Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Between China and Central Asian States in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Counter-Terrorism
Cooperation Between
China and Central
by 203.255.63.211 on 04/28/23. Re-use and distribution is strictly not permitted, except for Open Access articles.
Asian States in the

Shanghai Cooperation
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2019.05:65-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
Organization
Wang Jin and

Kong Dehang
Abstract: As Islamic extremist threats have grown to be a common issue

of focus and a major cooperation area between China and Central Asian
states since the 1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
provides China with an important regional and even international
Wang Jin is Research Fellow at the Syria Research Center of Northwest University in
China. His mailing address is: 39th building, Dianjian Community, Jiaozuo City, Henan
454000, China. He can also be reached at warmjohn@live.com. Kong Dehang is Director of
Central China Economic Region Research Institute. His mailing address is: Room 1308,
Qianxi Square, Zhengdong District, Zhengzhou City, Henan 450000, China. He can also
be reached at ccerri@ccerri.org.
This article is funded by the National Social Sciences Fund of China under Grant number
16ZDA096.
c 2019 World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
°
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 65–79
DOI: 10.1142/S2377740019500027
This is an Open Access article, copyright owned by the SIIS and WCPC. The article is distributed
under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY-NC) Licence. Further distribution of this work is
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65
66 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 5, No. 1
counter-terrorism platform. Highlighting sustainable security cooperation

and countering terrorism in a peaceful way under the “Shanghai Spirit,”
the SCO helps stabilize China’s internal security environment while en-
hancing the country’s economic and cultural cooperation with its Central
Asian neighbors. This article reviews the Islamic extremist and terrorist
challenges to China and the counter-terrorism cooperation between China
and Central Asian states under the framework of the SCO, with a focus on
how to tackle the weaknesses of such cooperation. It is concluded that SCO
member states must be prudent in taking further steps in counter-terror-
ism cooperation, especially with regard to whether the organization

should be transformed into a quasi-military and political alliance.
Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); counter-terrorism;

“Shanghai Spirit”; Central Asia.
In 1996, five regional countries China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,

and Kazakhstan announced the founding of a new organization in
Shanghai, the “Shanghai Five,” to resolve border disputes among them-
selves.1 With the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, it became the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), an important regional cooperation
mechanism to combat terrorism and facilitate the development of its
member states in inland Asia. Though substantially larger than the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union in terms of
total population, land size, and natural resources,2 the SCO is far less strong
and integrated than the NATO. The major concern of the SCO is to curb the
1 The “Shanghai Five” mechanism can be traced back to the late 1980s when China and
the Soviet Union started negotiation over their border disputes. After the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991, the border negotiation mechanism was retained and transformed into the
China-Russia-Central Asian states negotiation mechanism, which was later called the
“Shanghai Five.”
2 Today, the SCO consists of 8 formal members, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and
Mongolia are accepted as “observer states,” while Armenia, Azerbajian, Cambodia, Nepal,
Sri Lanka and Turkey are treated as “dialogue states.” In addition, Turkmenistan and three
international organizations including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (UN) are wel-
comed as “guest attendances” for the SCO.
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation 67
expansion of terrorism, extremism and separatism in Central Asia and

China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
How well have China and other SCO members cooperated on counter-
terrorism over the past two decades? And what challenges does the SCO
face in the future? This article aims to address these two questions with a
focus on the counter-terrorism cooperation between China and Central
Asian states. It first reviews the Islamic extremist and terrorist threats in
China and Central Asia; it then examines the major achievements of the
SCO in countering terrorism as well as the limitations and challenges faced

by the organization. The concluding section discusses the future trends of
the SCO with regard to the changing geopolitical circumstances in Asia and
different foreign policies of SCO member states.
Security Concerns of SCO Members
Central Asian Islamic terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced

