DOCUMENTS

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE OF GOOO OFFICES

BY THE

NETHERLANOS OELEGA TION

IN THE PERIOD

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTJATIONS

UP TO 17 JANUARY 1948.

PR1NTED BY KOLFF & Co .. BAT A VIA.

 CEASE-FIRE

and

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS

with

the Security Council's

COMMITIEE OF GOOD OFFICES

on the

INDONESIAN QUESTION
Memorandum submitted by the Netherlands technical sub-committee dated 27
November 1947 concerning paragraph (d) of the initiat suggestions submitted
by the representatives of the committee of good offices (for the personal
information of the members of the Committee of Good Offices).
(S-AC. 10-CONF. l-I-Rev. 1).

I. Object of the police action.

1. The police action which the Netherlands Government was obliged
to initiate on 21 July 1947, after every other means had failed to per-
suade the Republican Government to fulfil the obligation undertaken,
had as its main object to put an end to a situation that had become
untenable.
2. ]n this connection it was necessary to take police measures of a
military nature so that in the areas concerned,
(I) an end was made to the continual and systematic destruction of
estates, works, factories and other objects of vita! importance for the
country and its people;
(11) to re-establish law and security in these areas, so that a rapid
start might be made on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of ]ndones ia
as a partner in the production system of the world.

11. The plan of operations.

3. ]n general terms the plan of operations comprised the following:
a. to break through the zone of fortified positions and demolitions
by means of which - in contravention to th e stipu!ations of the Truce
of 14 October 1946 - the opposing forces had encirc1ed the areas of
Java and Sumatra occupied by Netherlands troops, putting them under
the pressure of a food blockade by cutting oft all supplies of food trom
the interior;
b. swiftly to advance a number of columns in order to occupy quickly
the areas concerned, bringing them under Netherlands control by taking
key positions in these areas;
c. to re-establish law and securiiy in the occupied territories by car-
rying out mopping-up operations of the groups of ]ndonesian soldiers
and gangs still offering resistance and infesting the interior.
4. The main element of the police action was therefore constituted by
the rapidity of act ion in occupying strategic points, which would enab le
further destruction of any extent to be prevented, and which would dis-
organize the system of command and any co-ordinated action of opposing
forces. The police action was also conducted in such a way as to convince
the population that the action was not directed against the people, but
th at its sole aim was the rapid restoration of law and order with a view
to implement the political programme based on the principles laid down
in the Linggadjati Agreement.
5. The duration of the action to rearch and occupy the key positions
in the areas concerned was planned at fourteen days; mopping-up
operations (vide sub (3) re c) would then start.

III. Effectuation.
6. Between 2 and 4 August all strategic objectives were reached, the
casualties to the NetherIands forces being 79 ki li ed, 235 wounded and
 S mlssmg. ihese figures show that there waS nl> question of serÎous
fighting, as the number of casualties was exceptionally small in proportion
to the extent of the territory occupied and the scope of the opera ti ons.
Mopping-up operations were not left until all final objectives we re
reached, the whole territory th us becoming " occupied" j wherever suffi-
cient troops were available mopping-up opera ti ons were at once started.
Naturally these mopping-up operations were not completed on 4 August,
1947, so they were continued according as more Netherlands forces
became available by regrouping.
7. The Security Council's resolution of 1 August 1947 "to cease hos-
tilities forthwith" was put into effect by ordering the troops not to
undertake a single action against the opposing forces outside the
territory occupied by the Netherlands forces, as the consolidation of
one's position and police measures in territory al ready occupied can
not be taken to be included in the term "hostilities" . But also the phrase
in the Security Council's resolution of 1 NOVEMBER 1947, " that thc
use of the armed of either party by hostiIe action to extend its con trol
over territory not occupied by it on August 4 1947 is inconsistent \vith
the Council's resolution of August first" (see next page) places thc
problem under the heading of the interpretation of the term "occupied
territory" , which is elucidated hereunder.

IV. The occupation and mopping-up operations.

8. As the I-<epublican Government has continuously and repeatedly given
evidence of attributing a dilf ferent and exceptional interpretation to the
term "occupation", it would be useful to give the Netherlands inter- .
pretation attached to this term. '
, 9. From a military point of view an area can be considered to be "occupied"
when the occupier controls it in a strategie sense. It may be - and with
modern military methods by which fast-moving units are advanced to
s.trategic key-points it is al most inevitable-that, at the moment when
the strategie objectives are reached, there are still isolated groups of
opposing forces in the operational area j th is does not, however, detract
from the fact that the territory actually is occupied in the military sense.
During the German occupation of France in the last war there was still
unorganized resistance in various parts of the occupied territory, but
this does not mean that France was not occupied by the Germans.
Long after the capitulation in the Far East there were still fighting groups
in Malaja, Celebes, in java and Sumatra, but it certainly cannot be
maintained on these grounds that Malaya and Indonesia were not
occupied by the japanese. After the landing in Normandy in 1944 the
American anad British arniies penetrated to the interiorj at many
points remmants of German troops and in some cases "pockets
of resistance" as for instanee Calais, remained intact behind tfie fronts,
but it would be incorrect not to admit that the operational area of the
Allied armies in France should be regarded as "occupied" territory. ft
was never asserted in General MacArthur's G.H.Q. that, after the fierce
contest with the main japanese forces had been triumphantly decided by
the American marines, Guadacanal was not considered as occupied
territory because japanese gangs were still at large there and there
were even ]apanese strongpoints in the interior.
JO. Although in the Indonesian conflict there is no question of a war but
only of a police action, since, apart from the character of the action, the
4
 Republican does not possess the facultas bellandi, as the Netherlands
retain sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies, a parallel with recognized
military conceptions may certainly be drawn in reference to this subject.
11. Quite apart trom the consideration presented above,however, what
significance could be attached to the right of an occupying force if it
should not be allowed to take measures to maintain order and peace
.and the security of its own troops and lines of communication in its
own territory. If this be denied its rights become non-existent, its position
untenable, its responsibility illusory, the more so wh en the other party
leaves no way untried to incite the population of the occupied areas to
sabotage, intimidation, reprisals and other activities of a similar nature
against individuals or groups of individuals, and property, including
destruction of property of any kind.
12. The situation therefore is as follows:
a. by the advance of the Netherlands troops the system of defence
of the Republic in the areas of the act ion was destroyed and dis-
organized so that in these areas a complete military defeat was
inflicted upon the Republican forces.
b. Thereby the main Republican forces were partly neutralized, partly
dispersed, with the result that they ceased to exist as organized
fighting forces;
c. since the Netherlands forces occupied and controlled the strategie al
key positions, the dispersed units of the Republkan forces were,
from a military point of view, in an untenable position and we re
obliged to Iive off the land, thus exerting an unbearable pressure
on the population . In order to perform their task of re-establishing
and maintaining law and order in the areas occupied, the Netherlands
forces were for this reason compelled to take measures againt these
troops which process is generally known by the name of "mopping
up operations".
d. in view of the fact that these scattered groups in combination with
irregular bands did not hesitate to behave in a manner wholly con-
trary to the rules of war applicable to their position, these groups
could not be give any other status than of irregulars, irregular
. bands, franctireurs, etc.
The command of the Netherlands troops therefore reserved all
rights in order to perform its task in fhe areas occupied by the
Netherlands troops, to deal with these groups in the manner custo-
mary in the laws of war and in accordance with the principles
underlying the discharge of the police iask of the army in the
Netherlands Indies.
13. In addition it may be remarked that the military point of view regarding
"occupation" as set forth above, is supported by the interpretation
according to International Law, for which reference may be made to
the existing handbooks. As alreadly pointed out above sub (10) there
is in the present conflict no question of a war between two belligerents.
The Netherlands Government, holding and exercising sovereign power,
authorized by the responsibility arising from this sovereignty, on 21 July
1947 deemed it necessary to undertake the poli ce action. In view of this
tact a further definition of the concept " Occupation" as interpreted in
International Law is not relevant.
14. In this light, therefore, the newly proposed interpretation of point (d)
should be regarded. An encroachment on the rights of the Netherlands
 occupying force in the areas controlled by the Netherlands troops cannot
be accepted as it would undermine the foundations on which the Nether-
lands poliey rests. The N etherlands Government has guaranteed the
safeguarding of life and property in the occupied areas; on the side of the
Republic incessant threats have been uttered against the Jives and pro-
perty of those who conform to Netherlands policy. Reconstruction and
rehabilitation are effected under the protection of the Netherlands military
forces, wnich are here used exclusively as a police force; on the side of
the Republic attempts continue to destroy all vitalobjects, public utility
services and the whole apparatus of production , and to di s rupt the
economie life, even at the cost of the population who have to resig n them-
selves to these sacrj,fiees. It is not only the Chinese population th at asks
assistance and ' protection from the military commanders so as to be able
to live again a normal life under conditions worthy of a human being;
there is documentary evidence to support this contention. If the Nether-
lands are to be able to bear responsibilLty towards country and population
in the areas controlled by the Netherlands forces, it is therefore imperative
that they shall be tree to take the appropriate measures to ensure securi-
ty. The Republican Oovernment, aIthough not a sovereign power, take
similar measures whieh they consider necessary to maintain law and
order in the territory under their contro\.
15. The content ion that there are in interior still "pockets" or ilots de
résistance", where these groups can maintain themselves, is untenable. In
the first place the conceptions of "Pocket" and "maintain" must be
regarded as. dependent on a condition of locality, since no group is ever
"self-supporting" unless it has disposal of organized non-military means
to ensure its maintenance. What is only too readily represented as
" pockets " is in fact at present no more than a number of wandering
groups or bands, who live oft the land and the popul'ation, spreading
unrest and committing unlawful acts, and who are in military terminology,
or in th at of International Law, commonly denoted as guerilla-bands,
partisans, or franc-tireurs . Moreover the activities of these bands
incited the worst elements among the population to commit acts of
injustice, so th at brigandage is rampant which in the interest of the
pop uIa ti on must te eradicated.
16. The stipulations of the truce as proposed sub (d) with regard to the
limitations imposed on actions of a military nature can therefore only
apply to the forward areas, where there are in deed opposing forces, but
can never be accepted for the areas therein; poliee duties must be in the
temporary absence of an adequate police force - provisionally be carried
out by military forces . In this connection the Netherlands technical Sub-
comnüttee therefore is of opinion that the terms,
- military status quo in Java, Madura, and Sumatra,
- not to alter existing forward positions from their present locations,
- ar,e as occupied by the respective parties,
should be interpreted and accepted in accordance with the preceding
paragraphs.
17. The Netherlands technica I committee therefore sees only one way to solvc
the question of any Republican groups still operating in areas controlled
by the Netherlands and who claim military status. .
The solution proposed by the Netherlands Committee will be the subject
of a special document to be submitted separately.
Balavia, 27 November 1947.
6 .
Memorandum subtrtitted by the Netherlands special committee dated 28
November 1947 conceming paragraph ( d) of the initial suggestion8
3ubmitted by the representatives of the committee of good offices
(S-AC. lO-CONF.-I-I-Rev. 1)

1. In general terms the plan of operations of the police action comprised

the following:
a. to break through the zone of fortified positions and demolitions by
means 0If which - in contravention to the stipulations of the Truce
of 14 October 1946 - the opposing forces had encircled the areas
of Java and Sumatra occupied by Netherlands troopsi
b. swiHly to advance a number of columns in order to occupy quickly
the areas concerned, bringing them under Netherlands control by
taking key positions in these areas i
c. to re-establish law and Security in the occupied territories by carr-
ying out a number of actions against groups of Indonesian soldiers
and bands still offering resistance .and infesting the interior.
2. The advance of the Netherlands troops destroyed and disrupted the
RepubIican system of de~ence in the operational area, the opposing forces
therefore sustaining a military defeat in this area. .
3. Thereby the main Republican forces were partly neutralized, partly
dispersed, with the result that they ceased to exist as organized fighting
forces.
4. Since the Netherlands forces occupied and controlled the strategical key
positions, the dispersed units of the Republican forces were, from a
military point of view, in an untenable position and we re obliged to
live off the land, this exerting an unbearable pressure on the population.
In order to perform their task of re-establishing and maintaining law and
order in the areas occupied, the Netherlands ~orces we re for this reason
compelled to take measures against these groups, which process is
generally known by the name of "mopping-up operations."
5. Between 2 and 4 August all strategie objectives were reached, the
casualties to the Netherlands forces bei~ng 79 killed, 235 wounded 8
missing. These figures show that there was no question of serious
fighting, as the number of casualties was exceptionally smaJl in propor-
tion to the extent of the territory and the scope of the opera.tions.
Mopping-up operations were not left until all final objectives had been
reached, the whole area thus becoming "occupied' i wherever sufficient
troops we re available mopping-up operations were at once started.
Naturally these were not completed on 4 August 1947, so they we re
continued according as more Netherlands forces became available by
regrouping.
6. To the remnants of the Republican groups, still roving in the areas
occupied by the Netherlands troops, it is impossible to observe adequately
any provisions of truce whatsoever, sin ce, separated from their bases
they will undoubtedly be inclined to violate the truce rather than perish
from starvation and destitution.
7. The contention that there are in the interior still "pockets of resistance".
where these groups can maintain themselves, is untenablc. In the first
 place the conceptions. of "pocket" and " maintain" must be. regarded as
dependent on a condition of locality, since no group is ever " self-sup-
porting" unless it has at its disposaI organized non-military means to
ensure its maintenance. What is only too readily represented as " pockets"
is in fact at present no more than a number of roving groups or bands,
who live off the land and the population, spreading unrest and committing
unlawful acts, and who are in military terminology commonly denoted
as guerilla-bands, partisans, or franc-tireurs . Moreover the activities of
these bands incite the worst elements among the population to com-
mit unlawful deeds, so th at brigandage is rampant which cannot be
tolerated by the occupying forces in the interests of the population and
must be eradicated.
8. Therefor·e there is only one way of settling the problem, viz .;
a. to deciare the "standfast applicable only to the forward areas,
where there are indeed "opposing forces";
b. to evacuate to Republican territory all these Republican fighting
groups which are still in the areas occupied by the Netherlands
troops;
c. to restrict the patrol aCtivity of the posts of both parties in the
"forward areas" to one kilometer in the direction of known posts
of the opposing party, with the proviso, however, that this restriction
can be maintained only for a short period (fourteen days at most).
9. From a purely tactical military point of view the provision proposed in
article 8 sub c is not really acceptable, because it seriously impairs the
security of the posts in question. However, the Netherlands Command
is prepared to make this concession in order to re duce to a minimum the
possibility of clashes in the forward areas during the initial period af ter
the cease fire order has been issued.
If after fourteen days it appears that the cease fire order is adequately
observed on the Republican si de, there are no objections on the part of
the Netherlands to extending the period, each time for fourteen days.
It, however, it should appear that the cease fire order is not satisfac-
torily observed on the Republican side, the Netherlands Command
reserves the rightto extend the patrolling ar·ea.
Batavia, 28 November 1947.

Issue No. 12
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.
Special Committee
Secretariaat
Issue No. 12
SPEECH BY JHR. VAN VREDENBURCH AT THE SIXTH MEETING OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEES O/B THE U.S.S. RENVILLE ON
DECEMBER 9TH, 1947.
On Tuesday, December 9th, the Netherlands and Republican Special
Committees met on board the "RenviIl'e".
During the meeting a plan for achieving a truce, submitted by represen-
tatives of the Committee of Oood Offices, was discussed.

8
 As it was feared that considerable time . would elapse before this · plan,
which co·vers a most Important field, can be put into effect, the Netherlands
Special Committee put forward a m.odified proposal, which.' if accepted,. in
the view of the Netherlands CommIttee, would allow parhes to make Im-
mediate progress. Such immediate progress would mainly be in the humani-
tarian and economic fields.
AT KALIOERANG an understanding (meeting of minds) between parties
was reached, on the principle that any kind of sabotage, intimidation, reprisal,
destruction and other activities of a similar nature against individuals and
property would be prohibited and prevented by all means at the command of
both parties. The same understaning existed, as to the principle th at prisoners
would be released by either party, regardless of the numbers of prisoners
held by them, and that discussions would be initiated with a view to the
most rapid and convenient implementation thereof. Some time earlier it was
resolved in principle to refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propa-
ganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians, ihe publication
of a dailly operational communiqué or any other information about military
operations would cease immediately, unless by prior mutual agreement in
writing and with the exception of weekly publications of casualty-lists. Full
opportunity was to be given for observation by military and civil assistants
cf the Committee of Good Offices.
Until the meeting of the Netherlands and Republican Special Committees
at KALIOERANG satisfactory progress was made. The Netherlands Special
Committee regretted that there had been astalemate since then . One of the
main reasons for this situation, which is causing uneasiness to both parties,
is the question of " pockets of resistance" which exist according to the Repu-
blican Government, but which do not exist according to the Netherlands
Oovernment.
It is the considered opinion of the Netherlands Government that th is
question cannot be solved until and unless experts are ordered by the
Committee of Good Offices to go and visit the territories under discusion.
Proposals to this effect have been made by the Netherlands Committee, but
have not been put into effect.
It seems to us :
a. th at, as regards the various resolutions of the Security Council, due
attention must not only be paid to their terms, but also and more parti-
cularly to the motives from which they originated .
b. that there would seem to be no doubt but that the Security Council's
prime object was to re-establish peaceful conditions in Java, Sumatra
and Madura.
c. that the Republican Government expressly declared, again on 25th
November 1947, "that we shall do everything possible to carry out the
wishes of the Security Council", and so on.
d. that since the Security Council's resolution of 1st November, it is in-
contestable that acts of violence against life and property are not in
accordance with the wishes of the Security Council.
e. that such acts occur daily within the territory where for lack of an
adequate police force, the Netherlands troops are discharging themsel-
yes of their police task; that there is no doubt but that, should that police
task be in any way curtailed, such acts would immediately increase,
ample proof of which can be presented .
.f, that, jf .th.e Republican Gov.e~nmentg.enuinely .wishes Ao observe\.-the

9
 Security Coucil's resolution, it must be assumed that it disapproves of ·
deeds against life and property committed by troops under its authority
and wis hes to see these put a stop to.
g. that in that case the value of these roving bands is extremely small to
the Republican Government. For, since the casualty lists of the Nether-
lands army show that there is no question of any organized resistance,
the action of the Republican bands really comes to putting into practice
the scorched earth policy and to terrorizing and intimidating Indonesians
and Chinese.
h. that the losses to Indonesian economy since the japanese capitulation
are al ready tar heavier than the damage sustain ed during the japanese
occupation.
i. that every minute that this situation is prolonged adds to the laad of the
work of reconstruction.
Basing itself upon these considerations the Netherlánds Special Commit-
tee proposed some time ago that:
1. the demarcation lines at present existing in fact be laid down as provo-
sional demarcation lines; .
2. the standfast immediately be proclaimed to the troops facing each other
along the demarcation lines;
3. all Republican fighting groups still in areas occupied by the Netherlands
troops be evacuated to Republican territory;
4. the patrolling of th ~ posts of either party in the forward area be
restricted.
However, this proved unacceptable to the Republican Government. The
Netherlands Special Committee has therefore modified its proposals, on the
assumption that such troops or rather remnants of republican troops as may
still remain in Netherlands contrölled territory are of scant military value.
That this assumption is correct, is shown by a casuaIty list of Dutch forces
during two weeks and the reasons causing these casualties. (vide annex I)
In view of the above, the Netherlands Committee has revised its pro-
posals and suggests to divide the military from the civilian side of the
problem. Civilian casu alti es, not only Dutch but especially Indonesian and
Chinese are heavier than those of the military. Furthermore, economie
destruction is extremely serious.
This is borne out by the information contained in thè annexes I to VII.
All these documents are dated af ter November 1st. They present nevertheless
an impressive list of activities contrary to the purpose of the Security
Council's Resolution of that date. i.e. the restoration of peaceful conditions.
It should be recalled that this sort of thing has been going on ever since
a "truce" was signed on October 14th 1946 and since the signing of the
Linggadjati Agreement on March 25th of this year. The Security Council's
resolution of November 1st has not altered this situation. The Republican
Government seizes every opportunity to protest its willingness to carry out
the recommendations and resolutions of the Security Council. It would appeal'
that they do so in theory, but not in fact. How can one have faith in the
outcome. of political discussions i<f all these subversive activities go on, and
while the gravest suspicion exists that acts of violence and other activities
are not only being condoned but fostered and provoked by the Republican
Government. The Republican Government - should they so desjre - could
allay these suspicions. The Netherlands Special Committee left it to theCom-

10
mittee of Good Offices to stat~ whether the Republican Government, having
accepted the resolution of November I st, is not in duty bound to do so.
In order to stop the fight that is being waged on unarmed civilians,
Indonesians, Dutch, Chinese, Arabs alike, the Netherlands Special Committee
proposes to divide the military from the civilian problem . To achieve this,
the Republican Government should inform all troops and civilians that
although there is as yet no complete cease fire, that consequently opposing
military forces may still defend themselves when: attacked, but th at the
campaign against civilians must stop, that anyone carrying on sabotage,
intimidation, reprisals and other activities agail1st civilians is acting against
t he order of the Djocja Government and th at the campaign againts Indonesia
itself, the wanton destruction of this country's resources, must also come to
an end.
The Netherlands Government fully understands that an order of this
nature would not be entirely effective. There are certainly many wild men in
thiscountry in both Republican and Netherlands held territory. In this con-
nection a broadcast trom Antara of December 5th may be cited, according to
which the Republican state-police at Solo has started vigorous action against
armed raiders who harass the inhabitants of villages and small towns and to
whom no quarter will any longer be given. The population is willing, says
Antara, to cooperate in eliminating those raiders. The action is being under-
taken in accordance with a promise recently made by premier Sjarifoedin that
roving bands would be dealt with. The same is true with respect to areas con-
trolled by Dutch forces, where marauding bands harass and terrorize the
local population and against whom action must be taken if peaceful conditions
are to be restored.
Let the Republican Government therefore " distantiate" themselves from
these murderers, kidnappers, etc. not only in their areas but also in those
under control of the Netherlands Government. If that were done honestly,
energetically, if these people we re disowned, if this sil ent fight against civi-
lians were stopped, conditions would indeed have been created in which
not only "cease fire" but also politica I discussions could be carried out,
without doubts, suspicions, distrust casting their shadows over all delibe-
rations.
The Netherlands Special Committee furthermore states the following.
Either the Republican Government incites its soldiers and followers to
sabotage, intimidations, reprisals and other activities of a similar nature
against civilians, group of civilians and property, including the destruction
of property, or the Republican Government does not do so.
Either the Republican Government has accepted the resolutions of the
Security Council, including resolution of November 1st including the words:
" and to take appropriate measures for safequarding Life and Property", or
ihe Republican Government has not done so.
If the Republican Government now says that they have not accepted
these resolutions without reservations, that will be news. If they have and do
::lccept them without reservations th at will be good news.
If the Republican Government accept the resolutions without reserva-
tions they should act accordingly. They should then not only refrain from
inciting its soldiers and followers to sabotage 'etc. but they should also do
everything in their power to sec to it that an end be put to these abominable
activities.

