Asia Europe Journal (2004) 2: 523–532

DOI: 10.1007/s10308-004-0115-7 ASIA

EUROPE
JOURNAL
Ó Springer-Verlag 2004

China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role

in global anti-terror cooperation
PAN Guang
Director, Institute of European and Asian Studies, Shanghai
(e-mail: panguang@sass.org.cn)

Abstract

Anti-terrorism has become an important part of China’s domestic and

diplomatic agenda. This has its historical roots and theoretical basis. China’s
anti-terrorism campaign started even before 9/11, but it was only after 9/11 that
China participates fully in the international anti-terror cooperation and
becomes a significant player in the efforts. This paper attempts to make an
analysis from the Chinese perspective.

Historical overview: China’s anti-terror strategy before 9/11

With reform and opening-up unfolding under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership,
China experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s. Meanwhile, there was
also an influx of various external influences into China. Some violent and
terrorist activities, mostly with economic motivations, began to occur, such as
taking hostages, robbing banks, armed drug-trafficking, and so on. Most of
such activities took place in the eastern coastal regions, where the economy
and overseas connections were more developed. However, activities like drug-
trafficking generally originated from the north-west (Afghanistan-Xinjiang)
and south-west (the triangle region-Yunnan). To be sure, terrorist actions of a
political nature were also observed, such as the recurrent hijacking of planes
for the purpose of simply getting to Taiwan. Yet, even those hijacking activities
might also have been economically motivated, as some hijackers acted to evade
punishment for their economic crimes on the Chinese mainland.
On the whole, the Chinese government treated those activities of the day as
ordinary criminal acts rather than terrorist acts. The Chinese authorities began
to feel the urgency of anti-terrorism only after terrorist violence was
committed by the separatist ‘‘East Turkestan’’ movement in Xinjiang in the
early 1990s.
The actual activities of the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ separatism in China can be
traced to the great uprising of the Hui people in the mid-19th century. At the
time, Yaqub Beg, the Muslim leader who led the expedition against the rule by
the Qing dynasty, turned for fully 10 years (1867–77) parts of Xinjiang into a
524 P. Guang

kingdom independent of the Qing control. Nevertheless, it was in the 1930s and
1940s that a so-called ‘‘East Turkestan’’ state was really established. Uygur
separatists established the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in
November 1933, but the regime collapsed in less than five months. In
November 1945, the Eastern Turkestan Republic was set up in Yining, but it
lasted half a year only. In the four decades from the founding of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949 to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Afghanistan in 1989, ‘‘East Turkestan’’ separatists rarely undertook armed
activities within Chinese borders, but only engaged in certain overseas
propaganda under the auspices of Turkey, certain Western countries and the
KGB. However, the end of the ‘‘jihad’’ against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan
and the chaotic situation in this country in the early 1990s provided them with
a golden chance of waging a ‘‘jihad’’ in Xinjiang. In April 1990, there erupted a
disturbance in Baren in Akto county of Xinjiang, and nearly 60 civilians and
policemen were killed. That turmoil represented the beginning of the terrorist
violence committed by the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ group.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asian states
won independence. Then, Taleban forces emerged and finally came to power in
Afghanistan. These developments constituted a stimulus for the separatist state-
building attempt by the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ movement, and a favourable
environment was created for the extremists to launch terrorist attacks. With
the support from Taleban and al-Qaeda, religious extremists and terrorist
organizations in Central Asia built up cross-border networks. Certain organi-
zations of the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ campaign like the ‘‘East Turkestan Islamic
Movement’’ became very active ones among these cliques. Evidence now
disclosed show that Osama bin Laden is quoted as telling them: I support your
jihad in Xinjiang.1
In order to cope with these terrorist challenges that threatened China’s
security and unity, the Chinese authorities began to formulate seriously an anti-
terrorism strategy, which from its outset focussed on combating ‘‘East
Turkestan’’ so as to ensure the security and stability of Xinjiang. In this context,
there was organized in Xinjiang, the first among China’s provinces and
autonomous regions, anti-terror corps under the fiscal support of the central
government. Meanwhile, as ‘‘East Turkestan’’ movement was cross-border in
nature, the Chinese anti-terrorist strategy should rely on international cooper-
ation. Indeed, this became one of the driving forces of the ‘‘Shanghai Five’’-
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) process. Of course, this process had
its origin in the Sino-Soviet negotiations on their border issues. Following the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the negotiations came to involve ‘‘two sides,
but five countries’’, i.e., China on the one hand and Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kirghizstan and Tadzhikstan on the other, and the interactions among them
finally led to the creation of a stable mechanism in Shanghai in April 1996. The
early priority of the multilateral mechanism was security cooperation, which
included the resolution of border problems left over from history, and the
campaign against ‘‘three evil forces’’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
When the border problems came to be solved, the campaign against the three

