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Priming involuntary autobiographical memories

Article  in  Memory · November 2005

DOI: 10.1080/09658210444000485 · Source: PubMed

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 MEMORY, 2005, 13 (8), 874±884

Priming involuntary autobiographical memories

John H. Mace
University of New Haven, CT, USA

Involuntary autobiographical memories occur frequently in daily life and are usually triggered by cues in
one's environment. This study investigated the possibility that priming plays a role in the production of
involuntary memories. In Study 1, participants recorded their involuntary memories in a diary for 14 days
and then completed a questionnaire assessing their cognitive activity during the recording period. Par-
ticipants indicating frequent thought about significant others on the questionnaire showed significantly
more involuntary memories related to such individuals than a control group. In Studies 2 and 3, partici-
pants recorded their involuntary memories in diaries for 14 days and were primed with recall sessions in
the laboratory during that period (recalling episodes from high school, Study 1, the past year, or ages 13±
16, Studies 2 & 3). The results of both studies showed significant priming effects in the involuntary
memories of participants for all of the periods primed. The possibility that priming plays a significant role
in the daily production of involuntary memories is discussed.

We often unintentionally remember past epi-
sodes. Although Marcel Proust (1928/1998) and
other novelists (Salaman, 1970) are often credited
with vivid and accurate descriptions of involuntary
memories, this memory phenomenon was origin-
ally described by Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) more
than a century ago. Ebbinghaus described invo-
luntary memories as ``mental states once present
in consciousness return to it with apparent spon-
taneity and without any act of will; that is, they are
reproduced involuntarily''(p. 2). Despite this early
recognition of involuntary memory, very little is
known about the topic because it has only recently
become the focus of study by a handful of memory
researchers (e.g., Berntsen, 1996, 1998, 2001;
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Brewin, Christodoulides,
& Hutchinson, 1996; Kvavilashvili & Mandler,
2004; Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2003; Mace,
2003b, 2003c, 2004, in press; Richardson-Klavehn
& Gardiner, 1995; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardi-
ner, & Java, 1994; Ross, 1984).
In the first diary study of involuntary auto-
biographical memory, Berntsen (1996) reports an
estimate which suggests that people experience on
average two to four involuntary autobiographical
memories on a daily basis, thus indicating that
they occur routinely. In a more recent diary study
in which participants were asked to record all of
their involuntary memories for a 2-week period,
Mace (2004) reports that participants experienced
daily involuntary memories ranging from one to
five per day, thus corroborating Berntsen's (1996)
earlier estimate.
Diary studies have also indicated that the vast
majority of involuntary memories are elicited by
some type of retrieval cue (i.e., usually ranging
from 80%, Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004, to as
much as 90%, Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall,
2004; Mace, 2004). Berntsen and colleagues (1996,
Berntsen & Hall, 2004) and Mace (2004) report
that these cues are thoughts, elements of language
(e.g., words spoken in conversation), sensory or
perceptual experiences (e.g., smells, places,
objects, or persons), various mood or bodily states
(e.g., feeling sad or cold), and activities or actions
(e.g., bike riding, pay the bill at a restaurant, etc.).

Correspondence should be addressed to John H. Mace, Department of Psychology, University of New Haven, West Haven, CT
06516, USA. Email: jmace@newhaven.edu
This research was funded in part by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of New Haven to the author. The author thanks
Dorthe Berntsen and one anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

# 2005 Psychology Press Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/09658211.html DOI:10.1080/09658210444000485

In addition, Mace (2004) showed that involuntary
memory cues always have some sort of sensible
relationship to the past episode (i.e., typically
forming a part of the memory content or directly
related to the content, see Mace, 2004, for a dis-
cussion of this point).
These studies have established that involuntary
memories are commonly experienced on a daily
basis and that they are most typically produced by
a wide variety of sensible cues. This raises the
question of whether the retrieval process is purely
random (i.e., involuntary memories are simply
randomly triggered through the random experi-
ence of cues), or is to some extent organised by
cognitive processes? Priming is one possible cog-
nitive process that may organise the production of
involuntary memories. For example, routine cog-
nitive activities, most particularly thinking about
the past, could prime a set of related auto-
biographical memories, making it more likely that
these memories would be elicited when their cues
are processed at some later point in time. The
present study investigated the possibility that
priming may play a role in involuntary memory
production. The details of the study are discussed
below, after a more detailed account of how
priming may influence involuntary memory
production.
