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The thinking eye: visual re-cognition in design emergence

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Arnheim is important in this discussion because his work proposes that cognitive processes are inherent in the visual
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The thinking eye: visual re-cognition in design emergence

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The thinking eye: visual re-cognition in design emergence

 Cognitive
Robotics
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Research Notes:
 
 

Desi Design thinking has a large sequential and cyclical component, these processes are supported by cisual representation.
a. Design thinking operates through externalize representations in visual reasoning.
      

i. Sequence of: seeing-moving-seeing cycles.

                                                                    

b. The designer thinks of something and then draws it out and the drawing provides a kind of feedback to the
     

designer.
i. The designer has a ‘reflective conversation with his or her ideas’ by the design drawings giving ‘back talk’ : a feedback
                                                                    

mechanism to aid in the thinking of designing

Two different interpretations of the model:
a. Moving connotates the ‘moves’ of the designer who acts upon his/her seeing, an his/her reflection on the visual
      

representation
i. psychological content of design thinking
                                                                    

b. Algebra of Shapes: mathematical and computational view of design where moving connotes shape relations and
     

rule transformations that are embedded in a mathematical model.

i. representational formalism, process model for the externalization of visual reasoning in design.
                                                                    

c. Arnheim is important in this discussion because his work proposes that cognitive processes are inherent in the
      

visual process and cannot be separated from perception

Marr, in his computational approach, describes vision as a process that produces a shape description from images of the external world.
a. Shapes are used in drawings to describe physical properties of the world.
      

b. Shapes are used in diagrams to describe abstract concepts.      

c. In design,  shapes can be design concepts or design the objects of design.

      

Abstracted visual imagery provides a medium for giving symbolic expression to domain knowledge.
a. Shapes are ambiguous figures that are open to interpretations, this process is the ‘seeing-moving-seeing’ model
      

proposed by Schon.
i. Since it can be interpreted, emergence is a conceptual and perceptual process.
                                                                    

b. Shapes are ambiguous because they can be divided into several parts in many different ways. The creation and
     

dissection of shapes are independent processes.

c. Designers exploit this property by assigning new meaning to pre-existing models. One can re-analyze a drawing
      

and get a different conceptual understanding out of that analysis.

Syntactical Emergence deals with the syntax of shapes, their legibility, properties, and transformations in the sequential evolutionary process
of emergence.
a. Emergent shape: a shape that exists only implicitly in a primary shape and is never explicitly input and is not
representat at input time
      

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b. Emergence of sub-shape: emergent sub-shape is any closed or unclosed, explicit or implicit part of a primary
shape.
     

review
Semantic emergence through the semantic properties of shapes
a. Recent studes show that while drawing or sketching shapes, the experienced designer can reason about their
      

properties as well as about the shapes as form.

i. Reasoning can include properties shuch as the function or the implied acticites that are represented by the shapes.
                                                                    

ii. This exemplifies the way in which shapes symbolize domain semantics.
                                                                  

Cognitive Emergence:
a. Certain design schemas, a pattern or configuration, uses the ability to generalize a perceptual event in order to
      

map it to a knowledge structure already stored in memory.

i. Certain schemas may be tied to already existing semantics about a given scenario.
                                                                    

1. A designer can look at a drawing pattern and know what is going on regardless if
      

he has been told what the context of the drawing is.

b. Emergent forms are dependent on cognitive processes. In order to extract the underlying structures (schemas)
     

one must use higher order cognition. This higher order cognition influences the perception of the drawing
and thus ties cognition to perception.
Psychology to visual reasoning in design
a. Low level perception vs. high level visual cognition:       

i. Perceptuion explains how the sensory information is transformed into a model of the real world as represented by the original
                                                                    

stimulus pattern.
1. Stimulus driven       

2. Determine edges/ boundaries       

3. What object is rather than what object is about

      

4. take information actively by seeking specific or distinctive part-whole

      

characteristics through identification of shape.

a. stimuli derived from: legibility of contour, geometric form and
      

pattern, gestal.
ii. May have visual prototypes which guide perceptual identification.
                                                                  

b. Visual cognition:      

i. involves stored information.

                                                                    

ii. knowing about the object.

                                                                  

iii. recognition of apperent visual properties as well as information about the object itself
                                                                 

iv. initiates thought processes relating to the perceptual event.

                                                                

v. Primary perceptual functions may provide an indexical function for viusla cognition.
                                                                  

1. Initiates reasoning with the perceived stimuli of visual objects.

      

vi. Differentiation of square from rectangle is an example of understanding that is stimulated/indexed from the perceptual event.
                                                                

1. Knowledge of visual properties of square can also be morphology and syntax.

      

a. Certain geometric shapes, patterns, and gestalts may posses a

      

kernel of visual knowledge and function as prototypes in a

more complex cognitive phenom.
Mental Imagery
a. Recognition: input matches a visual memory       

b. Identification: input matches a stored representation in associative memory.

     

i. Asst. mem is accessed to look up descriptions of parts and spatial relations, which are used to form an image of an object.
                                                                    

c. Visual images are built on the basis of visual memories. Prototypes and precedents can be recalled and
      

manipulated during the design process in visual imagery in order to create novel configurations.
d. Visual reasoning is the high level cognitive process that exploits images of the domain’s visual knowledge that
     

is acquired over time.

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e. A medium for visual memory.      

i. Mental images are stored and associative memory attaches semantic information that can be accessed when these images are
                                                                    

recalled.
1. Thus, mental imagery may be a bases for shape recognition.
      

Visual Cognition in Design

a. Two processes that images play in enabling emergence:       

i. a process of perceptual interpretation that is concerned with the description of a pattern

                                                                    

ii. a process that uses this pattern for the generation of new structures 
                                                                  

1. Existing visual memory guides shape manipulation, transformation and invention

      

b. Images support interpretation and enable reasoning.      

c. ‘Re-cognition’: introduction of cognitive content to visual images in order tot enable visual reasoning.
      

i. Model: perceptual evevnt-cued images-cued interpretation (domain semantics)-re-cognition (domain knowledge, values)-cued
                                                                    

transformational operations (domain knowledge)-back to perceptual event.

d. Drawings are segmented into elements that can reveal thought in a particular domain.
     

i. Drawings reveal not only the percept, but the concept. An image can convey domain information. This is most likely done
                                                                    

through the activation of visual memory and associative memory that goes along with those
images.
1. This can be related to Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems. One image can
      

activate an entire perceptual symbol systems that draws on experiences with

images of that type seen before
2. In this way, images can become schematized and certain shapes can become
      

closely associated with a given concept.

e. The prototypicality may stem from different sources, the answer is not yet clear.
     

i. It could be from repeated use of the a certain schema, thus prototyping a given shape
                                                                    

ii. Or, the domain semantics may give rise to the prototypicality.
                                                                  

iii. The domain content of a visual image also codes what can be done to this images. How they can be manipulated and changed
                                                                 

in order to create new results.

f. Thinking with images in mind can be mapped to thinking with externalized images on paper.
       

i. An aspect of embodiment that is related to this topic is offloading cognition onto the environment.
                                                                    

1. The drawing becomes part of the cognitive system and the feedback between the
      

visual system, the drawing, and higher order processes creates a unique
interplay/communication in the designing process.
What designers do in visual reasoning in emergence
a. ‘In its simplest form, design is about the emergence of shape and form in response to objectives’
      

 
b. Three important aspects of cognitive emergence:      

 
i. Conceptual Emergence
                                                                   

 
ii. Transformational Emergence
                                                                 

 
iii. Anticipated Emergence
                                                               

 
c. Conceptual Emergence       

 
i. generic term to signify emergence based upon the exploitation of conceptual knowledge as a general class of design domain
                                                                   

knowledge.
 
