4 The SCO and security

cooperation
Ekaterina Mikhaylenko, Aigerim Ospanova
and Maria Lagutina

Introduction
From its establishment, the SCO made security cooperation one of its key foci.
Having placed combatting the “Three Evils” (extremism, terrorism, and sepa-
ratism) at the forefront, the Organization has established a frm structural and
legal framework over its 20 years of existence. A signifcant stage of the SCO’s
development was the period 2015–2017 when the Organization admitted two
new members: India and Pakistan. The membership expansion triggered several
important changes to SCO’s activities, while also giving rise to some new ten-
sions. The SCO became the largest regional organization in the world, and its
scope increased. A literature on the SCO during this period reveals a discourse
regarding its focus, the security issues on its agenda, the regional approach to
addressing them, and the way in which interaction between the SCO states is
structured. Until 2015, the regional focus of the SCO’s security initiatives had
been on CA members and Afghanistan. The inclusion of India and Pakistan as
members, along with the active participation of Afghanistan as an observer, led
not only to the expansion of the SCO’s regional focus to include South Asia and
the Middle East, but also to the shaping of an even broader security agenda;
encompassing non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile
defense, and regional security matters in the Middle East. By the SCO’s defni-
tion, policy and security cooperation include maintaining global and regional
security, promoting the global arms control process, combating the Three Evils,
and ensuring cyber security, among other activities.
The SCO’s efciency in addressing these issues has always been central to Rus-
sian discourse (S. G. Luzyanin, 2017, 2019; A. F. Klimenko, 2015, 2017, 2019;
V. A. Matveyev, 2019; Yu. V. Kulintsev, 2017; Yu. Nikitina, 2011). There are
certain discrepancies in defning the Organization’s focus and its role in regional
and global security. While Russian experts strongly recommend transforming the
SCO into a full-fedged political and military alliance (Kulintsev, 2017, p. 93) and
formalizing the SCO’s Concept of Regional Security (Klimenko, 2017, p. 91),
non-Russian experts view the SCO as a regime security (Aris, 2011, pp. 100–
133), or as an expression of solidarity among members against the norms imposed
by external actors (Allison, 2008). Some scholars argue that as CA members seek

DOI: 10.4324/9781003170617-5
 The SCO and security cooperation 39
to limit regional cooperation, China is utilizing the SCO and its expansion as a
driver of its broader region-building ambitions (Chung, 2006, pp. 3–14; Ahmad,
2018, pp. 425–427; Kerr and Swinton, 2008, pp. 89–112).
The goal of this chapter is to retrace the evolution of the SCO’s agenda on
security and to outline the key development trends at its current stage. The theo-
retical core of the study is formed by comparative regionalism theories. When
analyzing the SCO’s legal and regulatory framework, the authors conducted
extensive interviews with experts and representatives of the SCO institutions.
They also utilize SCO documents, published interviews with representatives of
the SCO countries, publications by experts, informal interviews with Russian
ofcials working in the SCO, and materials gathered during meetings of experts
from Russia and the CA members.

