Received: 9 October 2019 Revised: 12 December 2019 Accepted: 8 January 2020

DOI: 10.1002/csr.1905

RESEARCH ARTICLE

CEO ability and sustainability disclosures: The mediating

effect of corporate social responsibility performance

Isabel-María García-Sánchez1 | Beatriz Aibar-Guzmán2 |

Cristina Aibar-Guzmán2 | Tânia-Cristina Azevedo3

1
Instituto Multidisciplinar de Empresa &
Departamento Administración y Economía de Abstract
la Empresa, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Combining the postulates of the upper echelons theory and the economic theories of
Campus Miguel de Unamuno, Salamanca,
Spain information disclosure, one might expect that the effect of chief executive officers'
2
Faculdad de Ciencias Económicas y (CEOs') managerial ability on their firms' disclosure policies has both a direct and indi-
Empresariales, Universidad de Santiago
rect nature. The latter would be associated with the mediating role of corporate
Compostela, Santiago Compostela, Spain
3
Departamento de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas, social responsibility (CSR) performance on the relationship between CEOs' ability and
Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana corporate transparency. Using a sample of 956 international firms over the period
(UEFS), Salvador, Bahia, Brazil
2006–2014 (6,442 firm-year observations), we examine the role that the CEO ability
Correspondence plays in determining the relevance of CSR disclosures and whether this role is medi-
Isabel María García-Sánchez, Instituto
Multidisciplinar de Empresa & Departamento ated by CSR performance. By proposing several regression models, we document
Administración y Economía de la Empresa, that more able CEOs are more willing to disclose comparable and useful CSR infor-
Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus
Miguel de Unamuno, Salamanca, Spain. mation that favours stakeholder engagement. This relationship is mediated by the
Email: lajefa@usal.es impact that CEO's ability has over the implementation of sustainability strategies that
improve CSR performance.

KEYWORDS

corporate social responsibility, CSR performance, environmental policy, managerial ability,

sustainability disclosures

1 | I N T RO DU CT I O N other than the concealment of less suitable practices. In this regard,

Parallel to the growth of investment in corporate social responsibility
(CSR) strategies, companies have begun issuing reports of nonfinancial
information on their social and environmental impacts (Amorelli &
García-Sánchez, 2019). However, managers may not or only partially
integrate sustainability into business strategy because it can mean
allocating resources to certain actions that do not favour their inter-
ests (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019). Under this prism, the
voluntary disclosure of CSR information can be used as a mechanism
to manipulate external opinions about the firm's behaviour or to man-
age relationships with a specific group of stakeholders (Braam, de
Weerd, Hauck, & Huijbregts, 2016; Li, Gong, Zhang, & Koh, 2018).
Furthermore, the voluntary disclosure of CSR information, the
elaboration of which comes at a significant cost, can be associated
with the search for complementary positive effects for companies,
the economic theories of voluntary disclosure suggest that there is an
expected direct (positive) relationship between the company's sustain-
able performance and the volume and quality of the CSR information
disclosed by it (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Wang,
Hsieh, & Sarkis, 2018). This relationship would be justified by the pro-
prietary costs theory (Verrecchia, 1983), according to which, from an
economic viewpoint, companies will only disclose voluntary informa-
tion when its benefits outweigh its costs (Aragón-Correa, Marcus, &
Hurtado-Torres, 2016; Depoers, 2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Pre-
ncipe, 2004). This theory requires assuming that companies with the
best CSR practices will report on them to obtain competitive advan-
tages, whereas those with worse CSR indicators will elude providing
this information to avoid a comparison of results that would harm
their reputation (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes Ii, 2004; Clarkson
et al., 2008; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010).

