Sec.

1, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court: Rule on Habeas Corpus

1. Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)

Facts:

On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden
concerning conjugal partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A preliminary
injunction was issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or alienating, except with
consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money, shares of stock, property,
real, personal, whether in his name, her name or both) in the partnership with Mrs.
Harden. During 1946 however, Mr. Harden transferred drafts and cash in overseas
accounts. In the course of two years, he received orders from the SC to return the
amounts but Mr. Harden kept filing for extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was
committed to jail because of contempt (failure to comply with the court’s orders of
producing the amounts) and held there until he can produce said amounts.

Issue:

WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive punishment

Held and Ratio:

Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is something
that he himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court: When the
contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused
to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it)
Kelly v. Director of Prisons (1923)

FACTS:
1. Amzi B. Kelly, herein petitioner, is a member of the Philippine Bar. He has made applications
in court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to release sixteen young Russians (Ivon
Pumutkin, et al.). These Russians were members of the crew of a fleet of boats now at anchor
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. 

2. Attorney-general Villa-Real, respondent, states that these Russians are confined in Bilibid
Prison pursuant to the request of the Admiral of the Russian ships, and of the orders of the
Governor-General. He further states that said persons do not desire or wish for any writ of
habeas corpus to be issued on their behalf. They simply accept and abide by the order of the
Governor-General pending such disposition as it is the wish of the Chief Executive to make in
their respective cases. This last statement is supported by an affidavit of the sixteen Russians
before the Director of Prisons.

3. The Court denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the writ of habeas corpus shall be denied where the person in whose behalf it is
asked repudiates the action taken. (YES)

RULING:
The writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted by a person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
his liberty, or by some person on his behalf. Where the application is made on the prisoner's
behalf by a third person, and where the prisoner repudiates the action taken, the writ will be
denied. The writ of habeas corpus ought not to issue if the restraint is voluntary because it is
unnecessary.
4. Nava v. Gatmaitan (90 Phil. 172) (EDIT)

Doctrine: Sec. 1, Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court: Rule on Habeas Corpus (Article III, Section 1,
Paragraph 17 Old Constitution, Art III, Section 13, Par 2, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: 
1. On 22 October 1950, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by President Elpidio
Quirino. The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210, was the
apprehension and detention of lawless elements (communist threat from the
Hukbalahap) in whose possession strong and convincing evidence was allegedly found
showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and otherwise subversive acts.

Issue:

Whether or not, a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 which has been formally charged
with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, may be entitled to bail. (YES)

Ruling: 

Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, “All persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong.” The crime of rebellion or insurrection is certainly not a capital
offense, because it is penalized only by prision mayor and a fine not to exceedPhp20,000.00.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights are separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of
the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.The right
to bail; along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel;to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to have a speedy and public trial; to meet
the witnesses face to face; and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf, tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If
it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the
suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply
the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for
him ultimate acquittal and, hence,absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for
being patently untenable.

In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion so complexed with
other offenses as to make them capital. Their right to bail is accordingly not absolute and may
be denied when evidence of guilt is strong. The filing of the information implies that the
prosecution holds sufficient evidence for conviction, and it is fair to suppose that the court will
duly exercise its judgment when called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. At any rate, on admission to bail, the accused is delivered to the
custody of his sureties as a continuance of the original detention.
5. ANITA MANGILA vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA
JUDY SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO),

FACTS:

Anita Mangila was charged with seven criminal complaints with syndicated estafa in violation of
Art. 315 of RPC, PD 1689, and Migrant Workers Act of 1995. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants
as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application without authority from POEA. Following the
preliminary investigation (PI) conducted by Judge Pangilinan of MTCC in Puerto Princesa, a
warrant of arrest was issued against Mangila and her cohorts without bail. By virtue of the
arrest warrant, Mangila was arrested in Manila and detained at the NBI. Mangila filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the CA to obtain her release. She argued that Judge Pangilinan had no
authority to conduct the PI; that the PI was not yet completed when the arrest warrant was
issued; and that there was no finding of probable cause prior to the issuance of the arrest
warrant. The CA denied Mangila’s petition.

ISSUE:
1.) What is the nature of habeas corpus?
2.) Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention.

RULING:
1. Habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in
character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the
act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

2. NO. It was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the
public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause
should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention.

Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the
City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of
the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the
City Prosecutor for appropriate action. The writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a
substitute for another available remedy.
6. Ampatuan v. Macaraig (622 SCRA 266) (2010)

Facts:
 Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed in Ermita
Manila. The alleged perpetrator was PO1 Ampatuan. Police Senior Superintendent Atty.
Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan,
finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan.

 On 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1
Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody
unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.

 Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office,
petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing
said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of
PO1 Ampatuan.
 The contention of the respondent that the filing of the administrative case against PO1
Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the
release of the subject police officer and that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has
rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted
by this Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the
appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while
PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The respondent court then favored
the respondents that prompted the RTC that the petition for habeas corpus to be
dismissed. Hence, this petition for certiorari to the SC.

Issue:

WON the trial court erred in dismissing the petition of habeas corpus of the petitioner. (NO)

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization
Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary
actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and
equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline.

The Court held that, given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive
custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It
is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It
is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers
concerned are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is
the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. (PG
621-622 CRUZ).
 The Court likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19
April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been
resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and
academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551. Thus, since petitioner
is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the
writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on
its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in
the Constitution.

Hence, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

WRIT OF AMPARO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO GR NO. 183533

FACTS:

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order,
inspection of place and production of documents. In the petition, he expressed
his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary
appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from
the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that
starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain “Joel,”
a former colleague at Bayan Muna.

“Joel” pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner's store. CA

denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how the supposed
threat or violation of petitioner's [right to] life, liberty and security is
committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said
supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner's right to life, liberty or security to
warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is likewise denied

because allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6
[Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any
allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner's right to privacy
was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a party respondent.

ISSUE:

2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude
from the evidence offered by the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of
battle list, threats and violations to the latter's life, liberty and security were
actually committed by the respondents.

RULING:

2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court
cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to
warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether. In this case, the petition
was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on
him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset.

While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo
and habeas data, in the petitioner's case, the restraints and threats allegedly made allegations
lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand
on nebulous grounds -it was claimed that “Joel” once inquired from the petitioner if the latter
was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty that the
petitioner was being monitored. -The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will
and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latter's control.

The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered
his service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and
affiliations. -inclusion in the “order of battle” -it was categorically denied by respondent Gen.
Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who stated that he “does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) "order of battle‟ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the
CPP.” -Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner's mobility was never curtailed.
 Burgos vs Esperon GR No. 178497, February 04, 2014

Doctrine:
The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to
determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.

Facts:
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the
forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon City.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of
Jonas Burgos had transpired and that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were
violated by the Government have been fully determined. The CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found
probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his arrest in connection
with Jonas’ disappearance.

Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The respondents
have not appealed to the court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

Issue:
Whether or not a writ of amparo should be issued anew in light of newly
discovered evidence

Ruling:

No.
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all
the developments of the case, including the Court of Appeal’s decision that confirmed the
validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, the Court resolve to deny the
petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

The Court note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the Court held in Razon,
Jr. v. Tagitis the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of
Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it
directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific
criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings
has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability”
signify in an Amparo case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by
the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. The Court take judicial notice
of the fact that the Regional Trial Court has already found probable cause for arbitrary
detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’
disappearance.

The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to
determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present
case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the
enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga.
At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach
of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
 Tapuz et. al. vs. Del Rosario (Spouses Sanson)

Facts:

The Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible
entry with damages against the Tupaz’s (Tupaz family and about 120 John Does). The Sansons
allege that they own 1 hectare of land as evidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes,
came in the morning of April 16, 2006, came in to the property armed with bolos and suspected
firearms, with force and intimidation, took possession of the disputed property of the Sansons
and built a nipa and bamboo structure.

The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had previous possession of the
disputed land since 1993 up to 2006 when the land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction
prayed for. The petitioners (Tupazes) appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the
RTC granted the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and also issued a writ of
demolition against the Tupazes. The MR filed by the Tupazes was denied. So the Tupazes went
to the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and Writ of Demolition reviewed. While in the
CA, the sheriff of Aklan served the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition to the Tupazes.

Thus, the Tupazes came before the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under Rule 65, the
issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of the writ of Amparo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Writ of Amparo be issued for the Tupazes in this case? – No

RULING:

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how
and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed. Under these legal and factual situations, we are far
from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the
persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
related and focused on the disputed land.
Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally
accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than
on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
 Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo G.R. No. 189155 07 September 2010 (EDIT)

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

FACTS:

Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States,
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.
informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her
companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was
interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist
beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her came
from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is
included in the “Order of Battle.” On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was
given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident
to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. After
her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her.
Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card. Hence, on 01 June 2009,
Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the
Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National
Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture. On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and
habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not
convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of
Roxas. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested
in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her
companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the
house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was

PERTINENT ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo

petition.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
RULING:

1. No. It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence.
2. Yes. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
WRIT OF AMPARO Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is
legally inaccurate – The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in
impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect.
Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a partyrespondent in an amparo petition. The
Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the
writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order
to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
law. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case
rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the
doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed
with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the
ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS In amparo proceedings, direct

evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence – In amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or nonavailability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of
the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former
indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators.

