Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 135981 September 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
Vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review.
The Court may pass upon all relevant issues, including those factual in nature and those
that may not have been brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases
involving the imposition of the death penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to
avail themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even novel theories such as
the “battered woman syndrome,” which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense,
should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits, not rejected
merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic
Genosa y Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the September 25, 1998
“Judgment”1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City2 in Criminal Case No.
5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced
her to death.
In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta
charged appellant-movant with parricide allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound
one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,causing the following wounds,
to wit:‘Cadaveric spasm.‘Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.‘Face, black, blown up
& swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue
slightly protrudes out of the mouth.‘Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the
occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of
the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and
meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.Blisters at both
extremities, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.‘Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’Which caused his death.”
After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5,
RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and
none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of
DEATH.The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.”
The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,4
to bring “to the attention of the Court certain facts and circumstances which, if found
valid, could warrant the setting aside of her conviction and the imposition of the death
penalty.”Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she
had lied about the means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she
had consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled
that the cause of his death was “cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe
intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone,” which
resulted from her admitted act of “smashing” him with a pipe. Such conclusion was
allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy report
on the body of the victim.Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record
of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial
court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the
surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-
defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she “did not lie about how she killed her
husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands.”
She thus prays for the following result:
“1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa,
and a re-examination of the cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists of the Court to determine her state of mind at the time
of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.
3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and
psychiatrists to form part of the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case before a lower
court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.”
On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,6
which substantially objected to the Motion on the ground that appellant had not been
“deprived of her right to due process, substantial or procedural.”
The Issues
In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be
exhumed and reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his death, and (2) whether
the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to
determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for
the reception of evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties
may present to establish her state of mind at the time of the killing.
First Issue: No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death
Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim’s body to be able to determine
his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo’s conclusion that he was “smashed
or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.Considering
that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his
nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes
that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victim’s death. There is no need to exhume the body at this time
and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.Moreover, the matter of proving the
cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and again, we have
said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception
of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during
the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for
the exhumation of the victim’s body cannot be granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant’s State of Mind at the Time of the
Killing
In seeking to be “examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring
into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will
support the ‘battered woman syndrome’,” the appellant brings to the fore a novel
defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to “re-evaluate
the traditional elements” used in determining self-defense and to consider the “battered
woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.Allegedly, there
are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was
her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere;
(3) she fears for her life and/or her children’s lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief
that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm or
death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over
time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to
when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously threaten her survival.
Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other
than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending
lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her
acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.Appellant further
alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United
States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress
disorder, rather than a form of mental illness.8 It has been held admissible in order to
assess a defendant’s perception of the danger posed by the abuser.In view of the
foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove
that her relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome.
Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected
her perception of danger and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had
resorted to force against her batterer.The records of the case already bear some
evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her deceased husband. A
defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6)
times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for
severe hypertension due to emotional stress.10 Even the victim’s brother and mother
attested to the spouses’ quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however,
simplistically ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded the killing, self-
defense could not be appreciated.Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with
respect to the so-called “battered woman syndrome” as a possible modifying
circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The
discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court
that the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible
effect on her very life. It could be that very thin line between death and life or even
acquittal. The Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant
the opportunity to offer this defense, for any criminal conviction must be based on
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the
death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could
save them from capital punishment.In People v. Parazo,after final conviction of
appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to
undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to
determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and
mute, yet unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally
understand and interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court granted him re-
arraignment and retrial. It justified its action on the principle that “only upon proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt may the accused be consigned to the lethal injection
chamber.”More recently in People v. Estrada,we likewise nullified the trial proceedings
and remanded the case “to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper mental
examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial,
and for further proceedings.” In that case, the defense counsel had moved to suspend
the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
because of his mental defect, and to confine him instead in a psychiatric ward. But the
trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them “intelligently.” After
trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus sentenced to death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:
“The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant.
The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with
the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person’s mental health. To
determine the accused-appellant’s competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant
case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in
the light of the latter’s history of mental illness.”It was held that in denying appellant an
examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court practically denied him a fair
trial prior to conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.Moreover, proof of
insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not
performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court,
through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:
“The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony
committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based,
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e.,
with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.”In the instant
case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely,
intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot
properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on
her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological
cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her for proper
psychological or psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and
evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of automatic review. The
prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-
examine the defense witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent
with the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to
allow the defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our
foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and
refute the same.WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa
is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception
of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this
Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
Vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the
Decision3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated November 8,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.The present controversy arose
from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the
residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January
4, 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal
charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3€7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter,
informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case
against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil,
Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3€ of R.A.
No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to
include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The Amended
Information12 reads:That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,the above-named
accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both
having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release
from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in
Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by
Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar,
and thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused
Ambil’s residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done
without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had given
unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.At the pre-trial,
petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that
Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and
the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners,
Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same
jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.Consequently, the prosecution no longer
offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the admission of its documentary
exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was denied.At the
trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A.
Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was
the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it was upon the
advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his
home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for taking
personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the company of
inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political
opponents.For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of
Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was
arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6,
1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr.
after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the
mayor’s safety.Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft,
Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a
murder case filed against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern
Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s account that he spotted inmates who served as
bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He
also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched fist.
Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.’s
residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge against him
was downgraded to homicide.Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial
Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe
Balano fetched him at home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty.
White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s arrest and arguing with the jail
guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was
confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in the
latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he
submitted to the governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.Further, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50
inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation
cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa
huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits.On September 16, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision20 finding petitioners
guilty of violating Section 3€ of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to
a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in
the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges
that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under
detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail.The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’
defense that Adalim’s transfer was made to ensure his safety. It observed that
petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied
simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the
availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of
the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it
cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant
Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local
Government.Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the
court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior
order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine
(9) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3€ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO
PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY
FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3€, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT, MANIFEST
PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3€.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER
SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR
IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER
SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER
PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN
PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM “UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST,
SPECULATIVE.
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a
provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and
(3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can
be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance
of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article
11(6)25 of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019 does not
apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary
nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a
private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to
Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the
mayor pursuant to his duty as a “Provincial Jailer” under the Administrative Code of
1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other
hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when he
transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal
liability.For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence
of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019 to
transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in
performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to Adalim for
liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed
a private party for purposes of applying Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019 because the
unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a
detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were
motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite
instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of
authority to take custody of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it
concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any justifying
circumstance.After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions
bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3€ of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.As to
the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging
official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-
Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended
by R.A. No. 8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads.In
cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.Thus, the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as
regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial
Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial
Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the
accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall
exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was
charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said
public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them –
the Sandiganbayan.The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by
whichh a violation of Section 3€ of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined “partiality,” “bad faith” and “gross negligence” as
follows:
“Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which “excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” “Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property.” In this case, we find that petitioners
displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor
Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his
power as the “Provincial Jailer” of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief
executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National
Police.—The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over
the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as “The Department
of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,” and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. – The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control
over all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by
the provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by
the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this
Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.On the
other hand, the power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer
to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.”35 If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of
supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully
executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down
the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them.Significantly, it is the
provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise
control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers
authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary,
subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the
subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should
be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites
Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in
support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.The governor of the province shall be
charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the
same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of
provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed
to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer
shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner
in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to
all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office
only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until a successor in the
office of the jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial
governor shall, under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the
province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board
may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other
person. This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But
again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the “provincial
jailer,” or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of
prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as
a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food
and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts
which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already
declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it38 by the Constitution.
Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce
the law but not supplant it.Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said
article is found in Section 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail
of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3,
Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention
by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when
he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by
legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the
governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40
dated October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:

