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European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468 – 478 (2011)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.803

Research article
Concern for self‐image and social image in the management of moral failure:
Rethinking shame†

NICOLAY GAUSEL1* AND COLIN WAYNE LEACH2

1
Østfold University College, Fredrikstad, Norway; 2University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA

Abstract

Moral failure is thought to damage self‐image when people appraise it as indicating a global self‐defect. This appraisal is
thought to be associated with the feeling of shame and thus self‐defensive motivation. However, a damaged social image better
explains self‐defensive motivation to hide from and avoid others. Based on an integrative review of theory and research, we
offer a conceptual model of how concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience of moral failure. The model
distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame)
embedded in the shame concept. Concern for a damaged social image is represented in an other‐condemnation → rejection
combination, whereas concern for a damaged self‐image is represented in a (global) self‐defect → inferiority combination. As
these appraisal–feeling combinations are concerned with damage done to one’s image, they should be linked to self‐defensive
motivation. As the (specific) self‐defect → shame combination is concerned with a repairable defect in self‐image, it should be
linked with self‐improvement motivation. Thus, our model explains why “shame” is sometimes tied to self‐defensive motivation
and sometimes tied to self‐improvement motivation after moral failure. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Despite our best intentions, we sometimes fail to be honest,
trustworthy, or fair. Such moral failures are central to our
social image because they sour others’ evaluations of us (see
Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Wojciszke, 2005). Our
moral failures also sour the social image that we imagine
others have of us (see Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959). Given
their interest in social relationships and society, social sciences
like anthropology, economics, and sociology have paid great
attention to peoples’ concern for their social image in
instances of moral failure (for reviews, see de Waal, 1996;
Scheff, 2000). The concept of shame has been central to much
of this work. For instance, the symbolic interaction tradition in
sociology has long examined shame as the experience of a
social image damaged by moral failure (e.g., Cooley, 1902;
for a review, see Scheff, 2000). Generally, avoidance of others
and withdrawal from the social scene are thought to follow
from shame about a badly damaged social image. This is
because people are thought to be motivated to defend their
social image from further damage by limiting others’
opportunities to further condemn them for their moral failure
(Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000).
One’s morality is also of the utmost importance to one’s
evaluation of oneself (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007;
Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; for a review,
see Wojciszke, 2005). Thus, moral failure is also central to self‐
image. In psychology, it is concern for one’s self‐image that is
emphasized in most work on the experience of moral failure.
Thus, psychology tends to view shame as the emotional
experience of a badly damaged self‐image (for reviews, see
Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). This
view is buttressed by the fact that a good deal of research finds
self‐reports of chronic shame to be moderately to strongly
correlated with depression, negative self‐evaluation, and low
self‐esteem (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998;
Tangney & Fischer, 1995). At least since Lewis’s (1971)
Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, shame has been thought to be so
devastating to self‐image because individuals view their failure
as indicative of a global, and thus unalterable, self‐defect (for
reviews, see Lansky, 1995; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Given this conceptualization, it is presumed
that shame leads people to defensively protect their self‐image
from further harm by hiding, avoidance, and withdrawal (for
reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; M. Lewis, 1992;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Whether shame is viewed as concerned with self‐image or
social image, there appears to be agreement across the
disciplines that shame is detrimental socially and/or psycho-
logically. This is because shame is typically linked to an
appraisal of irreparable damage to self‐image or social image.
We offer a contrasting view. By reconceptualizing how
concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience
of moral failure, we re‐conceptualize shame. Based on a
review of theory and research, we develop an integrative
model that distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and

*Correspondence to: Nicolay Gausel, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway. E‐mail: nicolay.gausel@hiof.no
†
Both authors contributed equally to this article.

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 5 July 2010, Accepted 5 April 2011