Corp Soc Responsib Environ Manag. 2020;1–13. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/csr © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment 1
2 GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.
Previous literature on transparency in sustainability has mainly
focused on the influence of institutional factors and organisational
attributes (Maak, Pless, & Voegtlin, 2016; Yuan, Tian, Lu, & Yu, 2017).
However, several studies recently showed that the chief executive
officer (CEO) plays a key role in the process of preparing quality finan-
cial information and greatly influences corporate transparency (Lewis,
Walls, & Dowell, 2014; Li et al., 2018). These results are supported by
the upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to
this theory, differences in managers' personal values and cognitive
styles lead them to make distinct decisions, particularly in complex sit-
uations (Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010), such as investment in CSR
strategies (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016).
Considering the key role that the CEO plays in corporate deci-
sions, researchers have analysed the extent to which several CEOs'
demographic and personality attributes (e.g., gender, age, educational
background, experience, personality, political ideology, religious
beliefs, experience, leadership style, power, and media exposure)
affect their companies' decisions regarding CSR investment and
reporting. Thus, some studies document that CEOs' attributes signifi-
cantly influence their firms' CSR strategies (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino,
2013; Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Godos-Díez, Cabeza-García,
Fernández-Gago, & Nieto-Antolín, 2019; Liao, Dong, Weng, & Shen,
2019; Maak et al., 2016; Oh, Chang, & Cheng, 2016; Petrenko et al.,
2016; Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015; Wu, Kwan, Yim, Chiu, & He,
2015), and the associated disclosure policies (Lewis et al., 2014; Li
et al., 2018).
An emerging stream of research has focused its attention on how
CEOs' managerial ability influences their firms' CSR engagement and
performance (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Yuan et al.,
2017). Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, no study has
analysed the relationship between a CEO's ability and CSR disclosure.
This paper aims to fill this gap by analysing whether and how CEOs'
managerial ability plays a role in their firms' decision to disclose rele-
vant CSR information.
Various studies suggest that CEOs' managerial ability is related to
better career prospects and fewer career concerns (Cui, Chen,
Zhang, & Zhu, 2019; Rajgopal, Shevlin, & Zamora, 2006; Yuan et al.,
2017). Under these assumptions, we posit that more able CEOs—who
have fewer career concerns—will show a greater orientation towards
CSR practices, namely, by promoting those procedures that have
greater positive effects on corporate performance (Chatjuthamard,
Jiraporn, Tong, & Singh, 2016; García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero,
2019; Yuan et al., 2017). According to the proprietary costs theory,
these decisions will result in greater commitment to CSR reporting
and increased disclosure of more comparable and useful CSR informa-
tion (Wang et al., 2018). Therefore, CSR practices will play a mediating
role in the effect that the CEO's ability has on sustainability disclosure
policies.
Using a sample of 956 international firms over the period of
2006–2014 (6,442 firm-year observations), this paper aims to exam-
ine the role that CEO ability plays in determining the relevance of
CSR disclosures of a firm and whether this role is mediated by CSR
performance. We find the following evidence: First, greater CEO abil-
ity increases both the socially responsible performance and the rele-
vance of CSR disclosures. Second, CSR practices mediate the
relationship between CEO ability and CSR disclosures quality. Consid-
ering these results together, we can affirm that CEO ability plays a
direct and indirect effect on the relevance of CSR disclosures.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, its
findings enrich the CSR literature by identifying a new driver of CSR
disclosure—CEOs' managerial ability—whose influence has not been
previously analysed. Specifically, we show that able/talented CEOs
develop specific management styles that promote voluntary disclo-
sure of CSR information and the adoption of international standards
(Bamber et al., 2010) in order to manage relationships with stake-
holders and prevent investors from withdrawing their trust in the
company. These parameters allow CEOs to avoid corporate reputation
losses (Lewis et al., 2014; Maak et al., 2016).
Second, this study contributes to the research on the effects of
CEOs' managerial ability on their firms by extending and reinforcing
prior research that has mainly focused on different facets of the firms'
performance. This study shows that differences in CEOs' managerial
ability result in different levels of CSR engagement and CSR perfor-
mance as well as differences in CSR reporting. These findings extend
the understanding of the implications of CEOs' managerial ability.
Specifically, we demonstrate that the ability of the CEO positively
impacts corporate transparency on CSR—both directly and indirectly—
through its influence on CSR performance.
Third, from a theoretical point of view, this study combines two
different theoretical frameworks—a managerial theory (upper eche-
lons theory) and an economic-based theory of voluntary disclosure
(proprietary costs theory)—to explain the influence of CEOs' manage-
rial ability on CSR disclosure. As far as we know, such theories have
not been previously linked in the CSR literature. This aspect provides
a new conceptual basis to develop research hypotheses and interpret
results regarding the direct and indirect effect that CEOs' managerial
ability plays on the relevance of CSR disclosure.
Finally, this study adds exploratory evidence by adopting an
international approach—encompassing 28 countries—rather than a
single-country or two-region approach (e.g., Chatjuthamard et al.,
2016; Yuan et al., 2017; both focused on U.S. firms). Furthermore,
examining the period from 2006 to 2014, rather than a single year,
allows us to update the time frame hitherto analysed. Methodologi-
cally, unlike previous studies that adopted descriptive analysis
(i.e., deductive content analysis or survey instruments), we employ
econometric models based on dependency techniques for
panel data.
This paper contains four main sections. Following this introduc-
tion, the second section reviews the literature and presents the devel-
opment of the research hypotheses. The third section sets out the
empirical framework of the study. The fourth section summarises and
discusses the results. Finally, the last section presents the main con-
clusions and implications of our study, its limitations, and possible
future extensions.
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.
2 | L I T E R A T U RE R E V I E W A N D R E S E A R C H
HYPOTHESES
2.1 | CSR and managerial ability
The effect of managerial ability on CSR has its rationale in the upper
echelons theory, according to which differences in CEOs' attributes
and skills determine the variety in their companies' strategic decisions
and performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). CEOs' managerial ability
is associated with a better understanding of their firms' functioning
and performance drivers (Cui et al., 2019; García-Sánchez & Martínez-
Ferrero, 2019) and, consequently, a better use of organisational
resources (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, & McVay, 2013) and a higher capa-
bility to assess potential business opportunities and investment pro-
jects and deal with uncertainty (Yuan et al., 2017). Accordingly,
managerial ability affects the way CEOs interpret and react to the
same environmental stimuli (Tang et al., 2015) by making them more
likely to adopt innovative strategies (Chen, Podolski, & et al., 2016), who enjoy discretion about the decision of disclosing and
Veeraraghavan, 2015) and take risks (Yung & Chen, 2018).
To the extent that the CEO's ability increases, he or she is more
valued by the labour market (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). Conse-
quently, CEOs' managerial ability is related with better career pros-
pects and fewer career concerns (Cui et al., 2019; Yuan et al., 2017).
In this regard, prior research stresses the close link between manage-
rial ability and the CEO's career concerns and the strong influence of
the latter on her or his strategic decisions (García-Sánchez & Martí-
nez-Ferrero, 2019). Indeed, as these concerns rise, CEOs will attempt
to demonstrate their managerial ability to the labour market to gain
recognition and enhance their reputation (Cui et al., 2019). Therefore,
less capable CEOs—who have more career concerns—will prefer those
investment projects that involve lower risks and whose potential gains
can be obtained in the short term, at the expense of long-term invest-
ments with uncertain outcomes (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Fer-
rero, 2019).
Considering that CSR strategy often implies a long-term focus
with uncertain potential results, CEOs' ability positively influences
their firms' CSR engagement (Yuan et al., 2017). To the extent that
able managers feel less pressured to demonstrate their ability to the
