FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1990:

TRANSFORMATION THROUGH
INCREMENTAL ADAPTATION
BY C. RAJA MOHAN

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INDIAN

FOREIGN POLICY,
ed. by David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath
Raghavan
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2015)

REVIEWED BY-
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 India’s Foreign Policy after 1990

INTRODUCTION

This article highlights India’s position in the subcontinent in 1990s, major challenges faced
and changes in its foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War the scale and scope of the
changes in India’s foreign policy have been truly impressive. This is due, in part, to Delhi’s
strategy of incremental adjustment rather than revolutionary transformation in which we
moved with great caution and much aversion to any significant risk. India’s improved
economic performance and the international expectations of commercial opportunities in a
globalizing India provided Delhi the much-Needed incentive, time, and space to reconstruct
its foreign policy after the Cold War. Despite much uncertainty in domestic and international
politics, India’s foreign policy evolved in a relatively stable manner under several prime
ministers.

This article focuses on three themes in India’s foreign policy evolution since 1990

1. Re-engagement with the major powers after the Cold War,

2. Rediscovery of the extended neighbourhood in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean,

3. An attempt to redefine its ties to immediate neighbours in the subcontinent.

RE-ENGAGING GREAT POWERS:

After disintegration of Soviet- union in 1991 redefining the relations with the West,
especially the United States, became one of the urgent priorities for Delhi.

Three important factors which facilitate the new engagement with the West are:

1. Some difficult ground had already been cleared in the 1980s by Indira Gandhi and
Rajiv Gandhi.
2. India’s economic reforms opened the space for India’s commercial engagement with
the West that had shrunk so significantly during the era of State-led socialism.
3. Finally, disappearance of the Soviet Union freed India to reinvent its major power
relationships.
In all this, Delhi refused to abandon post-Soviet Russia. Delhi held on to the relationship
despite Moscow’s new focus on the West, insisted on a new treaty of friendship to replace the
1971 pact, offered generous financial terms on phasing out the rupee–rouble trade, etc. Delhi
faced a number of obstacles in deepening ties with the United States and the West. Many in
the developed world were deeply sceptical of India’s ability to undertake Structural reforms
to realize its full economic potential and absence of a great power challenger to the United
States meant there was no geopolitical rationale in Washington to warm up to Delhi. A new
international agenda centred in the West focused attention on some of the problems
bedeviling Indian democracy—from human rights violations in Kashmir to child labour
which was deeply disturbing to the Indian political elite who are so proud of its democracy
and concerned about territorial sovereignty.

Finally, the growing Western focus on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and India’s traditional policy of keeping its nuclear weapons option open and the
refusal to accept any constraints on its atomic energy and missile programmes. When India
conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998, the United Nations security Council unanimously
passed resolution number 1172 demanding that India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear and
missile programme but India’s nuclear isolation seemed absolute.

Nevertheless, India’s nuclear tests provided a basis for an intensive engagement with the
United States and an opportunity to resolve the extended disputes with Washington on non-
proliferation issues that began with the emergence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1970 and the negative international response to India’s ‘peaceful’ nuclear test in 1974.

India successfully accomplished this objective by 2008, when there was a fundamental
change in the US approach to India’s nuclear weapons programme under the administration
of George W. Bush. In a bold initiative with Bush in July 2005, Manmohan Singh agreed to
separate India’s civil and military nuclear programmes, bring a significant portion of its civil
programme under international safeguards, and actively support the global non-proliferation
regime. In return, Bush agreed to carve out a nuclear exception for India within US law and
the international conditions for atomic commerce. India’s engagement with Bush not only
helped India end its prolonged nuclear isolation. It also facilitated the de-hyphenation of US
relations with India and Pakistan.

Clinton focused on reducing the dangers of a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ in Kashmir between India
and Pakistan, whereas Bush emphasized India’s importance to the world as a large
democracy, and its potential contribution to a stable balance of power in Asia amidst the rise
of China. As part of his conviction that America must assist India’s emergence as a great
power, Bush was also willing to remain neutral in India’s disputes with Pakistan and defer to
Delhi’s leadership elsewhere in the subcontinent and strongly back India’s role in East Asia
and the Pacific. Obama largely walked along the path cleared by his predecessor, with a lot
less fervour towards India.

The new growth in ties with the United States facilitated stronger cooperation with US allies
in Europe and Asia. But it also complicated India’s relations with China as Beijing began to
contemplate the strategic logic behind the American outreach to India in the Bush years.

Since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China 1988, there had been a steady improvement in relation
with China. The disputed boundary remained peaceful and the two sides agreed for the first
time in 2005 on a set of guiding principles to settle the territorial dispute. On the economic
front, China emerged as the largest trading partner in goods with India. This happy trend of
improved relations began to break down by the latter part of the 2000s, amidst greater friction
on the border, Beijing’s hardening stance in the boundary negotiations, the widening trade
deficit in China’s favour, and Beijing’s rising profile in the subcontinent and the Indian
Ocean.