1
Information Office of the P.R.C. State Council, ‘‘East Turkestan’’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get
Away with Their Offences, Beijing, Jan. 1, 2002.
China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation 525

forces rose to the top of the security agenda and the mechanism became five
parties. On June 15, 2001, the mechanism was upgraded to SCO that extended its
membership to Uzbekistan, and expanded its cooperation beyond the security
field.
It is noteworthy that this mechanism truly played a very significant role in
fighting against the three evil forces. For example, in August 1999, a clique of
terrorists penetrated into Kirghizstan, seizing hostages and killing civilians. The
Kirghis government, resorting to the agreements within the regional cooperation
framework, sought assistance from China and Russia, who in turn helped to drive
out the gangsters. In December 1999, leaders of the security and law enforcement
authorities of the Shanghai Five countries declared in Bishkek, capital of
Kirghizstan, to set up a ‘‘Bishkek Group’’, which would hold regular meetings to
discuss the cooperation on security and law enforcement issues in order to
safeguard security and stability in Central Asia. On July 5, 2000, leaders of the
Shanghai Five, while reaffirming their determination to combat separatism,
terrorism and extremism, endorsed the proposal put forward by Kirghizstan to
establish a regional anti-terror institution in Bishkek. On June 15, 2001, less than
three months before 9/11, leaders of the six countries signed the Shanghai
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism when
launching the SCO. This convention, as the first international treaty on anti-
terrorism in the 21st century, spelt out the legal framework for fighting terrorism
and other evil forces for SCO members and their co-ordination with other
countries. From the perspective of the Chinese, it is of particular importance that
China could now, in the framework of the organization, count upon the support
of other five countries in its campaign against the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ movement.

New security concept: Theoretical basis of China’s anti-terror

strategy
China’s growing participation in multilateral anti-terror cooperation since the
1990s is not only motivated by the increasing necessity to safeguard its
security, but also embedded on its new mind-set on security issues. This new
mind-set is termed a new security concept.
As early as the 1990s, when international relations were undergoing radical
transitions of the early post-cold war era, Chinese leadership under the guidance
of Deng Xiaoping were already considering how to transcend the cold war
mentality and construct new notions of security, new state-to state relations and
new patterns of regional cooperation. On March 26, 1999, President Jiang Zeming
expounded basic Chinese ideas on the new security concept for the first time
while attending the disarmament meeting in Geneva. He pointed out, ‘‘History
tells us that the old concept of security based on military alliance and escalating
armament will not help to guarantee international security, even less to nurture
the lasting peace of the world. This requires that we must construct a new concept
of security in line with the needs of the time, and actively explore new approaches
to peace and security. It is believed that the core of the new security concept
should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.’’ 2 Later on he

2
The People’s Daily, Mar. 27, 1999.
526 P. Guang

changed ‘‘cooperation’’ into ‘‘co-ordination’’.3 President Hu Jingtao also stressed