back to the 1970s when the Soviet ideology was losing its charm in Central
Asia. Many Islamic clergies and groups financed by both Arab states and
some Western states established branches in the region from the 1970s to
the 1980s to disseminate Islamic extremism through underground activities.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing nation-state building
process of Central Asian states including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, many Islamic groups, some of
which were extremism groups, expanded their influence in Central Asia. As
a Turkish American scholar observes, “[b]y the end of the Soviet era the
number of local clergy had shrunk, while the demand (of Islamic knowl-
edge) for them across Russia and Eurasia was mushrooming.”3 Meanwhile,
the defeat of the Soviet Union by Islamic Mujahidin in Afghanistan left a
legacy of trans-Islamic networks in Central Asia.4 Against this backdrop,
many Islamic extremist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan and Hizbut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), started to penetrate into
Central Asia and provoked Islamic revolution in Central Asian states.
3 Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency (Washington D.C.: The Nixon
Center, December 2004), p. 71.
4 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 247.
Afghanistan under the Taliban served as an important base for Islamic

extremism in Central Asia; many Islamic extremists and terrorists were
trained in the country. A number of Islamic extremists and terrorists in
China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region also received training and
supplies from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Incomplete sta-
tistics indicate that over the past three decades, “separatist, terrorist and
extremist forces launched thousands of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, killing

large numbers of innocent people and hundreds of police officers, and
causing immeasurable damage to property.”5 To be more exact, from 1990

to 2001, Uygur extremists and terrorists implemented more than 200 ter-
rorist attacks, killing 162 people and injuring over 400 in Xinjiang.6 The Al-
Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, established training camps in Afghanistan
for the Chinese Islamic extremists, and the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan
became a major external threat to social stability and security in China’s
Xinjiang.7 Some of the Uygur extremists and terrorists also penetrated into
Central Asian states and Russia to join the local terrorist groups.
After the American invasion of Afghani-
stan, many Central Asian Islamic extremists Terrorist, secessionist
fought side by side with the Taliban against and extremist forces
the Washington-led coalition forces in 2001. pose serious threats
Some Islamic extremists from Central Asia fled
to China and Central
to Pakistan and entered into the complex sys-
tem of local Pashtun tribal allegiances.8 After Asian states.
the Arab Spring especially the Syrian civil
war broke out in 2011, thousands of Islamic
5 TheState Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “The Fight
Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang,” March 2019,
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1649931/1649931.htm.
6 “` ’ , [Èastern Turkistan Groups’ Commit
Crimes in Xinjiang After Training in Afghanistan],” Global Times, February 1, 2002, p. 2.
7 Brynjar
Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri
(London: Hurst Publisher, 2007), pp. 247–248.
8 DavidWitter, “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” Institute for the
Study of War, January 27, 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Back-
grounderIMU 28Jan.pdf.
extremists, including some from Central Asia and China, went to Syria and
Iraq to join the “Islamic State (IS)” and other Islamic extremist groups.9
Meanwhile, some Islamic extremists and terrorists pledged allegiance to the
IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and set up their own branches in Afgha-
nistan and Pakistan.10
A network connecting the Islamic extremists from Central Asia and
Southeast Asia was also constructed. Reports of IS recruiters in Hong Kong

approaching Indonesians and using Malaysia as a hub for gathering po-
tential fighters further put Beijing on alert as more Uygurs joined the IS
ranks. In July 2013, Chinese leading media Global Times accused Uygur
Islamic terrorists of receiving training and support from rebel groups in
Syria and Turkey.11 The threat of Uygur extremists became obvious in
August 2015 when several Uygur Islamic terrorists killed almost two dozen
people at the Hindu Erawan Shrine in Bangkok, Thailand.
As warned by Vice Minister of Chinese Public Security Meng Hong-
wei, the biggest concern for China is a possible mass return of Uygur
Islamic militants.12 Although a mass return of trained militants to Central
Asian states is less likely, for they may be relocated to new terrorist attacks
elsewhere, yet in the long term, the influx of such militants will still pose
serious threats to Central Asia. One reason is that Islamic extremism is used
by many extremists to provoke dissatisfaction and hatred among the gen-
eral public; another reason is that Islamic extremists try to brainwash
people with the narrowly defined notion of “Jihad,” abetting them to
participate in violent and terrorist activities against innocent civilians. Since
9 Most Uygur Islamic extremists are concentrated in Idlib province of Syria. See
“Turkey’s De-escalation Efforts around Idlib Come with Risks,” Al-Monitor, May 21, 2018,
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/turkey-syria-de-escalation-efforts-
around-idlib-risky-1.html.
10 Caleb Weiss, “Uzbek Groups Part of New Offensive in Southern Aleppo,” Long War
Journal, June 7, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/uz-bek-groups-part-
of-new-offensive-in-southern-aleppo.%20php.
11 “Syria Ambassador to China: At Least 30 ETIM Members Went to Syria,” Global
Times, July 2, 2018, http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-07/4081528.html.
12 “ChineseIslamic Extremists Might Return to China,” Zaobao News, May 8, 2011,
http://www.zaobao.com/special/report/politic/cnpol/story20110508-140335.
“[a]ll this indicates their denial of modern civilization, rejection of human