1. Interpreting images includes seeing implicit shapes that are not present upon first
      

examination.
 
2. Generating an image is the ability to used stored information to produce an image
      

 
ii. Conceptual emergence is the process by which mental image memory is transformed into a formal configurational schema, such
                                                                 

as an architectural drawing.
 
iii. Emergent shapes from the design process is guided by higher level cognitive process, not accidental, like normal theories of
                                                               

emergence.
 
d. Tranformational Emergence      

 
i. Tranformation is the ability to modify patterns in images.
                                                                   

 
ii. Changing the image in the mind and being able to externalize this image display some syntactic property of the image and deals
                                                                 

with the domain knowledge behind that image.

 
1. One must know the meaning and structure of an image if one is to rotate it and
      

manipulate it in a meaningful way. The process of seeing-moving-seeing,

generates a new understanding of the object at hand.
 
2. The transformation draws upon knowledge of the domain and allows additional
      

inferences to be drawn according to the transformation.

 
e. Anticipation in emergence      

 
i. The designer may not know exactly what they are looking at in the process of transforming the image, but they know the
                                                                   

underlying language of the image. They have a visual prototype, a domain knowledge, of
the image and are able to anticipate the effect of transformation upon the shape.
 
1. In this way, emergence is anticipated and guided, not purely accidental, as is
      

claimed in other theories.

 
ii. ‘Designers do not know what exact shape will emerge but they do know how to manipulate shape ambiguity and transform
                                                                 

images in order to obtain a desired form’.

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Emergencia (filosofía) - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre

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La emergencia o el surgimiento hace referencia a aquellas propiedades o procesos de un
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La teoría del desarrollo cognoscitivo de Piaget es una teoría sobre la naturaleza y el
desarrollo .... Es el proceso de adecuar nueva información en los esquemas cognitivos
preexistentes. .... Dicha juego es demostrado por la idea de que las fichas son aperitivos,
los trozos de papel son platos, y una caja es una mesa.

Artículo: PEDAGOGIA COGNITIVA - Usal

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La mente y los procesos cognitivos que incluye no están destinados únicamente ... Otra
característica que la define es la del mentalismo, es decir, su clara oposición al
conductismo clásico al postular la idea de que existe, .... B) Emergencia.
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[PDF]Guía de Práctica Clínica de Prevención y Tratamiento de ... -

GuíaSalud

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recabada a lo largo del proceso de evaluación deberá ser ... agitación e ideación suicida
grave (ideas de muerte recurrentes todos los días, la mayor.

[PDF]protocolo para la detección y manejo inicial de la ideación suicida

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Memory Evolutive Systems; Hierarchy, Emergence, Cognition

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The Emergence of Artificial Cognition: An Introduction to Collective Learning

Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Creative Process

 

Liane Gabora
Center Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies (CLEA)
Free University of Brussels (VUB)
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Krijgskundestraat 33, B1160 Brussels, Belgium, EUROPE

lgabora@vub.ac.be
http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/liane/
Phone: 32(2)644.26.77

ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an explanation of the cognitive change that occurs as the creative process proceeds. During the initial, intuitive phase, each
thought activates, and potentially retrieves information from, a large region containing many memory locations. Because of the distributed, content-
addressable structure of memory, the diverse contents of these many locations merge to generate the next thought. Novel associations often result. As
one focuses on an idea, the region searched and retrieved from narrows, such that the next thought is the product of fewer memory locations. This
enables a shift from association-based to causation-based thinking, which facilitates the fine-tuning and manifestation of the creative work.
Keywords
Associative hierarchy, bisociation, brainstorm, concepts, conjunction, context, creativity, defocused attention, distributed representation, emergent
features, evaluation, focus, generativity, idea, impossibilist creativity, intuition, variable focus.
INTRODUCTION
What happens in the mind as a creative idea takes shape? This paper puts forth a theory of the cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity, elaborating
on previous work [19, 20] to include the cognitive change that occurs as an idea transforms from inspiration to finished product. It assumes some form
of homomorphism (rather than isomorphism) between the physical and the mental.
STAGES OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
The creative process has a long history of being divided into stages [3, 23, 60]. It is assumed that prior to the onset of a particular creative act, the
creator has acquired the tools of the trade. The first stage is known as preparation, where the creator becomes obsessed with the problem, collects
relevant data and traditional approaches to it, and perhaps attempts, unsuccessfully, to solve it.
During the second stage, termed incubation, the creator does not actively attempt to solve the problem, but unconsciously continues to work on it.
In the third stage, illumination, a possible surfaces to consciousness in a vague and unpolished form. Subjective and theoretical accounts of this phase
of the creative process speak of discovering a previously unknown 'bisociation' [33], or underlying order. For example, Poincaré [50] claims that
creative ideas "reveal unsuspected kinships between other facts well known but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another" (p. 115). The classic
example is Kekule's discovery of the ring-shaped structure of the benzene molecule via a dream about a serpent biting its tail.
In the final stage, verification, the idea is worked into a form that can be proven and communicated to others.
Some argue that an incubation period may not be necessary [61], and that the creative process can be boiled down to a generative brainstorming stage
followed by an evaluative focusing stage [9, 10]. Dennett suggests that the generative-evaluative process is cyclic; a new product is generated,
evaluated, new goals are set, and the cycle is repeated.
COGNITIVE MODES: ASSOCIATIVE AND ANALYTIC
The existence of two stages of the creative process is consistent with the widely-held view that there are two distinct forms of thought [9, 10, 30, 31,
46, 49, 54, 56]. The first is a suggestive, intuitive associative mode that reveals remote or subtle connections between items that are correlated but not
necessarily causally related. This could yield a potential solution to a problem, though it may still be in a vague, unpolished form. The second form of
thought is a focused, evaluative analytic mode, conducive to analyzing relationships of cause and effect . In this mode, one could work out the logistics
of the solution and turn it into a form that is presentable to the world, and compatible with related knowledge or artifacts.
This suggests that creativity requires not just the capacity for both associative and analytic modes of thought, but also the ability to adjust the mode of
thought to match the demands of the problem, and how far along one is in solving it. What cognitive mechanisms might underlie this?
ARCHITECTURE OF THE MIND
Before we can piece together the cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity, we must briefly look at how episodes of experience, as well abstract
items such as concepts, attitudes, and stories, are stored in memory.
Memory is Sparse
The human mind would have to have more memory locations than the number of particles in the universe to store all the permutations of sound, colour,
and so forth that the senses are capable of detecting. Thus, the number of memory locations is much smaller than the number of possible experiences.
This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Every vertex represents a possible constellation of stimulus properties that could be present in some
experience we might have, and stored as an episode in memory. (A property might be something concrete such as 'blue' or more abstract such as
'honorable', or it may be something one would be unlikely to ever think of or come up with a word for.) Only a fraction of these constellations of
properties is realized as actual memory locations (those with circles on them). The memory is therefore sparse. And in fact, only a fraction of those
actually has some previous episode stored in them (those with black dots in the center).
 