11
 One broadcast by Mr . . Sjarifoeddincalling up on . his followers· to stop
the silent fightagainst unarmed civilians would do more to create cOrifidence,
than all the fine words addressed atthe world at large. The Netherlands
Special Committee wis hes to state th at it is willing to go full speed ahead
with the discussions of the latest suggestions made by the Committee of
Good Offices. It believes that they contain very valuable ideas, that they are
based on common sense and th at agreement on them could be reached, pro-
vided always that the Republican Government offers deeds, not words, and
that the present suspicions be allayed. Proof on which these suspicions are
based has been submitted to the Committee of Good Offices, which is wel-
come to investigate th is . information and decide for themselves whether the
doubts and hesitations ofthe Netherlands Government are weil founded.
The Netherlands Special Committee hopes for a clear cut answer. Let it
be either yes or no. If the answer is in the affirmative the following could be
agreed to and put into effect immediately.
l. Ta prohibit sabotage intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a
similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property,
including destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned,
and to utilize every means at their command to this end.
2. To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at
provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.
3. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops
and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict
compliance with the provisions sub 1 and 2.
4. Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made
available to the Committee of Good Offices.
In this agreement could also be incorporated the other points on which
a meeting of minds has been reached, i.e.
To cease immediately thepublication of a daily operational communique
or any oth.er information about military operations unless by prior mutual
agreement in writing except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving
names, numbers and home addresses) who have been kiIled or have died as
a result of injuries received in action.
To accept the principe of the release of prisoners byeach party and
to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and convenient imple-
mentation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number
of prisoners held by either party Both parties would then have achieved
somethingpositive.

A N NE X I.
Comparison of the Netherlands casualties in the first week of November
;md the first week of December 1947
Sniper activities KiJIed and
Period against bivouacs
Killed by mines and fixed wounded on Total
posi- patrols
tions
IKilled I
woundedlKilled I
wounded IKilled Iwoundedl Killed I wounded
1-7 Nov. incl
1-7 Dec. incl
8 4
1
9
·9
19
19 II 5
3
21
16
22
12
44
36
 ANNEX 11.
List of subversive acts - November 21st.-1947.
1. On 21 November a capok shed was set fir e to in Probolinggo; shots
were fired at those who tried to exfnguish it. (E. java).
2. On 21 November an inhabitant of Bonda'Aroem was murdered by a gang
( 10 'km . E. of Bondowoso, E. java).
3. On 21 November a Dessa policeman at Bagoe near Pasirian was abduct-
ed by T.N.I.
4. From Sambirate, 8 km. E. of Soegiwars, one Indonesian was abducted .
(S. Sumatra). .
5. In the night of 20 to 21 November a detachment of field police and a rice-
hulling mill at Tjilamaja were fired at (W. java).
6. On 21 November a VDMB (Security Serv;ce of th e Marine Brigade)
information agent at Djatian, 4 km S. of Kalisan, was murdered (E. java).
7. The Krio (head of the kampong) of Panggal-Panggil, 234d, abducted by
a gang of 5 men; 13 weapons collected by him were taken. (25 km W .
of Batoeradja - S. Sumatra) .
8. On 21 November 5 regular soldiers raided the house of a VDMB informa-
ti on agent at Sapikerop, 4 km. S. of Soekapoera (E. java).
9 . On 21 November a gang of five abducted an inhabitant of Kesambiram-
pak, 8 km. SE. of Besoeki (E. java).
10. On 21 November a motor-car was fired at near TjoekoergoeI"ng, 10 km.
SE. of Pasoeroean. The car was burned out completely. (E. java).
1l. On 21 November a truck struck a mine between Djember and Rambi-
poedjl (E. Java).
12. On 21 November possessors of Nica money were manhandled by regular
soldiers at Wonotoro, 7 km. SW. of Soekapoera . All the personnel of
the sugar factory Gending is threatened with murder. Ta lend force to
these threats a head-servant of this factory was slaughtered before his
house at Maron Wetan, 10 km. SE, of Kraksaan , in the night of 20 tot 21
November (E. Java).
13. On 21 November a bridge 4 km. S. of Kawali partly destroyed (W. java).
14. On 21 November a telephone cab Ie was cut along a length of 40 m. near
Baringin.

A N N E X 111.

List of Subversive Activities, from 1 to 25 November 1947.

Intimidation and terrorization of population.
A. Intimidation 12
B. Abductions 41
C. Looting 16
D. Arson 36
E. Murderous attacks 26
F. Murders
a. dessa policeman murdered 8
b. others 22

13
 ACTS Of' SABOtAO~.
A. Works and plantations (including cases of arson) 21
B. Irrigation works 4
C. COMMUNICATIONS
a. Roads 12
b. Railways 17
c. Bridges 42
d. Telephone 14
D. Mines and Booby Traps placed 40
Actually the list is much longer. We have only selected those cases
which appear to be beyond doubt.

ANN EX IV

Extract from instructions to a Kampong-Head. November 5th. 1947.

1. Murder people who assist the DlItch (traitors), set fire to thcir
houses and possessions.
2. · Guide your people to fight the Dutch.

ANNEX V.
News - items.
Training for the women's guerilla corps.
SOERAKARTA, December 7th (radio Solo) - Solo Radio reports that
the BPRI (republican revolutionary fighting organization), section Solo, will
in the course of th is month start training officers for fhe women's gllerilla
troops.
Subjects to be taught are guerilla fighting, poli tics and national ideology.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM
CONCERNING THE REQUESTS FOR ELUOIDA TION
OF THE "PLAN FQR ACHIEVING A SPEEDY AND
EFFECTIVE TRUCE", AS PUT BY THE NETHER-
LANDS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT THE INFORMAL
MEETING OF IOth DECEMBER 1947, TO THE M'ILI-
T ARY ADVISORS OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD
OFFICES.
1. "DEMILlTARIZED ZONE".
a. what is the correct definition of the concept "DEMILIT ARIZED
ZONE" as referred to in paragraph 1, 2, 3 c, d, and e, 5, 9 and 1O?
b. does the qualification "DEMIUT ARIZED" refer te MILITARY UNITS
in general and everything connected with such units, or only to
 ármed members or units of the mllÎtary forces and e.g. not te
unarmed members of the military forces?
c. do these regulations also apply to "poli ce", and what are the con-
sequences with respect to its arms.
2. Paragraph 3 sub a.
Are in this connection the "military positions of the various elements of
both forces" on 20th November 1947 - in analogy with sub (c) of the
same parapraph - taken into consideration or not?
3. "WELFARE" of local populations.
Wh at is understood by WELFARE? Does it refer only to law and order,
or also to food distribution, education, medica I care, etc.?
4. Paragraplz 4.
a Objections exist on our part to supplying to the "other party" full
military data, such as maps indicating the dislocation of the Nether-
lands troops.
b. Experience after the Truce of 14th October 1946 has shown that
the data supplied, which as regards the location of Netherlands
troops were most detailed, have more than on ce been misused by
the other party (shelling of Netherlands positions by artillery). In
view of this experience th ere are objections to the phrase "AND TO
THE OTHER PARTY" in the 4th line of paragraph 4.
c . In view of the fact th at experience has shown that data supplied
with regard t<5 the dislocation of republican forces do not always in
every respect agree with the actual facts, is it the intention of the
Committee of Good Offices to verify in the field the data supplied?
. - -
S. Paragraplz 7.
Is "PRESENT POSITIONS" taken to include the " positions" in all
arcas, or only in the so-called forward areas ?
6. Paragraph 9 sub a.
ft is imperative that provisions with regard to the problem of foreign
exchange th at will satisfy the Netherlands Delegation, precede the possi-
bie resumption of "normal trade" and " intercourse".
7. Paragraplz 9 sub b.
This paragraph actually applied only to republican fighting groups as
there are no Netherlands troops in Republican-held territories. For the
Nether lands troops this point is of importance on ly in so far as it affects
the interpretation or the concept " demilitarized zone".

Memorandum submitted by the Netherlands Special Committee on 16th De-

cember concerning paragraph (g) of the initiat suggestions submitted by the
representatives of the committee of good offices (SIAC. 10/CONF. 1/1 Rev. 1
The Netherlands Special Committee is of the opinion that in the discus-
sions concerning paragraph (g) of the initial suggestions submitted by the
representatives of the Committee of Good Offices the following groups of
persons should be considered with a view to obtaining their release;
1. Interned members of forces, which term on our si de is taken to
inc1ude all persons belonging _~o _ .!:I.~i~~. _?f .~h_~_. ~~therlands and Netherlands

15
lndies Land, Sea and Air Forces who are detained byRepublican orgà-
nizations.
2 Politica! prisoners. On the part of the Netherlands this term is taken
to include all those who on the grounds of professed or imputed pro-Nether-
lands leanings have been imprisoned, interned, taken into protective custody
or have otherwise had their Iiberty of action curtailed. Also to be considered
for release are those who have been sentenced or arrested on charges of
assisting the enemy (so-called kaki tangan moesoeh or kaki tangan Nica)
or af being in possession of Netherlands Indies money.
As political prisoners shou!d further be considered all . those who have
unwillingly been removed from the Netherlands controlled territory by force
or threats or in any other way, and who are now being detained . by any
Republican organization or being prevented from returning to the above-
mentioned territory in any manner whatsoever. '
3. Other civil detainees. This term is taken to include all those in
Republican areas or in the hands of any Republican organization or group
who desire to move to Netherlands controlled territories but are being
prevented from doing so by intern ment, protection, custody or any other
form of compulsion or intimidation whatsoever, directly or indirectly, in so
far as these persons are not already included among the political prisoners.
The Netherlands Special Committee wish to add to the above th at
the effectuation of wh at is agreed with respect to the release of prisoners,
is, of course, also dependent on the actual termination of hostilities, including
acts of violence, intimidation, terrorization, sabotage, sedition and similar
activities.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE
Secretariat,
Issue No. 8.
Ag. No. 475/ CGD/ SC/ Cor.

Bafavia, December 18th, 1947.

Sir,
'With reference to the statem..:nt I had the honour to make at the formal
meeting of the Special Committees on board the U .S.S. Renville on December
9 inst., I herewith transmit translation of the documents I mentioned in this
statement.
1 remain,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenlburch,
Chairman of the
Netherlands Special 'Committee.
Mr. Glenn Abbey,
Chairman of the Conference
of Special Committees.

16
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE

6ecretaria't.
Issue No, 34
Ag. No. 446/ Min.
Document J.
Transldtion ot a military report:
I. On 14/ 11/'47 our group arrived safely at the Cop. of We'h rkreise lIl.
Reported 'to commander of Wehrkreise I1f, received instructions on
duties of contact section and pioneers.
11 . At the order of commander of Wehrkreise lil the staff of th e engineers
of Wehrkreise 111 was transferred to Goenoeng-Ooewoer.
lIl. The following detachments we re detailed oft:
a. The "sie" pioneers under serg, D'haelani moved to Binangoen
(Capt. jasir) .
b. Three signalIers detailed off to Goenoeng Doewoer, to act as
couriers under Capt. Doeran,
c. Three signaliers detailed oft to Trenggiling, to act as couriers under
serg. Moerdjono.
IV. As from 18/ 11/ 47 radio ·Wehrkreise 111 mus't go on the air. Callsignal
QOY -4, wave-length 58 m. Tri ed to contact QOY every day; so far
no result. Apparently our transmitter is not strong enough (6 Watt),
please sel1Jd us as soon as possible a DC 12 Wa'tt transmitter (of the
same type as that of P"oenggelan).
V. As regards the health of engineers personnel of Wehrkreise 111, we are
troubled in particular by malaria. Please send medicine, whic'h we
need badly, as the medical serv ice of Wehrkreise lil is quite inadequate .
We request you 'to give this point due attenti6n.
VI. We urgently need the civilian clothes you promised us, in view of the
instruction issued by the cOll1l11ander of Wehrkreise 111 to the effect
that as many of us as poss ible mus't wear civilian dress in order to
comply with the requirement that the army shall be an "invisibl e" one.
VII. Please send immediately landmines accompanied by t'he necessary
detonators and tro'tyl (b lock, bag, drilI) . We need all this very urgently.
VII I. Other requisi tes are:
Radio parts: Lubricating oil (as much as possible) Stock exhausted.
Hattery acid " " Stock exhausted.
Petrol.
Batteries .

Phone parts.3 telephone appara tuses

Telephone wire 3 mmo (as much as possible)
Insulators
Wb with 6 numbers
5 bd telephone batteries
paraffin wax.
IX. lt is requested that 'the requisiti es specified above be sent in as large
as possible quantities.
No . 5/ artjKI.

17
D 0 cum ent 11.
EXTRACT FROM INSTRUCTIONS TO A KAMPONG HEAD,
5TH NOVEMBER 1947.
Merdeka! (Liberty!)
To the Loerah of
DOEKOEHLO.
I. BRATAADlSASMITA, A. W. R. I. (Assistent Wedono, of the Republic
of Indonesia a't Boelakamba make known to you Loera'hs by th is letter th at I
have always remained true and obedient to the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia and our President Soe'karno. I have always stayed among th'e
people and have always sought contact with 'the central government in Djoc-
jakarta and directly carried out the commands of the Republic of Indonesia,
In this letter I give you, Loerahs, good ad vice :
1. Remain faithful 'to our Republic of Indonesia .
2. Obey the commands of our President >Soekarno.
3. Refuse to obey all commands of the Dutch or to render them any assistan-
ce, also disregard the orders of district heads appointed by 'the Dutch.
4. Murder people that help the Dutch (traitors ), burn down their houses and
possessions.
5. Lead your people to fight 'the Dutch.
6. You, Loerahs, must not remain in hiding just to save your own lives.
7. 00 into hiding so th at the enemy may not find you, but go on working
against the Du'tch enemy and fight his spies, for Country and People.
8. Do not let yourselves be deceived by the iriendly mien of the Dutch .
Remember the history of Diponegoro.
9. Be confident of our certain victory, because our country is one Jthat has
a love for the truth. (By ourselves defending our Indon esian rights).
Thát is all. Earnestly consider these words!
Date: 5/ 11 / 1947
A. W . R. I.
BOELAKAMBA
(Signed) BRATAADISASMITA
Seen:
Union of Wedonos of the Republic of Indonesia
BAND JARHORD JO/TAND jOENO
A square stamp with the words: Wedono TAND]OENO (signature illegible)

Document 111
IInd Division
OPERATIONAL ORDER
P.D./No. 44/47
Annexes: 1 sheaf Instr.
2 Maps
Subject: "Wehrkreise" I1nd Division.
1. Destined for officers only. ,
2. To be destroyed in case of danger.

18
Situation: J. The Netherlanders do not cease their mopping-up opera-
o.
tions, with the intention of rigidly adhering to the "van
Mook" line.
b. Netherlands aftacks outside the "van Mook" line (KA-
RANGANJAR, BANDjARNEGARA).
c. The Netherlanders continue to exert themselves to
advance towards Dj OCJAKA'RT A.
2. a. A considerable part of the area of 'the I1nd Division has
already been occupied by the Netherlanders.
b. IW hat we can do is offer resisfance in the form of
guerilla.
3. o. The cease fire order has already been issued.
b. The American proposals were already accepted by UNO
.(i.e. the military situation of 4th August 1947).
In connection with the above, and in view of the decisions
taken at the Staff discussions of 25th and 29th October
1947by:
1. Major BIROTOSISWOjO
2. Lt. Col. MOH. BAHiROEN
3. "" SAPARI SOERIADIB'RATA
4. "" MOH. SOESMAN
It is ordered that immediately on receipt of this order,
J. The respeètive commanders shall be appointed of the
WEHRKREISEN " I, II, III and IV.
2. Every effort is to be made to assembie military units for
direct attacks on the enemy (criteria for selection are:
physical condition and intelligence).
3. For instructions reference is made to the annex.
4. Within three weeks after receipt of this order and these
instructions everything must be completed.
5. End.
Issued at Staff Quarters Iind Div.
Sth November 1947
at 09.00 hours
COl11mander II Division,
0/ 1. Chief of Staff
Signature not clear, probably
SOEGENG??
TO: Stamp of
Major BROTOSISWOjO Markas Div. IJ
Lt. Col. MOH. BAHROEN Ten'tara Nasional Indon es ia
" " SAPAR!I SOERIADIBRATA
" MOH. SOEISMAN
Copies:
M. B. T. S. O.-lI
Bataljon 14 P. T.
Djaw. Kesehatan Tentara Div. 11 For information with request
Djaw. PerI. Angk. Perang Div. 11 where necessary to give
Pembantoe Inspektoer Div. 1I full support .
Persendjata'an Div. II
Detasemen Genie Div. JI
Files
19
 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
I. Division of the area.
Wehrkreise J. to comprise the area bounded on the
North: ,by the boundary between the residenc es
BANjOEMAS and PEKALONGAN.
East : a. by the main road KRANGGAN - ADjI-
BARANG - WANGON - PAWALO.
South : by the Indian Ocean
West : by fhe boundary between the res. BANjOEMAS
and PRIANGAN.
Wehrkreise IJ. to comprise the area bounded on the
North: by 'the boundary between the res. BANjOEMAS
and PEKALONGAN.
East: by the boundary between the residencies
BAND jARNEGARA - POERBALINGGA.
South: a. by the K SERAJOE.
South: b. by the road RAWALO - WANGON.
West : by the main road KRANGGAN - ADjIBA-
RANG - WANGON.
Wehrkreise lIl. to comprise 't he area bounded on the
North: by the K. SERAJOE .
East: ) by the boundary be'tween the residencies
South: ) BANjOEMAS and KEDOE.
Wehrkreise IV. to comprise the area within the boundaries of the resi-
dencies TEGAL and BREBES.

II. Commanders.
Cdr of W. K. I Major HROTOSISWOjO
W.K 11 Lt. Co!. MOH. BAHROEN
" " W.K. III
" " W. K. SAPARI SOERIADIB:RATA
IV " " MOH . SOESMAN.
" " " "
lIl. Strength.
a. Each Wehrkreise commander is at the head of a group of some 500
men, who are to carry out orders which aim at the direct attack of
the enemy. The proportion of strengh and arms is 2 : 1.
b. This group is sub-divided into various sub-divisions each in charge
of a commander. The furth er sub-division (into companies or sections
directly under W. K cdr) is left to the discretion of each W. K. cdr,
depending on situation and atmosphere in genera!.
In carrying out orders guerilla tacties are to be applied as much as
possible and fher e must be no attempt at "line-formation". To this
end i't is necessary always to remain mobile, not be dependent on one
another, and to attack. In any case one must not remain in the same
. place, not longer than e.g. 2 days.
Although it is necessary to be mobile, this mobility from the largest
.fo the srnallest unit must not be of an entirely arbitrary nature,each
unit having its own welldefined area.
20
 C. In addition the W. K cdr has at his disposal auxiliaries who by their
intelligence, in conformity with th e instructions, are to deal the enemy
severe blows indirectly.
The division of these forces will be determined and laid down by the
W.K.
d. The sections of the inspectorate are charged ta supply the wants of
the guerilla troops. The inspectora te of Public Health is requested
to erect as many posts as possible in the W. K, so that the troops can
be helped as much as possible wh ere their health is concern ed.
All ather inspectorates are to take similar measures.
All 'these bodies must completely (for 100 % ) obey the W. K cdr.

IV. The Defence~tactics.

The methods for correctly applying guerilla tacties.
1. Indirect methods.
Non-coopera tion.
Say to all and sundry, for instance in the course of a friendly conversa-
tion over a cup of coffee, or at meetings, that 'the orders given by the
Dutch must not be obeyed. Or that no one must accept an appointmen~
as Loerah or undertake ot her activities as prescribed by the Du~ch.

2. Provocation.
Spread the rumour, if necessary by means of pamphlets which must reach
the lower strata of the Dutch community, that there are, e.g. differences
of opinion (disputes) between VAN MOOK and SPOOR, or something
similar.

3. Agitation.
Spread the rumdur that the Dutch soldiers are cal!ous and fond of
loo·ting, and so on, so that the population thoroughly hates them.
4. Propaganda.
Spread fhe rumour that the Republican Government is andremains po-
werfuI, that the same is true of the army, etc.

5. Abductions.
Abduct alive persons working for the Ne'therlands Government, such as
Nica- boepati's etc. and then take them to safe areas.

6. Espionage.
Seek out documents which will give an indication of the positive in'ten-
tions of the Dutch. Give information regarding staffs, fortified places,
and dumps to the guerilla 'traops who th en fal! upon them.

7. Attacks.
Kil! the leaders and other important people of the enem y.

~I
 The way to deal direct blows to the enemy.
I. Destroy the enemy's means of communication, as telephones, road s,
means of transport, in 'the night, and whenever the chance offers.
2. Attack units by laying ambushes.
3. Attack th e enemy's bivouacs and other encampments.
4. Allow enemy patrols to walk into your ambuscades and a'ttack them.
These attacks need not be continued until the enemy is completely
destroyed. Carry them out in such a way 'that they are fired at for
five or ten minutes, then withdrawing and Iying low, during those
five or ten minutes the greatest poss·ible casualties must, however,
be inflicted upon the ememy.

V. Minimum programme.
The least that must be achieved by this resistance mus't be to recover the
situation as it existed at the moment 'that the cease fire order was issued
(of 4th August 1947) (See annex).
VI. How the reports must be drawn up.
Reports are submitted in the usual way.
a. Every movement of the enemy must be reported, the report" being
accompanied by a sketch showing the directions of this movement.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION S.A.C. 10jconf. 1/17.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE Secretariat
Issue nr. 49

IMMEDIATE
Bafavia, 20th December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum of the Nether-
lands Special Committee regarding the "plan for Achieving a Speedy and
Effective Truce" submitted to the Special Committees by the representatives
of the Committee of Good Offices.
As is stated in this memorandum, the Netherlands Special Committee will
gladly consider the abovementioned plan as a working base for carrying the
truce into effect. The observations 'Submitted are therefore to be regarded as
general principles, the elaboration and adaptation of which should be the
subject of further discussions with the military experts of your Committee.
It will thus be clear that the proposal which I had the honour to make
at the meeting of the Special Committees on 9th December and which aimed
at an immediate effectuation of part of the entire truce plan, was not intended
to serve as a substitute for the plan for aehieving a speedy truee; on the con-
trar)', this Committee wishes to continue the eurrent diseussions on the plan
as a whoie. Consequenti)' the proposal of the Netherlands Special Committee
has been made only with the intention to reaeh agreement on a certain
22
number of practical measures which could be etfectuated immediately, pending
the outcome and execution of the plan for a speedy truce in its entirety.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch
Chairman of the N etherlan,ds
Special Comm,ittee.
Mr. Glenn Abbey,
Chairman of the Conference
of the Special Committees.
- -- - - -
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat
SPECIAL COMMITTEE Iss ue Nr. 50.

Memorandum of the Netherlands Special Committee regarding the "plan for

aehieving a speedy and effective truee" submitted to the Special Committees
by the representatives of the Committee of Good Offiees - (Restricted S/AC.
10 Conf. 1/9).

