To what extent did Britain pursue a pro-Arab policy towards Palestine in the period 1939 to

1948?
Between 1939 and 1948 one of Britain’s major foreign policy challenges was how to deal with
Palestine and what sort of a policy to take, particularly following the end of the Second World War in
1945 where the decline of Britain’s place as a great power, the details of the Holocaust known to the
world, and the new threat of the Cold War placed greater importance upon the Palestine issue. From
the 17th of May 1939 when Britain published the Palestine Whiter Paper, 1 to the termination of the
British Mandate in Palestine on the 15 th of May 1948, it has been argued that Britain pursued a
policy that was pro-Arab and anti-Zionist. This essay will look to cover to what degree Britain
followed a pro-Arab policy and if so, why? It will also look into how Britain may not have been
following a pro-Arab policy, whether that was a pro-Zionist policy, or simply pro-British.

It can be argued that from before the beginning of the Second World War, with the publishing of the
Palestine White Paper to the end of the war, Britain predominantly pursued a pro-Arab policy that
aimed to appease both Palestinians and the surrounding Arab nations. The White Paper was a policy
put in place to appease the Palestinians following the Arab Revolt from 1936-1939 that had been
triggered by large Jewish immigration in 1936. 2 The revolt, originally a six month strike, did see the
initial concession of the Peel Commission, whose foresight that “the mandate was unworkable, with
the aspirations of the Jews and Arabs being mutually contradictory, with partition being only way of
dealing with the roots of the problem in Palestine,” 3 being rejected by Britain as being unworkable.
This failure of results for the Arabs led to the second stage of the revolt, which was far more violent
and was brutally suppressed by the British Army. However, the reaction to the revolt from Britain
was a change of stance by the government, straying away from the sort of policy that had been
favourable to the Jews and brought Britain into the mess of the Arab revolt in the first place. Instead,
Britain aimed to appease the Arabs, and as such produced the Palestine White Paper on the 17 th of
May, limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine to 15,000 a year and prohibiting the sale of land to
Jews for five years, after which the Arabs would get control of all immigration. It also stated that
government departments would be transferred over to Palestinians gradually, and an independent
Palestinian state would be established within ten years. 4 Despite the fact the White Paper was
meant to be conciliatory to the Arabs and was clearly extremely unfavourable to Jews, it was a policy
that the Arabs were still not happy with. In spite of Egypt and Iraq’s advice against it, the Higher Arab
Council rejected the White Paper, with all other Arab nations soon after following suit and rejecting
it.5 As such we can assume what might have been viewed as severely pro-Arab to anyone who was
Jewish or supported the Zionist cause, was to the Arabs nowhere near good enough.

For the start of the Second World War, Britain’s main policy in the Middle East was to retain the
goodwill of the Arab states at any cost, particularly from 1940 to 1942, when Britain’s vulnerability
was at its highest and the Axis powers were at the doorstep. This was continued even after the Axis
threat was diminished, with Britain trying to maintain the policy of goodwill amongst Arabs so as to
maintain their hegemony in the Middle East and counter any attempts of the Soviets trying to

1 Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years p.169

2 J. Barr, Lords of The Desert. (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd 2018) p.18

3 A. Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine 1921-1951. (St Antony's Col-
lege, Oxford 1998)
p.58
4 M. J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. (Princeston University Press. 1982) p.7

5 M. J. Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine: Retrospect and Perspectives, 1917-1948. (Routledge. 2014) p.360
increase their influence in the region. 6 From this point on it was apparent that Britain had to
maintain a pro-Arab policy towards Palestine so as to sustain the friendship and cooperation of the
surrounding Arab countries. This is clearly enforced by the fact that despite having a pro-Zionist
Prime Minster in Churchill, he did not manage to press any pro-Zionist measures to any positive
conclusion, and ultimately ended his ministry leaving the Jewish people with nothing, 7 although
much of this could be attributed to the assassination of Lord Moyne by Zionist terrorists in Cairo on
the 6th of November, 1944.8 Although carried out solely by the Zionist extremist group the Stern
Gang and not the Jewish agency, the murder impacted badly on all of Zionism. Rather ironically, the
British War cabinet had been on the verge of deciding a partition scheme on Palestine, in which
Moyne played a crucial role and which may have provided for the creation of a Jewish state. As a
result of his murder, the scheme was shelved and the “fulfilment of the political aims of political
aims of the Zionist movement probably much retarded.” 9 Notably, the British government never had
such a pro-Zionist figure in the government again, with the murder estranging Churchill, who had
been good friends with Moyne, therefore losing the Zionist’s biggest ally within Parliament, allowing
Britain to continue with a purely pro-Arab policy in Palestine.