progress, and gross violation of the human rights of their fellow citizens,”13
religion-based terrorism has become a common threat to both China and
Central Asian states that entails their close cooperation and, when neces-
sary, joint efforts with the international society.
Achievements of the SCO in Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

The SCO can be traced back to a set of bilateral and multilateral

boundary-monitoring and trust-building mechanisms between China
and its Central Asian neighbors in the early 1990s. As mentioned previ-
ously, the “Shanghai Five” was established in 1996 with the signature
of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai. At
the 2001 summit in Shanghai, leaders of the “Shanghai Five” agreed to
accept Uzbekistan into the group and upgrade it into the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization. The “Shanghai Spirit,” which features mutual trust,
mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and
pursuit of common development, thus became the founding values of the
SCO and continued promoting the development of the organization not only
for the benefit of its members, but also for regional peace and stability.14
To confront the challenges posed by the expansion of the “three evil
forces (terrorism, secessionism and extremism) in Central Asia and
Xinjiang, it became necessary for China as a leading member of the SCO
to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation
in the organization. Since 2001, a number of key SCO cooperation
documents on counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded to all
have been signed by SCO members (Table 1). fields for effective
With the signing of various important
documents and agreements, counter-terrorism
counter-terrorism
cooperation has been strongly enhanced, actions.
highlighting mutual trust and the openness of
13 TheState Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “The Fight
Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang.”
14 “`ShanghaiSpirit,” Secret of SCO’s Success, Xinhua News, June 6, 2017, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017xivisitskazakhstan/2017-06/06/content 29640474.htm.
Table 1. SCO Documents on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.
Issue Date Place Name of Document
June 2001 Shanghai, China Shanghai Convention of Counter-Terrorism,

Counter-Extremism and Counter-Secessionism
June 2002 St. Petersburg, Russia Chapter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization;
Agreement over Counter-Terrorism
June 2004 Toshkent, Uzbekistan Agreement over Counter-Terrorism Database

June 2006 Shanghai, China Cooperation Guideline of Counter-Terrorism,
Counter-Extremism and Counter-Secessionism,
2007–2009
June 2007 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Agreement over Military Exercise
August 2008 Dushanbe, Tajikistan Agreement over Counter-Terrorism Exercise;
Agreement over Cracking Down Smuggling
Weapons, Explosives and Ammunition
March 2009 Toshkent, Uzbekistan Agreement Between Afghanistan and SCO mem-
ber states over Cracking Down Drugs Smug-
gling, Terrorism and Organized Crimes;
Agreement over Counter-Terrorism Training;
Agreement over the Procedures of Counter-
Terrorism Exercise;
Cooperation Guideline of Counter-Terrorism,
2010–2012;
Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation against Terrorism
August 2010 Toshkent, Uzbekistan Declaration of Toshkent
June 2011 Astana, Kazakhstan Declaration of Astana
June 2012 Beijing, China Cooperation Guideline of Counter-Terrorism,
2013–2015
June 2017 Astana, Kazakhstan Statement by the Heads of the SCO on Joint
Counteraction to International Terrorism
Source: SCO website (http://scochina.mfa.gov.cn/chn/).
the SCO.15 Most importantly, China and other SCO members have agreed on
the definition of such key concepts as “terrorism”, “terrorist groups,” “se-
cessionism” and “extremism.” According to the Shanghai Convention of
Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Extremism and Counter-Secessionism signed in 2001
and the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism
signed in 2009, all the SCO member states were “[a]ware that terrorism,
separatism and extremism constitute a threat to international peace and
Cabestan, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asia and