other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority,
and shame) embedded in the shame concept (see also Gausel,
Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, &
Brown, 2011). By identifying three specific appraisal–feeling
combinations, we are able to specify when and why the
experience of moral failure leads to self‐defensive motivation.
For example, we review theory and research that suggests that
it is the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection
combination that is especially tied to self‐defensive motiva-
tion, such as hiding and avoidance. Where people appraise
their moral failure as damaging their social image to such a
degree that others will condemn them, they are likely to
defend their social image from further damage by avoiding
others’ opprobrium. This has little to do with the feeling
of shame.
THE MANY MEANINGS OF “SHAME”
Because moral failure is so important to social image and self‐
image, people can feel very bad about it. Shame has received
the most attention in the study of how moral failure is
emotionally experienced. However, what scholars mean by
the term “shame” is often unclear. For instance, in her
influential view of shame, Lewis (1971) identified more than
seven different appraisals, feelings, and motivations as part of
a single shame concept. Most contemporary researchers
conceptualize shame as including at least several of the facets
discussed by H.B. Lewis. However, there is little agreement
about which appraisals and feelings are necessary to define the
concept of shame.
A great deal of work views shame as necessarily including
the appraisal that one suffers a global, unalterable, defect of
the whole self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins,
2006). Some work views the shame concept as including the
appraisal that others are likely to condemn one for a moral
failure (Braithewaite, 1989; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff,
2000). The shame concept is sometimes thought to include
the painful feeling of rejection and isolation that is associated
with the appraisal of other‐condemnation (MacDonald &
Leary, 2005; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000). In addition, the
shame concept is sometimes said to include the debilitating
feeling of inferiority that is associated with the appraisal of
a global self‐defect (Smith et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing,
2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Finally, some approaches
go so far as to include the self‐defensive motivation
thought to be based on the experience of shame within the
shame concept itself (see M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002).
Including so many different appraisals and feelings about
moral failure in a single concept of shame obscures the precise
(social and psychological) meaning conveyed by each
appraisal and feeling. As a result, contemporary theory and
research on individuals’ experience of moral failure cannot
distinguish concern for self‐image from concern for social
image (see also Ferguson, 2005; Smith et al., 2002). This is
important because concern for social image is likely to promote
different appraisals and feelings from concern for self‐image. In
addition, including the self‐defensive motivation of hiding and
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Rethinking shame 469
avoidance in the shame concept makes it difficult to know
why “shame” might motivate self‐defense. Is self‐defensive
motivation tied to the feeling of inferiority that indicates a
concern for damaged self‐image? Or, is self‐defensive
motivation tied to the feeling of rejection that indicates a
concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of others?
As feelings of inferiority and rejection are both embedded
in the common conceptualization and measurement of
shame, it is unclear why such an ambiguous “shame”
should be tied to self‐defensive motivation, such as wanting
to hide, run away, or cover up (see also Gausel, Leach, &
Vignoles, 2011b).
A Conceptual Model
One way to re‐conceptualize an overly broad concept like
shame is to dissect it into its constituent elements (see Leach
& Spears, 2008 regarding envy). A dissection of the shame
concept yields at least two distinct appraisals and three
feelings (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach,
Vignoles, & Brown, 2011). Figure 1 shows our model of how
these appraisals and feelings connect to each other and to self‐
defensive and self‐improvement motivation. Specifically, a
moral failure can be appraised as indicating either that others
will condemn one or that one suffers a self‐defect. If the self is
appraised as suffering a self‐defect, this self‐defect may be
viewed as either global (and thus unalterable) or specific (and
thus potentially alterable). These appraisals are the central
subjective meaning that people give their moral failure (for
general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, &
Collins, 1988). We view these appraisals as representing two
distinct concerns: social image and self‐image. When people
appraise a moral failure as indicating other‐condemnation,
they show a concern for their social image (these are the
constructs with a white background in Figure 1). Appraising a
moral failure as indicating a self‐defect shows a concern for
their self‐image (these are the constructs shown with a lightly
shaded background in Figure 1).
Rather than debating whether “shame” is based on concern
for self‐image or social image, we specify the ways in which
each concern guides the appraisal of, and feeling about, moral
failure. For instance, the appraisal of a moral failure as making
condemnation by others likely should be most tied to a feeling
of rejection. The appraisal (e.g., “lying to my best friend
yesterday will lead her, and others, to condemn me”) is linked
closely to the feeling (e.g., “rejected,” “rebuffed,” “isolated”).
This is why the path between this appraisal and feeling
combination is thick in Figure 1. The appraisal of other‐
condemnation suggests that one views one’s social image as
damaged (i.e., “people will no longer think well of me”). If
this damage could still be prevented, one could be motivated
to defend one’s image in the eyes of others. But, because one
believes that the damage to one’s social image is already done,
one is likely to feel rejection. This painful feeling of social
devaluation and isolation should be associated with a self‐
defensive desire to escape other’s condemnation. Thus, we
expect the feeling of rejection to best predict wanting to cover
up one’s moral failure and to (physically and psychologically)
avoid the moral failure, those affected by it, and those likely to
condemn one for it.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

470 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W. Leach
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the experience of moral failure. Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social‐image; shaded, bottom half
of figure shows concern for self‐image
As shown in Figure 1a, our model proposes that the
appraisal of a specific self‐defect (e.g., “lying to my best
friend yesterday shows that I am not as honest a person as
I should be”) is most tied to the feeling of shame. This
appraisal–feeling combination shows a concern for self‐
image. As Ferguson (2005) argues, shame is a feeling
about who one is; it is about one’s identity (see also
Ferguson, Brugman, White & Eyre, 2007). However, as the
self‐defect is specific, it is potentially alterable. One can
improve a defect by reforming the faulty aspect of the self
and by repairing one’s relationship to those affected by
one’s moral failure. This is why we view the feeling of
shame as important to the motivation to improve the self
and social relations. The feeling of inferiority that should
be most associated with the appraisal of a global self‐
defect also shows concern for self‐image. However, in the
feeling of inferiority, one believes that one’s whole self‐
image is severely damaged. This is because a global self‐
defect is viewed as unalterable (Lewis, 1971). Indeed,
there is little that one can do if one believes that lying to
one’s best friends shows that one is generally “a liar.” As
such, the feeling of inferiority should be more debilitating
than the feeling of shame.
Our model of the experience of moral failure eschews the
overly broad conceptualization of shame that prevails at
present in favor of a more elemental approach. We see the
two appraisals and three feelings often embedded in the
shame concept as forming specific appraisal–feeling com-
binations. Each appraisal–feeling combination gives a
distinct meaning to the moral failure that is guided by
concern for either one’s social image or self‐image. As
such, each appraisal–feeling combination represents a
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particular way of experiencing one’s moral failure. Our focus
on specific appraisal–feeling combinations is inspired by
Lazarus’s (1991) view that “core relational themes” should
define emotion concepts, not (English) emotion words like
‘shame’. Words like ‘shame’ make poor emotion concepts
because they are defined by everyday (English) language use
rather than formal analysis (Ortony et al., 1988). Thus,
researchers, and the participants in their studies, may mean
many different things when they describe the experience of
moral failure with the polysemous word ‘shame.’
In specifying three distinct appraisal–feeling combinations,
we are better able to specify the motivation that should be tied
to each experience of moral failure (see Figure 1). For instance,
the feeling of rejection should be most tied to the self‐
defensive motivation to withdraw, hide, or avoid because the
feeling of rejection is an experience of social isolation based
on the appraisal that others will condemn one for a moral
failure. This motivation is the most logical, and thus most
likely, implication of the concern for a damaged social image
that is the core relational theme underlying the appraised
other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination.
Although our model is novel in many respects, each of its
elements has been examined in previous theory and research.
In the sections below, we review the empirical support for
our model offered in previous work. Although most previous
thinking views shame as debilitating and thus detrimental to
self and to social relations, a good deal of research is
consistent with our view that this is more true of the feelings
of rejection and inferiority than of shame. Indeed, a good
deal of prior work is consistent with our view that shame
is associated with the motivation to improve the self and
social relations.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