Towards the end of the Second World the Labour Party under Clement Attlee won a landslide victory
in the general election of 1945. To many it seemed that this new Labour government would have a
pro-Zionist policy in Palestine, with the party having supported “the recognition of the existence of
Palestine of the existence of Palestine, and the need to guarantee to Jewish people the full
opportunity of the establishment of their national home” 10 pre-elections. Notwithstanding this
promise, the Labour leaders where not committed to Zionist demands, particularly once coming into
government. When Ernest Bevin became the new Foreign Secretary, he was briefed about the
importance of Palestine in keeping Britain’s position in the Middle East by both the foreign office and
Britain’s military Chiefs of Staff on how Palestine had massive importance for Britain’s position with
the Middle East post-war. To the foreign office, the Middle East was a focal point of communication,
a growing source of oil, and the shield of Africa and the Indian Ocean. 11 Looking at the British COS’s
views on Palestine we can see that their strategic aims largely overlapped with the foreign office. To
the COS, the three cardinal requirements for the protection of the British Commonwealth were “the
defence of the United Kingdom and its development as a base for air offensive, the maintenance of
communications, and the retention of Britain’s existing position in the Middle East,” 12 and if any one
of these requirements was lost the others would be imperilled. With the threat of a Third World
War with the Soviets looming, it was deemed vital that Britain was able to fight from the Middle
East, requiring a lightly manned foothold in peace that could then accommodate a much larger force
in the event of war.13 With Britain now withdrawing from Egypt, Britain had to look elsewhere for a
base, and although relations were arguably best with Transjordan, the facilities there were
considered insufficient for Britain’s requirements. Palestine however had ample facilities. During the
Second World War Palestine’s economy had been jumpstarted, with its human resources being
mobilised to supply the needs of the large British armies in the region. Palestine soon became a huge

6 M. J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948. (Princeston University Press. 1982) p.7
7 Ibid p.7
8 B. Wasserstein, The Assassination of Lord Moyne, (Transactions & Miscellanies (Jewish Historical Society of
England) Vol. 27 1978-1980), p.72
9 Ibid p.82
10 R. Langham, The Bevin enigma: what motivated Ernest Bevin's opposition to the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine, (Jewish Historical Studies. Vol. 44 2012), p.171-172
11 Ibid p.172
12 R. Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government, 1947: The decision to withdraw’,
(International Affairs, 56, 1, 1980) p.77-78
13 Ibid p.78
British base with large local industrial infrastructure capable of supplying its needs. 14 To the Military
COS, if one of the communities of Palestine had to be antagonised, it was preferable it was not the
Arabs, as Arab hostility would mean difficulties for Britain throughout the Middle East. 15 Clearly, to
both the Military and the Foreign Office the Middle East was an area of drastic importance and that
they were viewing the issue of Palestine as part of a much greater Cold War outlook. Although
Bevin’s nature likely made him challenge this due to it contradicting the previous Labour policy of
creating a Jewish state, Bevin accepted the foreign office and COS’s views, soon becoming
paramount to him, and as such the Arabs were to be supported and there would be no Jewish
National State.16