06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier
received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor
Francisco “Aising” Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by
virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.If the report is true, it
appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the nearest
police station or jail.Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking
custody of the accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the
power of supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does
not, definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in detention.In view of
the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds of law
and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid legal
complications.Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a “provincial jailer.” Said
petitioner’s usurpation of the court’s authority, not to mention his open and willful
defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate,41
betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his
actions.Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the
crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3€,
R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1)
causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the
accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.In the case at hand, the
Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his
release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3€, R.A. No. 3019 in this case
on two points. First, Section 3€ is not applicable to him allegedly because the last
sentence thereof provides that the “provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other
concessions” and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the purported
unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public
officer.However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has
obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3€ of the Anti-
Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is “charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.” Following is an excerpt of
what we said in Mejorada,Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the
corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to “any
public officer” is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last
sentence of paragraph [Section 3] € is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers
and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary
concept of “public officers” may not come within the term. It is a strained construction
of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the
duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution
for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.Meanwhile, regarding
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a “public
officer” to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But
considering that Section 3€ of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of
unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the
recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the ambit of said law?We
believe not.In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use “private party”
rather than “private person” to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference for a reason. The term “party” is a technical word having a
precise meaning in legal parlance46 as distinguished from “person” which, in general
usage, refers to a human being.Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is
not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest.In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from
the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded
such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee
charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3€, R.A.
No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the
second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to
another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word
“unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage” means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some
course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability;
choice or estimation above another.Without a court order, petitioners transferred
Adalim and detained him in a place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed
in much more comfortable quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move
about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to
Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life would be put in
danger inside the provincial jail.As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were
unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter
would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat
Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same
would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention
outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of
the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners
while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More
importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his
person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.The
foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by
petitioners.Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of
the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this justifying
circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury
caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.50 Both requisites are
lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil,
Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his
house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed
from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC,
any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply,
the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior;
(2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first requisite is present in this
case.While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was
then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to
carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a
court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable
as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC.An accepted
badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view
to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.Conspiracy was sufficiently
demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in executing petitioner
Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of
the law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal
process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the
intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said,
the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation
charged, makes them equally responsible as conspirators.As regards the penalty
imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public officer or a
private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for not less
than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.Thus, the penalty imposed
by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord
with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance
to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.WHEREFORE, the
consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil,
Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
3€, R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 240231, November 27, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CRESENCIANO ENOJO A.K.A.
“OLPOK,” ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
ZALAMEDA, R.V., J.:
This appeal 1 assails the Decision2 dated 19 December 2017 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02161, which affirmed with modifications the
Joint Decision3 dated 16 November 2015 of Branch 31, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dumaguete City in Criminal Case Nos. 14617, 14900, 14902 and 14903, finding
Cresenciano Enojo (accused appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for three (3)
counts of murder, for the killing of three (3) children, namely: Delfred A. Cuevas, nine
(9) years old; Alfred A. Cuevas, six (6) years old; and Chrocila A. Cuevas, two (2) years
old; and one (1) count of frustrated murder, for the wounding of their mother, Carmen
A. Cuevas.
Antecedents
The separate Informations filed against accused-appellant read:
Criminal Case No. 14900
That on November 20, 1999, at about 5:30 in the afternoon at Sitio Dumanon,
Barangay Nasig-id, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and
abuse of superior strength the victim being a minor and of tender age and unarmed,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of a bolo, assault,
attack and hack DELFRED A. CUEVAS, a 9 year old, inflicting upon the said victim the
following mortal wounds which caused the instantaneous death of the victim.Contrary
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.4
Criminal Case No. 14902
That on November 20, 1999, at about 5:30 in the afternoon at Sitio Dumanon,
Barangay Nasig-id, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and
abuse of superior strength the victim being [a] minor and of tender age and unarmed,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of a bolo, assault,
attack and hack CARLFRED A. CUEVAS,5 a 6 year old, inflicting upon the said victim the
following mortal wounds which caused the instantaneous death of the victim.Contrary
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.6
Criminal Case No. 14903
That on November 20, 1999, at about 5:30 in the afternoon at Sitio Dumanon,
Barangay Nasig-id, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and
abuse of superior strength the victim being [a] minor and of tender age and
unarmed, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of a
bolo, assault, attack and hack CHRESELA A. CUEVAS,7 a 2 year old, inflicting upon the
said victim the following mortal wounds which caused the instantaneous death of the
victim.Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.8
Criminal Case No. 14617
That on or about November 20, 1999, at about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon at Sitio
Dumanon, Barangay Nasig-id, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery, abuse of superior strength and disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of her sex, the victim being a woman, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack three (3) times
Carmen Cuevas with the use of a bolo the accused was then armed and provided,
thereby inflicting upon the victim the following injuries which injuries could have caused
the death of the victim, thus performing all the acts of execution which could have
produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but neve1iheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by
the timely medical assistance given to said victim that prevented her death.Contrary
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Articles 6 and 250 of the
said (sic) code.When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Upon termination of pre-trial, trial ensued where the prosecution and the defense
presented their respective versions of the facts.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses: (1) Felix Montiil (Montiil),
the victims’ neighbor; (2) Carmen Cuevas (Carmen); and, (3) Dr. Clemente Hipe IV
(Dr. Hipe). Montiil testified that he overheard one of the child victims, Delfred, saying
he hit accused-appellant’s dog with a slingshot. At that exact moment, accused-
appellant was passing by, and in a fit of rage, he told Delfred, “tirador ka rang bataa
ka nga akong iro dako man ug samad sa kilid. Buk-on nya nako na imong ulo bataa
ka. Bisan musugilon ka sa imong ginikanan iapil nako ug buak ang ulo. “10 The RTC
translated this to mean:
Slingshot you juvenile child, my dog has a big wound on its side, it even went home to
my house. I might break your head you juvenile child. Even if you will tell your parents
I will also break their heads.Upon hearing this, Delfred rushed home. Moments later, his
mother, Carmen, came looking for accused-appellant to confront him on what he told
her son. However, accused-appellant emerged and hacked Carmen twice on the head
and once on the back, causing the latter to fall to the ground. Accused-
appellant then made his way to Carmen’s house, giving Carmen the opportunity to
seek Montiil’s help.In her testimony, Carmen recounted how she heard her
children, Alfred and Chrocila, calling out to her after she fell to the ground. She
yelled for them to run to their house, but accused-appellant followed them. Carmen
claimed she witnessed how accused-appellant hacked Alfred and Chrocila to
death. As for Delfred, she maintained that her son almost escaped, but accused-
appellant caught up with him and hacked him on the head twice. Finally, Dr. Hipe, the
physician who medically examined Carmen, testified that the injuries she suffered were
fatal, and should have resulted in her death, but which nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of a cause independent of the will of the accused: the timely medical
attention provided to Carmen.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied having hacked to death Carmen’s three (3) minor children.
He narrated that while plowing his neighbor’s field, he heard children crying from
a distance, but the sound died down. Accused appellant continued with his errands and
chanced upon Carmen, then armed with wooden club with clothes drenched in
blood. When asked what happened, Carmen angrily retorted she would break his
head if he continued asking her questions. Carmen then attacked and hit him. When
the attack continued, accused-appellant swung his bolo, accidentally hitting Carmen on
the head. He was surprised for being considered the suspect in the killing of Carmen’s
three children.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of murder and
one (1) count of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 14617, the court finds accused Cresenciano Enojo @
“Olpok” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder
under Article 248 as amended by R.A. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 6 and 50 also of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentence[s] him to suffer 13 years of cadena temporal with the accessories of
the law as well as sentences him to pay temperate damages in the amount of
Php25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages considering that some pecuniary
loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proven with certainty during trial.
2. Considering that deceased minor victims Delfred Cuevas, Calfred (actually Alfred)
Cuevas and Chrosela (actually Chrocila) Cuevas in Criminal Case Nos. 14900,
14902, 14903, were children of tender years, and since killing a child
is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown
because of the weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the
absence of any danger to the accused, the court finds accused Cresenciano
Enojo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for three (3) counts of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7559
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
The penalty of Death should have been imposed to the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
14900, 14902 & 14903, however, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 on June 24,
2006, this court has to reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua each in all
said cases. This, notwithsating (sic), accused should not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
Finally,the accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid three (3)
children the amounts ofPhp50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral
damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages and Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages for each child-victim, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 225599 March 22, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
Vs
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
VELASCO. JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 06456, which affirmed accused-appellant’s conviction for the offense of
murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, in its Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100,
promulgated on September 3, 2013.The present case stems from an Information filed
against accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa (Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging him
for the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as follows:
That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay San
Miguel, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as
“ginunting,” hitting and injuring the body of the latter, inflicting multiple mortal hack
wound[s] thereon, which were the immediate and direct cause of his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may
be proven in court.That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying
circumstance or which qualified the killing to murder, and with taking advantage of
superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.
The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as follows:
A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused Roa is known to have
suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime charged. While his uncle,
Issac Mejaro , attributes said condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused
was reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers, SPOl Nelson Ballebar claimed to