3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS Substantial evidence of an actual

or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended – An
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to
show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time
that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation
 of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must,
at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas
data.

DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it
modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows:
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. Further directing the
incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and
the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on
its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as
may hereinafter be determined by this Court. The Supreme Court likewise referred the case
back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above
directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there
would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at
least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own
report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was declared that
the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its
tasks under this decision.
 Miranda v. Arizona

FACTS:

On March 13, 1963, police arrested Ernesto Miranda on charges of rape and kidnapping after a witness
identified him in Phoenix, Arizona. Police failed to inform Miranda of his constitutional rights to an attorney
or to refrain from incriminating himself during his two-hour interrogation. Nevertheless, he admitted to
offenses and signed a written confession confirming his understanding of these rights. Due to this
confession, Miranda was found guilty of rape and kidnapping on June 27, 1963, and a robbery charge is
still pending against him. Miranda was given a maximum sentence of fifty-five years in jail by Judge
McFate.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination violated when a suspect
is interrogated in custody without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel
present? (YES)

RULING:

YES. The suspect must be informed beforehand that he has the right to remain silent, that any
statement he makes may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed, as required by the constitution for statements made during a custodial
interrogation to be admissible. This requirement must be met in the absence of a clear, intelligent waiver of
the involved constitutional rights. If the prosecution cannot show that the defendant was warned and
consciously and rationally disregarded those warnings, the evidence gathered during interrogation cannot
be utilized against the defendant at trial.

The 5th Amendment protects from self-incrimination and requires the police to inform the detainee about
his or her rights while the 6th guarantees criminal suspects rights to a personal or state issued attorney.

The Four Miranda Warnings:

1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You have the right to an attorney.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELIA NICANDRO y VELARMA

FACTS
 Not long before November 6,1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 5,
Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, Manila, received complaints from
concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by one alias 'Nel' in the
Commodore Pension House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila.
 At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6, 1981, the police team formed to carry out the
entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, alias 'Nel', at room 301
of the Commodore Pension House, selling marijuana to drug users and immediately
proceeded to the said Commodore Pension House and met the female confidential
informant.
 Following later, the informant went to room 301 of the Commodore Pension House
where Appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias 'Nel is and asked to buy some
marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills.
 The appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette so the police
team immediately closed in and nabbed appellant.
 Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights,
appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the
ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce
her confession to writing.
 To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who testified
that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed police informant,
which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she was under custodial
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED MORE PARTICULARLY THE
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESS AGAINST
HER HAS BEEN VIOLATED. (YES)

RULING
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under
custodial investigation. When in fact he did not, neither did he state the manner in which the
appellant was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them.

Under the Constitution, it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under
investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to
affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent
such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation
cannot be admitted in evidence.

The court held that the guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable
doubt and shall be acquitted.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ G.R. Nos. 118866-68:
September 17, 1997

FACTS
 In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and
his children, 12-year-old Karen Verona D. Laroya who is also bore external signs of
sexual assault and 10-year-old John Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence
by their horrified neighbors. When found, the star-crossed trio were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded in
and protruding from their bodies.
 None of their neighbors witnessed the gruesome murders. However, two of them later
testified in court and both of them had previously executed sworn statements just three
days after the incident that serves as their testimonies in court.
 On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his
brother in Fort Bonifacio and interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same
day that he was arrested. The police officer declared in the trial court that before he
questioned appellant as to his participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to
completely inform the latter of his rights and this he did in the presence of appellant's
supposed counsel.
 Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the
victims.
 When presented as the lone witness for himself, the appellant insisted that he was
never assisted by any counsel of his choice, when he was interrogated at the police
headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession. He also
claims that he was tortured by the police authorities into signing and that he did not do
it voluntarily.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused was informed of his rights. (NO)

RULING
SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the lower court that the investigation of
appellant in connection with the murders actually commenced at the time when appellant was
still without counsel. Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in Tagalog of his right
to remain silent, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless
failed to tell appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be
provided with one.

Therefore, the accused, Rodolfo Dela Cruz is acquitted because the accused must perforce be
informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein.

RIGHTS ENUMERATED:
- That where he lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating
cause, he shall be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, the cautionary
 right to counsel would merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an impecunious
person like appellant who is hardly educated.
- That his right thereto would mean simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or
has the financial capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing more.

NOTES:
Under the Constitution, “any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.”

The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language or
dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere
characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is entitled
would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with
the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of
Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory law.

Miranda In-custody interrogation rule:

- He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
- That anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
- That he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
- That if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.

Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.