Henry Stimson 1945 U S Secretary of War on the Nuclear Bombing of Japan_Harpers

Bazar 1947 Article

This is a paste from the text of his Wikipedia page as it read on 5/6/2023, the Harper’s
article follows.

LINK:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_L._Stimson

TEXT:

Henry L. Stimson
Henry L. Stimson
Stimson, c. 1944

45th & 54th United States Secretary of War

In office
July 10, 1940 – September 21, 1945

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Harry S. Truman

Deputy Robert P. Patterson

John J. McCloy

Preceded by Harry H. Woodring

Succeeded by Robert P. Patterson

In office
May 22, 1911 – March 4, 1913

President William Howard Taft

 Deputy Robert Shaw Oliver

Preceded by Jacob M. Dickinson

Succeeded by Lindley Miller Garrison

46th United States Secretary of State

In office
March 28, 1929 – March 4, 1933

President Herbert Hoover

Deputy Joseph P. Cotton

William Castle

Preceded by Frank B. Kellogg

Succeeded by Cordell Hull

Governor-General of the Philippines

In office
December 27, 1927 – February 23, 1929

President Calvin Coolidge

Deputy Eugene Allen Gilmore

Preceded by Leonard Wood

Succeeded by Eugene Allen Gilmore (Acting)

 United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York

In office
January 1906 – April 8, 1909

President Theodore Roosevelt

William Howard Taft

Preceded by Henry Lawrence Burnett

Succeeded by Henry Wise

Personal details

Born Henry Lewis Stimson

September 21, 1867

Manhattan, New York City, New York, U.S.

Died October 20, 1950 (aged 83)

West Hills, New York, U.S.

Political party Republican

Spouse Mabel Wellington White

Parent Lewis Stimson

Education Phillips Academy Andover

Yale University (BA)
Harvard University (LLB)
 Military service

Allegiance United States

Branch/service United States Army

Rank Brigadier General

Battles/wars World War I

Show more
Henry Lewis Stimson (September 21, 1867 –
October 20, 1950) was an American statesman,
lawyer, and Republican Party politician. Over
his long career, he emerged as a leading figure
in U.S. foreign policy by serving in both
Republican and Democratic administrations. He
served as Secretary of War (1911–1913) under
President William Howard Taft, Secretary of
State (1929–1933) under President Herbert
Hoover, and again Secretary of War (1940–
1945) under Presidents Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, overseeing
American military efforts during World War II.
The son of the surgeon Lewis Atterbury
Stimson, Stimson became a Wall Street lawyer
after graduating from Harvard Law School. He
served as a United States Attorney under
President Theodore Roosevelt and prosecuted
several antitrust cases. After he was defeated
in the 1910 New York gubernatorial election,
Stimson served as Secretary of War under Taft.
He continued the reorganization of the United
States Army that had begun under his
mentor, Elihu Root. After the outbreak of World
War I, Stimson became part of
the Preparedness Movement. He served as an
artillery officer in France after the United
States entered the war. From 1927 to 1929, he
served as Governor-General of the
Philippines under President Calvin Coolidge.
In 1929, President Hoover appointed Stimson
as Secretary of State. Stimson sought to avoid
a worldwide naval race and thus helped
negotiate the London Naval Treaty. He
protested the Japanese invasion of Manchuria,
which instituted the Stimson Doctrine of
nonrecognition of international territorial
changes that are executed by force. After World
War II broke out in Europe, Stimson accepted
President Franklin Roosevelt's appointment to
return as Secretary of War. After the U.S.
entered the war, Stimson, working very closely
with Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall,
took charge of raising and training 13 million
soldiers and airmen, supervised the spending of
a third of the nation's GDP on the Army and
the Air Forces, helped formulate military
strategy, and oversaw the Manhattan Project to
build the first atomic bombs. He supported
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. During and after the war, Stimson
strongly opposed the Morgenthau Plan, which
would have deindustrialized and
partitioned Germany into several smaller states.
He also insisted on judicial proceedings
against Nazi war criminals, which led to
the Nuremberg trials.
Stimson retired from office in September 1945
and died in 1950.
Early life and career

Young Stimson with Mimi, the cat, portrait

by Dora Wheeler Keith

Stimson as a young lawyer

Henry Lewis Stimson was born
in Manhattan, New York City, the son of Lewis
Atterbury Stimson, a prominent surgeon, and
his wife, the former Candace Thurber Wheeler.
When he was nine, his mother died of kidney
failure, and he was then sent to boarding
school.
He spent summers with his
grandmother Candace Wheeler at
her Catskills country house and played with his
uncle Dunham Wheeler, who was almost the
same age, in "the Armory", which was their
nickname for one corner of a large room in the
house.1 2 Roaming the Catskill Mountains, he
grew to love the outdoors and would become
an avid sportsman.3
He was educated at Phillips
Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, where he
gained a lifelong interest in religion and a close
relationship with the school. He later donated
Woodley, his Washington, D.C. real estate, to
the school in his will (the property is now
the Maret School).4 He was an honorary lifetime
member of Theodore Roosevelt's Boone and
Crockett Club, North America's first wildlife
conservation organization.5 He was a Phillips
trustee from 1905 to 1947 and served as
president of the board from 1935 to 1945.6 7 He
then attended Yale College, where he was
elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He joined Skull and
Bones, a secret society that afforded many
contacts for the rest of his life.8 He graduated in
1888 and attended Harvard Law School, where
he graduated in 1890. He joined the
prestigious Wall Street law firm of Root and
Clark in 1891 and became a partner in
1893. Elihu Root, a future Secretary of War and
Secretary of State, became a major influence
on and role model for Stimson.9
In July 1893, Stimson married the former Mabel
Wellington White, a great-great granddaughter
of one of the Founding Fathers, Roger
Sherman, and the sister of Elizabeth Selden
Rogers. An adult case of mumps had left
Stimson infertile, and they had no
children.10 The
couple honeymooned in Kyoto, Japan, a
voyage that would prove critical in Stimson's
decision not to drop a nuclear bomb on that city
during the Second World War.11
In 1906, President Theodore
Roosevelt appointed Stimson U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, where
Stimson made a distinguished record
prosecuting antitrust cases. He later served
from 1937 to 1939 as president of the New York
City Bar Association, where a medal honoring
service as a U.S. Attorney is still awarded in his
honor.
Stimson was defeated as Republican candidate
for Governor of New York in 1910.
He joined the Council on Foreign Relations at
its inception12 and was described by The New
York Times as "the group's quintessential
member".13
Stimson is an English surname, a variant of
Stevenson.14
Secretary of War (1911–1913)

