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Semantic networks have proven useful in explaining why thinking about one word

(such as butter) can make a closely related word (such as bread) easier to remember. Ac-
cording to Collins and Loftus (1975), when people think about a word, their thoughts
naturally go to related words. They call this process spreading activation within a semantic
network. They assume that activation spreads out along the pathways of the semantic
network surrounding the word. They also theorize that the strength of this activation
decreases as it travels outward, much as ripples decrease in size as they radiate out-
ward from a rock tossed into a pond. Consider again the semantic network shown in
Figure 7.10. If subjects see the word fruit, words that are closely linked to it (such as
peach) should be easier to recall than words that have longer links (such as orange juice).

7.3
7.3 rEtriEval: gEtting information Key Learning Goals
out of mEmory • explain the tip-of-the-tongue phenome-
non, and understand how context cues
can influence retrieval.
Entering information into long-term memory is a worthy goal, but it is an insufficient one • summarize research on the reconstruc-
tive nature of memory, and apply the
if you can’t get the information back out again when you need it. Fortunately, recall often concept of source monitoring to every-
occurs without much effort. But occasionally a planned search of long-term memory is day memory errors.
necessary. For instance, imagine that you were asked to recall the names of all fifty states
in the United States. You would probably conduct your memory search systematically,
recalling states in alphabetical order or by geographical location. Although this example
is rather simple, retrieval is a complex process, as you’ll see in this section.

using Cues to aid retrieval


At the beginning of this chapter we discussed the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon—the
temporary inability to remember something you know, accompanied by a feeling
that it’s just out of reach. The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon is a common experience
that happens about once a week, although its occurrence increases with age (Salthouse
& Mandell, 2013; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2014). It clearly represents a failure in retrieval.
However, the exact mechanisms underlying this failure are the subject of debate. A
number of explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon (A. S. Brown, 2012a;
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2011).
Fortunately, memories can often be jogged with retrieval cues—stimuli that help gain
access to memories, such as hints, related information, or partial recollections. This was
apparent when Roger Brown and David McNeill (1966) studied the tip-of-the-tongue phe-
nomenon. They gave participants definitions of obscure words and asked them to think of
the words. Our example at the beginning of the chapter (the definition for nepotism) was
taken from their study. Brown and McNeill found that subjects groping for obscure words
were correct in guessing the first letter of the missing word 57% of the time. This figure far
exceeds chance and shows that partial recollections are often headed in the right direction.

reinstating the Context of an event


Let’s test your memory: What did you have for breakfast two days ago? If you can’t im-
mediately answer, you might begin by imagining yourself sitting at the breakfast table (or
wherever you usually have breakfast). Trying to recall an event by putting yourself back
in the context in which it occurred involves working with context cues to aid retrieval.
Context cues often facilitate the retrieval of information (Hanczakowski, Zawadzka,
& Coote, 2014). Most people have experienced the effects of context cues on many
occasions. For instance, when people return after a number of years to a place where they

human memory 235

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▶ Reality CheCk used to live, they are typically flooded with long-forgotten memories. Or consider how
often you have gone from one room to another to get something (scissors, perhaps), only
Misconception to discover that you can’t remember what you were after. However, when you return to the
Hypnosis can be used to retrieve memories first room (the original context), you suddenly recall what it was (“Of course, the scissors!”).
of forgotten events.
These examples illustrate the potentially powerful effects of context cues on memory.
The value of reinstating the context of an event may account for how hypnosis occa-
reality
For over a century, advocates of hypnosis
sionally stimulates eyewitness recall in legal investigations (Meyer, 1992). The hypnotist
have claimed that it can enhance recall, but usually attempts to reinstate the context of the event by telling the witness to imagine
the empirical evidence is quite clear. Hyp- being at the scene of the crime once again. Although it is widely believed by the general
nosis does not improve memory retrieval. public that hypnosis can help people remember things that they would not normally re-
Quite to the contrary, hypnotized subjects
are more likely than others to get things
call (Simons & Chabris, 2011), extensive research has failed to demonstrate that hypnosis
wrong—and to feel overconfident about can reliably enhance retrieval (Mazzoni, Heap, & Scoboria, 2010). Quite to the contrary,
their memories. research suggests that hypnosis often increases individuals’ tendency to report incorrect
information (Mazzoni, Laurence, & Heap, 2014).

reconstructing memories
A survey on people’s notions about memory found that 63% believe that when you retrieve
information from long-term memory, you’re able to pull up a “mental videotape” that
provides an exact replay of the past (Simons & Chabris, 2011). However, countless studies
have demonstrated that this is a naïve and extremely inaccurate view of memory. In reality,
all memories are reconstructions of the past that may be distorted and may include details
that did not actually occur (Gallo & Wheeler, 2013; Schacter & Loftus, 2013).
Research by Elizabeth Loftus (1979, 1992, 2005) and others on the misinformation
effect has shown that reconstructive distortions show up frequently in eyewitness tes-
timony. The misinformation effect occurs when participants’ recall of an event they
witnessed is altered by introducing misleading post-event information. For example,
in one study, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed participants a videotape of an automobile
accident. Participants were then “grilled” as if they were providing eyewitness testimony,
and biasing information was introduced. Some subjects were asked, “How fast were the
cars going when they hit each other?” Other subjects were asked, “How fast were the cars
going when they smashed into each other?” A week later, participants’ recall of the ac-
cident was tested. They were asked whether they remembered seeing any broken glass in
the accident (there was none). Subjects who had earlier been asked about the cars smash-
ing into each other were more likely to “recall” broken glass. Why would they add this
detail to their reconstructions of the accident? Probably because broken glass is consis-
tent with their schemas for cars smashing together (see Figure 7.11). The misinformation
effect, which has been replicated in countless studies (Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011),

