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DOCUMENT 2

ELECTRONICALLY FILED
4/12/2023 2:27 PM
63-CV-2023-900328.00
CIRCUIT COURT OF
TUSCALOOSA COUNTY, ALABAMA
MAGARIA HAMNER BOBO, CLERK
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TUSCALOOSA COUNTY, ALABAMA

CMB HOLDINGS GROUP LLC )


d/b/a TWELVE25 SPORTS BAR AND )
ENTERTAINMENT VENUE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No.: CV-2023-_____________
)
CITY OF TUSCALOOSA; ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
WALTER MADDOX, individually and in his )
official capacity as Mayor of the City of )
Tuscaloosa; )
LEE BUSBY, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
NORMAN CROW, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
JOHN FAILE, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
RAEVAN HOWARD, individually and in her )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
CASSIUS LANIER, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
KIP TYNER, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; )
MATTHEW WILSON, individually and in his )
official capacity as a member of the )
Tuscaloosa City Council; and )
PATRICK STINES, in his )
official capacity as Fire Marshal )
for the City of Tuscaloosa; )
)
Defendants. )

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COMPLAINT

Article I, Sec. 35 of the Alabama Constitution provides that “the sole object and only

legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property,

and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.” This is an

action under the laws of the State of Alabama and the Alabama Constitution 1 in which Defendants

have usurped Plaintiff’s liberty and property and engaged in a pattern and practice of oppression

against Plaintiff, which is a sports bar and restaurant in the City of Tuscaloosa. As described herein,

Defendants unlawfully passed, enforced, and applied a local ordinance targeting the Plaintiff’s

land use rights because Plaintiff’s business is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the

Black community (predominantly Black college students) to the area of Tuscaloosa known as the

“Strip,” and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from already-established businesses

on the Strip which have white owners. To Plaintiff’s knowledge, Plaintiff is the only minority-

owned gastropub between downtown Tuscaloosa and the Strip. In support thereof, Plaintiff states

the following:

INTRODUCTION

This action arises from the unlawful passage, enforcement, and application of Ordinance

No. 9353, which inaccurately states it is “Amending Sections 3-30 and 11-21 of the Code of

Tuscaloosa” on March 7, 2023 (“Ordinance”), 2 by the City of Tuscaloosa, the Mayor of

1
Twelve25 asserts only state law claims in this Complaint and makes no claims herein under the
United States Constitution or any federal law.
2
The Ordinance purports to amend what was previously a blank placeholder provision of the Code
of Tuscaloosa labeled as Section 3-30 and enacts an entirely new subsection under Section 11-21
of the Code of Tuscaloosa. In both instances, the language added is entirely new language that
directly affects and dramatically alters long-standing existing municipal law in the City of
Tuscaloosa.
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Tuscaloosa, the members of the Tuscaloosa City Council, and the City of Tuscaloosa Fire Marshal.

In fact, rather than being a mere amendment or, as the City Attorney called it, a mere

“clarification,” the Ordinance is in reality a wholesale change to the Code of Tuscaloosa sections

at issue.

The Ordinance unlawfully establishes new land use restrictions on “gastropubs” like

Plaintiff’s by retroactively limiting occupancy of the premises to the occupant limit “with

applicable furnishings arranged for dining,” and by prohibiting “dual occupant limits” for

gastropubs such as Plaintiff’s. Prior to the Ordinance, Plaintiff’s land use—as it related to

occupancy—was regulated by two occupancy limits, both of which were set and provided to

Plaintiff by the City: one occupancy limit (287 people) for periods of use when tables and chairs

were present; the second occupancy limit (519 people) for periods when furnishings are removed

or reconfigured. Both occupancy limits were officially set by the City, and both limits were

reviewed and approved in 2019 by the Tuscaloosa Building Department, the Tuscaloosa Fire

Department, and the Tuscaloosa Revenue Department. The two occupancy limits were set by the

City in compliance with existing laws at the time the City approved Plaintiff’s construction plans,

including the Tuscaloosa Building Code, the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, the International Fire Code,

the International Building Code—the latter two of which are incorporated into the Tuscaloosa

Municipal Code—and the relevant Tuscaloosa zoning ordinances. Plaintiff relied extensively on

the existing laws and lawful land uses for the premises at the time it entered into contracts: to lease

the premises, construct/renovate the premises, purchase and lease equipment for the business, and

take on over $2,000,000 in financial obligations related to the business.

Following the passage of the unlawful Ordinance, the City has now restricted Plaintiff’s

land use by only allowing Plaintiff to have one occupancy limit of 287 people. In effect, the

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Ordinance unlawfully: (1) re-zones Plaintiff’s business into a new zoning category; (2) rescinds

previously lawful land use that the City specifically approved; and (3) restricts future land use

based on conditions the City has placed on a State-issued liquor license. In taking this action, the

City did not comply with re-zoning laws, and the City disregarded the fact that the Alabama State

Legislature has vested the Alabama Beverage Control Board with exclusive regulatory powers

over State-issued liquor licenses. In other words, the City is preempted from regulating liquor

licenses in Alabama.

Defendants’ discriminatory passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance

directly targets Plaintiff’s minority-owned business and is aimed at taking away Plaintiff’s land

use rights (one occupancy limit when furnishings are present and another occupancy limit when

furnishings are removed) that were previously lawfully approved, licensed, and permitted by

Defendants and upon which Plaintiff has relied for its business model and contracts.

In the process of passing, applying, and enforcing the Ordinance, Defendants have:

• violated Twelve25’s freedom from laws impairing the obligations of contracts;

• wrongfully refused to recognize the Ordinance as a zoning ordinance and have


violated the notice and hearing requirements for zoning ordinances under Ala.
Code § 11-52-7;

• violated Plaintiff’s vested right in the land use of the property that was allowed
before the passage of the Ordinance, in manner approved by the City, and in a
manner used by Twelve25 since opening;

• acted outside their authority by amending, defining, and issuing rules affecting
State-issued liquor licenses despite being preempted from imposing conditions
that affect restaurant retail liquor licenses issued in accordance with Ala. Code
§ 28-3A-13, in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code and the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code;

• violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Alabama Constitution to procedural due


process, substantive due process, equal protection, inverse condemnation, and
unreasonable seizure;

• converted Plaintiff’s property;

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• made fraudulent and/or negligent and/or reckless misrepresentations in


contravention of Alabama common law;

• unlawfully enforced the Ordinance before it took lawful effect in contravention


of Ala. Code § 11-45-8(c);

• tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual relations; and

• been unjustly enriched.

Defendants should be estopped and preliminarily and permanently enjoined from enforcing the

Ordinance as against Twelve25.

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff CMB Holdings Group LLC d/b/a Twelve25 Sports Bar and Entertainment

Venue (“Twelve25” or “Plaintiff”) is an Alabama Limited Liability Company which does business

in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, operating a restaurant and entertainment venue located at 1225

University Boulevard, Tuscaloosa, AL 35401. Twelve25 is also a “gastropub” as defined in the in

the Code of Tuscaloosa as an “establishment where full menu meals are primarily served during

typical mealtime hours and bar operations continue independently or as the primary use during

late night hours, providing the on-premise sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.” Code of

Tuscaloosa, Sec. 24-5. Twelve25 is a minority-owned business jointly owned by JDJ Investments,

LLC, an Alabama domestic limited liability company which is entirely minority-owned, and SAK

Investments LLC, an Alabama domestic limited liability Company which is entirely minority-

owned. Twelve25 has operated its Tuscaloosa establishment in compliance with all laws, codes,

and ordinances since receiving the requisite licensure, permitting, occupancy certificates, and land

use approval from the City of Tuscaloosa as of January 2020.

2. Defendant City of Tuscaloosa (“City”) is a municipal corporation located in

Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.

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3. Defendant Walter Maddox (“Maddox”) is an individual over the age of nineteen

and, upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As the Mayor of

the City, Defendant Maddox is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and official

capacity. Defendant Maddox is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of his

authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his

authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in the

wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance, which violated

clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of

Alabama.

4. Defendant Lee Busby (“Busby”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of the

Tuscaloosa City Council (“Council”), Defendant Busby is a state actor and is being sued in both

his individual capacity and official capacity. Defendant Busby is sued in his individual capacity

because he acted outside of his authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully,

fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or

in bad faith, as he participated in the wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application

of the Ordinance, which violated clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama

Constitution and laws of the state of Alabama.

5. Defendant Norman Crow (“Crow”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and,

upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of the

Council, Defendant Crow is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and official

capacity. Defendant Crow is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of his

authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his

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authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in the

wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of Ordinance which violated clearly

established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of Alabama.

6. Defendant John Faile (“Faile”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of the Council,

Defendant Faile is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and official capacity.

Defendant Faile is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of his authority, and he

did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority, under a

mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in the wrongful and illegal

passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance, which violated clearly established rights

of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of Alabama.

7. Defendant Raevan Howard (“Howard”) is an individual over the age of nineteen

and, upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of

the Council, Defendant Howard is a state actor and is sued in both her individual capacity and

official capacity. Defendant Howard is sued in her individual capacity because she acted outside

of her authority, and she did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously,

beyond her authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as she

participated in the wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance,

which violated clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of

the state of Alabama.

8. Defendant Cassius Lanier (“Lanier”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and,

upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of the

Council, Defendant Lanier is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and official

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capacity. Defendant Lanier is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of his

authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his

authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in the

wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance, which violated

clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of

Alabama.

9. Defendant Kip Tyner (“Tyner”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and, upon

information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member and President

of the Council, Defendant Tyner is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and

official capacity. Defendant Tyner is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of

his authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond

his authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in

the wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance, which violated

clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of

Alabama.

10. Defendant Matthew Wilson (“Wilson”) is an individual over the age of nineteen

and, upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As a member of

the Council, Defendant Wilson is a state actor and is sued in both his individual capacity and

official capacity. Defendant Wilson is sued in his individual capacity because he acted outside of

his authority, and he did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond

his authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith, as he participated in

the wrongful and illegal passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance, which violated

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clearly established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of

Alabama.

11. Defendant Patrick Stines (“Stines”) is an individual over the age of nineteen and,

upon information and belief, is a resident of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As the Fire Marshal for

the City, Defendant Stines is a state actor and is sued in his official capacity, as he participated in

the wrongful and illegal application and enforcement of the Ordinance, which violated clearly

established rights of Twelve25 under the Alabama Constitution and laws of the state of Alabama.