Figure 1. Each vertex represents a possible memory location. Each black ring represents an actual location in a particular memory
architecture or mind. The three rings with circles inside represent actual locations where an item has been stored. Degree of whiteness
indicates degree of activation by current thought or experience. Activation is greatest for location k and falls with distance from k. In this
case, only one location in the activated region has had something stored to it, and it is only marginally activated, so a reminding or
retrieval event may or may not take place. If many memories had been stored in locations near k, they would blend to generate the next
experience.
Memory is Distributed but Distributions are Constrained
If the mind stored each item in just one memory location as a computer does, then in order for an experience to evoke a reminding of a previous
experience, it would have to be identical to that previous experience. And since the space of possible experiences is so vast that no two ever are exactly
identical, this kind of organization would be somewhat useless.
In neural network models of cognitive processes, this problem can be solved by distributing the storage of an item across many memory locations [26,
32, 47, 62]. Likewise, each location participates in the storage of many items. However, in a fully distributed memory, where each item is stored in
every memory location, the stored items interfere with one another. (This phenomenon goes by many names: 'crosstalk', 'superposition catastrophe',
'false memories', 'spurious memories' or 'ghosts' [17, 28, 29, 59] ).
The problem can be solved by constraining the distribution region. This is illustrated Figure 1; only a portion of the memory region (indicated by the
degree of whiteness) gets activated. One way of constraining distributions in neural networks is to use a radial basis function, or RBF [24, 27, 36, 63].
Each input activates a hypersphere of memory locations, such that activation is maximal at the center k of the RBF and tapers off in all directions
according to a (usually) Gaussian distribution of width  . Both k and  are determined in a training phase. The result is that one part of the network
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can be modified without affecting the capacity of other parts to store other patterns. A spiky activation function means that  is small. Therefore only
those locations closest to k get activated, but they get activated a lot. A flat activation function means that  is large. Therefore locations relatively far
from k still get activated, but no location gets very activated.
The mind is similarly constructed such that items in memory are distributed across assemblies of nerve cells [25, 37] but the distributions are
constrained because assemblies are limited in size. Thus a given instant of experience activates not just one location in memory, nor does it activate
every location to an equal degree, but activation is distributed across many memory locations, with degree of activation decreasing with distance from
the most activated one, which we call k. The further a memory location is from k, the less activation it not only receives from the current stimulus
experience but in turn contributes to the next instant of experience, and the more likely its contribution is cancelled out by that of other simultaneously
activated locations. Following the neural network terminology, we say that the degree to which episodes and concepts are distributed is determined by
the spikiness or flatness of the activation function. The flatter the activation function, the more distributed the memory.
The choice of k does not have to be determined in advance as it is in the neural network if memory locations differ in their capacity to detect and
respond to different features. There is much evidence that this works through temporal coding [1, 6, 7, 8, 14, 35, 44, 45, 48, 53, 58, for reviews see 11,
51]. As Cariani points out, temporal coding drastically simplifies the problem of how the brain coordinates, binds, and integrates information. Different
features or stimulus dimensions are carried by different frequencies like a radio broadcast system, and each memory location is attuned to respond to a
slightly different frequency, or set of frequencies. Thus, k arises naturally due to the differential effect of the stimulus on the various memory locations.
The greater the number of stimulus frequencies impacting the memory architecture, the greater the number of memory locations that respond.
Memory is Content Addressable
Content addressability refers to the fact that there is a systematic relationship between the content of an experience (not just as the subject matter, but
the qualitative feel of it) and the memory locations where it gets stored (and from which material for the next instant of experience is evoked). In a
computer, this one-to-one correspondence arises naturally because each possible input a unique address in memory. Retrieval is thus simply a matter of
looking at the address in the address register and fetching the item at the specified location. The distributed nature of human memory prohibits this, but
content addressability is still achievable as follows. Memory locations are contained in nerve cells called neurons. A given experience induces a chain
reaction such that some neurons are inhibited and others excited. For an experience to be engraved to a certain memory location, a particular pattern of
activation must occur. The 'address' of a memory location is thus the pattern(s) of activation that lead it to be affected.
Associative Richness
We have looked at three aspects of the architecture of memory: it is sparse, distributed (yet distributions are constrained), and content-addressable. In
such a memory architecture, if the regions where two stored episodes or abstract concepts overlap, it means they share one or more common features or
properties. The relationship between memories and concepts stored in overlapping regions of memory is therefore one of correlation rather than
causation . Now let us look at why this turns out to be important for creativity.
Martindale [39] has identified a cluster of psychological attributes associated with creativity which includes defocused attention [12, 13, 43], and high
sensitivity [39, 40], including sensitivity to subliminal impressions; that is, stimuli that are perceived but of which we are not conscious of having
perceived [57].
Another characteristic of creative individuals is that they have flat associative hierarchies [42]. The steepness of an individual's associative hierarchy is
measured experimentally by comparing the number of words that individual generates in response to stimulus words on a word association test. Those
who generate only a few words in response to the stimulus have steep associative hierarchies. Those who generate many have flat associative
hierarchies. One can also refer to this as associative richness . Thus, once such an individual has run out of the more usual associations (e.g . chair in
response to table), unusual ones ( e.g. elbow in response to table) come to mind.
The experimental evidence that creativity is associated with not just flat associative hierarchies but also defocused attention and heightened sensitivity
suggests that associative richness stems from a tendency to perceive more of the detail of a stimulus or situation. One includes in ones' internal
representation of the stimulus situation features that are less central to the concept that best categorizes it, features that may in fact make it defy
straightforward classification as strictly an instance of one concept or another. This could be accomplished through a tendency toward a flat activation
function. Experiences get more widely etched into memory, thus the storage regions for episodes and concept overlap more, resulting in greater
potential for associations to be found amongst them.
A Stream of Thought
Since content addressability ensures that items with related meanings get stored in overlapping locations, one naturally retrieves items
that are similar or relevant to the current experience. As a result, the entire memory does not have to be searched in order for, for
example, one person to remind you of another. It is because the size of the region of activated memory locations must falls midway
between the two possible extremes--not distributed and fully distributed--that one can generate a stream of coherent yet potentially
creative thought. The current thought or experience activates a certain region of memory. Episodes or concepts stored in the locations in
this region provide the 'ingredients' for the next thought. This next thought is slightly different, so it activates and retrieves from a
slightly different region, and so forth, recursively.
In a state of defocused attention or heightened sensitivity to detail, stimulus properties that are less directly relevant to the current goal
get encoded in memory. Since more features of attended stimuli participate in the process of storing to and evoking from memory, more
memory locations are activated and participate in the encoding of an instant of experience and release of 'ingredients' for the next instant.
The more memory locations activated, the more they in turn activate, and so on; thus streams of thought tend to last longer. So if a
stimulus does manage to attract attention, it will tend to be more thoroughly assimilated into the matrix of associations that constitutes
the worldview, and more time is taken to settle into any particular interpretation of it. We refer to this as a state of conceptual fluidity. In
such a state, new stimuli are less able to compete with what has been set in motion by previous stimuli, i.e. the memory network plays a
larger role in conscious experience.
Another interesting consequence of a flat activation function is that an episode or concept that lies relatively far from the one that best
captures the properties of the current thought, but that at least lies within the hypersphere of activated memory locations, can 'pull' the
next thought quite far from the one that preceded and evoked it. Thus there is an increased probability that one thought will lead in a
short period of time to a seemingly unrelated thought; consecutive instants are less correlated. So the worldview is penetrated more
deeply, but also traversed more quickly.
VARIABLE FOCUS AS THE KEY TO CREATIVITY
There is in fact a considerable body of research suggesting that creativity is associated with, not just high conceptual fluidity, nor just
extraordinary control, but both [2, 15, 16, 18, 52, 55]. As Feist [16] puts it: "It is not unbridled psychoticism that is most strongly associated
with creativity, but psychoticism tempered by high ego strength or ego control. Paradoxically, creative people appear to be
simultaneously very labile and mutable and yet can be rather controlled and stable" (p. 288). He notes that, as Barron [2] said over 30
years ago: "The creative genius may be at once naïve and knowledgeable, being at home equally to primitive symbolism and rigorous
logic. He is both more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and more constructive, occasionally crazier yet adamantly saner
than the average person" (p. 224). There is also evidence of an association between creativity and high variability in physiological
measures of arousal such as heart rate [4], spontaneous galvanic skin response [38], and EEG alpha amplitude [39, 41].
Knowing that creativity is associated with both conceptual fluidity on the one hand, and focus or control on the other, puts us in a good
position to posit an underlying mechanism: the capacity to spontaneously adjust the spikiness of the activation function in response to
the situation. Each new instant of thought can touches more or fewer memory locations, depending on the nature of the problem, and
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how far along one is in the process of solving it. We can refer to this as the capacity for variable focus . Let us now look in more detail at
how it could explain what happens during the creative process from initial brainstorming stage to fine-tuning of the finished product.
Brainstorming and insight
Let us now consider what happens in the mind of an artist or scientist who does something particularly creative. The first response to a problem,
perceived inconsistency, or desire to express oneself or generate something asthetically pleasing, may be a rational or deductive approach. When this
doesn't work, it seems likely that there is a tendency to brainstorm; temporarily 'loosen' one's internal model of reality, weaken inter-concept
relationships so as to allow new insights to more readily percolate through and exert the needed revolutionary impact. One becomes receptive to new
ways of perceiving the world. How might this happen?
Dennett [10] believes that the generative component of the creative process operates randomly. Campbell [5] claims it operates through a process of
blind variation. He specifically states that by 'blind' he does not mean random, and is emphatic that it is not causal, though how it does work he does
not say. Nevertheless, the notion that the generative stage is not random yet not causal is readily explainable given the attributes of memory described
above. In a state of defocused attention and heightened sensitivity, more features of the stimulus situation or concept under consideration get processed.
Thus the more memory locations the current instant of experience gets stored to; the activation function is flat, as in Figure 2.
 

