CASE LIST ARTS 55-67 FCP

1. Najera vs Najera (GR No. 164817, 3 July 2009)

2. Laurena vs CA (GR No. 159220, 22 Sep 2008)
3. Navales vs Navales (GR No. 167523, 27 June 2008)
4. Paras vs Paras (GR No. 147824, 2 Aug 2007)
5. Ong vs Ong (GR No. 153206, 23 Oct 2006)
6. Busuego vs OMB (GR No. 196842, 9 Oct 2013)
7. Castro vs CA (GR No. L-22159, 31 July 1968)
8. Matubis vs Praxedes (GR No. L-11766, 25 Oct 1960)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_164817_2009.html
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2008/sep2008/
gr_159220_2008.php
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2008/jun2008/gr_167523_2008.php
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/aug2007/gr_147824_2007.html
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_153206_2006.html
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_196842_2013.html
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1968/jul1968/gr_l-22159_1968.php
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/oct1960/gr_l-11766_1960.html

1. Najera vs Najera (GR No. 164817, 3 July 2009)

 Facts: On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with
Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon,
Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A).
They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at
the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage. On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order
terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal Motion, which
stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide
equally their conjugal properties. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances
of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder werenil. Its curability depended on
whether the established organic damage was minimal, referring to the malfunction of
the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which
possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses. Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent
arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without
provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was
entered in the police blotter.

Issue: Whether the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the
evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The
root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

2. Laurena vs CA (GR No. 159220, 22 Sep 2008)

3. Navales vs Navales (GR No. 167523, 27 June 2008)
Facts:
In 1986, Nilda and Reynaldo met in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of
his fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got
married in 1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock.
The 1st year of their marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected
some of her duties as a wife. She later worked as a gym instructor and according to
Reynaldo’s allegations; her job makes her flirt with her male clients. She also drives
home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to fetch her. She also
projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo because that
would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be
annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness that attested that Nilda was flirting with
other guys even with Reynaldo’s presence. Reynaldo also presented the findings of a
psychologist who concluded that based on Nilda’s acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who
has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social
personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of
Nilda’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on
her part attacked Reynaldo’s allegations. She said that it is actually Reynaldo who is a
womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against him which was
still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself
because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected
herself as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to
females only. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground
of Nilda’s psychological incapacity.

HELD: The petition must be granted because the State’s participation in this case is
wanting. There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public
Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the
judgment was rendered. And even if the SC would consider the case based on the
merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented by Reynaldo by
themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious,
incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty, “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity”
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be
insufficient to prove the PI of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the expert
interviewed were not concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up
with their respective information was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that
Nilda had had sex with different guys – a condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as
to Nilda’s PI the SC ruled that this case be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
4. Paras vs Paras (GR No. 147824, 2 Aug 2007)

5. Ong vs Ong (GR No. 153206, 23 Oct 2006)

 FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3
children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55
(1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct of petitioner. RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision
when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The highlight was on
December 14, 1995 when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son,
back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the
respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at
respondent’s head asking her to leave the conjugal house.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her
family.

HELD:

No, It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment
referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct
which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The
petition was denied for lack of merit.

6. Busuego vs OMB (GR No. 196842, 9 Oct 2013)

7. Castro vs CA (GR No. L-22159, 31 July 1968)
Petitioner, Emiliano Castro y Villanueva - hereinafter referred to as appellant - seeks the
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, convicting him of the crime of concubinage, with which he is
charged, upon complaint filed by his wife, Flordeliza T. Castro, and sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto
mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs. Not having been apprehended, his co-defendant,
Lolita Flojo y Balicanta has not, as yet, been tried.

The Court of Appeals found that, although legally married to the complainant on
February 9, 1952 - who was separated from him since 1954 - and their marriage had not
been dissolved, appellant had, from about 1956 to 1959, cohabited and had sexual
intercourse with his co-defendant, who live with him, in his house - which used to be his
and complainant's matrimonial domicile - at 1321-A P. Guevara St., Manila, openly as his
wife, as well as presented herself and was presented by appellant as such.

These facts were established by complainant's testimony and that of her sister Sylvia
Tanjuan, who were fully corroborated by the birth certificate (Exh. B) and the SSS form
(Exh. E) of appellant's co-defendant. Indeed, Exhibit B, which is signed by the latter as
Lolita Flojo Castro, shows that on October 7, 1957, she gave birth, at the Far Eastern
University Hospital, to a child named Alejandro Flojo Castro, who, she declared, was her
"legitimate" son and that of Emiliano Villanueva Castro, appellant herein. At the foot of
her signature, she wrote "1321 P. Guevara, Santa Cruz, Manila," which is appellant's
address, as her own. Upon the other hand, in her SSS form, she used the same name and
address - although it was more specific, by adding the suffix A to the house number -
and, apart from naming appellant as her beneficiary, she described him as her
"husband", and her mother, Angeles Vda. de Flojo, as her dependent.

Appellant denied, on the witness stand, having had illicit relations with his co-defendant;
but, it is clear that his testimony can not prevail over the aforementioned evidence for
the prosecution, aside from the circumstance that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive upon us under a petition for review on certiorari, such as the one
at bar. Indeed, the issues raised by appellant herein are basically factual, in view of
which said petition should not have been given due course. Since, however, we have
already examined the record, we are satisfied that said issues are devoid of merit.

Thus, appellant maintains, as he did in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, that
there had been condonation or pardon on the part of his wife; but neither court
sustained this pretense. What is more, the conclusions of the Court of Appeals thereon
constitute another finding of fact, which is not reviewable by us. Independently of the
foregoing, although one letter of the complainant in 1956 - when she seemingly had
mere hearsay notion of the illicit relations between the defendants herein - may not be
clear on her position in relation thereto, her letters in 1957 - in which she referred to
Lolita Flojo as appellant's "querida" or mistress - and, particularly, her behaviour since
1958, when she became positive about said relations, leave no room for doubt that she
had never consented, pardoned or condoned the same. In fact, on May 5, 1959, she
even filed a civil action - civil case No. 1957 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan -
against her husband, for legal separation, based upon the illicit relations between the
herein defendants.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant, Emiliano Castro y Villanueva. It is so ordered.
8. Matubis vs Praxedes (GR No. L-11766, 25 Oct 1960)

Facts:

In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered
into a contract wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and that they should
not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising
from their separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later
gave birth to their child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on
the ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed
the complaint on the ground of prescription and condonation/consent.

Issue:

1.) Did the action prescribe?

2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

Held:

1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant
of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred (now 5 years
under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the
above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground
(concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint
only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than
that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and
consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or
consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. (Matubis
vs Praxedes, G.R. No. L-11766, October 25, 1960)