Models of the SCO’s development: theoretical evaluation

The theoretical basis of this chapter mainly follows theories of regionalism (see
Introduction chapter for more details). According to the logic on development of
theoretical regionalism studies (Söderbaum, 2015, pp. 6–23), the SCO is a com-
plex regional project where three diferent regionalism models, Russia’s “post-
Soviet regionalism”; China’s “Asian regionalism”; and the CA members’ “virtual
regionalism,” compete.
Russia builds regional processes in Eurasia relying upon the closed model con-
sisting of a mix of “old” and “new” regionalism. Concepts of regional identity
or cohesion are interpreted by Russia based on the EU experience of region-
building. The European model adopts heavy bureaucratization along with a sub-
stantial emphasis on rule of law and unifying norms and values. Region-building
practiced by Russia relies on institutionalization and a strong legal framework.
Post-Soviet regionalism is characterized by its low efciency, largely due to the
artifcial nature of ties built top-to-bottom, the absence of a unifed integration
strategy of the states, and a signifcant diference of government and the eco-
nomic system. For Russia, all integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space are
aimed at restoring its former infuence, which is often negatively perceived by its
integration partners. Therefore, the distinctive features of post-Soviet regionalism
are its closed nature and protectionism, which undermine Russia’s aspiration to
build structures that are strong both legally and institutionally.
China has its own regionalism-related traditions. The Chinese Tributary Sys-
tem focused on East and Southeast Asia could be examined as a regionalism
project. In the 20th century, the CPC projected infuence in Cambodia, North
Korea, Laos, and to some degree Vietnam. China has embarked in recent years
to “[create] a peaceful peripheral environment, which refects China’s unique
interpretation of the role of the international community in defning norms and
values” (Pestsov, 2018, p. 41). In our opinion, China’s policy in CA is close to
the Asian regionalism pattern; “defned foremost in market terms” (Katzenstein,
2018); invalidity of legal norms, deep ideological and cultural diferences in Asia,
a fear of creating formal supranational bodies, the threat of losing sovereignty and
40 E. Mikhaylenko, A. Ospanova, M. Lagutina
the transitional state of regimes impede the establishment of a regional security
network (Aggarwal and Koo, 2007, pp. 359–369). Lack of military organizations
is compensated by bilateral agreements between the East Asian countries and the
presence of a superpower (the USA) and a major regional power (Japan). China’s
infuence in CA is characterized as economic penetration followed by the estab-
lishment of cultural and economic hegemony (Acharya, 2003, pp. 468–470).
China’s policy in CA is like its tactics in East Asia. Overall, China’s expanded
infuence in CA is focused on two courses: bilateral economic relations and invest-
ments into the oil and gas industries of the region. Ideologically, this expansion
is accompanied by the dominance of Chinese/Confucian cultural elements of
“great harmony” and “universal commonwealth” (Clarke, 2010, p. 136). Since
2001, China has concluded bilateral agreements with the key states of the region
(SCO members) to solve some territorial disputes. It is possible to agree that
the “Shanghai Spirit” refers to mutual trust and beneft, equality, consultation,
respect for diferent civilizations, and common prosperity (Aris, 2009, p. 457).
The statement that, over the years, the Shanghai Spirit “has been [a] precious
treasure accumulated in the cooperation among the countries of the region”
(SCO, 2001) echoes provisions of the ASEAN Way. The latter consists of four
principles deserve particular notice: “open regionalism,” “cooperative security,”
“soft regionalism” and “consensus” (Acharya, 1997, p. 324). This code of con-
duct incorporates a set of well-known principles: non-interference in domestic
afairs, non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of states, all of which can also be found in the UN Charter.
Also worthy of note are the peculiarities of CA regionalism or “virtual region-
alism” (Allison, 2008, p. 185). It means “the type of politically instrumental
view of regionalism,” “the absence of any deeper regionalist impulse” behind
regional structures and “the dominant political function” (ibid.). The Russian
expert observes that in CA, “bilateral formats of relations still prevail over mul-
tilateral ones in the international cooperation in CA” (Koldunova, 2015, p. 60),
while they are characterized primarily by a high degree of confict. Indeed, the
numerous attempts to create a multilateral CA subregional structure have all
been fruitless. At the same time, CA countries are quite actively involved in inte-
gration projects of third countries, which indicates a preference for the so-called
“protective integration” – “a form of collective political solidarity with Russia
against international political processes or agendas that are interpreted as chal-
lenging politically incumbent regimes and their leaders” (Allison, 2008, p. 186).
The CA states take part in some other regional projects in addition to those
initiated by Russia and China. In 2015, with US support, the CA states estab-
lished the C5 + 1 Forum, aimed at developing multilateral regional cooperation
in various felds, including trade, security matters, culture and “people-to-people
contacts.” Hence, the CA states partake in regional integration projects initiated
by both global and regional powers. This approach does not lead to the Western-
type integration, but rather fulflls the political function of upholding sovereign
interests of the CA countries.
 The SCO and security cooperation 41
The SCO is a unique organization that unites asymmetric members based on
their interests, capabilities, and identities. In the frst years of the SCO’s exist-
ence, China and Russia took the helm, but their goals and capabilities ran dif-
ferent courses. The CA members have worked to maintain infuence within the
Organization. We posit that the process of establishing the SCO’s regional con-
solidation mechanism is still underway. The SCO is a regional institution, which
more closely follows the Asian regionalism model with is a greater emphasis on
confdence-building measures and non-legally binding security arrangements.
Accession of new actors India and Pakistan put the SCO more frmly on the
Asian regionalism course, while providing the possibility that a new South Asian
regionalism model will emerge within the Organization.