1. The Netherlands Special COlT\mittee has carefully studied and considered

the "plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce".
It has come to the conclusion that the principles embodied therein,
upon which are to be based the regulations for the technical implemen-
tation of a truce caJ1l be accepted in general terms as a working base.
This standpoint was already made known during the sixth meeting of the
Special Committees on board the USS " Renville" on 9th December 1947.
It seems evident, furthermore, that the plan concerned can be only
of a provisional nature and that its adoption would be without prejudice
to the rights, claims or positions of the parties, as stated in the fifth
paragraph of the letter of th e Committee ot Good Offices of 3rd Decem-
ber 1947.
2. The Netherlands Speci al Committee is, however, of the opinion that an
agreement on the basis of the plan ref erred to sub 1 can only be carried
out a'dequately if agreemeri,t has previously been reached as regards the
term "occupied territories" . By occupied territory the Netherlan,ds Special
Cornmittee understands territory which is actually under con trol of the
occupying forces.
3. Furthermore the Netherlands Special Coml11ittee is of the opini on that
agreem ent should first be reached as regards the extent ctnd delimitation
of the areas occupied in JAVA and SUMATRA, as it will otherwise not
be possible strictly to ,define the rights and duties ot each party ensuing
from any such agreement and see th at they are fulfil/ ed.
4. The Netherlands Special Committee wis hes it to be noted in this
connection that,
a. the Netherlands Indies Government at the conclusion of the police
action on; 4th August 1947 at 24.00 hours at once assumed respons-
ibility for law and order in the areas at that moment occupied by
its forces,
23
 b. the Netherlands Indies Government still maintains this responsibility
'in its entirety,
c. the standpoint of the Netherlands lndies Government is th at the areas
described in the proclamation of the Lt. Governor General of
29th August 1947 must be regarded as territories occupied by the
Netherlands troops (vide memorandum of the Netherlands Special
Committee of 27th November 1947) , with the inclusion of the whole
of the island of Madura vide paragraphs 15 alld 16 of the memo-
randum submitted by the Netherlands Delegation concerning the
political developments in Madura which led to the occupation of the
entire island (Secretariat issue Nr. 31 Ag. Nr. 425fMin).
5. The Netherlands Special Coml11ittee is therefore of the opinion that the
line usually referred to as the "Van Mook Line" will in principle have to
be the fine of demarcation ibetween the territories occupied and .controJled
by either party and that on either si de of th at line a demilitarized zone
wiJl have to be established, within which authority is exercised by the
party concerned and in which the maintenance, or restoration, of, order,
law an,d security will in principle have to ibe in the hands of a police force.
6. In view of the fact that in the territories occupied by them the Netherlands
forces are performing police duties whieh are rerrdered more difficult by
the present terrorization an-d sabotage on the part of Republieans, the
transfer of these responsibilities to the police in the areas to be demili-
tarized can only take place gradually, as the requisite concentration: of
poliee forces in these areas makes heavy demands on the available police
personnel.
7. Therefore the police 'duties in the Netherlands areas to be ,demilitarized
wjIJ for the time being have to be dischargect also 'by Netherlands troops.
8. Regulations will have to be passed restrieting strength and arms, whieh
shall unambiguously make c1ear the police function of the NetherJands
military police units within the Netherlands areas to be demilitarized.
9. The mom.ent when the said restrictive reguJations shall become operative,
will have to be determined at a later date, dependent on the general
sifuation.
10. The Netherlands Special Committee proposes that the said restrictive
regulations shall in the first intent be considered binding for a period of
at most 14 days. lf during th at period the truce regulations are strictly
observed, this period will be exten'ded, each time for 14 days. If during
such a period of 14 days it should be established that the truce reguIa ...
tions are not strictly observed, the restrictive regulations are automatically
annulled. It will be greatly appreciated if the military assistants of the
Committee of Good Offiees wiJl undertake to ob serve the manner in which
the truce regulations are being carried out by both parties .
11. The police duties will gradually be transferred from the army to the civil
poli ce, according as conditions in the Netherlan'ds areas to be demilita-
rized, or in parts of these areas, admit of such measures.
12. In the first intent those Netherlands areas will be demilitarized whieh are
situated between

24
 a. the demarcation line mentioned in paragraph 5 above,
b. the line connecting the Netherlands forward positions.
The Netherlands areas to be demilitarized have been indicated as
"area'S controlled by Dutch patrols" on the maps, which have lately
been transmitted by the Netherlands Special Committee to the
Representatives of the Committee of Good Offices.
13. The Netherlands demilitarized zone (vide paragrap!l 12) may as a
matter of course be further extended, in the event that th e general situafion
slrould continue to develop favourably.
14. The remnants of Republican forces which at the moment when a cease-
fire and stand-fast order is issued are still inside the territories occupied
by the Netherlands troops, will have to be evacuated to areas controlled
by Republican troops with their arms, equipment and military stores.
15. There is no objection to the establishment and maintenance of goods and
passenger traffic between the Netherlands and 'Republican held territo-
ries, provided that,
a. routes of communication are determined beforehand in mutual
consu ltation , along which this traffic will be conducted and outsidc
which traffic wilI not be permitted,
b. both the commercial and the passenger traffic are subject to regula-
tions passed or at a later date to be passed by the Netherlands Indies
Government, regarding 'foreign exchange, imports, exports and
transit of goods, etc., adequate measures for control of which shall
be taken on the Netherlands side of the demarcation line.
16. The Netherlands Special Committee wi ll be glad on the basis of the above
considerations to continue discussions on points of detail of the plan for
achieving a speedy and effective truce, so that complete agreement shall
be reached on the cease fire and stand fa st orders to be issued.
17. Meanwhile the Netherlands Special Committee wishes once again with the
utmost emphasis to drawattention to its proposal made in the meeting
of 9 December. To the Netherlands Special Committee, agreement on the
said proposal appears to be essential for a sl1100th and favourable
progress of the discussiOllS on the implementation of the plan for achiev-
ing a speedy and effective truce. .
Batavia, 20th December 1947.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION INFORMAL.

~-

INSTRUCTION
SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES
A. General regulations
1. This instruction becomes operative for both parties on D-day at
00.00 hours. At this moment hostilities in the forward areas (see par.
8 - 10 below) will be ceased, with due observance of the regulations
and directives of this instruction. D-day will be announced by the Chief
of General Staff.
2. An identically worded instruction will be simuItaneously issued by the
the Netherlands and republican authorities to subordinate commanding
officers.

25
 B. Delineation of occupied areas
3. In JAVA and SUMATRA the territory occupied by Netherlands troops
comprises the areas described in the Proclamation of the Lt. G .G. of 29
August 1947 as indicated in the annex to this instruction. .
. 4. All areas in JAVA and SUMATRA not specified in the above proclamatlOn
will be considered as controlled by republican troops.
5. The line dividing the territories mentioned in piuagraphs 3 and 4 wi.lI
be named "status quo line" and is indicated in the annex to thls
instruction.
6. Commanding Officers will ensure that the above mentioned line be
clearly indicated in the field as soon as possible . Further instructions will
be issued by the Chief of General Staff after consulation with the military
representatives of the Committee of Good Offices and th e Neth lrep
military authorities.
7. Members of the military forces and police units of both parti es are not
allowed to cross the status quo lin e. For other traffic across this line
see paragraph 20 below.
C. Forward areas
8. The forward areas are the areas situated on either side of the status quo
line and delimited by the lin es connecting the advance positions (inclu-
sive). (see annex)
9. In the forward areas it is not allowed :
(a) To establish new military positions and/or detachm ents .
(b) To move, or to reinforce military positions and/ or detachments or
to extend existing defenses.
(c) To prepare or to carry out measures of an offensive nature.
10. Movements of troops in the forward areas will be restricted to a
minimum, e .g. for the maintenance and relief of advance positions .
Commanding officers will inform the Chief of General Staff at least 36
hours before the effectuation of planned reliefs.
D. Demilitarized Zone
11. The forward areas will be demilitarized.
12·. In the demilitariz ed zones the maintenance of law, order and security
wiII in principle be carried out by civil police farces.
13. For ·the tim e being the police duties in the Netherlands demilitarized '
zones will be carried out by military personnel. who will be wearing an
orange band with the letters VP (Veiligheids Politie - Security Police)
on the left upper arm.
14 . . In principle the military VP mentioned in paragraph 13 will be armed
in such a way that their police function shall be unambiguously clear.
Further instructions to this effect will be issued by the Chief of General
Staff. . .
15. Commanding officers will issue writte n instructions to military VP units
in the demilitarized zones after consultation with civil authorities.
16. As conditions in the N etherlands demilitarized zones or in parts thereof
permit, the VP referred to in paragraph 13 will be gradually replaced
by civil police. .
E. Evacuation
17. Elem ents of republican military farces, which, at t.he moment at which
this instruction becomes operative, are still in areas occupied by Nether-

26
 lands troops, will be evacuated to their own territory with arms, equip-
ment and warlike stores.
18. These evacuations will be effectuated with the assistance and und cr the
supervision of the military representatives of the Committee of Good
Offices.
Further instructions will be issued by the Chief of the General Staff
after consulation with these representatives and with authorities of the
other party (see also par. 19).
19. The evacuations have to be concluded latest on D-day plus thirteen at
24.00 hours.
F. Civil traffic across the status quo Hne
2Q. Civil traffic across the status quo line is permitted in principle, with due
observation of the following:
(a) Traffic will be confined to routes of communication designated and
agreed upon by the military commanders of both parties (see
paragraphs 24 and 25 below) .
(b) No traffic will be allowed outside the routes mentioned under (ä)
(c) Detailed instructions concerning goods and monetary traffic will
be issued.
(d) Persons, goods, etc., crossing or being conveyed across the status
quo line will be subject to con trol and search; this will be carried
out in such a way as to cause minimum inconvenience and distress.

G. Air forces.
21. The use of respective air forces will be confined to the areas occupied
or controlled by the parties.
Air transport f1ights are not included in the above.
22. Further detailed regulations will be worked out in consultation with the
aviation experts of the Committee of Good Offices and the two parties.
H. Naval forces.
23. Naval bombardments, landings and other offensive operations against
land objectives are prohibited.
I. Meetings of local military commanders of the two parties.
24. Meetings of local military commanders of the two parties to discuss the
measures required for the detaited implementation of this instruction
must take place on D-day plus three 12.00 hours latest.
They may be accompanied by civil authorities.
The places on or near the status quo line where these meetings will
take place will be announced by the Chief of General Staff, after
consulation with the military representatives of the Committee of Good
Offices and of the other party.
Names, ranks and functions of the local commanders concerned will be
announced at the same time.
J. Final regulations.
26. Both parties wilJ give full cooperation to the military assistants of the
Committee of Good Offices in observing the effectuation of truce regu-
lations.

27
27. To that effect they will be informed of local detailed regulations whereas
they also will be consuited if the parties cannot reach agreement.-
28. Infringements of the terms of the truce will immediately be reported by
the parties, through their own channels, to
(a) The Chief of General Staff.
(b) The local military observers of the Committee of Good Offices.
29. Infringements wiJl also be recorded in writing as accurately and com-
pletely as possible and substantiated by proper evidence and submitted
to the Chief of General Staff, who will take appropriate further measures.
30. No militaryaction against infringements ofthe truce by one of the parties
will be taken by any local commanders of the other party, without my
previous orders, unless such an infringement should cause a serious and
acute danger to the safety of troops or the civil population, in which
case this should be reported immediately to the Chief of General Staff
and to the local military observers of the Committee of Good Offices
(see paragraph 28).

NETHERLANDS DELEGAnON.

Batavia, December 27'th, 1947.

INFORMAL REPLY OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION TO THE
DRAFT MESSA GE OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES OF
DECEMBER 26, 1947.
The Netherlands Delegation has the honour to submit the following
considerations with regard to the draft message receivcd from the Security
Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question on Decem-
ber 26th.
Concerning the parts of 'the draft message relative to the implementation
of the truce, a few remarks may suffice.
With refen~nce to point III A:
1) It is not quite c1ear what is meadt by documents "together with those
at present before our representatives with the Special Commit'tee".
To avoid ,any possibility of a misunderstanding elucidation of this point
would be much appreciated.
2) In order to safeguard life and property the Netherlands troops carry out
\their police task. The Netherlands Government is therefOf'e gratified that
'Orders are 'to be issued, or confirmed, to achieve this preeminently
humanitarian aim.
Dissemination of such orders by all possible means, including tr'eq uently
repeated radio broadcasts, appears essential. The way in which these
orders areto be disseminated should have fhe continuous attention of
the Committee of Good Offices.
With regard to point III 8 specific information will be appreciated as to
what proposals are referred to, whilei't should be noted that if the "plan
for aohieving a speedy and effective truce" Ibe intended, this plan has
al ready been accepted by the Netherlands Special Committee as a
working basis for carrying 'the truoe into effect (vide Document S/ AC.
10/ Conf. 1/ 17; letter dated December 20th 1947).
28
 With the contents of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of point B the Netherlands
Delegation is glad to be in complete agreement.
The contents of the last paragraph of point B will be dealt with below.
With respect to Annex I the Ne'therlands Delegation ,has the 'honour to
observe the following.
Re 1.
The Netherlands Delegation expects that a stand fas't and cease fire order
be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties. This order will apply
to 'the troops of both parties along the line of the areas described in the pro-
clarnation of August 29th, issued by the Lieutenant Governor~General of the
Netherlands Indies. The orders to he issued should be identically worded.
A draft of such an order is hereby submitted.

Re 2.
The Netherlands Delegation agrees that in the first instance and for the
time being, demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with ~he
line of the areas described in the proclamation of 29th August; it is suggested
tha't this line be called the status quo line. These zones as a rule will comprise
the territories between these demarcation lines and on one side the line of
the Dutch forward positions and on the other side 'the line of the Republican
forward position, the average width being approximately the same.
The Netherlands Delegation regrets that the Committee has not at th is
time sufficient ,d ata before it to determine w.here in its opinion the demilitarized
zones should be ,drawn in relaton 'to Western Java. The Netherlands Delegation
wishes to point out that it can accept no responsibility whatsoever for trhis
:Jtate of affairs. It may be recalled that from November 23rd on, the Netherlands
Special Committee has repeatedly and with increasing emphasis urged that
immediate enquiries be carried out in order to establish wh ether, in 1he ter-
ritories occupi ed by Netherlands forces, Republican pockets of resistance still
existed, and ,whether the Republica'11 Government be right in claiming that
there still existed o'rganized Republican civil and military authorities in these
areas; or whether the Netherlands we re righ't in saying th'a t there were mainly
!awless elements roaming the countryside, and a small number of troops who
act in a similar way.
In spite rOf repeated requests to do so, th e Republican Governmedt has
never specified precisely where these pockets of resistance are supposed to be.
The only area ever mentioned in Western Java is the S.E. Preanger. The
Netherlands Delega'tion therefore understands that "areas concerned" in
paragraph 2 mean the alleged pockets of resistance in the S.E. Preanger.
This area may be described as indicated on the appen,ded map.
In th is connection the Netherlands Delegation would wish to make the
following suggesti ons.
A. That the Republican Government should report to the Commdttee of Good
Offices with some degree of exactitude where these all eged pockets of
'fesistance are to 'be found.
B. That 24 hours after receipt of this memorandum the Committee of Good
Offices send one or more teams of military assis'tants to these areas to
ascertain the actual situation there.
C. That the Netherlands Command 'is then prepared to issue in ithese ,a reas
a stand fast order for 48 hours, regardless of wh ether a truce has been
concluded or not.

29
 With due observance of the abov~ the Netherlands Delegation can accept
paragrapih 2 of Annex I, it being understood that in view of the performance
of police duties by Netherlands forces beh'ind the Netherlands forward areas
to be demili'tarized,including Western Java, there shall be no restriction of
patrol activities for the mainfenance of law and order.
In this connection it should be pointed out:
that the population of Western Java amounts to over twelve million
peoplej
that acts of terrorization have of late rather increased than decreasedj
that a restriction of patrol activities for the maintenance of law and order
would therefore be wholly and totally unwarrantable in view of assuring the
safety of the population .
Re 3.
The Netherlands De legation agrees to paragraph 3 of Annex I.
Re 4.
The Netherlands Delegation ag rees to paragraph 4 of Annex I.
Re 5.
With respect to paragraph 5 the Netherlands Delegation is in agreemen!t
that
"p'2nding a political settlement, the respons ibility for the main tenance of
law .and order and of security of life and property in thedemilitarized
zones wiU remain vested in 'th e civil police forces of the respective
parties",
it being understood that for reason~ repeatedly stated, the term civi l police
force will not exclude the 'temporary use of military personnel. It is further-
more understood that the transfer of the above-mentioned responsibility can
only take place gradually, and that 'this point must be worked out in further
detail. In this connection reference is made to points 6-11 incl. of the Nether-
lands Special Commiftee's Document Sj AC. lOjCo nf. 1/17 of 20'th December
1947. It wi11 be app reciated if the Committee's mi li tary assistants will be
available to advise the appropria'te authorities of the parties and to serve in
such other proper capacities as may he requested by the par ties.
The Netherlands Delegation wholeheartedly endorses the suggestion to
promo'te co-operation between the two police forces (paragraph 5 b).
With reference to paragraph 5 a, it may be observed that this appears
to be in contradiction with the first sentence of paragraph 5, where ft is stated
that the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order e'tc. will remain
vested in the civil police forces of the respective partJes. This point therefore
requires further elucidation. In any case it would appear to the Netherlands
Delegation that, in order to avoid inddents in particltlar immediately after
the conclusion of the truce, it would be advisable to res'trict the movements
of either Netherlands or Republican officials in the respective demilitarized
zones, and only to effect any such movements in 'the presence of represe ntatives
of the Committee of Good Offices.
Re 6.
The Netherlands Delegation agrees to paragraph 6 of Annex 1.
Re 7.
The Netherlands Delegation agrees to paragraph 7 of Annex I, it being
unders'tood that the points already ag reed to in principle by th e parties are
the following:

30
 1. To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activities
of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property,
including destruction of proper'ty of any kind and by whomsoevcr owned,
ann to utilize every means at their command to this end.
2. To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed
at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.
3. To inftiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all
troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict comp-
Iiance with the provisions sub 1 and 2.
4. Full opportunity for observa'tion by military and civil assistants made
available to the Committee of Good .offices.
5. To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational com-
munique or any other information about milrtary operations unless by prior
mutual agreement in writing except weekly pulblication of lists of individuals
(giving nam es, numbers and home .adresses) who have been killed or have
died as a result of injuries received in action.
6. To accept the principle of Ithe release of prisoners byeach party
and to COmt11'ènCe discussions with a vi'ew to the most rapid and convenient
implementation thereof, the release in principle to be wrthout regard to the
number of prisoners held by either party.

Re 8.
The Netherlands Delegation agrees that t'hc Comllliftee's military assis-
tants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether elemen'ts of the
Republican military forces continue to offer resistance behind the present
forward posftions of the Netherlands forces.
As no applica tion has as yet been made on the part of the Netherlands
to visit territory controlled by Republican military forc es and as, moreover,
the dbjeètions to the admission of Republican officials into territory occupied
by Netherlands military forces still apply (vide in this matter the letter of
the Netherlands Delegation of 12 December) Ithere seems as yet no sufficient
reason, to admit Republican officials at the proposed enquiries.
It is understood that if the enquiry establishes Ithe existence of such
forces, these shall withdraw with arllls and warlike equipmcnt and be evacuat-
ed under the observation of miJrtary assistants of the Committee and move
peacefully with arms and warlike equipment to the territory on the party's
own side of demilitarized zones.
The Netherlands Delegation proposes that these evacuations take place
forthwith, and be terlllinated within a period of 14 days after the issue of
the cease fire and standfast orders concerned.
Re 9.
It is unders'tood that according to the Netherlands point of view the
evacuations mentioned in paragraph 9 of Annex I would also apply to
Republican forces in the South East Preanger, for the reasons set forth under
paragraph 2 above.
The Netherlands lOelegation finally draws atl'èn tion to the following:
1) The Netherlands Delegation is prepared, in the event of agreement being
reached in accordance with the above, to issue the cease fire and stand
fa st orders, and to effectuate these within at most 48 hoursafter the
signing of the truce.

31
2) The Netherlands 'Command is prepared in the fiTst instance to consider
the truce binding for a period of at most 14 days. If during that period
the truee regLllations are observed this period will be extended each time
for t 4 days. If during such a period of 14 days it should be established
that the truce regulations are not observed, these may be automatically
annulled.
3) It is suggested that the specification of the armamcnt to be used by the
police forces in the demiJiItarized zones should be based upon the arma-
ment of the Philippine constabulary, whose duties may be considered
to be of a similar nature to the tasks assigned to the police forces.
With regard 'ta the part of the draft message concerning the political
discussions, the Netherlands Delegation begs to bitsum the following con-
siderations.
The ,delegation fully agrees that an effective truce will cause a marked
improvemertt in the atmosphere and consequently will materially further the
possibility of a successful treatment of the political issues. It must point out
that substan'tive discussions on these issues have not yet taken plaee as a
resuIt of the absence of a real cease fire and that, therefore, the agreement
on the cease fire should not wait a poli'tical agreement. This point of view
is in complete accordance with the wording of the resolution of 1 November,
quoted in the draft messa ge under 3a.
The de legation fu ll y concurs with 'the suggestion that each party state
in a new memorandum its views concerning the practical steps to be taken
in the very near future, to ens ure a lasting set'tlelTI'~ nt of the political dispute.
ft has made a similar suggestion as early as 7 November (secretariat issue
No. 33), which was repeated on 15 December in the forty first meeting of the
Committee. It notes with satisfaction that 'th'e Republican delegation has ap-
parently stated to 'the Committee of Good Offices its adherellCe to the prin-
ciples underlying the Linggadjati agreement.
The summary given in the draft message is correct though incomplete in
order to complete the enumeration of those principles the delegation herewith
submits the gist of a statement concerning them by the Minister of Overseas
Territories in the Stat es General on 17 December last (see Annex).
A further elaboration of those principles, as rcquested by the Committee,
can be provided in a few days.
It will be dear from the foregoing th at 'tbe delegation wil! gladly avail
itself of the good offices of the Committee in the treatme nt of 'the political
issues. It has understood th at 'the urgency of these issues has prompted the
Committee to offer, in Annex II to the draft message, a number of suggestions
even ,before the memoranda, suggested in 'the message itself, have been
abtained. lt must, however, regretfully differ with the Committee on its belief
that 'these suggestions are all based on principles essential to the attainmen,t
of a just and lasting settlem~ nt.
'In order to cJarify its position with regard to those principles and to
show that, in a number of cases, they cannot be based on views presented
by the Netherlands delega'tion, it seems appropriate to remind the Committee
of certain facts and statements.
It is essential to realize that the dispu'te with th e Republic took its origin
in two facts:
1. the unwillin gness of the Republican Government to recognize the
sovereignty of the Kingdom of the Ne.!herlands, not only in obedience to
our constitution but also in view of the intended transfer to the Un ited

32
 States of Indonesia, and during the transition period (articles 2, .12, 13
and 15 of the Linggadjati agreement). .
2. the contiOluation of hostilities on the Republican side and the rejection
by the Republican Government of the proposed joint measures to end
these hostilfties and to el1!sure law and order in the whole territory under
its factual con trol.
The limited police action was under'tak~ n on 21 Juli to put an end to a
situation, which had become intolerable. On 23 July the Netherlands Govern-
ment stated publicly that by so doing they intended to create the conditions
for the implementation of the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement,
if necessary without the cooperation of the Republic. They stated at the same
time that a resumptiol1 of the cooperation with the Republic would become
possible as SOOI1 as its Government would appear ready and able to resume
such cooperationas a prospective member of 'the future United IStates of
Indonesia on the basis of the prineiples underlying the Linggadjati agreement
and on an equal footing with the other prospective members.
Although ini'tially the NetherJands Government intended to maintain the
RepubJican civil a,dministration in the occupied areas, the Republican Govern-
ment expreSosly forbade its civil servants to cooperate. As a c'Onsequence the
Netherlands Government had 'to assume full control and responsibiJity in those
áreas, which was proclaimed on 29 August.
MeanwhiJe in several of those areas popuJar movements for the impJe-
mentation of the Linggadjati principJes in cooperation with- the Ne'therJands
'Government arose and gained an ever widening popuJar support. In accor-
dance with their decJared purpose and with the prineiples con'tained in articJes
3 and 4 of the Linggadjati agreeffi'~ nt the Netherlands Government had to
recognize those demands of the local popula'tion and to assist in the organizat-
ion of these territories in such a way that an expression of politicaJ aims
and purposes, by democratic process, would become possibJe. As, at the same
time, the Republic followed a poliey of organized vioJence against all those
who wanted to cooperate with the Netherlands Government *), the establish-
ment and maintenance of law .and order by 'the NetherJands Government
remained an essential requisite for the freeexpression of politicaJ opinion in
those areas.
The Netherlands Government is not primarily interested in the way in
which Indonesia shall be buil't up as a federation; this has to be deeided,
in the first pI ace, by the population itself. But they are vitally concerned in
the guarantees for a free deeision and the elimination of coercion by vioJencc
or threa't, this being essential for thc stability of the future United States
of Indonesia. They must stress that the inhabitants of every area have the
fundamentaJ right to demand pro'teetion against such coereion and to deeide
themseJves about the status of their territory within the framework of the
United States of Indonesia. They cannot s'top the politicaJ organization of
these territories if the in'habitants decide otherwise. They have not and never
have had any intenltion of artifieially creating new political structures but
neither can they nor do they wish to prevent popular, movements from
expressing themselves freeJy., And neither can they withdraw the protec'tion
of their forces until Jaw and order and freedom from coe'reion can be guaran-
teed by an adequate, non-politicaJ poJice force to the sa'tisfaction of those
inhabitants and of the Netherlands Oovernment.
*) Not only in the' newly occupied territories in Java, Madura and Sumatra, but
also in South Borneo, Bali and South Celebes.