labour market, they are more willing to foster CSR projects despite
the uncertainty associated and their long-term outcome (Rajgopal
et al., 2006). In this sense, prior research found a positive associa-
tion between CEO's managerial ability and CSR investments and
performance (Yuan et al., 2017; García-Sánchez & Martínez-Fer-
rero, 2019).
Drawing on such results, we posit that more able CEOs have a
greater incentive for CSR investments. Furthermore, due to their
greater knowledge and skills, able CEOs will select better CSR pro-
jects, a decision that will maximise shareholders' wealth and allocate
value resources to society (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019;
Tang et al., 2015). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1 There is a positive relationship between CEO ability and CSR
performance.
3
2.2 | Corporate transparency and managerial
ability
Several studies recognise the influence of the CEO on her or his
company's disclosure policies and the quality of the disclosed financial
information (Demerjian et al., 2013). Likewise, the CEOs' personal
attributes significantly influence corporate transparency and the qual-
ity of information voluntarily disclosed by their companies (Bamber
et al., 2010). Regarding the influence of managerial ability on the vol-
untary disclosure of information, due to their greater knowledge about
their companies' functioning and performance drivers, able CEOs can
better interpret and respond to the pressures from the economic and
competitive environment (Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2010; Hui &
Matsunaga, 2015). This factor leads to a positive association between
CEOs' managerial ability and voluntary disclosure (Cui et al., 2019).
Given its voluntary nature, CSR disclosure is influenced by the
choices, motives, and values of CEOs (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Maak
the reports' content and scope (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero,
2019; Maak et al., 2016). In this sense, some studies have confirmed
the influence of several CEO's characteristics on CSR disclosure
(Lewis et al., 2014; Li et al., 2018).
According to the upper echelon theory, CEOs' managerial ability
moulds “the lens through which they view current strategic opportu-
nities and problems” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 200). Therefore,
we posit that able CEOs have a greater capacity to deal with powerful
stakeholders' demands and to determine the political and social costs
that would entail not attending to them. In addition, when such
demands are met through efficient investments in CSR (García-
Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019), able CEOs know that they should
voluntarily disclose information on these dimensions of corporate per-
formance. They view this disclosure as a key tool to manage relation-
ships with stakeholders and reduce such costs (Li et al., 2018).
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2 There is a positive relationship between CEO ability and the rele-
vance of the disclosed CSR information.
2.3 | The mediating role of CSR performance
According to the proprietary costs theory, there is a positive relation-
ship between the companies' social and environmental performance
and voluntary disclosure of CSR information. Specifically, companies
with better CSR performance use voluntary CSR disclosure as a
means to obtain competitive advantages. On the contrary, a worse
social and environmental performance would lead companies to not
disclose information about CSR so as to not harm their competitive
position (Prado-s & García-Sánchez, 2010).
However, studies on this subject provide inconsistent results
(Aragón-Correa et al., 2016; Braam et al., 2016). Some researchers
found a positive association between environmental performance and
the environmental disclosure level (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson
4 GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.
et al., 2008; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, & LaGorea, 2013; Luo & Tang,
2014; Ahmadi & Bouri, 2017; Luo et al., 2018). On the other hand,
other authors documented a negative association, with the worst per-
forming companies being the ones that would disclose the most infor-
mation (Aragón-Correa et al., 2016; Bewley & Li, 2000; Braam et al.,
2016; Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Cormier, Ledoux, &
Magnan, 2011), whereas others found no association between CSR
reporting and environmental performance (Brammer & Pavellin, 2008;
Ingram & Frazier, 1980). Finally, other studies reported a mixed rela-
tionship, depending on the industry (Cho & Patten, 2007; Hughes,
Anderson, & Golden, 2001), the means used to disclose environmental
information (Aerts & Cormier, 2009), or the measures employed
(Cormier & Magnan, 1999).
Following the theoretical approaches of the previous subsections,
those companies led by CEOs with greater ability will have a better
CSR performance and will disclose quantitative data on CSR perfor-
mance indicators. This disclosure will allow them to positively affect
their image as well market value (Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez,
2010). Conversely, companies led by less able CEOs, who are, conse-
quently, less socially responsible, will avoid disclosing CSR information
that may cause a comparative grievance with the highest performers
and the resulting disadvantages. Thus, we posit a mediating relation-
ship of CSR performance on the relationship between the CEOs' abil-
ity and the relevance of the CSR information disclosed by their
company. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3 There is a mediating effect of CSR performance on the relation-
ship between CEO's ability and the relevance of CSR informa-
tion disclosed.
3 | M E TH O DO LO GY
3.1 | Sample and data description
The data for this study resulted from a combination of information
available in two databases for the period 2006–2014. First, archival
data were collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. We considered
information on all the firms from the global benchmark stock indices
from America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa and Asia, compris-
ing 3,594 companies from 31 stock indices, after duplicated compa-
nies were removed. Second, we combined the firms' social and
environmental performance from the Ethical Investment Research
Service (EIRIS) database. After excluding observations with missing
financial, economic, and CSR information, we obtained a final sample
of 6,442 firm-year observations (956 firms). The firms belong to dif-
ferent sectors and are from 28 different countries: Australia, Belgium,
Bermuda, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). The sample is unbalanced because not all compa-
nies were represented in all periods.
3.2 | Variables
3.2.1 | CSR disclosures
The dependent variable (DIVULCSR) measures the relevance of CSR
information disclosed by the sample's companies. To compute its
value, we performed content analysis of the reports and compared
the CSR reports with the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines' stan-
dards. We developed an index that assesses the relevance (compara-
bility and utility) of the information disclosed by each company in its
CSR reports, assigning each one a value between 0 and 100 (see
Table 1). In this way, compared with other measures, our index has a
broader scope because it covers all significant aspects of sustainabil-
ity, regardless of whether they reflect negative data or nonoptimal sit-
uations. Furthermore, the information is expressed in both numerical
and monetary terms, a feature that facilitates its comparison.
3.2.2 | CSR performance
CSR performance (CSR) was measured using the EIRIS database score,
which has been widely used in the literature (i.e., Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, Rodríguez-Ariza, García-Sánchez, & Martínez-Ferrero,
2017; García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019). The EIRIS score is a
multidimensional construct that encompasses all the social and envi-
ronmental activities performed by firms. It includes strength ratings
and concern ratings for five dimensions across 26 issues: environmen-
tal, employees, human rights, stakeholders, and ethics.
3.2.3 | Managerial ability
Following prior studies (Chatjuthamard et al., 2016; Demerjian et al.,
2013; García-Sánchez, Hussain, & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Yuan et al.,
2017), we measured managerial ability (CEOAbility) using Demerjian,
Lev, and McVay's (2012) measure, which captures how efficiently
managers employ their firms' resources. Such a measure indicates that
managers who are more able will generate a higher rate of output
from the given inputs compared with less able managers, who will
produce the opposite result. Demerjian et al. (2012) calculated a data
envelopment analysis score, which estimates firm efficiency within
industries, by comparing the sales generated by each company (the
output) conditioned to the following inputs: cost of sold goods; selling
and administrative expenses; net property, plant, and equipment; net
operating leases; net research and development (R&D); purchased
goodwill; and other intangible assets.
3.2.4 | Control variables
According to previous studies on CSR and financial performance, we
included several control variables (firm-, board- and CEO-level
aspects) to avoid biased results. The firm-level control variables
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 5