CONCERN FOR SELF‐IMAGE
Appraisal of Self‐defect
Global
In psychology, the widely held view is that the feeling of
shame is closely linked to an appraisal that a failure indicates
that one’s whole self‐image is damaged (for reviews, see
Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Lansky, 1995; Lewis, 1992;
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This conceptualization of shame
informs numerous measures of the concept. For example, four
of the 16 items of the Test of Self‐Conscious Affect (TOSCA)
measure of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing,
2002) refer to global self‐defects (e.g., “I am… terrible, …
incompetent, … irresponsible, … lazy). Some recent work on
in‐group moral failure has also incorporated the appraisal of a
global self‐defect into measures (Brown & Cehajic, 2008;
Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi & Cehajic, 2008) and
manipulations (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007) of the shame
concept. For example, Brown and his colleagues measure
“collective shame” about discrimination and violence with
statements such as “we are …racist and mean, … predisposed
to be racist” and “I feel ashamed for the racist tendency of…”
Lewis (1971) viewed the appraisal of a global self‐defect as
the most central element of the shame concept. What was
most important for her is that people believe that it is
extremely difficult to improve a self‐image that is wholly
defective. It is this appraisal of a global self‐defect as
unalterable that makes shame debilitating in Lewis’s (1971,
p.40) view: “Shame is about the whole self […] This global
target of hostility makes it difficult to find a solution short of a
sweeping replacement of self by another, better one.”
In psychology, Lewis’s view has been examined by
assessing whether shame is strongly tied to internal, stable,
and global attributions for failure. Although most of this
research represents itself as consistent with Lewis, measures
of “shame” tend to be only weakly correlated with the
attributions that suggest an appraisal of a global, unalterable,
self‐defect (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002; but see Miller & Tangney, 1994). Tracy and
Robins (2006) is the most elaborate examination of this issue.
In a first study, they found chronic “shame proneness” to
correlate with chronic internal and stable attributions
(r = .24–.39) as well as chronic external attributions
(r = .36–.44). In a second study that asked students to reflect
on their academic performance, reported shame was weakly
correlated to internal (r = .12) and stable (r = .15) attributions.
In a third study, past experiences of shame were no more
likely to be attributed to stable causes than past experiences of
guilt. A fourth study asked students to imagine how they
would feel if they did badly on an exam because of self‐
attributes that varied in stability and controllability. Failure
due to stable or unalterable attributes (e.g., low ability) did not
lead to greater imagined shame.
In contrast to the prevailing view in psychology, shame is
not closely tied to an appraisal of the self as globally, stably,
and thus irreparably, defective (see also Ferguson, 2005;
Ferguson et al., 2007). Even when measures of shame include
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Rethinking shame 471
chronic appraisal of global self‐defect, shame’s association
with a view of the self as irreparably damaged is moderate at
best (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2006, study 1; for a review, see
Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In actuality, internal, stable, and
global attributions for failure are more strongly linked to
depression, dispositional pessimism, and low self‐esteem than
shame (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Gilbert & Andrews,
1998). Unfortunately, the presumed linkage between the
feeling of shame and an appraisal of a global self‐defect has
prevented attention to the more circumscribed appraisal of a
specific self‐defect that is more logically linked to the feeling
of shame.
Specific
Rather than viewing oneself as globally, and thus irreparably,
defective, one may interpret a specific failure as indicating a
specific self‐defect. Although this appraisal is discomforting,
its focus on a specific aspect of the self should make it less
debilitating than a more global and stable attribution for
failure (Lewis, 1971). This is because the appraisal of a
specific self‐defect shows concern for damage to a specific
aspect of one’s self‐image. One may more easily imagine
improving one’s emotional honesty with intimates than
improving one’s whole self, for example. A specific self‐
defect is potentially alterable in a way that a global self‐defect
is not.
Appraising a moral failure as indicating a specific self‐
defect goes beyond appraising oneself as responsible for the
failure and its consequences (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, &
Brown, 2011). The appraisal of a specific self‐defect indicates
a serious criticism of the specific aspect of the self that is
found wanting (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011).
Thus, the appraisal of a specific self‐defect focuses on one’s
identity as a person who wishes to be moral but has failed to
do so. In other words, this appraisal is based on a concern that
one’s self‐image is at stake in one’s moral failure (for a
general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991). The appraisal of a
specific self‐defect is about one’s moral identity rather than
one’s moral behavior (see Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al.,
2007). As the feeling of shame is also about one’s identity
(Ferguson et al., 2007), shame and the appraisal of a specific
self‐defect should be closely linked.
Feeling of Shame
The feeling of “shame” is often associated with strong self‐
blame and self‐anger (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Pettersen,
2009; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow,
1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Consequently, people report
that “shame” and cognate emotion concepts are intensely
unpleasant experiences (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994;
Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996). This
is underlined by the fact that out of the 135 English emotion
words that Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor (1987)
had students evaluate, few were more negative than “shame.”
The three English emotion words that are most commonly
used to express shame are “ashamed”, “disgraced”, and
“humiliated” (see Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Retzinger &
Scheff, 2000). These three words are very similar in meaning
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

