Nationalism

Author(s): James C. King

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 39, No. 6 (May, 1934), pp. 818-826
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 NATIONALISM
JAMES C. KING
Universityof Chicago

ABSTRACT
Althoughthe politicalsettlementof i9i9 was based on the principleof nationalism,
the expectationwas that the economicsystemwould remaininternational.But in the
post-wardecade nationalismspread steadilyto economicmatters.In I920 the United
States underwentan extremereactiontowardpoliticaland economicnationalisolation
which it was forcedto tempersomewhatin the ensuing ten years. The New Deal
showsa tendencytowardinternationalpoliticalco-operation,but only towardsuch as
is consistentwitha plan of nationaleconomicdevelopment.Internally,the New Deal
promisesto strengthenAmericannational solidarityby increasingthe integrationof
economicactivityand organizationaround a national plan and by emphasizingthe
differencebetweenthat whichis comprisedin the nationalplan and that whichis out-
side it.
I
The last centuryofworld-history has seenthesteadyincreasein
nationalismas the basis of social and politicalorganization.The
oldernationshave increasedtheirsolidarity, and newnationshave
been set up. The principleof self-determination whichformed the
basis of the Europeansettlement of I919 was a frankrecognition
thatpoliticalreconstructionshouldbe builton the existence ofna-
tionalism.But theframers ofthepeace of I9I9 did notapparently
expecttheprinciple ofnationalism to extendmuchbeyondthepoliti-
cal sphere.They seemto have assumedthat,in spiteof the new
settlement, tradewouldcontinuealongmuchthesame
international
linesit had followedbeforethewar. Thesehad notbeenprimarily
nationalistic.In spiteof certaintariffpolicies,the nationsofthe
worldhad notgoneveryfarin thedirection of closedeconomicsys-
temscoinciding withnationalboundaries.The International Labor
Officeandtheeconomic clausesoftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNa-
tionsbear witnessto thisexpectationon the part of the guiding
statesmenofthe conference.
But thepost-warworlddid notreturnto thenineteenth-century
systemofinternational trade. The warhad badlydisrupted thein-
ternational economicsystem,and in spiteofnumerous attemptsto
restoreit,beginning withtheBrusselsConference of I920 and con-
tinuingto theEconomicConference of I933, it provedimpossible to
8i8

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 NATIONALISM 8I9

reviveeven the measureof freecirculationof goods and capital

whichhad existedin I9I4. Instead,thenations,bothold and new,
driftedsteadilytowardpoliciesof economicself-sufficiency. Tariff
wallsbecamehigher,quota systemsforimportswereadopted,and
all mannerofnewrestrictions on internationaltradeand theinter-
nationalmovement of capitalwereinventedand put intopractice.
In short,thepost-war periodhas seenthesteadygrowth ofnational-
ismnotonlyinthepoliticalbutintheculturalandeconomic spheres.
The UnitedStateswas,ofcourse,involvedin thismovement.At
theendofthewartheUnitedStateswas playinga majorrolein in-
ternational affairs, butverysoona powerful reactiontowardnational
isolationsetin. The earlypolicyoftheHardingadministration was
to end,to as greatan extentas possible,thepoliciesofinternational
co-operation whichhad characterized the Wilsonadministration.
The LeagueofNationswas ignored;theUnitedStatestookno part
in Europeanconferences; thequestionofwardebtswasheldto have
no connection withreparations policy;and theAmericantariff was
revisedsharplyupwardin theFordney-McCumber Actof I922.
In thepost-wardecadetheUnitedStateswas generally successful
inmaintaining itspolicyofeconomicnationalism; but thisincluded,
besidesa policyofrestricting imports,theinconsistent policyofen-
couraging exports.Theseincompatible aimsweremadetemporarily
attainableby a steadystreamof foreign loans. The UnitedStates
was soon,however, forcedto modifyits standtowardinternational
politicalco-operation.The WashingtonConference was held in
I92I-22. As timewenton,theUnitedStatesdevelopeda friendlier
attitudetowardthe League machinery.Throughoutthe entire
periodtheexecutivesponsored American membership in thePerma-
nentCourtofInternational Justice.The UnitedStatesbegansend-
ing "unofficial observers"to conferences calledby theLeague,and
later American
official representatives part. Finally,towardthe
took
closeof the Hooveradministration, a representativeof the United
Statesactuallyattendeda meetingoftheLeague Council,and the
State Departmentand theLeague co-operated on theManchurian
problem as well as was possibleunder the difficulties
whichflowed
fromthe factthatthe UnitedStateswas not a memberof theor-
ganization.