During the Cold War, India’s foreign policy was designed to cope with the two bloc and after
cold war India had to cope up with American and China. But Delhi has no desire to see a
revival of the Cold War between America and a rising China; it is equally apprehensive of a
potential Sino-American condominium in Asia. The substantive expansion of its economy
since 1990 has produced a solid if still modest commercial relationship with all the major
powers. Yet, India’s strategy of engagement of all powers is coming under some stress, these
include the rapid rise of Beijing, the widening strategic gap between Delhi and Beijing, the
unfolding uncertainty in US–China relations, and the breakdown of the post-Cold War
understandings between Washington and Moscow. So now India has its potential role as a
‘swing state’ that could shape the regional and global balances gives it a kind of leverage that
it did not enjoy in the past.
 RECLAIMING THE EXTENDED NEIGHBOURHOOD

Initially, India was very enthusiastic for Asian unity and Afro-Asian solidarity, due to which
its relationship in the critical regions which shared the common boundaries in the
subcontinent diminished during the Cold War era. Also, it's emphasis by following the path
of non-aligned movement (NAM) gave its foreign policy the illusions of international
leadership but was accompanied by the hollowing out of its regional primacy established in a
century and a half of British rule in the subcontinent.

Later as the Cold War started to end, India’s commercial links with Africa, the Middle East
and South-East Asia had started declining which used to be strong. India also had limited
political interactions with its neighbouring leaders which only included the meetings of G-77
countries and NAM. It's economic relationship with Africa was also very little despite
winning a much good will in the continent while countering Apartheid. Also, it's engagement
in the Middle East, began to strain as the regional dispute started to unfold as in the Iran–Iraq
War and Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait.

In the East, economic marginalization was accompanied by India’s identification with the
Soviet Union on regional security issues. The end of the Cold War and launch of new
economic reforms gave India the opportunity to rebuild its regional relations. The Look East
policy which was articulated by then Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao
in 1992, turned out to be one of the most successful Indian initiatives after the Cold War
through which India first turned to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as
a benchmark for its own liberalization and sought to initiate engagement with the regional
grouping while reforming its economy. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Rao
established diplomatic ties with all the new republics in Central Asia. In the early 1990s
relations with the Middle East also changed when Rao decided to establish full
diplomatic relations with Israel, by ending India's limited engagement with Tel Aviv. Rao’s
tenure also saw a fresh look at regional cooperation with Africa. With the founding of the
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) due to which all of the
subcontinent’s adjoining regions acquired a new prominence for India’s foreign policy.

Under the tenure of Vajpayee and Singh, a new phase of India was seen as its relations with
extended neighbourhood started widening. Its commercial links with all the neighbouring
regions grew rapidly. India's trade with East Asia overtook that with America and Europe. It
signed up Comprehensive Economic Partnerships with Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. It
also signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN which was not an easy task due to their
limited and shallow nature.

Significant constituencies in the country opposed to trade liberalization. Sections of the

Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party too were wary of free trade for ideological reasons
as both had to expend much political capital in winning domestic support for trade integration
with East Asia. Incase of the West, the free trade talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) made little progress. Gradually, GCC became one of India’s top trading partners with
the growing exports and imports. Further with the boom in African economy raised the
continent’s share in India’s international trade and encouraged India to intensify political and
diplomatic engagement with Africa. India started rediscovering its extended neighbourhood
with its Look East policy. It followed up for a more dynamic engagement with Africa and the
Indian Ocean littoral.

The emergence of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East as major destinations for India’s exports
and sources of vital raw materials had significant consequences. First, restoring historic
physical connectivity and building new trans-border transport and energy corridors—to the
Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and South-East Asia—became an important priority.

Second, India devoted considerable diplomatic energies to participation in the new regional
institutions that had sprung up in its extended neighbourhood.

Third, as China’s economic profile began to rise in the Indian Ocean littoral, Delhi began to
revamp and intensify its own outreach in the region which involved significantly raising
India’s economic assistance delivered to countries in the East as well in the West and by the
setting up Development Partnership Administration.

Finally, the unfolding competition with China was not limited to the economic domain, but
involved the realm of security as well. Apart from demand and supply, there has been
significant expansion of ‘military diplomacy’ on India’s part. Due to this India signed up a
range of defence cooperation agreements all across the extended neighbourhood.

India, which shunned the heritage of the British Raj, is now rediscovering the virtues
becoming a regional security provider. India as a ‘net security provider in the Indian Ocean
and beyond’ began to gain considerable ground both within Delhi and other capitals. There
was growing demand on India to take a larger role and maintaining the regional order in the
extended neighbourhood with the end of Cold War In order to have a larger regional security
role, India might have to look beyond non-alignment and Third World solidarity.