have learned from others and the mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his
use of illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused returned from
Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and formal
deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter became talkative
and was observed to be “always talking to himself’ and “complaining of a headache.”On
September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought to the Don
Susana J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the
October 10, 2005 certification issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and
underwent treatment for schizophrenia at the Bi col Medical Center BMC in the years
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Edessa
Padre-Laguidao also stated that accused was prescribed antipsychotic medication which
he was, however, not able to continue taking due to financial constraints. Edgar
Sapinoso and Rico Ballebar, who. Knew accused since childhood, admitted hearing
about the latter’s mental health issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout the
wake of an unnamed aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac
that accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all the way
to Bagumbayan, Bula.On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually
silent, refused to take a bath and even quarreled with his mother when prompted to do
so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was
walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San
Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was spotted
by Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the
sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was
approached from behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back
with a bolo locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches.
Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed “Tara man, “ before falling to the ground. Chased by
both Edgar and Rico and spotted running by Mrs. Sombrero who went out of the
Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din, accused immediately fled and took refuge
inside the house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.With the incident already attracting
people’s attention, Barangay Captain Herminion Ballebar called for police assistance
even as Isaac tried to appease Eliseo’s relatives. Entering Camilo’s house, Issac saw
accused who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly thereafter, SPO 1
Hermilando Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on
accused to surrender. Upon his voluntary surrender and tum over of the jungle knife he
was holding to the police officers, accused was brought to the Bula Municipal Police
Station for investigation and detention. In the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula
Municipal Health Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival and, after the
necropsy examination, later certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died of Hypovolemia
secondary to multiple stab wounds.When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded “not
guilty,” but in the certificate of arraignment, he signed his name as “Amado M.
Tetangco.” Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over the fact that
accused-appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the defense of
insanity.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur
found that accused-appellant is guilty of the offense of Murder. The RTC ruled that the
defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from
the offense charged. The RIC noted that as an exempting circumstance, insanity
presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the RTC said, the
accused must be shown to be deprived of reason or that he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
is a total deprivation of the will. It is the accused who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity that has the burden of proving the same with clear and
convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC added, opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane
based on the witness’ own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified
as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he
failed to discharge the burden of proving the claim of insanity. First, while Isaac
Mejaro’s testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant started having
mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that his past medical history
does not suffice to support a finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he
perpetrated the killing of Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial court, the lack of showing of
any psychotic incidents from the time of his discharge in 2002 until March 2007
suggests that his insanity is only occasional or intermittent and, thus, precludes the
presumption of continuity.Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant
exhibited abnormal behavior after the incident, particularly in writing the name of
Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also noted that midway through
the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, accused-appellant’s mental condition
worsened, prompting his counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation and
treatment, and that he was subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from
schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type. The trial court, however, cited the rule that
the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded
weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then ruled that the
witnesses’ account of the incident provides no clue regarding the state of mind of the
accused, and all that was established was that he approached Delmiguez from behind
and stabbed him on his lower back. To the trial court, this actuation of the accused,
together with his immediate flight and subsequent surrender to the police authorities, is
not indicative of insanity.
Finally, while the accused was reputed to be “crazy” in his community, the trial court
ruled that such is of little consequence to his cause. It said:
The popular conception of the word “crazy” is to describe a person or act that is
unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a crazy manner but it
does not necessarily or conclusively prove that he is legally so. The legal standard
requires that the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a
criminal intent.
Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced
him as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused Christopher
Mejaro Roa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez
the following sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim; (b)
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.Aggrieved,
accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction by the trial
court. The CA first noted that all the elements of the crime of murder had been
sufficiently established by the evidence on record. On the other hand, the defense of
insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA said:
Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that he was
insane when he fatally stabbed the victim on March 16, 2007. To prove his defense,
accused-appellant’s witnesses including Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they
knew him to be insane because he was brought and confined to the Bicol Medical
Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year 2001 . However, such fact
does not necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the time he
fatally attacked and stabbed the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was
presented by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or that he had
acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had generally been
regarded as insane around the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.An
inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the act under prosecution was committed. Mere prior
confinement in a mental institution does not prove that a person was deprived of
reason at the time the crime was committed. It must be noted that accused-appllant
was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long before he committed the
crime charged. He who relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another time) must
prove its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-
appellant failed to do.Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense
witnesses that purport to support the claim of insanity are based on assumptions, and
are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be convincing. To the CA, their
observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not sufficient proof of
his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.On the contrary, the CA found that the circumstances of the attack bear indicia
that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known as
ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to
flee from the scene of the crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by
the police authorities.Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the
conviction of the RTC for the offense charged. The CA merely modified the award of
damages, and dispositively held, thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher
Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo
Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the death of the said
victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as moral damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages
as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition,
all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.Aggrieved by the ruling of
the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case before this Court by way of a Notice of
Appeal.
The Issue
The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is sufficient
evidence to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant for the offense of Murder,
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. However, there being no
contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the stabbing of the victim, which caused the
latter’s death, the resolution of the present issue hinges on the pleaded defense of
insanity.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA. Hence, the
assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for murder must be
upheld.Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals
or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss the nature
of the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance. The Court there said:
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be
punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption
of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free
will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable.
Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the
will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished.
No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason
of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred
from similar behavior in the future.In the Philippines, the courts have established a
more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.The issue of insanity is
a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state
or condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given
by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has
rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness’ own
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused’s insanity must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.
In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity
is in the nature of confession and avoidance.Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of
sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any
trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the
crime.This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the
accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a
successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition.
Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving
it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused’s insanity
must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense with which he is charged.In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of
accused-appellant Roa was supported by the testimony of the following witnesses: (1)
his uncle, Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs. Lourdes Padregon
Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao).Dr. Laguidao
testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the Bicol Medical Center, and
was discharged in 2002. She examined accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and
August 15, 2012. She evaluated his mental condition and found out that his answers to
her queries were unresponsive, and yielding a meaningless conversation. She then
diagnosed him as having undifferentiated type of Schizophrenia, characterized by
manifest illusions and auditory hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also
recommended anti-psychotic drug maintenance. Mejaro testified that accused-
appellant’s mental illness could be attributed to an incident way back in May 8, 2000,
when he was struck on the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-
appellant, who used to be silent and very formal, became very talkative and always
talked to himself and complained of headaches. On September 27, 2001, accused-
appellant had a psychotic episode, prompting his mother to confine him at Don Suzano
Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was observed to be well after his confinement.
The illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain his medications. The
symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his aunt died. He neither slept nor ate,
and kept walking by himself in the morning until evening. He did not want to take a
bath, and even quarreled with his mother when told to do so.The foregoing testimonies
must be examined in light of the quantum of proof required, which is that of clear and
convincing evidence to prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense.Taken against this standard, the
testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the
testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in
2012, or about five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five
years after the crime was committed is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether
he was also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that the 2012
diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that the accused was also
diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of Dr.
Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no
personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her
testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely
provides basis for accused-appellant’s mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not
immediately prior to or simultaneous to the commission of the offense in 2007.Second,
the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant
was insane during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely
demonstrated the possible underlying reasons behind accused-appellant’s mental
condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao’s testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-
appellant’s mental condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately after
accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation.Accused-
appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case,
because of the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an
asylum for the insane is presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is
noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001,
he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his
doctors would not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary
evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.In fine, therefore,
the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant’s mental
condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on
record of his mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses
are too far away from the date of the commission of the offense in 2007, as to
altogether preclude the possibility that accused-appellant was conscious of his actions
in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly conclude that
accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period from 2001 to 2012,
as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It was the defense’s
duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant’s state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis
and the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to introduce evidence to paint a full
picture of accused-appellant’s mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007.
With that, the Court has no other option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity,
and conclude that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was conscious of
what he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.This conclusion is based not
merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the circumstances surrounding
the incident.As the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee’s Brief, there are
circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence
on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he surprised the
victim when he attacked from behind. This is supported by the companion of the victim,
who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any danger when they
saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-appellant’s attempt
to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that
what he just committeed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to
accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was
hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.The foregoing actions of accused-
appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he committed the offense
indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed the act of
stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of
stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately
preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as that
expected of a fully sane person.Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to
reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant’s
culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.As to the award of damages,
however, the Court finds the need to modify the same, in line with the rule enunciated
in People v. Jugueta, where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded damages
should be ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral damages and ₱75,000 as
exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances
present.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-GR.
CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of
the Decision must read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accusedappellant is ORDERED
to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and (c)
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in line with recent
jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages shall bear legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 121176 - July 8, 1999
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This case was docketed on November 27, 1995, upon the elevation for automatic
review of Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, for rape and frustrated homicide, from
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, which imposed on accused-appellant
Marlon Paraza y Francisco the supreme penalty of death.On May 14, 1997, this Court
handed down a Decision, 1 affirming with modification subject Joint Decision of Branch
27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168,
disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24,
1995, is hereby AFFIRMED with respect to Crim. Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon
Parazo y Francisco is found guilty of the crime of rape under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2)
members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua.The decision
appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated homicide is
MODIFIED in that the accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum penalty.In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision,
let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M. Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic ActNo. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or
about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea
bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of
the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana.Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on
March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily
waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and
was duly concluded.The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later
identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain “Alyas Pusa” at Sto.
Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3 rd
Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt.
Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the
same unit. After securing marked money from Bustamante, the team, together with
their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police
authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential
informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and
asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered
to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed
to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to
P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as aPre-arranged signal to his
companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team
closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team,
arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3 rd Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under custodial
investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez’
testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the
appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took
the marked money from appellant.Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that
although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of
the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He
did not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter’s arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his
rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived
his right to counsel.Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit “G”, the “Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated” which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation
of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed
the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one
marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz
corrected his entry by telling him to put “two”, instead of “one” and “40”, instead of
“20”.
He agreed to the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly
involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.Dr. Pedro S.
Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day
after the latter’s apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for his
relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury
on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the
latter’s complaint of Gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara
discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience
abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back
with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition
remained normal.As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant
facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching
television with the members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he
had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just
inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with
them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they
were taking a different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix
his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-
peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood
was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having
escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer
endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he
proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua,
reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a quack doctor
and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days.Appellant’s brother,
Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca,
Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise
confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter’s
arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal
pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic
ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion
on his body.On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government.Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of
the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not
upholding his defense of “frame-up”, (2) not declaring Exhibit “G” (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.13 At the outset, it should be noted that while the People’s
real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected with the
sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves.In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the
act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include
the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited
drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material consideration.It must, therefore, be
established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we
are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal
sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt
that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward,
positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers
through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion
and abuse.Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain
in the case at bar. Appellant’s entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard
way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the Buy-bust operation was
effected.No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they
are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty.Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as
well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,22
erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was
caughtRed-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance
for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.When
the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination,
P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23 confirmed in her Technical Report
No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were
positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti
of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.Appellant would
want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of
who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro
asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the
aforementioned “Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated,” he signed it as the one who
seized the same.Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated
the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with
which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was
confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the
prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant,
such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs
the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the
witnesses’ honesty.Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since
Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from
the person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof
as the investigator of their unit.Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-
peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing
purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has
been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation
you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the
thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking
that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and
only few are producing that, sir.
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as
the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that
powder because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir.
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used
for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of
the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes “any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.”30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an
evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
other species of evidence.Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of
his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or
booked in the custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in
flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to
effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.Likewise, contrary to appellant’s contention,
there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension.
Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that “suspect was arrested
for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of
another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves.” Below these remarks was
affixed appellant’s signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property,
hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the
confiscation of the marked bills from him.However, we find and hereby declare the
aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant’s conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged.
They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for
the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was
assisted by counsel.Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation
that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the
presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be
extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence.Besides,
the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a
suspect.Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot
thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal
sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.In the present
case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond
any peradventure of doubt.Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he
would sell marijuana to a total stranger.We take this opportunity to once again reiterate
the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case,
belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.It is
not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,for what
matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement
and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.While there may
be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused
supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars
are not present in this case.Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from
Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were
supposedly obtained by force and coercion.The doctrine is now too well embedded in
our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant’s
allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45 and the other for
the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant.
What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which
he had been suffering even before his arrest.His own brother even corroborated that
fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.Furthermore, if it is
true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for
not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest
and during his detention there.Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to
the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the
opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him.
Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant’s story is a pure
fabrication.These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that
his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to
arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant’s arrest was only the
culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential
that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs.
Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court. However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience
necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of
law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the
case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana Otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from
prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea
bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be
convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be
whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be
given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.Although Republic Act No. 6425
was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of
the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been
settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of
Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes
punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article would not apply to
those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions
for the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.Since, obviously, the favorable
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at
the present stage, canSua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to
reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been
resolved in the cited case of People.
The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of
penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be
useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such
duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.If the judgment
which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act
No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence
thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of
habeas corpus.Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable
penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby
calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.As applied to the
present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give
away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty,
according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is,
as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more.
The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated
drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to