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820 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

On theeconomicside,theUnitedStatesmadefewercompromises.
The anomalouspolicyofencouraging exportswas continued,butthe
tariff policywas maintained, and thetariff
was evenrevisedupward
in I930. Somemodifications oftheoriginalpost-warattitudewere
made,however.TheDawes Planforreparations wasdrawnup,part-
lyonthebasisofa suggestion oftheAmerican SecretaryofState; and
in thedrafting ofboththeDawes PlanandtheYoungPlan,although
theUnitedStatesgovernment didnotplaya partdirectly,
prominent
American citizensincontactwiththeAmerican andAmeri-
executive
can bankingcirclesexerteda veryconsiderable influence.In the
moratorium of I93I PresidentHooverwentevenfarther and inter-
veneddirectlyin the reparations problemand came verynear to
recognizing a connection betweenthedebtandreparations questions.
Thiswas thegeneralsituationwhentheRooseveltadministration
beganthe construction of the New Deal. The UnitedStateshad
begunthe post-wardecade by following a policyofnationalisola-
tionandhad beengraduallydrawnintomoreand moreactsofinter-
nationalco-operation, buton thewholeit had resistedco-operation
moresuccessfully in economicthanin politicalmatters.
II
Beforeconsidering the nationalisticaspectsof the New Deal, it
maybe wellto considerthenatureand manifestations ofnational-
ism. Nationalism maybestbe defined as theattitudeofa population
whichresultsinthemembers givingtheirsupremeloyaltyto a given
nation.But inorderto givethisdefinition meaning,onemustdefine
certainof the termsused. By a "nation"is meanta groupof cul-
turallysimilarpeople,cognizantoftheirsimilarity to eachotherand
theirdifferencefromothers,whether or notheldtogether by a com-
mon and whollyindependent politicalorganization.The "state"
may be definedas the socialunitheld togetherby a whollyinde-
pendentpoliticalorganization.In cases wherethepopulationof a
stateis culturallyhomogeneous, and the culturalsimilarityof the
members is definitely
recognized, thestateand thenationare coter-
minous,and we have a nationalstate. "Nationalism"is thuseasily
recognized as a formof social cohesion,and thiscohesionis likely
to be bestdevelopedin thenationalstate.

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 NATIONALISM 82I

Withinall nationsas definedabovethesocialorganization is very

complex.The factthatthemembers givetheirsupremeloyaltyto
thenationdoesnotmeanthattheindividuals maynotbe unitedin
othergroups. Withinall nationsthereare manygroups,such as
trade-unions, churches, voluntarysocieties,local communities, and
politicalpartiesinwhichindividuals areconnected inan interlocking
complexand to whichtheseindividuals givevaryingdegreesofloy-
alty. Butnormally theseloyaltiesaresubordinateto thatcommand-
ed by thenation. Exceptin the unusualcircuirLstance of civilwar
or nationaldisintegration, theseotherloyaltiesgivewayto national
loyaltywhenconflict arises.
The degreeof cohesionwithina givennationwilldependon the
internalorganization, on theextentto whichthecomplexsystemof
internalgroups is welded into a singleintegratedsystem.It will
manifest itselfin theextentto whichthenationis successful in pur-
suinga nationalpolicyas againsta policyofco-operation and com-
promisewithnon-national groupseitherwithinor outsideitself.
III
Whathas beenthegeneraldirection oftheRooseveltadministra-
tion'spolicywithreference to international co-operation? Regard-
ingtheLeague and international organization, thepolicyhas been
similarto thatofthepreviousadministration; but it has goneeven
farther.Beforehis inauguration Rooseveltindorsedthe Stimson
policyrelatingto Manchuria.In May thePresidentmade a direct
appealto thenationsoftheworldto supportthedisarmament con-
ference, whichwas thenfacedwithgreatdifficulties; and a fewdays
laterNormanDavis, chiefoftheAmericandelegation, outlinedthe
extentof Americanco-operation whichcould be expected. The
UnitedStates,he said,favorseffective disarmament and is willing
to go as faras othernations.The UnitedStatesis willingto consult
theothernationsin case ofa threatto peace; and in case theother
nationsdecideon collective actionagainsta violatorofinternational
obligations and iftheUnitedStatesconcursin theirdecision,it will
takeno actiontendingto defeatsuchcollectiveeffort.The United
Statesfurther believesin thenecessity ofarmament supervision and
is readyto aid in theexecution of such supervision.This was a clear-

