AKBAR S AHMED

Identity and ideology in Pakistan:

an interview
Akbar S Ahmed is Iqbal Fellow {Chair in Pakistan Studies) at Cambridge University. He
was Commissioner, Quetta Division in Baluchistan Province, Pakistan in 1988. Educated
at Punjab University, and the universities of Birmingham, Cambridge and London, he has
been Visiting Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton and Harvard Univer-
sity. He has also been on the faculty of the Islamic Institute of Advanced Study, USA; the
Islamic Academy, Cambridge; and the University of Washington. He is a Fellow ofSelwyn
College, Cambridge.
Dr Ahmed is the author o/Millennium and Charisma among Pathans (1976), Pukhtun
Economy and Society (1980), Religion and Politics in Muslim Society (1983), Pakistan
Society: Islam, ethnicity and leadership in South Asia (1986) and co-editor of Islam in
Tribal Societies (1984). His latest book, Discovering Islam: making sense of Muslim
history and society (1988), is reviewed in this issue o/Third World Quarterly.
Shahid Qadir interviewed Akbar Ahmed in London in July 1989.

Shahid Qadir: What do you see as the main reasons for the resilience
of race and religion in the communal politics of all of South Asia, not just
Pakistan?
Akbar Ahmed: Social scientists like Clifford Geertz have noted the
importance of ethnic identity in South Asia, based on race, language
and custom. In the last decade we have witnessed a sharp increase in
ethnicity leading to severe political tensions—for example, the Sikhs in
India, the Sindhis in Pakistan, the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The main rea-
sons lie in the relationship of the centre or state with its minority groups
and the intolerant environment prevalent in the region.
The important point is to recognise that there were distinct structural
and historical features in South Asian society well before the independ-
ence of India and Pakistan, which sharply identified the existence of
race and caste in society. Then came the desire of communities like the
Muslims in South Asia to establish its identity. This goes back one to
two centuries—to the Faraizi movement in what then became East
Pakistan (eventually Bangladesh), to the Barailvi movement, based in
Peshawar in what then became West Pakistan. There were attempts by
the Sind to break away from Bombay and the strivings of the Bengali
Muslims for their own identity leading to their own province at the
turn of this century.
It is simplistic to assume that there was one social structure, one

54 TWQ 10(4) October 1989/ISSN 0143-6597/89. $1.25

 IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY IN PAKISTAN

tribal structure when Pakistan was created in 1947. In fact this was not
so, there were at least four separate socio-ethnic categories. First, there
were the tribal groups living in what is now Pakistan, mainly in the
Frontier Province and Baluchistan, though also in the Punjab and the
Sind to an extent. These tribes are distinct and conduct themselves
according to a defined code that goes back centuries. They perceived
the world through tribal eyes; honour, revenge, hospitality were the
main features of the tribes. The regions which they occupied were
generally inaccessible and materially poor. There were few schools or
development schemes in these areas.
Another distinct category in Pakistan is peasant agricultural society
based largely in the Punjab, but increasingly expanding into the Fron-
tier Province and even parts of Sind. This is a characteristic kind of
society based upon the village. The village is defined and self-sufficient.
It tends to be exploited by the state apparatus, the police official or the
revenue official. A kind of work ethic and an energetic desire of the
peasant farmer for material wellbeing permeates society.
The third distinct but not very well developed category is urban
society. Karachi was a small town in 1947, Lahore really a provincial
headquarters, and Peshawar and Quetta small cantonment towns.
Today 30 per cent of the entire population of Pakistan is urban. So
you can see how this category has grown since 1947, creating tremen-
dous pressure on the urban infrastructure.
The fourth category which we can identify as quite distinct from the
other social and ethnic groups is the large influx of refugees coming
from all over India. So 7 or 8 million people suddenly arrived from
India, often with very little in common between them except the sense
of'refugeeness'.
Today, to make a comparison with 1947, we note that Pakistani
society is characterised by certain features. Firstly, the great paradoxes
in Pakistan society: on the one hand the economic growth of 8 per
cent, the large-scale industries' growth rate of 10 per cent, the fact that
Pakistan is a nation in the middle-income category of the World Bank
($400 income per capita). And, on the other hand, the serious break-
down of law and order, use of drugs, falling educational standards, and
widespread corruption. So here is one of the major paradoxes. Secondly,
the complexity of society; at one end of the scale, the tribal structure
which still exists in Pakistan (in many parts of Baluchistan, for instance,
there are tribes which still do not have access to black-top roads or to
drinking water), together with a highly sophisticated and aware urban
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population in Karachi or Lahore. Thirdly, the fact of change. Pakistan