15 Jean-Pierre
Great Powers: An Introduction,” Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No, 3 (2013), p. 424.
security, promotion of friendly relations among States as well as enjoyment

of fundamental human rights and freedoms.”16
Meanwhile, SCO counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded to other
areas to restrain the financial resources of the terrorist networks in the
region. For example, because the smuggling of drugs is a major source of
funds for Islamic extremists and terrorists in Central Asia, SCO members
signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Traffic of Narcotic

Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors in 2004, calling for all coun-
tries to “promote bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in

combating illicit trafficking of narcotics and their precursors, and in pre-
vention and control of drug use.”17
With time, various cooperation mechanisms among SCO member
states have been constructed, with the Council of Heads of State (CHS)
serving as its top decision-making body and Council of Heads of Govern-
ment (CHG) working as the second-highest body inside the SCO. Both the
CHS and the CHG hold summits annually to discuss major directions and
events of the SCO in one of the member states’ capital cities. Apart from the
CHS and the CHG, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of
National Coordinators also hold regular meetings, where the former is
focused on discussion of the international situation and the SCO’s interac-
tion with other international organizations and the latter coordinates
multilateral cooperation of member states within the framework of the
SCO. The Secretariat of the SCO, located in Beijing, is the primary executive
body of the organization. It serves to implement organizational decisions
and decrees, draft proposed documents (such as declarations and agendas),
arrange specific activities within the SCO framework, and promote infor-
mation sharing about the SCO. In 2004, a special office for counter-terrorism
was set up in Toshkent to facilitate information sharing and intelligence
cooperation among SCO states.
16 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Convention of Counter-Terrorism,

Counter-Extremism and Counter-Secessionism, Article 1(2), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/;
and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
against Terrorism, Article 1(3), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/.
17 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit
Traffic of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors between the Member States of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Article 1, http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/.
Table 2. Major SCO Counter-Terrorism Exercises.
Time Exercise Code Location Participants
October 2002 “Exercise-01” China-Kyrgyzstan China and Kyrgyzstan

border
August 2003 “Union-2003” China and Uzbeki- China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
stan Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Kazakhstan
August 2005 “Peace-Mission China and Russia China and Russia
2005”
August 2006 “Tianshan Mountain China and Kazakh- China and Kazakhstan
No. 1” stan
September 2006 “Coordination 2006” Tajikistan China and Tajikistan
September 2007 “Peace Mission 2007” China and Russia China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Kazakhstan
July 2009 “Peace Mission 2009” China and Russia China and Russia
September 2010 “Peace Mission 2010” Kazakhstan China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
and Kazakhstan
May 2011 “Tianshan Mountain China China, Tajikistan and
No. 2” Kyrgyzstan
June 2012 “Peace Mission 2012” Tajikistan China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
and Kazakhstan
August 2014 “Peace Mission China China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
2014”18 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Kazakhstan
Source: Selected from the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure of Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, http://ecrats.org/cn/.
These mechanisms cover various fields ranging from defense and di-
plomacy to law enforcement, culture communication and economic rela-
tions. All levels of meetings and panels have been held regularly, including
the SCO Summits, Prime Ministers’ Meetings, Parliament Speakers’ Meet-
ings, Defense and Foreign Ministers’ Meetings, Chief Procurators’ Meeting,
and Interior Ministers/Public Security Ministers’ Meetings, among others.
Over the past two decades, different SCO member states have co-
operated on various multilateral counter-terrorism exercises (Table 2) and
China has participated in all the exercises. In fact, the SCO military exercises
have become an important platform for both Chinese military forces and
armed police, for it was in those SCO exercises that the Chinese military and
police personnel had the first regular encounter with their foreign coun-
terparts. The “Exercise-01” in 2002 was the first military drill by Chinese
military forces with foreign states, while the “Union-2003” was the first
joint exercise conducted on the soil of a foreign country.18
With the ever closer cooperation among
SCO members, the drug-trafficking network China has initiated
between Afghanistan and other Central Asian many counter-
19
states has been significantly restricted. At the terrorism exercises
same time, the SCO has attempted to tap the

collective economic potentials of its member
with Central Asian
states by encouraging trade and economic ex- states.