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 822 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

erstatement ofjustwhatcouldbe expectedoftheAmerican govern-

mentthananyAmerican administration hadpreviously given.While
sucha statement couldscarcelybe expectedto satisfy theFrenchde-
mandforsecurity, it servedto clarify theproblemofAmerican par-
ticipation in collectiveactiontopreserve peace,especially withrefer-
enceto thethornyproblemsofneutrality and freedom oftheseas.
In additionto makingthisfar-reaching statement of American pol-
icy,theAmerican delegation haslaboredactivelyfora disarmament
agreement.In his WilsonDay addressthePresidentreiterated his
faith in theLeaguemachinery a in
as prop thepeace structure ofthe
world.TheUnitedStates,he said,doesnotcontemplate membership
in theLeague,butitintendstoco-operate openlyandfullywithit.
The newadministration has also strengthened theAmerican pol-
of
icy co-operation in inter-American matters. The Cuban situation
earlyput thispolicyto severetest,but theUnitedStateshas made
everyeffort to avoidarmedintervention. In theWilsonDay address
thePresident announcedthathe wasopposedto armedintervention
in theLatin-American republicsand thatin cases wherethefailure
oforderly government withinan American stateaffects otherstates,
thissituationwouldbe regardedas a jointconcernofthoseaffected
ratherthanas a concernoftheUnitedStatesalone. Thisdeclaration
is in effecta modification oftheessentially unilateralinterpretation
whichtheUnitedStateshad previously insistedon givingtheMon-
roeDoctrine.At thePan-American Conference at Montevideothe
Americandelegation, led by SecretaryHull, followedthepolicyof
allayingLatin-American suspicionof theUnitedStatesand offered
practically no resistance to theexpression by theconference ofoppo-
sitionto armedintervention. The generalresultof the conference
was to raiseAmerican prestigeand to increasethebeliefthroughout
Latin-America in the sincerity of Americanexpressions of anti-im-
perialism.
The recognition of Russia,besidesendingthe estrangement be-
tweenthesetwonations,willundoubtedly facilitate
universalinter-
nationalco-operationon anyquestionwhichmayarisein thefuture.
On thewholeit hardto see howit can be deniedthattheRoose-
is
velt administrationhas broughtthe UnitedStates to a fullerco-
operationin international
politicalmatters.

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 NATIONALISM 823

IV
In mattersofinternationaleconomicpolicytheNewDeal has had
a different
trend.The policyofpushingAmerican exportswas early
abandoned.Verysoonaftertheinauguration theadministration be-
ganpreparations forthecomingeconomicconference, and a number
ofconsultationswereheldwithregularand specialrepresentatives of
foreignstates. The numerouscommuniqueswhichresultedfrom
thesenegotiations weresomewhatvague,but mostof themrecog-
nizedthatthequestionsofmonetary stabilizationand a riseofprice-
levelswereamongtheimportant questionswithwhichthe confer-
encemightdeal. As a partofthepreparation fortheconference the
UnitedStatesachievedtheadoptionofa tariff trucefortheperiod
oftheconference, butit was notacceptedwithoutnumerous excep-
tionsand interpretations.VerysoonafteritsadoptionthePresident
was facedwithan uglydilemmain thisregard.The application ofa
cottonprocessingtaxwhichwas a partofthenewlyadoptedagricul-
tural adjustmentpolicy requiredthe adoptionof compensating
dutieson cottonproducts.Aftersomehesitation theadministration
put on thetax and thedutiesin spiteofthetruce.
On May 20 AssistantSecretaryMoley made'a veryimportant
speechovertheradio,thegistofwhichwas thatgreathopesshould
notbe entertained forthe accomplishments of theLondonConfer-
ence. The problemsof the depressionwere,he said,primarily na-
tionaland couldbestbe metbynationalaction.International action
mightaid towardrecovery, butlargelythrough a friendly exchange
of views. Comprehensive international for
agreements endingthe
depressionshouldnotbe expected.
WhentheConference met,thequestionofimmediate stabilization
cameto the foreground at once. A greateffort was made to effect
somekind of agreement, and finallyit becamenecessaryforthe
Presidentto take a definitivestandon the matter.In a strongly
wordedmessageofJuly3, Rooseveltrejectedimmediatestabiliza-
and temporary
tionas "a purelyartificial experiment" ofmuchless
valueandimportance thanthesettlement ofotherbroaderandmore
fundamental problemswithwhichthe conference shoulddeal. It
was obvious that thisdecision had been dictated by the factthat

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824 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