13
 ·· · ' Finàlly, before commenting on the separate suggestiorrs conJained in
Annex 11, the Netherlands delegation must emphasize tha't from long experienee
it hastheconviction that publication of Annex IJ in its present form would
resul't ina deterioration of the situation, instead of an improvement of the
atmO'sphere. It must be clear that the fear and unrest ereated by the poliey
of coercion of the Republic would be greatly inereased if points 2 and 3 were
put forward, a't this juncture, as essential to the attainment of a just and
hlsting settlement. Whatever may be the ultimate decision in those areas when
the stage envisaged under' point 6 has been reached, 'the announcement of
even a proposed return of the 'Republican administration, combined with a
withdrawal of the Netherlands forces would go far in creating distress and
consternation among the numberless people who have wholeheartedly accepted
çooperation with the Netherlands Government for the realization of their
Indonesian national aspirations.
Concerning the separate items the Netherlands Delegation offers the
the following remarks :
Ad . t. The Netherlands Government will gladly avail themselves of the assis-
tance of the Committee of Good Offices and of the U.S.S. Renville,
which has been put at the disposal of the parties, for the settlement of
the politica! dispute.
Ad. 2. The Netherlands Government does not wish to preven:t popu!ar move-
ments towards politica! organization on the basis of the principles
. of the Linggadjati agreement, trom expressing themselves freely.
Ad. 3. o/t would seem that, generally speaking, such points as are contained
under this item should form the substance of the politica! agreement
itself and not be decided beforehand. The Netherlands Government
.is not prepared to change the administration or to withdraw the pro-
tection of their forces i.l these territories until these decisions can be
taken with the full and free consent of their population.
As already stated on I tAugust the Netherlands Government is pre-
pared to transfer to the . Interim Government the administration of
those areas now under contro! of the Netherlands Indies Government
which have not as yet a politica! structure of their own.
Ad 4. Ag~adual reduction of the armed forces of both parties must certainly
be one of the aims of a politicaI agreement. It may even become
possible already after the full implementation of the truce. ..
~Ad 5. The restoration of free economie activity, tra de, transportation and
communications must also be an integral part of a politica! agreement.
The. interests of Indonesia as a whole demand, however, that these
economie activities are organized in full cooperation between all t~e
constituent parts of Indonesia, in such a way that further injury to
the general interests of the country and the particular interests of the
producers can be prevented.
Ad. 6. The Netherlands Government fully concur with the necessity of ah
uncoer.ce.d and tree discussion and 'consideration of vital issues· and :oi
free elections for · self-determination by the people of their politicaI
reIationship to the Republic and to the United States of Indonesia.
They must, however, stress in th is respect as in others the necessary
prerequisite of the establishm ent and maintenance of such a state of
law and order, in all parts of Indonesia, that the danger of coercion
cah be whoIly eliminated.
Ad 7. This point is completely in accordan-ce wjth the principle contain~d
in artiele 5 of the Linggadjati agreement. .
Ad 8. The advisability of internationaal observation should be decided upon
in the light of the measure of agreement reached in the politicalissues
and the state of peace and order to be achieved by the implementation
of the truee. . . r:
In conclusion the Netherlands Delegation begs to offer the follqwing
suggestions. In their opinion Annex 11 mentions a number of problems which
should, without do'ubt, beincluded in a preliminary politica I agreement. There
are other problems, of similar importance, which it does not mention. As an
agreement on the solution offered in these suggestions seems impossible, the
Annex should be withdrawn and the memoranda requested of both parties
~ho uld be taken as a starting point for the political discussions. However
divergent they may be, they will have the advantage of clearly expressing th.e
point of view of the two governments. In the meanwhile the conclusio,n and
implementation of the truce, in accordance with the resolution of the Security
Council of 1 November, should clear the ground for a better understanding,
as without a cessation of hostilities substantive political discussions wHI be
of Iittle or no avail. By concluding and implementing a truce nelther party
will lose any advantage; on the contrary such a ' truce would equally
enhance the position of both and contribute more to the restoration of .confi-
den ce than anything else. .

ANNEX
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE LINGGADjATI AGREEMENT.
Gist of a statement of the Minister of ~Overseas. Terrories
of December 17th 1947.
"1,- Continued voluntary cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands
and Indonesia offers the best guarantee of a sound and strong develop-
ment of both countries and peoples. ' .. '.' .,
2. The peoples of Indonesia have theright to chosethe form of governméiit
under which they will .live, and the right of self-government. ' . '
3. The fundamental hu man rights and freedoms refer.red to in the Charter
of the United Nations must beensured. .
4. The rights of minorities must be guaranteed.
5. The continued relationship between the ' Netherlarids afid ' lrtdonesi,i shall
be embodied in a Netherlands-Indonesian Un'ionto , prom6te: ~he' joint
interests of the Netherlands and Indonesia. ' . . . ' . ~ .' .~
6. At the head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union sh'all be 'the House of
Orange. The King can do no wrong. .. .. :
Acting in the name of the King the organs of the Union are respánsible
to the respective parliaments. · ,
7. The members of the Union are :equal, sovereign states and members :o f
the United Nations. . . ' .
8. The political constitution shall be .
a. federative
b. democratie
c. based on the rule of law.

35
l. ~
 9. The constitution shall be determined in further consultation.
10. The re-organization shall be effected gradually and as rapidly as
possible. During the period of transition the ultimate constitution shall
be realised to the greatest possible extent in the institution of provisional
organs.
11. Both the re-organization and the institution of a new politica\ constitution
require that adequate executives shall be at the disposal of the authorities.
In consequence the territories under Netherlands control can be transfer-
red to other authorities only when the peace, order and security necessary
for the preparation and realization of the new politica\ constitution are ·
ensured.
12. The Netherlands wiJl assist Indonesia according to its requirements.
13. The Netherlands interests in Indo nes ia must be assured.
14. The new political organization must rest on a sound financial and
economie basis.

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE

OF OOOD OFFICES OF DECEMBER 29, 1947.

As stated in the informal replyof the Netherlands Delegation to the Draft

Message of the Committee of Good Offices of December 26,1947 our Delegat-
ion is prepared, for the purposes of this enquiry to issue in this area one day-
this period could be extended to two or three days at the utmost after receipt
of our memorandum-a standfast order for 48 hours, regardless of whether
a truce has been concluded or not, It must, however, 'he made dear that the
offer to issue a standfast order for 48 hours in th is area could not possibly
be extended for the reasons given orally to Colonel Myers by Lieutenant
Colonel Peireira on 28th December.

2 January, 1948.

Informat proposals of the Netherlands delegation for a truce agreement

8ubmitted informally by the Netherlands delegation on January 2, transmitted
informally to the Republican delegation on the same date and made format
on January 9, 1948.
I. That a stand fast and cease fire order be issued separately :and simu\-
taneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of this agreement
and to be fuHy effeetive within forty-eight hours. This order will apply
Ifo the troops of Iboth parties along the boundary lines of the areas
described jn the proclamation of the NEl Governmen1t on 29 August-1947,
which shall be called the status quo line, and in the areas specified in
the following paragraph.
2. That in the first instanee and for ihe time being, demilitarized zones be
established in general conformity with the above-mentioned status quo
1ine; these zones as a rule will comprise the territories between this
status quo line and, on one side, the line of the Netherlands forward
positions and, on the side, the line of the Republican forward positions,
the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same.
 3. That the establishment of the demilitarized zones in no way prejudices
the rights, claims or position of the parties under the resolutions of the
Security Council of 1, 25, and 26 August and 1 November 1947.
4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties, ,the Committee
will place alt the disposal of both parties it,s mHitary assistants who will
be instructed to assume, in the first instance, responsibility for deter-
mining whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher au/thorities
of either or both parties.
5. That, pending a political settIement, 'the responsibility for the maintenance
of law and order and of security of life " nd property in the demilitarized
zones will remain vested in the civil police *) forces of 'the respective
parties.
The Committee's military advisers will be availableto advise the
proper authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities
as may be requested. Among others they should.
(a) call upon pools of police officers established byeach party in its
demilitarized zone to accompany the military assistants in their
endeavours and moves throughout th at demilitarized zone;
(b) promote cooperation between the two poli ce forces.
6. Thalt trade and intercourse betweenall areas should he permitted as far
as possiblej such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed upon
by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its represenbtives
if required.
7. That this agreement shall include all the following points already agreed
to in principle by the parties:
(a) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activfties
of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, arid
'property, including destruction of proper'ty of any kind and by
whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command
to this end.
(b) To refrain trom broadcas\ts or any other form of propaganda aimed
at provoking or disturbing troops and dviIi.ans.
(c) To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all
\troops and civilians of the delicate situaion and the necessity for
,s trict compliance 'w ith the provisions sub (a) and (b).
(d) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistan'ts
made available to Ithe Committee of Good Offices.
\ e) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational com-
munique or any other information ,a bout military operations unless
by prior mutual agreemen1t in writing except weekly publication of
lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses)
who have been killed or have died as aresuIt of injuries recei ....ed
in action.
(f) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners byeach party
and '10 commence discussions with a view to 'the most r,a pid and
convenient implementation thereof, the, release in principle to be
without regard to f.he number of prisoners held by either party.
8. That on the acceptance of the foregoing, the Committee's military
assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether
*) The term civil police' does not exclude the temporary use of military personnel
in the capacity of civil police. it being understood that the poli ce forces wil! be under
civil control.

37
 elements of tbe Republican military fmces continue to offer resistance
bebind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces. If the
enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these would withdraw
as set out in the following paragraph. These enquiries and withdrawals
are to be completed within a period of fourteen (14) days.
,9. That all forces of each par/ty in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone
~ or in any area on the other party's side of a demi litarized zone, will
under the observation of inilitary assistants of the Commi'ttee and with
arms and warlike equipment, move peacefully to the territory on 1he
party's own side of demilitarized zones.
10. This agreement shall be eonsidered binding for a period of fourteen (14)
days and will be automatieally extended ' for further periods of fourteen
(14) days, unless one party notifies, the Committee of Good Offices and
. .the :other party that it eonsiders the truce regulations are hot being obser-
veëI by the ' other party and thai ,th,is a'greement ' should therefore be
. terminated.

llolitical principles for the settlemelit of the dispute and 'the four principles
~f the Linggadjati agreement taken from the committee's Christmas draft
message proposed informally by the Netherlands delegation on 2 January,
transmitted informallyon the same date to the Republican delegation and
màde formaIon January 9, 1948.
1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in
1he working out and signing of an agreement for 'the settlement of the
political dispute in the islands · of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon
the principles underlying the' Linggadjati Agreemen't.
2. It is understood that neither party has the riglIt to prevent the free
expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations
Whi.c\1 are in aceord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement.
'H is futther understood 'that each party wil! guarantee the freedom of
assembly, speech and publication at all times 'provided that this guarantee
is not eonstrued so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.
3. It is understood that decisions eoncerning changes in adminiS'tration of
terrHory should be made only with the fu ll and free consent of the
populaNons of 'those territories and at a time when th'e seeurity and
free~om from eoercion of sueh populations will have been ensured.
4'. That on /the signing of the political agreement provision be made for
the gré\dual reduction of the . armed forees , of both parties,
5. That as soon as practicabie after the signing of the truce-agreement,
economie activi ty, trade, transportation and communiea,tions be restored
through the eooperation ofboth parties, taking into eonsideratJion the
.ihterests of all 'the constituent pants 'Of Indonesia.
6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months
nor more than lone year after the signing of the agreemedt, duri'l1'g whiéh
time uneoereed and free discussion and consideration of vita! issues will
proceed. At the 'e nd of this period, free elections will be held for self-
de'termination by the peop!e of their political relationship to the United
States of Indonesia.
7. . That a constitutional convention be chosen · according to democratie
. procedure to draft a cons'titution for the United States of Indonesia.
8. It is understood that if, after sign'ing the agreement referred to in rtem 1,
either party should ask 'the United Nations to provide an agency to ob-
,s erve conditions at any time up to the point at whieh sovereignty is
'transferred from the Government of ,t he Netherlands to the Government
of the United States of Indonesia,dhe other party will take ,this request
in serious consideratlion.
The following four principles of Ithe 'Linggadjati Agreemen1t taken from
the CommHtee's drart message (S/ AC. 10/ 75) are included as an integral
part of this document.
(a) Indepenlden ce of the Indonesian peoples.
(b) Cooperation betwee n the peoples of the Ne'therlands and Jndonesia.
(c) A sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitution which wil! be
arrived at by democratie processes.
(d) A union between the United States of lndonesia and other parts of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the , Neth erlands.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretaria t.

Ag. No. 586/ COD/ Cor. Issue No. 71.

MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION AT RAWAHGEDE.

Batavia, 3rd January 1948.
The Netherlands Delega'tion has the honour to submit the following
considerations with respect to the memorandum of the Rept!blican Special
Committee concerning the incidents at Rawahgede No . S/ AC; 10/ 76, dated
27th December 1947.
A. Reason for the 'action. During normal patrolling Netherlands patrols
,had on various occaSlions been fired at from kampong Rawahgede. For
th is reason the battalio!1 commander concerned gave orders on 8th
December for mopping up operations to be carried o ut in the said
kampong. In fhe night o f 8th to 9th December the troops marched oult
and surrounded kampong Rawahgede; at 05.30 hours groups o f men not
'in uniform opened fire on the Netherlands Itroops who had been posted
to the East of the kampong. The leader o f th e action ,then decided with
part of his "troops to get rid of these snipers.
B. Troops taking part. The total strength of the Netherlands patrol car-
rying out 'this operation was 90 me n with two 2" mortars assign ed to it,
and not, as stated in 'the Republican mem orandum 300 men.
C. W'Ïth regard t6 the Annexes I, 11 ,and IIJ appended to -the above memoran-
·,dum. a1e-w remarks may suffice. ' . . ,'.
With regard Ito Annex I:
Re 1. The action began in the mornin g of 9th December 1947 at -05.30
hours and ended at 13.00 hours on the same day, and was there-
fore not, as the Republican memorandum sta'tes, continued from
9th to 12th December.
 Re 2. Not more than 150 dead were counted, immediately after the
action. ft is quite possible that in the course of the exchange of
fire, provoked by the other party, some innocent persons we re
killed, because on more than one occasion fire was opened on 'the
Netherlands patrol from groups of m'~ n, which fire was returned.
Moreover none of the opponents was dressed in uniform. While
the kampong was encircled and searched some men were found
walking through the sawah carrying patjols on their shoulders
bu't with their free hanel dragging a firearm along. Such persons
were also fired at by the Netherlanders.
With regard to Annex 11,
page 5 Houses burned down:
A total of some 8 to 10 houses we re burneddown as a result of mortar-
fire by the Ne'therlands troops at the moment when ·the Netherlands patrol
was fired at from the Eastern side of the kampong trom machineguns and
carbines.
As regards Annex rrr:
page 6 Re A. .
The 12 "uncJaimed ,dead bodics" found were cvidently not inhabitants
of Rawahgede, but extremists from elsewhere.
page 7.
There was no question of an execution at the station. The firing referred
to was a result of the fact that the Netherlands patrol was fircd at from a
group of people collected there, .and the Netherlanders returned their fire.
At most 15 men we re killed and ndt 60 as stated in the Republican me-
morandum; nor was there any question of their being stood in a row.
The Netherlands patrol only fired at suspecteel elements, who meanwhile
took to their heels.
Attention is callcel to the fact that there we re no women or childrcn among
those killed, contrary Ito what the Republican memorandum claims.
. It goes without saying that Netherlands patrols never fire at villagers
thalt stay quietly where they are.

4 january, 1948.

Redrafted paragraph and explanation of paragraph 10 of the Netherlands

propot~als for a truee agrement submitted informally by the Netherlands
delegation and transmitted informally to the Republiean delegation on 4
January and made formal on 9 January 1948.
The following paragraphs are afternatives for similarly numbered
paragraphs in the proposed text of January 2, 1948 for the truee agreement
and may be substituted if odesired by the Republic.
5. (a) Police officers of one party wiII not move into and throughout the
the demilitarized zone of ,the ather party unless accompanied by a military
assistant of the Commiftee of Good Offices anel a police officer of that
other party.

40
 8. That, on the acceptance of the foregoing, 'the Committee's military
assistants wiJl immediately conduct enquiries te establish whether and
where, especially 'in West Java, elements of the Republican military forces
con'tinue to offer resistancc behind the present forward positions of the
t

Netherlands forces.
If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these would with-
draw as quickly as practicabIe land in any case within 21 days, as set
oltt in th e following paragraph.
10. This agreement shall be oonsidered binding unless one panty notifies the
Committee of Good Offices and the other party tha't ''Ït considers the
truce regulations are not being observed by the ather party and that
this agreement should therefore (be terminared.
The following paragraph is to be considered as an add~tion to paragraph
9, if the Republic so wishes :
,9. Both parties undertake to facilitate a speedy and peaceful evacuation of
the forces concerned. .
The following explamrtion is offered in connection with paragraph 10:
(1) The first period of 14 days 'is intcnded to provide :for the Republic an
opportunity of carrying out the provisions of the truce. It is understood
that during Ithat period even a breach of 'the truce would not be con-
sidered automatically cause for immedia,te termination.
(2) It is understood that if breaches occur during the fortnightly periods,
the denunciation may take place at the time of the breach, though the
end of Ithe fortnightly period would I have to be awaited before the truce
agreement would be considered terminàted.
(3) To make this c1ear, the Netherlands delegation have agreed that if the
original paragraph 10 is preferred the following words may be added
af ter "terminated", "at the end of the fortnight peri od" .

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
Batavia, January 7, 1948.

Sir,
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a Memorandum concerning
paragraph (E) of the initial suggestions submitted by the representatives
of the Committee of Good Offices (SJAC. JO/Conf. lfl j Rev. l).
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servan t,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the
Security Cou.nciJ's
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

41
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
Secretariaat.
Issue No. 77.
Ag. No. 601 /CGD/ST

Batavia, January 6, 1948.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE NETHERLANDS SPECIAL COM-

MITTEE CONCERNINO PARAORAPH (E) OF THE INITIAL SU OOES-
TIONS SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMITTEE
OF OOOD OFFICES
(S/AC. lO/Conf. lfl j Rev. 1)
1. Whereas only a sovereign state can have territorial waters the repu-
blican Government cannot claim any authority whatever over any part
of the sea.
On the other hand the Netherlands having sovereignty and ultimate
authority over the whole of the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) are
entitled to exercise their sovereign rights in the maritime belt.
Moreover the Republican Government never exercised any authority over
any part of th is maritime belt in fact, and in the Linggadjati agreement
no mention was made of the waters adjacent to the islands of Java,
Madura and Sumatra.
2. The questions concerning the supervision of the territorial waters of the
Netherlands lndies have been dealt with in annexes I, IJ and Hl, entitled
"The Situation at Sea".
These annexes have already been transmitted informally to the Com-
mittee of Good Offices.
3. Moreover the contröl of foreign and inter-insular commerce of the
"Republic" has been dealt with in the Economic Memorandum of this
Delegation, especially in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, which have been
appended to this document as Annex IV.
4. The memorandum submitted by the Special Committee of the Indonesian
Republic on 5 December 1947 concerning paragraph (e) of. the initial
suggestions submitted by the Representatives of the Committee of Good
Offices (SJAC. lO/Conf. 1/11) calls furthermore for the following obser-
vations.
Re paragraph 2a. This question of the possible Iosses suffered by the'
shipowners because of the investigations carried out by the Royal
Netherland Navy has been treated in paragraph 15 of the aforementioned
Economic Memorandum, reproduced in Annex IV. ft is hereby recalled
that the cargo papers issued in Republican ports repeatedly do not tally
with the cargo carried, thus hampering and unnecessarily prolonging
examination. The Netherlands Indies Government have never put any
obstacle in the way of the importation of food, cJothing, medica! supplies,
etc.
On the contrary, relief ships with this kind of goods have been allowed
to pass to areas temporarily closed to shipping at the commericement of
the police action, in spite of this closure. The observation that the N.1.
Government could prevent the import of these goods, is., moreover, in

42
 contradiction to the import, export and transport regulations issued,
which make it quite clear that there is no question of any hindranc~)9
importation or conveyance of such goods. .'

Point 2 sub b
Warships and other vessels have express orders not to fire unless the
other si de has fired first. Moreover, orders have been issued never under any
circllmstances to provoke action. What is stated in this point is therefore
contrary to the facts.
Her Majesty's ships only make use of their arms in the event of absolute
necessity. Such necessity arises:
a) when ships are attacked. Frequently patrolling vessels of the Royal Ne-
therlands Navy are fired at trom ashore.
b) when ships refuse to obey repeated signals to stop and obviously try
to evade examination.
Re paragraph 3. For the definition of "legal" and "iIlegal" shipping
reference is made to the Economic Memorandum paragraphs 13 and 14.
Re paragraph 4. The subject of the territorial waters has. been dealt with
in paragraph 1 of the present document. . .
R~ paragraph 5. In view of the considerations set forth in the documents
appended to this memorandum, directives regarding the execution of:
a) Interception and search on the high seaSj
b) Investigation at the Dutch occupied harbours j
c) Compensation of Josses to the owners concerned, can only be given by
the Netherlands Indies Government.
Re paragraph 6. The S'ubjects of
a) Sea communications between Repllblican-held territories and
b) The export ofproducts raised by the Republican population, have been
discllssed at length in the documents appended to th is memorandum.
Furthermore, the following facts about sea borne trade to and trom
Republican-held ports will contradict that the Republican-held territory is
" blockaded" or that sea communications of the Republican Government are
"disrupted" by the naval c6ntrol executed by the Royal Netherlands Navy.

a. SUMATRA
As indicated in "the situatien at sea" about 10% of the coast of Sumatra
is "closed" i.e. the north coast of Sunda Straits and part of the east coast
between Langsa bay south, nearly to Djambi river. The river itself is "open".
"Closed" means fhaf previous permission fo visit harbours in this area
has to be asked of the C.i.C. RN .N., at Batavia through the local authorities
or Netherlands Consuls.
The whole of the JWest coast, the North coast and the rest of the East
coa~t, about 90% of. the total coast fine, is "open".
"Open" means that any shîp, without previous permission is allowed to
visit these harbours provided she calls at one of the control harbours Sabang,
Belawan, Tandjong Pinang or Tandjong Priok to show that she carries no
arms and ammunitions in and does not traffic in stolen estate produce during
her outbound voyage. .
During the month of November the following number of ships from and
to open republican held harbours visited the con trol ports.