472 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W. Leach
(Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles,
& Brown, 2011; Shaver et al. 1987). As a consequence,
“ashamed”, “disgraced”, and “humiliated” are found in many
established measures of the feeling of shame (for reviews, see
Robins, Noftle & Tracy, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
However, there is great variation in the semantic content of
measures of shame (for reviews, see Robins et al., 2007). This
likely reflects variation in the conceptualization of shame.
Interestingly, none of the 16 items of the widely used TOSCA
measure of individual’s proneness to shame makes explicit
reference to “shame;” four items refer to global self‐defects,
seven items refer to a general feeling of inferiority, one item
refers to a feeling of rejection, and five items refer to
avoidance motivation (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Research that assesses “shame” and related feelings
show a small link to self‐defensive responses. The feeling
of shame is correlated to wanting to physically avoid the
failure (Roseman et al., 1994; Schmader & Lickel, 2006;
Tangney et al., 1996) and other people (Frijda, Kuipers &
ter Shure, 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996).
The feeling of shame is also correlated with wanting to
psychologically avoid one’s failure by not thinking about
it and wanting to cover it up (Miller & Tangney, 1994;
Roseman et al., 1994). The TOSCA measure of shame
proneness tends to yield small to moderate correlations with
self‐defensive motivation (e.g., O’Connor et al., 1999; for a
review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, the
inclusion of self‐defensive motivation in the TOSCA itself
likely exaggerates this link. In addition, our conceptual model
suggests that by emphasizing the appraisal of a global self‐
defect, and feelings of rejection or inferiority, the TOSCA
exaggerates its association with self‐defensive motivation.
It should be clear from this brief review that the feeling of
shame is not as closely linked to self‐defensive motivation as
is commonly claimed (see also de Hooge, Breugelmans, &
Zeelenberg, 2008; Ferguson, 2005). What is even more
difficult to reconcile with the prevailing conceptualization of
shame in psychology are the small to moderate correlations
that the feeling of shame has with the motivation to improve
the self and social relations, which we describe in the
following paragraphs. By viewing the feeling of shame as
closely tied to the appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is
potentially alterable, our model explains why shame is linked
to the motivation to self‐improve.
Self‐improvement Motivation
The feeling of shame is based on concern for the damage
done to one’s self‐image by a failure. Although self‐
defensive motivation can temporarily alleviate the unpleasant
feelings produced by this concern, it cannot address the
concern directly. Avoiding one’s moral failure, and the self‐
defect it indicates, does nothing for a damaged self‐image. A
concern for one’s self‐image is most directly addressed by
facing one’s self‐defect and identifying the means by which it
can be improved (see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, &
Braithwaite, 2001; Ferguson et al., 2007). Although it can
be unpleasant to recognize a self‐defect, it is a necessary first
step in the motivation to improve the self (e.g., Miller &
Tangney, 1994; for discussions, see Ferguson et al., 2007;
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Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Of course, if one does not feel
bad about one’s specific self‐defect, one has little reason to
try to improve it. When based on an appraisal of a specific
self‐defect, the serious self‐criticism of shame should
motivate effort to improve this particular aspect of the self‐
image (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011).
Conceptualizing the feeling of shame as based on an
appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is potentially alterable
serves to explain why shame is linked to the motivation to
improve a self‐image damaged by moral failure. For instance,
Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) asked participants
in four studies what they would change if they had experienced
a shame‐eliciting event. Participants reported most wanting to
change themselves rather than simply changing their behavior.
Consistent with this, Roseman et al. (1994) found recalled
experiences of shame to be characterized by a moderate degree
of wanting to undo and correct one’s mistake, improve one’s
performance, and try harder. However, the most direct evidence
of a link between shame and self‐improvement motivation
comes from several recent studies by de Hooge, Zeelenberg, &
Breugelmans (2010). Here participants recalled, or experi-
enced, shame about an achievement‐related failure. de Hooge
et al. found felt shame to predict moderate levels of the
motivation to restore a positive self‐evaluation. Shame was also
associated with wanting to achieve in the face of failure and
with making greater effort to achieve. In most of the studies of
de Hooge et al., shame was more strongly linked to the
motivation to restore self‐image than to protect it from further
damage by responding self‐defensively.
Social‐improvement Motivation
Self‐improvement may also be achieved through efforts at the
improvement of the social relations affected by one’s moral
failure. Thus, our model proposes that the feeling of shame is
associated with social‐improvement motivation through the
motivation for self‐improvement (see Figure 1). Although it is
rarely acknowledged in psychology, the feeling of shame has
small to moderate correlations with motivation to improve the
individual’s social relations (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Schmader
& Lickel, 2006). For example, Tangney et al. (1996) found that
felt shame was correlated with wanting to make amends. Miller
and Tangney (1994) found that felt shame was characterized
by apologizing and trying to make things better. Roseman et al.
(1994) found that felt shame was characterized by wanting to
make up for what was done and to apologize for it. In three
studies, de Hooge et al. (2008) had participants imagine, recall,
or experience failure. The feeling of shame led individuals to
act more pro‐socially toward those who knew of their failure.
Perhaps because few psychologists expect shame to be related
to social‐improvement motivation, these are some of the only
studies to examine how shame encourages actual pro‐social
behavior. Nevertheless, there is clear and consistent evidence
that feeling shame is linked to the motivation to improve the
social relations affected by one’s moral failure.
Feeling of Inferiority
In English, the word “ashamed” can be used to express a
general feeling of inferiority (e.g., Leach & Spears, 2008;
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