12. Defendants Busby, Crow, Faile, Howard, Lanier, Tyner, Wilson are collectively

referred to as “Council Defendants.”

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. This action arises under and is brought pursuant to remedies under the Alabama

Constitution and laws of the state of Alabama.

14. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Ala. Code §§ 12-11-30 and

12-11-31.

15. Twelve25’s claims for declaratory relief are authorized by the Alabama Declaratory

Judgment Act and Rule 57 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure and confer upon this

Honorable Court jurisdiction and authority to enter a declaratory judgment pursuant to Ala. Code

§ 6-6-220 et al.

16. Venue is proper in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama pursuant to Ala. Code §§ 6-3-2

and 6-3-11 as, upon information and belief, all Council Defendants, Defendant Maddox, and

Defendant Stines reside in Tuscaloosa County, this action includes claims for damages, equitable

relief, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief against a municipality and defendants located in

Tuscaloosa County, and the acts or omissions complained of occurred in Tuscaloosa County.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Formation and Licensure of Twelve25

17. Twelve25 is a sports bar and entertainment venue located at 1225 University

Boulevard, Tuscaloosa, AL 35401, in an area of Tuscaloosa known as the “Strip,” where multiple

restaurants and bars are located. Twelve25 offers food and dining, alcoholic beverages, gaming,

and nightlife entertainment; it also regularly hosts private parties, receptions, and corporate events.

Generally, Twelve25 operates exclusively as a restaurant at least ten hours every day the business

is open; the offering of alcoholic beverages and nightlife entertainment becomes the primary use

of Twelve25 several days of the week after 10:00 p.m.

18. Twelve25, as a popular, minority-owned establishment, attracts many members of

the Black community (predominantly Black college students) to the Strip. Twelve25 also attracts

significant numbers of customers away from already-established businesses on the Strip which

have white owners.

19. Twelve25 leases its property from Weaver Rentals, LLC pursuant to a lease

effective September 11, 2018.

20. Twelve25 was formed in September 2018 and submitted a business license

application with the City in October 2019. Part of the business licensure process includes receiving

approvals from the City’s Planning Department, Health Department, Fire Department, and Waste

Water Department; Twelve25 received approval from all departments and lawfully received its

business license from the City as of January 2, 2020.

21. The City renewed Twelve25’s business licenses in 2021, 2022, and most recently

on January 27, 2023—just 39 days before passage of the Ordinance targeting Twelve25’s

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occupancy limits. No issues were presented to Twelve25 during the business license renewal

process.

22. Twelve25 submitted its application for a restaurant retail liquor license and a retail

beer license (on premises) to the State of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“ABC

Board”) on September 26, 2019, both of which were duly approved by the City Council and City

Clerk on October 15, 2019 and became effective December 23, 2019.

23. From the time that Twelve25 first submitted its documentation for licensing to the

City, Defendant Maddox and the Council Defendants have been aware of Twelve25’s intended

multifunction use and, until recently, have approved that use. At least as early as the Council’s

October 15, 2019 hearing in which it considered Twelve25’s application for a restaurant retail

liquor license and a retail beer license, Twelve25 was described as a “restaurant and sports bar”

with plans to “rent the space for corporate events,” “including three separate [areas] where

different events could be held simultaneously.” 3

24. At the June 4, 2019 Council meeting where Twelve25’s application for a restaurant

retail liquor license and a retail beer license was first considered, Defendant Maddox asked

whether Twelve25 would appeal to customers other than college students and stated Twelve25’s

concept spoke to “the three things I love in life,” “beer and food and sports.” June 4, 2019 Council

Meeting Tr. as Exhibit A at 5:21–23. At that same meeting, a representative of the Tuscaloosa

Police Department noted it “conduct[ed] a background history” on Twelve25 and had “no issue

with the applicants.” Id. at 2:3–6. Twelve25 representatives also disclosed what the business’s

3
Stephanie Taylor, New sports bar Twelve25 will open on the Strip, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Oct. 16,
2019), https://www.tuscaloosanews.com/story/news/local/2019/10/16/new-sports-bar-twelve25-
will-open-on-strip/2524053007/ (last accessed March 17, 2023).

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operations would include, specifically referencing “renting the space for corporate type events”

and emphasizing the “cutting edge . . . gaming aspect” (which Twelve25 has and continues to do).

Id. at 6:2 – 7:9.

II. The City approves Dual Occupancy Limits for Twelve25

25. Part of Twelve25’s business license application to the City in October 2019

included Twelve25’s building plans and life safety sheets 4 reflecting building architect Rex

Veron’s education, training, and expert analysis of the applicable codes and standards and an

egress plan based on a diagram of how the establishment was configured, including its tables,

chairs, and other seating areas.

26. The life safety sheets submitted with the business license application reflect that

Mr. Veron calculated the total occupant load of Twelve25, as an A-2 Restaurant under the

Tuscaloosa Building Code 5 with total available space of 3,637 square feet, at 738 occupants (5 net

square feet per occupant).

27. The life safety sheets with the 738-occupant load number were submitted to the

City’s Inspections Department for review and approval. Those life safety sheets, along with the

rest of Twelve25’s building plans, were approved by the City and a building permit was issued on

June 28, 2019. Thus, the City approved building plans reflecting a maximum occupancy limit of

4
Life safety sheets primarily consist of floor plans of a building that identify life safety features
such as sprinklers and ingress/egress points.
5
The 2021 Edition of the International Building Code (“IBC”), which was prepared by the
International Code Council, Inc., is adopted by reference as the Tuscaloosa Existing Building Code
(“Tuscaloosa Building Code”); the 2021 Edition of the International Fire Code (“IFC”), which was
prepared by the International Code Council, Inc., is adopted by reference as the Fire Code of the
City of Tuscaloosa (“Tuscaloosa Fire Code”). See Section 11-20 and Section 6-20, of the
Tuscaloosa Code.
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738 persons, and Twelve25 specifically relied on the City’s approval of the 738-occupant load in

the building plans in deciding to continue investing in the project.

28. On December 26, 2019, Defendant Stines, acting on behalf of the City, emailed Mr.

Jarrett and Mr. Veron a drastically lower calculation of the occupant load for Twelve25 following

his review of the building plans and life safety sheets submitted to the City by Twelve25. He stated:

Gentlemen, I have reviewed the life safety plan for Twelve25 and at this time based
on the information provided and the intended use depicted on the drawings the
occupant load will be set for 287. If there is a different layout intended at certain
times we need to discuss the functions of the new space. If the both of you would
like to meet with me one day feel free to contact our office and schedule a time to
discuss further. Thanks

See December 26, 2019 Email from Defendant Stines, attached as Exhibit B (emphasis added).

This 287-occupant load calculated by Defendant Stines assumed tables and chairs were present in

the establishment, and it relied on a 15 net square foot per occupant ratio rather than the 5 net

square foot per occupant ratio used by Mr. Veron to reach the 738-occupant load shown in

Twelve25’s business license application.

29. Mr. Jarrett replied to Defendant Stines later that same day, expressly advising

Defendant Stines “Twelve25 will offer different functions at different times.” See December 26,

2019 Email from Jay Jarrett, attached Exhibit C. Twelve25 was at all times transparent with all

Defendants about its intended purposes and use for the establishment.

30. Section 1004.3 of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Section 1004.3 of the Tuscaloosa

Building Code, titled “Multiple-function occupant load,” provides that “[w]here an area under

consideration contains multiple functions having different occupant load factors, the design

occupant load for such area shall be based on the floor area of each function calculated

independently.” (Emphasis added). Further, Section 302.1 of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and

Section 302.1 of the Tuscaloosa Building Code state that an “area, room or space that is intended

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to be occupied at different times for different purposes shall comply with all applicable

requirements associated with such potential multipurpose.” (Emphasis added).

31. In other words, the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code expressly

provide for independent occupant loads for an establishment (like Twelve25) which offers

multiple functions (i.e., musical performances; corporate events; gaming tournaments; and tables

and chairs for seated dining during typical restaurant hours, versus no tables and chairs for when

bar operations continue independently or as the primary use during late night hours). And based

on Mr. Jarrett’s December 26, 2019 response to Defendant Stines, the City has been on notice

since at least December 26, 2019 that Twelve25 would be operating an area with multiple functions

having different occupant load factors.

32. On January 2, 2020, Mr. Veron spoke with Defendant Stines regarding Twelve25’s

occupant load and other code-related issues. Specifically, Mr. Veron and Defendant Stines agreed

the “occupant load [for Twelve25] will be based on 7 [square feet per] person, and the agreed upon

load will be 519 total occupants.” This agreement was confirmed in a follow-up letter emailed by

Mr. Veron to Defendant Stines, copying Alan Boswell, the Chief Building Official for the City.

See January 2, 2020 Email and Letter from Rex Veron, attached as Exhibit D.

33. In accordance with the agreement between Defendant Stines and Mr. Veron, on

January 2, 2020 the City issued Twelve25 two “Maximum Occupancy” certificates.

34. The first Maximum Occupancy certificate, dated January 2, 2020 and signed by

Defendant Stines, specified the maximum occupancy for Twelve25 was 287 Persons (“287

Occupancy Certificate”):

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The second occupancy certificate, also dated January 2, 2020 and signed by Defendant Stines,

stated the maximum occupancy for Twelve25 was 519 Persons (“519 Occupancy Certificate”),

noting that the higher occupancy of the 519 Occupancy Certificate was meant to account for the

maximum occupancy of Twelve25 with “No Tables & Chairs” present:

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Copies of the 287 Occupancy Certificate and the 519 Occupancy Certificate are attached as Exhibit

E. In sum, the City, via its agent Defendant Stines, knowingly approved one occupancy limit for

those time frames when tables and chairs were present in Twelve25’s establishment and a separate

occupancy limit for the time frames when tables and chairs had been removed from the

establishment. This was consistent with the law and practice of the City. Twelve25 conducted its

business in reliance upon the lawfully approved land use and occupancy limits certifications.

