Chi Ming Tsoi vs.

CA

266 SCRA 324

FACTS:

On May 22, 1988, Gina Lao married Chi Min Tsoi. Since their marriage

until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact

between them. Gina filed a case of annulment of marriage on the

ground of psychological incapacity with the RTC of Quezon City. The

RTC granted annulment which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Is the failure of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife

from the time of the

marriage until their separation on March 15, 1989 a ground for

psychological incapacity
HELD:

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to

procreate children based on

the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual

cooperation is the basic end of

marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of

one of the parties to fulfill the above

marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Judgment AFFIRMED.
Republic vs. CA

268 SCRA 198

FACTS:

On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina

which union bore a son.

After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and

irresponsibility as a husband and

father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended

on his parents for assistance, and

was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in

frequent quarrels between

them. The RTC granted Roridel’s petition for declaration of nullity of her

marriage which was

affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute

psychological incapacity?

HELD:

There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an

incapacity. It

appears to more of a “difficulty”, if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in

the performance of some

marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and

“conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological

incapacity. It is not enough to prove

that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as

married persons; it is essential that

they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some

psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not

get along with each other. There

had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical

antecedence nor its incurability.

The following guidelines in interpretation and application of Article 36

of the Family Code are

hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff

(2) Root causes of PI must be: medically or clinically identified; alleged

in the complaint; sufficiently

proven by experts; and clearly explained in the decision

(3) PI must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the

marriage, although

manifestation need not be perceivable at such time

(4) Shown to be medically or clinically permanent

(5) Must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to

assume the essential obligations of marriage

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts.

68-71 of the Family Code

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by our

courts

(8) The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to

appear as counsel for the State.

No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a

certification, which will be

quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or

opposition to the petition

Judgment reversed and set aside.

Hernandez vs. CA

320 SCRA 76

FACTS:

Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on Januray 1, 1981 and they

begot three children. On

July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for

annulment of marriage

under Article 36 alleging that from the time of their marriage, Mario

failed to perform his obligation to

support the family, devoting most of his time drinking, had affairs with

many women and cohabiting with another woman with whom he had

an illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family.

The RTC dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article 36.

HELD:

Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were

married, private respondent was

suffering from psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the

ability to assume the essential

duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of

Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private

respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital

obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was

really incapable of fulfilling

his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not

merely physical.

Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or

perversion, and abandonment do

not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering

from a psychological incapacity

within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that

these acts are manifestations of a

disordered personality which make private respondent completely

unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and

not merely due to private respondent’s youth and self- conscious

feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.

Judgment affirmed.
Marcos vs. Marcos

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

FACTS:

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had

five children. Alleging

that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and

have resorted to physical abuse

and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage

for psychological incapacity. The

RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was

however reversed by the CA.

ISSUES:

1) Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the

respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of

psychological incapacity.
2) Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show

psychological incapacity.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

marriage, may be established by the totality of the evidence presented.

There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be

examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non

for such declaration.

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to

provide material support to the

family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the

totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological

incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects”

were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are

incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the

fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this period that he became

intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and

even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was

traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.

Equally important, there is no evidence

showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is

gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for

failure of petitioner to show that

the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical

antecedence and incurability

(Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20); and for her failure to observe the

guidelines as outlined in Republic v. CA

and Molina, 268 SCRA 198

Republic vs. Dagdag

G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001

FACTS:

Plaintiff Erlinda Matias married Avelino Dagdag in 1975 and they begot

children. A week

after the wedding, Avelino would disappear for months. During the

times he was with the family, he

indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.

He would likewise inflict

physical injuries on her. In 1983, Avelino left the family again and that

was the last they heard from

him. Erlinda later learned that Avelino was imprisoned but escaped

from jail. In 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition

for nullity of marriage for psychological incapacity. On December 17,

1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her

counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law,

Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. Virginia testified that she is

married to the brother of Avelino. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino

always quarreled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple’s

house. Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The RTC declared the

marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which was

affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is

emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic and a

fugitive from justice.

HELD:

Taking into consideration these guidelines laid down in the Molina case,

it is evident that Erlinda

failed to comply with the required evidentiary requirements. Erlinda

failed to comply with

guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological

incapacity must be medically or

clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no

psychiatrist or medical doctor

testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.

Further, the allegation that the

husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact,

the crime for which he

was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was

likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence

since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

The Supreme Court has decided six cases on Psychological Incapacity

under Art. 36 of the Family Code:

In the Case of Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20, the supreme court that the

failure of the wife to return home or to communicate with her husband

for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized:

A.) Gravity

B.)Juridical Antecedents

C.)Incurability

It refers to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a

party to be truly cognitive the essential marital obligations.

In Chi Ming Tsoi v, CA, 266 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court Ruled that the

senseless and protracted refusal of the husband to have sexual

intercourse to procreate children, an essential marital obligation from

the time of the marriage up to their separation ten months later is

equivalent to psychological incapacity.

In Republic v. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, the Supreme Court ruled

that irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities do not

constitute psychological incapacity. It then laid down the guidelines in

the application of Art. 36 of the Family Code, to wit;

1. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff.

2. Root cause of psychological incapacity.

a) Medically or clinically identified.

b) Alleged in the complaint.

c) Sufficiently proven experts.

d) Clearly explain in the decision.

3. Incapacity must exist in the time of marriage.

4. Incapacity must be incurable.

5. Gravity of illness disables the party to assume the essentials

marital obligations.