Involuntary memories may be primed through
a variety of cognitive activities (e.g., routine
thoughts, goal planning, etc.) (for reviews of the
different types of priming processes, see Ander-
son, 1983; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). How-
ever, it would seem that the most likely way in
which this would occur is by directly remembering
the past. Reminiscing about the past could cause
spreading activation to occur throughout a net-
work of related memories. Some of these mem-
ories may come into consciousness during this
activity, being experienced as thought-elicited
memories; some of these memories may trigger
other memories immediately; whereas some
memories may come to mind a few minutes later,
perhaps experienced as cueless involuntary
memories because the lapse in time causes the
thought to be forgotten or the connection is simply
not made. In any event, some of the memories
activated during this process may never reach
consciousness because they were only weakly
activated. Although only weakly activated, their
recent activation should put them in a special class
because they are now memories that have acti-
vation levels higher than other, non-activated
memories. According to the most popular priming
PRIMING INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES 875
theories, they should have a greater chance of
being retrieved later compared to other memories
(see various accounts of priming, e.g., Anderson &
Bower, 1973; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1990; Col-
lins & Loftus, 1975). Retrieval may occur minutes
to hours to days later when the conditions are
more optimal for it, which is most likely to be
when one encounters a cue that directly maps onto
the memory or is directly related to it.
If processes like those described above play a
role in involuntary memory production, then they
also may be a factor controlling involuntary
memory production. Although a very large num-
ber of cues are likely to be processed in the course
of a day, people typically only experience a few
involuntary memories (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Mace,
2004). Although there may be a number of
mechanisms involved in the control of involuntary
memory production (e.g., attentional factors, see
Berntsen, 1998; Mandler, 1994), priming may
modulate the flow of involuntary memories
entering consciousness through its implied role in
cue and memory selection. Recently activated
memories, though never rising to consciousness,
should have a greater chance of being elicited than
memories that do not have the same level of
activation. This process should narrow the overall
field of cues potentially triggering involuntary
memories such that cues (whether processed
internally or externally) associated with primed
memories would be more likely to trigger invo-
luntary memories than cues associated with other
non-primed memories. Thus the amount of invo-
luntary memories experienced would be deter-
mined to some extent by one's cognitive activity.
If one were to engage in a lot of reminiscence-type
cognitive activity, this would increase the number
of involuntary memories entering consciousness
by increasing the range of cues being selected,
whereas in contrast, relatively little of this cogni-
tive activity would narrow the range of cue
selection.
Although priming has most typically been
investigated in semantic, perceptual, and other
long-term memory systems, typically not auto-
biographical memory (but see Conway, 1990;
Conway & Berkerian, 1987), its presence in
these memory systems gives good reason for sus-
pecting that it may be operative in auto-
biographical memory as well. Indirect support
for the idea that priming may occur in involun-
tary autobiographical memory was recently
reported in a related memory phenomenon,
involuntary semantic memory (the case where
876 MACE
words, images, or other relatively context-free
information comes into mind, or ``mind pop-
ping''; see Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004, for a
complete review). In the first study of involun-
tary semantic memory, Kvavilashvili and Man-
dler (2004) reported that subjects in their diary
studies were able to trace the content of many of
their involuntary semantic memories back to
information that was processed (e.g., seen or
heard) a few minutes to a couple of weeks pre-
viously. They noted that the information either
had the same content as the memory (perhaps
indicative of direct or repetition priming) or was
related to it (perhaps indicative of an indirect or
associative priming; see Roediger & McDermott,
1993, for the distinction between associative and
repetition priming). Kvavilashvili and Mandler
(2004) reasoned that both repetition and associa-
tive types of priming may be influencing the
production of involuntary semantic memories.
The priming hypothesis was investigated in the
current study primarily through the use of
laboratory-based reminiscence manipulation. In
Studies 2 and 3, participants were asked to recall
specific past periods (e.g., high-school years) in
the laboratory while they kept a diary of their
involuntary memories outside the laboratory.
Priming was assessed by comparing their records
to relevant controls for involuntary memories
associated with the time period they were asked to
remember in the recall sessions. However, given
that there were no studies examining involuntary
memory priming to start with, a pilot study was
conducted first (Study 1). In Study 1, the diary
recording method was used along with a post-
recording questionnaire to assess the possibility
that thoughts during the recording period may
have primed involuntary memories.
STUDY 1
Participants in Study 1 recorded their involuntary
memories in a structured diary for a period of 2
weeks. Following the recording period, they
completed a questionnaire, which assessed whe-
ther they had been preoccupied with any parti-
cular thought or thoughts (i.e., common life
themes such as work, significant other, etc.) during
the recoding period. It was reasoned that evidence
that priming may occur in involuntary remem-
bering would be obtained if participants who
indicated preoccupation with a particular life
theme showed comparatively more involuntary
memories related to such theme than participants
who indicated no preoccupation with any life
theme during the recording period.