the importance of the new security concept on a number of occasions during his
first overseas visit as the president.
Here, ‘‘mutual trust’’ means overstepping differences in ideology and social
system, increasing mutual understanding and confidence, abiding by interna-
tional agreements and obligations, conforming to widely accepted principles of
international law, and refraining from targeting any other as an imagined
enemy or deliberately creating an enemy. ‘‘mutual benefit’’ means giving due
consideration to others’ interests while pursing one’s own interests, and
respecting others’ security while making efforts to guarantee one’s own
security. By ‘‘equality’’, it is meant that all countries, big or small, rich or poor,
strong or weak, are equal members of the international community, equally
entitled to peace, security, and the protection of their own interests; hegemony
or power politics by any country is to be opposed; and equal treatment of each
other, mutual respect and non-intervention in others’ internal affairs are to be
practised. ‘‘Co-ordination’’ means non-alignment, non-confrontation, no
targeting at any third country, elimination of risks of insecurity and prevention
of military conflicts by means of equal dialogues and reciprocal cooperation.
This new security concept has three characteristics. Firstly, it has expanded
from the traditional military security to comprehensive security. The new
concept stresses that, with the arrival of globalization, security has now become
a mutual dependence network of political, economic, military, cultural and
other relationships. Therefore, the security that we talk about today should
imply a comprehensive security that encompasses political security, military
security, economic security, information security, environmental security, etc.
Secondly, security of a single nation is closely linked to international or even
global security. The traditional security concept holds that the security
relationship among nations is a ‘‘zero-sum game’’, and that a country’s security
may be achieved by means of unilateral military strength or military alliance of
a few countries. The new security concept, in contrast, maintains that
globalization and the consequent emergence of a highly-interdependent world
system means that one country’s security is increasingly entangled with
international or global security. Meanwhile, the various non-conventional
security threats that humanity faces today are cross-border and pervasive in
nature. This means that the international community can expect to sort them
out only through cooperation, rather than antagonism, and only by multilat-
eral, rather than unilateral means. Hence, the need for ‘‘common security’’ and
‘‘cooperative security’’. Thirdly, the subject of security is now diversified. In
the traditional security concept, the subject seeking security is often the state,
while other subjects are rarely mentioned. The new framework, of course,
continues to acknowledge that nation state is still the most basic structure of
the international community. Yet, it also points out that, instead of being
restricted to nation states, the subject of security now also includes other
subjects like individuals, organizations, groups, communities, or even the
whole world, all of which are now coming under growing security threats.
Basing on this new security concept, China has worked out its security
policy at the turn of the century. The objectives of this policy are threefold: to

3
Jiang Zeming, On ‘‘Three Represents’’, C.P.C. Central Literature Press, Beijing, 2001, P. 183.
China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation 527

maintain China’s own stability and development; to safeguard the peace and
stability of China’s neighbouring regions; and to promote international
security dialogue and cooperation.4 Needless to say, the new security concept
gets incrementally substantiated and perfected. The occurrence of the Asian
financial crisis has increased China’s awareness of the importance of financial
security. The swift development of the internet is also calling for information
security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks have highlighted huge threats to the whole
human race presented by the swelling terrorism. The SARS epidemic that
erupted in the first half of 2003 has only further confirmed those new
perspectives on comprehensive security, common security, and diversification
of security subjects.
This new security concept has left obvious imprints on China’s anti-terror
strategy. A host of China’s new stances, such as supporting the United States in
combating Taleban, sending troops to participate in overseas multilateral anti-
terror exercises, allowing foreign troops to enter China for such similar
exercises, etc., were beyond imagination ten years ago. But they are now all
logical and indispensable, given those new viewpoints of common security or
collective security. In the meantime, it is right on the basis of the new security
concept that China opposes unilateralism in international anti-terror cam-
paigns. It emphasizes multilateral cooperation, and particularly, the role of the
United Nations. It also opposes unrestrained expansion of anti-terror war,
believing that terrorism will not be eliminated by military means alone, but by
consorted political, economic, cultural and diplomatic efforts.

Impact of 9/11: Strengthening of China’s anti-terror

strategy and institutions
The 9/11 terrorist strike that shocked the world also reinforced the determi-
nation of the Chinese leadership to come up with its anti-terrorism
mechanism. Shortly after 9/11, China established its national anti-terrorism
coordination group (NATCG) led by Hu Jingtao, and organized NATCG’s
office for handling the work. The National Ministry of Public Security also set
up its anti-terrorism bureau that is responsible for the research, planning,
guidance, co-ordination and undertaking of the national anti-terror agenda.5
The NATCG’s office is just headquartered in the anti-terror bureau of the
National Ministry of Public Security. Besides, all the provinces followed suit by
organizing their anti-terrorist co-ordination group and office, with Beijing,
Shanghai, Guangdong, Xinjiang and Tibet moving to the forefront.
For the moment, the No. 1 target of the Chinese anti-terror campaign is still
the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ terrorist group. This group was hit hard in the US war in
Afghanistan, where its bases were destroyed. However, following the US-led
war in Iraq, this group somehow revived, just when Taleban and al-Qaeda
resurrected and Southeast Asia became another hotbed of terrorism. On
December 15, 2003, China’s Ministry of Public Security issued a list of the