TABLE 1 Relevance of CSR information (“DIVULCSR”)

Values CSR memory's characteristics

0 point Companies that do not disclose information about CSR
Usefulness of CSR information
5–10 points Companies that disclose information about the employees' conditions and human rights.
5–10 points Companies that disclose information about business ethics.
5–10 points Companies that disclose information about the community and other stakeholders.
5–10 points Companies that disclose information about environmental issues.
Comparability of CSR information
20 points Companies that disclose CSR information adapted to level C of the GRI's guidelines. They would be very basic reports in which, at
least, the following information would be incorporated:
Disclosure profile: Epigraphs 1.1; 2.1–2.10; 3.1–3.8; 3.10–3.12; 4.1–4.4; 4.14–4.15.
Disclosures about the management report: Not required.
Performance indicators and sector specific performance indicators (sector supplement): at least 10 of any of the performance
indicators, including at least one of each of the following aspects: social, economic and environmental. Performance indicators
can be selected from any completed sectorial supplement, but 7 of those 10 must be from the original GRI guide.
40 points Companies that disclose CSR information adapted to level B/in accordance core of the GRI's guidelines. They would be more
complete and medium quality reports, in which, at least, the following information would be incorporated:
Disclosure profile: Epigraphs 1.1–1.2; 2.1–2.10; 3.1–3.13; 4.1–4.17.
Disclosures about the management report: For each category of indicators.
Performance indicators and sector specific performance indicators (sector supplement): at least 20 of any of the performance
indicators, including at least one of each of the following aspects: economic, environmental, human rights, labour, social, and
product responsibility. Performance indicators can be selected from any completed sectorial supplement, but 13 of those 20
must be from the original GRI guide.
60 points Companies that disclose CSR information adapted to level A/in accordance comprehensive of the GRI's guidelines. They would be
very advanced and high-quality reports, in which, at least, the following information:
Disclosure profile: Epigraphs 1.1–1.2; 2.1–2.10; 3.1–3.13; 4.1–4.17.
Disclosures about the management report: For each category of indicators.
Performance indicators and sector specific performance indicators (sector supplement): all the basic and sector specific
performance indicators.

Note: Own elaboration based on the information from the GRI and the EIRIS database.

include “Size,” as the natural logarithm of total assets that represents
firm size; “ROA,” as the ratio of return on assets that represents firm
profitability; and “Leverage,” as the ratio of total debt to total equity
that represents firm leverage. Considering that firms with higher R&D
expenses invest more in CSR and firms with more cash can afford to
conduct additional CSR activities (Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015), we
also controlled for R&D intensity (R&D), as the ratio of R&D expenses
to sales, and cash (StdCFO), as the standard deviation of cash flow
from operations from t − 1 to t. We controlled for cash dividends
(Div), as the dividend-paying firms, because they are associated with a
better CSR performance (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014). We also con-
trolled for the existence of asymmetric information problems (AI),
computed as the absolute value of real earnings per share, minus the
median expected earnings per share and adjusted for the share price
(Martínez-Ferrero, Villarón-Peramato, & García-Sánchez, 2017), as
well as the level of financial constraints (KZ_index), measured using
the KZ index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
Regarding the board characteristics, we included board size
(BoardSize), as the total number of directors; board independence
(BoardIndep), as the ratio of independent directors to total directors
of the board; and “BoardFemale,” as the percentage of female direc-
tors. For CEO-level controls, we included three variables:
“CEODuality,” a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of
the board and 0 otherwise; “CEOFemale,” a gender dummy that
equals 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; and “CEOTenure,”
which measures the number of years a CEO has occupied that
position.
To identify the effect of institutional pressures at the country
level (i.e., García-Sánchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, & Frías-Aceituno,
2016), four variables were included that measure the level of orienta-
tion towards stakeholders in each country (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, &
Yang, 2014). These variables identify the existence of civil law coun-
tries (“CivilLaw”), the degree of protection of human and labour rights
(“StakeLaw”), the degree of compulsory CSR disclosure (“CSRLaw”),
and the strength (independence and professionalism) of the judicial
system (“Enforcement”). Finally, to control for variation across time,
country, and industry, we included year, country, and industry cate-
gorical variables (García-Sánchez, 2019).
3.3 | Model and analysis technique
To determine the existence of a mediating effect—which supposes
the existence of a direct and an indirect relationship between
6 GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.

TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics

Panel A. Full sample Panel B. Higher vs. lower ability CEOs

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

DivulCSR 26.431 19.921 DivulCSR 27.150 19.566 25.327 20.415
CSR 35.668 16.838 CSR 38.550 15.958 32.386 17.213
CEOAbility 0.782 0.010 CEOAbility 0.788 0.006 0.776 0.014
Size 5.276 1.648
ROA 0.065 0.732
Leverage 0.578 0.191 Panel C. Higher vs. lower CSR performance
R&D 0.028 0.132 Mean SD Mean SD
StdCFO 0.009 0.008 DivulCSR 20.465 2.500 17.245 14.856
Div 20.4 33.648 CSR 50.053 9.251 21.288 8.229
KZ_index 0.027 0.645 CEOAbility 0.781 0.007 0.783 0.013
IA 0.304 1.030
BoardSize 11.037 3.177 Panel D. Higher vs. lower DivulCSR
BoardActivity 17.207 9.423 Mean SD Mean SD
BoardIndep 0.633 0.286 DivulCSR 44.720 17.302 13.255 7.242
BoardDiversity 0.134 0.110 CSR 41.701 16.069 33.642 16.606
CEODuality 0.357 0.479 CEOAbility 0.784 0.010 0.782 0.009
CEOFemale 0.341 0.474
CEOTenure 7.339 3.828

Note: N = 6,442 firm-year observations.

independent and dependent variables—it is necessary to implement Step 2. Models (2a) and (2b) determine how the independent and
the three steps proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177): “first, mediator variables (CEOAbility and CSR) separately impact on the
regressing the mediator on the independent variable; second, dependent variable (DivulCSR).
regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable; and
third, regressing the dependent variable on both the independent and
on mediator.” X
9 X
16
DivulCSRit = α0 + α1 CEOAbilityit + αj Boardit + αk Firmt
j=2 k = 10
Step 1. Model (1) identifies the effect of the independent variable
X
20
(CEOAbility) on the potential mediator variable (CSR), including three + αl Institutionalt + α21 Country + α22 Industry + α23 Year + μit + ηi:
vectors for several board, firms, and institutional characteristics to l = 17
ð2aÞ
avoid biasing the results.

X
9 X
16
DivulCSRit = γ 0 + γ 1 CSRit + γ j Boardit + γ k Firmt +
X
9 X
16 j=2 k = 10
CSRit = β0 + β1 CEOAbilityit + βj Boardit + βk Firmt
j=2 k = 10
X
20
γ l Institutionalt + γ 21 Country + γ 22 Industry + γ 23 Year + μit + ηi : ð2bÞ
l = 17
X
20
+ βl Institutionalt + β21 Country + β22 Industry + β23 Year + μit + ηi :
l = 17 The parameters α and γ are the estimated coefficients from the
ð1Þ
constant and each of the explanatory variables included in models (2a)
and (2b), respectively.
In model (1), i ranges from company 1 to 956 and t takes the
value of the year from 2006 to 2014. The parameters β are the esti- Step 3. Model (3) considers how the two variables (CEOAbility and
mated coefficients from the constant and each of the explanatory var- CSR) jointly impact the dependent variable (DivulCSR). Two condi-
iables included in model (1). tions should be met: The effect of the independent variable
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 7

TABLE 3 Correlations matrix

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 DivulCSR 1
2 CSR .3915*** 1
3 CEOAbility −.0457** .1219*** 1
4 Size −.0212 .0804*** .0775*** 1
5 ROA .0115 −.0247* .0949*** −.0048 1
6 Leverage .013 .0019 .0141 −.0022 −.0042 1
7 R&D −.0382* −.0515*** −.0168 −.001 −.0131 −.0011 1
8 StdCFO −.0146 −.1011*** −.0521** −.0043 .1776*** .0104 −.1246***
9 Div .0019 .0565*** .0337*** .0301*** .0362*** −.0204* .0125
10 Z_Score −.0595*** −.0695*** −.0722*** −.0293*** .3685*** −.0046 −.0125
11 KZ_index −.0537* −.0428** −.0156 −.0128 .0139 −.0026 −.0029
12 IA −.0118 −.0305** .0042 −.0129 .0001 .0003 .0004
13 BoardSize .0933*** .2512*** .246*** .1121*** .0413*** .0077 −.0174
14 BoardActivity .1544*** −.0395*** −.19*** −.0504*** −.0095 −.0007 .0247**
15 BoardIndep −.0394* −.1499*** −.1171*** −.0169* .0544*** −.0036 .0053
16 BoardDiversity .091*** .1409*** −.007 .0266** −.001 −.0194* −.0195*
17 BoardExperience −.0884*** −.1919*** −.0394*** −.0101 .055*** −.003 −.0044
18 CEODuality −.1273*** −.0782*** .0755*** .0288*** −.0055 .0054 −.0092
19 CEOFemale −.1066*** −.0436*** .0205* .0207** −.0296*** .0047 .0124
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
8 StdCFO 1
9 Div .0244 1
10 Z_Score .1491*** −.0042 1
11 KZ_index −.0181 .0221 −.016 1
12 IA −.0084 .0151 −.0202* .008 1
13 BoardSize −.0342** .0042 −.02** −.007 .0019 1
14 BoardActivity −.0201 .0791*** −.0157 .045** .0059 −.256*** 1
15 BoardIndep .0254 −.092*** .043*** −.0429** −.0253** −.1815*** −.0159
16 BoardDiversity −.0941*** −.0193* −.0731*** −.0306* −.0041 .1071*** −.0324***
17 BoardExperience .0172 −.0249** .07*** −.0352** −.0157 −.0095 −.0591***
18 CEODuality −.0481*** −.0431*** .0171* .0166 .0013 .0899*** −.2974***
19 CEOFemale −.0292* −.0465*** .021** −.0243 0.001 .0929*** −.2352***
15 16 17 18 19
15 BoardIndep 1
16 BoardDiversity .3026*** 1
17 BoardExperience .2644*** .1008*** 1
18 CEODuality .1966*** .069*** .2152*** 1
19 CEOFemale .1117*** .0526*** .2548*** .462*** 1