Method
Participants. The participants were 16 faculty,
staff, graduate, and undergraduate students from
the University of New Haven, ranging in age from
21 to 51 years (M = 30). There were 12 female and
4 male participants. Most of the participants
received $50.00 for their participation, but some of
the faculty and staff volunteered to participate
without payment.
Diary and questionnaire designs. The diary
was designed to have four entries per memory: (1)
a description of the memory, including its date; (2)
a description of the retrieval cue; (3) a description
of thought prior to the memory coming to mind;
(4) a description of the activity engaged in prior to
the memory coming to mind.
While the first diary entry was fundamental to
the studies reported here, entries 2±4 were
designed to gauge the typical circumstances under
which involuntary memories come to mind.
Although such information is important to the
study of involuntary memory (and is reported
elsewhere, e.g., Berntsen, 1996, 1998; Mace, 2004),
its purpose in this report was to show that invo-
luntary memories come to mind in a spontaneous
fashion, dissociated from any intentional context
(i.e., in the types of cues and how they are pro-
cessed, and in the thoughts and activities experi-
enced prior to retrieval).
The questionnaire contained a single question.
This question asked participants to think back to
the recording period and indicate what thought or
thoughts were on their minds frequently during
that period (work, school, personal finances,
family or family member, significant other [e.g.,
current or former spouse or fianceÂ], other thoughts
not listed, nothing in particular). The question was
framed to clearly separate their thoughts during
the recording period from the involuntary mem-
ories that were recorded in the diary. Participants
who indicated frequent thought about a life theme
were designated the life-theme-thought group,
whereas participants who did not indicate such
(i.e., those who chose the nothing in particular
response) were designated the no-life-theme-
thought group.

Procedure. Before meeting with the investi-
gator, participants were given written instructions
which defined involuntary remembering, descri-
bed the requirements of participation, and the
method of diary recording. All participants then
met individually with the investigator, and the
written instructions were reviewed, followed by an
opened-ended question and answer period. Par-
ticipants were asked to distinguish between an
involuntary and a voluntary memory for the
investigator (all were able to make the distinc-
tion). Participants were also asked to indicate how
familiar they were with involuntary memories in
their own life (all indicated that they were familiar
with involuntary memories, experiencing them
usually on a daily basis). All participants were
given a pocket-style notebook, which they were to
carry with them at all times, recording each and
every involuntary memory according to the writ-
ten instructions for a period of 2 weeks.
After the recording period, the participants
returned for a final meeting in which they turned
in their notebooks and completed the ques-
tionnaire. This meeting took place 2 or 3 days
after the last day on which they had recorded
memories in their diaries. Once the participants
turned in their notebooks, they were given the
questionnaire. They were told that the purpose of
the questionnaire was to determine to what extent
participants in diary studies may be preoccupied
with concerns of daily life, with the goal being to
make the recording process easier for future par-
ticipants. Finally, participants who indicated fre-
quent thought about a life theme on the
questionnaire were given an open-ended, informal
interview regarding the life theme chosen.
Results
A total of 558 involuntary memories were recor-
ded by the participants in their diaries. On aver-
age, they recorded 35 involuntary memories in the
2-week period, ranging from a low of 12 to a high
of 77 memories.
Cue analysis. On average, participants indi-
cated that 92% of their involuntary memories had
identifiable cues. Of all the involuntary memories
recorded, an analysis of the cue types showed that
30% were thought based, 31% were language
based, 27% were sensory/perceptual or activities,
and 4% were mood or bodily state based. Of all of
the memories classified as elicited by thought-
PRIMING INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES 877
based cues, 40% (12.5% of all involuntary mem-
ories) were involuntary memories that were trig-
gered immediately by a previously experienced
involuntary memory. This finding shows that
when involuntary memories are activated, they
can sometimes activate other involuntary
memories in turn.
Thought and activity analysis. An analysis of
the thought and activity diary entries showed
participants indicating wide-ranging thoughts and
activities at the time that their involuntary mem-
ories came to mind (e.g., ``I was thinking about my
homework project or listening to a lecture''). The
important aspect of this analysis for the present
study was that it revealed that participants'
descriptions for these entries gave no indication
(either explicit or implicit) that their thought or
activities involved an attempt to intentionally
recall any of their recorded memories.
Questionnaire analysis. Of the 16 partici-
pants, 4 (25%) indicated on the questionnaire that
they had thought frequently about a particular life
theme during the recording period (thus desig-
nated the life-theme-thought group), whereas the
rest (12, 75%) of the participants indicated that
they had not (i.e., they chose the thought about
nothing in particular response, and thus were
designated the no-life-theme-thought group). All
of the four participants indicating thought about a
life theme selected the significant other response.
Two of the participants indicated that the sig-
nificant other was a boyfriend or girlfriend, one
indicated a former spouse, and one indicated a
current fianceÂe.