35. The dual occupancy limits certifications and land use arising therefrom are

consistent with the Code of Tuscaloosa’s definition of “gastropub,” which was adopted in 2017

and specifically contemplates the “[r]emoval or rearrangement of table and seating facilities from

the floor area” when a restaurant’s “bar operations continue independently or as the primary use

during late night hours.” See Code of Tuscaloosa, Sec. 24-5. “Late night hours” is defined in the

Code of Tuscaloosa as the “time between 10:00 p.m. and the end of legal hours for on premises

consumption of alcoholic beverages each day pursuant to subsection 3-47(b) of this Code.” Id.

36. At the time the City was considering the definition of “gastropub,” the City

Planning Director at the time described the intent behind the “gastropub” ordinance was to “get

definitions into the zoning ordinance that will allow us to regulate food and beverage

establishments correctly and accurately.” 6

37. Thus, while the authority for Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits and land use arising

therefrom does not come from the Code of Tuscaloosa’s definition of “gastropub,”—that authority

is derived from the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code—its dual occupancy

limits and land use comports with the current language of the Code of Tuscaloosa.

6
Jason Morton, City defines bars, restaurants, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Sept. 26, 2017, available at
https://www.tuscaloosanews.com/story/news/local/2017/09/27/tuscaloosa-defines-bars-
restaurants-after-buffer-zone-proposal/18724307007/ (last accessed April 7, 2023).
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38. Upon information and belief, Twelve25 is the only minority-owned establishment

currently operating as a gastropub under the Code of Tuscaloosa.

39. Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits and land use are also reflected in its “queuing

permit” business license. Under Section 21-29 of the Tuscaloosa Code, titled “Sidewalk queuing

permit and rules,” a business in the corporate limits of the City is required to pay for a permit to

allow lines of people within defined temporary barriers on the public sidewalk or right-of-way

waiting to gain entrance to the business. Section 21-29(b) sets forth specific requirements for

queuing lines and employs a tiered application fee based on occupancy limits: $250.00 for a

business with an occupancy limit of less than 100 persons, $500.00 for limits between 100 and 299

persons, and $750.00 for limits of 300 persons or more. Twelve25 paid $750 for its queuing permit.

40. Twelve25’s first Queuing Permit was issued by the City on January 27, 2023, and

is specifically categorized as “QUEUING PERMIT 300 OR MORE.” This permit was thus issued

to Twelve25 with an acknowledgement of Twelve25’s occupancy limit of three hundred or more

persons only 39 days before the Ordinance was passed.

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A copy of the Queuing Permit is attached as Exhibit F.

41. Thus, the City not only has repeatedly approved Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits

and land use through its issuance of the 287 Occupancy Certificate and the 519 Occupancy

Certificate and its yearly approval and re-issuance of Twelve25’s business license, but the City

also approved and confirmed Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits as late as January 27, 2023, by

requiring Twelve25 to pay the highest queuing permit fee of $750.00 for an occupancy limit of

300 or more for a Queuing Permit. The Queuing Permit level (i.e., “300 or more”) is determined

by the occupancy level of the establishment paying for the permit.

42. From January 2, 2020 to March 9, 2023, Twelve25 lawfully operated in conformity

with the dual occupancy limits and land use approved by the City via the 287 Occupancy

Certificate, the 519 Occupancy Certificate, and, in 2023, the Queuing Permit.

43. Upon information and belief, the City has granted dual occupancy to at least one

other establishment.

III. Council Defendants Pass The Ordinance Prohibiting Dual Occupancy Limits

44. Defendant Maddox and the Council Defendants recently have demonstrated their

willingness to oppressively use unlawful means to purportedly justify what they deem to be

necessary ends to curtail the business of Twelve25. For example, in a January 19, 2023 news article

(which followed a tragic shooting on the Strip on January 15, 2023), Defendant Maddox expressed

his intent to attack the operations of establishments (like Twelve25) that “masquerade” as

restaurants but turn into bars at night. Twelve25 does not now nor has it ever masqueraded as a

restaurant. Defendant Maddox now claims the City “never tolerated” such establishments,

notwithstanding the extensive administrative, committee, City Council, and Fire Marshal review

and approval process that was exhaustively undertaken prior to the issuance of City licensing and

dual occupant level permits lawfully issued to Twelve25:


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The Tuscaloosa City Council has discussed ways to ensure restaurants that seem to
turn into bars at night are held accountable. He [Defendant Maddox] said some
businesses holding restaurant licenses allow large crowds to gather at night for
alcohol consumption. He hopes to work with lawmakers to come up with a solution.

“You have a lot of places in Tuscaloosa, not just The Strip, that masquerade as a
restaurant, but they’re really a bar and are protected by the state,” Maddox added.
“We’re not tolerating this, we never tolerated it, but certainly, this has become
hyper-sensitive, and we’re going to be looking at a broad range of action.” 7

45. These politically-motivated (and false) statements from Defendant Maddox seek to

blame others—“the state”—and inaccurately represent the City has “never tolerated”

establishments like Twelve25 operating as both restaurants and bars. Indeed, as described above,

Defendant Maddox and the Council were on notice from the very beginning of the application

process of Twelve25’s intention to operate as a multifunction establishment.

46. Moreover, contrary to Defendant Maddox’s inflammatory claims of the alleged

illegality of restaurants that are also authorized to operate as bars within specified parameters and

his assertion that “[w]e’re not tolerating this, we never tolerated it,” the Code of Tuscaloosa itself

specifically “tolerates” establishments like Twelve25 operating as a gastropub where, by

definition, a restaurant’s “bar operations continue independently or as the primary use during late

night hours” following the “[r]emoval or rearrangement of table and seating facilities from the

floor area.” See Code of Tuscaloosa, Sec. 24-5.

47. Further, Defendant Maddox was mayor and present at the Council meeting in

September 26, 2017 when the definition of gastropub was first added to the Code of Tuscaloosa.

In sum, despite Defendant Maddox’s self-serving political and inflammatory claims, Twelve25’s

7
Erica Thomas, Tuscaloosa Mayor Walt Maddox identifies problem with increased homicides,
hopes for change with bars that hold restaurant licensing, 1819 NEWS (Jan. 19, 2023),
https://1819news.com/news/item/tuscaloosa-mayor-walt-maddox-identifies-problem-with-
increased-homicides-hopes-for-change-with-bars-that-hold-restaurant-licensing (last accessed
March 17, 2023).
19
DOCUMENT 2

ability to operate as a restaurant and bar has been—to use Defendant Maddox’s own words—both

“protected” and “tolerated” by the City.

48. In reality, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox passed a facially

neutral ordinance that is designed to oppress Twelve25 and usurp its property because it is

minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly Black college

students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from already-

established businesses on the Strip which have white owners. Defendants have targeted Twelve25

even though Twelve25 has at all times lawfully operated in conformity with the dual occupancy

limits and land use approved by the City via the 287 Occupancy Certificate, the 519 Occupancy

Certificate, and the Queuing Permit. Rather, the City has clearly acknowledged that Twelve25 has

controlled its occupancy limits as approved by the City as reflected in the lines of people waiting

to get into Twelve25.

49. Without providing notice to Twelve25 of any issue and/or alleged wrongdoing, and

without providing Twelve25 with notice of the proposed Ordinance and an opportunity to be heard

as required under the guarantees of procedural due process in the Alabama Constitution, the

Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox introduced, considered, and approved the Ordinance

at the March 7, 2023 meeting of the Council (“March 7 Meeting”). 8 Specifically, the Ordinance

purportedly “amends” Section 3-30 (which was previously marked “Reserved” and was blank) to

read as follows:

“Sec. 3-30. Occupant Limits.

Occupant limits for restaurant liquor licenses and on-premise beer and wine
shall be established with applicable furnishings arranged for dining as
shown on the alcohol license application. There shall be no dual occupant

8
A video of the portions of the March 7 Meeting described herein is publicly available at
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1101500421244392 (last
accessed April 7, 2023).
20
DOCUMENT 2

limit for restaurants and gastropubs to increase the occupant limit when
furnishings are removed or reconfigured. Any increase in the occupant limit
due to reconfiguring furnishings must be approved by the city council.”

50. The Ordinance purportedly “amends” Section 11-21 to add an entirely new

subsection (t) reading as follows:

Sec. 11-21.—Amendments to code.

“(t) Section 1004 Occupant Load is amended by adding subsection


1004.5.2 to read as follows:

1004.5.2 Occupant limits for restaurants and gastropubs shall be


calculated based on the tables and seating configured for a
restaurant and as shown on any applicable alcohol license
application. There shall be no increase in the occupant limit due
to furnishings being removed or reconfigured without approval
of the city council.”

51. This Ordinance operates as a de facto revocation of the 287 Occupancy Certificate

and the 519 Occupancy Certificate and the resulting land use previously approved by the City.

52. Prior to the March 7 Meeting, Section 3-30 had been marked as “Reserved” with

no language whatsoever in that section. Section 11-21 included certain amendments and

modifications to the IFC, but until the Ordinance, none of those amendments concerned the

calculation of occupant load limits applicable to Twelve25. In other words, the Ordinance adds

entirely new language to Section 3-30 and Section 11-21, written on a blank script.

53. Regarding the new language added to the Code of Tuscaloosa by the Ordinance,

Defendant Crow recognized during the March 7 Council meeting that the Council was “supposed

to talk about changing some rules today,” to which Scott Holmes, the City Attorney for the City,

wrongfully stated the Council was going to “clarify what the rules are in our code.” March 7

Meeting Excerpts Tr. Attached as Exhibit G at 1:5–9. This is an incorrect, inaccurate, and

misleading statement because Section 1004.3 of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa

Building Code expressly provides for dual occupancy limits.

21
DOCUMENT 2

54. In the publicly available video 9 from the March 7 Meeting, Defendant Tyner and

Defendant Busby can be seen and heard laughing following Mr. Holmes’s “clarification”

comment, presumably because they know Mr. Holmes’ statement is misleading. Further, and to be

clear, the Ordinance did not “clarify” any existing code section. In reality, the Ordinance adopts

entirely new language in both Section 3-30 and Section 11-21 of the Code of Tuscaloosa and is,

in fact, a zoning ordinance, and neither Mr. Holmes nor Defendant Maddox (nor any other Council

Defendant, for that matter) has been truthful and forthcoming about that fact.

55. At the March 7 Meeting, Defendant Crow and Mr. Holmes discussed the purported

reasoning and application of the Ordinance. According to Mr. Holmes, an establishment’s

occupant load is supposed to be based on what was represented by the establishment in its initial

application for an alcohol license with the ABC Board.