The SCO’s activities in 2001–2015: establishment

of the regional security community in CA
From its very beginning, the “Shanghai format” was mostly a response to the
heightened terrorism threat in CA and security violations in the border areas of
the Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) due
to a civil war between the army of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban move-
ment in Afghanistan. Enhanced NATO presence in the region became a nota-
ble factor that infuenced the formalization of cooperation among the Shanghai
Five countries in 2001. However, over the course of time, the SCO became
an organization of multilateral political cooperation mostly in the feld of non-
military security. The SCO countries focused on combating terrorism, separa-
tism, extremism and other challenges.
Priorities of military cooperation were defned in 2007 during a meeting of
defense ministers of SCO members. They include ensuring regional security and
efectively countering contemporary challenges such as terrorism, extremism,
separatism, transnational crime, illegal migration, etc. In 2004–2015, a number
of documents were adopted which defned the key scope of action taken in the
feld of security: combating trafcking in narcotic drugs (SCO, 2004, 2015b),
illicit trafcking in weapons, ammunition and explosives (SCO, 2008), coopera-
tion in countering terrorism (SCO, 2009a) and crime reduction (SCO, 2010),
in ensuring information security (SCO, 2006), emergency prevention and relief
(SCO, 2005), response measures to infectious disease outbreaks (SCO, 2009b,
2020b), etc. Over the years, the SCO created several institutes for organizing
meetings for the defense ministries, law-enforcement agencies, judicial authorities
to coordinate their actions in the feld of regional security.
Emphasizing its non-military nature, the SCO is regularly engaged in holding
joint anti-terrorist exercises during which the members practice methods and
skills related to conducting joint operations. Today, there are three types of exer-
cises: for Special Forces and law enforcement agencies; joint border operations;
joint anti-terrorist military exercises called Peace Missions. A Chinese expert
notes that “as a result, member states are better equipped for maneuver warfare,
42 E. Mikhaylenko, A. Ospanova, M. Lagutina
coordination, joint command and joint crackdown on violent terrorist activities
while dealing with non-conventional security challenges” (Zhao, 2018).
Considering the geographic proximity of Afghanistan, the largest global pro-
ducer of opiates, and the deteriorating drug trafcking situation in CA, SCO
states prioritized combating illicit drug trafcking. The results of anti-drug traf-
fcking operations performed from 2012 to 2017 to seize heroine amount to
approximately 14% of drugs confscated worldwide (Alimov, 2017).
In 2002, The Afghanistan Agenda found its way to the core SCO documents,
and in 2005 the Protocol on Establishment of SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group
was released. The Group’s activities were suspended in 2009 but resumed in 2017.
The security services of the SCO states and the RATS are actively combatting
the threats coming from Afghanistan. What makes the SCO’s approach unique
is that the members were ready to engage their security services strictly along
Afghanistan’s borders, without activity in the country; within Afghanistan, indi-
vidual SCO states were willing to work only bilaterally, and primarily on economic
issues. Regarding political and military involvement in Afghanistan, China, for
example, has repeatedly stated that it could be politically active only within the
UN framework (Malashenko, 2012, pp. 67–68). It is obvious that the SCO coun-
tries have a vested interest in Afghanistan’s stability and security; therefore, they
have made multiple attempts to organize a broad political dialog involving all par-
ties impacted by resolving the security issue. Moreover, as the SCO has become
more active regarding Afghanistan, NATO states have begun to recognize it as
a potential partner in resolving the problem. In 2011, the USA even sought to
become recognized as a dialogue partner with the SCO; however, the bid was not
accepted. In 2012, Afghanistan joined the SCO as an observer and was thereby
institutionally admitted to the SCO’s area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the SCO
did not outline a roadmap for Afghanistan to participate intensively at that time.
Security issues were a driver for the rapprochement between the countries
in the region, but in developing common positions on regional problems the
members have also experienced some political diferences due to their national
interests. The 2013 Annual Report on Development of Asia-Pacifc by the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences notes that, despite resolving several controversial
border issues and deepening strategic mutual trust, the probability of restoring
allied relations between China and Russia on the current stage is low (Dergachev,
2014). As experts remarked,