Figure 2. Schematic representation of region of memory activated and retrieved from during the associative stage of creative process.
Stored items in all the memory locations in whitened region will blend to generate the next instant of thought.
The flat activation function results in a greater likelihood of 'catching' a stored episode or concept that isn't usually associated with the experience that
evoked it. The new idea arises in an unpolished form; it exists in a state of potentiality, in the sense that the newly identified relationship could be
resolved different ways depending on the contexts one encounters, both immediately, and down the road. For example, consider the cognitive state of
the person who thought up the idea of building a snowman. It seems reasonable that this involved thinking of snow not just in terms of its most typical
features such as `cold' and `white', but also the less typical feature `moldable'. At the instant of inventing snowman there were many ways of resolving
how to give it a nose. However, perhaps because the inventor happened to have a carrot handy, the concept snowman has come to acquire the feature
`carrot nose'.
Thus new ideas arise through a sort of 'conceptual meltdown', in that the details of episodes or the meanings of concepts merge or blend into one
another more than usual, such that they are more readily recombined to give something unique.
Focusing the Creative Idea
In the short run, a wide activation function is conducive to creativity because it provides a high probability of 'catching' new combinations of properties
by reconstructing unusual blends of stored items. But maintaining it indefinitely would be untenable since the relationship between one thought and the
next can be so remote that a stream of thought lacks continuity. Thus, once the overall framework of a unique idea has been painted in the broad
strokes, one goes from a state of mind that is more likely to simultaneously evoke items that are correlated and therefore stored in overlapping memory
locations, to a state of mind that is more conducive to establishing relationships of causation. This may happen by gradually narrowing the region of
memory that gets activated, such that fewer memory locations are activated, as in Figure 3. Fewer locations release their contents to 'participate in' the
formation of the next though, thus affording one finer control over what concepts gets evoked. Thought becomes focused and logical; access to remote
associations, and the ensuing generation of strange new combinations, would at this point be a distraction.
 

