(IM"=US). Once more, trade creation (the production effect a and
the consumption effect ¢) would clearly exceed trade diversion b, although the trade creation effects would be smaller than in the case of the free trade area.
The principal difference between the two alternative situations
would arise for country P. In the case of the customs union its consumers would suffer a consumption loss, denoted by d. Although its producers would enjoy a net gain, there would be an adverse production effect, denoted by e. In the case of the free trade area there would be no loss from the production and consumption effects, but there would be a gain in government revenue that was larger than the net gain that would accrue to country P with the customs union. In the case of the customs union, moreover, trade with the rest of the world would be eliminated, whereas it would increase in the alternative of the free trade area.
Taking these considerations into account, the customs union
alternative can be said to be inferior to the free trade area arrangement if judged purely in terms of static efficiency considerations. The difference between the two alternatives results essentially from the indirect trade deflection that occurs in the free trade area case, which rules of origin cannot prevent. In limiting cases this may make a free trade area equivalent in its effects to a customs union that takes the lowest pre-union tariff as the basis of the common external tariff. Evidently, if there are transport costs, which have so far been ruled out, the more geographically dispersed are the members of a free trade area, the smaller is likely to be the indirect trade deflection that results.
2. A second case will now be considered in which, unlike the
first, a price differential would arise for the product in the free trade area. In this case country P’s supply is again assumed to be relatively competitive and elastic, but it is now assumed to be incapable of satisfying country H's demand (Figure 2.4).
Before the free trade area is formed, both countries are
assumed to have prohibitive tariffs. Country P produces and consumes M, and country H produces and consumes N. If a free trade area were formed (Figure 2.4a), country P’s supply at price T, would be incapable of satisfying the extra demand in country H, and the equilibrium free trade area price in country H would therefore be Pp, (L'N'=0OM"). At the same time, the price in country P could not rise above 7}, at which level imports from