4
Wang Yi (Deputy Foreign Minister), ‘‘Speech at the International Conference on Security
Policies Held in Munich’’, Feb. 2, 2002, available online.
5
Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 20, 2002, Beijing.
528 P. Guang

names of four Eastern Turkistan terrorist groups and 11 of their members. The
Ministry also called on the International community to strengthen cooperation
in cracking down on terrorism, including the Eastern Turkistan terrorists. This
is the first time that the Chinese government identified the names of Eastern
Turkistan terrorist groups. The four Eastern Turkistan terrorist groups are: the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement; the Eastern Turkistan Liberation
Organization; the World Uygur Youth Congress; and the Eastern Turkistan
Information Center. Hasan Mahsum (already killed by Pakistan Army),
Muhanmetemin Hazret and nine others were identified as the Eastern
Turkistan terrorists. Falungong was not regarded as a terrorist group, but
some of its members have stepped up their attacks on Chinese communication
satellites, making it a typical example of cyber-terrorism. The Tibetan Youth
that propagates overthrowing the Chinese rule by armed struggles is a radical
organization even beyond the control of the Dalai Lama. It is considered a
potentially terrorist threat. On the whole, it is still the prerogative of the
criminal-affair policemen to handle those economic terrorist cases and
individual-extremist terrorist cases. Yet, anti-terror institutions often get
involved in such cases.
China has made remarkable achievements in strengthening its anti-terror
mechanism since 9/11. These achievements are as follows.
Firstly, an early warning and prevention system has been set up. The
objective of such a system is to monitor the activities of terrorist groups, so as
to forestall terror attacks well in advance by such means as cutting the fund
connections to terrorists. Should terrorist attacks become imminent, such a
system would be expected to give some sort of last minute alert. The APEC
summit meeting held in Shanghai in October 2001 was an event only 40 days
after 9/11. It was certainly a stern test on the anti-terror capabilities of the
Chinese authorities, particular their early warning and prevention system.
Freedom from troubles during the period of the event proved in some way the
efficacy of this system.
Secondly, a quick response system is now in place. The mission of such a
system is, in case of terrorist attacks, taking speedy and strong measures to
remove or contain the causes of such strikes, restrict their fallout, and work for
a quick resolution of the problem. China has greatly enhanced its quick-
response anti-terror troops over the past two years. They are now deployed not
only in Xinjiang, but also in almost every provincial capital city, besides being
significantly improved in their armament. China conducted a joint bilateral
anti-terror military exercise with Kirghizstan in October, 2002. In August 2003,
China took part in the multilateral anti-terror military exercise called ‘‘United-
2003’’ with other SCO members, which reinforced the quick-response
capabilities against terrorists. The most recent exercise is ‘‘Great Wall-2003’’
held on September 26, 2003 that President Hu Jingtao inspected in person.6
Thirdly, consequence control and management system is now being
established. This system focuses on the control of both physical and human
losses in the wake of terrorist attacks or during their development. It strives for
containment of the destructiveness of terrorist attacks and restoration of the
normal order. In this regard, China, drawing especially upon the NYC’s

6
The People’s Daily, Sept. 27, 2003.
China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation 529

experience of 9/11, makes efforts at the co-ordination of policemen, fire-

fighters, armed troops, civilian rescuers and medical personnel in emergency
cases. Training and exercises at various levels have already been conducted for
this purpose.
Fourthly, a mass education and mobilization system is being worked out.
This system focuses on the popularization of anti-terror knowledge, anti-terror
expertise, etc., so as to upgrade the anti-terror awareness and emergency
responsiveness of the people. This system is in itself guaranteed by the relevant
work on laws, regulations, and institutions, while complementing three
foregoing systems. Various authorities in China have carried out a series of
education and training programs among civilian citizens on a massive scale,
this system is especially important for China because of the 2008 Olympic
Games in Beijing and the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai. A number schools
have added anti-terrorism to their curriculum, while some research institutes
and universities have set up their anti-terror research centers. There was held
in Shanghai in 2002 an international conference on anti-terrorism. Besides, the
Chinese legislature – People’s Congress is also working on an anti-terrorism
law at the moment.