43
 Tg. Pinang was visited by 74 ships bound for Djambi carrying food, soft
goods. cigarettes, beverages, salt, soap and sugar.
About the same number of ships !eft Djambi carrying mostly rubber,
which is locally produced by Indonesians and entirely free for export.
Sabang was visited by 8 ships bound tor the repubJican harbours of Oleh-
Jeh, Sibolga, Goenoeng SitoJi, Benkoelen, Meulaboh, Sinabang and Lho Seu-
maweh.
The ships carriect salt, cigarettes, milk, medical suppJies, matches, guni-
bags, stationery, cosmetics, flour, c1othing.
Sabang was visited by 12 ships .t:eturning trom republican-held ports,
carrying rubber, coffee, ginger, copra, tobacco and keminjen.
Tg. Priok was visited by 2 ships on their way to Kroë, Benkoelen and
Priaman.
To the "c1osed" areas travelled the following ships, (after having
obtained special permissions from the C.i.C. R.N.N. at Batavia):
TO 'Bagan Si api api 6 ships
to BengkaJis 18 " (one every two days)
to Indragiri 1 ship
to Pakan Baroe 1 ship
to Telok Betong 12 ships ( one every three days)
total 38 ships.

These ships carried on their way in, textiles, c1othing"stationery, writing

material, incense and food and took damar (resin), pepper, coffee, tobacco,
rubber and about 300 passen gers out.

b. JAVA.
The republican-held territory has few harbours of any significance. The
Sou th co ast is "open". Two ships visited Patjitan bay. The North coast is
"c1osed". No permits were asked to visit the North coast.
Of this total of about 200 ships that travelled to and from repubJican-
held ports in the month of November, about half carried the British flag, the
other half being about equally divided between. ships under the republican
and the Chinese flags. Very few carried the Siamese flag .
Wlzereas slzips under republican flag are allo wed to enter all Netlzer-
lands In dies ports and get all facilities and tlze same treatment every ot/len
slzip gets, slzips carrying Dutclz flags are prolzibited to enter republican-Izeld
ports.
Before the war the majority of interinsular sea borne trade was carried
by Dutch ships. These lines still serve all parts of Indo nes ia, including Borneo
ànd East Indonesia. They are quite willing to serve republican-held ports
provided the Republican Government guarantees a decent treatment of the
ships and the safety of the crews. Up til I now the Republican Government
has been unable to give this guarantee. These lines coul'd increase sea borne
trade to republican-held harboul's manifold.

44
 ANNEX I
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION

THE SITUATION AT SEA.

. On October 14th 1946 a truce was signed between the Netherlands lndies
Oovernment and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. As this truce
concerned itself exclusively with territory of Java, Madura and Sumatra in
which the Republic ·e xercisedde facto con trol according to the status quo
f'n that day the sea was not mentioned. The sea was exclusively controlled
by the Royal Netherlands Navy. The low-tide fine was considered the line of
demarcation. Consequently there never have.. been any Republican territorial
waters. A few times since the truce the Republic tried to establish con trol hy
sending out armed ships or by attempts at shelling from shore batteries. These
encroachm ents were always opposed by the Royal Netherlands Navy. They
can only be considered violations of the Truce.
The legal base for the supervision of the territorial waters in the Nether-
lands Indies can be found in the pre-war Territorial Sea and Maritime Areas
Ordinance 1939. (Netherlands Indies Official Law Collection (Staatsblad)
1939 No. 442) , still in force.
The Royal Netherlands Navy exercises con trol over:
a. importation, shipping and carrying of arms and other war material;
b. movements of armed groups or individuals from Republican areas into
non-Republican areas (East-Indonesia and Borneo) in order to instigate
sabotage and subversive movements ;
c. piracy;
ä. illegal trade in opium;
e. iIIegal fishing ;
f. illegal trade in currency values;
g. exportation of unlawfully seized or obtained property (estate-produce)
abroad.
To cJarify existing legislation 1) and to assist bonafide trade, the Nether-

Note 1) Before January 28th 1946 supervision mentioned in para a and b was
based on pre-war statutory regulations concerning fire-arms (Netherlands
lndies Official Law Collection (Staatsblad) 1937 No. 170 and 1939 No. 279)
still in force, by which laws the unlicensed possession of arms was decJared
i1J egal and in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Indies Penal
Code for the protection of the security of the State.
The supervision para c is self-evident.
The supervision para d, e and ·f was based on pre-war legislation concern-
ing opium (Netherlan'd Indies Law Collection (Staatsblad) 1927 No. 278
and 280), and corcenning fishery (the T'e rritorial Sea and Maritime Areas
Ordinance 1939 above-mentioned and the Inshore Fishery Ordinance, Neth.
Indies Official Law Collection (Staatsblad) 1Q27 No. 144), and the Legis-
lation concerning currency-values (Netherlands Indies Official Law Collection
(Staatsblad) 1940 No. 205 and 291).
Before January 28th 1947 the supervision para g, was based on the laws
of the ' Netherlands Indies Pen al Code concerning theft, robbery, larceny,
embezzlement and receiving of stolen goods.
45
".
 lands Indies Government promulgated Import, Export and Shipping Regu-
lations (Netherlands Indies Official Law Collection (Staatsblad) 1947 No. 17
and 18).
The general purpose of the import, export and shipping Regulations in
regard to exportation is to safeguard the interests of the rightful owners of
p.state produce (see appendix). It is definitely not aimed against the Indone-
sian producers. A typical example follows: for export of rubber from places
North of the lin e Bengkalis, Sibolga an, exportlicense is needed (estate pro-
duce). Export of rubber South of this line is free as nearly all rubber from
this area can be considered native produce.
It is emphasised that this Order does not restrain or obstruct bona-fide
trade. Control necessarily imposes a certain amount of delay but that is
inevitabIe.
The activities of the Royal Netherlands Navy with regard to foreign
shipping are strictly limited to the territorial waters in the Netherlands Indies .
It is clear that these controlmeasures can in no way be interpreted as blockade
in the internationally accepted sense of the word.
Before the publication of the import, export and shipping regulations,
mentioned above, the control took place at sea.
The RNN relied upon the ships papers. Soon it became evident that these
papers could not be trusted . On several occasions definite irregularities we re
found. A thorough inspection at sea was impossible as the cargo could not
be moved or unloaded.
Therefore a routing order was promulgated by 'decree of the C.i.C. Naval
Forces in the Netherlands Indies No. S 221 /9 of January 29th 1947, Javase
. Courant 1947 No. 12, at the same time as the import, export and shipping
regulations. Ships to or trom all Java and Sumatra harbours had to call at one
of the following ports: Soerabaja, Semarang, Tandjong Priok, Palembang,
Tandjong Pinang, Belawan, Sabang, Emmahaven for inspection.
This system intended to allow thorough inspection and at the same
time keep obstructions to legal trade down to the utmost minimum. Cons'e -
quent developments showed that legal trade benefited by it considerably.
This system did obviously not cut communications between the Republic
and the international world as has often been aIIeged. Later on an increasing
number of falsifications of loading-papers by Republican authorities increased
the time, necessary for thorough inspection of ships.
Af ter the Signing of the Agreement of Linggadjati the situation did not
change: Though article 14 of the agreement recognizes the claims of all
non-Indonesians to restoration of their rights and restitution of their property,
rhe Republican authorities continued their attempt to E:Xport estate produce and
the con trol by the Royal Netherlands Navy had therefore to be maintained
as before.
At the beginning of the police-action on July 21st 1947 on the strength
of the Territorial Sea and Maritime Areas Ordinance 1939 and the Regulation
No. 171 (D.V.O.) VII A - 3 of the Military Authority of Februari 21 st 1942
(Javase Courant 1942 No. 17a) the Commander in Chief of the Royal Nether-
lands Navy prohibited temporarily all navigation to and trom certain Repu-
blican areas, close to the Areas of action. The reasons for th is order were
obviously prevention of movements of Republican troops and arms to opera-
tional areas arid safety of bona-fide ships. The coast sections in question were
the Eastern Coast of Sumatra, from Langsa bay sauth to Djambi-river, the
coast of Sunda-straits, Java's north and east coast, the coast of Madura 'and

46
part of the south coast of Java near Chilachap (Decree of the C.i.c. Naval
Forces in the Netherlands In dies No. S 227/Z0/ 1'/7 of June 27th 1947, Javase
Courant 1947 No. 56a and S 227/Z0/ 1/12 of july 28th 1947, Javase Courant
1947 No. 59.) .
. To and from all other Repub!ican areas (Achin, westcoast of Sumatra)
the extant order, however, remained in force.
Ports, occupied by the Netherlands Forces (Cheribon, Probo!inggo~
Banjuwangi, Tandjong ' Pura, Tandjong Ba!ai-Asahan) were re-opened for
trade and shipping as soon as the equipment and the con trol apparatus bf
the Customs and of the Office of Economic Affairs came up to reasonable
requirements (o.ecrees of the C.i.C. of the Naval Forces in the Netherlands
Indies No. S 227/Z0/1/ 13 of July 28th 1947, Javase Courant 1947 No. 59 and
No. S 227/0 /6/24 of August 22nd 1947, javase Courant 1947 No. 69.
The cease-fire order has stopped all offensive opera ti ons from R.N .N.
ships al:{ainst Republican shore-positions.
Contro! of shipping at sea is carried on as usua!.
To prevent iIIegal importation of arms to Republican forces some parts
of the coast, mentioned earlier, are stiII c10sed to alI shipping. Permits are
given to bona-fide ships that carry relief goods (food) to the population in
.some of these areas and a certain amount of export to barter for these goods
is allowed (Bengkalis, Bagan-siapiapi, Telok Betong) .
(Decree of the C.i.c. of the Naval Forces in the Netherlands Indies
No. S 227/0 /7/16 of September 13th 1947. Javase Courant 1947 No. 7,!,
No. S 227/0 / of September 25th 1947).
The unsettled situation existing in the Netherlands Indies after the uncon-
ditional surrender of Japan, drastically affected the economic conditions of
the country. It was consequently impossible to exercise control over tradc
between the Netherlands Indies and other countries, as existed before the
japanese agression. The Crisis Export Ordinance of 1939, (annex Crisis
Exoort Regulations of the same year and related official dec rees ) and the
fureign Exchange Regulations of 1940, may here be mentioned. In addition
the importation and exportation of fire arms, narcotics and several other
goods and commodities, . involving the general welfare, have always been
subjected to · certain restrictions.
Owing to thedifficulties ensuing from the japanese capitulation, the
greater part of the estate produce in java and Sumatra was withheld from
the control of the rightful owners. Unauthorized persons took possession of
these products and illicitly endeavoured to export these goods. The Import,
Export and Shipping Regulations, promulgated by the Netherlands Indies
Government on the 28th of January, have in view to restrict, and if possible
to · abolish the trafficking in stolen goods. It seems hardly necessary to recall
th at it is, and always has been a fundamental principle of Netherlands Indies
legislation to protect private property wheth er it be of Netherlands, or foreign
ownership .
. it is evident thát · those having illicitly obtained possession of estate pro-
ducts, and having consequently not been involved in commensurate expense
in its production, are able (lnd willing to sell these goods far below the real
value of world market prices . It is furthermore obvious that these practices
cause the most serious injury to the economy of the Netherlands Indies, and
it is equally obvious that the responsible Oovernment endeavour to curtaif the

-l7
detrimental effe cts of this iIIegal and pernicious trade. iJt may moreover be
mentioned that in many cases goods have been imported into the Netherlands
lndies for which no real rieed existed while the good imported have frequently
been of so poor a quality that they were unsuitable for use. The resultanl
impoverishment of the Netherlands Indies is of all the more importance at a
time when foreign exchange is essential for the rehabilitation and reconstruct-
ion of the country.
flurthermore it should be borne in mind that the iIIegal export trade
greatly contributes to the scarcity of essential foodstuffs and other goods
within the Netherlands Indies. Several products, such as sugar and palm
oil, are being exported from some parts of java and Surriatra, whilst these
same goods are urgent ly needed in the ~hole of Indonesia.
It may iinally be recalled th at in regard to all such products, the distribu-
tion of which is internationally controlled, the Netherlands Indies Government
are responsible to ensure that no export takes place other than in accordance
with internationally ag reed allocations.
No absolute prohibition existsfo r importations into the territory not act u-
ally under the authority of the Governmetlt of the Netherlands Indies of pro-
ducer and consumer goods. On the contrary, importation in these terr itories is
explicitly permitted with the sole exception of military and semi-military
goods, the importation of which requires a genera l or special permit issued. by
or on behalf oi the Director of Economie Affairs. The official Netherlands
I.ndies statistics before the war prove that by far the greater part of imported
producer and consumer goods, such as yarns, comestibles, earthenware and
porcelain, glass and glassware, paper, wood, cork, vegetable dye-stuffs
furniture, etc, etc. may still be imported freely into the territory refetred to.

ANNEX 11
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION

THE SITUATION AT SEA.

DECREE of the Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands
Jndies of 28th january 1947 No. 21 (Official Gazette No. 17)
Pursuant to article 1 of the Crisis Export Ordinance 1939 crisis-uitvoer-
ordonnantie 1939) (Official Gazette No. 659), as also to article 1 of the
Crisis · Export Regulation 193·9 (Crisis-uitvoer-verordening van 1939) , (Offi-
cial Gazette No. 660), amended by the Regulation of 19th july of 1940
(Official Gazette No. 386);
It is hereby approved and decided:
1. Setting aside article 5 of the Decree of 2nd November 1939 No. 2
. (Official Gazette No. 661), as later amended by the decrees of 19th Decem-
ber 1939 No. 21 (Official Gazette No. 714) and of 19th August 1941 No. 1
(Official Gazette No. 365), and setting aside also the decrees of 30th August
1940 No. 1 (Official Gazette No. 439), of 27th September 1940 No. 2 (Offi-
cial Gazette No. 476), of Ist October 1940 No. 4 (Official Gazette No. 477),

48
of 29th March 1941 No. 7 (Official Gazette No. 88), of 22nd April 1941
No. 15 (Official Gazette No. 120) and of Ilth June 1941 No. 12 (.official
Gazette No. 201), to order, that unless covered by a general or specific permit
issueä by or on behalf of the Director of Economie Affairs, the following is
prohibited:
I. the export of all goods from the CU'stoms area of the Netherlands lndies.
2. ,the export ,of all goods irom the areas of the Netherlands lndies Iying
outside the customs area to other countries.
3a. the carriage by sea of goods set out in Schedule I attached hereto from
any part of the CU'stoms area of the Netherlands Indies lying to the East
of the meridian of 116 0 E. to any other part of the customs area . lying
0
to the East of the meridian of 116 E.
3b. the carriage by sea of goods set out in Schedule 11 attached hereto from
any part of the customs area of the Netherlands lndies to a part of the
0
customs area lying to the West of the meridian of 116 E.
3e. the carriage by sea of goods set out in Schedule Il attached hereto from
any part of the customs area of the Netherlands Indies lying to the IWest
of the meridial1l of 116 0 E. to a part of the customs area lying to the Ea's t
of the meridian of 116 0 E.
11. This 'decree shall come into effect on 29th Januari 1947.
Copy etc.
• By order of the Lieutenant Governor General
of the Netherlands Indies.
The Government Secretary
(Signed) E. Schokker.
lssued the twenty-eigth of January 1947
The Government Secretary
E. Schokker.

ANNEX lil
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION

THE SITUATION AT SEA.

Regulation Goveming the movement of goods in the Netherlands In dies and
between the Netherlands Indies and foreign countries.

The movemel1t of goods between the Netherlands Indies and Foreign

countries was al ready before th e war subject to various restrictions. The
Exchange-Ordinance of 1940 (Official Gazette 1940/ 205) and the Exchange-
Regulation of the same year (Official Gazette 1940/ 291) regarding the
export and import of goods trom and to the Netherlands Indies impose on
the parties concerned the obligation to obtain a permit from the Exchange
lnstitute before effecting transactions such as the sale abroad of goods present
in the Netherlands lndies, or the sale in a foreign country of goods emanating
from 'the NetherIands lndies or the sale within the Netherlands lndies of goods
to or for account of a non-resident.
·1 9
 In addition, other prohibitiv'e regulations exist, such as with regard to the
import and export of fire-arms, narcotics, and other goods wherein the general
public interest plays a major role.
The extraordinary conditions now existing in the Netherlands Indies
coupled with the scarcity of goods, necessitate regulating the import and export
of goods to and from the Indies - in addition to the existing regulátions -
while as it is also necessary to restrict the transport of goods by sea from ohe
place in the Archipelago to another place in the Netherlands Indies.
In th is connection it must be borne in mind th at many owners - during
and' af ter the war - no longer have their property at their disposal, while
other owners are not yet represented in the Netherlands Indies.
In accordance with the laws existing in the Netherlands Indies and in
accordance with the accord arrived at during the Political discussions regard-
ing the maintenance of the rights of private property the new regulations for
the import, export and transport over sea have been compiled, inter alia with a
view to the necessary protection of these owners.
By Decree of the Lieutenant Governor General of 28th January 1947
No. 21 (Official Gazette No. 17), pursuant to the Crisis Ordinance 1939
(Official Gazette 1939 No. 659), the export of all goods from the customs
area of the Netherlands Indies situated outside the customs area to foreign
countries is now prohibited, the Director of Economie Affairs being empow-
ered to lift this prohibition, ei th er by general or special permit.
In the same Decree is furthermore prohibited the transport ,by sea of
goods, mentioned in Schedul,e I, attaehed to the Decree, from any part of the
customs area of the Netherlands Indies, situated East of the meridian 116 0 E.
to another part of the customs area, similarly situated east of the meridian
116 0 E. (this covers consequently transport from East to East).
Furthermore this Deeree prohibits the transportation by sea of thegoods
mentioned in Schedule II of this Deeree, from any part of the Cu stoms Area
of the Netherlands Indies to those parts situated West of the meridian 116 0 E.
(thus transport from East to West and West to West), as weil as the transport
thereof from any part of this Customs area situated West of the meridian
116 0 E.L to the part situated East of the said meridian, (thus the transport
from West to East).
In this conneetion it must be noted that the movement of goods from the
Cilstoms area of the Netherland Indies to places outside the Customs area of
the Netherlands Indies is not considered as "transport" but as "export" and
consequently is prohibited as described above.
Comparison between the abovementioned Schedules land 11, cleary shows
that a distinetion has been made between interinsular traffic East of the above-
mentioned meridian (which runs through Lombok Straits about 1 Y2 0 East
of Bandjarmasin) and the remaining interinsular traffic.
The reason for this is to upset the normal, bona-fide, prahoetraffic between
East Borneo and Celebes and furthermore in the en ti re area of East-Indonesia
as Iittle as possible. The traffic from East to East is consequently only
restricted with regard to the most important food-stuffs (maize, riee, cane-
sugar, salt and sago), the free transport of which might lead to, disturbances
in the local distribution of those commodities.
Furthermore, in the traffie East to East, the transport of maehinery and
vehicles including aecessories, is subjet to license, sinee these goods are
required for the reconstruction of the economie life of the country, which

50
 reconstruction might be injured by the injudicious and uncoordinated move-
ment of these goods from one place to another.
Finally, all so-called "military goods" must be accompanied by a permit
(namely a. goods suitable for military purposes, b. goods suitable for the manu-
facture of the items mentioned under a., including gasoline and lubricants ),
which is necessary from a point of view of safety.
For the traffic from West to East and vice versa, as weil as traffic from
West to West, the regulations are more stringent.
In the first place the inter-insular prahoe-traffic is less intensive than
East of meridian 116 0 E., whiIe moreover the protection of the rights of
owners as mentioned above is of more importance, among other things, because
of the fact th at the the export from the Netherlands Indies to other countries
in mainly directed via the Western part of the Archipelago. .

For these reasons the following goods require a Iicense when being
transported:
1. Citronella oil 16. nutrnegs
2. copal 17. palm oil
3. copra 18. pepper (black & white)
4. copra cakes 19. rattan
5. damar 20. rubber (hevea) manufactured or
6. jelutong not
7. mace 21. rice
8. gambir in blocks 22. sugar ( cane-)
9. gutta percha 23. tobacco
-10. hides and skins 24. tapioca flour
11. cinnamon 25. tea
12. kapok 26. tin
12. quinine bark, quinine and qui- 27. cattle
nine salts 28. fibres (hard rope-)
14. coffee (in parchment or hulled). 29. salt.
15. 'Maize
Here again furlher restrictions are imposed with a view to the rehabilita-
tion of the Netherlands Indies, and in view of the public safety.
Finally there is a restrictiolli on the transport of gold and siIver, since the
transfer of these precious metals could lead to undesirable consequences for
the monetary position of the Netherlands Indies.
As has been said above, the issue of the necessary permits has been
placed in the hands of the Director of Economic Affairs who, by his Decree of
28th January 1947 No. 1 has delegated this funlCtion to the Export Bureau,
which is part of this Department, whiIe in such places where there is no
Export Bureau, but where the Customs and Excise Service is established, it
is delegated of the Senior Officer of that service.
It can nevertheless occur, that in some small pI aces neither a represen-
tative of the Export Bureau, nor an official of the Customs and Excise Ser-
vice is represented; insuch cases the person concemed is el1titled to p.foceed
by the shortest possible route to the nearest Netherlands Indies port, where
there is such an authority, so that he can obtain the necessary permit there .
.In this connection the Decree of the Director of Economic Affairs prov-
ides a general Iicense for the transport of the good set out in Schedules land
11, trom the place of loading to the near·e st port as mentioned above.