MR. HOLMES: -- . . . In their alcohol license they have to show a layout and
that layout is what their occupancy is based on.

...

MR. HOLMES: So they’ll be locked just as everybody else will be to what


they told the ABC when they applied for their alcohol
license.

Exhibit G at 1:17 – 2:7.

56. These statements by Mr. Holmes are, at best, grossly inaccurate representations of

the City’s previous practices and are inconsistent with the Code of Tuscaloosa. No section of the

Code of Tuscaloosa requires that an establishment is “locked” into an estimated seating capacity

submitted with an alcohol license application to the ABC Board. In fact, Mr. Holmes knew or

should have known that the dual occupancy limits are not based on an establishment’s alcohol

license application. To Plaintiff’s knowledge, the City has never “locked” in an establishment’s

9
See Note 8, supra.
22
DOCUMENT 2

occupant load based solely on an estimated seating capacity submitted with an alcohol license

application to the ABC Board.

57. Mr. Holmes made clear at the March 7 Meeting that the real reason behind the

creation of the Ordinance was to specifically target Twelve25 and intentionally shut it down by

destroying its dual occupancy limits: “And so what they won’t be able to do, and what nobody will

be able to do is then say, pull up a trailer,[10] drag all those tables out and now say our occupancy

is 300 because we have more open floor space.” Exhibit G at 1:22 – 2:3. Mr. Holmes’ statement

is strong evidence of the targeted, arbitrary and capricious actions of Mr. Holmes (as an agent of

the City), Defendant Maddox, the Council Defendants, and the City, as Mr. Holmes’s

representations to the Council are inconsistent with the Code of Tuscaloosa and the Defendants’

habit, custom, and practice of providing City-approved dual occupancy limits to Twelve25 and at

least one other establishment.

58. The new subsection added to Section 11-21 pursuant to the Ordinance directly

contradicts Section 1004.3 of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and the Tuscaloosa Building Code. In

essence, the Ordinance’s addition of Section 1004.5.2 to the Tuscaloosa Fire Code purports to

prevent an establishment from having multiple independently calculated occupancy loads for the

multiple independent functions of the establishment, which is precisely what Section 1004.3 and

Section 302.1 of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code specifically allow.

59. As an operating establishment lawfully and reasonably relying on the relevant

sections of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code pursuant to which Twelve25’s

licensing, permitting, occupancy certificates, and land use were approved, and because the

10
Upon information and belief, Twelve25 is the only gastropub in Tuscaloosa which houses its
removed tables and chairs in a trailer as referenced by Mr. Holmes.
23
DOCUMENT 2

Ordinance directly contradicts the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code, at a

minimum due process would require that the City give Twelve25 notice and an opportunity to be

heard regarding the Ordinance prior to its enactment.

60. The Council Defendants unanimously passed the Ordinance with no revisions,

despite the expressed reservations of some Council members that the two establishments Mr.

Holmes claims the Ordinance impacts had no notice or opportunity to be heard on this oppression

and usurpation of Twelve25’s rights under the laws and constitution of the State of Alabama. See

Exhibit G at 12:12 – 13:6.

IV. Twelve25 Receives No Notice or Opportunity to Be Heard

61. As indicated above, according to statements made at the March 7 Meeting by

certain Council Defendants and Mr. Holmes, the supposed amendments in the Ordinance affected

only two businesses, one of which is Twelve25:

MR. HOLMES: . . . on page 33 and 34 you’ll be amending Sections 3-30 and


11-21 of the Code of Tuscaloosa, that came from Admin
Committee on the 21st and that’s what we discussed here
briefly.

MR. CROW: Can you -- this is only affecting two businesses, correct?

MR. HOLMES: To my knowledge, yes, sir.

Exhibit G at 5:6–13 (emphasis added).

62. Despite the enormous impact of the Ordinance on Twelve25’s entire business

model, and despite the Ordinance acting as a de facto revocation of Twelve25’s higher occupancy

limit certificate and lawfully approved land use—with the Council Defendants and Defendant

Maddox expressly recognizing that fact—Twelve25 was given no notice or opportunity to be heard

regarding the substance, impact, or application of the “amended” code sections prior to the passage

of the Ordinance at the March 7 Meeting. According to Mr. Holmes, there was no need to do so,

24
DOCUMENT 2

because the Ordinance is just a “clarification.” Indeed, Twelve25’s owners had no idea that

Ordinance had been passed until after its passage; the City never notified Twelve25 of its intention

to consider the Ordinance, much less pass, pass, apply and enforce it immediately. The failure of

the Defendants to notify Twelve25 can only be because the Defendants did not want public

discourse and discussion about the Ordinance; rather, the Defendants preferred to operate in a

stealthy manner so as to not give the impacted businesses an opportunity to publicly provide

feedback to the Defendants—feedback that the Defendants were unwilling to consider or even

receive.

63. The issue of notice regarding the Ordinance first arose at the February 21, 2023

meeting of the Council Administration and Policy Committee Meeting (“February 21 Meeting”).

There, Mr. Crow questioned whether any discussions had taken place with any of the affected

businesses:

MR. CROW: Have we had discussions with businesses affected by this?

MR. HOLMES: No, sir.

MR. CROW: Have we got any feedback from business groups like the
Chamber [of Commerce], or --

MR. HOLMES: No, sir.

MR. CROW: -- Bar owners or anybody?

MR. HOLMES: No, sir. This is the first time this has been presented to
anybody.

MR. CROW: Mr. Chairman I would hope we would get some feedback
from business owners before we would enact this.

February 21 Meeting Tr. at 11:14 – 12:4, attached as Exhibit H.

64. Following this discussion, Defendant Maddox asked for two weeks to contact the

affected businesses:

25
DOCUMENT 2

MR. MADDOX: Can I ask that the council or this committee could pass this
out of committee --

MR. TYNER: I’m going to make a motion.

MR. MADDOX: -- maybe two weeks before it appears on the council agenda?

MR. TYNER: Sure.

MR. FAILE: Sounds good to me.

MR. TYNER: Yeah. I was going to make that motion.

MR. MADDOX: That would allow that conversation.

Id. at 12:7–19.

65. Despite this request for two weeks to “allow that conversation [for the City to notify

and get feedback from the affected businesses],” and despite Mr. Crow’s valid concern that

feedback from the affected businesses was needed before enacting the Ordinance, Defendants

never bothered to contact Twelve25, and certainly never notified or solicited feedback from

Twelve25, raising the obvious inference that at least certain of the Defendants never intended to

follow through with that representation in the first place. It is impossible to justify the Defendants’

failure to notify or inform Twelve25 with the stated need, agreed to by all Council Defendants and

Defendant Maddox at the February 21 Meeting, to obtain the feedback of the affected businesses

before placing the consideration of the Ordinance on the Council Agenda.

66. At the March 7 Meeting, Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox expressly

discussed and ultimately ignored, to the great detriment and injury of Twelve25, the fact that

Twelve25 was given no notice or opportunity to be heard despite the Council Defendants’ and

Defendant Maddox’s previously-stated intention to the contrary:

MR. CROW: Have we notified those businesses that something’s going


to change?

MR. HOLMES: Not individually. We’ve spoke [sic] at it, I guess, what,
three meetings here. I know I presented it to the Chamber of
26
DOCUMENT 2

Public Safety Policy Committee, and I believe Mayor was


-- discussed it with the Mayor’s business alliance.

MR. CROW: Would normal procedure not be to send them a letter or send
them something and say this is what we’re doing –

MR. HOLMES: No, sir.

MR. CROW: -- or we’re just -- I mean, I know we’re clarifying something


that we believe to be true.

MR. HOLMES: I don’t believe so until this is passed, no, sir.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Do you think we need to?

MR. CROW: I don’t know. I mean, I would hate to be a business owner


and something be changed and I don’t even get a chance
to talk to you about it.

MR. HOLMES: Yes, sir.

MR. CROW: You’re assuming that they know that. I mean, I just don’t
think that’s -- I don’t think that’s right, personally.

...

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Have any council members reached out?

MR. BUSBY: Not -- I think they’re both in my district. I have not. This is
not -- to my knowledge, this is not a hidden agenda. We have
been discussing this furiously for months. . . .

MR. CROW: Yeah.

MR. BUSBY: No, I have not talked to them because I don’t think there’s
anything non-transparent about this. We’re on TV right now,
I would assume.

MS. HOWARD: And, honestly, I was thinking that like in the past when
we’ve had decisions like this they were seeking this out, they
showed up in numbers. So, I mean, I’m surprised they
haven’t said anything.

MR. CROW: Me too, but I -- I’m just -- I’m not saying I’m opposed to
doing this. I’m just saying to me I wish we were -- we’d
had that conversation with them. And I understand why,
but it’s -- I’m just raising a question.

Exhibit G at 5:14 – 7:21 (emphasis added).


27
DOCUMENT 2

67. These Defendants sought to minimize their oppression and usurpation and justify

their failure to follow proper due process. They have mischaracterized the Ordinance by calling

this dramatic change in the Code of Tuscaloosa merely a “clarification” which they claim did not

require notice to Twelve25 or an opportunity for Twelve25 to be heard, even though Mr. Holmes

himself previously referred to the Ordinance at the February 21 Meeting as one that would “add

[a] provision” and “amend our Code,” (see February 21 Meeting Tr. at 7:7–13 and 10:3–4). In

truth, the passage and enforcement of the Ordinance revoked Twelve25’s higher occupancy limit

certificate and its approved land use, and caused and will continue to cause immeasurable damage

and injury to Twelve25 and its business model, reputation, good will, and the like.

68. Contrary to the statements at the Council meeting, Twelve25 had no knowledge of

any prior conversations or discussions, and certainly no “furious” discussion, about revoking the

dual occupancy certificates and land use that had long been duly approved by the City and

drastically altering the provisions of the Code of Tuscaloosa. Twelve25 had no idea the Ordinance

was under consideration. Further evidencing that fact that Twelve25 had no prior knowledge of

the Ordinance is that just one day prior to the passage of the Ordinance, Twelve25 entered into a

contract for a corporate event to take place on April 15, 2023, to provide venue space for more

than 350 people. See “Sorority Contract”, infra at ¶ 86.