for Beijing, the format of a club uniting the CA countries, Russia and China
was convenient to promote its economic interests in the region. But Rus-
sia thwarted creation of the SCO Development Bank, where China would
dominate anyway because of its economic clout.
(Karpyuk, 2015)

China experts note that the SCO’s region-building is largely determined by the
approaches of economic institutionalism aiming at creating a promising mecha-
nism for streamlining relations in East Asia (Serebryakova, 2011, p. 153).
 The SCO and security cooperation 43
The 2014 crisis in Ukraine and between Russia and Western countries has “fur-
ther underscored the divergence in regional Eurasia policies between the SCO’s
two largest member states, Russia and China” (Lanteigne, 2018, p. 120). While
Russia continues to view the Organization as a security regime with a strong mili-
tary dimension, China takes a more holistic and diverse approach toward coop-
eration and strives to develop a broader economic and diplomatic identity for the
SCO. The CA countries have also become apprehensive about Russia’s increas-
ingly unpredictable foreign policy, and the possible negative economic outcomes
for CA because of the Western sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its
actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Syroezhkin, 2014, p. 62).
The interaction between the SCO and the CSTO is another point of conten-
tion between China and Russia (Lanteigne, 2018, p. 128). China sees this as
a Russian attempt to strengthen the political and military element in the SCO
activities, whereas China is much more interested in promoting it as a multifac-
eted organization with a strong socio-economic development component. Thus,
China did not support the initiative to merge the SCO and CSTO, which was
introduced during the 2014 SCO Dushanbe Summit (Salimov, 2014).
Following the logic of Western regionalism, Russian experts suggest streamlin-
ing the structure of the Organization’s permanent bodies, clearly codifying their
responsibilities and authority, and developing sustainable funding mechanisms
and sources (Luzyanin and Safronova, 2015, pp. 164–165). Recommendations
for the SCO Strategy include increasing the institutionalization of the RATS,
elevating it to a similar status to that of Interpol; raising the amount of fnancial
aid provided by China and Russia to other SCO countries for modernization
of their training bases; and consolidating the legal framework of defense coop-
eration (Vasiliev, 2015, p. 87). Considering its cooperation with the CSTO, the
SCO could become a substantial regional security institution (Klimenko, 2015,
p. 139).
Upon review of the SCO’s activities until 2015, it can be acknowledged that
the period 2001–2015 is characterized by the process of establishing a new center
of global politics to facilitate a regional security regime and good neighborliness
among SCO members. This is explained both by the desire to reduce instability
along the borders and by their strategic interests in this region. In contrast to
NATO or the emerging ASEAN Security Community, the SCO’s cooperation in
the feld of security is distinct, as it does not involve the political element of inter-
action. The SCO was foremost established for addressing new types of challenges
and security threats and not on creating a traditional military bloc.