society is undergoing rapid change. The entire political situation in late
1988 leading to the elections illustrates the kind of change that is taking
place in Pakistan. The emergence of the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) is a
good example. In a few years it emerged and swept the urban vote
among the original refugees from India (Mohajir); it is indicative of
this kind of change. Finally, and again paradoxically, the widespread
belief in the major ethnic groups that they are deprived of their rights.
Each group feels the other groups are doing them in, taking and eating
more than their share of the cake. So in these categories we have the
paradoxes, the complexity and change which characterise Pakistan
society.
SQ: You have pointed out the historical roots of ethnic conflict in
Pakistan, but isn 't it true that various political analysts, be they Marxist
or Western, have consistently maintained that ethnicity is not very impor-
tant, that internationalisation of capital and culture will erode it, or that
modernisation will lead it to its dilution. Can you expand as to how and
where these theorists have gone wrong, and, given that the last decade has
seen the increasing Islamisation of Pakistan, how is it that provincialism
has not been swept by Islamic universalism?
AA: It is interesting that both the contemporary Marxist and Muslim
perspectives at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum have the same
blind spot, which is to assume that ethnicity either does not exist, or
would wither away over time. This is ironical considering that both
Marxism and Islam in their original texts clearly recognise ethnicity as
a factor in society. Lenin, and even Stalin in the early years, was con-
cerned with clarifying the question of the rights of nationalities in the
USSR. Hence, the assumption of Marxist states that under Marxism
ethnicity cannot exist or will die out with the dawning of the workers'
paradise is doubly naive. Today we are witnessing tremendous ethnic
resurgence and upheaval in the USSR, and obviously the authorities
are caught completely off guard, and are unable to deal with it. The
same is true of some other Marxist states in East Europe. Unless they
come up with answers, Marxist states in the 1990s will begin to unravel
under the strain of ethnicity. Similarly, Islamic analysts examine society
as an ideal—as it should be, not as it is—and most of the literature
simply dismisses ethnicity as non-existent. This is incorrect, because
even in Pakistan, which is overwhelmingly Muslim, ethnicity is a crucial
factor in political and social life. This is also true in Afghanistan and
Iran, two neighbouring Muslim states. The Holy Prophet, in his saying

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'there is no Bedouinism in Islam' clearly recognises there is ethnicity,

but he emphasises that Islam is a universal ideology and hence that it
transcends ethnicity. There are other hadith and Koranic verses on the
subject which acknowledge its place in human organisation. For ex-
ample, the holy Koran says in Surah 49, 'We have made you into
nations and tribes so that you might know one another.' This blind
spot is therefore curious.
Mainstream social scientists trained in America and Britain have
traditionally analysed Pakistan society as if it possessed a uniform
social structure with common social values. Ethnicity is reduced to a
peripheral factor, and this carries into 'World Bank-US AID' kinds of
assessments on Pakistan society, leading, I think, to serious con-
ceptual and practical problems. At this level, from the headquarters
in Washington or the capital in Islamabad, it is assumed that there
is no such thing as ethnicity: whereas on the ground it very much
exists.
SQ: If we could turn to the use of Islam under the former General Zia.
Is it not true that instead of ethnic strife diminishing during his Islamic
rule, Zia's^ decade has only worsened ethnic relations, and do you think
that Benazir will be able to heal the damage?
AA: The question raises a whole host of interesting issues. Firstly,
General Zia was not able to 'Islamise' Pakistan. He certainly made
Pakistan and the wider world aware of some of the issues involved in
Islamising a society. Towards the end he himself was acutely aware of
his failure in attempting the Islamisation of Pakistan. Islam, as a conse-
quence of the last decade, has begun to be identified with many of the
more negative features in society, such as lashing, the cutting off of
hands, the stoning of an illegitimate infant near a mosque, the disrobing
of women (which took place in the Punjab) and so forth. The positive
and permanent aspects of Islam have not been brought to the fore,
the more permanent and fundamental aspects of Islam, such as the
emphasis on piety, genuine humility, Urn (knowledge) and the respect
for learning, as well as the encouragement of brotherhood and toler-
ance.
Pakistan is essentially a plural and multi-ethnic society. When the
culture and ideology of one group is firmly and forcibly thrust upon
other groups there is a natural and historic reaction against that par-
ticular ideology. There was, therefore, a general kind of resistance to
Islamisation, largely due to the more negative aspects we have identified.
If the more positive aspects had been emphasised, a more tolerant,
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humanistic society might have evolved. Muslim society is complex and