Memory description analysis. The diary
records of the life-theme-thought group were
inspected for involuntary memories related to
their significant other designation (i.e., former
spouse, etc.). Involuntary memories were deemed
to be related to the significant other designation
noted by the participant on the questionnaire only
in the case where that designation was clearly
mentioned in the memory description as being a
part of the memory (e.g., ``I suddenly remembered
the time when my boyfriend and I went to see a
Broadway play''). For purposes of baseline com-
parison, the diary records of the no-life-theme-
thought group were inspected for involuntary
memories related to significant others. The same
scoring method was used for this group, however
in this case the mention of any (and all possible)
878 MACE
significant other types in the memory description
was deemed as related to a significant other. It was
reasoned that this scoring approach would yield
the most appropriate baseline comparison condi-
tion because it would represent the natural like-
lihood of having an involuntary memory related to
a significant other.
For both the life-theme-thought and no-life-
theme-thought groups, the mean proportions of
involuntary memories related to significant others
was calculated by dividing the total number of
involuntary memories related to significant others
by the total number of involuntary memories
recorded by a participant. The results of this
analysis are displayed in Table 1. As can be seen in
the table, the mean proportion of involuntary
memories related to significant others was a great
deal higher for the life-theme-thought group than
it was for the no life-theme-thought group. The
data were subjected to a t-test, which indicated a
significant difference between the groups, t(14) =
5.16, p < .001, suggesting that the involuntary
memories of the life-theme thought group were
primed by thinking about significant others.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 suggest that involuntary
memories may be primed by routine cognitive
activity, such as thoughts about an important
person in one's life. In informal interviews, three
life-theme-thought participants indicated that
most of their thoughts about their significant
others referred to recent periods, yet the dates of
their involuntary memories for significant others
ranged from weeks to several years (this judge-
ment could not be made for one of the participants
because the individual had separated from the
significant other some years ago). This suggests
that the priming effect was an associative type
rather than a repetition type of priming effect.
However, because Study 1 was only correla-
tional in nature, causal inferences cannot reliably
TABLE 1
Mean proportions of theme-consistent involuntary memories
recorded in dairies for life-theme-thought and no-life-theme-
thought groups
Group M SD Range
Life-theme-thought .41 .20 .47
No-life-theme-thought .07 .07 .25
be drawn from it. Of course, the main problem
with the results is the possibility that the direction
of causality was reversed for life-theme-thought
participants (i.e., unusually high levels of invo-
luntary memories related to a significant other
caused high levels of thought about that other,
rather than the other way around). For this rea-
son, Study 1 could not firmly answer the priming
question for involuntary memories. To assess this
question more reliably, the next two studies tested
the priming hypothesis with a laboratory manip-
ulation. In these studies, participants recalled
specific life periods in the laboratory while they
recorded their involuntary memories in a diary
outside the laboratory.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, participants recorded their involuntary
memories in a diary for a period of 2 weeks. Close
to the midpoint of the recording period, they
voluntarily recalled high-school memories in the
laboratory for 30 minutes. Priming was assessed
by comparing involuntary memories related to
high school recorded in the diary in the period
before the laboratory recall session to those
recorded in the diary in the period after laboratory
recall. It was reasoned that if participants showed
more involuntary memories of high school in the
after-recording period, this would indicate that
recall in the laboratory had primed the production
of these memories.
Method
Participants. The participants were 12 faculty,
staff, graduate, and undergraduate students from
the University of New Haven (age range was 22 to
56 years, M = 34, with 9 females and 3 males).
Some of the faculty and staff volunteered to par-
ticipate without payment, whereas the rest of the
participants received $50.00 for their participa-
tion.
Study and diary designs. The study design
consisted of two conditions: diary recordings
before laboratory recall and diary recordings after
laboratory recall. The before-recording period
was used as the baseline control condition (i.e., the
n natural ``unprimed'' occurrence of high-school
memories). The after-recording period was used
4
12 as the primed condition. The diary design was
identical to that used in Study 1.

Procedure. Participants recorded their invo-
luntary memories in a structured diary for 2
weeks. Near the midpoint of the recording period,
participants came into the laboratory for a recall
session (six came in on the seventh day of
recording, six on the eighth day). As a cover story,
participants were told that the experimenter was
interested in various properties of their voluntary
memories apart from their involuntary memories.
They were asked to freely recall memories of high
school for a period of 30 minutes, recording them
on sheets of paper. When the recall session was
finished, participants were asked to score their
memories on a number of properties (e.g., usual-
ness, frequency of occurrence, specific vs general).
These properties were of no interest to this study.
Participants were merely asked to do this as a part
of the cover story to distract them from the true
purpose of the recall session.
