Gashem Shookat Baksh, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Marilou T.

Gonzales

Civil Law – The New Civil Code – Human Relations

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Facts:

Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral character and
reputation, duly respected in her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987,
against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up
a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.  The
complaint for damages is due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.

Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to marry her. 
She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married.  They agreed to get
married at the end of the semester, which was October of that year.  They also visited
Marilou’s parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.

Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him in Guilig, Dagupan
City.  It should be noted that she was a virgin before she lived with him and not a
woman of loose morals.  A few weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem started
to maltreat her, which result to injuries.  A confrontation with the barangay captain of
Guilig ensued and Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is
already married to a girl in Bacolod City.

On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of the New Civil Code in its
decision favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay PhP 20,000
moral damges, PhP 3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation
expenses.

Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court seeking for the review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said decision
which was also affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

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Held:

The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, the Court rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our laws.  It was
evident from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to
marry Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”

In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith and honest
motive when he proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou Gonzales.  He was
merely motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”

The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Aticle 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise to marry, but
due the fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the
honor and reputation of the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the
morals, good customs or public policy.
in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

Vivian B. Torreon Et al vs. Generoso Aparra Jr., Et Al., G.R. No. 188493 December 13, 2017
VIVIAN B. TORREON v. GENEROSO APARRA, GR No. 188493, 2017-12-13
Facts:
Vivian's husband, Rodolfo Torreon (Rodolfo), and daughters, Monalisa Torreon (Monalisa)
and Johanna Ava Torreon (Johanna), arrived with Felomina Abellana (Abellana) at the
municipal wharf of Jetafe, Bohol. They came from Cebu City aboard M/B Island Traders, a
motor boat owned and operated by Carmelo Simolde (Simolde).[5] After they disembarked
from the motor boat, they looked for a vehicle that would transport them from the wharf to
the poblacion of Jetafe. A cargo truck entered the wharf and their fellow passengers
boarded it. Abellana, Rodolfo, and his daughters chose not to board the already-
overcrowded truck. Instead, they waited for a different vehicle to bring them to the
poblacion. However, they were informed that only the cargo truck, which was also owned
and operated by Simolde, would enter the wharf.[6]
Approximately 10 minutes later, the same cargo truck returned to the wharf. Again, fellow
passengers from M/B Island Traders started embarking it. This time, Rodolfo, Monalisa,
Johanna, and Abellana also boarded it. Abellana was seated in front, while Rodolfo and his
daughters were with the rest of the passengers at the back of the truck. Because there were
no proper seats at the back of the truck, the 30 or more passengers were either standing or
sitting on their bags.[7] While passengers were getting on the truck, Simolde called Felix
Caballes (Caballes), the official truck driver. Caballes approached Simolde but left the engine
running. While Simolde and Caballes were talking, Generoso Aparra, Jr. (Aparra), Simolde's
chief diesel mechanic, started driving the truck. Upon seeing the truck move, Caballes rushed
to the truck and sat beside Aparra. However, instead of taking control of the vehicle,
Caballes allowed Aparra to drive.[8] Shortly thereafter, Aparra maneuvered the truck to the
right side of the road to avoid hitting a parked bicycle. But as he turned, Aparra had to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting Marcelo Subiano, who was allegedly standing on the side
of the road. Because the road was only four (4) meters and 24 inches wide, rough, and full of
potholes, Aparra lost control of the truck and they fell off the wharf.[9]
Consequently, Rodolfo and Monalisa died while Johanna and Abellana were injured.[10] On
April 3, 1990, Vivian and Abellana filed a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Double Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
against Aparra and Caballes,[11] docketed as Criminal Case No. 6555 before the Regional
Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.[12]
Vivian and Abellana filed a separate complaint for damages against Simolde, Caballes, and
Aparra[13] docketed as Civil Case No. 3593 before Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Butuan
City
Simolde, Caballes, and Aparra filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Suspend Proceedings (Motion
to Dismiss) in Civil Case No. 3593. They argued that when Abellana instituted Criminal Case
No. 6555 before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, she failed to make a reservation to file an
independent civil action for damages. Thus, Abellana was barred from instituting the civil
action.
Abellana and Vivian filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,... Hence, this
Petition was filed before this Court.
Issues:
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows: First, whether or not actual damages for
loss of earning capacity should be awarded to petitioner Vivian B. Torreon; and Second,
whether or not the value of the other awarded damages should be increased.
this Court will briefly discuss Abellana's standing in this case. Notably
Ruling:
April 3, 1990, petitioners instituted a criminal case against respondents. However, petitioner
Abellana did not reserve her right to file a separate civil action for damages arising from the
crime.[49] Rule 111, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Court provides
The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28859 correctly reinstated the present case only
with regard to Vivian. When Abellana did not reserve her right to institute a separate civil
action, her cause of action for damages was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
case. Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court prohibits offended parties from recovering
damages twice for the act being prosecuted in the criminal action.[50] Thus, Abellana is now
barred from instituting this case.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that those who commit acts constituting a quasi-
delict are liable to pay damages:
In an effort to decry liability, Simolde insists that the passengers boarded the truck without
his knowledge and despite his objections
Instead of helping his defense, Simolde's testimony proves his failure to supervise his
employees. Simolde should have been more diligent in ensuring that his employees acted
within the parameters of their jobs. He should have taken steps to ensure that his
instructions were followed. His failure to control the behavior of his employees makes him