69. By the time Twelve25 learned of the Ordinance, it had been passed by the Council.

This is not only wrong, but this action on the part of both those who stated there had been “furious

discussion” and those who went along with it and voted to unanimously approve the Ordinance

demonstrates that these Defendants (other than Defendant Stines) acted knowingly, wrongfully,

willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the

law, and/or in bad faith.

28
DOCUMENT 2

70. On March 10, 2023, three days after the passage of the Ordinance, Defendant Stines

emailed Twelve25 a new Maximum Occupancy certificate with a total occupant load of 287

persons.

71. As a result of the Council Defendants’ unlawful passage, application, and

enforcement of the Ordinance, Defendant Stines emailed Twelve25 only a single occupancy

certificate for 287 persons (“Discriminatory 287 Occupancy Certificate”), thereby revoking the

January 2, 2023, 519 Occupancy Certificate and the 287 Occupancy Certificate and land use

arising therefrom.

72. Importantly, Defendant Stines’s enforcement of the Ordinance via issuance of the

Discriminatory 287 Occupancy Certificate on March 10, 2023 occurred before public notice of

adoption of the Ordinance. The Ordinance was not published in the Tuscaloosa News until March

13, 2023, six days after passage of the Ordinance. The City’s rushed enforcement of the Ordinance

as against Twelve25 directly violates Ala. Code § 11-45-8(c), which mandates that an ordinance

is not effective until it is published: “When the ordinance or notice of the substance of an ordinance

is published in the newspaper, it shall take effect from and after the time it shall first appear therein

. . . .”

73. Twelve25’s prior occupancy limit certificates and land use were revoked and its

occupancy limit summarily reduced, without any notice to Twelve25, without any allegation or

notice of violation of any of Twelve25’s occupancy limits, and without opportunity for Twelve25

to be heard regarding the drastic reduction in its occupancy limits.

74. The loss of its ability to have a larger occupancy load when tables and chairs are

not present dramatically impacts Twelve25’s business model, dramatically marginalizes

29
DOCUMENT 2

Twelve25’s business operations and relationships, and renders Twelve25 a shadow of the

establishment it has always been and was designed to be.

V. The City Blames Twelve25—and only Twelve25—for “Crowd Control” Issues

75. The Defendants contend they passed the Ordinance pursuant to their authority to

address issues related to health, safety, welfare, and morals. See, e.g., Tuscaloosa Code Sec. 24-2.

Specifically, they assert the issue affecting health, safety, welfare, and morals is crowd control,

which they admit is a problem everywhere, all over Tuscaloosa (not just in front of Twelve25). If

that is the case, then why target Twelve25 and not other establishments on the Strip or all over

Tuscaloosa?

76. Defendants cannot maintain the position that the crowd control problems all over

Tuscaloosa and especially the Strip are caused by this one establishment, yet it is Twelve25 against

whom the Ordinance is expressly directed. The Defendants have not targeted any establishment

on the Strip other than Twelve25 to address these supposedly City-wide crowd control and public

safety issues. Upon information and belief, the City has permitted and approved increased

occupancy in other establishments on the Strip. Defendants’ purported safety rationale is a

smokescreen behind which Defendants’ true motives are masked, that is, to target Twelve25 and

dramatically curtail its business model.

77. Here, Defendants have completely reversed course on their previous

representations to Twelve25 that it could operate with a maximum capacity of 519 persons without

furnishings present. Defendants now claim those representations were incorrect when made and

resulted from the Fire Marshal’s incorrect reading of the applicable Code provisions. Of course,

Defendants have full knowledge that Twelve25 relied and was relying on those representations to

its detriment. Hiding behind a facially neutral ordinance, Defendants are, in reality, intentionally

30
DOCUMENT 2

targeting the minority-owned and minority-frequented establishment to treat Twelve25 differently

than other establishments with purported crowd control problems because their owners are not

Black and they do not cater in significant part to the Black community, in violation of the equal

protection provisions of the Constitution of Alabama.

78. Upon information and belief, the City, Defendant Maddox, and certain Council

Defendants have wrongfully and illegally targeted Twelve25 by blaming Twelve25 for a recent

shooting and crime on the Strip.

VI. The Ordinance is a de facto Zoning Ordinance

79. The Ordinance here limits the actual use of Twelve25 by cutting its maximum

occupancy nearly in half, and it mandates certain types of land usage based upon categories,

namely gastropubs. This is neither fair nor equitable. The Ordinance is a de facto zoning ordinance.

80. The Defendants contend the Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance. See February 21

Meeting Tr. at 10:16–17. The reasons are clear as to why Defendants do not want to admit the

Ordinance is a zoning ordinance.

81. First, zoning ordinances cannot be retroactive. By declaring that the Ordinance is

not a zoning ordinance, the Defendants intentionally precluded Twelve25 from being

“grandfathered” in and thus allowed to continue operating with its dual occupancy limits as

lawfully approved by the City.

82. Second, notice and an opportunity to be heard are required under Alabama law prior

to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. By declaring that the Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance,

the Defendants intentionally sought to avoid the statutory requirement of notice and opportunity

to be heard prior to adoption of the Ordinance. 11

11
This, of course, is separate and apart from the right guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution to
due process of law in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard when one’s life, liberty, or
31
DOCUMENT 2

83. Further evidencing the fact that the Ordinance is a de facto zoning ordinance are

the zoning provisions of the Tuscaloosa Code. First, “gastropub” as used in the Tuscaloosa Code

is defined in the zoning chapter, Chapter 24. See Tuscaloosa Code, Sec. 24-5. The permitted uses

of “gastropub” are expressly set forth in the zoning chapter of the Tuscaloosa Code at Sec. 24-

229. Simply put, the operation of and restrictions on gastropubs are zoning issues.

84. Further, Defendants’ contention that they passed the Ordinance to address crowd

control also aligns with the stated purpose of the zoning chapter of the Tuscaloosa Code. By

limiting Twelve25’s occupancy limit to 287, Defendants are purportedly attempting to lessen

congestion on the Strip; secure safety on the Strip from fire, panic, or other dangers; prevent

overcrowding on the Strip; avoid undue concentration of people on the Strip; and facilitate

adequate provisions of transportation through the Strip. These are the exact purposes outlined in

the zoning chapter of the Tuscaloosa Code:

This chapter is enacted for the following purposes: To promote the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the inhabitants of Tuscaloosa by lessening
congestion in the streets; securing safety from fire, panic, and other dangers;
providing adequate light and air; preventing the overcrowding of land; avoiding
undue concentration of population; facilitating the adequate provisions of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements;
conserving the value of buildings; and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land.

Tuscaloosa Code, Sec. 24-2. Defendants may refuse to acknowledge it, but the Ordinance has

every hallmark of a zoning ordinance and is, in fact, a zoning ordinance regardless of Defendants’

futile efforts to characterize it otherwise.

property interest are about to be affected by governmental action. See Alabama Constitution, Art.
I, Secs. 6 and 13.
32
DOCUMENT 2

VII. Twelve25’s Contractual Obligations Rendered Impossible by the Ordinance

85. In reliance on the City’s approval of Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits, Twelve25

regularly entered into contracts with event organizers and entities which expressly referenced and

were contingent on the higher 519 maximum occupant load previously approved by the City. For

example, Twelve25’s form “Event Promoter Contract” includes the following provision regarding

capacity:

4. CAPACITY. Any event hosted by Promoter may have up to 450


attendees inside the premises at any given time, which is less than
full legal capacity of the premises. Twelve25 represents that it will
provide reasonable staff, security, and inventory to accommodate
450 guests. . . .

Redacted versions of two executed Event Promoter Contracts currently in effect are attached as

Exhibit I.

86. As another example, prior to the passage of the Ordinance, Twelve25 lawfully

entered into a corporate event contract with a University of Alabama sorority for an event to take

place on April 15, 2023, that included an estimated number of event attendees of 350-plus

(“Sorority Contract”). A redacted version of the Sorority Contract is attached as Exhibit J.

Specifically, the Sorority Contract is a corporate “Venue Rental” contract and was expressly

contingent on the higher 519 maximum occupant load previously approved by the City.

87. Defendants’ impairment of Twelve25’s contractual obligations also leaves

Twelve25, an innocent and legally compliant business, vulnerable to claims and lawsuits from

promoters and others. Through no fault of Twelve25, Defendants’ passage of the Ordinance

without notice to Twelve25 prevented Twelve25 from giving advance notice to promoters and

others who have contracted with Twelve25 that Twelve25 could no longer provide event space at

the occupant level which it is contractually obligated to provide.

33
DOCUMENT 2

88. Defendants’ impairment of Twelve25’s contractual obligations has and will

continue to irreparably harm Twelve25’s reputation, relationships, good name, business model,

and goodwill, among other things.

89. Defendant’s impairment of Twelve25’s contractual obligations has and will

continue to irreparably harm Twelve25’s current and future operations, including the ability to

host events at Twelve25, including many events primarily attended by members of the Black

community (predominantly Black college students).

90. The passage of the Ordinance violates the laws of the State of Alabama and the

Alabama Constitution in that it deprives Twelve25 of its property interests and rights pursuant to

those contracts upon which Twelve25 relied and which were contingent on Twelve25’s 519

Occupancy Certificate as previously considered and approved by the City via its agent Defendant

Stines.

CAUSES OF ACTION

91. Twelve25 asserts only state law claims in this Complaint and makes no claims

herein under the United States Constitution or any federal law.

COUNT I

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 22


IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

92. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

93. Twelve25 has a protected right guaranteed by Art. I, Section 22 of the Alabama

Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama to be free from the enforcement of any law

impairing the obligation of contracts.

34
DOCUMENT 2

94. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

95. The passage of the Ordinance unlawfully deprives Twelve25 of its property

interests and rights pursuant to those contracts which relied and were contingent on Twelve25’s

519 maximum occupant load previously approved by the City via its agent Defendant Stines, and

which complies with the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code.

96. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox acted with intent or purpose

to deprive Twelve25 of its right to be free from the enforcement of a law impairing the obligation

of contracts under the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

97. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

98. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox knew or should have known

the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its rights

under the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

99. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violated rights held by

Twelve25 which were clearly established, and no reasonable official similarly situated to Council

Defendants and Defendant Maddox could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful or

within the bounds of reasonable discretion.

100. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

35
DOCUMENT 2

101. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Twelve25’s guaranteed rights

under the Alabama constitution and Alabama law, and the actions/inactions of the City, Council

Defendants, and Defendant Maddox alleged herein, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to

suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF ALA. CODE § 11-52-7

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

102. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

103. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

104. The Ordinance is a de facto zoning ordinance because it limits the actual use of

Twelve25 by cutting its maximum occupancy nearly in half, and it mandates certain types of land

usage based upon categories, namely gastropubs.

105. Ala. Code § 11-52-77 requires that before a zoning ordinance or any amendment

thereto can be adopted and become effective, “notice that an ordinance will be considered shall be

published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county,” and

the City must hold “a public hearing in relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens

shall have an opportunity to be heard.” See Ala. Code § 11-52-77.

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106. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox failed to provide the notice

and public hearing required under Ala. Code § 11-52-77 prior to passage of the Ordinance.

107. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s, Council Defendants’, and Defendant

Maddox’s violation of Ala. Code § 11-52-7, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT III

VIOLATION OF VESTED RIGHTS

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

108. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

109. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

110. The Ordinance is a de facto zoning ordinance because it limits the actual use of

Twelve25 by cutting its maximum occupancy nearly in half, and it mandates certain types of land

usage based upon categories, namely gastropubs.

111. Twelve25 reasonably relied on the City’s zoning ordinances in effect at the time of

approval, the land use as approved by the City, the issuance of two maximum occupancy

certificates, and has operated in conformity therewith since opening for business. Further,

Twelve25 needs the dual occupancy limits that were approved by the City to sustain its business

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model, and has made changes to and investments in Twelve25 as a result and in reasonable reliance

upon the City’s approval of Twelve25’s building permit and dual occupancy limits.

112. Twelve25 has a vested right in the land use of the property that was allowed before

the passage of the Ordinance, in manner approved by the City, and in a manner used by Twelve25

since opening.

113. Twelve25’s vested right in the use of the property allowed by the dual occupancy

limits vested when the City issued the 287 Occupancy Certificate and the 519 Occupancy

Certificate and is supported by Twelve25’s use of the land since that time in conformity with the

dual occupancy limits.

114. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s, Council Defendants’, and Defendant

Maddox’s violation of Twelve25’s vested rights, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT IV

PREEMPTION

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

115. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

116. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

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117. Twelve25 has a restaurant retail liquor license issued by the ABC Board in

accordance with Ala. Code § 28-3A-13.

118. Ala. Admin. Code r. 20-X-1-.01(2) provides that the ABC Board is vested with the

authority to carry out the provisions of the Title 28, Code of Ala. 1975 (the Act under which the

ABC Board is given authority to issue restaurant retail liquor licenses like Twelve25’s), and to

promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent therewith.”

119. Based on Ala. Admin. Code r. 20-X-1.02(2), the City, Council Defendants, and

Defendant Maddox, are preempted from imposing conditions that affect restaurant retail liquor

licenses issued in accordance with Ala. Code § 28-3A-13.

120. The City is attempting to regulate a State-issued liquor license by requiring license

holders to forfeit land use rights. The City is retroactively placing conditions on a State-issued

license, which the City has no authority to issue, revoke, or regulate beyond any specific statutory

authority granted to the City by the State legislature.

121. The State legislature has not granted the City the authority to regulate a State liquor

license by placing conditions on the license requiring license holders to forfeit land use rights. To

the contrary, the State legislature has vested the ABC Board with the authority to issue, revoke,

and regulate liquor licenses.

122. The Tuscaloosa Code sections regarding “gastropubs” (see, e.g., Sec. 24-5, 24-51,

and 24-229) purport to regulate Twelve25’s restaurant retail liquor license by amending, defining,

and/or issuing rules related to the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code (Ala. Code § 28-3A-1, et

seq.) and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code (Ala. Admin. Code r. 20-X-

1, et seq.). Specifically, the Ordinance purports to regulate the manner in which a State license

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holder may use the license and the manner of operation of an establishment operating under that

license.

123. The City’s intent to usurp the authority of the ABC Board is evident from the City

Planning Director at the time commenting that the intent behind the “gastropub” ordinance was to

“get definitions into the zoning ordinance that will allow us to regulate food and beverage

establishments correctly and accurately.”

124. The City has no authority to amend, define, or issue rules under the Alcoholic

Beverage Licensing Code or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code as it

relates to State-issued liquor licenses. Further, the State legislature has not granted the City the

authority to amend, define, or issue rules under the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code or the

Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code as it relates to state liquor licenses. If the

Ordinance is allowed to stand, then a municipality’s ability to impose conditions or restrictions on

a State-issued license, or its ability to define any terms of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code

or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Administrative Code as it relates to state liquor licenses,

could result in a de facto revocation of that State-issued license. This would create dramatic

inconsistencies across the State for the authority of a State-issued liquor license.

125. By revoking Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits, the City, Council Defendants, and

Defendant Maddox have effectively modified Twelve25’s restaurant retail liquor license by

imposing conditions that result in a de facto revocation of that license.

126. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s, Council Defendants’, and Defendant

Maddox’s actions described herein, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages

and injuries to be proven at trial, plus interest.

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WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT V

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SECS. 6 AND 13


VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

127. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

128. Article I, Sections 6 and 13 of the Alabama Constitution require notice and an

opportunity to be heard when one’s life, liberty, or property interests are about to be affected by

governmental action.

129. Article I, Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution specifically contemplates a

remedy by due process of law for any injury done to “lands, goods, person, or reputation.”

130. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

131. Twelve25 has a property interest and right to due process of law guaranteed by

Article I, Sections 6 and 13 of the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

132. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox acted with deliberate

indifference to Twelve25’s property interests when they deprived Twelve25 of its right to

procedural due process by failing to give Twelve25 notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding

the substance and application of the Ordinance prior to its passage, enforcement, and application.

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133. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

those already-established businesses on the Strip.

134. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have deprived

Twelve25 of its right, as lawfully established, to use its establishment to the full maximum

occupant load as permitted and provided for under the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, the Tuscaloosa

Building Code, and pursuant to the 519 Occupancy Certificate issued to Twelve25 by the City.

135. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have caused

a de facto revocation of Twelve25’s 519 Occupancy Certificate, without any notice or finding of

a violation by Twelve25, any notice regarding the revocation of the 519 Occupancy Certificate,

and without any hearing or opportunity to be heard.

136. As an operating establishment lawfully and reasonably relying on the applicable

sections of the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code to which Twelve25’s

licensing, permitting, land use, and occupancy certificates were approved, and because the

Ordinance directly contradicts the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and Tuscaloosa Building Code, at a

minimum due process under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law requires that the City

give Twelve25 notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the Ordinance.

137. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox knew or should have known

the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its rights

under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law.

138. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violated rights held by

Twelve25 which were clearly established, and no reasonable official similarly situated to Council

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Defendants and Defendant Maddox could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful or

within the bounds of reasonable discretion.

139. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

140. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Twelve25’s guaranteed rights

pursuant to the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law to notice and an opportunity to be heard

when one’s life, liberty, or property interest are about to be affected by governmental action, and

because of the actions/inactions alleged herein by the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant

Maddox, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at

trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable, in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT VI

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SECS. 6 AND 13


VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

141. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

142. Article I, Sections 6 and 13 of the Alabama Constitution create a constitutionally

protected right to engage in a chosen business, a right to be free from arbitrary and capricious

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governmental action, and a right to be free from government officials passing laws impairing

obligations under existing contracts.

143. Article I, Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution specifically contemplates a

remedy by due process of law for any injury done to “lands, goods, person, or reputation.”

144. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

145. Twelve25 has a property interest and right to due process of law guaranteed by

Article I, Sections 6 and 13 of the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

146. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted with deliberate indifference

when they deprived Twelve25 of its right to substantive due process by arbitrarily and capriciously

passing, enforcing, and applying an Ordinance without adequate justification and which resulted

in sufficiently serious harm and deprivation of Twelve25’s property rights, including the loss of

business and impairment of existing contracts.

147. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

148. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have further

deprived Twelve25 of its right to use its establishment to the maximum occupant load lawfully

permitted and provided for under the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, the Tuscaloosa Building Code, and

under the 519 Occupancy Certificate issued to Twelve25 by the City.

149. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have caused

a revocation of Twelve25’s 519 Occupancy Certificate, without any notice or finding of a violation

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by Twelve25, any notice regarding the revocation of the 519 Occupancy Certificate, and without

any hearing or opportunity to be heard.

150. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox knew or should have known

the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its rights

under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law.

151. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violated rights held by

Twelve25 which were clearly established, and no reasonable official similarly situated to Council

Defendants and Defendant Maddox could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful or

within the bounds of reasonable discretion.

152. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

153. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Twelve25’s guaranteed rights

pursuant to the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law, and the actions/inactions alleged herein

by the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue

to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

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COUNT VII

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SECS. 1, 6, 13, 22, AND 35


VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

154. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

155. Twelve25 has a right to equal protection under the law without regard to race as

guaranteed by Article I, Sections 1, 6, 13, 22, and 35 of the Alabama Constitution and the laws of

the State of Alabama.

156. According to Article I, Section 35 of the Alabama Constitution, the sole object and

only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and

property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.”

Defendants have usurped Plaintiff’s liberty and property and engaged in a pattern and practice of

oppression against Plaintiff.

157. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

158. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox acted with intent or purpose

to racially discriminate against Twelve25 and its patrons when they deprived Twelve25 of its right

to equal protection through the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance.

159. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have a history of targeting

Twelve25 because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community

(predominantly Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of

customers away from already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

160. The City and Defendant Maddox have a history of targeting restaurants, bars, and

lounges that have significant numbers of black customers – particularly in the Strip and Downtown

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areas – with enhanced surveillance, investigative, administrative, and/or enforcement actions,

including threats of and/or actual business license revocation, in a manner the City and Defendant

Maddox do not do with other similar establishments that do not regularly have significant numbers

of Black customers, even when major incidents of violence or public safety concerns occur at,

near, or in connection to other such establishments.

161. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox passed a facially neutral

ordinance to provide supposedly neutral justification to treat Twelve25 differently than other

similarly situated establishments and their owners who are not Black or do not cater in significant

part to the Black community. If these Defendants were truly concerned about overcrowding on the

Strip, they should have similarly and significantly reduced the numbers of white owned “bars”

operating in the area which are owned and patronized by white people, several of which have

higher capacities than Twelve25. Yet the only establishment targeted was Twelve25, as if all the

issues with crowd control and safety on the Strip are caused by Twelve25 and its clientele.