SECURING SOUTH ASIAN PRIMACY

India had to face extreme challenges in the subcontinent in 1990s. The Indian intervention in
Sri Lanka in 1987 was considered as a mistake- an ill consider foreign military intervention
in a complex situation. Also, Pakistan acquired nuclear weapon with the help of China. This
became a threat for Indian Kashmir. Thus, India already had a lot in its plate which changed
India’s foreign policy in 1990s.

It was recognised that improving the relationship with Pakistan was an absolute necessity.
India rejected repeated appeals from the strategic elite and the media for a conflict with
Pakistan. India continued to maintain its relationship with Pakistan despite constant cross-
border terrorist provocations from the Pakistani army. With this strategy, India was able to
regulate the shift to nuclear power on the subcontinent, keep the conflict to a minimum to
stop Pakistani aggression across the Line of Control, convince Islamabad to occasionally halt
its support for transnational terrorism, increase economic ties with Pakistan, manage issue of
Kashmir by deploying confidence building measures, etc. The Indian government also looked
into and nearly resolved long-running bilateral problems like Siachen and Sir Creek. Above
all, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh worked to resolve the Kashmir issue through
a back channel with Pakistan.

Author also mentions approaches adopted by Inder Kumar Gujral, former Prime Minister. He
replaced Indira doctrine by Gujral doctrine, which was is a set of five principles to guide the
conduct of foreign relations with India’s immediate neighbours. These five principles arise
from the belief that India’s stature and strength cannot be isolated from the quality of its
relations with its neighbours. On the other hand, Indira doctrine was limited assert Indian
supremacy in the subcontinent. Gujral acknowledged that as the largest power in the region,
India had to take greater responsibility for promoting peace and prosperity in the
subcontinent. All he sought in return for a generous approach to the neighbours was that they
not allow their territories to serve as springboards for hostile activities against India.

This approach was continued by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Vajpayee gave good neighbour
policies particular attention. The dedication of Vajpayee to regional peace was not motivated
by idealism. Vajpayee made economic progress by concluding the South Asian Free Trade
Pact and signing a bilateral free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. As India's economic
situation dramatically improved, Manmohan Singh expanded Gujral's approach. In addition
to highlighting the significance of connectivity and promoting trade facilitation, Singh
proposed unilateral tariff reductions for the SAARC neighbours. South Asia remains to be the
region with the least integration and connectivity in the globe, despite regional economic
cooperation having grown substantially over the previous 25 years.

India's perspective of its near neighbourhood began to go beyond its official participation in
the SAARC on the political front as well. India had to give more attention to Kabul as events
in Afghanistan starting in the late 1970s started to alter the security dynamics in the
subcontinent.

Mistakes committed by India are also highlighted in this particular article. Author states that
India appeared very eager to project itself forcibly inside its neighbourhood in 1980s.
However, India discovered that it would need to completely restructure its policies in order to
maintain its dominance in the area because it cannot do it by simple diktat. India renegotiated
certain old hegemonic treaties like treaty with Bhutan and Nepal.

However, there were still a number of issues that India's regional diplomacy had to deal with,
some of which have gotten worse recently. The topic of interfering in the domestic affairs of
the neighbours on the subcontinent has long been a source of contention. India may be the
world's leading proponent of "non-intervention," yet the country has a lengthy history of
intervening in the neighbourhood. On the one side, it persisted in urging its neighbouring
nations to follow India's moral standards and made its own small contribution to the
resolution of domestic problems. For example, In Sri Lanka, it pressed Colombo to give the
Tamil minority its due; in Nepal, it brought the Maoists and the political parties together and
facilitated the transition from monarchy; in Bhutan, it strongly encouraged the democratic
transition. Political leaders like Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were strong enough to
handle the pressure and formulate policies which would reduce the impact of India’s
domestic politics in its international policies. However, coalition governments were not
efficient enough especially UPA-2, according to the author.

An essential geopolitical goal carried over from the British Raj is keeping the superpowers
out of the subcontinent. India, however, did not have much success because the US-Soviet
conflict engulfed the area and India's relative position deteriorated. From 1954 on, India was
enraged by the US's partnership with Pakistan and was suspicious of Anglo-American
influence elsewhere in the area. However, several intriguing shifts emerged in the decades
following 1990. Delhi did not let the rekindled US-Pakistan relations following 9/11 interfere
with its efforts to strengthen ties with Washington. Delhi supported the US invasion of
Afghanistan and considered it as a benefit in the struggle against Pakistan-based terrorism.