Otherwise, with the exception of the laboratory
recall manipulation, all other aspects of the pro-
cedure for Study 2 (i.e., method of diary recording
and instructions given to participants) were
identical to those used in Study 1.
Results and discussion
A total of 385 involuntary memories were recor-
ded by the participants in the 2-week period. On
average, participants recorded 32 involuntary
memories (ranging from a low of 17 to high of 65).
Cue analysis. Participants indicated that 90%
of their involuntary memories had identifiable
cues. The cue type analysis showed that 27% were
thought based, 32% were language based, 30%
were sensory/perceptual or activities, and 1%
were mood or bodily state based. Once again, the
memories classified as elicited by thought-based
cues included involuntary memories triggering
involuntary memories (37% of all thought cues,
representing 10% of all involuntary memories).
Thought and activity analysis. The thought
and activity diary entries analysis showed partici-
pants indicating wide-ranging thoughts and activ-
ities prior to the involuntary memories coming to
mind, as in Study 1. Most importantly for Study 2,
this analysis gave no indication (either explicit or
implicit) that their thoughts or activities involved
an attempt to intentionally recall any of their
recorded memories or to remember (intentionally
or unintentionally) the laboratory recall session.
PRIMING INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES 879
Memory description analysis. The diaries of
participants were inspected for involuntary
memories of high school both before and after the
laboratory recall session. A memory was deemed
a high-school memory only in the case when a
participant clearly described it as a memory of
high school (e.g., ``I suddenly remembered the
time in my high school French class when . . .'').
The mean proportions of involuntary high-
school memories experienced before and after the
laboratory recall period were calculated by
dividing the total number of involuntary high-
school memories in each period by the total
number of involuntary memories in each period.
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table
2. As can be seen, it revealed that participants had
more involuntary high-school memories after the
laboratory recall session than they did before the
recall session. These data were subjected to a
dependent-samples t-test, which indicated a sig-
nificant difference between the before and after
conditions, t(11) = 2.51, p < .05, suggesting that the
voluntary recall of high-school memories in the
laboratory primed participants' involuntary
memories of high school.
A comparison of the voluntary memories
recorded in the laboratory with the involuntary
memories recorded in the diaries after the recall
session revealed none of the involuntary mem-
ories of high school to be repetitions of the ones
recalled in the laboratory. This suggests that the
priming effect was the associative type, as was
suggested for the result obtained in Study 1. An
inspection of the involuntary memories recorded
after the recall session showed that virtually all the
involuntary memories of high school were recor-
ded one or more days after the recall session (the
only exception was one participant who recorded
some of them immediately after the session). This
suggests that the recollective activity primed
involuntary memories, but such memories did not
come into consciousness until participants
encountered a related cue some time later.
The possibility that the priming effect could be
attributed to a demand characteristic (i.e., that
TABLE 2
Mean proportions of high-school involuntary memories
recorded in dairies before and after laboratory recall session
Condition M SD Range
Before recall session .01 .02 .08
After recall session .11 .13 .39
880 MACE
participants intentionally recalled high-school
memories in the after period and wrote them in
their diary because they believed that the experi-
menter was interested in such memories) seems
unlikely. Part of the evidence against such an
alternative explanation is that none of the parti-
cipants indicated having knowledge of the true
purpose of the laboratory recall session when they
were interviewed following their participation in
the study. Further, an inspection of the cues trig-
gering high-school memories recorded after the
recall session revealed a pattern inconsistent with
a voluntary recall hypothesis. Similar to the pat-
tern seen for other involuntary memories (i.e.,
overall in this study and in Study 1), most of the
memories had cues (93%), the percentage of
thought-based cues was somewhat lower (19%),
while most were externally based (74%, elements
of language, sensory/perceptual experiences, or
activities). The high level of external cues is
important because it seems unlikely that if parti-
cipants had intentionally tried to recall these
memories, such memories would be reported as
triggered by external cues. Thus, a more likely
scenario is that voluntarily recalled memories
would be reported as having no cues or the cues
would be recorded as thought based (e.g., ``trying
to remember a time when I was in high school
produced a memory of . . .''). However, the
thought cues for the high-school memories gave
no indication of this, in that they were like others
reported in this study (e.g., ``thinking about the
repairs that need to be made for my car reminded
me of an old car I used to have in high school and
how it needed to be fixed all the time''). In addi-
tion, as noted above, the thought or activity
entries give no indication of attempts to volunta-
rily recall memories recorded, to think about or
recall the laboratory session, or even that partici-
pants were thinking about their high-school years
before memories came to mind.