In 1911, President William Howard

Taft appointed Stimson as Secretary of War.
Stimson continued the reorganization of the
army that had begun by Elihu Root, which
improved its efficiency prior to its vast
expansion in World War I. In 1913, Stimson left
office following the accession of
President Woodrow Wilson.
World War I

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred William Bjornstad,

organizer and director of the U.S. Army Staff
College in France, and Lieutenant Colonel
Henry L. Stimson who is about to leave the
college, July 1918.
Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914,
he was a strong supporter of Britain and France
but also supported U.S. neutrality. He called
for preparation of a large, powerful army and
was active in the privately funded Plattsburg
Training Camp Movement to train potential
officers. After the U.S. declared war in 1917,
Stimson was one of the 18 selected by former
President Theodore Roosevelt to raise
a volunteer infantry division for service in
France in 1917.
President Woodrow Wilson refused to make
use of the volunteers, and the unit disbanded.
Stimson served the regular U.S. Army in France
as an artillery officer and reached the rank of
colonel in August 1918. He continued his
military service in the Organized Reserve Corps
and rose to the rank of brigadier general in
1922.15
Nicaragua and Philippines

In 1927, Stimson was sent by President Calvin

Coolidge to Nicaragua to negotiate an end to
the Nicaraguan Civil War. Stimson wrote that
Nicaraguans "were not fitted for the
responsibilities that go with independence and
still less fitted for popular self-
government."16 He opposed independence for
the Philippines for the same reason after he
had been appointed Governor-General of the
Philippines, an office that he held from 1927 to
1929.17
Secretary of State

Official portrait, 1929

Stimson returned to the cabinet in 1929, when
U.S. President Herbert Hoover appointed
him US Secretary of State. Both served until
1933. Stimson lived in the Woodley
Mansion in Washington, D.C., where he
remained through 1946.
Shortly after being appointed as the new
Secretary of State, Stimson shut down
the Cipher Bureau (U.S. cryptanalytic service,
later known as the "Black Chamber") in 1929.
According to the NSA's Center for Cryptologic
History, Stimson likely dissolved the bureau for
budgetary reasons.18 But he also considered
intercepting diplomatic communications
unethical and famously commented,
"Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."19 20
In 1930 and 1931, Stimson was the Chairman
of the U.S. delegation to the London Naval
Conference of 1930. In the following year, he
was the Chairman of the U.S. delegation
to World Disarmament Conference in Geneva.
The same year, the United States issued the
"Stimson Doctrine" in response to Japanese
invasion of Manchuria. It stated that the U.S.
refused to recognize any situation or treaty that
limited U.S. treaty rights or was brought about
by aggression.
Returning to private life at the end of
the Hoover administration, Stimson was an
outspoken advocate of strong opposition to
Japanese aggression.
Secretary of War (1940–1945)

US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson (right)

and Frank B. Kellogg, at the leaving from
the State Department, (July 25, 1929)
After World War II broke out, Roosevelt
returned Stimson to his post at the head of
the War Department, in July 1940. The choice
of Stimson, a conservative Republican, was a
calculated effort by the president to win
bipartisan support for what was considered the
almost-inevitable U.S. entrance into the war. In
the seventeen months leading up to the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stimson,
working side-by-side with U.S. Army Chief of
Staff George C. Marshall (in offices adjacent to
one another where the door between them was
deliberately left open at all times) led efforts to
prepare an unprepared America for war.
Together, Stimson and Marshall had to build
the Army and Air Force up, organize housing
and training for the soldiers, and oversee the
design, testing, production, and distribution of
the machines, weapons, and materials required
to support the country and its allies. Ten days
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Stimson
entered in his diary the following statement:
"[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we are
likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday, for
the Japanese are notorious for making an
attack without warning, and the question was
what we should do. The question was how we
should maneuver them into the position of firing
the first shot without allowing too much danger
to ourselves."21 With respects to the war in
Europe, Stimson was "pro-British" even before
Pearl Harbor. Stimson's view was that
the British Royal Navy fighting Nazi Germany in
the Atlantic was protecting America, and was
the reason the U.S. did not (for the time being)
"have to do the fighting ourselves." Stimson
said America should "rely on the shield of the
British Navy," and that on that basis the U.S.
should do everything possible to arm and
supply the British.22 Because of this view, when
the Senate voted to confirm him, all of the most
notorious isolationist Senators such as Henrik
Shipstead and Ernest Lundeen of
Minnesota, Gerald Nye of North Dakota, Robert
Marion La Follette of Wisconsin, David I.
Walsh of Massachusetts and Burton K.
Wheeler of Montana voted against his
confirmation on the grounds that he was "too
pro-British" whereas all of the most "Anglophile"
Senators such as John H. Bankhead II and J.
Lister Hill of Alabama, Kenneth
McKellar and Tom Stewart of Tennessee, Harry
Schwartz and Joseph C. O'Mahoney of
Wyoming all spoke in favor of Stimson and his
foreign policy views (and voted to confirm him
as Secretary of War).23 24 The British
government watched his confirmation vote
closely, hoping he would have enough votes to
get confirmed by the Senate, and they
celebrated when he was confirmed.25 26 Stimson
and Frank Knox, both "vigorous
interventionists", were confirmed by the Senate
at the same time.27 Both advocated American
entry into World War II on the side of the United
Kingdom, earning them the title of "war hawks"
from isolationists. Knox was described as "even
more of a Hawk than Stimson."28 Stimson was
hired by FDR explicitly to replace Harry Hines
Woodring, Knox was hired explicitly to
replace Charles Edison on the grounds that
Edison and Woodring were isolationists who did
not agree with the philosophy of helping Great
Britain in their war against the Nazis. Stimson
referred to the views of isolationists as
"hopelessly twisted."29 The power of
isolationists explains why Stimson did not
record "shock, horror or anger" after Roosevelt
informed him of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Instead, he wrote, "my first feeling was of relief
that the indecision was over and that a crisis
had come in a way which would unite our
people (…) For I feel this country united has
practically nothing to fear while the apathy and
visions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been
hitherto very discouraging."30
During the war, Stimson oversaw a great
expansion of the military, including drafting and
training of 13 million soldiers and airmen as well
as purchasing and transporting 30% of the
nation's industrial output to the battlefields.31 In
addition to George Marshall, Stimson worked
closely with his top aides Robert P. Patterson,
who succeeded Stimson as secretary;32 Robert
Lovett, who handled the Air Force; Harvey
Bundy; and John J. McCloy, Assistant
Secretary of War.33
Stimson was 73 when he took the reins as War
Secretary, and many critics questioned if a man
of his age could tackle a job that was so
enormous. He defied all naysayers and plunged
into the task with "an energy that men 20 years
his junior could not have mustered." However,
at 75, Stimson confessed that he was "feeling
very tired. The unconscious strain has been
pretty heavy on me."34
Japanese American internment