Note: N = 6,442 firm-year observations.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

(CEOAbility) on the dependent variable must be less in this step than The parameters δ are the estimated coefficients from the con-
in the preceding step, and the mediator (CSR) must be statistically stant and each of the explanatory variables included in model (3).
significant. The econometric models are based on dependence techniques
for panel data, that is, repeated observations of the cross section of
companies over time. Panel data models provide greater consistency
X
10 X
17
and explanatory power by considering several periods. This technique
DivulCSRit = δ0 + δ1 CEOAit + δ2 CSRit + δj Boardit + δk Firmt
j=3 k = 11 allowed us to control for unobservable heterogeneity and enhanced
both econometric specifications and parameter estimations. We used
X
21
+ δl Institutionalt + δ22 Country + δ23 Industry + δ24 Year + μit + ηi : the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
l = 18 based on the generalised method of moments (GMM), and concretely
ð3Þ
utilised the two-step system estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991)
8 GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.

TABLE 4 Results for basic empirical models

CSR DIVULRSC
Variables
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3

Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)

CSR 31.38*** 80.76***
(1.268) (8.285)
CEOAbility 118.0*** 0.718*** 0.623***
(8.721) (0.0353) (0.0296)
Size 4.43e-05 −0.000108 4.31e-05*** −0.000261***
(0.000129) (8.29e-05) (1.36e-05) (7.61e-05)
ROA 2.32e-10*** 2.41e-10*** −1.03e-10*** 2.83e-10***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage −0.00374 −0.00572 0.000387*** −0.00981*
(0.00343) (0.00633) (7.99e-06) (0.00562)
R&D 74.94*** 44.70*** −2.757 53.33***
(11.54) (14.86) (1.756) (15.10)
StdCFO 3.24e-10*** 5.92e-10*** −2.32e-10*** 4.91e-10**
(6.09e-11) (1.88e-10) (0.000) (1.91e-10)
Div 1.81e-10*** 2.33e-10*** −1.99e-10*** 2.64e-10***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KZ_index 76,389 133,465 −0.408*** 267,469
(109,579) (201,866) (0.00611) (179,051)
IA −1.72e-08*** −1.95e-08*** 2.77e-09*** −2.18e-08***
(8.53e-10) (1.48e-09) (2.81e-10) (1.48e-09)
BoardSize 0.564*** 0.340*** −0.419*** 0.594***
(0.0439) (0.0762) (0.0144) (0.0591)
BoardActivity 1.475*** 0.968*** −0.458*** 0.644***
(0.265) (0.310) (0.0428) (0.239)
BoardIndep 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.0850*** 0.178***
(0.0160) (0.0182) (0.00267) (0.0161)
BoardDiversity 0.303*** 0.377*** −0.117*** 0.383***
(0.0495) (0.0457) (0.00267) (0.0453)
CEODuality 2.901*** 4.017*** 2.283*** 4.134***
(0.296) (0.334) (0.0845) (0.435)
CEOFemale −1.266** −1.583*** −1.153*** −1.771***
(0.590) (0.430) (0.0757) (0.464)
CEOTenure 0.313*** 0.502*** 0.0676*** 0.579***
(0.0575) (0.0545) (0.0215) (0.0546)
CivilLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CSRLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
StakeLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Enforcement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controlled by country, industry, and year
z 122,000.00 168,000.00 118,939.10 142,000.00
m1 −3.28 −2.26 −2.46 −2.45
m2 −1.04 0.45 0.15 0.38
Hansen 208.70 67.79 60.37 65.36

Note: N = 6,442 firm-year observations. Estimated coefficients and associated standard errors are reported. z is a Wald test of the joint significance of the
reported coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ 2 under the null hypothesis of no relationship, degrees of freedom and significance in parentheses. mi
(m1 and m2) is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation. Hansen is a test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ 2 under the null hypothesis of noncorrelation between the
instruments and the error term; degrees of freedom and significance in parentheses.
*p < .10.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL. 9