wouldhave interfered
stabilization withtheprosecution of thena-
tionalrecovery scheme.
The messageproduceda crisisat theconference. It was possible
to preventan open breach,but afterseveraldays of diplomatic
sparringtheconference adjournedwithouteffecting anyagreements
offar-reaching importance.
On the subjectof tariffsthe administration has made verylittle
progresstowardinternational agreements.Apparently the fearof
far-reachingpoliticalrepercussions hasprevented thePresident from
askingCongressforauthority to deal withthisthorny problem, al-
thoughseveraltimeshehasbeenreported on thepointofmakingthe
request.'We havealreadyseenthattheagricultural adjustment pol-
icy causedthe administration to do violenceto the tariff truceal-
mostas soonas it was agreedto. JustbeforetheMontevideoCon-
ferenceit was reportedthattheunsettledstateof economicaffairs
wouldmakeit impossible fortheUnitedStatesto discussthem,and
at an inter-American conference thismeantthattariffs wereto be
taboo. Secretary Hullwas successful ingetting authorizationto pre-
senta resolution lookingto thereduction of tradebarriers,but the
resolutioncontainedthestatement that"temporary, emergency or
otherextraordinary measurescomprising domesticprograms, pri-
marilyfornationaleconomicrecovery," wereto be regardedas ex-
ceptions.
On the whole,therefore, it mustbe admittedthattheRoosevelt
administrationhas shownlittletendency to directtheUnitedStates
towarda policyof co-operation in international economicmatters.
In hisinaugural addressthePresident said: "Ourinternational trade
relations,
thoughvastlyimportant, are,in pointof timeand neces-
sity,secondary to theestablishment ofa soundnationaleconomy.I
favoras a practicalpolicythe puttingof firstthingsfirst."This
statement summarizes theforeign policyoftheadministration to a
remarkable degree.The administration favorsinternational co-op-
eration,and in the politicalsphereit has goneas faras American
publicopinionwillpermit.But in theeconomicsphereit regardsre-
coveryas possibleon a nationalscale,anditis unwilling toindulgein
I On March2 thelong-delayed
executive
requestforpowerto concludereciprocal
tariff wassentto Congress.
agreements

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 NATIONALISM 825

international at the expenseof the national

economicco-operation
recovery
program.
V
Fromtheinternalpointofview,whatare likelyto be theeffects
oftheNewDeal on thedegreeofnationalcohesion?Thetrendseems
to be towarda morehighlyintegratednationalorganization, and
hencetowardan increasein cohesion.The generaltendency toward
nationalcentralization whichhas been goingon almostsincethe
adoptionofthefederalConstitution has beengreatlyspeededup by
the depression, and the New Deal seemsdestinedto carryit even
farther.
The N.R.A., unlessit shouldveryobviouslyfail,can scarcelydo
otherwise thanincreasethenationalcohesion.In thefirstplace it
setsup a nationalplanofrecovery and to thatextentemphasizes the
distinction betweenAmericanindustries and thoseoutsidethena-
tion. It givestheexecutivethepowerto protectAmerican industry
bymeansoftariff increases incaseswhereforeign competition threat-
enstointerfere withtheoperation oftheplan. It callsfortheorgani-
zation,on a nationalbasis,ofthevarioustypesofproducers, and it
encourages parallelactionon thepartoflabor. It seemsdestinedto
increasetheintegration oftheeconomicorganization intoa national
system.Sucha system, ifonlysuccessful enoughto be retained, will
tendto minimize localand regionaldifferences and to emphasizethe
differences betweenAmericanproducersand laborersand thoseof
othernations. This willcertainly tendto increasethenationalco-
hesionoftheUnitedStates.
The Agricultural Adjustment Actpromisesto function in a some-
whatsimilarmanner.It encourages theco-operation offarmers on a
nationalbasis. It emphasizes thedistinctionbetweenthehomeand
foreign markets.It providesforexecutivetariff increasesto offset
pricerisescaused by the applicationof processing taxes. It gives
American agriculture a setofinterests distinctfromthoseoffarmers
abroad. Thiswillcertainly tendto increasetheirfeelingofnational
cohesion.
Finally,thegeneralnotionofa nationalplanofrecovery cannotfail
to havean influence on publicopinionfavorableto nationalsolidari-
ty.Theideaofplanning isinextricably associatedwiththeNewDeal.

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826 THE AMERICANJOURNAL
OF SOCIOLOGY

A NationalPlanningBoardhas actuallybeensetup undertheNa-

tionalRecoveryAct. Planningmeanscontrol;and in the present
stateoftheworldit must,almostofnecessity, be nationalplanning,
forthedifficultiesofinternational controlhave provedto be almost
insurmountable. If therecovery program it willbe the
is successful,
nationaleffortwhichhas succeeded,and the group whichhas
emerged fromso severea crisisthroughcollectiveeffort
willcertainly
emergewithan increasedsolidarity.
The policieswhichcomprise theNew Deal havebeenin operation
forso shorta timethatit is verydifficultto isolatetheeffects they
havehad and to prophesy thosethattheywillhave. But,so faras it
can be analyzed,theNew Deal appearsto be partof a generalna-
tionalistreactionto whatare feltto be theshortcomings ofinterna-
tionalism-especially in the economicfield-and it promisesan in-
of Americannationalism
tensification and the curtailment of such
internationalco-operation as the administration may feelis incon-
sistentwithitsgeneralplanofnationaleconomicdevelopment.

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