China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation

The past several years have witnessed China, inspired by the new security
concept, participating actively in the international anti-terror cooperation,
particularly so since 9/11. The Chinese participation, which assumes an
increasing role in the international anti-terror campaigns, unfolds on the
following four levels.
Firstly, China has actively supported and participated in the international
alliance against Taleban and al-Qaeda. The prominent role of the Chinese is
manifested in the sharing of anti-terror information, uprooting the financial
sources of the terrorist groups, granting support to the Pakistani anti-terror
efforts, preventing the escalation of India-Pakistani confrontation that might
have disrupted the regional anti-terror campaign, combating cross-border
criminal activities related with terrorist organizations, and so on. As previously
mentioned, the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ terrorists have for long been trained, armed
and financed by international terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda in particular.
Therefore, the Chinese campaign against the ‘‘East Turkestan’’ movement is a
key link in international anti-terror campaigns.
Secondly, China, always favouring a dominant UN role in international
anti-terror affairs, has taken an active part in the anti-terror efforts in the UN
framework, which includes the construction of an international anti-terror
legal system. Even before 9/11, China had joined most of the international
conventions on anti-terrorism. After 9/11, China supported the UN and its
Security Council in passing various anti-terrorism resolutions, in enforcing the
relevant resolutions, in joining treaties like ‘‘The International Convention on
Curbing Terrorist Explosions’’ and ‘‘The International Convention on Curbing
Funding to Terrorism’’, and in initiating negotiations and dialogues on
anti-terrorism with countries concerned. China contributed significantly to the
UN-led national reconciliation process in Tadzhikstan, and the post-war
reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Likewise, China’s role has also been
530 P. Guang

obvious in seeking a political solution for the Iraqi problem before the Iraq
war, and in assisting the UN to play a bigger role in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Thirdly, China has promoted international anti-terror cooperation through
such multilateral mechanisms as SCO, APEC, ASEM, and the ASEAN Regional
Forum.
As remarked earlier, the Shanghai Five/SCO that targeted the three evil
forces since its initiation in 1996, has consistently played a pivotal role in the
anti-terror struggles in Central Asia. Only three days after 9/11, there was a
joint statement declared on September 14 by the leaders of the six SCO
members attending the prime minister-level meeting in Alma-Ata. That
statement, besides showing strong indignation at the terrorist attack, expressed
the determination of the multilateral group to stand with all countries and
international organizations in waging a relentless war on all threats of
terrorism around the world.7 Chinese premier Zhu Rongji proposed at the
meeting to establish an SCO anti-terror center as soon as possible.8 Following
this, all the member states of the group took part in the international anti-
terror cooperation. It is therefore right to say that, without the support from
the SCO members, the US war on terrorism in Afghanistan could not have
developed as smoothly as it did. In June 2002, the SCO St. Petersburg summit
meeting approved ‘‘An Agreement on the Anti-Terrorism Agency in the
Region’’, which finally laid a foundation for the establishment of a regional
multilateral anti-terror mechanism. On October 31, 2003, The Executive
Council of the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization held its first meeting in Tashkent. Rustam Inoyatov, chairman of
the National Security Service of Uzbekistan, chaired the meeting and Yang
Huanning, Vice Minister of Public Security, represented China. At the meeting,
V. Qosimov of Uzbekistan was chosen as chairman of the Executive Council of
the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure from 2004 to 2006. The official launch of
the Executive Committee of the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS)
was obviously the most remarkable event at the SCO Tashkent summit in June,
2004. The above-mentioned two joint anti-terror exercises in October 2002 and
August 2003 also demonstrate that the anti-terror function of SCO is being
strengthened steadily. It is believed that, with the American attention now
more focussed on the Middle East, SCO will exert greater influence in
combating terrorism and coping with other non-conventional security issues
like drug-trafficking in Central Asia.
In the two weeks before the 2001 APEC summit meeting in Shanghai, China,
as the host of the event, went to great lengths to co-ordinate among disputing
sides and bring about a consensus in the form of an anti-terrorism declaration
by the APEC leaders. At the ASEM Copenhagen summit meeting in September
2002, Premier Zhu Rongji elaborated on China’s position on anti-terrorism,
which contributed to the consensus of the attending delegates who approved
an anti-terror statement and a cooperation plan.9 Following this, an ASEM
anti-terrorism conference was held in Beijing in September 2003. In another
development, there has long been cooperation between China and ASEAN