TABLE 5 Complementary results

Utility Comparability

Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3

CSR 37.69*** 31.46*** 110.1*** 117.2***
(1.405) (1.978) (6.122) (6.161)
CEOAbility 0.321*** 0.311*** 0.159*** 0.139***
(0.00718) (0.00934) (0.0113) (0.0169)
Size −0.0003*** −0.0002*** −0.0003*** −0.0004*** −0.0004*** −0.0004***
(1.65e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.97e-05) (3.22e-05) (4.19e-05) (6.12e-05)
ROA −5.81e-11*** −1.03e-10*** −8.44e-11*** 1.92e-10*** 7.65e-11*** 1.01e-10***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage −0.000269*** −0.000238*** −0.000257*** −0.00162*** −0.00147*** −0.00147***
(5.28e-06) (5.62e-06) (6.27e-06) (2.70e-05) (2.12e-05) (3.19e-05)
R&D 16.75*** 19.62*** 16.87*** −3.455 −2.924 −5.445**
−2.152 −1.916 −2.433 −2.712 −2.395 −2.699
StdCFO 1.65e-10*** 0.001*** 1.45e-10*** −8.06e-10*** −9.22e-10*** −7.37e-10***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (1.16e-10) (7.93e-11) (1.14e-10)
Div −0.001** −7.30e-11*** −0.001*** −7.76e-11*** −9.30e-11*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
KZ_index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120*** −0.318*** −0.310***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0184) (0.0170) (0.0298)
IA −9.94e-10*** −5.00e-10* -1.19e-10 1.75e-08*** 1.79e-08*** 1.74e-08***
(2.70e-10) (3.01e-10) (2.45e-10) (5.26e-10) (7.82e-10) (6.14e-10)
BoardSize 0.160*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.434*** 0.357*** 0.457***
(0.0123) (0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0320) (0.0313) (0.0452)
BoardActivity 0.879*** 0.798*** 0.915*** −2.696*** −2.774*** −2.210***
(0.0423) (0.0732) (0.0608) (0.126) (0.0524) (0.191)
BoardIndep 0.00362 0.00328 0.00584*** 0.209*** 0.224*** 0.187***
(0.00285) (0.00252) (0.00172) (0.00775) (0.00832) (0.0123)
BoardDiversity 0.00574 −0.0583*** −0.00166 0.128*** 0.137*** 0.146***
(0.00583) (0.00578) (0.00588) (0.0114) (0.00651) (0.0104)
CEODuality −0.403*** −0.453*** −0.476*** 1.540*** 2.381*** 1.826***
(0.0586) (0.0639) (0.0933) (0.128) (0.140) (0.154)
CEOFemale −0.0419 −0.410*** −0.0434 0.732*** 0.838*** 0.420***
(0.0317) (0.0519) (0.0632) (0.0815) (0.0944) (0.139)
CEOTenure 0.0547*** 0.0683*** 0.0546*** 0.0541** 0.0244 0.0799***
(0.00906) (0.00822) (0.0109) (0.0241) (0.0309) (0.0293)
CivilLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CSRLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
StakeLaw 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Enforcement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controlled by country, industry, and year
z
m1
m2
Hansen