In sum, participants showed a comparatively
higher rate of involuntary high-school memories
in their diaries after they had voluntarily recalled
high-school memories in the laboratory. This
finding suggests that remembering the past can
prime the later production of involuntary mem-
ories. Thus, similar to the results obtained in Study
1, the results of Study 2 give support to the idea
that routine cognitive activities (such as reminis-
cence) may prime involuntary memories. How-
ever, the important difference here is that the
present results were obtained with a laboratory
manipulation rather than with a correlational
approach. Although this does not change the dif-
ficulties with drawing causal inferences from
Study 1, it does allow causal inferences concerning
a priming mechanism in involuntary remembering
to be drawn from the present results more
confidently.
STUDY 3
Study 2 showed that recalling high-school mem-
ories will prime the involuntary recall of such
memories. Although the recall manipulation in
Study 2 was limited to the recall of high-school
memories, one would imagine that recall of past
experiences generally would have the potential of
priming involuntary memories. Thus the aim of
Study 3 was to replicate the priming results due to
recall, and extend to them beyond the very spe-
cific lifetime events of high school by using recall
manipulations that involved recall of more generic
lifetime periods. Participants recalled episodes
from the previous year (the 1-year group) or from
when they were aged 13 to 16 (the 13±16 group) in
four separate laboratory sessions during a 2-week
diary recording period. Additional recall sessions
were added simply to make the manipulation
stronger.
Method
Participants. The participants were 24
undergraduate students from the University of
New Haven who participated in return for course
credit. The mean age of the 1-year group was 20.8
years (age range was 20 to 22 years, n = 12, with
eight females and four males), whereas the mean
age of the 13±16 group was 21.2 years (age range
was 20 to 23 years, n = 12, with seven females and
five males).
Study and diary designs. The study design
consisted of two conditions: a 1-year recall group
and a 13±16 recall group. The 1-year recall group
recalled memories from the past year, whereas the
13±16 recall group recalled memories from ages 13
to 16. Participants in each group also served as
controls for the other group (i.e., the 13±16 invo-
luntary memories of the 1-year recall group were
used as baseline controls for the 13±16 recall group,
while the 1-year involuntary memories of the 13±16
recall group were used as baseline controls for the
1-year recall group). The diary design was identical
to those used in Studies 1 and 2.

Procedure. Participants in both groups
recorded their involuntary memories in a diary for
2 weeks. For both groups there were four
laboratory recall sessions (on days 1, 5, 8, and 11 of
the recording period, each for 30 minutes). As in
Study 2, participants were told that the experi-
menter was interested in various properties of
their voluntary memories apart from their invo-
luntary memories. Participants in the 1-year group
were asked to freely recall memories from the past
year, whereas participants in the 13±16 group were
asked to freely recall memories from the age
period of 13±16 years (all recording their mem-
ories on blank sheets of paper). Once again, when
the recall sessions finished, participants were
asked to score their memories on a number of
properties (e.g., usualness, frequency of occur-
rence, specific vs general). As in Study 2, the sole
purpose of this task was to distract participants
from the true purpose of the recall session.
Otherwise, all other elements of the procedure for
Study 3 were identical to those used in Study 2.
Results and discussion
A total of 673 involuntary memories were recor-
ded by the participants. On average, participants
recorded 28 involuntary memories in the 2-week
period, ranging from a low of 13 to a high of 56.
Cue analysis. Of all involuntary memories
recorded in the diary, 93% had identifiable cues.
The cue type analysis showed that 20% were
thought based (of which 35% were involuntary
memory cues, representing 7% of all), 44% were
language based, 25% were sensory/perceptual or
activities, and 4% were mood or bodily state
based.
Thought and activity analysis. As in the pre-
vious two studies, the thought and activity diary
entries analysis showed wide-ranging thoughts
and activities prior to the involuntary memories
coming to mind. In addition, the analysis gave no
indication that the thoughts or activities recorded
by participants involved attempts to intentionally
recall any of the recorded memories or to
remember the laboratory recall sessions.
Memory description analysis. The diaries of
participants were examined for involuntary
memories pertaining to the two time periods. An
involuntary memory was deemed as pertaining to
PRIMING INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES 881
the past year only in the case where a participant
had dated it as coming from that time. Likewise,
an involuntary memory was deemed as pertaining
to the ages 13±16 only in the case where a parti-
cipant had dated it as falling within that time
period.
The mean proportions of involuntary memories
pertaining to the past year and ages 13±16 were
calculated by dividing the total number of invo-
luntary memories for each time period by the total
number of involuntary memories. Table 3 displays
the mean proportions of involuntary memories
from the past year and from ages 13±16 for both
groups (past year scores of the 13±16 group are the
controls for the 1-year group, the 13±16 scores of
the 1-year group are the controls for the 13±16
group). As can be seen in the table, each group
shows more involuntary memories for the period
of time for which they were primed than for the
same unprimed period of the comparison group
(i.e., .14 vs .31 and .19 vs .34). The data were
submitted to two independent t-tests. The results
of these analyses were significant for both groups,
t(22) = 2.69, p < .05 (1-year group), t(22) = 2.18, p <
.05 (13±16 group), suggesting that the recall
manipulation primed the involuntary memories of
both groups.