diverse, with many different aspects. The one that was emphasised over
the last decade was harsh and rigorous. Muslim society is not a mono-
lith: there are numerous groups and sects within Islam—and within
them ethnicity allows different interpretations of some of the main
features of the role of religious leadership, or the role of the mullahs,
the religious functionaries, and so on.
It is worth remembering that it is not just the role of religion which
has been the cause of structural weakness in Pakistan society. Let us
look at some of the other contributing factors. A fundamental flaw has
been the lack of education. Pakistan's education figures are appalling—
even today the literacy rate is about 20 per cent. Pakistan society may
well be regressing in this field. There is a general apathy towards learn-
ing and education. And apart from the obvious outside interference—
which has devastating psychological consequences—in Pakistan's inter-
nal affairs, there is the repeated imposition of martial law which stifles
or suspends all creativity and initiative in society.
However it is an exaggeration to state that ethnicity is the sole crea-
tion of martial law. Suspension of political parties and civil rights create
a social vacuum into which rush ethnic forces. This is to some extent
correct. But it is a simplification. Sri Lanka has had little truck with
martial law and is yet torn apart by a vicious ethnic conflict. Other
. factors are important in its growth, for example, the demographic pat-
terns of the groups. In Pakistan Punjabis constitute about 60 per cent
of its 100 million people, and Baluchis about 5 per cent. Yet the area in
which the former live is only 26 per cent of Pakistan and the latter
45 per cent; Punjabis must push out of their borders, as they have
done. In their own province, Sindhis (just over 50 per cent of the
population) complain that they do not want to become extinct like
the 'Red Indians'. The Baluch, who are marginally more in number
than the Pukhtun in Baluchistan, resent the Pukhtun Afghan refugees
who may tilt the balance against them if they settled permanently.
Each ethnic group in Pakistan feels cheated out of its rights and there-
fore frustrated.
There is also the bankrupt role of the intellectual who blindly sup-
ports his own ethnic group, no matter what the truth. The 'committed'
intellectual courts cheap ethnic popularity. He succeeds in stoking
ethnic fires as his arguments gain currency. Mischief between groups is
thus created. Government, with its monopoly of the media, is also a
culprit. By blocking out and blacking out all discussion of ethnicity in
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an attempt to reinforce its 'nationalist' position, the government allows