Figure 3. Schematic representation of region of memory activated and retrieved from during the more analytic stage of the creative
process. The activation function is spiky.
Through such focusing, one slowly settles on a 'draft' of the idea that incorporates aspects that are relevant, pleasing, or useful, while weeding out
aspects that are irrelevant, distasteful, or misleading. In the process, the idea becomes grounded more firmly in consensus reality, so that when it is
born it is more widely understandable and less vulnerable to attack.
MODELING THE CREATIVE PROCESS
Is it possible to mathematically model the creative process? One big stumbling block is that a creative idea often possesses features which
are said to be emergent: not true of the constituent ideas of which it was composed. For example, the concept snowman has as a feature or
property 'carrot nose', though neither snow nor man does). Most mathematical formalisms are not only incapable of predicting what sorts
of features will emerge (or disappear) in the conjunctive concept, but they do not even provide a place in the formalism for the gain (or
loss) of features. This problem stems back to a limitation of the mathematics underlying not only representational theories of concepts (as
well as compositional theories of language) but all classical physical theories. The mathematics of classical physics only allows one to
describe a composite or joint entity by means of the product state space of the state spaces of the two subentities. Thus if X1 is the state
space of the first subentity, and X2 the state space of the second, the state space of the joint entity is the Cartesian product space X1 x X 2.
For this reason, classical physical theories cannot describe the situation wherein two entities generate a new entity with properties not
strictly inherited from its constituents.
One could try to solve the problem ad hoc by starting all over again with a new state space each time there appears a state that was not
possible given the previous state space; for instance, every time a conjunction comes into existence. However, this happens every time
one generates a sentence that has not been used before, or even uses the same sentence in a slightly different context. Another possibility
would be to make the state space infinitely large to begin with. However, since we hold only a small number of items in mind at any one
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time, this is not a viable solution to the problem of describing what happens in cognition. This problem is hinted at by Boden [3], who
uses the term impossibilist creativity to refer to creative acts that not only explore the existing state space but transform that state space; in
other words, it involves the spontaneous generation of new states with new properties.
However, this sort of problem is addressed by mathematical formalisms originally developed for quantum mechanics, as follows. When
quantum entities combine, they do not stay separate as classical physical entities tend to do, but enter a state of entanglement. If H 1 is the
Hilbert space describing first subentity and H 2 the Hilbert space describing second, the state space of the joint entity is described by the
tensor product of the two Hilbert spaces. The tensor product always allows for the emergence of new states--specifically the entangled
states--with new properties.
Because of the linearity of Hilbert space, the mathematics of pure quantum mechanics is too limited to begin to describe how concepts
combine in the mind to form new ideas. However, this (and other) limitations are overcome using a generalization of the pure quantum
formalism known as the state context property system, or SCOP formalism. This formalism is being used to articulate a theory of creativity
by treating complex ideas as conjunctions as concepts in the context of one another [21, 22]. Whereas the role of context is generally
neglected, as we see it, ideas require a context to actualize them in a thought or experience. The SCOP formalism enables us to explicitly
incorporate the context that elicits a reminding of a concept, and the change of state this induces in the concept (possibly transforming it
into something new and creative) into the formal description of the concept itself. A concept is viewed not as a fixed mental
representation, but as a source of potentiality which predisposes it to dynamically attract context-specific cognitive states (both concrete
stimulus experiences and imagined or counterfactual situations) into a certain subspace of conceptual space. Interaction with the context
(the stimulus or situation) causes a concept to `collapse' to an instantiated form of it. Thus a concept cannot be described in a context-
independent manner (except as a superposition of every possible context-driven instantiation of it). In this view, not only does a concept
give meaning to a stimulus or situation, but the situation evokes meaning in the concept, and when more than one is active they evoke
meaning in each other. Each of the two concepts in a conjunction constitutes a context for the other that `slices through' it at a particular
angle, thereby mutually actualizing one another's potentiality in a specific way. The stimulus situation plays the role of the measurement
in physics, acting as context that induces a change of the cognitive state from superposition state to collapsed state. The collapsed state is
more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts for associative than analytic thought because more stimulus or concept properties take
part in the collapse. As a metaphorical explanatory aid, if concepts were apples, and the stimulus a knife, then the qualities of the knife
would determine not just which apple to slice, but which direction to slice through it. Changing the knife (the context) would expose a
different face of the apple (elicit a different version of the concept). And if the knife were to slash through several apples (concepts) at
once, we might end up with a new kind of apple (a conjunction).
SUMMARY
We have looked at a cognitive mechanism to explain what happens in the mind during the course of the creative process. Until a creative
insight has been obtained, one is in an intuitive, brainstorming state of mind, and the activation function is wide. The creative insight
may take many forms: for example, an invention or scientific theory, story or myth, a way or moving, acting, or accomplishing
something, or a way of portraying relationship and emotion artistically. At this point the new idea is still vague and needs to come into
focus. One reflects on an idea by reflecting it back into the memory with an increasingly spiky activation function, seeing what it evokes
back into awareness, and repeating the process until it comes into focus. By taking what is retrieved from memory (which may consist of
many items blended together) and feeding the most promising properties of this construction back at the memory, seeing what is then
retrieved, and so forth, certain properties get abstracted. The initially unfocused idea eventually turns into one that can solve the problem
at hand, account for the inconsistency, or convey the desired relations and emotions.
The mathematical modeling of the creative process is a difficult endeavor, partly because the new idea often has properties that were not
present in the constituent ideas or concepts that went into the making of it. It is possible to use a mathematical formalism that was
originally devised partly to cope with the problems of context and emergent properties in the quantum world. In this model, interaction
with a context (the stimulus or situation) causes a concept to `collapse' to a possibly new instantiated form of it. The collapsed state is
more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts for associative than analytic thought because, due to the flat activation function, more
stimulus or concept properties take part in the collapse.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the support of Grant FWOAL230 of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research. The part at the end about modeling the
contextual aspects of cognition using formalisms originally developed for description of contextuality in physics was developed with Diederik Aerts,
and is more fully described in our joint papers.
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Emergence in Complex, Cognitive, Social, and Biological Systems

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The dynamics of team cognition: A process-oriented theory of knowledge emergence in teams

James A. Grand, Michael T. Braun, Goran Kuljanin, Steve W J Kozlowski, Georgia T. Chao

 Psychology

 Management
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

 2 Citations

Abstrac

Team cognition has been identified as a critical component of team performance and decision-making. However, theory and research in this domain continues to remain largely static; articulation and examination of the dynamic processes through which collectively
held knowledge emerges from the individual- to the team-level is lacking. To address this gap, we advance and systematically evaluate a process-oriented theory of team knowledge emergence. First, we summarize the core concepts and dynamic mechanisms that
underlie team knowledge-building and represent our theory of team knowledge emergence (Step 1). We then translate this narrative theory into a formal computational model that provides an explicit specification of how these core concepts and mechanisms interact
to produce emergent team knowledge (Step 2). The computational model is next instantiated into an agent-based simulation to explore how the key generative process mechanisms described in our theory contribute to improved knowledge emergence in teams (Step
3). Results from the simulations demonstrate that agent teams generate collectively shared knowledge more effectively when members are capable of processing information more efficiently and when teams follow communication strategies that promote equal rates
of information sharing across members. Lastly, we conduct an empirical experiment with real teams participating in a collective knowledge-building task to verify that promoting these processes in human teams also leads to improved team knowledge emergence
(Step 4). Discussion focuses on implications of the theory for examining team cognition processes and dynamics as well as directions for future research.