The SCO’s activities from 2015 onward: a forum

in Greater Eurasia
The second stage of the SCO’s development began in 2015 and continues today.
Following the 2015 Ufa Summit, experts noted the SCO’s emergence as a politi-
cal force in “Greater Eurasia,” and the 2017 accession of India and Pakistan
underscored this notion. The SCO’s activities at the current stage are viewed
44 E. Mikhaylenko, A. Ospanova, M. Lagutina
against the backdrop of the implementation of BRI, the project of linking the
SREB with the EAEU, and the implementation of Russia’s Greater Eurasian Part-
nership initiative, which involves ASEAN states. Within the SCO, the geopolitical
relationship between Russia, India and China is on display. Some view India’s
accession to the SCO to be a converging point for the SCO and BRICS. Further-
more, the positive experience of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and
India within the SCO should contribute to strengthening ties of the original six
members and the new ones (Luzyanin, 2017, p. 22). Following the Ufa Summit,
India and Pakistan began the formal accession process, and at the 2017 SCO
Astana summit, they were ofcially admitted as SCO members. As a result, the
Organization’s geopolitical focus changed, the scope of activities widened, and
the emphasis previously put on the CA region shifted toward South Asia.
The SCO’s expansion has also afected the RATS activities. The expanded SCO
membership enhances the RATS’s potential for “countering international crime,
drug trafcking and terrorism in the context of radical Islamism strengthen-
ing” (Muratbekova, 2019, p. 145). In 2018, the SCO adopted the Cooperation
Program to Combat Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism for 2019–2021 and
the Anti-Drug Strategy for 2018–2023, which confrms the issues are relevant
for SCO countries. In 2019, joint exercises of all SCO states “Center-2019”
were conducted for the frst time. As noted, “[the] presence of participants from
China, India and Pakistan takes military cooperation to the continental level”
(Filatov, 2019). An innovation in the current stage is joint online exercises in
2015, 2017 and 2019 “Xiamen-2015,” “Xiamen-2017” and “Xiamen-2019”
aimed at uncovering and suppressing destructive activities of terrorist organiza-
tions on the Internet. Today, cyber security dominates the SCO’s political and
military agenda (see also about the RATS in Chapters 2 and 14 – eds.).
Participation of India and Pakistan can also neutralize the political tension
between China and Russia when the former created the Quadrilateral Coop-
eration and Coordination Mechanism in 2016 with Pakistan, Tajikistan, and
Afghanistan without Russia. The goal of this Mechanism is “joint combatting
of terrorism and extremism for maintaining peace and stability in the territories
of all member states” (Frolova, 2020). This format helps China to strengthen its
position in regional security but closely resembles the RATS activities in some
areas. Russian experts questioned whether this Mechanism was redundant: “if
it becomes a reality, an attempt to create such military alliance de facto disa-
vows the anti-terrorist element of the SCO (e.g., the RATS). The existence of
the CSTO in this case is simply ignored” (Knyazev, 2016). Undoubtedly, Russia
takes an interest in increasing the RATS’ importance (SCO Russia, 2019–2020).
However, China expresses only a wish to supplement existing China’s Anti-Terror
Coalition, 2016, underscoring that the new format is not intended to take any
institutional shape, and is focused more on addressing security issues in Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region.
At present, one of the major challenges for the SCO is still the situation in
Afghanistan. The geographic location of Afghanistan is the gateway to Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, and further into CA. After 2015 the SCO’s approach to Afghan
 The SCO and security cooperation 45
security underwent some changes: while earlier the issue was viewed rather as an
external security factor for CA, now Afghanistan has become an internal concern
for the SCO in a Greater Eurasian region. However, it is impossible to dismiss
the diference in the political interests of SCO members regarding the intra-
Afghan settlement process. Currently, a key objective for the SCO is “preventing
the deployment of terrorist groups (primarily those connected with the Islamic
State) in the CA countries” (Efremenko, 2019, p. 122). The US withdrawal from
Afghanistan has already infamed the situation in the region. Numerous experts
have suggested that the uncertainty of the porous borders of Afghanistan can
lead to the military-political transformation of the SCO, since strengthening the
“military component” would arguably beneft nearly all SCO members (Luzya-
nin, 2017, p. 23); however, neither the SCO nor the CSTO can yet efectively
respond to the challenges of military security in the region.
Overall, a distinct feature of the current stage of the SCO’s security activities is
the expansion beyond the regional boundaries to the global level (SCO, 2019).
The Russian presidency of the SCO has brought arms control issues onto the
SCO agenda (SCO, 2019, 2020a), and it is becoming an important forum for
discussing a wide range of security issues facing Eurasia and Asia as a whole.