Smith et al., 2002). Thus, when lay people state that they feel
“ashamed”, they may mean that they feel inferior because they
appraise a failure as indicating a global, and thus unalterable,
self‐defect. When a general feeling of inferiority is not
explicitly assessed, the expression of “shame” may be
confounded with the debilitating feeling of inferiority (Gausel,
Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011). For this reason alone, most
measures of “shame” are ambiguous in meaning. Somewhat
less ambiguous are those measures that purposefully assess
the shame concept as mainly a feeling of inferiority. At least
since Lewis (1971), psychologists have tended to conceptu-
alize a general feeling of inferiority as central to the shame
concept. For example, seven of the 16 items in the TOSCA
scale of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing,
2002) refer to general feelings of inferiority (e.g., “I feel…
like a rat, … stupid, … inadequate”). This fits with Lewis’s
(1971, p.84) argument that “Shame of failure is for an
involuntary event. It results from incapacity.”
Like the appraisal of a global self‐defect to which it is tied,
a general feeling of inferiority views the self as unalterably
defective. Partly because Lewis (1971) viewed a general
feeling of inferiority as central to shame, it made sense for her
to expect shame to promote self‐defensive responses to
failure, such as avoidance, hiding, and covering up. However,
it is the feeling of inferiority embedded in the shame concept
that provides a clearer psychological basis for self‐defensive
responses to failure (for discussions, see Ferguson, 2005;
Leach & Spears, 2008). As one believes that there is little that
one can do to alter the defective self, the feeling of inferiority
drives the motivation to escape the painfully inadequate self
and the failure that indicates one’s inadequacy.
A wide range of research in psychology shows the feeling
of inferiority to be a moderate to strong predictor of
maladaptive responses to failure (for reviews, see Ferguson,
2005; Leach & Spears, 2008). For example, Smith et al.
(2002, Study 4) asked participants to recall a time when they
felt bad about doing something wrong or being inferior.
Feeling angry and vengeful at the time was more highly
correlated to feeling inferior (r = .34) than was feeling
ashamed (r = .23). In a study of chronic individual differences,
O’Connor et al. (1999) showed that the feeling of inferiority
was more strongly associated with maladaptive responses than
“shame.” They found chronic “self‐hate” to be more strongly
correlated to hostility, low self‐esteem, and psychopathology
than the chronic proneness to shame measured by the TOSCA.
Given the debilitating degree of self‐reproach in the feeling
of inferiority, it is also possible that this feeling immobilizes
people (Lewis, 1971). For this reason, Leach and Spears
(2008) describe the pain of inferiority as a state of extreme
passivity that promotes externalized hostility only when easy
opportunities arise. Thus, our model proposes that the feeling
of inferiority has only a tenuous link to self‐defensive
motivation (see Figure 1a).
CONCERN FOR SOCIAL IMAGE
Having others view one as honest, trustworthy, and fair is
important for a moral social image in one’s own eyes
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Rethinking shame 473
(Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Rodriguez Mosquera,
Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008) and in the eyes of others
(see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996). Thus, if a
moral failure threatens to damage one’s social image, it also
threatens to damage one’s “social bond” (Scheff, 2000) to others
(Ahmed et al., 2001; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996).
This is exemplified by the fact that a moral failure can lead
groups to exact social punishment by marginalizing, ostracizing,
or excluding the offender (Braithewaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996).
Thus, our model proposes that those concerned with their social
image can appraise others as likely to condemn them for their
moral failure (see Figure 1a). This form of social marginalization
should be most linked to a painful feeling of rejection against
which people should want to defend themselves.
Appraisal of Other‐condemnation
For some time in sociology, damage to social image has been
central to the shame concept (e.g., Cooley, 1902; for reviews,
see Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000). Despite the fact that
Lewis (1971) is widely referenced as arguing that shame is
intensely self‐focused, she also argued that “The ‘other’ is a
prominent and powerful force in the experience of shame”
(p.41). Thus, she conceptualized shame as, at least partly,
based on concern for social image: “the self is thus divided in
shame; it is experiencing condemnation from the other or from
the field, and it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself”
(p.39, italics added). Lewis’s (1971) emphasis of this appraisal
of other‐condemnation likely followed from the fact that her
research on “shame” was of “neurotic” clients who came to
view their therapists as the “laughing; ridiculing, powerful,
active” other.
A number of recent psychological approaches to the shame
concept include the appraisal of other‐condemnation in
combination with the typical emphasis of global self‐defect
(e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2002). For example,
Iyer et al. (2007) told US and British participants that Iraqis
believed their national character to be corrupt and arrogant.
This manipulation increased the feeling of shame and a
measure akin to the appraisal of other‐condemnation.
However, the manipulation aims to damage both self‐image
and social image, making it impossible to gauge the role of
each in the feeling of shame. Such oscillation between
conceptualizing shame as based on concern for self‐image or
social image is consistent with Lewis’s (1971) insistence that
the shame concept include a variety of appraisals and feelings.
However, folding the appraisal of other‐condemnation into
“shame” obscures the role of social‐image concerns in the
experience of moral failure. As a remedy, our model isolates
the appraisal of other‐condemnation and ties it to the feeling
of rejection in an appraisal–feeling combination that shows a
distinct concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of
others (see Figure 1).
Feeling of Rejection
Lewis (1971) argued that “for shame to occur there must be an
emotional relationship between the person and the ‘other’
such that the person cares what the other thinks or feels about
the self. In this affective tie the self does not feel autonomous
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