Original language English (US)

Pages (from-to) 1353-1385
Number of pages 33
Journal Journal of Applied Psychology
Volume 101
Issue number 10
State Published - Oct 1 2016

Profile

Cognition
Information Dissemination
Automatic Data Processing
Decision Making
Communication
Keywords

 Agent-based simulation

 Computational modeling

 Emergence

 Team cognition

 Team knowledge
ASJC Scopus subject areas

 Applied Psychology

Etiology (/iːtiˈɒlədʒi/; alternatively aetiology or ætiology) is the study of causation, or origination. The word is derived from
the Greek αἰτιολογία, aitiologia, "giving a reason for" (αἰτία, aitia, "cause"; and -λογία, -logia).[1] The word is most commonly used
in medical and philosophical theories, where it is used to refer to the study of why things occur, or even the reasons behind the way
that things act, and is used in philosophy, physics, psychology, government, geography, spatial analysis, medicine, theology, and
biology in reference to the causes of various phenomena.
An etiological myth is a myth intended to explain a name or create a mythic history for a place or family, an origin story.
Contents
 1 Medicine
 2 Mythology
 3 See also
 4 References
 5 External links
Medicine
Main article: Cause (medicine)
In medicine, etiology refers to the many factors coming together to cause an illness. It is normally the focus of epidemiological
studies. The etiology of scurvy is a good example. With scurvy, sailors going to sea often lacked fresh vegetables. Without knowing
the precise cause, Captain James Cook suspected scurvy was caused by the lack of vegetables in the diet. Based on his suspicion, he
forced his crew to eat sauerkraut, a cabbage preparation, every day, and based upon the positive outcomes, he inferred that it
prevented scurvy, without being able to say precisely how it might have worked. It was only about two centuries later, in 1926, that
it was discovered that it was the lack of vitamin C in a sailor's diet that was the basic cause of scurvy. From modern knowledge we
can see that the sauerkraut was probably much less effective than Cook supposed (see scurvy in the 18th century).
Mythology
Main article: Origin myth
An etiological myth, or origin myth, is a myth intended to explain the origins of cult practices, natural phenomena, proper names
and the like. For example, the name Delphi and its associated deity, Apollon Delphinios, are explained in the Homeric Hymn which
tells of how Apollo, in the shape of a dolphin (delphis), propelled Cretans over the seas to make them his priests. While Delphi is
actually related to the word delphus ("womb"), many etiological myths are similarly based on folk etymology (the term "Amazon",
for example). In the Aeneid (published circa 17 BC), Virgil claims the descent of Augustus Caesar's Julian clan from the hero
Aeneas through his son Ascanius, also called Iulus. The story of Prometheus' sacrifice trick at Mecone in Hesiod's Theogony relates
how Prometheus tricked Zeus into choosing the bones and fat of the first sacrificial animal rather than the meat to justify why, after
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a sacrifice, the Greeks offered the bones wrapped in fat to the gods while keeping the meat for themselves. In Ovid's Pyramus and
Thisbe, the origin of the color of mulberries is explained, as the white berries become stained red from the blood gushing forth from
their double suicide.
See also
 Backstory
 Bradford Hill criteria
 Creation myth
 Just-so story
 Just So Stories
 Pathology

Teoría de la seducción

Sigmund Freud junto a su amigo Wilhelm Fliess, con quien comentó profusamente los fundamentos de la teoría de la seducción y las razones para su posterior viraje teórico
(fotografía de 1890)
Tal vez más tarde

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gracias a donaciones de una media de 10 €. Solo una pequeña parte de nuestros lectores donan. Si todos los que están leyendo esto ahora mismo donasen 2 €, podríamos
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Cerrar
La teoría de la seducción es una teoría desarrollada por Sigmund Freud en los albores del psicoanálisis con la que pretendió explicar el origen de las neurosis atribuyéndolo a la
vivencia de experiencias de abuso sexual en la infancia. En un primer momento Freud pensó que se trataba de hechos realmente sucedidos, sin embargo desde un comienzo puso
énfasis en que no era la experiencia misma sino el correspondiente recuerdo reprimido (pero psíquicamente activo) del abuso o acoso sexual padecido en la infancia lo que
provocaría la neurosis. Freud analizó también el curso y las posibilidades de cura a la luz de esta primera teoría. Sus investigaciones posteriores experimentaron un giro, de
modo que después planteó que se trataba de fantasías inconscientes, abandonando la teoría de la seducción y desarrollando a partir de este momento el concepto de «realidad
psíquica» y la serie de implicaciones teóricas que de allí derivan. Para muchos autores es justamente esta renuncia la que marca el comienzo del psicoanálisis: a partir de allí
Freud pudo desplegar diversos conceptos, como el de «sexualidad infantil», «trauma» como posterioridad retroactiva y el edificio teórico del complejo de Edipo. Aunque Freud
nunca terminara de renunciar a la teoría de la seducción, tampoco la reivindicó explícitamente más adelante, mientras los psicoanalistas dejaron, en su mayoría, de hablar de
ella.
Índice
 1 Teorización