Note: N = 6,442 firm-year observations. Estimated coefficients and associated standard errors are reported. z is a Wald test of the joint significance of the
reported coefficients, asymptotically distributed as χ 2 under the null hypothesis of no relationship. mi (m1 and m2) is a serial correlation test of order i using
residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test of overidentifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ 2 under the null hypothesis of noncorrelation between the instruments and the error term; degrees of freedom
and significance in parentheses.
*p < .10.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
10
because it is the most suitable estimator (Alonso-Borrego &
Arellano, 1999).
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive results
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for the full
sample (panel A), as well as for the sample split into higher versus
lower CEO ability (panel B), CSR performance (panel C), and CSR dis-
closures (panel D). The variable “CSR” showed a mean value around
36 points (±16.838). On average, this value was higher when CEO
ability and CSR disclosures were higher. “CEOAbility,” with a mean
value of 0.782, and “DivulCSR,” with a mean value of 26.431, were
higher when subsamples were considered according to higher (lower)
values of the CEO ability, CSR performance, and the relevance of the
CSR disclosures. The descriptive results for the other variables appear
to be reasonable and comparable with those in previous studies.
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between dependent, inde-
pendent, and control variables. The coefficients suggest that there
were no collinearity problems.
4.2 | Multivariate results
In Table 4, we present the results of the GMM regression models used
to test the proposed relationships. For each explanatory variable, we
reported the coefficient and the standard error associated with each
coefficient. Model (1) presents the results for the relationship
between CEO, managerial ability, and firms' CSR. Consistent with our
predictions, there was a significant and positive effect of CEO ability
on CSR performance (coef. 118.0, p < .01). These results suggest that
CEO ability increases the socially responsible practices and decreases
the firm's irresponsible behaviour. Accordingly, we can support H1.
This result is consistent with that of Yuan et al. (2017) and García-
Sánchez and Martínez-Ferrero (2019).
In relation to the effect of the CEO ability on CSR disclosures,
model (2a) reflects that this attribute positively impacted the rele-
vance of the firms' sustainability reports (coef. 0.718, p < .01). Model
(2b) revealed that CSR performance had a positive impact on the
dependent variable (DivulCSR; coef. 31.38, p < .01). When we consid-
ered these effects jointly (model 3), we observed that both CEOAbility
(coef. 0.623, p < .01) and CSR (coef. 80.76, p < .01) enhanced the rele-
vance of CSR disclosures.
To examine the mediating effect of CSR performance on the CEO
ability–CSR disclosures relationship, we examined the value and sig-
nificance of the variables' coefficients in models (2a), (2b), and (3). In
all regressions, the independent variable (CEOAbility) and the media-
tor (CSR) were significant at a confidence level of 99%. Additionally,
the effect of the independent variable (CEOAbility) on the dependent
variable was smaller in model (3) (coef. 0.623, p < .01) compared with
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.
model (2a) (coef. 0.718, p < .01). Based on these data, we accept H2
and H3.
From the above findings, we can state that more able CEOs
improve corporate transparency by disclosing more relevant CSR
information. This relationship is both direct and indirect through the
implementation of CSR strategies that lead to greater CSR
performance.
4.3 | Complementary results: Comparability and
utility
Based on the approach of García-Sánchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, and
Sepúlveda (2014), two key attributes (utility and comparability) can be
highlighted in relation to the voluntary disclosure of CSR information.
According to research conducted in 2013 by Prince's Accounting for
Sustainability Project (A4S) and the Global Reporting Initiative,
commissioned by Radley Yeldar, these characteristics are the main
ones that analysts and investors value in nonfinancial disclosures.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider these two variables as a
complementary analysis to the main research. Utility refers to the
level of adequacy of the disclosed information to its users' needs,
whereas comparability implies that the information disclosed by a
company can be analysed comparatively with that of other
organisations.
Table 5 shows the results of models (2a), (2b), and (3) for the
dependent variables Utility and Comparability, as a breakdown of
DivulCSR. The results were similar to those obtained in the main anal-
ysis. This finding indicates the positive impact that CEOAbility and
CSR variables have on the utility and comparability of CSR disclosures.
Furthermore, the mediating effect of CSR was maintained for both
dimensions. Finally, comparing the coefficients between the different
regressions of model (3), we can assert that the direct impact of
CEOAbility was higher for Utility (coef. 0.311, p < .01) compared with
Comparability (coef. 0.139, p < .01), whereas the mediating role of
CSR was stronger for Comparability (coef. 117.2, p < .01) compared
with Utility (coef. 31.46, p < .01).
5 | CONC LU SIONS
Using a sample of 956 international firms over the period of
2006–2014, this paper aimed to examine the role that CEO ability
plays in determining the relevance of CSR disclosures of a firm and
whether this role is mediated by CSR performance. By proposing sev-
eral regression models using the GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991), we found the following insights. As proposed, CEO abil-
ity positively impacts CSR performance. Concretely, a greater CEO
ability increases the resources allocated to socially responsible
strengths while reducing irresponsible investments. In addition, more
able CEOs show a greater focus on promoting more relevant CSR dis-
closures that favour stakeholder engagement. This effect is both
GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ ET AL.
direct and indirect, the latter associated with the mediating effect that
higher CSR performance plays over disclosures policies.
Our paper contributes to the previous literature by identifying a
new driver of CSR disclosure—CEOs' managerial ability—whose influ-
ence has not been previously analysed. Furthermore, our findings
extend the understanding of the implications of CEOs' managerial
ability on corporate decisions for disclosing CSR information. Thus,
this study informs the upper echelons theory and links it to an
economic-based theory of voluntary disclosure (i.e., the proprietary
cost theory) and provides a new conceptual perspective to explain the
effect that CEOs' managerial ability has on CSR reporting. Finally, this
study complements prior empirical evidence by using a panel dataset
(28 countries from 2006 to 2014), a design that allows for comparison
between countries and years.
This paper's findings have several practical implications for firms,
investors, and policy makers. First, our findings indicate that the
CEO's managerial ability has a positive impact on corporate transpar-
ency regarding CSR. This transparency leads to more relevant sustain-
ability disclosures, which, in turn, enhance the firm's reputation and its
relationships with stakeholders. Thus, firms should be aware of the
importance of “choosing the CEO well” (Weng & Chen, 2017, p. 224).
Accordingly, to foster corporate transparency, the firms' executive
recruitment policy should value managerial ability. Moreover, as the
decision to invest in CSR is related to the CEO's career concerns, firms
should consider this fact and include CSR indicators in their assess-
ments of the CEO's performance so that their efforts to improve CSR
performance and reporting enhance their value in the labour market
and career prospects (García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Yuan
et al., 2017). Similarly, to encourage CEOs to promote CSR practices,
executive compensation plans could include CSR-related terms
(Jouber, 2019; Peng, 2019). Second, because better CSR disclosures
can be attributed to the CEOs' managerial ability, such disclosures can
send investors and financial analysts a “signal” of the firms' manage-
ment quality and, hence, enhance the firms' reputation in the financial
market. Finally, to the extent that CEO compensation packages are
linked to CSR indicators, both the firms' boards and policy makers
should implement measures (i.e., external monitoring mechanisms) to
ensure the credibility of the firms' CSR indicators and disclosures
(Jouber, 2019; Peng, 2019).
This study's results should be interpreted carefully because this
research is subject to certain limitations. First, with regard to the CSR
measure, we measured the unweighted sum of different environmen-
tal and social performance indicators relating to strengths and con-
cerns, based on numerical scales. Although we believe this measure to
be reliable and accurate—following previous studies, for example,
Martínez-Ferrero, Rodríguez-Ariza, and García-Sánchez (2016)—we
are cautious about the possible bias included in it, because it may not
capture the true underlying practices. Moreover, we only examined
CSR as a global construct. Thus, we cannot conclude whether the pro-
motion of CSR varies according to the area of CSR being analysed (for
instance, human rights, society, or employees' practices). In this sense,
considering that “talented managers do not view all categories of CSR
uniformly” (Chatjuthamard et al., 2016:266), future research could
11
refine the dependent variable to capture possible differences in rela-
tion to the influence of CEOs' managerial ability on the disclosure of
information related to each CSR category. Similarly, in line with
Chatjuthamard et al. (2016), future research could analyse the effect
of different levels of CEOs' managerial ability on information
disclosure.
Second, although we complement prior literature with evidence
drawn from an international sample, our sample comprises only public
firms from 28 countries, with a notable bias towards U.S. and
U.K. firms. But, as Chen, Zeng, Lin, and Ma (2017) point out, reliable
data on nonlisted firms is difficult to obtain. Moreover, the analysis—
conducted in an international context—is focused on countries with
different corporate governance systems and legislative and legal
frameworks. To generalise our findings beyond the listed sample, we
recommend that researchers explore our evidence in nonlisted and
small and medium businesses and examine the relationships in our
analysis in the context of greater stakeholder/shareholder protection
and different legal systems, cultural values, and so forth.
Finally, we evaluated managerial ability (CEOAbility) by using the
measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Although its validity has
been confirmed in prior studies (Chatjuthamard et al., 2016; Demerjian
et al., 2013; García-Sánchez & Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Yuan et al.,
2017), future research could refine it and include some direct measure-
ment of CEOs' career concerns as well as other attributes related to
the CEO's managerial ability (e.g., salary or reputation).
CONFLIC T OF INT ER E ST
None
OR CID
Isabel-María García-Sánchez https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4711-
8631
Beatriz Aibar-Guzmán https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7410-5997
Cristina Aibar-Guzmán https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1229-9631
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How to cite this article: García-Sánchez I-M, Aibar-Guzmán B,
Aibar-Guzmán C, Azevedo T-C. CEO ability and sustainability
disclosures: The mediating effect of corporate social
responsibility performance. Corp Soc Responsib Environ Manag.
2020;1–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1905