Despite all of this evidence that Britain plainly wanted to pursue a pro-Arab policy, it would be unfair
to say that Britain actually put this policy into practise. Simply, stated had Britain wanted to pursue
an entirely pro-Arab policy, it would be fair to consider that Britain would have stepped up their
military operations against Zionist military groups as the British Military Commander in Palestine,
Bernard Montgomery wanted, famously stating that he wanted “utterly and completely defeat the
Jews and their illegal organisations.”17 It is severely ironic that the man who saved Palestine from the
Nazi advance in North Africa now wanted to use such heavy force against the Jews. From here
Britain could have granted and help enforce self-government to the Palestinians and ideally, arrange
a deal upon which they would maintain a military base in the country. The fact Britain did not do this
is an indication that although that despite the cabinet being dominated by the pro-Arab Bevin,
ultimately their policies in Palestine from this time period were not. There were some amongst the
British who believed that partition was the only plausible option for Palestine. Colonial Secretary
Arthur Creech Jones was pro-Zionist and believed that Britain should impose partition by force if
necessary. This view was supported by Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Aneurin
Bevan, Minister of Health, as well as the High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Alan Cunningham. 18
They believed that only a partition was the only hope for Palestine and that any alternative would
involve of a bloodbath for all parties involved. 19
In addition to this, it was impossible for Britain to administer a pro-Arab policy without facing huge
criticism from the US and the international community. President Truman often found himself
championing the Jewish cause, despite the fact that Roosevelt had promised the Saudis in 1945 that
there would be no assistance to the Jews that went against Arab interests, 20 and that the US State
Department and Secretary of State George Marshall counselled against a Jewish state in a similar
vein to the British Foreign Office.21 Much of this was due to Truman personally being very
sympathetic to the Jews following the atrocities of the Holocaust, but also was severely influenced
domestically by the large pro-Zionist, Jewish vote in America. Truman, on October the 4 th 1946, with
November elections imminent, personally endorsed partition and the creation of a Jewish National
State.22 Truman also limited what Britain could do, putting pressure on Britain to help the Zionists in
14 M. J. Cohen, Britain’s Moment in Palestine: Retrospect and Perspectives, 1917-1948. (Routledge. 2014) p.
363
15 R. Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government, 1947: The decision to withdraw’,
(International Affairs, 56, 1, 1980) p.79
16 R. Langham, The Bevin enigma: what motivated Ernest Bevin's opposition to the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine, (Jewish Historical Studies. Vol. 44 2012), p.173
17 J. Barr, Lords of The Desert. (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd 2018) p. 74
18 R. Langham, The Bevin enigma: what motivated Ernest Bevin's opposition to the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine, (Jewish Historical Studies. Vol. 44 2012), p. 175
19 R. Miller, (eds) Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years. (King’s College London, UK 2010) p.181
20 R. Ovendale, ‘Palestine and the British Labour Government, 1945-6’, (International Affairs, 55, 3. 1979 p.410
21 J. Barr, Lords of The Desert. (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd 2018) p.81
22 R. Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government, 1947: The decision to withdraw’,
(International Affairs, 56, 1, 1980) p.73
return for favourable loans from the USA. 23With this endorsement, it became impossible for Britain
to foster a pro-Arab policy any more, much to Bevin’s annoyance who claimed that “Truman was
prepared to sacrifice Western security on the altar of domestic politics.” 24 From this, it seems clear
that Bevin was resigned to the fact Palestine would be partitioned and there was nothing Britain
could do about it.

Separate to this, the Anglo-American committee, assembled in January 1946 looked to find a policy
for Palestine that could be supported by both Britain and the US. The committee backed the
Harrison report that 100,000 Jews should be immediately allowed into Palestine. Britain however
refused to deviate from the White Paper unless the US was willing to assist with any backlash from
the Arabs, and as no support was promised, the White Paper was maintained until Britain left
Palestine.25 The reports ultimate suggestion, the Morrison Grady Plan under which Palestine would
see federalisation under the British trusteeship was rejected by both Jews and Arabs. Britain
ultimately sent the mandate onto the UN. Britain, exhausted economically besides facing massive
opposition to any military commitments domestically, looked to the UN to find a solution for
Palestine.26 The UN came to the conclusion of many others before it that partition was the only
answer, except by now Britain was sick of Palestine and accepted the resolution, finally withdrawing
on May the 15th of May, 1948, terminating the mandate and letting the Arab-Israeli war
commence.27
In conclusion it can be argued that in regards to Palestine Britain certainly pursued a pro-Arab policy,
but beyond 1945 it failed to implement such a policy. From 1939 to the end of the Second World
War Britain failed to do anything that could be considered pro-Zionist, although the Zionists truly
hamstrung themselves with the assassination of Lord Moyne in 1944. With the White Paper policy
and need to maintain Arab goodwill, Britain heavily pursued a pro-Arab policy during these years
and it can be argued that from 1945 onwards Britain would have pursued an even greater pro-Arab
policy in Palestine if it were not for the United States large Jewish population influencing President
Truman, who promoted a Jewish state whilst also trying to pressure Britain into doing so. As such it
would be unfair to say that Britain actually pursued a pro-Arab policy between 1945 and 1948 as
they failed to properly produce any policy at all, surrendering the issue to the UN and leaving in
1948. Overall it must be considered that Britain did pursue a pro-Arab policy in Palestine, but it could
have been taken much further.

Word Count: 2195

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24 Ibid p.429
25 R. Ovendale, ‘The Palestine policy of the British Labour Government, 1947: The decision to withdraw’,
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26 R. Ovendale, ‘Palestine and the British Labour Government, 1945-6’, (International Affairs, 55, 3. 1979) p.
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27 J. Barr, Lords of The Desert. (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd 2018) p.90
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