give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where
the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first
paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all
doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.Where, as in this
case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the
imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now
modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range “depending
upon the quantity” of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second
paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum
period.Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penaltyShall be
imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20,
however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend
upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way
of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered
as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can
be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be
explained.It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context
of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a
deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided
into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively
the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods
according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams,
the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision
mayor; and 500 to749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.Now, considering
the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision
correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue
has first to be resolved.Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6
years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of
and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether
or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the
penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or
other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.We are not
unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special
laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the
Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently
be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function
is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of
the Code.This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the
former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from
the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When,
as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense
under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
More on this later.For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in
the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.Originally,
those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but
differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish
origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive
durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without
division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence
Law61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an
offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same
manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 30362
penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein,
provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section
one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer
against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned
in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein
provided.Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the
Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion
Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor toDeath;64 Presidential Decree No.
1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision
mayor; and Presidential DecreeNo. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts
involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion
temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14
years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years
and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.With respect to the first
example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant
statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the
Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.The same
exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it
is true that the penalty of 14 years and8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually
equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical
term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides,
the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in
the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the
same formulation.On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory
enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have
suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700 and those
now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special
laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the
Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on
penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws,
in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold
otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated
system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have
been the intendment of Congress.In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a
special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that We do
not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from
and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed
which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws,
the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised
Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to
be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable,More particularly with
regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63 of the Code, we have this more
recent pronouncement:
Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall
be “supplementary” to special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly
grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is
no room for the application of the provisions of the CodeThe Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the
Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court
must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
application of penalties which distill the “deep legal thought and centuries of experience
in the administration of criminal laws.” Under the aforestated considerations, in the case
of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and
constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much
more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all
attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different
kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating.Such penalties by
degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they
would result in absurdities as will now be explained.While not squarely in issue in this
case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances
should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the
penalties within rational limits.Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation
and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in
Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However,
under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one
degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in
Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of
the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic
Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by
the legislature.Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs
thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties
which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and
since the complex penalty in thisCase consists of three discrete penalties in their full
extent, that is,Prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise
consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in
the scale.The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the
imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that
the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in
any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation
is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A
perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should
now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.The final query is
whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before
us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68
The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate
sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that “if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.”
We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a
special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to
the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the “offense is punished” under that law.There can be no sensible debate that
the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was
necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which
were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum “within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense,” as is the rule for felonies therein. In the
illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule applied,
and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the
vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an application and is
justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425,
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amend Section 20 of said law to arrive
at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished
by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we
must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in imposing a
prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.A divergent
pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the
hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has
never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage “persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment,” we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion perpetua is
likewise embraced therein although what the law states is “life imprisonment”.What
irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the
concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to
that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws,
which is the best mode of interpretation.The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and
social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.The “minimum” sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a
matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the
balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.It does not constitute the totality of
the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict’s eligibility for
parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is
found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if
he has served the minimum sentence.It Is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the
case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within
the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum
sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one day, is hardly
worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.ACCORDINGLY, under
all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo
against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the
MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. Nos. 131149-50 July 28, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
HIPOLITO DIAZ y DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision1 dated September 22, 1997, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 180, in Criminal Case Nos. C-48872
and C-48873 finding accused-appellant HIPOLITO DIAZ guilty of two counts of rape
committed against his very own daughter, Marissa Diaz.In two informations
simultaneously filed on June 5, 1995 in the aforesaid trial court, accused-appellant was
charged for raping his daughter Marissa Diaz in two separate incidents. The information
in Criminal Case No. C-48872 charges him as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1995 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the father of the victim MARISSA DIAZ Y GOROSPE, a minor, 16 years of age, with
lewd design and by means of force and intimidation employed upon the latter, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge with said
MARISSA DIAZ Y GOROSPE, against the latter’s will and without her consent.
The information in Criminal Case No. C-48873, on the other hand, alleges:
That sometime during the month of February, 1995, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then the father (sic) one MARISSA DIAZ Y GOROSPE, a minor, 16 years
of age, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation employed upon said
Marissa Diaz y Gorospe, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have carnal knowledge with said complainant, against the latter’s will and without her
consent.Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” to the
offenses charged. The cases having been consolidated, joint trial ensued. On
September 22, 1997, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty of two counts of rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused HIPOLITO DIAZ Y DE GUZMAN, alias
“TONY”, GUILTY as principal, of TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE, attended by the
alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship, the offended party being the
daughter of the accused, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and
hereby sentences him as follows: in Criminal Case No. C-48872, to suffer the penalty of
death; and in Criminal Case No. C-48873, to suffer the penalty of death, to indemnify
the victim Marissa Diaz y Gorospe in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case, and to pay
the costs.SO ORDERED.
It appears that after the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court set the case for
reception of evidence for the defense. However, all four settings for the reception of
evidence for the defense were postponed at the instance of the accused himself since
his counsel, Atty. Alexander T. Yap, was not in court even if he was duly notified of the
hearing on the fourth setting on June 17, 1996. No motion for postponement having
been filed by the accused-appellant, the court a quo proceeded to consider such non-
appearance of his counsel as a waiver of his right to present evidence and, accordingly,
terminated the trial.5 Hence, the case was considered submitted for decision with only
the prosecution’s evidence having been presented.Considering the trial court’s
imposition of the capital punishment, accused-appellant now complains that the trial
court violated his right to due process in submitting this case for decision without giving
him time to adduce evidence for his defense.We believe that accused-appellant’s
complaint requires inquiry into the extent of the rights accorded to an accused in a
criminal case and to determine whether accused-appellant has indeed been denied the
rights to which he is entitled. In this regard, accused-appellant asserts that considering
the penalty imposed, the trial court should have afforded him the opportunity to
present his evidence. He further avers that the non-appearance of his counsel should
not have been taken against him outright and interpreted to mean a waiver of his right
to present evidence. He claims that prudence should have dictated that the court a quo
should not consider the absence of his counsel as a waiver, and instead, should have
appointed another counsel to represent him in the proceedings.It Is well-settled that
the right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights granted
to the accused. Not only this but he likewise has the right to present evidence for his
defense. Accordingly, denial of due process can be successfully invoked where no valid
waiver of rights has been made, as in the instant case.We note that accused-appellant’s
counsel was fairly notified of the scheduled hearings. Despite this, he did not attend
any of the four settings.Even on the fourth setting, counsel for accused-appellant did
not even bother to file a motion for postponement. Understandably, the court a quo
deemed it best to adhere to the policy on speedy disposition of cases for the wheels of
justice must turn unhampered by undue delay. However, we find that under the
circumstances, the accused-appellant was, in effect, denied due process when the
successive non-appearance of his counsel was construed as a waiver of his right to
present evidence. Since the imposable penalty under the facts of the case at bar may
be death, the trial court should have been more circumspect in outrightly denying the
accused-appellant his opportunity to present his side, particularly since he himself was
present during the four hearings. Clearly, such presence is a strong indication that
accused-appellant was in truth interested in presenting his side but unfamiliarity with
the highly technical rules of judicial proceedings prevented him from doing so.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolves to GRANT this appeal insofar as the accused-
appellant’s right to present evidence is concerned. Hence, the instant case is
REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of accused-appellant’s evidence and for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 167594 March 10, 2006