51
 The same Decree of the Director of Economie Affairs also embodies a
general permit for the export from those parts of the customs area of the
Netherlands lndies which are not de facto under the authority of the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands Indies, with the exception of estate-products, so that
the so-caIled "native produce" may be exported freely from the said customs
area.
The reason for this is, that in the case of these "native" products the
principle of ownership set out above, plays a different role, than in the case
of es ta te products.
In the granting of this general permit it has heen realised however th at
certain products, which come trom the areas in question, cannot be other than
estate-products. For that reason therefore it is ,decreed, that all goods coming
from the areas not actually under the authority of the Government of the'
Netherlands Indies may he exported with the exception generally of quinine
bark, quinine~alts, tea, palm oil, and further as regards Java and Madoera,
coffee, rubber, cane sugar, tobacco, and rope fibres and as regards Sumatra
to the north of the line Bengkalis, Sibolga, gambir in blocks, rubber, tobacco,
and rope fibres.
In connection with the rehabilitation of the Netherlands Indies and owing
to military reasons, the exceptions also include machinery and means of
transport with thei r spares, petrol, lubricat ing oils and coal, while the export
of gold and silver from the areas in question, as weil as legal tender of the
Netherlands Indies, is fOfbidden· for monetary-financial reasons.
For the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that the intention
is, while paying due regard to the al ready existing legal restrietions, to leave
import from other countries tree, insofar as there is no question of socatled
military goods.
The Commander in Ohief of the Navy has decreed onl 28th january 1947
that all ships (with the exception of the native prahoe-fleet which trade to
and from Sumatra, java and Madoera, must call at certain ports and subject
themselves to inspection for contraband goods. For ships, which are destined
for Soerabaja, Semarang, Tandjong Priok, Palembang, Belawan and Emma-
haven, this is not necessary, as these ships wiIl be inspected at their destination
for the above mentioned goods.
This connects up with the Ordinance of the Lieutenant Governor General
of 28th jan1ua ry 1947 No. 22 (Official Gazette No. 18) (Import Ordinance
1947) in whieh it is definitely prohibited to import.
A. goods suitable for military purposes, among others, weapons of all sorts,
ammunition, gunpowder, explosives, gun carriages, caissons, army
trucks, armour plate and barbed wire
B. unless with a permit is'sued by or on behalf of the Director of Economie
Affairs:
1. goods suitable for the manufacture of the goods mentioned sub A.
among others machinery, instruments, high speed tooI steel, steel
and copper wire, oxygen, sulphur, pitch and alcohol.
2. vehicles, aircraft, means of transport, railway material, telegraph,
radio-telegraph and telephone, material, fuel and lubricants,
uniforms etc.
3. gold and silver, Netherlands Indies or other paper-money.
The reasons whieh have led to these import prohibitions need no
further expla'nation after what has been said above in re gard to their

52
 export and transport. It ·should be said ho wever, that the Import Ordi-
nance 1947 and its contentsdo not detract from the already valid import
restrictions.
ff therefore no goods are found, the import of which is prohibited as
laid down above, innormalcircumstances the ship will be immediately given
permission to continue its voyage by the Naval Commander or tby the Senior
Naval Officer or by the harbourmaster concerned.
To sum up, the new regulations taken together imply the following:
As regards export.
All export is prohibited, unless covered by a permit from the Director
of Economic Affairs, with the exception of the export of native produce irom
the customs area of the Netherlands fndies, which is not de facto under the
authority of the Netherlands Indies Government.
In addition transport preceding ex port, in which the ship proceeds along
the shortest route to the nearest port to obtain a permit, is allowed.
As regards inter-insular traHic.
The carriage oi goods mentioned in the Schedules land 11 attached to
the Decree of the Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands Indies of
28th January No. 21 (Official Gazette No. 17).
a. to the East of 116 0 of essential foodstuffs, of goods necessary to the
rehabilitation of the Netherlands Indies and of military goods.
b. to the West of the same meridian, as also hom the West to the East of
the meridian and vice versa, of essential foodstuffs, of export produds,
of goods destined for the rehabilitation of the Netherlands lndies, anld of
military goods and of goods of a monetary-financial nature.
As regards import.
Only the import of military and semi-military goods is prohibited,
whereby the already existing legal restrictions remain in force .
28th January 1947.

ANNEX IV
Extracts from Economic Memorandum
of the Netherlands Delegation.
Regulations and restrictions regarding sea traffic before the police action
(regulations of 28/ 1 '47)
13. In elucidation of the regulations of January 1947 regarding com-
mercial traffic by sea - regulations which the Republican Government, with
complete disregard for the actual facts, has repeatedly attempted to represent
as an economic blockade - it seems advisable to outline the situation as
it had developed in Indonesia before the war.
The inter-insular goods tratffic in Indonesia and ihe goods traffic between
Indonesia and foreign countries were subject to various restrictions. The most
important relevant regulations are: the Crisis Export Ordinance (Crisis
Uitvoer Ordonnantie) of 1939, Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 658 and

53
the Crisis Export Regulation (Crisis Export Verordening) of the same year,
Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 660, and the pursuant executive
regulations, together with the Exchange Ordonance (Deviezen Ordonnantie)
of 1940, Government Gazette (Staatsblad No. 205, and the Exchange
Regulation (Deviezen Verordening) of 1940, Government Gazette (Staats-
blad) No. 291.
The aim of these regulations was to bring about a system which made
it possible i'n the interests of the community (e.g. with regard to food
supplies ) to impose restrictions on the commercial intercourse between the
various islands of the Indian Archipelago, the purpose of exchange control
being in the interest of purchases necessary for the community, to make the
best possible use, through an exchange fund, of currencies obtained in foreign
countries by the export of goods.
While post-war eonditions of scarcity of commodities and acute shortage
of foreign exchange made it imperative that these regulations should be most
rigidly enforced, the Republican Government made use of these conditions
apparently for political reasons by conveying, to the detriment of the
inhabitants of certain localities, scarce products to other parts of the Nether-
lands ]ndies, and by exporting commodities to foreign countries which we re
ugently needed in the country itself. This may be iIIustrated by the consider-
able republican exports of riee, sugar, coco-nut oil and copra, all articles
which we re needed by the Indonesian community.
This ilIegal trade, which is counter to the interests of the community,
moreover misused the circumstance that long after the japanese occupation
considerable quantities of arms and ammunition were stored in various places
in the Netherlands Indies, by supplying arms and other articles of this nature
to other districts, where these supplies in conjunction with the infiltration of
Republican 1ighting groups increased public insecurity.
]n this connection we may point to military infiltrations in BaH, Celebes,
South and East Borneo. Repeatedly Republiean proas, heavily laden with
machine-guns, carbines and handgrenades attempted to cross from Cheribon,
Toeban and Probolinggo to Borneo and Celebes.
In addition the T.R.I. regularly planned raids on Bali from Banjoewangi,
of which occasionally Balinese in kampongs (Tabanan) were the victims.
Adjacent foreign countries, which in many cases insufficiently controlled
their exports, unfortunately added to the impairment of publit security by
the import, in exchange for commodities exported by the Republicans, of
military and semi-military articles.
Finally it should be pointed out th at a state of economie disorganizätion
existed in the Netherlands. In dies af ter the japanese occupation, because many
owners of Western concerns and plantations had been expelled from their
properties by the japanese and the majority interned, these owners being
una51e to return a~ter the japanese surrender owing to the unsettled conditions
prevailing at the time. As a result large quantities of plantation products
had accumulated in the interior, whence they could easily be removed by
unauthorized traders.
In spite of numerous protests from the Netherlands Indies Government,
the RepubJican Govemment has not only countenanced this iIIicit trade, but
even encouraged it, so that vast quantities of these products were smuggled
to foreign countries wh ere, as a rule, they were sold far below their real
value. Apart from its illegitimate character, this export trade is to be con-
demited, because it has seriously injured the exchange position, at the expense
of the entire population, who received inadequate supplies in exchange for
54
valuable Indonesian products. Moreover these imported supplies mostly
consisted of commodities which were either unfit for use or not of primary
impOrtance.
In order to put a stop to these intolerable conditions, the Netherlands
Indies Government, after several earnest but vain attempts to arrive at a
solution in consuItation with the Republican Government, on 28th January
1947 put into operation a complete import, export and transport system.
The regulations of 28th January 1947, which maintain the exchange
con trol system, are based on the Ifollowing principles:
a. the import, export and transport system must never hinder the distribution
of food supplies; on the contrary, wherever possible it should be con-
ducive to a better delivery of primary food supplies ;
b. the transport of scarce native products must be made subject to a system
of . permits;
c. transport and export of military and semi-military goods, as weil as of .
goods required for the industrial rehabilitation must be partly prohibited,
partly be possible only with permission from the competent military and
civil authorities;
d. the transportation and export of estate produce cannot be permifted in
those cases where the interests of the rightful owners are prejudiced
because the latter have no say in the transactions concerned;
e. importation of military and semi-military goods is either to be prohibited
or to be made subject to a permit.
When these measures - which are entirely in keeping with the sovereign
rights over Indies waters exercised by the Netherlands ~ are viewed in the
light of existing pre-war regulations and the most serious economie plight
of Undonesia at the end of the war, the absolute necessity of these measures
is at on ce evident, the more so as apparently the Republican Government
began to make use of the prevalent chaotic conditions to take "economico -
politicaI" steps at the expense of the seriously impoverished Indonesian
community.
That this further impoverishment of the Indonesian community for the
sake of a "fighting fund" in foreign exchange, and mostly for the good of
a small group of privileged officials (both civil and military) is na empty
phr·ase, may be illustrated by the figures of the calculated extent of trade
outside · Netherlands control between the Republican areas and Malaya and
Singapore. In the period from the Japanese capitulation to the end of Novem-'
ber 1947 this "tra de" resuIted in a netf [oss of foreign exchange to Indonesia
of roughly Sfraits dollars 265,000,000.-
The illicit exports, i.e. the unlawful exportation of goods at the expense
of rightful owners, amounted during the same period to not Jess than Straits
dollars 115,000,000.-.

Measures of 28/1 '47 always applied in the most lenient possible manner.
14. In order to interfere as IittJe as possibJe with the commercial
relationa between the RepubJicans and foreign countries, a regulation was
isstted by the Director of Economic Affairs, on the same date as the above-
mentioned measures, stating that, in sa far as Republican controlled areas
were concerned, in deviation from the regulations affecting foreign exchange,
the export of all goods, with the exception of estate proc:lucts and goo.ds
destined for industrial rehabilitation, was permitted. -

55
 It should be remarked that this general permiSSIOn involved a consid-
erabIe loss to Indonesia af foreign exchange. For in this way a continuous
flow of -goods was withdrawn from the Indiés currency-system, while as a
""esuIt of the very disadvantageous basis of exchange immoderate profits
feil to foreign traders.
That consequently this commerce between the Republican areas and the
Malayan peninsuIa remained considerable, will appear from the following
figures,
(in millions of Str. $) Exports to Imports from
peninsuIa peninsuia
2nd half of 1946 167 19
1st half of 1947 132 43
As appearsfrom the principles mentioned above sub a - e, the impor-
tation of all goods to Republican areas is entirely unrestricted in so far, of
course, as it aoes not involve military or semi-military goods.
The above-mentioned import and export system therefore does not in
:my way interfere with the economic machinery of the Republican Oovern-
ment, in so far as it is on a legitimate basis. The same applies to the inter-
insular traffic.
The only restriction of any importance, which applies not only to the
Republican Oovernment but also to the territories lunder Netherlands control,
is that the transport of agricultural food produce such as rice and maize, is
subject to a system of permits in order to ensme the best possible distribution
of food supplies in the interest of the Indonesian population , who mainly
depend on these products.
When therefore the Republican Oovernment wishes to export from the
territories under its con trol, rice and maize to other localities in the
Archipelago a permit is requested from the Netherlands Indies Oovernment
(Department of Economic Affairs) in so far as normal and not "poli tica!"
supplies of food are concerned, this permit is always granted.
When in May 1947 the Republican Oovernment wished to export riee
and maize from East Java to areas where there was a shortage, and objected
to the delay expeeted from the permit-system, the Netherlands Indies
Oovernment immediately took steps to prevent delay by ordening the Royal
Netherlands Navy not to deflect the transport ships to some port for exam-
Îna tion , but to conduct a superficial examination at sea so that the ships
could continue towards their destination.
The standpoint adopted by the Netherlands Indies Oovernment with
regard to food suplies, and to which it still adheres, appears from a telegram
sent in this connection by the Department of Economic Affairs to its represen-
tative at Soerabaja on 22nd March 1947, which reads,
"338 In eonsequenee our regulation 28 January transport rice maize unoc-
"cupied Java to Madura permits BUZ (i.e. export of.fice) however unintended
"hinder traffic stop Decided following procedure colon Navy stops proas,
"Commander wires Navy Commander Soerabaja, latter each case telephones
"for your pernüssion stop Request your cooperation permission always grant
" readily enable Navy Commander promptly order release of stopped proas" .
On this point no more complaints have been made by the Republican
Government.
For a correct appreciation of the position at that time - i.e. before
the police action - one should bear in mind the strong contrast existing

56
between the attitude of the Netherlands Indies Government with regard to
food supplies, and the attitude adopted by the Republican Government.
Although the Netherlands Indies Government had abundant reasons to
suspect that the Republican Government made an improper use of the ship-
:nents of rice permitted, by allotting this rice exclusively to the T.R.1. (T.N.I.)
instead of distributing it to the population, or by smuggling this rice - e.g.
from Madura - to foreign countries, the Netherlands IndiesGovernment,
as expJained above, tried to meet the Republican Government's wishes as
much as possible.
The Republican Governmellt, on the contrary, maintailled the food bloc-
kade by land (vide Re A.), whi·le furthermore Republican publications which
tell into the hands of Netherlands authorities, show that before the police
action the Republican Governm ent also attempted to prevent, with all the
means at its disposal, tbe transportation of rice by sea to the areas under
Netherlands control. Thus in the course of 1946 the coast of japara was
c10sed by the Republican Government to prevent the existing smuggling trad ::!
from selling food stuffs to the "opponents" . The Republican Government
further orde red a "policy of restrietion" to be carried out in the Residency
of Pekalongan with regard to the export of goods (read, food stuffs) to
"enemy occupied territories" .

Same leniency applied by Royal Navy in its control.

15. The Royal Navy during its con trol at sea - for its duties included
the enforcement of the regulations of 28th January 1947 - was equally
mindful of the interests of the freighters and owners concerned.
The ships stopped for con trol were therefore examined as quickly as
possible and immediately released when no infringements were found.
In some cases (vide above, food shipments) the examination was even
reduced to a minimum, and permission was granted telegraphically.
Although the rights of the Navy to exercise police con trol at sea are
fully acknowledged in International Law, and although according to interna-
tional rules the extra-expenses incurred by the exercise of these rights (detour
expenses, anchorage fees, loading costs etc.) are charged entirely to the ship's
account, the Netherlands Indies Government has gone so far as to charge
to their account the unloading and stowing expenses resulting from the
examination of the cargo when no infringements were committed.

.17
 REPORT

on

CONDITIONS

of

CHINESE RESIDENTS

.OF BANDJARNEGARA

(Mid -Java)
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat.
Issue No. 4.

RESTRICTED.

Batavia, 4 December 1947.

Sir,
I have the honour to request the earnest attention of the Committee of
Good Offices for the following matter.
IA prominent Chinese resident of Semarang has given a report of the
removal of about 2000 Chinese residents of Bandjarnegara (Banjoemas) by
brigands and the deplorable condition in which they are now compelled to
live.
The related facts are the following.
I. "In the noon time of the 2nd of August, the Chin1ese residents had been
ordered by the native brigands to evacuate to Goenoeng Alang, and
later, part of them to Goenoeng Djati, a di'Stance of about fifteen kilome-
ters from the town itself.
This had been perfornled after the Regent of Banc\jarnegara, R. Soe-
mitro Kolopaking, had been overpowered by the native brigands, said
to have been the retreating brigands from Tegal and Poerbolinggo.
2. The Regent of Bandjarnegara, R. Soemitro Kolopaking, is in fact a man
of character and of principles, and had he not been overpowered by such
brigands of japanese inheritance, the situation would have been ,different.
The rumour even ha's it that the Regent had been murdereel .
3. The fact that the Chinese residents had been evacuated as late as the
2nd of August, proved the tactfulness of the Regent to cope with the
situation against the local so-called army, and, if m,y informants were
correct, the loss of such a Regent is a matter to be regretted, not only
by the Chinese community at Bandjarnegara, but also by the Dutch
Government.
4. On the 8th September, two Chinese houses had been bumt dOWn - one
Toko Batavia, and the other the house of Mr. Oei Gwan Jang. Chinese
properties have, of course, been looted to the skin - bag anel baggage.
Although the rest of the Chinese houses are still intact, yet combustible
materials had been prepared in all those houses ready to be fated to
arson only at amoment's notice.
5 As late as the 26th of September, the situation of the Chinese evacuees
had become ' worse and worse for reasons of being underfed. Each
person had been rationed with only 100 grammes of rice per day, and
they need salt very badly. The rainy season had and still has becOlne
the cause of a world of miseries to them, for being underfed, underclothed
exposed to open air and packed up in small village houses, sickn·ess,
chiefly malaria, dysentery and beri-beri, became the order of the day. In
the first month of their evacuation, they still had some money with them
to buy extra food from the villagers, but unfortunately, their funds are now
said to be running low. The worst may come to the worst within short?
6. So far my informants could not ascertain, whether or not there had been
Chinese residents who had been murdered, although a reservation of
some 'Îear to this end is justifiable" .
Ijl
 In the meantime additional evidence has been obtained to the effect
that the Chinese quarter of Bandjarnegara has been completely burnt down
and the entire civiJian population shifted elsewhere.
ft would seem highly desirabIe that an immediate investigation be
carried out into th is matter and it would be greatly appreciated if the Com-
mittee of Good Offices would take the necessary measures to institute such
an investigation.
The Netherlands Indies Government has asked me to give the assurance
that the competent authorities will give all the assistance needed to accom-
modafe the victims within our territory.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
(Signed) <R. Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo.
To the Chairman
of the Securi:ty Council's CommHtee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

62
 REPORT

on

TERRORISM

in

EAST-SUMATRA
COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t
. NETHERLANDS Issue No. 93.
Government with the committee of good
offices

Bafavia, December Ist, 1947.

Sir,
'With a view to the forthcoming discussions regarding the detention of
political prisoners, I have the honour to draw the attent ion of the Committee
of Good Offices to the foJlowing report of Dr. F. J. Nainggolan, member of
the Provisional Council of the Daerah Istimewa East Sumatra, on arrests
and acts of violence, carried out on behalf of the Government of the
Republic in East Sumatra (Suma tra Timoer) ia the month preceding the
police action by the Netherlands Government, and since that time.
Although it had been assertecl by thc republican radio that all political
prisoners anel internees hael been released "by the Parties on behalf of th:e
people" (Rakjat)", there still remain hundr,eds of persons of both sexes in
various internment camps or in thc cllstody of the Republican police at
Raya near Berastagi or of the lasjkars (pcople's army, irrcgular forces) at
Boh Birong Oeloe near Pematang Siantar anel Kampoeng Merdeka (the
former Kampoeng Keling) in the same region.
About two weeks before the police action there were again large scale
arrests, which were continued eluring and after the action. On July 21st a
large scale massacre of ill'ternees took place 'from which only a few escaped.
Some of the survivors now have a large scar on the back of their heads,
the \'Iestiges of an attempt to behead them, accorcling to the testimony of an
eye-witness, who spoke to four wounded persons in the hospital "Timor-
straat" at Medan, all of whom sllcceeeled in escaping the massacre at
Kampoeng Merdeka ne ar Berastagi 011' July 29th. Onother example is the
case of Radja Imbang, whose brother was beheaded anel who was himself
severely woundecl on the back of his heael; he pretendeel to be dead anel
dragged himself i.n the night through a ravjne alld a wood to a Netherlands
post, thus saving his life.
A list of names of some persons, known to have becn arrestec! by
order of the Republican Regent, and of persons abducted ~ (and of whom
it is not known whether they are still alive, nor their whereabouts) foJlows:
I. The wife of the Sibajak (autonomous ruler) of Lingga (Raban Djahe)
with six chilelrcn anc! the mother of the Sibajak.
2. The Sibajak of Sarinel11'bah with his wife anel three children.
3. Thc wife of the Sibajak of Baros Djahe (Berastagi) with two children,
two brothers of Thc Sibajak, the mother of the Siltlajak anc! two
stepmothers.
4. The mother and sister of Ngradjai Simbiring, at present all official in
the Netherlands civil service at Berastagi.
5. The Sibajak of Soeka.
6. The wife of Pakoe Tamboen (at present district magistrate at
Berastagi) with 'six chif.dren.
7. The wife of Pelin Tamboon, district magistrate in the Netherlancls
civil service at Kaban Djahe, two children and a brother.
8. Petrus Baroes, his two wives anel fifteen children.
9. The wife, six children and one grandchild of the above mentioned
Radja Imbang.

f,5
 10. The widow and two childrer~ of the murdered Radja Malam.
11. The wife and three children of Mangkat Brahmana, market superin-
tendent of Kaban Djahe.
12. Ndabi Karo-karo with his wife and six children, two grandchildren,
his mother-in-Iaw and sister.
13. The three wives of Tamboe Poerba with nine childrel1.
14. The wife of the teacher Haroen and five childrel1.
15. The wife of Radja Morah of Sarincmbah.
16. F. Moesa, son of the Sultan of Langka t, abducted trom P. Countan
on July 29th to an unkl1Qwn destinatiol1.
ft is uncertain whether he is stil l alive.
On july 29th 1947, the police actio n ha·d reachecl as far as Berastagi.
On july 31st 1947 Mrs. Nain ggolan-jWaroLlw, her sixteen year old daüghter
Zus Nainggolan, and Mi ss Wattimena (a nu rse) were kidnapped, their house
ransacked and set fire to. On August 28th , they were murdered after having
been ta~e n from one kampong to the oth er. Mrs. Nainggolan had lived for
twelve years in her dwelling, 'Situated 1V2 kilome·ters from Berastagi. Miss
Wattimena lived next door to Mrs. Nainggolan, anel she had lived there for
m.ore than seven years. The names of the kidnappers, who are all members
of the "Harimau Liar" (Wild Tiger) are :
Dahlan Poerba Karo-karo;
GenlOek Karo-karo;
Hassan Gin<ting;
Damei Taringin;
Mapal Karo-karo;
"On july 31 st, a bus with fifteel1 bound men passed the town Kaban
Djahe", says th e police report of Kaban Djahe. The bus came from th e
direction of Sariboedolok and went westwards towards Tiga Binanga.
Seven of these men were natives of Toba an d were unl oaded at the orders
of Bindjai Tarigan at Kampocng Katjariboc with the instruction : "They are
Nica (Netherlands In dies Civil Administration) sples. Invesfigate and then
murder them". The others were murdered at Kadibata .
In the course of apa trol to Dj oemaradja (near Berastagi) twenty newly
killed men were foune!. Identity unknown.
According to an eye-witnessreport, the general situation in the area
between Berastagi, Kaban Djahe and Baros Djahe is as follows:
As a result of an order issued by the Republican authorities thaf a
vacuum of five kilometers radius must be made round every town , occupied
by the Netherlands forces, all the Batak kampongs situated in the areas of
Berastagi-Kaban Djahe - Baros Djahe - and which are occupied, arc
being depopulated. The population isdriven away by the irregular forces
Harimau Liar and Halilintar and carried off. Only the old people are allowed
to remainl.
The well-known Batak kampongs with their hundred years old council
house and family houses are deserted. Only cattle is left . Dogs, pigs, hens,
even cows are straying around, while all houses are deserted and broken
down.
The population living in the areas east of the line Berastagi-Kaban
Djah e were moved from the south, beyond Soeka to Pertibi near the
Tapanoeli border. The population of the above mentioned line were moved
to Tiga Binanga in the direction of Kota Djahe (Atjeh) .

66
 On account of the terrain conditions of the Karo plateau roaming
bands are ab Ie to maintain themselves and terrorise the whole area and
compel the people to make the 5 kilometer vacuum. By the threat, that
whoever remains in this zone is a Nica (follower) and therefore to be
eliminated .
Thus the Karo Plateau is deselied by the population, who are driven
away by the lasjkars. The Karoplateau formerly provided the lowlying
plains around Medan with vegetables and potatoes and flowers, which were
even transported by boat to other islands.
On November llth 1947 news was received in Medan from the Ngradjai
Simbering, civil service official at 'Berastagi, th at
1. at the end of the last week of October the Kampong Pertjoreian was
partly burned down.
2. Barondjahe was partly burnt down on November 5th.
3. On October 16th, 11 council houses were burnt down in Kampong
Berastagi.
4. Kampoeng Pradj a was completely burnt ,down on October 11 th .
5. Half of the kampong Kadibata was burnt down.
On October 25th 1947, a Toba Batak woman and her fivc childrcl1
\Vere kidnapped by the Hari1l1au Liar, after her husband had been
murdered a week previously, She herself had su cceeded in gLtting away
and was rescued by the military patrol and had reported the abov~ to the
civil service official at Berastagi.
There is evidence that the Republican Regent Rakoeta Simbiring has
written a letter to the village head of Baros Djahe, orderin g him to have
the two daughters of the above-mentioned Radja Imbang Selat and
her sister conveyed to Tiga Binanga, ostensibly to proteet them from the
Harimau Uar.
The above 1l1erely contains a few examples of acts, perpetrated in thet
tcrritory of Eastern Sumatra (Sumatra Ti1l10er). The facts r·eported by Or.
1\: ainggolan appear to be of a nature to merit an investigation by the
Committee of Good Offices. The competent authorities of the Netherlands
Indies Government will immediately receive the necessary instructions to
assist the Committee of Good Offices in every respect, should it be decided
to hold such an investigation .
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,

(Signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo.