6. The essential marital obligations are those in Articles 68 to 71,

Arts. 220, 221, 225 of Family Code.

 7. Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church should be given great respect.

8. Prosecution and Solicitor General must appear as counsel of the

state. M

In the case of Hernandez v. CA, 320 SCRA 76, the Supreme Court ruled

that the husband’s habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or prevision

and abandonment do not constitute incapacity.

In Republic v. Dagdag G.R. No. 136490, Oct. 19, 2000, the Supreme

Court ruled the psychological incapacity must be established by the

totality of the evidence presented. Examination by physician or

psychologist is not a condition sine qua non for the declaration of

psychological incapacity. Although the husband failed to provide

material support and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the

totality of his acts does not lead to psychological incapacity.

In Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, Feb. 9, 2001, the Supreme

Court ruled that the complainant wife failed to comply with the

evidentiary requirement under the guidelines set in the two cases of

Santos and Molina, as she failed to present a psychiatrist or medical

doctor to testify; the allegation that the husband is a fugitive of justice

was not sufficiently proven, and the investigating prosecutor was not

giving an opportunity to present controverting evidences.

From the above cases, the Supreme Court has laid down both

substantive and procedural requirements for psychological incapacity.

These substantive requirements are the incapacity. These substantive

requirements .

82
LEGAL RESEARCH
The following do not
constitute
psychological incapacity:
the
failure
of
the
wife to
return
home or to communicate
with her
.
-.
husband
for more
than
five
years
(Santos case);
the
irreconcilable
differences
and
conflicting personalities of
the
spouses (Molina case);
the husband's habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion
and abandonment
(Hernandez case).
The procedural
requirements are that the burden
of proof
belongs to
the
plaintiff
;
the
root case of
the
psychological incapacity
must
be
1)
medically or clinically identified, 2)
alleged in
the
com-
plaint,
3) sufficiently proven, 4) clearly
explained in
the
deci
s
ion;
the interpretations
of
the National
Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal
of
the
Catholic Church
are entitled
to
great
respect;
the
prosecu-
tion and the
Solicitor General
must appear
as counsel for
the state
(Molina case).
Psychological incapacity may be
established
by
the totality
of
the
evidence presented. Although
the husband
failed to provide
material support and resorted
to physical abuse and
abandonment
,
the totality
of his acts do not lead to
psychological incapacity (Marcos
case
).
As
the complainant
'
s wife failed to comply
w
ith the
eviden-
tiary requirements,
as she failed to
present
a
psychiatrist
or medi-
cal doctor
and that the investigating
prosecutor was not given
an
opportunity
to
present
controverting evidence,
the petition
is dis-
missed (Dagdag case).
However in
another
case (Marcos),
the
Supreme Court said
that
e
x
amination
by a physician or psychologist is
not a
c
ond
i
tio
sine qua non
for
the
declaration of
p
s
ychological incapacity.
With
the
above
synthesis
of cases, we have analyzed
the
indi
-
vidual
cases and
then
generalized
them
by identifying two require-
ments
for psychological
incapacity
,
namely:
the substantive and the
procedural
requirements.
By
relating the
cas
e
s to each
other
and
puttin
g
th
e
m
under
onerubric,
we can now
und
e
rstand the
a
pplicable
ar
ea of
l
a
w
and
th
e
n
use
the
synthesis to
analyz
e
th
e
problem facing
u
s
82
LEGAL RESEARCH
The following do not
constitute
psychological incapacity:
the
failure
of
the
wife to
return
home or to communicate
with her
.
-.
husband
for more
than
five
years
(Santos case);
the
irreconcilable
differences
and
conflicting personalities of
the
spouses (Molina case);
the husband's habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion
and abandonment
(Hernandez case).
The procedural
requirements are that the burden
of proof
belongs to
the
plaintiff
;
the
root case of
the
psychological incapacity
must
be
1)
medically or clinically identified, 2)
alleged in
the
com-
plaint,
3) sufficiently proven, 4) clearly
explained in
the
deci
s
ion;
the interpretations
of
the National
Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal
of
the
Catholic Church
are entitled
to
great
respect;
the
prosecu-
tion and the
Solicitor General
must appear
as counsel for
the state
(Molina case).
Psychological incapacity may be
established
by
the totality
of
the
evidence presented. Although
the husband
failed to provide
material support and resorted
to physical abuse and
abandonment
,
the totality
of his acts do not lead to
psychological incapacity (Marcos
case
).
As
the complainant
'
s wife failed to comply
w
ith the
eviden-
tiary requirements,
as she failed to
present
a
psychiatrist
or medi-
cal doctor
and that the investigating
prosecutor was not given
an
opportunity
to
present
controverting evidence,
the petition
is dis-
missed (Dagdag case).
However in
another
case (Marcos),
the
Supreme Court said
that
e
x
amination
by a physician or psychologist is
not a
c
ond
i
tio
sine qua non
for
the
declaration of
p
s
ychological incapacity.
With
the
above
synthesis
of cases, we have analyzed
the
indi
-
vidual
cases and
then
generalized
them
by identifying two require-
ments
for psychological
incapacity
,
namely:
the substantive and the
procedural
requirements.
By
relating the
cas
e
s to each
other
and
puttin
g
th
e
m
under
onerubric,
we can now
und
e
rstand the
a
pplicable
ar
ea of
l
a
w
and
th
e
n
use
the
synthesis to
analyz
e
th
e
problem facing
u
s