Stimson and Colonel William H. Kyle (right)

arriving at the Gatow Airport in Berlin,
Germany to attend the Potsdam Conference
(July 16, 1945)
Stimson was initially opposed to the internment
of Japanese Americans away from the West
Coast, but he eventually gave in to pro-
exclusion military advisers and secured
Roosevelt's final approval for the incarceration
program. The administration was split in the
wake of Pearl Harbor, with Justice
Department officials arguing against
"evacuation" and the Army and the War
Department leaders demanding the immediate
relocation. Still opposed to the idea of
wholesale eviction, Stimson spent much of
January 1942 in fielding calls from military
advisers and West Coast politicians on the
potential threat of a Japanese American fifth
column. By February, John McCloy and others
from the pro-exclusion camp had won him over.
On February 11, Stimson and McCloy briefed in
a phone conference Roosevelt, who gave his
Secretary of War the go-ahead to pursue
whatever course he saw fit. McCloy
contacted Karl Bendetsen to begin formulating
a removal strategy immediately after. Roosevelt
granted Stimson the final approval to carry out
the eviction of West Coast Japanese Americans
on February 17, and two days later, Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 9066, which authorized
the establishment of military zones that
excluded certain persons.35
As the Western Defense Command began
circulating civilian exclusion orders, a new
debate formed regarding Japanese Americans
in the Territory of Hawaii. Stimson joined other
officials to push for the exclusion of all "enemy
alien" Japanese from the islands.35 (Japanese
immigrants were prohibited by law from
naturalization and so were classified as enemy
aliens, regardless of their residential status.)
However, Japanese Hawaiians were the largest
ethnic group in the territory and the foundation
of the Island's labor force. Since mass removal
was infeasible both economically and politically,
Stimson's proposal quickly fell through.36
Although Stimson believed it to be "quite
impossible" to determine the loyalty of
Japanese Americans and eventually came to
support the army's incarceration program, he
remained unconvinced on the legality of the
policy: "The second generation Japanese can
only be evacuated either as part of a total
evacuation, giving access to the areas only by
permits, or by frankly trying to put them out on
the ground that their racial characteristics are
such that we cannot understand or trust even
the citizen Japanese. The latter is the fact but I
am afraid it will make a tremendous hole in our
constitutional system."37
Stimson authorized the release of Japanese
Americans from camp in May 1944 but
postponed permission for them to return to the
West Coast until after the November elections
to avoid controversy in Roosevelt's upcoming
campaign.35
General Patton

Main article: George S. Patton slapping

incidents
On November 21, 1943, the news broke that
General George S. Patton, commander of the
U.S. Seventh Army, had slapped an enlisted
man who suffered from nervous exhaustion at a
medical evacuation hospital in Sicily.38 The
incident caused a storm of controversy, and
members of Congress called for Patton to be
relieved of command. General Dwight
Eisenhower opposed any move to recall
General Patton from the European Theater and
said privately, "Patton is indispensable to the
war effort – one of the guarantors of our
victory."39 Stimson and McCloy agreed; Stimson
told the Senate that Patton would be retained
because of the need for his "aggressive,
winning leadership in the bitter battles which
are to come before final victory."40
Morgenthau Plan

Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers pointing out

landmarks at devastated Cassino to Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson touring the Italian
battlefront
Stimson strongly opposed the Morgenthau
Plan to deindustrialize and to partition Germany
into several smaller states.41 The plan also
envisioned the deportation and the summary
imprisonment of anybody suspected of
responsibility for war crimes. Initially, Roosevelt
had been sympathetic to the plan, but Stimson's
opposition and the public outcry when the plan
was leaked made Roosevelt backtrack. Stimson
thus retained overall control of the U.S.
occupation zone in Germany, and despite the
plan's influence on the early occupation, it
never became official policy. Explaining his
opposition to the plan, Stimson insisted to
Roosevelt that 10 European countries, including
Russia, depended upon German trade and its
production of raw materials. He also stated that
it was inconceivable that the "gift of nature,"
which was populated by peoples of "energy,
vigor, and progressiveness," should be turned
into a "ghost territory" or "dust heap."
What Stimson most feared, however, was that a
subsistence-level economy would turn the
anger of Germans against the Allies and
thereby "obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the
viciousness of their doctrines and their acts."
Stimson pressed similar arguments on Harry S.
Truman, when he became president, in the
spring of 1945.42
Stimson, a lawyer, insisted, against the initial
wishes of both Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, on proper judicial
proceedings against leading war criminals. He
and the War Department, drafted the first
proposals for an International Tribunal, which
soon received backing from Truman. Stimson's
plan eventually led to the Nuremberg Trials of
1945–1946, which have strongly influenced the
development of international law.
Atomic bomb