change among themselves, emphasizing the
necessity of “expanding trade and investment,
facilitating joint ventures and trade activities, and creating suitable condi-
tions for gradual free movement of goods, capital, services and technolo-
gies.”20 As a result, the SCO has become an important regional mechanism
to facilitate communication, mutual understanding and cooperation among
its member states, in order to curb the expansion of Islamic extremism in
Central Asia and to counter the threats from Islamic extremists and ter-
rorists in the region.21
Challenges for the SCO on Counter-Terrorism
In June 2010, the SCO approved the procedure of admitting new members
and several states participated as observers. In June 2017, India and
Pakistan became full members of the SCO, while Turkey, Iran22 and some
18 Unlike most other exercises, “Peace Mission 2014” received many observers including
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, India, Sri Lanka, Belarus, Turkey and more than 60
military attaches in China.
19 Ruslan Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Per-
spective,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (August 2006), p. 11.
20 GregoryLogvinov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A New Qualitative
Step Forward,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2002), p. 22.
Yu-shek Cheng, “The Afghanistan Situation and China’s New Approach to the
21 Joseph
SCO,” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2015), p. 246.

22 Formore about Iran’s consideration of joining the SCO, see Shahram Akbarzadeh,
“Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Ideology and Realpolitik in Iranian
Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1 (July 2014).
other states have expressed strong willingness to become full members in

the future.23 With the enlargement of the SCO, several challenges also
emerge in counter-terrorism cooperation among its member states.
Above all, mistrust and conflicts of all sorts among SCO member states
may seriously undermine their willingness for counter-terrorism coopera-
tion. For example, since India and Pakistan became member states, the SCO
has witnessed more disagreement and disputes on its action agenda due to
the enmity between the two states, which might lead to possible division
between China and Russia as well. For although China fully supports
Pakistan’s participation in the SCO, Russia tends to have some reservations
because Islamabad supported mujahidin during the Soviet Union’s invasion
of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Meanwhile, India is widely regarded as a
strategic partner of Russia, yet to many observers, China and India are
regional competitors apart from their unresolved territorial disputes.
Similarly, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
Mistrust and conflicts have been bogged down in enduring terri-
among SCO torial disputes the former even sus-
members seriously pended gas supply to the latter in 2013 for
that reason. Uzbekistan also strongly oppo-
hinder their joint ses Kyrgyzstan’s plan to construct dams over
counter-terrorism the Naryn River; and military skirmishes
efforts. between the two countries are not unusual.
As many empirical studies have demon-
strated that territorial disputes are central
to the breakout of interstate wars and conflicts,24 they seriously hinder
the cooperation among SCO members on their common cause of counter-
terrorism.
Second, the definitions of “terrorists” and “terrorist groups” have
become more blurry and sensitive with the SCO enlargement, for dif-
ferent SCO members have varied definitions and standards concerning
counter-terrorism, despite the many documents signed in the past in this
23 In 2012, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka applied for observer
status within the SCO.
24 See, for example, John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), Chapter 4.
regard. For example, although China, India and Russia agreed to treat the
Jaish-e-Mohammed, an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan, as a
“terrorist group” in 2017,25 Pakistan opposes the definition and is re-
luctant to take actions against the group. Likewise, China’s counter-ter-
rorism measures taken by local security agencies in Xinjiang are often
criticized by Central Asian states as “persecution against Muslims.”26
Indeed, the disagreement among SCO members on the status of some

Muslim groups in Central Asia will continue to be a major challenge for
China to further enhance counter-terrorism cooperation with its Central

Asian neighbors.
Third, there remains much debate and doubt about whether the SCO
should develop into a quasi-military and political alliance in the long run,
which may affect the counter-terrorism cooperation among SCO members
and, in particular, with non-member states.27 As a matter of fact, the SCO
was designed as an endeavor to strengthen regional cooperation mechan-
isms rather than compete with the United States or the West as a whole. As
an issue-oriented regional organization, both the establishment and ex-
pansion of the SCO are based on shared concerns of its member states over
terrorist threats. Although the population and area of SCO member states
are much larger than that of Europe and the United States, and cooperation
in various fields have been ever closer over the past few years, the SCO
should not be perceived as an anti-U.S. or anti-West bloc, since that would
harm the interests of all member states that are in need of working with the
West in trade, investment, education, science and technology, as well as in
other areas.
Take China, for example. With China’s active participation and leading
role in the SCO, the organization has managed to reach many important
25 Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Haqqani network and Lashkar were all designated as

terrorist groups in the Xiamen Declaration issued at the BRICS Summit held in China in
September 2017.
26 “ThePlot Behind China’s Suppression of Uygurs in Xinjiang,” Central Asia Program,
January 8, 2018, http://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/12048.
for instance, Kathleen A. Collins and William C. Wohlforth, “Defying `Great
27 See,
Game’ Expectation,” in Richard J. Ellings et al., eds., Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis
(Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003).
Table 3. SCO Documents on Economic and Social Development (2013–18).
Year Document Cooperation Area
2013 Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation Science and Technology