Figure 7.11 Leading question asked Possible schemas activated Response of subjects asked
The misinformation effect. In an experiment by during witness testimony 1 week later, “Did you
Loftus and Palmer (1974), participants who were see any broken glass?”
asked leading questions in which cars were (There was none.)
described as hitting or smashing each other
were prone to recall the same accident “About how fast were the “Yes”—14%
differently 1 week later, demonstrating the cars going when they hit
reconstructive nature of memory. each other?”

“About how fast were the “Yes”—32%


cars going when they
smashed into
each other?”

236 Chapter 7

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is a remarkably reliable phenomenon that “challenged prevailing views about the validity
of memory” (Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007, p. 37). Indeed, the effect is so difficult to
escape that even subjects who have been forewarned can be swayed by post-event misin-
formation (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013).
Studies have demonstrated that the influence of misinformation is not limited to mem-
ories of events that one has personally experienced or witnessed; it can also distort one’s
knowledge of basic facts (Bottoms, Eslick, & Marsh, 2010). For example, most people know
that the Pacific is the largest ocean on Earth and that Thomas Edison invented the light
bulb. These are facts that most people have encountered repeatedly. They should be stable
memories that ought to be resistant to change. But, consider what happened when Fazio and
colleagues (2013) had participants read short fictional stories that contradicted these facts
by casually mentioning that the Atlantic was the largest ocean and that Benjamin Franklin
invented the light bulb. Although the participants had shown correct knowledge of these
and other well-known facts 2 weeks earlier, when they took a test of general knowledge
after reading misleading stories, about 20% got basic facts wrong—such as indicating that
Franklin invented the light bulb—even though they were explicitly warned that the fictional
stories might contain factual errors. Thus, in a portion of subjects, a single, brief exposure
to misinformation disrupted basic factual knowledge. Sorry to say, these findings suggest
that just reading about this study might distort your own future recall of these simple facts.
Other research on the reconstructive nature of memory has demonstrated that the
simple act of retelling a story can introduce inaccuracies into memory (Marsh, 2007).
When people retell a story, they may streamline it, embellish the facts, exaggerate their
role, and so forth. In such retellings, people may be aware that they are being a little loose
with the facts (Marsh & Tversky, 2004). However, what is interesting is that their inten-
tional distortions can reshape their subsequent recollections of the same events. Some-
how, the “real” story and the storyteller’s “spin” on it begin to blend imperceptibly. So,
even routine retellings of events can contribute to the malleability of memory.

Source monitoring
The misinformation effect appears to be due, in part, to the unreliability of source
monitoring—the process of making inferences about the origins of memories. Marcia
Johnson and her colleagues (Johnson, 1996, 2006; Johnson et al., 2012) maintain that source
monitoring is a crucial facet of memory retrieval that contributes to many of the mistakes
that people make in reconstructing their experiences. According to Johnson, memories are
not tagged with labels that specify their sources. Thus, when people pull up specific mem-
ory records, they have to make decisions at the time of retrieval about where the memories
came from (example: “Did I read that in the New York Times or Rolling Stone?”). Much
of the time, these decisions are so easy and automatic that people make them without be-
ing consciously aware of the source-monitoring process. In other instances, however, they
may consciously struggle to pinpoint the source of a memory. A source-monitoring error
occurs when a memory derived from one source is misattributed to another source.
For example, you might attribute something that your roommate said to your psychology ▶ Reality CheCk
professor, or something you heard on Dr. Phil to your psychology textbook. Inaccurate
memories that reflect source-monitoring errors can seem quite compelling. People often Misconception
Memory is like a mental videotape that can
feel quite confident about the authenticity of their assertions even though the recollections
provide faithful reproductions of past events.
really are inaccurate (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 1999).
Source-monitoring errors appear to be commonplace and may shed light on many in- reality
teresting memory phenomena. For instance, in studies of eyewitness suggestibility, some Countless studies in recent decades
subjects have gone so far as to insist that they “remember” seeing something that was have demonstrated that memories are
only verbally suggested to them. Most theories have a hard time explaining how people incomplete, distorted, fuzzy reconstructions
of past events. The adjectives that best
can have memories of events that they never actually saw or experienced. But this para-
describe memory are not exact or accurate,
dox doesn’t seem all that perplexing when it is explained as a source-monitoring error but fragile, fallible, and malleable.
(Lindsay et al., 2004).

human memory 237

Copyright 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s).
Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.

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