Melvin (2007) stated Southern Thailand has faced insurgency for many years

especially in active largely in the provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. In some areas of
Songkhla, particularly in some districts with a large Muslim population and in Hat Yai, a
regional economic centre and the largest city in the South, there has also been some violence.
The majority of Malay Muslims live in the neighbouring Satun province, however they have
not been seriously impacted. Nevertheless, the violence had greatly decreased by the late
1980s, and an amnesty plan had convinced many of the rebel leaders to end their violent
resistance. Because of this, in the 1990s, it could be seen that a majority of relative stability in
the area, despite the fact that there were still some instances of fighting there; between 1979
and 2003, political violence in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat was
blamed for 233 fatalities in those three provinces.

The author also found that regarding how to handle the conflict, there was a growing
rift between Thaksin and the army. The powerful Privy Council of King Bhumibol Adulyadej
supported a go-back to the conventional security measures Thaksin had eliminated when he
took office in the South. There were concerns that the war may spill over into well-known
tourist destinations like Koh Samui and Phuket when 8 bombings occurred in Hat Yai, the
southern region's capital, on the night of September 16, 2006—and the death of the first
Western visitor killed in the unrest. It contended that politics are the main contributing factor.
Others point to the emergence of a power struggle between Thaksin and Thailand's long-
standing power structure, which revolves on the institution of the monarchy, in particular.
Others emphasised the crucial role played by the harsh policies adopted by succeeding
governments in regards to the conflict (Melvin, 2007).

An open-source data collection shows that while overall violence increased last year,
it nevertheless remained fairly low by historical norms. The figures are conservative since not
all violent crimes or assaults were covered by the media. Without counting rebels, there were
around 30 fatalities and 123 injuries related to terrorism in the Deep South the previous year.
Even if there were more casualties, these figures are nothing compared to a decade before,
when there were more than ten times as many fatalities and six times as many injuries
(Abuza, 2023). In comparison to the five-year average of 2.45 per month, the author also
stated there were 17 targeted killings in the past year, or 1.42 per month. An informant, a
member of the security forces riding a motorbike with his family, or a critic of Barisan
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the most potent of the armed insurgency organizations in the Deep
South, might all be purposefully targeted in such attacks. Eleven arson attacks and eight
assaults on cellular and power towers were among the other acts of violence. There were
around 11 different assaults on the trains, including a blast on December 3 that caused the
derailment of 11 out of 20 goods vehicles, which was followed the next day by a bomb that
was intended at first responders. On August 17, terrorists set off 17 little explosives (Abuza,
2023).

Chalermsripinyorat (2022) stated ever since 2004, the insurgency has been mostly
driven by the BRN, which wants independence for the predominantly Muslim Pattani
province bordering Malaysia. Since then, around 22,000 assaults have taken place, resulting
in roughly 7,300 fatalities and 13,600 injuries, making it one of Southeast Asia's worst
ongoing wars. More than 484 billion baht ($13.2 billion) have been spent by the Thai
government to put down the uprising. With 31.4 billion baht allotted for the current fiscal
year, spending has increased since the military overthrew the government in a coup in 2014.