2014 Agreement on Creating Favorable Conditions for Infrastructure
International Road Transportation
2015 Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025 Overall Cooperation
2015 Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction on Border Management

Border Issues
2015 Statement by the Heads of Member States of the Drugs Prohibitions
SCO on Drug Threat

2016 Program for Expanded Tourism Cooperation Tourism
2018 Statement by the Heads of the SCO Member States Health and Disease Control
on Joint Efforts Against the Threat of Epidemics
Source: SCO Website: http://scochina.mfa.gov.cn/chn/.
agreements on expanding cooperation in various fields (Table 3). Yet China

has no intention to expand its sphere of influence or foster a coalition
against a third party. On the contrary, China has taken strenuous efforts to
enhance its economic and strategic relations with the United States and
Europe while remaining prudent at every step of SCO institutionalization,
lest its efforts be misinterpreted as certain strategic ambition. In a similar vein,
its “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” is aimed at further promoting economic
globalization, thus facilitating its peaceful development, instead of challeng-
ing the established interests of the United States, Europe or any other party.28
In addition, as two powers with over-
China has no whelming political, economic and military
intention to develop strengths, China and Russia maintain a sen-
the SCO into an sitive relationship within the SCO. Russia has
been worried that the expanding cooperation
anti-U.S. coalition. of the organization especially between
China and Central Asian members may
increase China’s political influence in Central Asia and put Russia in a risky
position.29 Therefore, it is necessary for China to manage the balance between
28 Ouyang Xiangying, “ : ` ’
[Russia and China: Misplacement and Connection over the Belt and Road Initiative],”
International Economic Review, 2017(2), p. 50.
Flikke, “Balancing Acts: Russian-Chinese Relations and Developments in the
29 Geir
SCO and CSTO,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (No. 1, 2009), p. 23.
ever closer cooperation within the SCO and potential concerns of other
member states.
Conclusion
During the past decades, Islamic extremist and terrorist groups have gradu-
ally connected with each other across the world, and a country’ local terrorist
and extremist threats might be provoked or planned from a distant region. It
is thus important for international society to tackle and constrain these threats
through closer cooperation in regional or global arenas, where the SCO serves
as a good example. For decades, it has not only helped its member states
effectively manage the threats of the “three evil forces,” but its cooperation in
other fields like finance, education, culture and counter-crime has also con-
tributed to the economic well-being and social stability of the whole region.
With the enlargement of the SCO, an important question to ask is: in
what direction will the organization develop in the future? Will the SCO
become a quasi-political and military alliance against the West? Or will it
evolve into a supranational organization like the European Union? Some
states may perceive the organization as a bargaining chip or a strategic
counterbalance against the United States or the European Union. For in-
stance, with the Turkey-U.S. relationship deteriorating after the failed
military coup against the Justice and Development (AKP) government in
mid-2016, Turkish leaders have many a time reiterated the necessity for
Turkey to join the SCO for more political support from international society,
in particular Russia and China. In another instance, after President Trump
decided to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) signed in 2015, the Iranian government expressed a strong will-
ingness to further enhance its relationship with Russia and China by joining
the SCO, in order to safeguard Iran’s security and development.30
For China, however, the SCO should be kept as an international
platform that aims to tackle those non-traditional security threats and up-
hold its “new security concept” featuring “mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality and cooperation,” rather than as a vehicle to bring all countries into
30 “Advisor
to Iran’s Supreme Leader Outlines Steps to Boost Nuclear Program,” Al-
Monitor, May 31, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/05/iran-nuclear-
program-jcpoa-deal-velayati-uf6-ir8-centrifuges.html.
a new Cold War.31 Thus, it is of great importance that China and other SCO
members be prudent in accepting new members while accommodating the
security needs of each other.
In the meantime, the enlargement of the SCO reflects the growing need of
its members and other regional countries for closer cooperation on the most
salient security and development issues, as well as for enhanced communi-
cation between the SCO and other regional or international organizations and
groups. For sure, effectiveness and efficiency of the SCO largely depend on the
common needs and joint efforts of its member states; and the many collective
initiatives such as the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” proposed by Russia
and the BRI proposed by China make it possible for SCO members to be
more deeply engaged in cooperation in areas beyond security and counter-
terrorism. Nevertheless, SCO cooperation on economy, trade, education,
culture as well as science and technology remains limited regardless of the
many agreements signed among its members, such as the Inter-governmental
Agreement on Facilitation of International Road Transport signed in 2014 and the
Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in 2017.
On the one hand, SCO member states still lack a clear common vision for
economic cooperation under the SCO. For example, although many SCO
members call for closer trade and economic exchange within the organization
and the idea of establishing an “SCO Free Trade Zone” has been under dis-
cussion for quite a few years, trade promotion was largely left out from the
Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025, an
important guideline for SCO members approved in 2015.32 On the other hand,
due to many reasons, bilateral rather than multilateral cooperation seems
to remain a major trend among SCO members, which in turn hinders the
institutionalization of the SCO and expansion of cooperation areas
among SCO member states. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, constraining
the expansion of terrorism and Islamic extremism will remain a priority task
for the SCO.
31 Sun Zhuangzhi, “ : [Counter-Terrorism Co-