 2 Metáfora de las fuentes del Nilo

 3 Descubrimiento

 4 Renuncia a la teoría

 5 Reconocimiento tardío

 6 Véase también

 7 Referencias
Teorización
Sigmund Freud desarrolló esta teoría inmediatamente después de que comenzara su trabajo teórico de manera independiente de Breuer en la segunda mitad de la década de
1890. Con ella pretendía explicar la etiología de la neurosis, principalmente de la histeria pero también de la neurosis obsesiva.
En este momento inicial del psicoanálisis, Freud pensaba que lo que sus pacientes le informaban durante las sesiones de análisis sobre sus vivencias de abuso eran siempre
hechos verídicos y que estos constituían el origen de sus síntomas.
La importancia de las vivencias infantiles radica en que la libido vuelve regresivamente a ellas luego de que fue expulsada de sus posiciones más tardías: esto es, la regresión.1
Freud creía que cuando una nueva escena activaba el recuerdo de esas tempranas escenas de seducción aparecía un síntoma como sustituto de ese recuerdo: en vez de recordar el
paciente creaba un síntoma histérico. Una pieza indispensable de esa teoría fue el supuesto de procesos anímicos inconscientes que en esa época Freud estaba recién
descubriendo.
En ese período de su desarrollo teórico, planteó que los recuerdos del abuso o del acoso sexual habrían sucumbido tempranamente a la represión, pero podían recuperarse
mediante el tratamiento psicoanalítico y lograr que devinieran conscientes, posibilitando así la remisión de los síntomas neuróticos y la cura del paciente.
Metáfora de las fuentes del Nilo
En su trabajo de 1896 La etiología de la histeria, Freud estaba tan seguro de la teoría de la seducción que utilizó la metáfora de las fuentes del Nilo para describir lo que él
consideró su descubrimiento fundamental2 3 y aseveró en su tesis que:
[...] en la base de todo caso de histeria se encuentran una o varias vivencias reproducibles por el trabajo analítico, no obstante que el intervalo pueda alcanzar decenios de
experiencia sexual prematura, y pertenecientes a la tempranísima niñez. Estimo que esta es una revelación importante, el descubrimiento de un caput Nili de la neuropatología
[...]4
El descubrimiento de las fuentes del Nilo fue muy importante en la geografía del siglo XIX. La época de Freud coincide con la de muchos descubrimientos geográficos,
especialmente en África. El río Nilo fue siempre una fuente inagotable de recursos debido a su potente fertilidad. Gracias a su enorme trascendencia social y económica a sus
orillas se desarrolló la gran civilización egipcia. Durante años el origen del río Nilo había sido un misterio para los investigadores y científicos. Los antiguos egipcios creían que
las crecidas, que tienen lugar en el período más seco y cálido del año, eran un milagro divino. Heródoto fue el primer europeo que investigó el origen de sus fuentes en el año
450 a.C. En el siglo XIX los científicos competían por ser el primero en descubrir dicho origen. En 1857 la Sociedad Geográfica de Londres financió una expedición para
emprender la búsqueda de las fuentes del Nilo.5 Distintos científicos proponían diferentes ubicaciones para las fuentes del Nilo. Fue uno de los más famosos misterios de esa
época y por eso Freud lo tomó como motivo de su metáfora, de la misma manera que utilizó la metáfora del «continente negro» para describir la sexualidad femenina. Freud
utilizaba habitualmente la geografía como metáfora de los enigmas por descubrir. 2
Descubrimiento
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Freud consideraba fundamental haber descubierto que el origen de los trastornos psíquicos se hallaba en la vida sexual de los pacientes. Este fue uno de los conceptos freudianos
que más polémica generó en su momento.6 7 Estaba además convencido de que podía descubrir el contenido del inconsciente a través de sus formaciones, tales como los sueños
o los propios síntomas.
En abril de 1896 dictó su conferencia sobre La etiología de la histeria en la Sociedad de Psiquiatría y Neurología de Viena. El hecho de que un médico hablase con sus
pacientes mujeres sobre escenas sexuales infantiles era un escándalo en la época victoriana.
La postura oficial sostenida por los científicos en ese momento era que los niños inventaban esas historias de abuso sexual infantil. Los médicos no aceptaban que existiera la
seducción sexual y mucho menos que pudieran ser los padres los abusadores de sus hijos. Eduard von Hofmann, profesor de medicina legal en la Universidad de Viena entre
1875 y 1897, afirmaba que las histéricas tenían una tendencia patológica a inventar historias y a relatar mentiras, sobre todo en sus acusaciones sexuales. 6
Los médicos sostenían que, en los pocos casos en los que el abuso sexual podría haber ocurrido realmente, no lo habría realizado el padre sino el personal doméstico. Creían
firmemente que un abuso en la infancia era algo que se olvidaba y que no podía tener ninguna consecuencia en el psiquismo de la víctima. 6
En cambio Freud, no solo no dudaba de la veracidad de los relatos de sus pacientes, sino que además consideraba que la distorsión del desarrollo emocional de los niños era
consecuencia directa de la seducción prematura. Lo novedoso era decir que los episodios de seducción sexual realmente habían sucedido y que constituían una experiencia
traumática.8
Cinco días después de la presentación, en una de sus cartas, Freud le escribe a Wilhelm Fliess, muy enojado:
Mi conferencia sobre la etiología de la histeria en la Sociedad Psiquiátrica tuvo un recibimiento muy frío por parte de esos burros. Kraft Ebing me dijo que parecía un cuento de
hadas científico. Eso que yo les estaba aportando una solución para un problema de más de mil años de antigüedad, una fuente del Nilo. Se pueden ir todos al infierno.9
Le pidieron que no publicara esa conferencia pero decidió hacerlo igual y lo hizo el 31 de mayo en el Wiener klinische Rundschau. El resultado fue que el creador del
psicoanálisis se sintió marginado y muy preocupado por no recibir nuevos pacientes. El 4 de mayo le escribió a Fliess que lo habían dejado solo y que sus colegas le hacían el
vacío.1
Renuncia a la teoría
Freud renunció a la teoría de la seducción después de la conferencia en la Sociedad de Psiquiatría y Neurología. Cambió su explicación al afirmar que hallaba la causa de la
histeria, no tanto en sucesos reales, como en fantasías de seducción de las propias pacientes. De esta manera Freud pasó a creer que el relato de sus pacientes se apoyaba en
fantasías que respondían a deseos inconscientes. Poco tiempo después, elaboró la teoría del complejo de Edipo, en la cual el seductor pasaba a ser el niño. Abandonó su teoría de
la seducción y la reemplazó por el concepto de «fantasía inconsciente», afirmando que los relatos de abusos sexuales que poblaban su consulta eran producto de los deseos
incestuosos de sus pacientes y no de acontecimientos reales vividos por los mismos.
En 1897 le escribió a Fliess «ya no creo en mi Neurotica» - es decir, en mi teoría de la neurosis - contradiciendo así la tesis explicativa del trauma y sumando la fantasía a su
nueva teoría al develar el valor psíquico que ésta tenía en la vida anímica de los neuróticos:
Ich glaube an meine Neurotica nicht mehr. Das ist wohl nicht ohne Erklärung Ya no creo en mi Neurotica. Pero es probable que eso no se entienda sin una
verständlich; Du hast ja selbst glauwürdig gefunden, was ich Dir erzählen konnte. Ich explicación; tú mismo habías considerado creíble lo que yo te pude relatar. Por tanto
will also historisch beginnen, woher die Motive zum Unglauben gekommen sind. Die quiero comenzar históricamente con el origen de los motivos para la falta de fe. Los
fortgesetzten Enttäuschungen bei den Versuchen, eine Analyse zum wirklichen continuos desengaños en los intentos de llevar a un verdadero término algún
Abschluß zu bringen, das Davonlaufen der eine Zeitlang am besten gepackten Leute, análisis, la huída de las personas que por un tiempo habían sido las más
das Ausbleiben der vollen Erfolge, auf die ich gerechnet hatte, die Möglichkeit, mir involucradas, la ausencia de los éxitos plenos, con los que yo había contado, la
die partiellen Erfolge anders, auf die gewöhnliche Art zu erklären: dies ist die erste posibilidad de explicarme los éxitos parciales de otro modo, de manera común y
Gruppe. Dann die Überraschung, daß in sämtlichen Fällen der Vater als pervers corriente: he aquí el primer grupo [de motivos]. Después, la sorpresa de que en
beschuldigt werden mußte, mein eigener nicht ausgeschlossen, die Einsicht in die todos los casos fuera necesario acusar de perversión al padre, sin excluir al mío
nicht erwartete Häufigkeit der Hysterie, wo jedesmal dieselbe Bedingung erhalten propio, la apreciación de la frecuencia inesperada de la histeria, donde en cada caso
bleibt, während doch solche Verbreitung der Perversion gegen Kinder wenig se conserva la misma condición, mientras que, en cambio, es poco probable una
wahrscheinlich ist. (Die Perversion muß unermäßlich häufiger sein als die Hysterie, correspondiente frecuencia de la perversión contra niños. (La perversión tendría que
da ja Erkrankung nur eintritt, wo sich die Ereignisse gehäuft haben und ein die ser muchísimo más frecuente que la histeria, porque la enfermedad solo aparece allí
Abwehr schwächender Faktor hinzugetreten ist.) Dann drittens die sichere Einsicht, donde los eventos se han acumulado y se ha agregado, además, un factor capaz de
daß es im Unbewusten ein Realitätszeichen nicht gibt, so daß man die Wahrheit und debilitar la defensa.) Luego, en tercer lugar, la comprensión ya segura de que en el
die mit Affekt besetzte Fiktion nicht unterscheiden kann. (Demnach blieb die Lösung inconsciente no hay signos de realidad, de manera que no se puede distinguir entre
übrig, daß die sexuelle Phantasie, sich regelmäß des Themas der Eltern bemächtigt.) verdad y ficción investida de afecto. (De modo que solo restaba la solución de
Viertens, die Überlegung, daß in der tiefgehendste Psychose die unbewußte considerar que la fantasía sexual recurriría regularmente al tema de los
Erinnerung nicht durchdringt, so daß das Geheimnis der Jugenderlebnisse auch im progenitores.) Cuarto, la consideración de que, [aún] en la psicosis más profunda, no
verworrensten Delirium sich nicht verrät. Wenn man so sieht, daß das Unbewußte trasciende el recuerdo inconsciente, de modo que el secreto de las vivencias
niemals den Widerstand des Bewußten überwindet, so sinkt auch die Erwartung, daß juveniles no se hace patente ni en el delirio más confuso. Cuando así se ve que lo
es in der Kur umgekehrt gehen müßte bis zur völligen Bändigung des Unbewußten inconsciente nunca supera la resistencia de lo consciente, de igual modo se reducen
durch das Bewußte. las expectativas de que en el tratamiento pueda ocurrir a la inversa, hasta llegar lo
Soweit beeinflußt wurde ich bereit, auf zweierlei zu verzichten, auf die völlige consciente a domar por completo a lo inconsciente.
Lösung einer Neurose und auf die sichere Kenntnis ihrer Ätiologie in der Kindheit. 10
Bajo estas influencias llegué a estar dispuesto a renunciar a dos ideas, a la solución
completa de una neurosis y al conocimiento seguro de su etiología en la niñez.
A partir de allí desarrolló la teoría pulsional y escribió Tres ensayos de teoría sexual, en los que explicó el origen de la fantasía neurótica en la cual se juega la trama edípica
reeditada nuevamente en la pubertad.
La renuncia a la teoría de la seducción significó un salto cualitativo en el desarrollo del psicoanálisis. Tras esta renuncia Freud pudo desplegar el concepto teórico de
«sexualidad infantil», el concepto de trauma como posterioridad retroactiva y el concepto de complejo de Edipo.1
La medida alcanzada por este viraje explicativo y las razones que motivaron a Freud para dar este paso son, hasta el día de hoy, aspectos controvertidos en el psicoanálisis. Por
un lado se postula que el cambio hacia la nueva explicación — que clasifica estas vivencias como fantasías que respondían a deseos inconscientes — es absoluto, definitivo y
con base en nuevos hallazgos clínicos. Por otra parte, hay autores que consideran este viraje como un producto forzado por las presiones que la comunidad científica ejerció en
su momento y postulan que Freud personalmente habría mantenido su teoría de la seducción como elemento importante en la etiología de la neurosis, al menos como
explicación para una parte importante de los casos.
Aunque en la carta a Fliess de 1897 su renuncia a la teoría del trauma y de la seducción era ya bastante clara, la primera huella publicada de un reconocimiento explícito de
Freud acerca de su cambio de opinión aparece en el artículo Mis tesis sobre la teoría de la sexualidad en la etiología de las neurosis, escrito en 1905 y publicado en 1906.11
Reconocimiento tardío
Durante la década de 1980, cuando comenzaron a ampliarse los estudios sobre abuso sexual infantil, se comenzó a cuestionar la idea de «fantasías de seducción» con el
argumento de que escondían casos reales de abuso y se acusó a las teorías psicoanalíticas de hacer invisible el abuso sexual realmente cometido y de transformar en inocentes a
los perpetradores al cargar la responsabilidad sobre los niños y sus fantasías edípicas.
En 1984, El asalto a la verdad: la renuncia de Freud a la teoría de la seducción, la obra de Jeffrey Masson, director de los Archivos Sigmund Freud y los Derechos de Autor de
Freud en 1981, tomando la correspondencia completa entre Freud y Fliess, cuestiona la versión oficial del psicoanálisis. Según Masson, las cartas a Fliess donde Freud relataba
sus casos clínicos en los que aparecía fuertemente el tema del abuso sexual de niños por parte de adultos y la creencia de Freud en su teoría de la seducción fueron censuradas y
no publicadas en su correspondencia oficial. Algunas de estas cartas habían sido censuradas por Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris y Rudolph Loewenstein en la primera edición
cuando fueron publicadas en 1950.12
Esas cartas demostrarían que Freud nunca había dejado de creer del todo en su teoría de la seducción. Masson sostiene que, a pesar de todas sus dudas y vueltas, Freud seguía
encontrando atractiva la teoría de la seducción.13
Véase también
 Trauma psíquico