rumours and propaganda by interested groups to pass for truth. If
unable to avoid mention completely, the official media euphemistically
refers to ethnic clashes as those between 'factions'; the numbers of dead
and injured are scaled down, facts of the incident are left deliberately
vague.
All these features combine to create a society with rifts in it, a
society with tension in it. Benazir Bhutto will only heal the wounds
when she is not only aware of the tensions in society but does something
about them. She has a Herculean task ahead of her. But she is young
and conveys the optimism of youth. Her success—indeed survival—in
office will depend on how well she controls these problems on the
ground.
SQ: Considering the fact that Islam has somewhat glossed over the
ethnic factor, to what extent do you think that Islam is capable of healing
the various ethnic divides in Pakistan of which we spoke earlier?
AA: Islam has not glossed over ethnicity. As I pointed out, Islam
recognises ethnicity, and in its place accepts it as a social fact. But
Muslim analysts fail to see it. Islam has been identified in the recent
past (in Pakistan and abroad) with great disruptive politics and barbaric
influences on society. Examples of hand amputation and lashings
abound. But on another level, let us go down to the rural areas, to the
villages of Pakistan, and note Islam's role in the centres of learning, the
Sufi centres. Here it has provided a platform in bringing people together
and creating harmony. If you were to visit the shrines which are now
centres of learning, often small academies, in Punjab or Sind or even
Baluchistan you would see some very interesting things. For instance,
many of the visitors at the shrine of Bahaudin Zakaria in Multan will
be Sindhis. Also, at Shahbaz Qalandar's shrine in Sind you will note a
lot of visitors from the Frontier Province and the Punjab. So, firstly,
there is a healing factor at work here, the therapeutic effects of visiting
a shrine, and secondly, a harmony created among ethnic groups. People
do not see visitors as Punjabis or Sindhis, but simply as fellow believers
in a more universal and more harmonious philosophy or ideology of
brotherhood. In India you will note that the majority of the visitors to
Ajmer Sharif are Hindus, such is the power of the Sufi saints to attract.
Here is Islam acting as a healing force through its great scholars and its
great saints.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency to dismiss much of this kind of
activity as either primitive or as tribal, and not take it seriously. But for
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people in the villages, for people in the rural areas, and for tribal groups,
this is reality. The visit, the healing powers of the saints and the ac-
cessibility of the saints are what are real and what motivate people to a
more harmonious awareness of others which overrides ethnic positions
and ethnic hatred. Ultimately it boils down to the eternal motto of the
Sufis, sulh-i-kul, or 'peace with all'.
SQ: Perhaps we could turn to one of the constants in post-Bangladesh
Pakistan—Punjab's dominance of Pakistan's ethnic map. Would you not
agree that the more mellow and self-assured Punjabi nationalism of earlier
decades is resurging into a more virulent and chauvinistic kind recently?
Punjab seems to be getting whipped into an awareness of having a Sindhi
head of central government.
AA: This is again a complex question and raises a lot of interesting
issues. First is the self-conscious role of the Punjab as the upholders of
the ideology of Pakistan—which is an equation of Islam plus Urdu
plus the Kashmir issue plus the glory of the Pakistan Defence Services.
The ideology is defined in Islamabad with a base in the Punjab. Second,
and leading from this, is how this translates into the administrative
machinery of Pakistan, the civil services and the army, two of the most
powerful and major institutions in Pakistan—in both the Punjab plays
a dominant role. Thirdly, is the reaction to the Punjabi soldier-cum-
farmer ethos in the other smaller provinces of Pakistan and their local
ethnicities. Punjabi ethnicity has become articulate in the late 1980s
and is a response to growing ethnic awareness in Baluchistan, in Sind,
in the Frontier. It has taken interesting forms—theatre, articles and a
revival of the Punjabi language itself. Fourthly, and most importantly,
is the fact that Punjab society is fast becoming a distinct society within
the rest of Pakistan—it is a more economically prosperous, socially
stable society. The schools and the parks are much better, a visible
middle class is emerging and wanting a better life. This class is based
on small (five to ten acre) farms in the Punjab; sons of small farmers
have risen to powerful positions in the military and the civil service.
The Sikhs in East Punjab had evolved a similarly distinct and prosper-
ous society from the rest of India, based on agriculture as a result of
the green revolution in the 1960s. This is what is happening in the
Pakistani Punjab, feeding a kind of Punjabi nationalism which, in turn,
exacerbates as it provokes a reaction in the other provinces. The sense
of deprivation that exists in the smaller provinces is being heightened.
Unfortunately, instead of provoking a healthy sense of competition,
there is a feeling that Punjab, because it is so powerful and has the
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largest population, has (to quote what will be heard in many of the
smaller provinces) 'eaten us up' or 'exploited us'. This is a very defeatist
kind of reaction, and it unfortunately feeds on rumours, on a sense of
ethnic chauvinism which is usually sterile. In the end this negative feel-
ing takes the form of secessionist ideas, which can lead in the extreme
to irredentist movements.
SQ: Are you saying that Punjabi prosperity is a healthy sign worthy of
emulation, and therefore the other regions should not be jealous and that
there is no case to be made here for a more equitable distribution of
national resources?
AA: No, what I am saying is that experience in South Asia tells us
that when a specific zone begins in economic and social terms to 'take
off, it generates two reactions; a feeling of wellbeing, pride and differ-
ence in the privileged province, and a sense of frustration, of envy if
you like, in the less fortunate provinces. This happened in the Punjab
in India, and eventually led to Sikh conflict with Delhi. Unfortunately
a similar situation exists in Pakistan.
In order to avoid conflict, the standards of the smaller provinces
must be brought up to the level of the Punjab standards, rather than
the standards of the Punjab being brought down to the levels that exist
in some parts of Pakistan.
SQ: Moving on to the role of the military in Pakistan, your work