Further information: Manhattan

Project and Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki
Stimson arriving for a Truman cabinet meeting
in August 1945
As Secretary of War, Stimson took direct and
personal control of the entire atomic bomb
project, with immediate supervision over
General Leslie Groves, the head of
the Manhattan Project. Both Roosevelt and
Truman followed Stimson's advice on every
aspect of the bomb, and Stimson overruled
military officers when they opposed his
views.43 44 That is best seen after military
planners had selected Kyoto as the most
promising target in southern Japan for nuclear
attack. Stimson, remembering his honeymoon
in that city, once again overruled his generals:
Kyoto had been favored for the very first attack
but the committee opted to blitz Hiroshima,
which was an important army depot and
embarkation port within an urban environment.
Targets in the south were given priority to boost
possible invasion plans but the ancient city of
Kyoto was withdrawn because the U.S.
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who had
honeymooned there, said it was an important
cultural center and "must not be bombed."11
The Manhattan Project was managed by Major
General Groves (Corps of Engineers) with a
staff of reservists and many thousands of
civilian scientists and engineers. Groves
nominally reported directly to General George
Marshall, but Stimson was really in charge.
Stimson secured the necessary money and
approval from Roosevelt and from Congress,
ensured that Manhattan had the highest
priorities, and controlled all plans for the use of
the bomb. Stimson successfully tried to get
"Little Boy" (the Hiroshima bomb) dropped
within hours of its earliest possible availability.
Japan was to be forced to surrender, and the
bombing of Hiroshima August 6 was likely a
finishing blow for Tokyo.45
Stimson ultimately concluded that if the U.S.
had guaranteed the Japanese preservation of
the imperial constitutional monarchy, Japan
might have surrendered and prevented the use
of atomic bombs.46 Historians debate whether
the impact of continued blockade, relentless
bombing, and the Soviet Union's invasion
of Manchuria would have forced Japanese
Emperor Hirohito to surrender some time in late
1945 or early 1946 without the use of atomic
bombs but with massive Allied casualties.47 48
After American journalist John
Hersey's account of the Hiroshima atomic
bombing became a media sensation, Stimson
and others published their own article "The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb". It argued
that the atomic bombings saved the Japanese
from themselves, that demonstrating it would
have been impractical, and American casualties
from a potential invasion would exceed 1
million, although military documents from July
1945 estimated under 200,000 casualties.
Stimson also sidestepped questions such as
the suffering of the victims and the radioactive
qualities of the bombs, saying they had a
"revolutionary character" or "unfamiliar nature".
Because his article was the first official account
of the reasonings behind the bombings, news
outlets that were covering
Hersey's Hiroshima began to cover Stimson's
article instead. President Truman commended
Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, who had
worked with Stimson on the article, later wrote,
"We deserve some sort of medal."49
Stimson's vision

Stimson looked beyond the immediate end of

the war. He was the only top government
official to try to predict the meaning of
the Atomic Age, and he envisioned a new era in
human affairs.50 For half-a-century, he had
worked to inject order, science, and moralism
into matters of law, state, and diplomacy.51 The
impact of the atom bomb, he thought, would go
far beyond military concerns to encompass
diplomacy, world affairs, business, economics,
and science. Above all, Stimson stated that the
"most terrible weapon ever known in human
history" opened up "the opportunity to bring the
world into a pattern in which the peace of the
world and our civilization can be saved."52 He
thought that the very destructiveness of the new
weaponry would shatter the ages-old belief that
wars could be advantageous. It might now be
possible to call a halt to the use of destruction
as a ready solution to human conflicts. Indeed,
society's new control over the most elemental
forces of nature finally "caps the climax of the
race between man's growing technical power
for destructiveness and his psychological power
of self-control and group control--his moral
power."53 54 To this end, Stimson advocated
collaboration with the Soviet Union and genuine
international control of atomic technology and
weaponry, including possibly turning them over
to the United Nations. He was opposed in this
by other members of the Truman administration
like James Byrnes.55 Stimson's vision of such a
new world order, shared in part by many atomic
scientists as well as Albert Einstein, would have
meant yielding some sovereignty to something
akin to a world government.56
In 1931, when Japan had invaded Manchuria,
Stimson, as Secretary of State, proclaimed
the Stimson Doctrine: no fruits of illegal
aggression would ever be recognized by the
United States. Although Japan ignored it,
according to Stimson, the wheels of justice had
now turned and the "peace-loving" nations, as
Stimson called them, had the chance to punish
Japan's misdeeds in a manner that would warn
aggressor nations never again to invade their
neighbors. To validate the new moral order, he
believed that the atomic bomb had to be used
against combatants and workers in the
war. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had both
contained combatant bases and major centers
of war industry that employed tens of thousands
of civilians. The question for Stimson was not
one of whether the weapon should be used.
Involved were the simple issue of ending a
horrible war and the more subtle and more
important question of the possibility of genuine
peace among nations. Stimson's decision
involved the fate of mankind, and he posed the
problem to the world in such clear and articulate
fashion that there was a nearly-unanimous
agreement mankind had to find a way so that
atomic weapons would never be used again to
kill people.57 58 59
Later life