liable for the consequences of their actions. Thus, Simolde is solidarity liable with Caballes
and Aparra for the payment of the damages granted by law. The Civil Code holds Simolde
liable for the damages that his actions have caused.[57] Article 2206 specifically applies
when a death occurs as a result of a crime or a quasi-delict:
The Court of Appeals deleted the award of actual damages granted to petitioner for
Rodolfo's lost earnings. According to the Court of Appeals, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate a claim for the deceased's lost income.[67] This Court disagrees.
civil cases, Vivian is only required to establish her claim by a preponderance of evidence.
Allowing testimonial evidence to prove loss of earning capacity is consistent with the nature
of civil actions.[68] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Nothing in the Rules of Court requires that only documentary evidence is allowed in civil
cases. All that is required is the satisfaction of the quantum of evidence, that is,
preponderance of evidence. In addition, the Civil Code does not prohibit a claim for loss of
earning capacity on the basis that it is not proven by documentary evidence. Testimonial
evidence, if not questioned for credibility, bears the same weight as documentary evidence.
Testimonies given by the deceased's spouse, parent, or child should be given weight because
these individuals are presumed to know the income of their spouse, child, or parent. If the
amount of income testified to seemed incredible or unrealistic, the defense could always
raise their objections and discredit the witness or, better yet, present evidence that would
outweigh the evidence of the prosecution.[69]
With regard to the award of moral damages, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling
to grant it. Article 2206 of the Civil Code expressly grants moral damages in addition to the
award of civil indemnity.[
The Court of Appeals correctly imposed exemplary damages against respondents. Each
respondent clearly acted with gross negligence. Aparra drove without a license and
jeopardized the life of the cargo truck passengers.
With respect to the award of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, the Civil Code allows
attorney's fees to be awarded if, as in this case, exemplary damages are imposed.
WHEREFORE, the April 3, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71090
is MODIFIED.
Principles:
Lack of documentary evidence is not fatal to a claim for the deceased's lost earning capacity.
Testimony from a competent witness familiar with his salary is a sufficient basis to determine
the deceased's income before his death.
Vergara v. Court of Appeals[51] enumerated the elements necessary to establish a quasi-
delict case: These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose-acts he must respond, was guilty;
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.[52]
This Court affirms the finding of the Court of Appeals that Caballes and Aparra were grossly
negligent in transporting the passengers
Caballes was grossly negligent in allowing Aparra to drive the truck despite being an
inexperienced driver. Aparra's inexperience caused the accident that led to the deaths of
Rodolfo and Monalisa. It is undisputed that the deaths of Vivian's husband and daughter
caused damage to her. Clearly, the requisites for a quasi-delict are present in this case.
addition to Caballes and Aparra, the law also holds their employer, Simolde, liable. Article
2180 of the Civil Code provides that an employer is vicariously liable with his employees for
any damage they cause while performing their duties.
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc.[54] explained that when an
employee's negligence causes injury to another, a presumption against the employer arises.
To avoid liability, the employer must prove he exercised due diligence in selecting as well as
supervising his employees.
It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family
pertains not only to the selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough
that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still
required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.
once negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he
observed the diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees shifts to the
employer.[55] (Emphasis supplied, cit
The same rules on damages are applicable whether or not the death occurred as a result of a
crime or a quasi-delict. To summarize, the heirs are entitled to recover:
This Court has previously accepted a competent witness' testimony to determine the
deceased's income. In Pleyto v. Lomboy,[70] this Court used the testimony of the deceased's
widow as basis to estimate his earning capacity:
In a torts case, this Court also accepted testimony from co-workers of the deceased to
establish
If co-workers were deemed competent to testify on the compensation that the deceased
was receiving, all the more should an employer be allowed to testify on the amount she was
paying her deceased employee

Picart vs. Smith

2019-10-06administrator
AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
(37 Phil 809) G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

Facts:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
When Frank Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile with rate of
speed of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the Smith neared the bridge, he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of
the road.

Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the rapid
approach of the vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The bridge is about 75 meters and a width
of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without slowing down. Smith quickly
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s proximity to the animal, the
animal became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward
the railing. In so doing, it has struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the
car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations

HELD:
Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was
his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other
persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight
on until he was almost upon the horse.

A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to
guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem
always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Test of Negligence:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

“Last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a
point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury,
his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf
[1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA
 on 6:00 AM  in Case Digests, Civil Law, Commercial Law 
 0

G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997

o The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss

FACTS:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in
connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to
RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s
account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by
PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:

o What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly
statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
HELD:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared
and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished
contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips,
original or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting
cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the
funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current account, and then
make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been
for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that the
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair
chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v.
CA, supra)