continually points out the symbiotic alliance between the military and the
civil service. Do you think that Benazir will be able to make inroads into
this 'trusteeship' that the military and the bureaucracy hold over Paki-
stan 's destiny?
AA: Interference by the military and the civil services is in itself an
obvious failure in democracy. I have tried to place the sociological
links between the military and the civil service, which continue to over-
see politics in Pakistan as they have done over long periods of its his-
tory, in the context of Pakistan society.
I would like to add here that we tend to be dismissive of both the
military and the civil services—rightly when they are interfering in
politics—but that both institutions have played a critically important
role in providing continuity and stability to Pakistan in its times of
crisis. For instance in the very act of creation in 1947 and onwards,
their critical role is well documented. Men in the military and the civil
services, were able to provide continuity in spite of personal hardships,
ensuring the existence of the state. When politics begins to atrophy and
decay these institutions assume power and a role which they are not
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meant for. I think very few civil servants or military officers will
actually support the interference of their services into the arena of
politics. One is constantly reminded that it is something they do reluc-
tantly. Of course once they do, the momentum and the sheer labyrinth
in which they enter makes it very difficult for them to come out easily;
history has shown us that leaders do not leave power easily unless they
are deposed or assassinated or removed forcibly.
Benazir Bhutto's emergence is of course very significant because it
acts as an important corrective, a balance, to the conservatism of the
military and the bureaucracy. It is also interesting because she comes
from the south, from Sind, and was educated abroad, at Harvard and
Oxford, which allows her a wider perspective on issues. She will con-
tinue to be resisted by those elements of society which do not wish for
change or are not prepared to experiment with new forms of leadership,
such as a young, educated, female prime minister. Not only certain
religious quarters but even many conservative groups in the Punjabi
middle-class society will resist her. The danger is of her falling between
two stools, of not being able to do much and, by not living up to the
very high expectations, disappointing her followers. She faces a catch-
22 situation.
SQ: You speak of continuity and stability as far as the contribution of
the bureaucracy and the military are concerned. Could you explain
why their ethnic composition seems to be regionally unrepresentative? I
believe, for instance, that there are hardly any top-ranking Baluchis or
Sindhis.
AA: First, let me clarify the position. Although the position you have
depicted is true for the army it is not so in the civil services. It is
precisely this imbalance which fuels the ethnic sense of deprivation in
the smaller provinces. There are two or three reasons for this and we
must analyse them in historical perspective. First of all, having worked
in various parts of Pakistan, let me belie the widely-held notion that the
only right officer is the one from the Punjab. This is a corruption of the
incorrect 'martial races' thesis that the British created to recruit their colo-
nial officers based on ethnic origins. This 'martial races' thesis should
be confined to the dustbins of history. Secondly, the entrance require-
ments for the two services depend on competitive examinations. So a
boy studying in Lahore in an English medium school would immediately
be at an advantage. Also the fact that the Punjab has a network, an en-
tire foundation and structure of better schools, a society more aware of
the modern state and its organs—a modern ethos—definitely gives an
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advantage to them over the other provinces. The case of the Frontier
Province is instructive. Up to the 1960s Pathans would often complain
about their absence from the civil services (of course, there was always
a tradition of Pathan officers and generals in the military). Traditionally
considered as backward, today the Frontier Province provides some of
the top candidates in the civil services—often topping the lists. So the
automatic assumption that the smaller provinces cannot compete is
wrong. The third fact is that people from the smaller provinces will talk
of nepotism—that once a Punjabi is in the army or civil services he
often promotes his own group to the detriment of the others. But it
also works the other way round since a person from a smaller province
would very often tend to work along tribal or ethnic lines at the cost of
merit. This is something that people from the Punjab have constantly
pointed out: someone from one of the smaller provinces will go
out of his way to favour his own tribesman at the cost of a better
candidate. The whole argument about the quota system in the services
is based precisely on this kind of thinking. Pakistan society still func-
tions as a tribal society—often ethnicity and not merit therefore secures
jobs and appointments. Paradoxically, the middle-class society in
Punjab may be the only group insisting on merit and talent as criteria.
When the competition is so fierce within the Punjab it really tends to
produce what is best in terms of quality within the Punjab, further
widening the gap between the Punjab and the other provinces.
SQ: Having recently been a Commissioner in Baluchistan, and earlier
a Political Agent in the Northwest Frontier, how legitimate are the provin-
cial demands for autonomy? Could you elaborate on the 'genuine' versus
the 'greedy' demands of the provinces. What reasons were there for the
Baluchistan insurgency of the early 1970s and do you see any chance of
anything similar happening again?
AA: First of all, there has been a tendency, not only in Pakistan but
in many of the post-colonial states in Africa and Asia, for the state to
centralise. This happened in India, it is happening in Pakistan. Auth-
ority is drawn to the capital of the new nation, to the president or
prime minister's office. Commands then flow out from these offices. At
the provincial level this is also true, increasingly the power and auth-
ority of the deputy commissioner or commissioner is focused in the
provincial capital. So there is a tendency to centralise, which must be
resisted. Illiterate villagers bewildered and helpless, wasting energy and
money to chase applications or files in Secretariat buildings are a fam-
iliar sight. They must have their problems solved nearer home.
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There should be decentralisation and a greater amount of trust at the