To the Chairman
of the Security Council
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

67
 REPORTS

on

CONDITIONS

IN THE ISLAND OF MADURA

 13 December 1947.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat.

Issue No. 24.
Ag. No.: 41Oj CGDjSCjCorr.

MEMORANDUM: of the Netherlands Delegation on the development of the

military situation in Madura since 4th August 1947.

Military situation on 4th August 1947.

1. On 4th August 1947 at 24.00 hours the Netherland forces had occupied :
Bangkalan: the capitalof the Regency of Bangkalani
Pamekasan: the residcntial capital and actual capital of the Regency
of Pamekasan;
Tjamplong: a place on the coast, in the district of Sampang.
2. The area - as subsequently described in the announcement by the
Lieutcnant Governor-General on 29th August 1947 - was declared to
be Netherlands occupied territory, but with the reservation that the areas
outside it JIlere to be patrolled by N etherlands forces in the event that
any activity whatsoever should be developed from tlwt area on the part
of the Republicans with the object of impeding the resforation of order,
law and security andj or endangering fhe safety of the Neth erlands posts.
Period from 4th August to the beginning of November 1947.
3. On 6th August, at the request of the opulation of Blega, this place
was occupied and the safety of the ma in road Bangkalan-Blega-Sam-
pang-Pamekasan was assured by the ol't.:u pa tion of Sampang.

The occupation of Arosbaja.

4. Upon the occupation of Bangkalan by the Netherlands forces the
Republican forces in that district, with their leader, had placed them-
selves at the disposal of the Netherlands commande r.
The military situation in the Baflgkalan was, therefore, perfectly quiet,
until new Republican forces , were moved from Toeban (N. coast of
Java) to Arosbaja.
5. From that moment Baflgkalan was repeatedly attacked and the main
road from Baflgkalan to Pamekasan was threatened, so that the Nether-
lands commander was compelled to order the occupation of Arosbaja.
This was done on 20th August 1947 .

Ketapang brought under direct Netherlands control.

6. At the urgent request of the population of Kefapaflg - on the N. coast
of the is land - early in September a pat rol was carried out from Sam-
pang to that pI ace, a number of Chinese held by the Republican forces
in the immediate vicinity of Ketapang being released.
7. The pat rol itself met with no resistance from Republican troops and
continued the patrol unhindered to the Netherlands post of Arosbaja.
8 Obviously as a re sult of their friendly attitude to the Netherlanders, the
popu lati on of the district of Kefapang was from th at moment continually
troubled by Republican fighting groups so thaf the Netherlands comman-
der feit obliged regularly to send NetherJar.ds patrols to this pI ace, which

71
 sometimes stayed in th at district for some days - depending on con-
ditions there.
Occupation of Pakong.
9. The Republican military commander of Madoera Chandra Hassan (re-
cently arrested in the district of Probolinggo) had orelered his troops
vigorously to carry through the infiltration into Netherlands-held territory.
to harass the NetherJands troops with every means at their disposal and
thus to hinder the restoration of order, law and security as weil as
economie rehabilitation. This can be substantiated by the order in
question, da teel 14th September 1947 anel signeel by the aforementioned
Chandra Hassan, which feil into Netherlands hands.
10. The aggressive action resulting from this order (which was in partieular
elirected against Pam ekasan, was led and stimulated from Pakong (N.
of Pamekasan), so that the Netherlands commander feit obligeel to have
th is place occupied, which was done early in October.
11. This brought the Regencies of Bangkalan anel Pamekasan of the
Residence of Madoera completely uneler Netherlands control, their
capita Is having already been occupied on 4th August.
Development of the situation sin ce the beginning of November.
12. Since the occupation of Pakong and the nearby district capitals Pegan-
tenan the Republican centres of rpsistance moved to the district of
Soemenep, whence 'fhe attacks upon Pamekasan were continueel.
13. Positive reports were also receiveel concerning extensive preparations
,for the destruction of objects of vital economie il11portance to the whole
of Indonesia (a salt-block plant) and salt stocks in the district of Soe-
menep, which, if carried into effect, would seriously endanger the salt
position of the whole population. This will be elealt with in further detail
in a separate economic report on Madoera.
14. In order to put an end to further RepubJican attempts effectively to
impede the restoration of law, order and security, and in order to prevent
the execution of the destructions referred to in paragraph 13, it was
decided at the earnest request of the population and its leaders to quell
for good the centre of resistance in Soemellep anel also to bring the rest
of the island under Netherlands control.
Occupation of Soemenep.
15. On 9th November 1947 a detachment of engineers began to mend the
PeRantenan-Soemenep roael, the bridges and culverts of which had been
destroyed.
16. On lOth November following, apatrol to Soemenep anel th e surrouneling
country was prepared at Goeloekgoeloek.
17. On 1 !th November this patrol reached Lenteng-Soemenep and the salt
area of Kaliangat, successively.
18. On 12th November communications between Pegantenan and Soemenep
were restored and the road could be used by vehicles.
19. On 12th November an LST landed near Kaliangat with relief goods for
the population of East-Madoera.
Military situation in the Regency of Soemenep.
20. In order to safeguard law and order in East Madoera patrol detachl11ents
we re placed successively in Bandoengan, Bloelo, Batangratang Daja,
 Manding, Amboeten, Pasongsongan, Roebaroe and Temberoe Timoer
between 13th November and 1st December.
Resistance encountered from Republican force~.
21. Some sniper activity was encountered at the b::gillning of the patroJ"s
march trom Ooeloekgoeloek; thereafter there was no more resistance .
22. Casualties on the Netherlands' si de : one man slightly wounded.
23. The Republican military commander of Madoera, Chandra Hassan, on
14th November, in a written message to his battalion commanders, dis-
banded his regiment, ordering them to cross to java with their men.
Chandra Hassan was recentJy captured in th e dIstrict of ProboMnggo
(E. java).
final observations.
24. The "brief facts" as decribecl in the Repulican Government's Memoran-
dum of 29th November 1947 (Restrictecl Sl A. 10/ 51) in paragraph 6
are on the whoIe, with the exception of article IV, in accordance with
the truth.
25. The wording of article IV is put too sllggestively, as during the mov,ement
to Soemenep and its surrollndings there was no question of any real
Republican resistancc, neither by the Republican forces nor by the pop u-
lation. On thc contrary, tlle patrols were joyfully welcom :: cI by the pOpll-
lation anel helped in every way.
26. The Republican allegation concerning the behaviour of the soleliers in
the first sentence of the same paragraph 6 is not in accordance with the
facts, as thc population itself several times sent deputations to Nether-
lands-held territory with the request to place East Madoera lInder Nether-
lands security and protection.
27. Finally, the Netherlands Aclministration will endeavour to have the con trol
of the island of Madoera taken over as soon as conditions permit, by an
Indonesian Administration of their own, assistecl by security forces to
be formeel from the ineligenous population.

18 Dccember 1947 ,

~ETHERLANDS DELEGATION. Secretaria t

Issue No. 31
Ag. No. 425/Min .
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
CONCERNING THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MADURA WHICH
LED TO THE OCCUPATION Of THE ENTIRE ISLAND.

GeographicaJ, economie and ethnographical particulars.

1. For general information on this island we refer to the description.
derived from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which is appcnde,d to this report
as Annex I.
It must be added th at th e population of Madura is now estimated ·to
amount to nearly 3 millions, while some 412 millions of Madurese live in
East java.
The Madurese have always been knOWI1 to be good soldiers. Before
the Pacific War an auxiliary corps of the Netherlands Indies Army was

73
drawn from the Madurese, called the Barisan Tjakra Madura, aftel' the ancient
family of the Tjakraningrats, who still have much inflllence in the island.
Before the war Madura constituted a Residency (under a Ellropean
I~esident), subdivided into th ree Regencies, Bangkalan. Pamekasan and
Soemenep each under an Indonesian Regent.
Situation after the Pacific War.
2. In the alltllmn of 1945 allied troops occllpied the port of Soerabaya,
with a narrow strip of land arollnd it. Soon inhabitants of Madura were
coming to that town, reporting that the population of the islanc\ were in a very
bad way. Sinee the livestock had decreaseel to about ~, anel eonsequently
also the number of ploughing oxen, the soil had to be tiJled by means of
patjols, an agricultural implement whieh the Maelllrese has not learned to
handle, and whieh was moreover in short supply. Thc rcsult was a grca t
shortage of agricuJtural produets. As a result of shortage of materiaIs, fish eries
had also dropped considerably. By the Republiean allthorities 1 kg of rice was
distribllted per month per family, from Japanese dumps whieh at the time
still eontained same stocks. CJothing had not been renewed for 5 years and
there was a great shortage of medical sllpplies which had seriously impaired
pllblic health, anc! raised the death rate.
3. If before the war the deficit of riee was made good by imports from
East Java, the Republican Authorities in Java now prohibited proa traffic
between Java and Madura except ior transports of salt for the Repllblican
Government; proas conveying other goods were confiseated by the Republican
authoritics. The smaJl quantities of food that reached Madura from East-Java
in spite of these measllres, were there intercepted by the Rcpublican Arllly
(Tentara Republik Indonesia) and consull1ed by them or sold at high prices.
Some trade between Madura and the 'AJlied occupied area of Soerabaya was
possible, but only while Japanese money was aeeepted as legal tender in both
territories (until the end of October 1946).
4. As a result, a situation had arisen which bordcreel on famine. The
tact that in spite of th is serious food shortage the Repllbliean Govemment
offered to deliver large quantities of rice to India (in April 1946) came as a
most painful shock to the population of Madura.
5. The elements of the T.R.I. that were in the island (only some 5700
poorly equipped men) were not popular with the population, at whose expense
they lived. Former officers of the Barisan Tjakra Madura, wLo refused to
cnIJst in the army were interned in the prison of Pamakasan.
6. The civil administration proved to be conducted by the former regent
of Bangkalan, R.A.A. Tjakraningrat, who had been appointed resident, while
his son acted as Regent of Bangkalan. Although the members of this prominent
family were naturally very reticent on' this point, there were even then reasons
to expect that they would not be unwilling to accept Netherlands assistance to
the population in respect of food and c1othing. As everywhere in Republican
areas, the Resident was assisted by a Komite Nasional Indonesia with a Badan
Exekutief (executive body). However great the influenee of the Resident,
actual power in many districts was in the hands of party leaders and mjlitary
coml1landers.
Period before the poJice action.
7. In the month of September 1946 increasing Ilumbers of Madurese
began to fJee to Soerabaya in praas, or often on roughly made rafts and even
swimming. By the end of 1946 a weekJy average of 2500 arrived there, and

74
their total numbers may be estimated at from 20,000 to 25,000. They were in a
condition of extreme undernourishment and without exception asked for military
help to relieve their relatives in the island, to which end they wished to receive
military training themselves. In the autllmn of 1946, howcver, the Nethcrlanc\s
lndies Government was not in a position to provide the assistance requested
In the first place, even after a possible military occupation of Madura the
Government would not have been able to relieve the shortage of food at the time,
as the rice-producing areas of East Java were under the factual authority of
the Republican Government. The Netherlands Inc\ies Government hac\ to cope
with great difficulties in providing food for the 'fugitives at Soerabaya;
however, this task was successfully accomplished. Moreover at the time
negotiations had been begun with the Republican Qovernment concerning a
Truce, which was concluded on 14th October 1946.
8. Under pressure of the growing dissatisfaction of the population the
T.R.1. in Madura also showed signs of disintegration. The ex~Barisan captain
Asmoro Joedo resigned as commancler of the Republican forces in West-
Madura, large groups of his forces deserted and he himself leH for East-Java.
Colonel Chandra Hassan, who was held in bad repute by the population, was
appointed Commander of the Republican forces in the whole of Madura.
9. During the discussions between the Netherlanc\s Commission General
anc! the Republican delegation, the attention of the Republicandelegation was
drawn to the distressed condition of Madura, who agreed in November 1946
to help the population. Accorc\ing to messa ges receivec!, the Republican
Government after that did begin to import rice into Madura. A ration· of 100
gram mes per c\ay was instituted for the town populations, but in practice this
ration was only very irregularly delivered.
Towards the end of 1946 a combined Netherlands-Republican Committee
visited East-Madura in connection with the evacuation of Europeans stiJl
111 ternec! there. It was then found that there was no famine in East-Madura, but
that there was a serious shortage of c10thing and medical supplies. Reports of
serious food shortages in the western part of the island, however, persisted.
10. On the part of the Republican Government it has been: contcnc!ed that
the distressed conc\ition of Madura was the result of a blockade imposed by
the Netherlanc!s Navy. The fact is that the contents of proas sailing between
Madura and East-Java have been examined by the Netherlands Navy, but these
proas were allowed to continue their way, if they proved to be engaged
in legit imate tra de. It was only when arms or - according to the packing or
marks - obviously stolen goods were being carriecl, that these ships
were conducted to a Netherlanc!s-held port.
11. In the course of 19A7 the real power more and more came into the
hands of those political parties which had fighting organizations of their own,
independent of the T.R.I.: the Pesinclo (socialist youth organization), the
Pembrontak Rakjat In.c\onesia (revolutionary people's movement) and the
Islamic fighting organization Sabilillah, under the leadership of religious
fanatics who spread the idea that the Netherland ~ rs were endcavouring 10 wipc
out Islam, and by this means attempted to keep the fighting spirit aIive.
12. In Soerabaya the Madurese refugees in May 1947 founded all
association caIled Persatoean Kebangsaän Madura (P .K.Mi.) , which aims at
the formation of a federative state in accordance with the Linggac!jati
Agreement in which state the Madurese group of the population is to find a
suitable position by democratic means. In a resolution this association expressed
themselves as unwilling to see Madura included in the RepubIic of Indonesia.

75
 13. In June 1947 the tension between the population and the fighting
organizations in Madura came to a head. Thc population from Kamal to
Brantah on thc south coast refused to obey the order of thc T.R!. to evacuate
to the interior. In Batah, Boedjoer and Kwanjir-Barat clashes occurred between
the T.R!. and the population. Some 30 relatives of members of the Tjakra
battalion, drawn from Madurese refugees at Soerabaya, were arrcsted anti
imprisoned at Pemekasan, as were likewise relatives of members of the P.K.M.
Inhabitants of the islands received set~tences of imprisonment for alleging that
the T.R.1. was inferior to the Netherlands army. While on the one hand former
Barisan officers we re again being arrcsted for refusing to cnlist in the T.R .!.,
on the other hand it was reported that a consi·derable part of the T.RI. forces
at Soemenep were deserting and going home for fear of an action on the part
of the population.

The police action.

14. On 4th August troops were landed in West-Madura and at the con-
clusion of the police action at 24.00 hours on that day, a large portion of the
Western anel Southern part of the isla.nd was al ready occupied. For thc
progress of the action and the conditions encountered, we refer to the
documcnt appended to this report as annex 11, which was presented to thl:
Consular Committee on 24th September 1947 in connection with the visit
raid by some members of that Committec to the island.

Standpoint of the Netherlands Indies Government af ter 4th August 1947.

According to the announccmcnt of the Lieut. Govcrnor-General on 291h
August 1947, at the conclusion of the police action, the arca within which the
direct responsibility for law and order was taken over by the Netherlands Indies
Governmcnt comprised the following districts, among others:
"Madura, The districts of Bangkalan, Kabandjar anel Baliga of the Regency
of Bangkalan and the dis tri cts of Tordjoen, Boender, Pamekasan and Kota
Sampang of the Regency of Pamekasan".
. 16. It must he observed, however, that the Netherlands Indies Govern-
ment has always attached a different value to the demarcation line in Madura
from those in Java or SUInatra, as the situation in Madura has always been!
more or less "fluctuating". Therefore, in Madura a line of demarcation was
drawn coinciding with the boundaries of the districts of which the capitals
\Vere occupied on 4th August 1947. This does not mean, however, that there
was then no military activity of any kin el in the areas outside that boundary.
On the contrary, at th at time anel also later, the area outside that boundary
was patrolled. On the maps of Java and Sumatra handed to the Chairman of
the Consular Committee in September, the demarcation line on Madura was
accordingly indicated by a fluid line, and this was then explained in the
manner set forth above.
17. In the patrol area which the whole of Madura therefore constituted,
also after 4th August, various places were occupied in succession : Sampang
(6th August), Aroshaja (20th August.), Ketapang (beginning of September),
Pakong (lOth October) . These pI aces \Vere occupied either because of requests
trom the population itself, or in reaction to Republican military activities. The
population of the Kangean islands (east of Madura) themselves expelled the
republican administration after asking for and obtaining some weapons.

76
- - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - -

Occupation East Madura.

18. The occupation of the remaining eastern part of Madura, which began
on 9th October, should also be regarded as a continuation of the above-
mentioned patrol activities. The decision to do so was taken on the following
grounds:
a. The Netherlands Army Command had received information that the
regimental commander of the T.R.1. (now called T.N.1. - Tentara Nasional
Indonesia) in Madura had given orders for infiltrations into the Netherlands
controlled area to be carried out in order to hinder the reconstruction in th at
area with all the means at its commando Not only in this way was the cease
iire order infringed, but also by the lIse of harbours in East-Madura for the
infiltration of troops.
b. It appeared th at also in the eastern part of Ma·dllra the population
suffered greatly trom shortage of food and cIothing, and in addition was much
afflicted by the measures carried out by the fighting organizations. Especially
after the occupation of West-Madllra conditions rapidly deteriorated. From
abollt the mi·ddle of August the greater part of the inhabitants of Soemenep
had been evacuated by the T.R.1. In those regions the popltlation was given a
ration of 1 kg per month, while the T.N.1. lived in plenty, having i.a. SOLI th of
Soemenep 300 tons of rice in stock.
Both orally anel in writing variolIs requests for intervcntion had been
addressed to the Netherlands In clies authorities by clelegations from thc
population (translations of two written requests by inhabitants of Soemenep
and of thc island of Gili Genteng who had crossed to the lIlainlanc! have been
appended as annexes III anc! IV) anti gradually it becam e cIear that, Illainly
becallse of this attitude on the part of the peo ple, bilt also because 'thc T.N.1.
seemed to c!issolve in the population, Iittle opposi'tion was to be expected. As
a ma'tter of fact Iimitec! patrolling provecl thaI organized resistance was
negligiblc.
C. IFlIrthermore it proveel that the most prominent political anel religious
leaelers in Maclura would not only not oppose the completion of the occupation
of the islanel, but consid cred it desirabie in the interests of the population as
in 'Ihis way an unsatisfactory situation could be brought to an end. Three
religious teachers in the regency of Soelllenep, e.g. informeel the Government
by the end of October that 85 !~ of the population of East-Madura were in
di stress as a result of the attitude of the Republican soleli ers, for which reason
they requested that measures be taken to relieve the situation. Several influen-
tial leaelers of Islamic fighting organizations (sabilillahs) stateel their own
willingness anel that of thcir organizatiol1s to cooperate with the Netherlands
troops.
The IlIOst influen'tial leader in Madura, the Republican resi dent R. A. A.
Tjakraningrat, who after the Netherlands occupation of West-Madura had
removed the seat of his administration trom the capi'tal Pamekasan to the
unoccupied village of p.egantenan, had soon decIared himself willing to con-
tinue to conduct the administra·tion also in the area occupied by the Nether-
lands troops. When his decision did not receive the support of the leaders of
the republican figh'ting organizations of the Pesinelo, he resigned his post in
October, and had gone to live in the occupied area at the house of his son,
the regent of Hangkalan, who cooperated fully with the Netherlands Govern-
ment. This attitude of the Resident, whose influence in 'the island is very great,
did much to reduce the already enfeebled authority in East-Madura of the
Republican Government.

77
 d. In East-Madura is established the extensive Oovernment salt
industry, which supplies salt to the population of the whole of Indonesia and
constitutes a considerable source of revenue for the population of Madura.
Reports showed that the Soemenep-Kaliangat concern, comprising a works,
salt lands, wharves etc., and where in addition large quantities of salt we re
s'tored, was In danger of being destroyed or at least seriously damagcd
because the Republican organizations had made extensive preparations for
carrying out demolitions. If by a single thoughtless act these preparations
would have been carried in'to effect, incalculable damage would have been
do ne to the salt position of Indonesia.
19. The above has been amply confirmed by what was found during
and after the patrol action in East-Madura. There was no military resis'tancc
of any importance; on the Netherlands side only one man was slightly injured.
The remaining fighting organiza'tions either reported voluntarily, or piled up
their weapons by the side of the road and went home. Apparently they con-
sidered resistance useless, bu t were especially afraid to come into confIic't
with the population. Immediately the population resumed its normal Iife. Thc
evacuated towns were soon re-inhabited. Indonesian officials of all ranks,
especially those belonging to the civil administration and the police, resumed
their duties. The resident R.A.A. Tjakraningrat also fulfils his function, "ii1
the interests of the country and its population" - as ,he stated in a proclama-
tion announcing this fact - and after a tour of inspection in the regency of
Soemenep as early as 22,nd November reported that the si'tuation in that
regency was perfectly peaceful and quiet. Lastly the preparation for destroying
the sart concern proved to be in an advanced stage, so that its destruction was
only prevented by the rapid advance of the Netherlands patrols.
20. On 4th December 1947 the T.N.I. commander in Madura, Colonel
Chandra Hassan was arrested by Netherlands troops. The s'tatements made
by him confirm in many respects the opinion of the Nctherlands Indies 00-
vernment set forth above, concerning the condi'tions prevailing in East Madura
before the occupation of this area. He stated that he had issuec\ orders for the
continuation of hostilities even aft er 4th August 1947 (a transla-
tion of one such order dated 14/9/4 7, is appended below as annex V) by order
of ,his divisional commander who had told him tha t the cease fire order did
not apply to Madura since this island continued to be attackec\. The Comman-
der in Chief of the T.N.I., General Soedirman, had also ordered him to go
on fighting (the translation of a letter from General Soedirman dated 30/9/47
is appended below as annex VI). He also ac\mittecl that the morale of his
troops was low and their relations both to the population and to the other
fighting organ izations were extremely bad at several pi aces, especially at
Soemenep.
Documentary evidence of the way in which Chandra Hassan intended
to apply systematic terrorism with the help of released criminals can be found
in his Secret order No. 49 of 31 August 1947, a translation of which has been
added as annex VII.
With regard to the alleged food blockade by the Netherlands Navy he
stated tha't after a protest against such measures made by him in july 1946
all proas loaded exclusively with food stuffs had been left undisturbed by the
Netherlanders. The precarious food situation he attributed to the inadequate
organization of the machinery for distribution.