Stimson officially announced his retirement on

September 21, 1945. Afterwards, he wrote his
memoirs with the aid of McGeorge Bundy. On
Active Service in Peace and War was published
by Harper in 1948 to critical acclaim. It is often
cited by historians, as are the 170,000 typed
pages of candid diaries that Stimson dictated at
the end of every day. The diary is now in the
Yale University Library; parts have been
published in microfilm.60
Two months after leaving office, in November
1945, Stimson suffered a heart attack from
which he recovered, although he suffered a
speech impediment.61 In the summer of 1950,
Stimson fell and broke his leg and was confined
to a wheelchair. On October 20, one month
after his 83rd birthday, he succumbed to
complications from a second heart
attack.62 Stimson died at his estate Highhold
in West Hills, New York.63 He is buried in the
adjacent town of Cold Spring Harbor, in the
cemetery of St. John's Church.64 65 He was the
last surviving member of Taft's cabinet.
Anecdote

Theodore H. White noted that Stimson had

known and served under more Presidents than
any other American citizen of his era. According
to White, a short time before Stimson died, he
had been asked by a friend which of the many
Presidents that he had been acquainted with
"had been the best." After a few moments of
reflection, Stimson indicated his answer to the
query depended on what was meant by "the
best." He said that if it meant the most efficient
man to hold the office, the answer was William
Howard Taft. If, however, the question meant
the greatest president, the answer was
"Roosevelt," but Stimson could not decide
whether the first name would
be Theodore or Franklin. Stimson said both
"understood the use of power" but as well
"knew the enjoyment of power."66
Awards

 Distinguished Service Medal (U.S. Army)67

 World War I Victory Medal
 American Legion Distinguished Service
Medal68
Legacy

Mount Stimson in Montana's Glacier National

Park is named after Stimson, who in the 1890s
hiked and assisted George Bird Grinnell in
surveying the area and later supported creating
the park.
The Henry L. Stimson Center, a private
research institute in Washington, DC,
advocates what it says is Stimson's "practical,
non-partisan approach" to international
relations.69
The Benjamin Franklin-class ballistic missile
submarine USS Henry L. Stimson (SSBN-
655) was commissioned in 1966.
Stimson's name graces the Henry L. Stimson
Middle School in Huntington Station, Long
Island; a residential building on the campus
of Stony Brook University; as well as a dorm at
his alma mater Phillips Academy.
Stimson is also commemorated by the New
York City Bar Association, where he served as
president from 1937 to 1939, with the Henry L.
Stimson Medal. The medal is awarded annually
to outstanding Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
In popular culture

Stimson has been portrayed in nearly a dozen

movies and television shows about World War
II and its aftermath, including Manhattan (2014-
2015), Truman (1995), Truman at
Potsdam (1995), Fat Man and Little
Boy (1989), Day One (1989), War and
Remembrance (1988), Race for the
Bomb (1987), Churchill and the
Generals (1981), Oppenheimer (1980), Tora!
Tora! Tora! (1970), and The Beginning or the
End (1947).
In the alternate history short story "Truth,
Justice, and the American Way" by Lawrence
Watt-Evans contained in the 1992 alternate
history anthology Alternate Presidents by Mike
Resnick, Stimson succeeded Hoover (who
defeated Roosevelt in 1932 after Al Smith ran
as a third party candidate and split the
Democratic vote) as president in 1936,
defeating Roosevelt. He once again defeated
Roosevelt in 1940.
See also