lower level. One way of doing this is to create a district council with
genuine power and devolved authority. The history of district councils
is a chequered one, often interrupted by martial law. This suspension
ensures that the constant flow from the top downwards does not take
place and authority is once again gathered and pushed up towards the
centre. There is a need for autonomy at provincial and district levels.
This has to be secured, and if not conceded will increase the social and
political frustration.
Your second question was about the Baluchistan insurgency repre-
senting a push to political autonomy. It is important to point out that
it was more a tribal response to the centre. I was in charge a decade
later of the Marri and Bugti areas that were the focus of the insurgency.
Many of the stories of resistance and rebellion that I heard were really
to do with honour, with tribal concepts of looking at themselves rather
than with sophisticated political argument. From the outside the move-
ment was cast in the romantic frame of a Marxist tribal revolt led by a
Sardar. There lies its paradox—the Sardar may have been well versed
in Marxism but it was not a Marxist peasant or workers' revolt. It was
a genuine and last attempt by two proud and honourable Baluch tribes
(the Marri and the Bugti), to assert their own way of life and independ-
ence. They were confronting changing times, the harsh reality of the
new world, and the power of the central state, and, in the context of
our discussion, the competitiveness and aggressive drive of the Punjabis
which they could not match. They took on all this through the centre
and one of its instruments, the army. They acquitted themselves with
great honour, and at one stage in the Marri area alone three divisions
of the Pakistan army were operating. Now the Marri area is not large
in a geographical sense and the tribe is small—about 100,000—but they
fought honourably.
On whether this kind of insurgency can happen again or not, I am
optimistic. Let us examine the facts: the same province of Baluchistan
today is led by a Baluch governor, a Baluch chief minister, a Baluch
chief secretary. The provincial secretaries and commissioners, barring
one or two, are also from Baluchistan. Unlike the earlier period the
key players are all Baluch. As they work within the idiom of Baluchi-
stan society, they understand and are therefore capable of containing
any development of this kind which could eventually become a tribal
war. There are institutions within the tribe, of the jirgah (council) of
elders, which can mediate at the time of crisis, and can be called upon
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to resolve issues. Another factor discouraging rebellion is the genuine