Prospects for political and military cooperation within

the SCO in Greater Asia
Debates about the SCO’s efectiveness in carrying out its mandate proceed.
Russia continues to emphasize the enhancement of the SCO’s efciency. Some
believe that the SCO Strategy through 2025 (SCO, 2015a) demonstrates a vari-
ety of interests and does not provide a sufcient long-term vision for develop-
ment (Matveev, 2019, pp. 75–77). According to Russian experts, the SCO does
not belong to classical regional security institutions, as it has ruled out traditional
military activities (Klimenko, 2019, p. 132). Combining the capabilities of the
SCO and the CSTO and military coalition building is also hampered by political
conficts between the CA members, along with Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani
territorial disputes that repeatedly led to cross-border armed conficts (Klimenko,
2019, p. 134). Consequently, there is a need for overall coordination of interests
within the SCO, and corresponding rules. Russia is keen on intensifying inter-
institutional ties on the regional level with CSTO and other regional institutions
in Eurasia, and on the global level with the UN. Currently, contacts have been
established and legal acts have been concluded to facilitate cooperation between
the RATS and the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, the UN Ofce on
Drugs and Crime, and Interpol.
China is working to build multilateral cooperation (Bolt and Cross, 2010,
p. 199) and views the SCO as a multilateral platform. It primarily promotes its
economic interests, such as its BRI, along with border security issues. Seeking
regional cooperation in preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the
spread of ethnic separatist elements within the XUAR, China uses the SCO as a
tool for multilateral combating of transnational threats (Yuan, 2010, p. 869). Its
46 E. Mikhaylenko, A. Ospanova, M. Lagutina
participation in the SCO is driven by its interest in restraining other actors in the
region. Sino-Russian relations were not aimed against the USA per se, but rather
toward containing the US and NATO infuence in CA and preventing further
“color revolutions” in the region.
The accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO has signifcantly changed its
role and agenda. There are new political and military challenges related to con-
ficts between India and Pakistan, India and China. If not resolved, these con-
ficts could negatively impact diverse cooperation and dialogue within the SCO
(Battams-Scott, 2019, pp. 2–3). The regional stability issue weakens the efective-
ness of the SCO. Furthermore, some bilateral conficts (e.g., on water resources)
are too complex to be settled within the framework of consensus-based confict
resolution. The most signifcant of these conficts is between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir due to the access it provides to the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab riv-
ers. In the future, this increased competition over energy and water resources in
Eurasia (the most signifcant will likely be between China and India) could lead
to large-scale confict. Additionally, “as India prepares for future increases in its
oil and gas demands, it may become a keen competitor of China for infuence and
hydrocarbons in CA” (Chung, 2006, p. 12). This competition may negatively
afect interactions within the SCO and lead to blocked initiatives or negotiations
on agreements.
Having admitted India and Pakistan, the SCO may develop from the Russian-
driven post-Soviet regionalism to the Asian Security model, based on three forms
of cross-border relations: subnational conficts are embedded into the inter-state
relations, transnationalism in the regional sphere and “virtual promiscuity” in
security engagement (Kerr and Swinton, 2008, p. 115).
However, the prospects of developing legally binding agreements in political
and military cooperation could be throttled by the Asian members. That will
beneft neither China nor India nor the CA countries. Uzbekistan is interested in
transportation infrastructure projects, those related to rail networks. Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan view their membership in the SCO, among other things, as a pos-
sibility to receive additional economic opportunities; for example, Dushanbe
actively promotes the idea of establishing the SCO Anti-Drug Center and head-
quartering it in Tajikistan. Kazakhstan strives to maintain a consistent strategy,
considering it important to cooperate in security, trade and economics. Most
members consider the Organization to be a platform for resolving economic,
energy and other issues. As for security matters, all states aspire to develop a stra-
tegic partnership that does not involve any legally binding obligations. India and
Pakistan are also rather disinterested in building political and military coopera-
tion within the SCO but view it as a platform for establishing mutually benefcial
relations and promoting their interests in CA.
Consequently, political and military cooperation within the SCO has been
poorly institutionalized. The SCO does not have legally binding agreements on
providing military assistance to its members. A distinct feature of the SCO model
is the development of strategic partnership and cooperation in a similar spirit to
that of the Non-Aligned States, and guaranteed freedom of diplomatic action to
 The SCO and security cooperation 47
all parties involved (Sun and Zoubir, 2014, p. 79). SCO countries will continue
working in the realm of anti-terrorist activities and settlement of border conficts.
Political and military cooperation is developing in arms trade, but mainly on
a bilateral basis (e.g., between Russia and India). In our view, the SCO’s stra-
tegic partnership with the Gulf and Middle East countries will intensify soon.
Since 2004, bilateral strategic partnership, economic and trade relations between
China and Arab countries have been developing steadily (Sun and Zoubir, 2014,
p. 96), SCO-GCC partnership will also have a positive impact on regional secu-
rity (Ahmad, 2018, p. 434) and the aims of the SCO are consistent with the poli-
cies of the GCC states (Ahmed, 2018, p. 541). Ultimately, the SCO’s hesitance
to enact rigorous institutionalization and the decision to develop the Organiza-
tion as a forum have the potential to facilitate trust-building between members,
and to resolve border disputes of China and India, as both they are interested in
long-term relationships.