7
Declaration by the Prime Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member
States, Sept. 14, 2001, in Alma-Ata.
8
The People’s Daily, Sept. 15, 2001.
9
Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 23, 2002, from Copenhagen.
China’s anti-terror strategy and China’s role in global anti-terror cooperation 531

countries on such non-conventional security issues as crackdown on drug-

trafficking. A multilateral anti-drug cooperation mechanism started to work in
2001 among China, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar. The sixth summit meeting
of China and ASEAN members in November 2002 released ‘‘The Joint
Statement by China and ASEAN Regarding Cooperation on Non-conventional
Security Issues’’, which initiated the full cooperation in the region on issues
including anti-terrorism. As pointed out by Premier Zhu Rongji, China would
continue to assist ASEAN countries in fighting against terrorist activities.10
Fourthly, China has developed bilateral anti-terrorism mechanism with
other states. Countries that have so far initiated regular anti-terrorism
cooperation with China or have conducted negotiations with China on such
issues include the US, Russia, India, Pakistan, Britain, France, and Germany, to
name the more significant ones. Take the Sino-US cooperation for example.
Their early anti-terror cooperation after 9/11 focussed on information sharing,
extirpation of terrorism funding sources, assistance to Pakistani anti-terror
efforts, and the prevention of escalation of India-Pakistani conflicts. In October
2001, China, at the request of the US, sealed its border of over 90 km with
Afghanistan to co-ordinate with the American military actions. After the US
captured in Afghanistan some ‘‘East Turkestan’’ terrorists of the Chinese
nationality, the Chinese side was invited to join the interrogation of the
captured. This cooperation has further developed following the three meetings
between President Jiang Zeming and President Bush respectively in October
2001, February and October 2002, the meeting between President Hu Jingtao
and President Bush in June 2003, and the meeting between Premier Wen Jiabao
and President Bush in December 2003. There are now established between
China and the US an institutionalized anti-terror working mechanism,
including a financial working group on anti-terrorism. In August 2002, the
US State Department formally included the ‘‘East Turkestan Islamic Move-
ment’’ into its list of terrorist organizations. This was followed by a similar
move on the part of the UN Security Council through the joint efforts of China,
the US, Afghanistan and Kirghizstan as well. Significantly, the FBI now runs an
office in Beijing, which further facilitates the bilateral cooperation in fighting
drug-trafficking, weapon smuggling, illegal immigration and various other
cross-border crimes. The US and China have also reached an agreement
regarding the security of containers. Between China and Russia, there is an
anti-terror working group now in action. Between China and India, and
between China and Pakistan, there are also bilateral anti-terror cooperative
mechanisms that are working effectively. China has also had a series of anti-
terror bilateral dialogues with Britain, France and Germany, all of which have
led to consensus on anti-terrorism. Recently, China conducted joint bilateral
anti-terror (searching and rescue) exercises with Russia, Pakistan, India,
France, UK, and Australia.

10
Zhu Rongji, ‘‘Speech at the Sixth Meeting Attended by Chinese and ASEAN Leaders’’, Nov.
4, 2002, available online.
532 P. Guang

Conclusion
China will, in the foreseeable future, continue to be an active member in the
international anti-terror coalition, and play a significant role in the interna-
tional anti-terror cooperation, even though China does not endorse the
American unilateral actions as seen in the Iraq war. However, it should be
pointed out that the Chinese anti-terror strategy is not globally oriented as the
US one. China still focuses on its own regions and neighbouring regions in this
aspect, for this strategy is also aimed at maintaining China’s own stability and
creating a favourable environment for China’s development. But, of course, it
is also increasingly clear that the Chinese participation is indispensable for
international anti-terror efforts, whether in the hinterlands of Eurasia, South
Asian subcontinent, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, or even Middle East.
Therefore, although China’s anti-terror strategy is not globally oriented, its
influence and significance will prove global.

References
Information Office of the P.R.C. State Council (2002) ‘‘East Turkestan’’ Terrorist Forces
Cannot Get Away with Their Offences, Beijing
Jiang Zeming (2001) On ‘‘Three Represents’’, C.P.C. Central Literature Press, Beijing, p. 183
Wang Yi (2002) Speech at the International Conference on Security Policies Held in Munich,
Feb. 2, 2002, available online.
Zhu Rongji (2002) Speech at the Sixth Meeting Attended by Chinese and ASEAN Leaders,
Nov. 4, 2002, available online.