MICHAEL F. PLANAS, Petitioner,

Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. and ANNA LIZA C.
CABOCHAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Being assailed by petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas) is the March 11, 2005 Resolution
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA 04-255, “In Re: Petition to
Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate
Anna Liza C. Cabochan.”
The following facts are not disputed.
On January 5, 2004, Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the
Third Congressional District of Quezon City under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino–Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.Also on January 5, 2004, Anna Liza C.
Cabochan (Cabochan) filed her certificate of candidacy1 for the same position under the
Liberal Party. Her certificate of candidacy dated January 5, 2004 appears to have been
notarized on even date by one Atty. Merito L. R. Fernandez of Quezon City and
recorded as Document No. 03, Page No. 1, Book No. I, Series of 2004. The stamped
entries on said document show that, among other things, Atty. Fernandez’s commission
as Notary Public was “Until December 31, 2003.”On January 12, 2004, Ramil T.
Cortiguerra (Cortiguerra), a registered voter of Quezon City, filed before the COMELEC
National Capital Region (NCR) a “Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan,”2
which was docketed as Case No. SPA (NCR-RED) No. A04-006, alleging that Cabochan’s
certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary
Public whose commission had already expired, in violation of Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code3 and Section 1 of COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 6453.On January 15,
2004, Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr.
(Defensor) filed his in substitution of Cabochan.
During the January 22, 2004 hearing on Cortiguerra’s petition, counsels for both parties
agreed on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Anna Liza Cabochan
shall be denied due course or cancelled; and
2. Whether or not the substitution of Mr. Matias Defensor for respondent Anna Liza
Cabochan who has withdrawn her Certificate of Candidacy last January 15, 2004
is valid.
By Memorandum6 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to the COMELEC En Banc, Atty.
Esmeralda Amora-Ladra, Acting Director IV of the COMELEC NCR Office, forwarded to
the COMELEC her RECOMMENDATION7 that the certificate of Cabochan be denied due
course and ordered cancelled and that the substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be
accordingly denied due course and declared invalid.In the meantime, the COMELEC En
Banc, on the recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department, issued on April 20,
2004 Minute Resolution No. 04-05828 in “In the Matter of the Memorandum of
Commissioner Florentino Tuazon, Jr., Commissioner-in-Charge, Law Department,
Relative to the Memoranda of the Law Department on the withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy, Acceptance and Nomination of Substitute Candidate, Additional Nickname
and Correction of Entry of Name,” giving due course to, among other things, the
certificate of candidacy of Cabochan and that of Defensor, Cabochan’s substitute.The
petition of Cortiguerra in which the COMELEC NCR Acting Director recommended the
grant thereof was docketed as SPA No. 04-255 and lodged at the COMELEC First
Division.In the meantime, the national elections were held as scheduled on May 10,
2004.On May 13, 2004, Planas filed before the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a
Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor who
appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing the above-stated April 15, 2004
memorandum-recommendation of the NCR Acting Director.On May 14, 2004, the
COMELEC First Division, by Resolution9 of May 14, 2004, granted Cortiguerra’s petition
and accordingly denied due course and cancelled Cabochan’s Certificate of Candidacy
and declared invalid Defensor’s substitution for her.On May 15, 2004, Planas’ counsel
submitted to the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a copy of the above-said May 14,
2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division on Cortiguerras’s petition in SPA No. 04-
255 and moved that the votes in favor of Defensor be no longer read. His motion was,
however, denied on the ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central
Office disqualifying Defensor.Planas thereupon filed on May 17, 2004 with the COMELEC
First Division in SPA No. 04-255 a “Petition for Intervention,”10 and a “Most Urgent
Petition/ Motion to Suspend Canvass and Proclamation,”11 invoking said Division’s May
14, 2004 Resolution granting Cortiguerra’s petition and accordingly denying due course
to Defensor’s substitution for Cabochan.Also on May 17, 2004, Defensor was proclaimed
as the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon
City.On May 18, 2004, Cabochan filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the May 14,
2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On even date, Defensor filed a Motion
to Intervene>14 and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention15 before the same
Division. Both Cabochan’s and Defensor’s motions alleged that, among other things, the
First Division cannot nullify the En Banc Resolution “firstly because it has no authority or
jurisdiction to do so, for it is the COMELEC En Banc that has jurisdiction to set aside a
decision of a COMELEC Division;” and “secondly, because Commissioners Javier, Borra
and Garcillano, who signed the COMELEC First Division resolution also signed the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution of April 20, 2004.”By Order16 of May 22, 2004, the
COMELEC First Division, acting on Cabochan’s Motion for Reconsideration of its May 14,
2004 Resolution, directed the elevation of the motion to the COMELEC En Banc.On
March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged Resolution17 reversing
the May 14, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Hence, the present petition of Planas (hereinafter referred to as petitioner), he arguing
that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that:
I
IT IS ALREADY OUSTED OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AND THAT THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SAME.
II
THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CABOCHAN IS VALID,
AND THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CABOCHAN
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT DEFENSOR AS CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 3rd CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF QUEZON CITY IS
LEGAL.
The issues are thus 1) whether the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue
of Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives, and 2) if in the negative, whether Cabochan was disqualified as a
candidate and, therefore, Defensor’s substitution for her was invalid.
Respecting the first issue, petitioner cites Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646
(ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW OF 1987) which provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.Petitioner argues that
since the COMELEC First Division May 14, 2004 Resolution invalidating the Certificates
of Candidacy of Cabochan and Defensor “did not attain finality before the May 10, 2004
elections because [said Resolution] was rendered subsequent to the day of the
elections,” the COMELEC was never divested of jurisdiction over the case by the mere
fact of the proclamation of Defensor as winner.In another vein, petitioner, citing Codilla,
Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia,19 contends that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC,
whether issued by the division or en banc. And he submits that the April 20, 2004
Minute Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc is null and void as it was decided ahead of
the COMELEC First Division and thus violative of the Constitution which requires that all
election cases shall be heard and decided in division.Respecting the second issue,
petitioner invokes the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, specifically Section
250 which requires notaries public to “affix to all acknowledgements taken and certified
by them, according to law, a statement of the date on which their commissions expire.”
Since the notarial commission of Atty. Merito Fernandez was valid only until December
31, 2003, petitioner concludes that Cabochan’s certificate of candidacy was invalid, and
consequently Defensor’s substitution for her, citing Miranda v. Abaya.The general rule is
that the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in
favor of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. As held in Mutuc, et al.
v. COMELEC, et al.,It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any
party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only
on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at
bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect
the basic issues.In Codilla23 which petitioner relies upon to support his thesis that it is
the COMELEC, not the HRET, which has jurisdiction over the case, the proclamation of
Codilla, who garnered the highest number of votes but who was facing charges of many
counts of indirect solicitation of votes, was ordered suspended even if he had not yet
been summoned to answer the charges. Codilla thereupon filed a motion to lift the
suspension order. The COMELEC Second Division, without resolving Codilla’s pending
motion, issued a resolution declaring his disqualification and directing the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. Despite
Codilla’s timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the votes cast for Codilla were
declared stray and Locsin, who garnered the second highest number of votes, was
proclaimed winner.
Held this Court:
At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division [disqualifying Codilla was seasonably challenged by
Codilla in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter. In other words, at the time Codilla was declared
disqualified by the Second Division and his rival Locsin who garnered the second
highest number of votes was proclaimed, the Division Resolution which declared
Codilla’s disqualification was not yet final, as Codilla’s Motion for Reconsideration
thereof had yet to be acted upon by the COMELEC En Banc which had exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the same. The HRET could not thus assume jurisdiction as
Locsin’s proclamation was invalid.In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of
Defensor who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution
invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in
time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.Following Mutuc
then, as at the time of Defensor’s proclamation the denial of his COC due course was
not yet final, his proclamation was valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of
office and assumed his duties as representative, the COMELEC had been effectively
divested of jurisdiction over the case.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-43126 July 5, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Vs.
SEVERO FONTABLA Y FORTO, defendant-appellant.
Jose Albornoz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
The information filed in this case substantially charges the appellant with having
treacherously and premeditatedly killed Agaton Punzalan. Upon arraignment, the
appellant pleaded guilty. The court, however, permitted the appellant to testify in order
to see whether or not a mitigating circumstance was present in the commission of the
crime.After hearing the appellant’s testimony, the court declared him guilty of murder
and, taking into consideration in his favor the mitigating circumstance of having pleaded
guilty, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P500, and to pay the costs.We find no error committed in the appealed
sentence in not talking into consideration in favor of the appellant the alleged fact that
prior to the commission of the crime the deceased had been calling him criminal; it not
appearing, as in fact it does not appear, how long before had the deceased made this
imputation to him.The court, in imposing upon the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which is the medium period of that prescribed by law, took into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty, which compensated for the
aggravating circumstance of premeditation alleged in the information.However, it
further appears that the appellant, after the commission of the crime, voluntarily
surrendered himself to the authorities. Article 13, subsection 7, of the Revised Penal
Code, considers as mitigating circumstance voluntary surrender to the authorities as
well as voluntary confession of guilt prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution. Under the law, any of these facts constitutes mitigating circumstance.
Although these circumstances are considered mitigating in the same subsection of
article 13, when both are present they should have the effect of mitigating the penalty
as two independent circumstances. If any of them must mitigate the penalty to a
certain extent, when both are present they should produce this effect to a greater
extent.The Supreme Court of Spain, interpreting article 10, subsection 15, of the
Spanish Penal Code (article 10, subsection 15, of the former Penal Code of the
Philippines) which considers nocturnity or uninhabited place as aggravating