 Histeria femenina
Referencias
1.
 Para releer a Freud: cien años de los Tres Ensayos para una teoría sexual, Juan Carlos Volnovich, Revista Topía
  Sherlock Freud, Página 12
  Un silencio ensordecedor: la violencia ocultada contra mujeres y niños, Patrizia Romito y Marcia Garcia Hernández, editorial Montesinos, 2007, ISBN 9788496831490
  Freud, Sigmund (1896). «II». La etiología de la histeria, (Título original: Zur Ätiologie der Hysterie) en: Obras Completas, Vol. III (9ª. edición). Buenos Aires:
Amorrotu, 1996. p. 202. ISBN 950-518-579-0.
  Las Montañas de la Luna: en busca de las fuentes del Nilo, Sir Richard Francis Burton, Madrid, editorial Valdemar, 2011, ISBN 9788477026884
  Intebi, Irene (2007). La niñez a lo largo del tiempo, capítulo 2 en Abuso sexual infantil en las mejores familias. Granica 2008, Argentina, ISBN 978-950-641-252-4.
  Mentes extraordinarias: cuatro retratos para descubrir nuestra propia excepcionalidad, Howard Gardner y Alfonso Colodrón, Barcelona, Editorial Kairós, 1999, ISBN
9788472454484.
  Freud. Etiología de la histeria. Biblioteca Freud, Alianza Editorial. ISBN 84-206-7208-4.
  Schur, Max (1972). Freud, Living and Dying. Nueva York, International University Press. ISBN 978-082-3680-52-8.
  Freud, Sigmund. Briefe an Wilhelm Fließ. Editor: Masson Jeffrey Moussaieff. Versión completa en alemán editada por Michael Schöter y S. Fischer. carta No. 139, 21 de
septiembre de 1897, isbn 3-10-022802-2, pp. 283 – 284.
Búsquedas
 emergencia de la idea cognitiva proceso 2016
 procees cognitive emergences

  Freud, Sigmund (1995) [1906]. Mis tesis sobre la teoría de la sexualidad en la etiología de las neurosis [Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie
der Neurosen Bemerkungen]. En O.C., Vol. VII. Traducción directa del alemán de José L. Etcheverry (6ª reimpresión, 2ª edición). Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Editores S. A.
pp. 264 -266. ISBN 950-518-583-9.
  Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson. El asalto a la verdad: la renuncia de Freud a la teoría de la seducción. Barcelona, Seix Barral. ISBN 978-843-22-4552-7.
13.  Tort, Michel (2008). «La violencia sexual, el padre y el psicoanálisis, pág. 459/480». Fin del dogma paterno. Paidós, Buenos Aires, ISBN 978-650-892-288-
5.
Categorías:
 Sigmund Freud

 Psicoanálisis