socio-economic change taking place in Baluchistan. Roads and elec-
tricity in some districts have triggered remarkable economic activity.
Pishin is a good example of an economically active district. Orchards,
Suzukis plying fruit and new constructions indicate change and ac-
tivity. Such tribesmen would rather make money than sit in the hills
to sulk.
SQ: The setting of the most severe ethnic strife in Pakistan is Sind.
The seeds of violence were sown in post-partition days, worsened during
Ayub's 'one unit' martial rule and renewed further during Zia's 'Islamic'
rule. The only time that the momentum of Sindhi nationalism was slowed
was during the Zulfikar AH Bhutto days. What chances do you give
Benazir of being able to contain Sindhi resentment?
AA: Benazir stands a greater chance of dealing with Sindhi nationalism
than anyone in the last decade. Above all, she has become a symbol of
Sind. Not only is she from the Sind, but she is young with fresh ideas, and
has the mandate of the people of Sind. The rural areas of Sind almost
unanimously voted for her and are with her. However the problems of
the Sind are far more complex than emotional responses to one national
leader like" Benazir. First, there is the delicate demographic balance
between the rural Sindhi ('the sons of the soil'), and the immigrants (the
'Mohajirs'). This population would not have posed as great a problem if
it had been overwhelmingly of one or the other group. But because there
is a 5-10 per cent difference between the two it poses a problem. Secondly,
the Sindhis have a very proud literary and historical tradition. They
produced great literature, great saints and scholars. This rich cultural
tradition makes them more acutely aware of their sense of loss, of the
fact that they may have fallen onto bad times in their own province.
Thirdly, is the fact that Sind is probably the most educated and literate
out of all the provinces of Pakistan. The final cruel paradox is that there
is an awareness amongst Sindhi intellectuals and writers that Sind was
in the forefront of the Pakistan movement, the need to assert a larger
Muslim identity in India beginning well before the creation of Pakistan,
vand that it is today accused of being anti-Pakistan or wanting secession
from Pakistan. This link between a rich literary and historical tradition,
an educated population, an awareness of deprivation in their own prov-
ince, and a very genuine feeling that the Sind was one of the foremost
areas in India in the Pakistan movement makes a potent political mix-
ture.
SQ: Within Sind of course lies Karachi, and as we know Karachi is in
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severe crisis. Every week there are ethnic wars being fought on the streets
of Karachi. What do you see as the future for this 'Pakistani Beirut'?
AA: Karachi presents a gloomy picture. In Karachi we have a city
which has exploded into a population of about ten million, a city which
cannot cope—water shortages and electricity and transport
breakdowns—a city above all that in a sense doesn't belong to anyone.
For the Sindhis it is a city which is outside their cultural pale, the
Mohajir do not have deep roots in it, the Pathan labourer or the Punjabi
do not really belong to it—the Pathan still looks to the Frontier
Province, the Punjabis to the Punjab.
However, people have been settled in Karachi now for one or even
two generations. Unless an awareness of a sense of identity—in all
these groups—grows in Karachi I see little hope for the city. I think the
situation will continue to deteriorate, although I will resist parallels
with Beirut or Lebanon for that is in a very different political and
cultural context. Karachi is more like other South Asian cities such as
Calcutta and Bombay, falling apart under the pressures of population.
Karachi will continue to deteriorate unless some very drastic thinking
takes place in the Karachi administration. Unfortunately, most of the
responses of administration have been in terms of law and order. An
ethnic crisis leads to the removal of a deputy inspector general of police
or deputy commissioner. The roots of the problem are untouched.
Problems are much more fundamental and deep rooted. We have to
talk in terms of creating a civic sense. A civic sense has to grow, an
awareness among people, education programmes, a feeling of roots,
that this city belongs, that the people living in it are there to stay, like
people living in London or New York. This sense of permanence would
prepare people to invest in the city rather than just create an industrial
unit or a mill to make money out of. Investment is needed in terms of
schools, parks, roads, community places, above all, people.
Take the emergence in Karachi of the MQM movement. This is an
interesting comment on Karachi as it brings in religion, class and liter-
acy. The Mohajir position on religion has moved from an association
with the Jamaat Islami and the Islamic parties of the 1960s to a com-
pletely secular alliance of the Urdu speakers. A shift has also taken
place in class—the leadership was based at one stage in wealthy suburbs
like Defence and Clifton, now it is in less privileged areas like Orangi,
with the lower middle class leading the Mohajir movement. Also a very
literate, young leadership has emerged in the MQM. Major changes have
taken place in this predominant community of Karachi, the most funda-
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mental being in the way they perceive themselves and the world. They
recognise that they are caught in a whirlpool leading to the probable
disintegration of Karachi. An awareness has grown that something
drastic has to be done soon to arrest this crisis before it is too late.
SQ: Is money the crisis of Karachi? And will economic prosperity be
the only solution to Karachi's ethnic misery? And what general economic
trends are there in Pakistan that are healing divisions?
AA: I think the argument that economic prosperity automatically
heals or closes ethnic wounds is a false one. Even economists are begin-
ning to realise that income per capita and growth do not necessarily
lead to harmony and the withering away of ethnic or political tensions.