circumstance, held in two decisions (April 5, 1884, and November 11, 1890) that when
both are present they should be considered as only one circumstance. However, the
same Supreme Court of Spain in subsequent decisions (April 27, 1897, and July 13,
1901), clarifying the doctrine laid down in the two former decisions, held that the
former should not be taken as an absolute rule and that said circumstances of
nocturnity and uninhabited place, when present together, may be considered separate
when they appear to be independent of one another. This doctrine is more reasonably
applicable in case of mitigating circumstances favorable to the accused.In invoking and
applying these precedents, we have in mind that the two mitigating circumstances
present in the case at bar, the voluntary surrender of the accused to the authorities and
his having pleaded guilty, which are facts subsequent to the commission of the crime,
are new circumstances not found in the old Penal Code which recognized only the
circumstances present at the same time of the commission of the crime as capable of
mitigating the penalty. The reasoning which sanctioned the establishment of said
doctrine has the same or greater force for adopting it in the interpretation of article 13,
subsection 7,of our present Revised Penal Code.Wherefore, inasmuch as two mitigating
circumstances and only one aggravating circumstance were present in the commission
of the crime, the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its minimum
period.Modifying the appealed sentence so that instead of reclusion perpetua, the
indeterminate penalty of from twelve years and one day, as the minimum, to seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, is imposed
upon the appellant, and it being understood further that the indemnity which he is
sentenced to pay is P1,000, the same is affirmed in all other respects, with costs.
So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:p
In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which
pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal
Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of
unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version of the
criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence
adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant’s guilt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, we affirm.An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983,
imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos,
alias “Ewet,” with the allegations That on or about the 20 th day of March, 1983, at
nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one
Sofronio Labine was an agent of a person in authority being a member of the
Integrated National Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a
piece of wood, which said accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose
while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and qualified member of the said
INP, was engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of
Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him “Lacerated wound 2 inches
parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose” which wound directly caused
his death.That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity was present.At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the
assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.The trial conducted thereafter
culminated in the decision3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding appellant
guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty of “life imprisonment, with the
accessories of the law.” Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. As recounted by
prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan,
Samar, appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of
March 20, 1983, which was then the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in
Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of
appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front
of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from
the residence of appellant.According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father
of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his employees in his transportation
business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day. While Major
Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to
scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the
elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and son.While the two were
thus quarreling, a woman shouted “Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-aringasa.”
Meaning, “Police officer, help us! Somebody’s making trouble here.” The victim, Pfc.
Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, “What is it, sir?”
The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos
leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood,
about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera
vehicle.He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at
Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head.
Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull
fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after
appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray bullets6
should a gunfight ensue.Appellant’s testimony, on the other hand, is of a different
tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece of wood during the incident in
question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being
attacked by a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). According to appellant, he was
then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue
uniform suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant’s father had just arrived from
a trip from Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford
Fiera.The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and
while the two were grappling for possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to
the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from Figueroa’s store with which he
then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the
ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing
that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the
identity of his victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authority.As
mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented
by appellant was roundly rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy
of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence
to the evidence adduced by the defense; (b) in believing the evidence presented by the
prosecution; (c) in relying on the prosecution’s evidence which falls short of the
required quantum of evidence that would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that
treachery attended the commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellant’s favor
his voluntary surrender; and € in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged.In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have
given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He also
contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility,
particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor
visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for
help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal’s narration of the events.
Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for
witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All
these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.From the evidence in the case at bar, the
prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of Basal,
the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of
any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or
dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in
this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to convict an accused.There was thus no need, as appellant would want the
prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her
testimony would only be corroborative in nature.The presentation of such species of
evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to
suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate.Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as
prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such
testimony. Also, no unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal
considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the
widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband’s slaying.
Appellant’s contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his
father of his firearm is rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as
to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank.
Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not
only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim’s assailant but
likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim’s violent
death.Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all
knew, he being also a long-time resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot
high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which, by appellant’s own
reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from them.Notwithstanding the fact that a
couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent lamp
and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the
combatants.Curiously enough, appellant’s assertion that there was poor visibility is
ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily
recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant considers
unbelievable Basal’s identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he
himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father’s assailant wearing a
fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that
he saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his
purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle.What these facts establish is that the
lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent
view of the incident, contrary to appellant’s pretense. Appellant’s testimony is thus
negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a
credible witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in
itself.Appellant’s flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his
testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that
his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent
case of error in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and
there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the Station Commander of
the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity
at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed with a
carbine. Appellant’s explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-
serving evidence with no weight in law.On the offense committed by appellant, the trial
court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the complex crime of
direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la
autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a
true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing
assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the
offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are
that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a
person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was
performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew
that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have
the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the
then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no
dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by
appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay
Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman
17 and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly
demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the
law.When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for
that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or
homicide.The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by
alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from
behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant’s father.The
evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit
with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.Obviously, appellant
resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry
was a policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled
by the court below. On the other hand, appellant’s voluntary surrender even if duly
taken into account by the trial court would have been inconsequential.The offense is a
complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable
penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would
have been unavailing and inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed by the law is
indivisible.At all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have
to be reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the
imposition of the death penalty.However, the designation by the trial court of the
imposable penalty as “life imprisonment” is erroneous, as the same should properly be
denominated as reclusion perpetua. Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of
the victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.ACCORDINGLY, with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos
should be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to
P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in
all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 167594 March 10, 2006

