer to a mature individ-
ual functioning in contact with the here and
now, with healthy participation of functional
Child and Parent GRs in an updated frame of
reference. Clearly, a unique integrated Adult
concept cannot apply when using a conceptual-
ization of three enduring systems.
This proposition would reflect the thinking
of Gilbert from her 1996 presentation on ego
states and ego state networks. She insisted on
the importance of interlinking and interaction
between ego states, as was discussed earlier in
this article. In light of this it becomes clear that
the generalizing factor of the ego state GRs
must not be so strong and rigid that our ego
states cannot influence each other and be
updated. Thus ego state systems remain open
to later influences and stay potentially active
throughout life. This is the requirement of
healthy functioning.
This is consistent with the views put forward
by Blackstone (1993) and Novey (1992), in
which events and therapeutic interventions can
update the representations that make up an ego
state but cannot change the basic nature of the
ego state as a whole. This updating or replace-
ment process also figures in the theory and
techniques of rechilding described by Clarkson
and Fish (1988). These updating interventions
must have the same repetitive strength and
recognition cues as in the formation of the
original GRs to override the former generaliz-
ing factors, which gave the homeostatic and
stable nature to the original representations.
287
JENNIHINE
In Conclusion
This article presents the three major ego
states as interconnected networks of general-
ized representations of experience (GRs) built
up through a self-reinforcing perceptual pro-
cess. I suggest here that the characteristic
differences between the ego states that are
observed and experienced when they are acti-
vated are due to each one of them developing
in a different perceptual mode or at a different
level of consciousness, or both.
Many of the generalized representations
(GRs) that are activated in the Child ego state
were built up within the framework of the
infant/caretaker relationship and often bear the
imprint of that interaction, while others are
more endogenous and were built up from
internal experiences. This is the perceptual
mode of the Child ego state. The child is aware
of the stimulus at the time it is perceived, even
though it is later forgotten, and is aware of his
or her own reaction to the stimulus. This per-
sonal reaction becomes encapsulated into the
same GR. This leads to a young and very
"self'-conscious state of the ego, in contact
with its own emotional reaction to stimuli.
In contrast, I suggest that the Adult ego state
is built up in a drive for mastery and under-
standing. It is formed from perceptions of
stimuli experienced mainly outside the influ-
ence of attention and stroke-seeking needs.
This happens at a later stage of cognitive
maturity, when the external world is being
explored by the child and its attention is fo-
cused outward. This autonomous perceiving is
the perceptual mode of the formation of the
Adult. These are, therefore, autonomously built
up GRs, and I think this is what gives this ego
state its typical focused attention and feeling of
separateness, characteristics that are much less
connected with self, with emotions, and with
the influence of others.
The mode in which the Parent ego state is
built up is seen as passive and inattentive on
the part of the child. It is an absorption and
internalization of the characteristics of the
parental figures out of the child's awareness
and with no reaction or sorting on the part of
288
the child. The Parent is similar to a network of
borrowed GRs, some of which are functional
and even life-preserving in the here and now
and some of which are out-of-date or dysfunc-
tional. The output at times seems stereotyped,
ready-made, and preoccupied and at other
times functional and busy with control and
care of self and others.
Each ego state is seen to form naturally and
to remain active throughout life, and each has
adaptive advantages for survival. The charac-
teristic differences between ego states are
described throughout the transactional analysis
literature, but reasons for these differences
have not been given. This article is a first step
toward filling in this gap.
Present research and observations in many
different fields begin to provide rather compel-
ling responses about these differences. I see
research possibilities both within transactional
analysis and outside of it for acquiring more
certitude both about underlying structures and
their differing characteristics. For instance, a
checklist could be developed to determine the
presence of a GR, say, for instance, a "script
belief': Do specific cues activate it? Does it
have a specific output? It is clear that more
scientific data is needed at the level of ego
state networks and both healthy and scripted
phenomena, before the hypotheses given here
can move out the realm of intuitive clinical
observation and become a reliable scientific
theory.
Before concluding this article, I want to
warmly thank many people for their input and
help, especially the following: my supervisors
Ted Novey and Bill Cornell, both clinical
psychologists and Teaching and Supervising
Transactional Analysts; my husband Mervyn
Hine, Ph.D., who is in physics at Kings Col-
lege, Cambridge; my friend Gretel Pelto,
professor emeritus of anthropology of Colum-
bia University; my brother, Robin Marris,
professor of economics (economic systems) at
Birkbeck College, London; and my son-in-law,
Kenneth Winter, Ph.D., who is in psychology
and computer systems analysis at the Univer-
sity of Michigan.
Transactional AnalysisJournal

Jenni Hine is an occupational therapist and
Provisional Teaching and Supervising
Transactional Analyst (clinical). She practices
in Switzerlandas codirector oftrainingfor the
Center for Transactional Analysis-Geneva
and has had a continuing interest in mind
structure since first doing reeducation work
with brain damaged patients as an occupa-
tional therapistand subsequently while seeking
to understand scripting processes in clinical
practice as a transactional analyst. Please
send reprint requests to Jenni Hine, Centre
A.T.-Geneve, 27 chemin des Neyruaz, 1297
Founex, Switzerland.
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