474 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W. Leach
or independent, but dependent and vulnerable to rejection”
(p.42). Consistent with this, Scheff and Retzinger (1991)
conceptualize shame as involving feelings of rejection and
rebuff about the threat of social isolation engendered by a
moral or other failure. Even the TOSCA measure of shame
proneness includes “feel alone and apart from…” as an item,
although it does not include a feeling of rejection in its
conceptualization of shame.
Although the feeling of rejection has rarely been explicitly
included in psychological approaches to the shame concept,
psychologists have long viewed the feeling of rejection as
central to the experience of condemnation or other social
devaluation (for a review, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
And, a great deal of research shows that individuals
experience social devaluation as an intensely unpleasant
emotional experience (for reviews, see Baumeister & Leary,
1995; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). In fact, MacDonald and
Leary (2005) reviewed a great deal of evidence that shows the
emotional experience of social devaluation to involve the
same physiological systems as physical pain. Consistent with
this, a great deal of research shows that the feeling of rejection
is extremely debilitating (for reviews, see Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). For instance, in a
meta‐analysis, Gerber and Wheeler (2009) showed experi-
mental manipulations of social exclusion to have moderate to
large effects on self‐esteem, mood, positive affect, and a sense
of control. Although people can describe this feeling as
“shame” (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), it is more accurate to
call it a feeling of rejection or isolation. The label is important
because the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection
combination is a more precise description of the social
psychological basis for self‐defensive motivation.
Self‐defensive Motivation
As reviewed above, the feeling of shame has a small empirical
link to self‐defensive motivation. However, the more
debilitating feeling of rejection, often embedded in the shame
concept, has a more considerable link to self‐defensive
motivation (for a review, see MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
This suggests that felt shame only appears to be linked with
self‐defensive motivation because it is conceptualized and
measured in a way that emphasizes felt rejection. Thus, our
model identifies the other‐condemnation → rejection combi-
nation of appraisal and feeling as a more precise explanation
of self‐defensive motivation than the more general concept of
shame that prevails at present (see Figure 1).
Physical or psychological withdrawal and avoidance can
militate against the appraisal of other‐condemnation and
feeling of rejection by reducing one’s exposure to those
expected to condemn one (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles,
2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011). Thus, one
can prevent further damage to one’s image in the eyes of
others by removing oneself from the scene of failure
(Ferguson, 2005; Thomas, 1997). Given that the damage to
social image is believed done, there is little else that one can
do but defend one’s social image against further damage.
Wikan (2008) offers what we view as an example of the link
between appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection and
self‐defensive motivation. She describes Rahmi Sahindal’s
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motivation for murdering his daughter Fadime for bringing
“shame” on the family by publicizing her relationship with a
non‐Kurdish Swede and the family’s resultant ostracism and
threats of violence. Although Sahindal described his feeling
as shame, he believed that his social image was so damaged
in the eyes of his extended family, community, city, and the
whole of Sweden that “he no longer could bear to get on the
bus between his job and his home; he wanted to move to a
new place. He couldn’t bear going to work” (p.117). This
sounds like a feeling of rejection tied to an appraisal of
widespread moral condemnation.
A damaged social image can also promote self‐defense
through the externalization of the painful feeling of rejection
(Lewis, 1971; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Thus, the appraised
other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination should also
be tied to hostile anger and aggression toward those who can
be blamed for the damage to one’s image in the eyes of others
(Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, 2011a). In their meta‐analysis,
Gerber and Wheeler (2009) found the feeling of rejection to be
linked to anti‐social responses. MacDonald and Leary (2005)
argue that feelings about devaluation lead to aggression when
other forms of self‐defense, such as escape, are not easy. This
seemed to be the case in Rahmi Sahindal’s horrific murder of
his daughter Fadime.
Social Defense of Social Image
A moral failure puts our social relations at risk because it
puts our social image in those relations at risk (Goffman,
1959; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff, 2000). This risk is
real. The damaged social image that can follow from a moral
failure can lead communities to exact material punishment
including starvation, physical isolation, and violence (see
de Waal, 1996). As discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
communities can also exact social punishment for moral
failure, including social marginalization, ostracism, and
exclusion (Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Goffmann,
1959). Fear of this sort of social punishment is the basis for
the feeling of rejection specified in our model. As a poor
social image poses a serious risk to our social relations, we
have good reason to worry about the material and social
consequences of moral failure.
Because the risk is so great, individuals should be
motivated to defend their social image against such potential
damage where possible. Indeed, those who have experienced
or witnessed the feeling of rejection tied to the appraisal of
other‐condemnation should wish to avoid this painful feeling
by engaging in social defense of their image in the eyes of
others. In instances when a moral failure does not yet appear
to have damaged one’s image in the eyes of others, concern
about social image should implicate the self less. This should
make emotion and emotion‐based motivation less likely
(Lazarus, 1991). Instead, individuals should be most focused
on defending their social image from the potential damage
that their moral failure may do to their social relations. This is
most easily done by improving one’s social relations—an
alternative pathway incorporated into our model at the top of
Figure 2. Thus, a moral failure may directly motivate efforts at
social defense of one’s social image when one views the
potential damage to social image as preventable.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

Figure 2. Expanded conceptual model of the experience of moral failure. Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social image; shaded,
bottom half of figure shows concern for self‐image. The core model is shown in dark gray
By expressing a desire to improve one’s relationship with
those affected by one’s moral failure or with the relevant com-
munity, one may pre‐emptively defend one’s social image from
the condemnation that could otherwise follow from a moral fail-
ure. Public statements of responsibility or regret can lead others to
view one as having re‐established one’s moral standing in the
group (Braithwaite, 1989). Expressions of humility may similarly
work as an appeasement strategy that reduces the need for
punishment or condemnation (de Waal, 1996; Keltner & Harker,
1998). This socio‐functional view of the social defense of social
image has been examined in ethological approaches to social
groups. It also fits with a socio‐functional view of emotion. As the
feeling of rejection is highly aversive, people should be motivated
to defend their social image in ways that prevent the appraisal of
other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection. A number of
sociological approaches to the shame concept also emphasize
that the possibility of other‐condemnation can motivate individ-
uals to defend their social image before serious damage is done
(e.g., Braithwaite, 1989; for a review, see Scheff, 2000). For
example, Goffman’s (1959) notion of face‐work suggests that
people engage in social defense of their image in the eyes of
others. Goffman presumes little involvement of the self and thus
gives no pride of place to emotion as a basis of motivation.
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS
Why do some people respond self‐defensively to moral failure
while others respond by wanting to improve themselves and
their social relations? The prevailing view in psychology is
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Rethinking shame 475
that shame promotes self‐defensive motivation, whereas guilt
or remorse promotes more positive motivation. Across sub‐
disciplines of psychology, shame is thought to be based on an
appraisal of global self‐defect and is thus driven by concern
for an irreparably damaged self image. As a result, shame is
thought to motivate people to defend themselves from further
damage to their devastated self image through avoidance or
withdrawal. Although this view is popular, it suffers from
several important problems. Notably, “shame” is only
modestly related to self‐defensive motivation. And, in direct
contrast to the prevailing view, shame is at least as strongly
linked to motivation for self‐improvement and social im-
provement. Thus, we thought it necessary to rethink shame.
We first differentiated the subjective feeling of shame from
the ambiguous concept referred to as “shame” by researchers
and by their research participants. In our view, the feeling of
shame is a dysphoric experience of contrite self‐criticism
about a failure in a domain important to the self‐concept. This
feeling of shame is only one of the numerous appraisals and
feelings embedded in the prevailing concept of shame. Thus,
rather than continuing to conceptualize shame as an
ambiguous admixture, we dissected the concept into two
distinct appraisals and three feelings. Our model proposes how
these elements combine to form distinct experiences of moral
failure. Each experience is suggestive of a distinct motiva-
tional pathway. As such, we offer social psychological
explanations as to why people respond to moral failure with
self‐defensive or self‐improvement motivation. Rather than
invoking the ambiguous experience of “shame”, our model
proposes that people travel down one or the other path
because of a specific pattern of how they appraise and feel
about their moral failure.
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