 List of U.S. political appointments that

crossed party lines
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(2001). Candace Wheeler: The Art and
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3. ^ Candace Wheeler, Yesterdays in a
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(1948). On Active Service in Peace and
War. New York, New York, USA: Harper &
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gentleman with the gentlemen sent as
ambassadors and ministers from friendly
nations, and as he later said, 'Gentlemen do
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Japanese," Mississippi Valley Historical
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Hodgson
23. ^ The Colonel: The Life and Wars of
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Hodgson
24. ^ "Voteview | Plot Vote: 76th Congress
> Senate > 223".
25. ^ The Colonel: The Life and Wars of
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26. ^ "Voteview | Plot Vote: 76th Congress
> Senate > 223".
27. ^ Those Angry Days: Roosevelt,
Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World
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28. ^ Those Angry Days: Roosevelt,
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War II by Lynne Olson, pg. 205
29. ^ Those Angry Days: Roosevelt,
Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World
War II by Lynne Olson, pg. 205-206
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2022). "Uniting America review: how FDR
and the GOP beat fascism home and
away". The Guardian. Retrieved 20
December 2022.
31. ^ Herman, Arthur. Freedom's Forge:
How American Business Produced Victory
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35. ^ Jump up to: a b c Niiya, Brian. "Henry
Stimson". Densho Encyclopedia.
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36. ^ Scheiber, Jane L.; Scheiber, Harry
N. "Martial Law in Hawaii". Densho
Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15 October 2014.
37. ^ Hodgson, Godfrey. The Colonel: The
Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867-
1950 (New York: Knopf, 1990), p 259.
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War in Sicily and Italy 1943-1944, New
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8861-8 (2007), p. 147.
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016455-7 (1995), p. 536
40. ^ D'Este, Patton: A Genius For War, p.
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07). Morgenthau-
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Trommler, eds. America and the Germans:
An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year
History (University of Pennsylvania Press,
1990) v2 p. 176; see also Michael R.
Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt,
Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's
Germany, 1941-1945 (2002)
43. ^ Sean Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry
L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the
Bomb Against Japan The Manhattan
Project, Department of Energy at
mbe.doe.gov
44. ^ "Henry Lewis Stimson". Archived
from the original on 2010-06-11.
Retrieved 2011-06-20.
45. ^ Art, Robert J.; Waltz, Kenneth Neal
(2004). The Use of Force: Military Power
and International Politics. Rowman &
Littlefield. p. 179. ISBN 9780742525573.
46. ^ David F. Schmitz, Henry L. Stimson:
the first wise man (2001) p 153.
47. ^ Barton J. Bernstein (1993). ""Seizing
the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear
History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies
Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb," Diplomatic History 17 (Winter 1993):
35-72". Diplomatic History. 17: 35–
72. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7709.1993.tb00158.x.
48. ^ Alperovitz, Gar (1995). The decision to
use the atomic bomb and the architecture of
an American myth (1st ed.). New York:
Knopf. ISBN 978-0679762850.
49. ^ Blume, Lesley M. M. (2020). Fallout :
the Hiroshima cover-up and the reporter
who revealed it to the world (First Simon &
Schuster hardcover ed.). New York.
pp. 153–157. ISBN 9781982128517.
50. ^ Henry Stimson to Harry S. Truman,
accompanied by a memorandum,
 September 11, 1945. Truman Papers,
President's Secretary's File. Atomic Bomb.
51. ^ Stimson, Henry. "Stimson Press
Release". Atomic Heritage Foundation,
1945.
52. ^ Top Secret Letter From Henry
Stimson, Secretary of War 24 April 1945.
Retrieved 31 December 2018.
53. ^ Henry L. Stimson, On Active Services
in Peace and War (1948) p. 636
54. ^ Michael Kort, The Columbia guide to
Hiroshima and the bomb (2007) p. 179
55. ^ Campbell Craig and Sergey
Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the
Origins of the Cold War (2008) pp. 114-120,
164, 168
56. ^ Campbell Craig and Sergey
Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the
Origins of the Cold War (2008) p. 170
57. ^ See Bonnett, John. "Jekyll and Hyde:
Henry L. Stimson, Mentalite, and the
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb on
Japan." War in History 1997 4(2): 174-
212. ISSN 0968-3445 Fulltext: Ebsco
58. ^ McGeorge Bundy, Danger and
Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the
First Fifty Years (1988)
59. ^ Robert P. Newman, "Hiroshima and
the Trashing of Henry Stimson" The New
England Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Mar.,
1998), pp. 5-32 in JSTOR
60. ^ "The Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson
in the Yale University Library".
Microformguides.gale.com. 1945-09-21.
Retrieved 2014-07-20.
61. ^ Universal Press Syndicate (Nov 13,
1945). "Stimson Recovering from Heart
Attack". Pittsburgh Press. Retrieved 2014-
01-23.
62. ^ "Henry L. Stimson Dies at 83 In His
Home on Long Island". New York Times.
October 21, 1950. Retrieved 2014-01-23.
63. ^ "Henry L. Stimson, 83, Dies on LI,
Served Nation in Four Cabinets". Newsday.
October 21, 1950. p. 2.
64. ^ "Memorial Cemetery, St. John's
Church". Retrieved October 20, 2016.
 65. ^ "St. John's Church Memorial
Cemetery". Oldlongisland.com.
Retrieved 13 October 2017.
66. ^ White, Theodore H. (2009). The
Making of the President 1960 (Harper
Perennial Political Classicss ed.). New York:
HarperCollins. p. 366. ISBN 978-0-06-
190060-0.
67. ^ "Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-
1953". Trumanlibrary.org. Retrieved 13
October 2017.
68. ^ "Distinguished Service Medal
Recipients - Page 9 - The American
Legion". Legion.org. Retrieved 13
October 2017.
69. ^ "About Stimson | The Stimson Center |
Pragmatic Steps for Global Security".
Stimson.org. Retrieved 2013-06-10.
Further reading

Secondary sources

 Aldrich, Edward Farley. "The Partnership:

George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the
Extraordinary Collaboration that Won World
War II." (Stackpole Books, 2022)
 Barlow, Aaron, ed. The Manhattan Project
and the Dropping of the Atomic Bomb: The
Essential Reference Guide (ABC-CLIO,
2019).
 Bonnett, John. "Jekyll and Hyde: Henry L.
Stimson, Mentalite, and the Decision to Use
the Atomic Bomb on Japan." War in
History 1997 4(2): 174–212. online
 Chu, Esther Briney. "The policy of secretary
of state Henry L. Stimson toward China"
(PhD dissertation, Northwestern
University; ProQuest Dissertations
Publishing, 1943. 10101268).
 Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American foreign policy, 1932-
1945 (1979) online
 Ferrell, Robert H. Frank B. Kellogg; Henry
L. Stimson (1963); as Secretary of
State online
 Gerber, Larry G. "Stimson, Henry
Lewis"; American National Biography Online
February 2000.
 Gerber, Larry G. The Limits of Liberalism:
Josephus Daniels, Henry Stimson, Bernard
 Baruch, Donald Richberg, Felix Frankfurter
and the Development of the Modern
American Political Economy (1983). online
 Golub, Grant. "The proper and orthodox
way of war: Henry Stimson, the war
department, and the politics of US military
policy during World War II." International
History Review (2022): 1-21. online
 Harper, John L. "Henry Stimson and the
Origin of America's Attachment to Atomic
Weapons." SAIS Review 5.2 (1985): 17-
28. online
 Hodgson, Godfrey. The Colonel: The Life
and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867-
1950 (1990). popular biography online
 Jordan, Jonathan W., American Warlords:
How Roosevelt's High Command Led
America to Victory in World War
II (NAL/Caliber 2015).
 Majerus, Joe. "Unconditional Surrender and
the American Case Against the Modification
of a Controversial Policy (1943–
1945)." International Journal of Military
 History and Historiography 40.2 (2020):
245-277.
 Majerus, Joé. "Final Strategy: The Post-War
Grand Strategic Designs of Henry L.
Stimson." International History Review 41.4
(2019): 845-865.
 Malloy, Sean L. Atomic Tragedy: Henry L.
Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb
Against Japan (2008) online
 Morison, Elting E. Turmoil and Tradition: A
Study of the Life and Times of Henry L.
Stimson (1960), scholarly biography online
 Newman, Robert P. "Hiroshima and the
trashing of Henry Stimson." New England
Quarterly 71.1 (1998): 5-32. online
 O’Brien, Phillips Payson. "The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the atom bomb, the American
Military Mind and the end of the Second
World War." Journal of Strategic
Studies 42.7 (2019): 971-991. online
 Rappaport, Armin. Henry L. Stimson and
Japan, 1931-33 (1963) online
  Redmond, Kent C. "The education of a
statesman: Henry L. Stimson, 1911-1928"
(PhD dissertation, University of Southern
California; ProQuest Dissertations
Publishing, 1953. DP28692).
 Robertson, Charles Langner. "The
American Secretary Of State: A Study Of
The Office Under Henry L. Stimson And
Cordell Hull." (PhD dissertation, Princeton
University; ProQuest Dissertations
Publishing, 1959. 6005044).
 Schmitz, David F. Henry L. Stimson: The
First Wise Man (2000) online
 Smith, Michael John J. "Henry L. Stimson
and the Philippines" (PhD dissertation,
Indiana University; ProQuest Dissertations
Publishing, 1970. 7021551).
 Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and utter
destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan (UNC Press Books,
2016). online
Historiography
  Kelly, Jason M. "Why Did Henry Stimson
Spare Kyoto from the Bomb?: Confusion in
Postwar Historiography." Journal of
American-East Asian Relations 19.2 (2012):
183-203.
 Kort, Michael. "The Historiography of
Hiroshima: The Rise and Fall of
Revisionism." New England Journal of
History 64.1 (2007): 31-48. online
 Newman, Robert P. "Hiroshima and the
Trashing of Henry Stimson" The New
England Quarterly, 71#1 (1998), pp. 5–32 in
JSTOR
Primary sources