Once again, a comparison of the voluntary
memories recalled in the laboratory to the invo-
luntary memories recorded in the diaries showed
no repetitions of memories, suggesting that the
priming effects were the associative type.
As in Study 2, the possibility that the results
were due to demand characteristics appeared to
be unlikely. With the exception of one participant
from the 1-year group, none of the participants
indicated having knowledge of the true purpose of
the laboratory recall sessions when they were
interviewed after the study had ended. In the case
of the one participant, his belief was that the recall
sessions were designed to see if any of memories
TABLE 3
Mean proportions of involuntary memories from the past year
and ages 13±16 recorded in dairies for 1-year and 13±16
groups
1-year group 13±16 group
Past year Control Ages 13±16 Control
M .31 .14 .34 .19
SD .19 .10 .22 .11
Range .63 .40 .72 .43
882 MACE
that he had recalled in the laboratory would return
as involuntary memories. He further indicated
that it hadn't worked for him, thus suggested that
he was not trying to intentionally recall memories
during the diary-recording period. Additional
evidence was also found in the cue, thought, and
activities analyses for the memories covering the
primed periods in both groups. As in Study 2, an
inspection of the cues for the primed memories
did not reveal a different pattern of cue type dis-
tribution (91% had cues, 19% were thought
based, 68% were external cues, language, sensory/
perceptual, or activities, 4% were state types).
Also, as reported in Study 2, neither the cues, nor
the thought or activities entries gave any sugges-
tion that participants were trying to recall the
primed memories or to remember the laboratory
recall sessions.
In sum, participants who recalled the past year
or ages 13 to 16 in the laboratory showed more
involuntary memories in their diaries related to
these periods than controls. As in Study 1, these
findings suggest that remembering the past can
prime involuntary memories. The results provide
an important follow-up to Study 2, in that the
priming effects were replicated in two separate
groups with recall manipulations using instruc-
tions somewhat different from Study 2 (i.e., recall
involving generic life periods, such as the past
year, as opposed to special life periods, such as
high school). Observing the findings under these
conditions extends the recall priming findings
beyond the period of high-school memories and
therefore demonstrates a broader range of prim-
ing due to reminiscence-type processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings reported in this study suggest that
priming plays a role in the production of invo-
luntary memories. Participants in Study 1 who
indicated frequent thoughts about significant
others on a post-diary recording questionnaire
showed a high degree of involuntary memories
related to such individuals (see Table 1). Although
these results were only suggestive, firmer evidence
was found with the laboratory manipulations used
in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 2, the involuntary
memories of participants showed a priming effect
for high-school memories after they had recalled
memories pertaining to high school in the
laboratory (see Table 2). In Study 3, recalling
memories from the past year for one group or
from ages 13±16 for another group in the labora-
tory produced priming effects for those periods in
the involuntary memories of each of those groups
(see Table 3). Finally, the possibility that the
findings were produced by intentional recall of the
memories recorded in the diary or attempts to
recall the laboratory sessions were rendered
unlikely by post-study interviews, an examination
of the distribution of cues types for primed
memories, and the thought and activity diary
entries.
It appears that three main conclusions con-
cerning involuntary memory priming can be
drawn from the results of this study. First, all of
the primed memories recorded in the diaries were
related to memories recalled in the laboratory
recall session, none was a direct repetition of
memories recalled in the laboratory (Studies 2 and
3). This result is indicative of an associative type of
priming effect (see Roediger & McDermott, 1993,
for a review). The prevalence of this type of
priming effect (and lack of any repetition-type
priming effect) in the results suggests that asso-
ciative priming may be the most typical form of
involuntary memory priming. However, there still
remains the possibility that repetition-type prim-
ing does occur, although the findings reported
here seem to indicate that it would occur much
less frequently than the associative type. Perhaps
the explanation for an associative-type dominance
is merely probabilistic (i.e., there simply is a
greater chance of triggering a host of related
memories rather than the same ones), or perhaps
this dominance serves some sort of function (i.e., it
is more useful to trigger a host of related mem-
ories rather than repeat the same ones). It seems
that this may be an important question for future
involuntary memory priming studies.