476 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W. Leach
We were able to distinguish the different pathways in our
model partly because of what each pathway suggests about a
person’s overriding concern in their moral failure. Those most
concerned with their self image are thought most likely to
appraise their moral failure as indicating a defect of the self.
Unlike the prevailing view in psychology, we thought it
important to distinguish the appraisal of global self‐defect,
presumed central to the shame concept, from the appraisal of a
specific self‐defect that seems more appropriate to moral
failure. This more circumscribed appraisal of self‐defect also
seems more likely in non‐clinical populations (Ferguson,
2005). We reviewed theory and research that suggests that
shame is actually tied to an appraisal that one’s self image
suffers a specific self‐defect in need of repair. As self‐
improvement is the most clear and direct way to repair a
damaged self‐image, we reasoned that shame about a specific
self‐defect should best predict self‐improvement motivation
and thus social‐improvement motivation. However, improve-
ment is a more difficult aim for those who appraise a moral
failure as damaging their global self‐image. As a feeling of
ontological inadequacy implies that one’s entire self‐image is
irreparably damaged by a moral failure, it should encourage a
feeling of inferiority. Although people may describe this
experience as a feeling of shame, a feeling of inferiority is a
more accurate conceptualization and description. Inferiority is
a highly unpleasant and intense feeling of self‐criticism that
people wish to be rid of. Thus, as shown in the research we
reviewed above, there is some reason to expect felt inferiority
to predict self‐defensive responses to moral failure. Indeed,
escape and avoidance is a reasonable response to an unalterable
self‐defect. What else can one do but run away? However, given
the debilitating degree of self‐reproach involved in the feeling if
inferiority, it is even more likely that individuals become passive
observers of their fate, unable to flee or do much else besides
reproach themselves (Leach & Spears, 2008).
Rather than attributing the defense of self‐image to shame,
we propose that this motivation is closely linked to a feeling of
rejection. Building on theory and research on the shame
concept and on social exclusion, our model views the feeling
of rejection as tied to the appraisal that a moral failure suggests
that others will condemn one. Thus, this appraisal–feeling
combination indicates a damaged social image and thus social
bonds at serious risk. Given this appraisal and feeling, a self‐
defensive response to moral failure makes most sense. If the
damage to social image is already done, there is little that one
can do to improve it. Instead, individuals focus on trying to
defend their social image against further damage by escaping
condemnation. By identifying the subjective appraisal of
other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection as distinct from
shame, our model explains the social psychological basis
for self‐defensive motivation more precisely than the
ambiguous shame concept.
Guilt?
Because shame is typically thought to promote self‐defensive
motivation, other self‐critical feelings have been tied to self‐
improvement and social‐improvement. Guilt is chief among these
emotions. In fact, a great deal of theory and research in psy-
chology views guilt as the pro‐social antithesis of an anti‐social
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shame concept (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Given this, some may wonder whether our conceptualization of
shame comes too close to the prevailing view of guilt.
We do, in fact, view shame and guilt as closely related
feelings that have a great deal in common (see Gausel, Leach,
Vignoles, 2011b; Leach et al., 2006). However, research has
established a number of small differences between the feelings
(for a review, see Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011).
Most important for the present purposes is that guilt focuses more
narrowly than shame on the appraisal of agency (i.e., causality,
responsibility) for moral failure (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 1994;
Roseman et al., 1994). Thus, as Lewis (1971) argued, the concern
in guilt is the moral failure rather than the self‐image of the failed.
Given this focus on the agency for moral failure, guilt is a likely
motivator of efforts at social improvement that ameliorate the
effects of the moral failure (e.g., Leach et al., 2006; for a
discussion, see Leach et al., 2002). This pathway is shown at the
bottom of the expanded model shown in Figure 2.
As shame shows a greater concern for self‐image than guilt,
shame should be a greater motivation for the improvement of
self‐image. As one’s identity is not implicated in the same way
in guilt as in shame (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007),
guilt may be more easily dealt with by improving the social
consequences of the moral failure for which one appraises
oneself as an agent. In the experience of shame, the agency for
moral failure is appraised as having the more profound
implication of highlighting a specific defect in the self. Thus,
as shown in Figure 2, we view the appraisal of agency as
modestly associated with the appraisal of self‐defect thought to
be central to shame. An example may prove helpful. Because of
a consistent failure to recycle, one may appraise oneself as
contributing to global warming and thus as the agent who caused
this moral failure. However, this appraisal does not imply that
one views oneself as suffering a defect in one’s self‐concept.
What of the Non‐moral?
There are few failures more important to self‐image or social
image than moral failures. Nevertheless, non‐moral failures can
be important. Indeed, much past work has examined “shame”
about failures of competence, such as performing poorly at
work or school. As in moral failure, we believe that
examinations of failures of competence need to distinguish
the feeling of shame from the feeling of inferiority and appraisal
of global self‐defect that are often embedded in the shame
concept. We expect that examinations of competence failure
will show that what has been previously described as “shame”
is actually an appraised (global) self‐defect → felt inferiority
combination. Failures of competence may also encourage
concern for social image, where such failure is important to
one’s view of oneself in a group or community. Thus, self‐
defensiveness may also flow from the appraised other‐
condemnation → felt rejection combination when social‐image
concern drives the experience of failures of competence.
The concept of shame is also used quite often to refer to
peoples’ experience of negative events that are not clearly
about morality or competence and not clearly an example of
failure. For example, shame is often used to describe the
experience of stigmas, such as physical deformity, severe
disability, extremely low status, and rape or other serious
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 468– 478 (2011)