162. Such racially disparate treatment was without adequate justification and resulted in

and will continue to result in substantial harm to Twelve25.

163. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, through the enforcement of

an official policy, practice, or custom or decision of a final municipal policy maker, discriminated

against minority-owned Twelve25 which caters in significant part to the Black community

(predominantly Black college students). This policy, practice, or custom treated Twelve25

differently than those establishments characterized as “non-Black.” This policy, practice, or

custom was deliberately indifferent to Twelve25’s rights to equal protection of the laws without

regard to race in violation of the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

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164. The practice of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox of treating

Twelve25 differently based on race of its ownership or clientele was the motivation behind

Twelve25 being deprived of its rights to equal protection.

165. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox knew or should have known

the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its rights

under the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

166. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violated rights held by

Twelve25 which were clearly established, and no reasonable official similarly situated to Council

Defendants and Defendant Maddox could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful or

within the bounds of reasonable discretion.

167. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

168. As a direct and proximate result of the violation of Twelve25’s guaranteed rights

pursuant to the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law, and the actions/inactions of the City,

Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox alleged herein, Twelve25 has suffered and will

continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

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COUNT VIII

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 23


INVERSE CONDEMNATION

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

169. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

170. Twelve25 has a protected right guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 23 of the Alabama

Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama that private property shall not be taken for public

use without just compensation.

171. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

172. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have

wrongfully deprived Twelve25 of its right to use its establishment to the full maximum occupant

load permitted and provided for under the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, the Tuscaloosa Building Code,

and under the 519 Occupancy Certificate issued to Twelve25 by the City.

173. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox also have

rendered impossible Twelve25’s ability to perform its obligations under existing contracts, thus

impairing not only its obligations, but its goodwill, reputation, business model, and standing in the

community, among other things.

174. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

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175. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox knew or should have known

the passage, enforcement, and application of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its rights

under the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.

176. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violated rights held by

Twelve25 which were clearly established, and no reasonable official similarly situated to Council

Defendants and Defendant Maddox could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful or

within the bounds of reasonable discretion.

177. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox never provided just

compensation to Twelve25.

178. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

179. The actions of the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox violate Art. I,

Sec. 23 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law, and Twelve25 is due just compensation

and equitable relief.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

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COUNT IX

ALABAMA CONSTITUTION, ART. I, SEC. 5


UNREASONABLE SEIZURE

ALL DEFENDANTS

180. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

181. Article I, Section 5 of the Alabama Constitution and the laws of the State of

Alabama prohibit the unreasonable seizure of persons, papers, and possessions.

182. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

183. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

184. On January 2, 2020, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, via the

City’s agent Defendant Stines, issued the 519 Occupancy Certificate to Twelve25.

185. On March 9, 2023, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, via the

City’s agent Defendant Stines, wrongfully seized Twelve25’s 519 Occupancy Certificate.

186. Defendants knew or should have known the passage, enforcement, and application

of the Ordinance would deprive Twelve25 of its constitutional rights under the Alabama

Constitution. Indeed, the Defendants applied and enforced the Ordinance before publication and

thereby illegally damaged Twelve25.

187. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

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188. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ violation of Twelve25’s

guaranteed rights under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law, and their actions/inactions

alleged herein, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be

proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT X

CONVERSION

ALL DEFENDANTS

189. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

190. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

191. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

192. On January 2, 2020, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, via the

City’s agent Defendant Stines, issued the 519 Occupancy Certificate to Twelve25.

193. On March 9, 2023, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox, via the

City’s agent Defendant Stines, converted Twelve25’s 519 Occupancy Certificate.

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194. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

195. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conversion, Twelve25 has suffered

and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT XI

FRAUD AND/OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, RECKLESS AND


INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION AND SUPPRESSION

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

196. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

197. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and

official capacities.

198. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

199. In 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant

Maddox made material direct and/or indirect representations to Twelve25 that the dual occupancy

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limits were permitted and provided for under Alabama law, the Code of Tuscaloosa, the

Tuscaloosa Fire Code, and the Tuscaloosa Building Code.

200. These representations, which were made either negligently, intentionally, and/or

recklessly without regard for the truth, specifically include but are not limited to:

a. The Defendants’ approval on June 28, 2019 of Twelve25’s building


plans that reflected a maximum occupancy limit of 738 persons;

b. The Defendants’ agreement and authorization, via its agent Defendant


Stines, with Mr. Veron that Twelve25’s maximum occupancy load
would be 519 persons;

c. The Defendants’ issuance, via its agent Defendant Stines, of the 287
Certificate and the 519 Certificate following Mr. Jarrett’s December 26,
2019 representation that “Twelve25 will offer different functions at
different times;”

d. The Defendants’ failure to inform Twelve25 of the defense they now


assert, that their agent Fire Marshal’s Stines’s interpretation of the Code
was wrong from the outset of his interactions and representations with
Twelve25;

e. The Defendants’ issuance and renewal of Twelve25’s business licenses


from 2020-2023; and

f. The Defendants’ issuance of the Queuing Permit categorized as


“QUEUING PERMIT 300 OR MORE.”

201. Twelve25 relied to its detriment on these representations that the dual occupancy

limits were permitted and provided for under Alabama law, the Code of Tuscaloosa, the

Tuscaloosa Fire Code, and the Tuscaloosa Building Code by hiring staff and acquiring other

property and resources to sufficiently accommodate the capacity allowed under the 519 Occupancy

Certificate, and by entering into contracts with event organizers and entities which expressly

referenced and were contingent on any event hosted at Twelve25 where tables and chairs would

be removed not exceeding the 519 maximum occupant load previously approved by the City.

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202. Twelve25’s reliance was reasonable and justified based on the knowledge available

to Twelve25 and the surrounding circumstances.

203. At the time the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox approved and

issued Twelve25’s Alcohol License, Business License, Queuing Permit, and Occupancy

Certificates in accordance with Alabama law, the Code of Tuscaloosa, the Tuscaloosa Fire Code,

and the Tuscaloosa Building Code, the Defendants had a duty to know, should have reasonably

known, recklessly disregarded the truth, and/or did know that their approval and issuance, and

annual reapprovals and reissuances, were provided in conformity with the City’s pattern and

practice.

204. Further, from 2019 to 2023, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox

suppressed and/or failed to disclose at any that they objected to Twelve25’s dual occupancy limits

or that they intended to amend the Code of Tuscaloosa in such a manner that would directly (and

wrongfully) contradict their previous representations regarding dual occupancy limits upon which

Twelve25 has reasonably relied and continued to rely upon until the passage, enforcement, and

application of the Ordinance to Twelve25.

205. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox intended for Twelve25 to

rely and act upon the above-described negligent, intentional, and/or reckless representations and

Twelve25, in fact, did so, to its detriment.

206. When Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox made these representations and

suppressed this critical information they acted outside of their authority, and they did so

knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority, under a

mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

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207. As a direct and proximate result of the above-described misrepresentations and

suppressions, Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven

at trial, plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT XII

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

ALL DEFENDANTS

208. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

209. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

210. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox have targeted Twelve25

because it is minority-owned, it attracts many members of the Black community (predominantly

Black college students) to the Strip, and it attracts significant numbers of customers away from

already-established businesses on the Strip which have white owners.

211. In 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023, Defendants made material direct and/or

indirect representations to Twelve25 that the dual occupancy limits were permitted and provided

for under Alabama law, the Code of Tuscaloosa, the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, and the Tuscaloosa

Building Code.

212. These representations specifically include but are not limited to:

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a. The City’s approval on June 28, 2019 of Twelve25’s building plans that
reflected a maximum occupancy limit of 738 persons;

b. The agreement and authorization from the City through Defendant


Stines with Mr. Veron that Twelve25’s maximum occupancy load
would be 519 persons;

c. The issuance by the City through Defendant Stines of the 287 Certificate
and the 519 Certificate following Mr. Jarrett’s December 26, 2019
representation that “Twelve25 will offer different functions at different
times;”

d. The City’s issuance and renewal of Twelve25’s business licenses from


2020-2023; and

e. The issuance by the City through Defendant Stines of the Queuing


Permit categorized as “QUEUING PERMIT 300 OR MORE.”

213. Twelve25 reasonably relied to its detriment on these representations that the dual

occupancy limits were permitted and provided for under Alabama law, the Code of Tuscaloosa,

the Tuscaloosa Fire Code, and the Tuscaloosa Building Code by hiring additional staff, acquiring

other property and resources to sufficiently accommodate the capacity allowed under the 519

Occupancy Certificate, continuing and increasing their investment in the business, and entering

into contracts with event organizers and entities which expressly referenced and were contingent

on any event hosted at Twelve25 where tables and chairs would be removed not exceeding the 519

maximum occupant load previously approved by the City.

214. Twelve25’s reliance was reasonable and justified based on the knowledge available

to Twelve25 and the surrounding circumstances.

215. Further, from 2019 to 2023, the City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox

suppressed from Twelve25 the fact that they intended to wholesale change the Code of Tuscaloosa

in such a manner that would directly contradict their previous representations and approvals

regarding dual occupancy limits upon which Twelve25 has reasonably relied.

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216. Defendants intended for Twelve25 to rely and act upon the above-described

representations and approvals, and Twelve25 did so.

217. When Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox made direct and/or indirect

representations and suppressed this critical information they acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

218. Defendants should be equitably estopped from enforcing and applying the

Ordinance against Twelve25.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court order Defendants are

equitably estopped from enforcing and applying the Ordinance against Twelve25, and seeks costs,

attorneys’ fees, and any such other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT XIII

VIOLATION OF ALA. CODE § 11-45-8(c)

ALL DEFENDANTS

219. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

220. Pursuant to Ala. Code § 11-45-8(c), the Ordinance was by law not effective until it

was published in the Tuscaloosa News on March 13, 2023.

221. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

222. Defendants attempted to enforce the Ordinance via the issuance of a new maximum

occupancy certificate to Twelve25 on March 10, 2023.

223. Defendants’ attempt to enforce the Ordinance prior to the Ordinance being

published in the Tuscaloosa News violates Ala. Code § 11-45-8(c).