Conclusion
The evolution of cooperation in security matters was rather complicated and
ultimately led to a paradigm shift manifested in the gradual removal of tradi-
tional military security issues from the Organization’s agenda. The SCO became
an organization of multilateral political cooperation, mainly in the feld of non-
military security, and concentrated its eforts on combating terrorism, separatism,
and extremism as well as other emerging challenges such as transnational crime,
illegal migration, and cyber security issues.
The initial period of the SCO’s development in 2001–2014 was defned by the
articulation of an ofcial agenda of military cooperation between members, and
the creation of the key mechanisms such as RATS which would have allowed them
to coordinate eforts in this area. The second period of the SCO development,
beginning in 2015, marks a shift in the Organization’s approach to political and
military cooperation. The SCO members interpret it diferently: for China and
the CA countries, it involves shaping a common position on security issues
and resolving unconventional security challenges, while for Russia the priority is
to develop political and military cooperation within the SCO which resembles
the NATO security model. This has prompted Russia to promote the merging of
the SCO and the CSTO as a basis for the regional security system. However, this
concept did not gain support from China and the CA states. The 2017 accession
of the South Asian nations India and Pakistan suggests that political and military
cooperation within the SCO is going to continue in the framework of consensus
and forum formats.
The SCO’s divergence from Western institutional models in the feld of
security might be viewed positively. The non-interference policy and lack of
decision-making rigor arguably make the SCO more attractive for new partners,
establishing it as a global terrorism governance regime and promoting it as a
platform for building inter-regional cooperation between CA, South Asia and
the Gulf countries. The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan will
48 E. Mikhaylenko, A. Ospanova, M. Lagutina
undoubtedly raise questions for the SCO countries as well. It is unlikely that the
SCO will become a real military institution for solving these challenges, but it can
become a platform for discussion.

Note
The article was funded by a grant from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research
(RFBR) 21–514–12001 NNIO_a “Theory of global institutions: dynamics of their
internal environment, external context and organisational role in world politics.”

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