victimization. We believe that dividing the broad concept of
shame into specific appraisals and feelings should aid any
examination of the emotional experience that people refer to
as “shame.” Although a survivor of sexual assault may tell a
therapist that she feels “ashamed,” our model requires an
analysis of this utterance to go beyond the survivor’s or the
therapist’s common‐sense understanding of “shame.” Our
model may be used to examine whether the survivor says that
she is ashamed because she feels that her family or community
will condemn her. Unlike other approaches, our model can
differentiate this concern for serious damage to her social
image from the concern for damage to her self‐image.
Referring to both of these experiences of sexual assault as
“shame” does little to clarify the survivors’ actual experience.
Describing the former experience as felt rejection and the
latter as felt inferiority goes much further in representing the
meaning the event has for the survivor. As such, these more
precise characterizations may better guide how therapists or
loved ones may best engage the experience and how it may be
more carefully and accurately researched.
Methods and Models
Distinguishing the appraisals and feelings that are commonly
embedded within the shame concept enables methodological
approaches that are more flexible and more precise than the
unitary scales that prevail at present. Rather than combining
appraisal, feeling, and motivation into a single scale of
“shame,” we advise the measurement of each individual element
(see Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach,
Vignoles, & Brown, 2011). This allows the direct assessment
of the inter‐relations between measures of appraisal, feeling, and
motivation. Structural Equation Modeling is one excellent way
to simultaneously estimate patterns of covariation to examine
the latent structure of peoples’ experience of moral failure (for a
general discussion, see Leach, 2010). Our studies of moral
failure have provided consistent evidence that our differentiated
model of appraisals, feelings, and motivations is a more
appropriate measurement of the experience of moral failure
than a single, omnibus concept of shame (Gausel, Leach, &
Vignoles, 2011a,b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011).
Examining the experience of moral failure with distinct
appraisals and feelings also allows researchers to validate the
subjective meaning of the feelings that participants express by
tying each feeling to an appraisal that helps define it (for
general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Leach, 2010). Thus,
participants’ expression of felt shame has a specific meaning
when it is especially linked to the appraisal of a specific self‐
defect. If, for some reason, an expressed feeling of shame is
closely linked to an appraisal of global self‐defect, this
particular meaning of “shame” would be evidenced in the
empirical model. In this way, we could know that this
particular expression of shame is equivalent to our concep-
tualization of the feeling of inferiority despite its expression as
“shame.” Thus, our model enables research to distinguish
between participants’ semantic expression of feelings and the
more consistent and considered conceptualization of emotion
required of those who generate theory and conduct research.
As such, our model helps to specify what exactly participants
and researchers mean when they refer to the shame concept.
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Rethinking shame 477
It may also be important to note that our conceptual model
need not be thought of as a simple, unidirectional, causal
model. Although appraisal often does lead to feeling and
motivation, this is not the only causal direction possible.
Based on Lazarus (1991), we prefer to view our conceptual
model as a network of inter‐related elements (for a discussion,
see Leach, 2010). Each element implies its concomitant
elements as well as the motivation that best suits each
combination. Thus, the self‐defensive motivation of avoidance
is implied by a feeling of rejection about an appraisal of other‐
condemnation. This motivation is socially and psychologically
consistent with self‐defensive motivation.
Self ⇔ Social
Our separation of concern for self‐image and social image is
not meant to imply that the two concerns are mutually
opposed. Rather, we wish to suggest that one or the other
concern is prepotent in each feeling in our model. In the
feeling of rejection, for instance, concern for social image is
prepotent; concern for self‐image is secondary. However, one
feels rejection because it is important to one’s self‐concept to
be accepted and valued by others. This is why the appraisal
that others condemn one harms the self and thus feels bad (for
a general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991). Concern for social
image that does not involve the self‐concept is not emotional
in our model. It is experienced as a more purely social concern
for the defense of one’s social image in an effort to avoid the
potential social costs of moral failure (see Figure 2).
Although concern for self‐image is at the heart of felt
shame, it is clear that self‐image is grounded in social relations
regulated by moral standards. More obviously, the moral
failure that precipitates felt shame is typically social in nature.
Moral failures often involve other people who one has
wronged in some way. Thus, the concern for self‐image that is
illustrated in moral shame is inherently social. This is part of
the reason that shame motivates not just improvement of the
self but also improvement of the social relation. If self‐image
is inherently social, then the improvement of self‐image is also
an improvement of social relations.
Because self‐image is inherently social, it is also possible
that concern for self‐image can dovetail with concern for social
image in felt shame. Indeed, individuals are likely to be aware
that improving their self‐image and their social relations is also
likely to improve their social image. It has long been recognized
that others can interpret one’s expression of shame as a signal
that one wishes to improve one’s social image and one’s social
relations (see Braithwaite, 1989; Ferguson et al., 2007; Scheff,
2000) in addition to improving one’s self‐image. As such, the
feeling of shame is an illustrative example of the way in which
the self and the social are bound together in a dynamic whole.
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