 Stimson, Henry and McGeorge Bundy, On

Active Service in Peace and War. (1948)
(memoirs) online
 United States. War Department. Prelude To
Invasion: An Account Based Upon Official
Reports by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of
War (1944) online
External links
Wikiquote has quotations related to Henry L.
Stimson.

Wikimedia Commons has media related

to Henry Lewis Stimson.
 Obituary, New York Times, October 21,
1950
 Henry Stimson Center
 Annotated bibliography for Henry Stimson
from the Alsos Digital Library
 Sherman Genealogy Including Families of
Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk, England By
Thomas Townsend Sherman
 Henry L. Stimson at Find a Grave
 verbatim copy of "Stimson Diary" entries
regarding Atomic Bomb, Dec 1944 to Sept
1945
 Works by Henry L.
Stimson at LibriVox (public domain
audiobooks)
 Newspaper clippings about Henry L.
Stimson in the 20th Century Press
Archives of the ZBW
  Henry Lewis Stimson papers (MS 465).
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University
Library. [1]

Here below is the Harper’s Article:

LINK:

https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/key-documents/stimson-bomb/

HEADER:

TEXT:

Stimson on the Bomb

In the February 1947 issue of Harper’s
Magazine, Secretary of War Henry
Stimson provided the American public with his
rationale for using the atomic bomb. President
of Harvard University James B. Conant, an
important scientific advisor to the Manhattan
Project, urged Stimson to respond to growing
criticism of use of the atomic bombs. Stimson’s
article documents the refusal of the Japanese
to surrender and estimates that the Allied
invasion would have cost one million American
casualties and many more Japanese.
From “The Decision to Use the Atomic
Bomb” by Henry Stimson
In recent months there has been much
comment about the decision to use atomic
bombs in attacks on the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This decision was
one of the gravest made by our government in
recent years, and it is entirely proper that it
should be widely discussed. I have therefore
decided to record for all who may be interested
my understanding of the events which led up to
the attack on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, on
Nagasaki on August 9, and the Japanese
decision to surrender on August 10. No single
individual can hope to know exactly what took
place in the minds of all of those who had a
share in these events, but what follows is an
exact description of our thoughts and actions as
I find them in the records and in my clear
recollection.
***
The extraordinary story of the successful
development of the atomic bomb has been well
told elsewhere. As the time went on it became
clear that the weapon would not be available in
time for use in the European Theater, and the
war against Germany was successfully ended
by the use of what are now called conventional
means. But in the spring of 1945 it became
evident that the climax of our prolonged atomic
effort was at hand.
***
The principal political, social, and military
objective of the United States in the summer of
1945 was the prompt and complete surrender
of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her
military power could open the way to lasting
peace. Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously
weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It
was known to us that she had gone so far as to
make tentative proposals to the Soviet
government, hoping to use the Russians as
mediators in a negotiated peace. These vague
proposals contemplated the retention of Japan
of important conquered areas and were
therefore not considered seriously. There was
as yet no indication of any weakening in the
Japanese determination to fight rather than
accept unconditional surrender. If she should
persist in her fight to the end, she had still a
great military force.
In the middle of July 1945, the intelligence
section of the War Department General Staff
estimated Japanese military strength as follows:
in the home islands, slightly under 2,000,000; in
Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa,
slightly over 2,000,000; in French IndoChina,
Thailand, and Burma, over 200,000; in the East
Indies area, including the Philippines, over
500,000; in the bypassed Pacific islands, over
100,000. The total strength of the Japanese
Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men.
These estimates later proved to be in very close
agreement with official Japanese figures. The
Japanese Army was in much better condition
than the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The
Navy had practically ceased to exist except as
a harrying force against an invasion fleet. The
Air Force had been reduced mainly to reliance
upon Kamikaze, or suicide, attacks. These
latter, however, had already inflicted serious
damage on our seagoing forces, and their
possible effectiveness in a last ditch fight was a
matter of real concern to our naval leaders.
As we understood it in July, there was a very
strong possibility that the Japanese government
might determine upon resistance to the end, in
all the areas of the Far East under its control. In
such an event the Allies would be faced with
the enormous task of destroying an armed force
of five million men and five thousand suicide
aircraft, belonging to a race which had already
amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to
the death.
The strategic plans of our armed forces for the
defeat of Japan, as they stood in July, had been
prepared without reliance upon the atomic
bomb, which had not yet been tested in New
Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea
and air blockade, and greatly intensified
strategic air bombing, through the summer and
early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an
invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This
would be followed in turn by an invasion of the
main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946.
The total U.S. military and naval force involved
in this grand design was of the order of
5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned
are included, it was larger still.
We estimated that if we should be forced to
carry this plan to its conclusion, the major
fighting would not end until the latter part of
1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such
operations might be expected to cost over a
million casualties, to American forces alone.
Additional large losses might be expected
among our allies, and, of course, if our
campaign were successful and if we could
judge by previous experience, enemy
casualties would be much larger than our own.
It was already clear in July that even before the
invasion we should be able to inflict enormously
severe damage on the Japanese homeland by
the combined application of “conventional” sea
and air power. The critical question was
whether this kind of action would induce
surrender. It therefore became necessary to
consider very carefully the probable state of
mind of the enemy, and to assess with
accuracy the line of conduct which might end
his will to resist.
***
There was much discussion in Washington
about the timing of the warning to Japan. The
controlling factor in the end was the date
already set for the Potsdam meeting of the Big
Three. It was President Truman’s decision that
such a warning should be solemnly issued by
the U.S. and the U.K. from this meeting, with
the concurrence of the head of the Chinese
government, so that it would be plain that all of
Japan’s principal enemies were in entire unity.
This was done in the Potsdam ultimatum of July
26, which very closely followed the above
memorandum of July 2 with the exception that it
made no mention of the Japanese Emperor. On
July 28 the Premier of Japan, Suzuki, rejected
the Potsdam ultimatum by announcing that it
was “unworthy of public notice.” In the face of
this rejection we could only proceed to
demonstrate that the ultimatum had meant
exactly what it said when it stated that if the
Japanese continued the war, “the full
application of our military power, backed by our
resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete
destruction of the Japanese armed forces and
just as inevitably the utter devastation of the
Japanese homeland.”
For such a purpose the atomic bomb was an
eminently suitable weapon. The New Mexico
test occurred while we were at Potsdam, on
July 16. It was immediately clear that the power
of the bomb measured up to our highest
estimates. We had developed a weapon of
such a revolutionary character that its use
against the enemy might well be expected to
produce exactly the kind of shock on the
Japanese ruling oligarchy which we desired,
strengthening the position of those who wished
peace, and weakening that of the military party.
Because of the importance of the atomic
mission against Japan, the detailed plans were
brought to me by the military staff for approval.
With President Truman’s warm support I struck
off the list of suggested targets the city of
Kyoto. Although it was a target of considerable
military importance, it had been the ancient
capital of Japan and was a shrine of Japanese
art and culture. We determined that it should be
spared. I approved four other targets including
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and
Nagasaki on August 9. These two cities were
active working parts of the Japanese war effort.
One was an army center; the other was naval
and industrial. Hiroshima was the headquarters
of the Japanese Army defending southern
Japan and was a major military storage and
assembly point. Nagasaki was a major seaport
and it contained several large industrial plants
of great wartime importance. We believed that
our attacks had struck cities which must
certainly be important to the Japanese military
leaders, both Army and Navy, and we waited
for a result. We waited one day.
Many accounts have been written about the
Japanese surrender. After a prolonged
Japanese cabinet session in which the
deadlock was broken by the Emperor himself,
the offer to surrender was made on August 10.
It was based on the Potsdam terms, with a
reservation concerning the sovereignty of the
Emperor. While the Allied reply made no
promises other than those already given, it
implicitly recognized the Emperor’s position by
prescribing that his power must be subject to
the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander.
These terms were accepted on August 14 by
the Japanese, and the instrument of surrender
was formally signed on September 2, in Tokyo
Bay. Our great objective was thus achieved,
and all the evidence I have seen indicates that
the controlling factor in the final Japanese
decision to accept our terms of surrender was
the atomic bomb.
The two atomic bombs which we had dropped
were the only ones we had ready, and our rate
of production at the time was very small. Had
the war continued until the projected invasion
on November 1, additional fire raids of B-29s
would have been more destructive of life and
property than the very limited number of atomic
raids which we could have executed in the
same period. But the atomic bomb was more
than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a
psychological weapon. In March 1945 our Air
Force had launched its first great incendiary
raid on the Tokyo area. In this raid more
damage was done and more casualties were
inflicted than was the case at Hiroshima.
Hundreds of bombers took part and hundreds
of tons of incendiaries were dropped. Similar
successive raids burned out a great part of the
urban area of Japan, but the Japanese fought
on. On August 6 one B-29 dropped a single
atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later a
second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and
the war was over. So far as the Japanese could
know, our ability to execute atomic attacks, if
necessary by many planes at a time, was
unlimited. As Dr. Karl Compton has said, “it was
not one atomic bomb, or two, which brought
surrender; it was the experience of what an
atomic bomb will actually do to a
community, plus the dread of many more, that
was effective.”
The bomb thus served exactly the purpose we
intended. The peace party was able to take the
path of surrender, and the whole weight of the
Emperor’s prestige was exerted in factor of
peace. When the Emperor ordered surrender,
and the small but dangerous group of fanatics
who opposed him were brought under control,
the Japanese became so subdued that the
great undertaking of occupation and
disarmament was completed with
unprecedented ease.
In the foregoing pages I have tried to give an
accurate account of my own personal
observations of the circumstances which led up
to the use of the atomic bomb and the reasons
which underlay our use of it. To me they have
always seemed compelling and clear, and I
cannot see how any person vested with such
responsibilities as mine could have taken any
other course or given any other advice to his
chiefs.