While India's aspirations for the latter did not come true and it continued to be genuinely
concerned about how the United States would conclude its operation in Afghanistan, Delhi's
worries have since shifted to the swift increase in the Chinese presence in the subcontinent
(Padukone 2014). China has increased its interaction with the rest of India's neighbours.

At a time when India is pursuing closer economic ties with China, India understands that it
cannot erect a massive barrier to block Beijing's economic leverage in South Asia. However,
India is unlikely to abandon its efforts to reduce China's potential military presence in the
area. China's growing regional threat could serve as India's biggest impetus to change its
South Asian policies.

RETHINKING NON-ALIGNMENT

One has observed a lot of political and strategic changes in the Indian foreign Policy after
independence such as how our relationship with our immediate neighborhood changed,
relation with the super powers etc. One of the major changes one can observe in the Indian
Foreign Policy was the adoption of Non-alignment as a policy which in recent times can be
said as "strategic autonomy".

Non-alignment gained importance in the context of cold war rivalry between the two super
powers of the world.

India chose the path of Non alignment where it would not join any of the competing blocks as
affirmed by Jawahar Lal Nehru in first address as vice chairman of the Viceroy's Council. He
even declared that India would work for the creation of 'world commonwealth and for free
cooperation among free peoples'. It was basically after Nehru that the concept of non-
alignment acquired a decisively anti-Western orientation. At that time also Nehru took
positions on international issues that clash with both the superpowers but despite this he
presided over expensive engagement with all the major powers. It can be said that India's
relation with the great powers today is very similar to that in 1950 i.e India avoids aligning
with any of the super powers but has great engagement economically and internationally in
various aspects with them. India today is actually in real-politik concerning international
situations and its bilateral relations with other nations. But the scale and scope of India's
international dialogue and corporation cooperation is far more intensive in the early 21st
century.

When the dynamics between US and China entered an uncertain phase the question regarding
India as attitude towards them became an important challenge for our foreign policy elites as
India could not deal with China in the similar way as it dealt with in the cold war with
Nations like America and the Soviet- union. India cannot just envisage the policy of being
equidistant because China is our immediate neighbour sharing boundaries.and also being the
second largest economy of the world and a neighbour whose potential power potential is
growing at a rapid pace. As the strategic gap between India and China is increasing in favour
of China so we need to strategize in order to balance a relation with China and this would
involve security cooperation with other Western Nations as well. India needs to be clear
about its foreign policy and should clearly define the boundary conditions in order to avoid
both the conditions of either being a subordinate to us or coming into direct confrontation
with China.

SOME FUTURE POLICY CHALLENGES

Nehru in his address of 1946 underlined India's commitment to promote the colonization and
combat racialism but he never became anti- western in any fundamental sense. He even
opposed the idea of considering non alignment movement as a third block and emphasized
on the importance of global peace and nuclear arms control rather than the confrontation with
the west.

But in 1990 the project of the new international economic order had collapsed and India had
to adapt to the 'Washington consensus'. Earlier India was a hesitant reformer but slowly it
began to benefit from globalisation immensely and trade got a boost. The central challenge
for India was to manage the tensions with the international economic system on the pace and
direction of India's reform and another major issue which India faced was climate change as
it began to test India's state craft.

Another significant problem India had was with the expansive new humanitarian agenda that
the US and western government adopted as India feared that it was an attempt to undermine
state sovereignty which would complicate our task of nation building after independence.
This agenda includes prevention of human trafficking promotion of democracy enforcing
human rights and labour standards etc.

But despite all these challenges India has adapted in multiple ways over the last quarter of a
century. Due to external pressures we begin to pay more attention to human rights issues,
encouraged around forces to adapt counter insurgency tactics, we moved beyond merely
defending sovereignty in the international sphere rather we promoted democracy on
international platforms too. We even reaffirmed India's identity as the world's largest
democracy with the help of political leaders like Vajpayee and Singh by joining the
community of democracy initiatives in 2000 and extending support, to the Bush initiative to
build a democracy fund at the United Nations. Over the years we finally moved from a
strategy of 'non-alignment' to the concept of 'strategic autonomy'.

How India sea is itself in the coming years can be contributed by two structural changes.
First, despite the slow- down of the Indian economy it is on its way to become a major power
in itself and come to terms with its emerging strengths as its policies are designed to cope
with its weaknesses in the international system. Second, is the huge change in the nature of
India's economy, i.e., nearly 50% of its economy is now linked to international trade
including both imports and exports.

Basically, strategic autonomy is a flipside of economic autarky India pursued in cold-war.

Now the main task of India's foreign policy no longer centre on preventing the rest of the
world from impinging on it rather it must focus on shaping its regional environment,
influencing the global order and proactively creating conditions for India's sustained growth
and prosperity. This can be summed up as "the quest for strategic influence".