In fact, Karachi is considered in economic and statistical terms to
be best-off in Pakistan. People outside Karachi constantly discuss how
Karachi has siphoned off a large part of the wealth of Pakistan. The
question is whether this wealth has created a harmonious society, and
the answer is obviously in the negative. So simple economic growth is
not enough—what is needed is tolerance and understanding between
the groups, a need for the genuine acceptance of genuine rights, and
cultural and social awareness of others.
Instead, what I see happening is a north and south divide in Pakistan
society. Ethnic tensions have created a distinct and potentially danger-
ous cleavage. The north stretches from Peshawar via Rawalpindi to
Lahore. It is the dominant, aggressive and dynamic part of Pakistan,
providing the civil and military leadership of the country. Small farmers
and active entrepreneurs drive its economy and shape its society. Islam,
patriotism, the army, simple village life and its values (equated to Islam)
are its important features. Its main cities boast magnificent fountains
and parks; its citizens enjoy stimulating theatre. This is a vibrant, vital,
confident society.
The south starts from Multan and includes Sind and Baluchistan.
One sees evidence of progress and pockets of prosperity here (the farms
of Rahimyar Khan or in Sind, Sukkur). But these are negated by the
deep and widespread feelings of deprivation. The election results in
November 1988 expressed this resentment unequivocally. The Pakistan
Peoples' Party (PPP) swept the rural and the MQM the urban areas. It was
the south rejecting the north. Unless bridged, the gap could assume
the form of secessionist movements creating political problems for
Pakistan.
SQ: Having identified ethnicity as one of the chief culprits in creating
political tensions, and having addressed yourself to the various ways of
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achieving social harmony, how do you see the resolution of Pakistan's ethnic
quagmire in the 1990s? What will prevent the implosion of Pakistani society?
AA: Let me first say that although we have analysed ethnicity largely
as a negative factor I do not see it as such. I think if you are to recognise
that ethnicity creates a sense of awareness and pride of people in their
own customs and traditions, a sense of achievement, of betterment of
life, I think it is a very positive and healthy factor of social life. It gives
identity, security and stability in a changing world. In Pakistan, un-
fortunately ethnicity is identified as a negative factor, for reasons we
are discussing. Those planning for and leading Pakistani society must
accept the fact that there is an ethnic problem, and that they cannot
avoid tackling it any longer. This must be followed by dialogue involv-
ing intellectuals and the politicians. Most importantly, a series of steps
have to be taken to tackle the problem: acceptance of the principle of
pluralism and respect for regional language and culture; maintenance
of the rule of law, in particular to protect minorities and their rights;
encouragement of an open debate on ethnic issues—government must
not hide from such issues, which unfortunately has been the policy so
far. Without this debate, without open and honest information, the
first important step to understanding each other cannot be taken. As
government monopolises the media it must be committed to this policy.
Ethnic groups, especially those with the greatest sense of deprivation,
must in turn publicly renounce threats of secession, because these
threats are simply counter-productive and lead to further repression.
This announcement will clear the air and remove the ambiguity sur-
rounding ethnicity. Neighbouring nations with an active interest in
ethnic groups, especially trans-border peoples, must stop aiding seces-
sionist groups. Without external training, weapons, and above all moral
support, such ethnic movements will be severely discouraged. Finally,
there have been definite developments in Pakistan society which, in
spite of the general gloom, give cause for some optimism. There is a
'Pakistanisation' process at work. Though Urdu as a mother tongue is
only spoken by 8 per cent of the population, it is now genuinely the
lingua franca of Pakistan. I have been to the most remote parts of
Baluchistan, possibly the most inaccessible province in Pakistan, where
Urdu is now widely and commonly spoken along with the local lan-
guage. Certain elite educational institutions or services like the civil
service or the military have provided a platform and a network for the
larger Pakistani identity to emerge. People from different parts of Paki-
stan are coming together and developing a kind of larger national

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position in these institutions. Mobility is another shared experience; for

instance the Pathan or Baluchi labourer in Karachi, or the Sindhi
student in Lahore. Hence Pakistanis end up living and experiencing first
hand the customs and attitudes of other groups in Pakistan. Another
factor is the genuine breakdown of classes and the older structures in
Pakistan society, which has released a dynamism in Pakistan society, a
genuine sense of participation in decision-making, a sense of oppor-
tunity particularly through elections. Another positive phenomenon has
been the emergence of a sharp and at times an excellent press—some
of the newspapers writing in Karachi and Lahore are excellent by any
standards and do not shirk from issues or hide from facts, and have
contributed greatly to awareness of national identity, of Pakistan-
isation. Another significant factor is the recent emergence of profes-
sional women in Pakistan society. Now this may seem a paradox in an
erstwhile orthodox society, but Benazir Bhutto symbolises this process.
The emergence of women is another very strong plus for Pakistan
society. Along with the minuses that we have identified—the long bouts
of martial law, the appalling educational statistics, the breakdown of
law and order, the clash of cultures, the widespread use of drugs—there
are also positive signs that Pakistan society is vibrant and dynamic.

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