The second conclusion concerns the time
course of priming. Most of the primed memories
were recorded from a day to a few days later
(Studies 2 and 3). Typically, associative priming
effects in semantic memory studies are reported to
have a duration of only a few seconds to minutes
(e.g., Swinney, 1979; see Anderson, 1983; Roedi-
ger & McDermott, 1993, for reviews). From the
current findings, it can be concluded that invo-
luntary memory priming can have a fairly long
duration, at least up to a few days. However, it is
important to note that the results do not permit
any further conclusions concerning the time
course of involuntary memory priming. Although
the time course findings seem to indicate that long
durations may be most common for involuntary

memory priming, it may be that shorter (perhaps
only a few seconds or minutes) and even longer
(perhaps weeks to months) durations are equally
likely. Determining the time course in future stu-
dies may prove useful to the development of
theoretical accounts of involuntary remembering
and involuntary memory priming, particularly
those that have an eye on function.
The third conclusion relates to the types of
cognitive activities that may prime involuntary
memories. Because the priming results were
obtained with a laboratory manipulation that
involved recall of the past, it seems the most
obvious conclusion is that reminiscence-type
cognitive activity (perhaps of any sort) will prime
involuntary memories. Although it would seem
that this is the most direct and perhaps robust way
in which involuntary memories are primed, this
observation does not rule out the possibility that
other types of cognitive activities could prime
involuntary memory production. For example,
Conway (1990) showed that presenting partici-
pants with goal-derived concepts (such as things to
eat at a party or times to have a party) will prime
voluntary autobiographical memory retrieval,
suggesting a link between goal-derived concepts
and specific past episodes. His findings suggest
that more generic types of cognitive processes
(such as goal planning) could also prime involun-
tary autobiographical memories.
Demonstrating that priming can influence
involuntary memory production suggests that the
retrieval process is not entirely random. Although
cues are likely to be experienced randomly, as well
as some involuntary memories, it would seem that
the primed component of involuntary memory
production would represent a level of cognitive
organisation. Perhaps this type of organisation is
one of the ways in which involuntary memories
are functional to cognition. Appealing to a use-
fulness heuristic common to many functional
accounts of priming (see Anderson, 1983), one
might speculate that involuntary memories that
are related to the contents of recent mental
activity may be functional to cognition because
their content is seen as potentially relevant to
current mental activity. Proposing functional
accounts of involuntary remembering may be one
of the most important challenges facing future
research in this area.
As discussed in the Introduction, the priming
notion also has implications for the control of
involuntary memory production. Based on the
strength of their constituent memories, cues
PRIMING INVOLUNTARY MEMORIES 883
associated with recently activated (primed)
memories should have a greater likelihood of
triggering memories than cues associated with non-
primed memories. This type of cue selection pro-
cess could either broaden or narrow the range of
cues triggering involuntary memories. When there
is a lot of cognitive activity priming auto-
biographical memories, more cues may be selected
from the range of cues experienced daily, whereas
in contrast, less priming activity narrows the field
of cue selection, thus resulting in fewer involuntary
memories. If this account is correct, then priming
may be a factor controlling both the flow and
selection of involuntary memories. However, other
factors may also have a role in this process.
For example, Mandler (1994) has suggested
that involuntary memories are more likely to
occur in relaxed attentional states, rather than
states that place relatively high demands on
attention. Berntsen (1998) corroborated this idea
by showing that participants in her diary study
were more likely to indicate that their attentional
state was diffuse rather than concentrated when
involuntary memories came to mind (similar
results were also reported in Kvavilashvili &
Mandler, 2004). Thus, attentional state may also
regulate the flow of involuntary memories reach-
ing consciousness (see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000, who discuss possible mechanisms involved
in inhibitory control of autobiographical
memories).
Finally, the results of this study also seem to
have implications for two other areas where
involuntary memories have been observed. For
example, among the typical symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) are recurrent thoughts and
involuntary memories about the traumatic event
(see Berntsen, 2001; Brewin et al., 1996). Perhaps
repetitive thoughts and memories continually
prime memories from the traumatic period,
thereby locking sufferers into a sort of vicious
priming cycle, which tends to prolong the time
course of the syndrome. The other area involves
the appearance of the reminiscence bump (e.g.,
Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986) in the involuntary
memories of older adults (Berntsen & Rubin,
2002; Mace, 2003a; Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, &
Schulz, 2003). Fitzgerald (1996) has noted that
older adults tend to engage in ``reminiscence
behaviour'' (i.e., talking about and recalling
memories from the bump period; see Fitzgerald,
1996). Because this type of activity involves
recalling the past, and recall was shown to prime
 884 MACE
memories in this study, it would seem that remi-
niscence behaviour would be capable of priming
memories in the bump period. Perhaps, this is a
factor that contributes to the reminiscence effect
in the involuntary memories of older adults.
Manuscript received 10 November 2003
Manuscript accepted 16 April 2004
PrEview proof published online 05 April 2005
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