operation: Process and Prospects of the SCO],” Modern World, 2018(11), p. 20.
32 See the SCO website for details: http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/.

Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Between China and Central Asian States in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Between China and Central Asian States in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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Counter-Terrorism

Asian States in the

Wang Jin and

Abstract: As Islamic extremist threats have grown to be a common issue

counter-terrorism platform. Highlighting sustainable security cooperation

ism cooperation, especially with regard to whether the organization

Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); counter-terrorism;

In 1996, ﬁve regional countries China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,

expansion of terrorism, extremism and separatism in Central Asia and

SCO in countering terrorism as well as the limitations and challenges faced

Security Concerns of SCO Members

Central Asian Islamic terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced

Afghanistan under the Taliban served as an important base for Islamic

extremist forces launched thousands of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, killing

causing immeasurable damage to property.”5 To be more exact, from 1990

Southeast Asia was also constructed. Reports of IS recruiters in Hong Kong

“[a]ll this indicates their denial of modern civilization, rejection of human

Achievements of the SCO in Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

The SCO can be traced back to a set of bilateral and multilateral

Table 1. SCO Documents on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

Issue Date Place Name of Document

June 2001 Shanghai, China Shanghai Convention of Counter-Terrorism,

June 2004 Toshkent, Uzbekistan Agreement over Counter-Terrorism Database

Source: SCO website (http://scochina.mfa.gov.cn/chn/).

Cabestan, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asia and

security, promotion of friendly relations among States as well as enjoyment

signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Traﬃc of Narcotic

tries to “promote bilateral and multilateral international cooperation in

16 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Convention of Counter-Terrorism,

Table 2. Major SCO Counter-Terrorism Exercises.

Time Exercise Code Location Participants

October 2002 “Exercise-01” China-Kyrgyzstan China and Kyrgyzstan

Source: Selected from the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure of Shanghai Cooperation

same time, the SCO has attempted to tap the

states by encouraging trade and economic ex- states.

Challenges for the SCO on Counter-Terrorism

SCO,” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2015), p. 246.

other states have expressed strong willingness to become full members in

Indeed, the disagreement among SCO members on the status of some

China to further enhance counter-terrorism cooperation with its Central

25 Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Haqqani network and Lashkar were all designated as

Table 3. SCO Documents on Economic and Social Development (2013–18).

Year Document Cooperation Area

2013 Agreement on Scientiﬁc and Technical Cooperation Science and Technology

2015 Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction on Border Management

SCO on Drug Threat

Source: SCO Website: http://scochina.mfa.gov.cn/chn/.

agreements on expanding cooperation in various ﬁelds (Table 3). Yet China

31 Sun Zhuangzhi, “ : [Counter-Terrorism Co-

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