MICHAEL F. PLANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. and ANNA LIZA C.
CABOCHAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Being assailed by petitioner Michael F. Planas (Planas) is the March 11, 2005 Resolution
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA 04-255, "In Re: Petition to
Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate
Anna Liza C. Cabochan."

The following facts are not disputed.

On January 5, 2004, Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the
Third Congressional District of Quezon City under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino–Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.Also on January 5, 2004, Anna Liza C.
Cabochan (Cabochan) filed her certificate of candidacy 1 for the same position under the
Liberal Party. Her certificate of candidacy dated January 5, 2004 appears to have been
notarized on even date by one Atty. Merito L. R. Fernandez of Quezon City and
recorded as Document No. 03, Page No. 1, Book No. I, Series of 2004. The stamped
entries on said document show that, among other things, Atty. Fernandez’s commission
as Notary Public was "Until December 31, 2003."On January 12, 2004, Ramil T.
Cortiguerra (Cortiguerra), a registered voter of Quezon City, filed before the COMELEC
National Capital Region (NCR) a "Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of Congressional Candidate Anna Liza C. Cabochan," 2 which
was docketed as Case No. SPA (NCR-RED) No. A04-006, alleging that Cabochan’s
certificate suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary
Public whose commission had already expired, in violation of Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code3 and Section 1 of COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 6453.On January 15,
2004, Cabochan withdrew her certificate of candidacy and Matias V. Defensor, Jr.
(Defensor) filed his in substitution of Cabochan.

During the January 22, 2004 hearing on Cortiguerra’s petition, counsels for both parties
agreed on the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Anna Liza

Cabochan shall be denied due course or cancelled; and

2. Whether or not the substitution of Mr. Matias Defensor for respondent Anna
Liza Cabochan who has withdrawn her Certificate of Candidacy last January 15,
2004 is valid.

By Memorandum6 dated April 15, 2004 addressed to the COMELEC En Banc, Atty.

Esmeralda Amora-Ladra, Acting Director IV of the COMELEC NCR Office, forwarded to
the COMELEC her RECOMMENDATION 7 that the certificate of Cabochan be denied due
course and ordered cancelled and that the substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be
accordingly denied due course and declared invalid.In the meantime, the COMELEC En
Banc, on the recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department, issued on April 20,
2004 Minute Resolution No. 04-05828 in "In the Matter of the Memorandum of
Commissioner Florentino Tuazon, Jr., Commissioner-in-Charge, Law Department,
Relative to the Memoranda of the Law Department on the withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy, Acceptance and Nomination of Substitute Candidate, Additional Nickname
and Correction of Entry of Name," giving due course to, among other things, the
certificate of candidacy of Cabochan and that of Defensor, Cabochan’s substitute.The
petition of Cortiguerra in which the COMELEC NCR Acting Director recommended the
grant thereof was docketed as SPA No. 04-255 and lodged at the COMELEC First
Division.In the meantime, the national elections were held as scheduled on May 10,
2004.On May 13, 2004, Planas filed before the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a
Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor of Defensor who
appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing the above-stated April 15, 2004
memorandum-recommendation of the NCR Acting Director.On May 14, 2004, the
COMELEC First Division, by Resolution9 of May 14, 2004, granted Cortiguerra’s petition
and accordingly denied due course and cancelled Cabochan’s Certificate of Candidacy
and declared invalid Defensor’s substitution for her.On May 15, 2004, Planas’ counsel
submitted to the Quezon City Board of Canvassers a copy of the above-said May 14,
2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division on Cortiguerras’s petition in SPA No. 04-
255 and moved that the votes in favor of Defensor be no longer read. His motion was,
however, denied on the ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central
Office disqualifying Defensor.Planas thereupon filed on May 17, 2004 with the COMELEC
First Division in SPA No. 04-255 a "Petition for Intervention, and a "Most Urgent
Petition/ Motion to Suspend Canvass and Proclamation, invoking said Division’s May 14,
2004 Resolution granting Cortiguerra’s petition and accordingly denying due course to
Defensor’s substitution for Cabochan.Also on May 17, 2004, Defensor was proclaimed
as the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City.
On May 18, 2004, Cabochan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 14, 2004
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On even date, Defensor filed a Motion to
Intervene and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention Cabochan’s and Defensor’s
motions alleged that, among other things, the First Division cannot nullify the En Banc
Resolution "firstly because it has no authority or jurisdiction to do so, for it is the
COMELEC En Banc that has jurisdiction to set aside a decision of a COMELEC Division;"
and "secondly, because Commissioners Javier, Borra and Garcillano, who signed the
COMELEC First Division resolution also signed the COMELEC En Banc Resolution of April
20, 2004."By Order16 of May 22, 2004, the COMELEC First Division, acting on
Cabochan’s Motion for Reconsideration of its May 14, 2004 Resolution, directed the
elevation of the motion to the COMELEC En Banc.On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC
issued the challenged Resolution17 reversing the May 14, 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division.

Hence, the present petition of Planas (hereinafter referred to as petitioner), he arguing

that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that:

IT IS ALREADY OUSTED OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AND THAT THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SAME.

II

THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CABOCHAN IS VALID,

AND THAT THE SUBSEQUENT SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CABOCHAN
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT DEFENSOR AS CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 3rd CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF QUEZON CITY IS
LEGAL.

The issues are thus 1) whether the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue
of Defensor’s proclamation and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives, and 2) if in the negative, whether Cabochan was disqualified as a
candidate and, therefore, Defensor’s substitution for her was invalid.Respecting the first
issue, petitioner cites Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (ELECTORAL REFORMS LAW
OF 1987) which provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared

by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.Petitioner
argues that since the COMELEC First Division May 14, 2004 Resolution invalidating the
Certificates of Candidacy of Cabochan and Defensor "did not attain finality before the
May 10, 2004 elections because [said Resolution] was rendered subsequent to the day
of the elections," the COMELEC was never divested of jurisdiction over the case by the
mere fact of the proclamation of Defensor as winner.In another vein, petitioner,
citing Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. de Venecia,19 contends that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by the division or en banc. And he submits that the April 20,
2004 Minute Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc is null and void as it was decided
ahead of the COMELEC First Division and thus violative of the Constitution which
requires that all election cases shall be heard and decided in division.

Respecting the second issue, petitioner invokes the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, specifically Section 250 which requires notaries public to "affix to
all acknowledgements taken and certified by them, according to law, a statement of the
date on which their commissions expire." Since the notarial commission of Atty. Merito
Fernandez was valid only until December 31, 2003, petitioner concludes that
Cabochan’s certificate of candidacy was invalid, and consequently Defensor’s
substitution for her, citing Miranda v. Abaya. The general rule is that
the proclamation of a congressional candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor
of the HRET. This rule, however, is not without exception. It is indeed true
that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election is to be
found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been
a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the
assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues.In Codilla23 which
petitioner relies upon to support his thesis that it is the COMELEC, not the HRET, which
has jurisdiction over the case, the proclamation of Codilla, who garnered the highest
number of votes but who was facing charges of many counts of indirect solicitation of
votes, was ordered suspended even if he had not yet been summoned to answer the
charges. Codilla thereupon filed a motion to lift the suspension order. The COMELEC
Second Division, without resolving Codilla’s pending motion, issued a resolution
declaring his disqualification and directing the immediate proclamation of the candidate
who garnered the highest number of votes. Despite Codilla’s timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration, the votes cast for Codilla were declared stray and Locsin, who
garnered the second highest number of votes, was proclaimed winner.

Held this Court:

At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division [disqualifying Codilla] was seasonably challenged by
[Codilla] in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.In other words, at the time Codilla was declared
disqualified by the Second Division and his rival Locsin who garnered the second
highest number of votes was proclaimed, the Division Resolution
which declared Codilla’s disqualification was not yet final, as Codilla’s Motion for
Reconsideration thereof had yet to be acted upon by the COMELEC En Banc which had
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same. The HRET could not thus assume jurisdiction
as Locsin’s proclamation was invalid.

In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who garnered the
highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy
was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his
proclamation was valid or legal.Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensor’s
proclamation the denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was
valid or legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction over the
case.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.