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224. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond their authority,

under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

225. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of Ala. Code § 11-45-

8(c), Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial,

plus interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages, and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT XIV

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

CITY, COUNCIL DEFENDANTS, AND DEFENDANT MADDOX

226. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

227. Twelve25 possesses protectable contractual relations with event promoters.

228. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities.

229. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox had knowledge of

Twelve25’s protected contractual relations with event promoters and other corporate entities.

230. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox wrongfully and wantonly

interfered with Twelve25’s protected contractual relations with event promoters, as the passage of

the Ordinance unlawfully deprives Twelve25 of its property interests and rights pursuant to those

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contracts which relied and were contingent on Twelve25’s 519 Occupancy Certificate and land

use previously approved by the City and which comply with the Tuscaloosa Fire Code and

Tuscaloosa Building Code.

231. The City, Council Defendants, and Defendant Maddox had an improper motive and

improper means to wantonly interfere with Twelve25’s protected contractual relations event

promoters without lawful justification.

232. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside of their authority, and

they did so wantonly, knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously, beyond his

authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in bad faith.

233. As a direct and proximate result of the tortious interference described herein,

Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and injuries to be proven at trial, plus

interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory and punitive damages and all other allowable damages which are

recoverable in such an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein;

costs; attorneys’ fees; injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

COUNT XV

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

CITY OF TUSCALOOSA

234. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

235. Section 21-29 of the Tuscaloosa Code sets forth specific requirements for queuing

lines and employs a tiered application fee based on occupancy limits: $250.00 for a business with

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an occupancy limit of less than 100 persons, $500.00 for limits between 100 and 299 persons, and

$750.00 for limits of 300 persons or more. Section 21-29(b).

236. On January 27, 2023, Twelve25 paid the City for a queuing permit based on a

maximum capacity exceeding 300 persons.

237. Shortly thereafter, the City issued a queuing permit to Twelve25 based on a

maximum capacity exceeding 300 persons.

238. The City, through its agents Council Defendants, Defendant Maddox, and

Defendant Stines, passed, applied, and enforced the Ordinance limiting Twelve25’s maximum

capacity to fewer than 300 persons.

239. By accepting payment for a queuing permit with a maximum capacity exceeding

300 persons, and subsequently limiting Twelve25 to a maximum capacity of fewer than 300

persons, Twelve25 cannot receive the benefit of its bargain with the City, and the City is unjustly

enriched.

240. As a direct and proximate result of the City’s unjust enrichment described herein,

Twelve25 has suffered and will continue to suffer damages in an amount to be proven at trial, plus

interest.

WHEREFORE, Twelve25 respectfully requests this Honorable Court enter a judgment

awarding compensatory damages and all other allowable damages which are recoverable in such

an amount to be determined by a jury due to the violations addressed herein; costs; attorneys’ fees;

injunctive relief; and any such other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

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COUNT XVI

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

ALL DEFENDANTS

241. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

242. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and

official capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

243. A justiciable controversy exists between the parties with respect to the

constitutionality and validity of the Ordinance, both facially and as applied to Twelve25.

244. In light of the foregoing, Twelve25 seeks a declaration that:

a. The Ordinance rendered impossible Twelve25’s ability to perform its


obligations under existing contracts with respect to Twelve25’s capacity;

b. Twelve25 had a vested right in the use of the land allowed by the dual
occupancy limits permitted by the 287 Occupancy Certificate and the 519
Occupancy Certificate, as approved by the City and used by Twelve25 since
opening;

c. The Ordinance is a de facto zoning ordinance;

d. Defendants acted outside their authority by amending, defining, and issuing


rules affecting State-issued liquor licenses in violation of the Alcoholic
Beverage Licensing Code and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
Administrative Code;

e. The Ordinance is void ab initio and due to be set aside because it violates
the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law;

f. Council Defendants’ passage of the Ordinance was arbitrary and capricious;

g. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox deprived Twelve25 of its


property interests without notice, an opportunity to be heard, or other due
process under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law;

h. Defendants’ actions with respect to the passage, enforcement, and


application of the Ordinance constitute inverse condemnation;

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i. Defendants’ actions with respect to seizing the 519 Occupancy Certificate


constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Constitution of Alabama;

j. Defendants converted the 519 Occupancy Certificate;

k. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox acted outside their authority,


and they did so knowingly, wrongfully, willfully, fraudulently, maliciously,
beyond their authority, under a mistaken interpretation of the law, and/or in
bad faith, in their participation in the passage, enforcement, and application
of the Ordinance, which violated clearly established rights of Twelve25
under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama law;

l. Section 11-21 of the Code of Tuscaloosa, as amended by the Ordinance,


conflicts with Section 1004.3 and Section 302.1 of the IFC and the
Tuscaloosa Fire Code;

m. Section 11-21 of the Code of Tuscaloosa, as amended by the Ordinance,


conflicts with Section 1004.3 and Section 302.1 of the IBC and the
Tuscaloosa Building Code;

n. Twelve25 justifiably relied upon the City’s approval and renewal of


Twelve25’s business licenses, queuing permit, and the dual occupancy
limits in entering into business contracts and in operating, marketing, and
promoting its business in accordance with all applicable code sections,
rules, and other regulations prior to the passage, enforcement, and
application of the Ordinance;

o. The Ordinance did not take effect until publication by the Tuscaloosa News
on March 13, 2023;

p. The City’s attempt to enforce the Ordinance via the issuance of a new
maximum occupancy certificate to Twelve25 on March 10, 2023 violates
Ala. Code § 11-45-8(c);

q. Defendants’ passage, application, and enforcement of the Ordinance


constituted tortious interference with Twelve25’s contractual relations;

r. The City was unjustly enriched by accepting payment for a queuing permit
exceeding 300 persons then limiting Twelve25 to a maximum occupancy of
fewer than 300 persons, when the cost of a queuing permit for fewer than
300 persons is less than the cost of a queuing permit exceeding 300 persons;

s. Defendants are equitably estopped from enforcing and applying the


Ordinance against Twelve25; and

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t. Twelve25 is entitled to maintain the dual occupancy limits as approved by


the City via its agent Defendant Stines whereby the maximum occupant load
for Twelve25 when tables and chairs are present totals 287 persons, and the
maximum occupant load for Twelve25 when table and chairs are not present
totals 519 persons.

COUNT XVII

PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

ALL DEFENDANTS

245. Twelve25 re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-91 as if fully set forth herein.

246. Council Defendants and Defendant Maddox are sued in their individual and official

capacities. Defendant Stines is sued in his official capacity only.

247. Defendants have violated Twelve25’s constitutional rights.

248. Absent the requested injunctive relief, Defendants’ actions will result in immediate

irreparable, substantial, and ongoing harm to Twelve25, in the form of loss of goodwill,

reputational harm, loss of business, loss of employees, and being subjected to claims and lawsuits

from third parties given that under the Ordinance, Twelve25 can no longer provide event space

with the capacity which it is contractually obligated to provide.

249. Twelve25 has no adequate remedy at law.

250. Twelve25 has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of its

claims.

251. The harm Twelve25 will endure absent the requested injunctive relief is severe and

cannot be remedied with monetary recovery alone.

252. Issuing an injunction will create little to no burden on Defendants and is even less

likely to disserve the public interest. Given the many wrongful actions by Defendants, the balance

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of the equities certainly favors the issuance of preliminary and later a permanent injunction in

Twelve25’s favor.

253. Accordingly, Twelve25 seeks a preliminary and ultimately a permanent injunction

as follows:

a. As to the preliminary injunction, restraining and enjoining Defendants and


any and all related entities, officials, officers, servants, agents, employees,
attorneys, representatives and assigns from enforcing any provision of the
Ordinance as against Twelve25;

b. As to the preliminary injunction, maintaining the status quo as to Twelve25


as it existed prior to the passage of the Ordinance until such time as a
permanent injunction is entered in this matter;

c. As to the permanent injunction, for an order decreeing that the provisions


of the Ordinance may not be enforced against Twelve25;

d. As to the permanent injunction, restraining and enjoining Defendants and


any and all related entities, officials, officers, servants, agents, employees,
attorneys, representatives and assigns from enforcing any provision of the
Ordinance as against Twelve25; and

e. For such other and equitable relief as this Court deems appropriate.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY STRUCK JURY ON ALL COUNTS SO TRIABLE

Dated: April 12, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ J. Mark White


J. Mark White (WHI001)
Augusta S. Dowd (DOW003)
W. Chambers Waller IV (WAL242)
Curtis H. Seal (SEA043)
Attorneys for Plaintiff Twelve25

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DOCUMENT 2

OF COUNSEL:
WHITE ARNOLD & DOWD P.C.
2001 Park Place North, Suite 1400
Birmingham, Alabama 35203
Phone: (205) 323-1888
Fax: (205) 323-8907
E-mail: mwhite@whitearnolddowd.com
E-mail: adowd@whitearnolddowd.com
E-mail: cwaller@whitearnolddowd.com
E-mail: cseal@whitearnolddowd.com

and

/s/ Bryan P. Winter


Bryan P. Winter (WIN028)
Ruth B. McFarland (BRI034)

OF COUNSEL:
WINTER McFARLAND LLC
205 McFarland Circle North
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35406
Telephone: (205) 650-1400
Facsimile: (205) 650-1401
E-mail: bpwinter@winmclaw.com
E-mail: ruth@winmclaw.com

As this Complaint challenges the constitutionality of municipal ordinance under the


Alabama Constitution, pursuant to Ala. Code § 6-6-227 Plaintiff hereby certifies that a copy of
this Complaint will be served on the Alabama Attorney General’s Office at the following address:

Executive Division
Alabama Attorney General’s Office
501 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 300152
Montgomery, AL 36130-0152

/s/ J. Mark White


OF COUNSEL

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 2023, copies of the foregoing were served via
electronic mail on the following counsel for Defendants:

Wilson F. Green
Wilson F. Green LLC
P.O. Box 2536 (ZIP 35403)
2620 6th Street, Ste. 200
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401
(205) 722-1018
wilson@wilsongreenlaw.com

Scott Holmes
Chad L. Hobbs
Office of the City Attorney
City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama
2201 University Blvd.
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401
sholmes@tuscaloosa.com
chobbs@tuscaloosa.com

/s/ J. Mark White


OF COUNSEL

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