78
 ANNEX I.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA.

(Volume 14 page 618)

MADURA, an island and residency of the D. E. Indies (Dutch Madoera),
Iying oft the north-east coast of Java, from whkh it is separated by a shallow
rstrait less than I Y2 milcs. It is over 100 mil es long and 24 miles wide and has
an area of 5.473 sq km. Pop. 1.953.669 (1051 Eur-opeans anc! Eurasians).
It has an undulating surface, but no mountains, 700 ft. being the greatest
elevation in the west and 1.565 ft. that of 'the east. In the north the hills run
down nearly to the sea: in the north-west and south there are extensive alluvial
plains, whilst the south coast is fringed with islets, shoals and mud-banks. The
geological formation reveals the relation of Madura to northern Java, since it
consists largely of the same limestone, rocks, of Tertiary formation, with lo\\'
alluvial tracts : there are hot springs. Oft the eastern coast are several islands-
Spudi, and the Kangean group, Kangean Island being 25 miles long and trom
3 to 15 wide, with hills reaching 1.5UO ft.
The c1imate, flora anc! fauna of Madura rcsclllble tllosc of cast Java.
Vegetation is luxuriant, but the soil is not as ferlil e as the avc rage soil in Java ,
and one indication of 'this is that rice has to be il11portcc! to mect the needs of
the population. Rice, maize, coconuts, coffee, cocoa, kap ok anc! most of the
lIsual Malayan fruits and vegetables are grown, anc! Kapok, copra anc!
coconut oil figurc largcly in exports, also teak, from the cxtcnsive forcsts in
the north-west. The island is weil adap ted for cattle-breeding, which is engag-
ed in extensively (in 1924 no less than 57.396 bulls, thorougbred, were ex-
ported), anc! the wide expanse of coast, weil sl1eltered on the southern si de ,
gives opportunity for a grcat deal of fishing: the Kangean Islands and Sapudi
yield timber, trepang and tortoise-shell. The principal industry is that of salt
winning, which is a governmen't monopoly. The salt is obtained from saline
springs and from se a-water, anc! the largest pans arc situateel at Kalianget.
Nl.anufacture is acco rding to European methoeI anc! gives employmentto many.
The 1926 yield was 6.620.430 piculs (I picul = 136 lb.). Petroleum has been
founc! and is worked on a small scale. 1 he Madurese (Mohammedans), who
are keen traders, but not very good craftsmen , fishermen and sailors, arc
shorter, but more sturc!il y built than the javanesei they are also more inde-
pendent, anel quick-tempered, but thrifty anc! harc!-working, anc! their moral
standarc! is high: they have their Own pecuJiar allluselllents of bull-racing and
bull-fightingi the races, usually held in the month of September, attract huge
crowds. There are Malay and Chinese residents. The capital and seat of the
resident, is Pamakasan, in the central southern part of the island, not far from
the coast, pop. 13.403 (269 Europeans and Eurasians), which has modern
builctings, incluc!ing a hotel. Other towns are Sumenep, Bangkalan pop. 12.359
(141 Europeans and Eurasians), with the old palace of the Sultan of Bangka-
lan. or Madura, and the interesting mosque, Sampang, pop 12.763 Kamal anel
Kalianget. A tramline crosses the island from wes't to east, from Kamal to
Kalianget, connection being maintained with Java by means of a ferry service
between Surabaja and Kamal: the line extends to Bangkalan, in 'the north,
and passes through Palllekasan and Sumenep.
There are roads along the north and south coasts, and across the cen'tre
of the island. There is teleg raphic communication with Java, and Pamekasan
and Sumenep possess telephone services.

79
 Ou'tch influence was established in Madura late in the 17th century, allel
the power of the ambitious prince of Madura was circumscribed by the clivi-
sion of the island into three regencies, Madura (or Bangkalan), Pamekasan
and Sumenep, each havingits own prince, or sultan. After much na'tive misrule,
the regencies were, in 1885 united uncler a residency attached to Java.

A N N EXil.

MADOERA COMMAND Transmitted September 24 .

BANGKALAN. to the Consular Com111ission.

1. GeneraJ.
Madoera island and its population represent a pictme of longdrawn
tragecly.
After threc and a half years of Japanese occupatioll the republic
established its authority by means of japanese trained Indonesian troops anel
officers. Though the total number of troops (5700 with only 4 to 500 rifles,
some machineguns and mortars ) compared with total of the population
(almost 3.000.000) is very sm all indeed, it should be borne in mind the resis-
tance coulcl only be insignificant, all the more since the people were starved
after having Iivecl uneler rigid japanese con trol and with no arl11s at their
disposal.
Madura a poor country has an ambitious, hard-working population,
which is known throughout the archipelago for its extensive fishin g - and
tranport "prauw" fleet, its large cattlebreeding and trade.
A barter system existed between Madoera and java for food (rice etc.)
from java, and this was traclecl against fishand other seaproclucts from
Macloera.
The hard working Maclurese, in spite of the poverty of their country,
had reachecl a relatively high prewar stanclarcl of living. During the
occuption a great part of their fleet had already been lost and after the
japanese capitulation the republic imposed restrictions on the development of
shipbuilding etc. as free tracIe and traffic overseas were not allowed .Already
in November 1946 urgent appeals 1rom the starving population, deprived of
the possibility to import food, reached us from Madura, while at the same
time food that did reach Madura was being held by republican organisations
and the army. Thousands and thousands tried to make their way to Soerabaja.
They arrived very often by means of primitive rafts, just on boa reis or swim-
ming buoyed up by the stem of a bananatree.
Of those who survived, between twenty anc! twenty-five thQusand
reached Soerabaja, where special colonies, dress centres of Red Cross etc. were
established for them.
The food position in the Outch occupied areas, tightly blockaded by the
republic made it impossible to come to the assistance of this so Iikeable
population.
The situation changed however after east-Java was incl,udecl in the
police action anel rice and other food could be made available.
80
2. Police-action and afterwards.
Police-action on the island of Madura started on August 4, 1947. Lan-
dings were made on the South coast and in general little opposition was met;
troops landing at Kamall) did not have a shot fired at them from the coast.
However, a tre mendous amount of mines, b oobytraps, all kinds of projectiles
and grenades were prepared on and along the roads together with roadblocks
of every conceivable kind. Bridges, waterworks, public buildings, telephone
exchanges, power stations, irrigation works, bankbuildings, post offices, in
short, everything th at is part of and serves normal civilised Iife had been
prepared for demolition. Unfortunately most of these objects have been
destroyed and after weeks we still find mines and explosives, indicated by the
population.
At Pamekasan, seat of the Resident of Madura, many buildings incluel-
ing his palace anel offices were also bumt down.
The population of towns of any importance was found to have been
evacuated unrler pressure. The Chinese community was taken into the hills
in due time and their houses, properties and shops were ransacked and partly
bumt before tlle arrival of our troops.
1) Some photographs have bee n addecl to this report showing the
condition in which we found the people.
Prisoners had been set free and we laid hands on an original order by
Lt. Col. Tjandra Hassan, commander of the various scattereel armed groups,
that all convicts should immediately organize in the hills and start guerilla
warfare, devastation and all possible sabotage immediately (original Doc. at
Army H.Q . Batavia).
Soon after our arrival the populaUon returned to their homes and urgent
requests came in, asking jo c1ear their villages of the many mines and explosi-
ves. Messages ca me in from Chinese, sometimes 250 at a time, being kep t
at distances of 10 to 20 miles from thejr homes. They were found to be guarded
by the loerahs (chiefs) of villages who had to prevent their return on penalty
Df death imposed on them by the repubJ:ican Army.
Since no armed guards of formations were found near or around, libera-
tion was effected without difficuIties. Treatment of the, Chinese by the Madu-
rese villagers had been fairly good since relations between the population
and the Chinese community had always been very satisfactory. ~n some parts
of the island intermarriage between Chinese and ,Madurese ' is a common
feature . Unfortunately on their return home the liberated Chinese found their
properties gone or destroyed. Many letters ,h ave been received anq ar.e still
coming in from Chinese, thanking the Dutch forces for their prompt action and
,denoucing several leaders of politica I and armed formations for ·having COIll -:-
mitted these various acts of violence, On the other harrd at' Ketapang on the
North coast a prominent "kiai" (religious leader) took his Chinese fellow
villagers under his protection, notwithstanding the . tnreats made by . various
armed groups, and returned them safely to their homes after the local consta-
bulary, assisted by our patrols, had disarmed ~ ~ittle . group of HizboeHah
(Allah-fighters) and , resto red order. ,
At various places the Dutch forces were and still are received with great
enthusiasm and in Sampang in the middle of the island on the South coast
the constabulary stayed behind in full force. After some fighting around thc
place had cleared the surrollndings, the constabulary and the Weclana (mayor)
of fhe little town had the situation completely in hand so that the patrols
could go on and Iiberate the Chinese who were fou11'd at various distances

Sl
in the hUIs. Without delay the constabulary was reinforced, detachments sent
tl<l :yarious places, even 'at 20 and 40 kilometers distance - such as Ketäpang
across the is land on the North coast where they maintain law and order and
where normal life has Jong since .returned.
The opposing armed groups have carri,ed out a plan of defence by des-
tructing the many bridges, found in the very few roads on the island. They
have withdrawn to the steep hills running from West to East along the middlc
vf "the i~land, which are extremely difficult to penetrate.
They move from one place to the other, descending UpOR the population
dur,ing tne night and taking away whatJittie food they have and terrorizing them.
Many appeaJs have come in from various villages to be Iiberated from these
violations but the little groups are extremely difficuIt to get at, owing to
terrain difficuities and quick displacements. These groups mainly consist of
remnants of companies as most of the ordinary saldiers did go home right
after the landings. Officers and political leaders and fanatics who have
.Jbtained certain 'standing in various groups and formations have practically
rio 'outlook for a come back innormal life, becaluse they have no regular job'
and cannot live on the level they have attained. liere we find the same
problem as that of the armed youth in Oermany, and a come back and possi-
bilities in civillife must be found,in order to keep them from the streets and
from forniing , sabotage' troops, for which they have been trained both by the
Japanesé and the Republic. ,Up.till now they ,stiJI prefer to carry on the scorched
éarfli poJicyorderedbythe Republic;creéiting utmost inconvenience for the
population by cutting what small connecting roads there are and by perpetrat-
ing all possible acts of sabotage.
Oradually, however, more of their sort are getting tired of this Jife
whereas the population shows a little more courage in opposing th eir activi-
f!'es. , , ' ,"
-" lInWtration from the North coast of Java tri es to keep activities going by
fierce, propaganda and, infiItration of men and arms.
, Since it is not possible to occupy every single port of the island much
depenàs , on the population itself and the backbone given to them by conti-
nuous patrolling. There is no doubt whatsoever as to the feelings of the people
towards our forces and the measures taken with the object to restore norm al Jife
as quickly as possible. After the landings and occupation of the main towns
(Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan) ~ifficulties arose as it proves not quite
pOssible to di vide an island lik~ Madura by such a thing as a demarcation-
li'nè. from the ,Republican Resident we got word that he considered himself
i~ charge of the administration of the island, that a demarcation line was also
geógrafically and politically completely impracticable and therefore the so-
called vçinMook-,line does not apply to Madura as it does to the positions in
Java. " ' ,
, On the ether hand so many appeals reach the Madura command asking
"!Jr protection and assistance that it would be not only inhuman but also
impossible to cut the island in two. As plunderers are still very active, even
though populati'On resists these activities more and more, the Indonesian
co[)stabulary reguired "active assistance and Dutch forces have to ' provide
for.jt -
" Only small groups of fanatics are opposing a quick change and since
they still have a certain amount of armed followers, persuasion or military
action::; ' can bring the ,' solution only. From the beginningonwards the civil
servants, have taken up their work and given tull cooperationin the interest

82
of the people. ·'Since the Republican Resident has made their position c1ear
,hey find no difficulty or objections in our relations and understand th at there
will be no interference whatsoever trom our side.
. -
ft is their job to administrate the country while ours is to assist them in
case the normal functioning of the corillTIlmity is threatened.
3. Food situation.
Madura is a very poor country and vast amounts of rice and com··have
always had to be imported.
The situation found upon arrival was most aJarming and iml11ediate steps
\Vere taken to sliip as mttch as possible to the island. .
Distribution is now in full swing but shortage of local t,ransport after fivc
years of occllpation and destroyed bridges create various problems. Many thou.,.
sands have died of starvation. Oui' Red Cross teams work day and night,
dispensing food and c10thing to the poorest and giving medical treatments to
endless rows of emaciated and almost naked people, cover~d with .- tropical
ulcers.
4. Clothing. .
The population has not seen decent c10thing for ',more than five years.
On our arrival the vast majority of them had hardly anything to wear bU,t
rags. Thousands ot yards of textile are distributed daily to those most in
need of cover. . . '
5. Health situation.
The rate of mortality in certain parts of the island is extremely high. No
medical stoc"k was available and sa a new start 'had to be made, ..while vast
amounts of medical Slupplies are necessary. The country has terribly suffered
from the occllpation and the-Republic has not been able to cape with thésitua-
tion found after the capitulation. What Iittle food there was, never reached the
paar as it was mostly used to feed the Republican civilians and armed forma-
tions . Same of these stocks have been found and distributed immediately to
the suffering population.
6. Livestock.
Madura has always been famous for its big stock of cattle. The Japanese
requisitioned such vast amounts that only 20 % was left at the time of the
capitulation. Since practically na export took place afterwards, the situation
has slightly improved sa that cattIe can now be traded on a small scale in
exchange for rice and com. On September 1st the population of Sampang and
surrounding villages asked permission to hold the famous bull races, a natio-
nal custom. That th is coincided with the celebtating of H.M. Queen Wil-
helmina's birthday was a very delicate gesture, highly appreciated bi our
farces. .
7. Fishing.
Fishing and overseas trade have of course been one of the big assets of
the island. Bath, however, were prohibited orseverely restricted by the Repu-
blic. For Jack of materiaJ, boats were rotting away and it wil\' take same time
before these industries, sa important to the population, will have reached
iheir prewar level. Those who still have vessels are saiJing back and forth
between Madura and Java at the moment and th is greatIy imp raves the food
situation along the coast. .

83
 , 8. Economy and curre.ncy.
Five years of restrictions and shortage, demolitions and political unrest
have disorganized the normal economie structure of the island. Two curren ..
cies, Japanese and Republican, have been poured into the is land, previous
currencies having been declared invalid and 50 causing tremendous losses
owing to various wrong manipulations.
lt is therefore extremely amusing that big amounts of the old prewar
currency are still kept and now coming into circulation again and, as rightly
expected by the 'people,is taken at its full value. Gradually Republican
money will disappear and in order not to create the havoc Japanese and
Republican money have caused, the monetary situation will be handled step
by step and with much ca,ution.
9. Religion.
Madura is a very religious country. Propaganda has caused the miscon-
ception in certain regions that with the arrival of Dutch forces sharp restrict-
ions would be made.
Whereas most kiai's are fully cooperating and even use their influence in
the handlng-in ' of arms, some less important kiaÎ's for lust of power and
personal reasons, use this propaganda by urging their groups to commit acts
of sabotage and terrorize the population. They have no or practically no arms
~md äre of no military importance.
Thc demolitions a:nd vexations of the population however create much
unrest and anxiety wh ere they operate.
Since these are fanatics, their leaders must be taken or brought to reason,
:tfter which these groups, according to statements made by the population,
,will immediately stop toeir activities and go home.
'10. Madurese forces.
Before the war the island produced Battallions of so-called "Tjakra"
. troops, They existed purely of Madurese with only a smal! Dutch cadre for
training and administrative purposes. In t 942 these forces were disbanded,
dnd many of its former soldiers have died in Birma and on the is land ; others
have been enlisted in various T.R.J., as this was the only way to obtain food.
i\1any of those deserted and reported to our H.Q. with the request to be
' incorporated in the old force again, after our landing. Some have refused to
' join the T.R.1. while others did not and thus problems exist which have to
oe solved with much ca~e and wisdom:
11. Saltworks.
The one artd only big in,d ustry are the saltworks on the south coast. One
of these, though part of the power station has been destroyed, restarted pro-
duction near Sampang.
Lack of labour, owing to the high rate of mortality in these surroundings
is one of the unexpected and alarming problems we have to face, because the
contingent available is so under-nourished that only gradually they can be put
to work for norm al hourS.
'2. Conclusion.
From a military point of view the island offers no excessiveproblems
provided time is given to gradually improve the situation and no infiltration
from Java will take place any more, which so far is an infringement of the ceaSe
fire order. As soon as the people will be to ,e xpress their own . sineere

.84
feelings and as soon as the terror created byrepublican 'déstrtictive elements
will cease, na Dutch soldier or civilian will encounter any hostility from this
friendly, hardworking population and Madura will be in a position to express
its opinion as to how it wants to fit in the commonwealth of these islands. Th.e
civil servants are able and hard working men who have realized that they
have the honourable task to restore the island to its former state of com-
parative wealth and lead the community to decision which will guarantee
them the place they are entitled t~.
BANGKALAN, 20 September 1947.
C. O. MADURA - FORCE
Signed
Jhr. Mr. W. VAN CITTERS.
GII(i) "A" DIV.
For Copy
O. L. REINDERHOFF
Major.

A N N EX ID.
Ta the Chief Authority
in
SOERABAJA.
The undersigned, ten persons of the desa of "Pagarbatoe", Soemenep,
Madura, urgently request your assistance, because the "Sabil" leaders in
our desa are acting very cruelly towards inhabitants that have come from
Soerabaja. This has led to many being locked up in the office of the Military
PoIice at Soemenep. When any one of these escapes, this ,is wreaked upnn
the relatives, who are beaten half to death, and all the goods in their homes
are confiscated.
We therefore beg you to take measures as soon as possible to stop
this as the inhabitants can no longer endure this misery. We will gladly go
with you to the desa to point out the djahats (ringleaders) one by one. '
Panaroekan, 12th September 1947.
(Signed) 1. Asmorosastro 2. Setjoprawiro
3. P. Ezam 4. Dahwari
5. Salama,r 6. Moehni
7. P. l3ahwawi 8. Hola
9. Soenar 10. P. Moena
N.B. We are all refugees from the desa of "Pagarbatoe".

A N N E X IV.

Ta the Recomba
at
SOERABAJA.
PETITION
The undersigned appeal to your Honour with the earnest request to
take measures to have OILI-OENTENO o'ccupied by the army ,or poIice of
your Oovernment, as O1LI-OENTENO is being guarded by the ,armyand
police of SOEMENEP, and we proa-men sailing ,from Soerabaja are being
captured and taken to Sarongi, sub-district of Soemenep.
Hoping that you wiJl comply with our request, we thank you a thousand
times.
Panaroekan, 13th October 1947.
(Signed)
1. P. Sai'Han
2. Boeramin
3. Modare
4. Misnadin
5. P. Soeraja
6. Miroela
7. P. Moesiati

A N N EX V.
IMMEDlATE ORDER
J. . The commander of Sector IjIlI is ordered to continue infiHration attacks
on the posts occupied by the enemy in cooperation with the Barisan SABI-
LILIAH and others in order to create confucion among the enemy and to
destroy him.
lssued d.d. J 4/ 9-' 47
12.00 hours
Cdr O.H.Q. VIj35
(signed) R. CHAMDRAHASAN.
Addressed to
I Sector IjIII
File O.H.Q. VIj35

A N N E X VI.
ARMY COMMANDER
TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA
JOGJAKART A, 30 September '47
To:
the Commander of Res. 35 (VI Div.)
anel all men in ,
. ' MADURA
M~fdeka,
I .thank God who has tak~n under his protection you anel all your men in
the fulfilment of your holy duty. I express my thanks for the sacrifices that have
been made for the salva'tion of the fatherland. I continue to place the most
complete confidence in all soldiers who as one man have given the tangible
proot. of determination, perseverance and courage in their resistance against
the Netherlands colonial encmy whosc armament is in every respect complete.
Remember anel realize that only with this cletermination, perseverance anel
courage wc can· destroy the malignant Dulch.
Do not be anxious ancl clo not lose heart at the constant progress of the
enemy, the resul't of theirsurprise attack maele with the' most complete and
modernarmarnent. The Dutch cannot for long-holelout,especialy wh en
unC'E'asingly, by day and by night with the use of guerilIa ta'ctics we penetrate
into their lines, as is al ready being do ne by all , our men in cooperation with
the population.
Be confident and be convineed that fina! victory is ours, for the Indone-
sian people is indeed waging a holy war in defence of truth and justice. Even
now it is c1ear thai we have been , able to recover various territories, not by
the strength of our weapons but thanks to a firm faith and a lambent fighting
spirit. '
I learn that you and all menwill completely and with stubborndetermina-
tion fulfill your oaths to Ood anct tb the r'atherland:
"Better to see our country ,a sea of flames than to have it once again
a colony". '
The Head of our State; Boeng RARO, has issue an order of the day,
which reads:
"Continue the st'ruggle '(1(ld reconquer, every inch of ground th at has
fallen into enemy hands".
be
There is nO need for the ,men tOH .:ànxiöus about the fate of JOGJA,..
KARTA as the capital of th e Negara Repoeblik Indonesia, nor abou't the late
of all yout leaders. Even though DjOKJA-'shoUldbè ,repeatedly bon15àrded
and shelled, we shouldall togcther .dèfend D jOCJAäs . the.capitálbl thè
Negara Repoeblik Indonesia. ' ' " , ' . ' '., ; " :, ': '
Even though in a manner of speaking the whole 'territory should. be
occupied, itis still our duty todefend DJOCJA as the capital, the symbol of
our country, to the u'tmost. However be confident that God will not permit
the fiendish Dutch to have any further successes.
Let us all together renew our original vow:
"To rise or to go under with our country".
This is my order as your Leader; may the most just God take us Haf]
under His protection. , '

, Tetap Merdeka
Army Commander
(signed) General SOEDIRMÁN.

A N NE X VII.

STRATEGlCAL ORDER No'. 49. , ~. Confidential.

I. The prison must be openecl, when the enerny ,l1as occupied an are~.

II. The prisoners released by us must previously bè sufficien'tly influenced

by us. Their task is to carry out terroragainst theenemy oècupa,tion
forces. ' , " ,
lil. Prison buildings must be thoroughtly destroyed . In 'this, direct contact
must be sought with the commanders of the subsector ateas (battalion
commanders) .
IV. ' This order is given 'to:
t. The HeadsoL the State Pr,isons at, Pamekasan, Bangkalan; , Sam-
, pang and Sumenep. "
eopies to:
2. the commander of the subsector I sj d VI;
3. cOl1lmander of the Staff regiment 35.

Jssued 23-7-1947, at 10.00 hours.

Territoial commander Madura
(Signed)
Lt. Col. R. Chandrahasan.

Secretariat.
Issue No .. 56.
Ag. No. 532j CGD j Cor.
Batavia, December 24th 1947.
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

Sir,
Further to the memoranda on the situa'iion in the island of Madura,
submitted by this Delegation to the Commit'tee of Good Offices, I have the
honour to transmit herewith a transla'tion of the reports of the first and second
interrogation of Chandra Hasan, Commander of the 35th Regiment of the
T.R.I. Further in'terrogation reports will be transmitted to your Committee as
soon as they will have been received from the competent military authorities.

have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,

in the absence of
Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo

(signed) H. van Vredenburch.

To the Chairman
of the Security Council 's
COl11l11ittee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

4th Inf~n.try Brigade Soerabaya,JHh December 1947.

INTERROGATIONREPORT NO. 1.
1) Personal data
Name R. Chandra Hasan
Rank Lieutenant-Colonel
Place of birth Sroenggit (Soemenep) Madoera
Date of birth 19th February 1920
Captured at Geding, near Probolinggo
Date of capture 4th December 1947
Captured by Patrol of K.N .I.L., V.D.M.B. (Mari-
ne brigade)
Date of interrogation 4th Dec. 1947 and following days.

88
 Interrogators Chief of staff of 4th Infantry Brig
Chief I.V.C., 4th Infantry Brig.
Serg. Leeuwenburg, M,V ,D, "A"
Div.
Function of captive Commander 35 th Reg t. T.N.I.
üur" designation Captured officer

2) LUe.
1927-1934 Schoól at Pamekasan
1934-1938 Secondary school at Soerabaya
1938- 1940 Commercial school at Soerabaya
1940-1942 Magelang
1942-1943 Hlead-master of a sl11aII private commercial school of
his own at Pamekasan
1943 (6 months) Clerk with the Shun-choo
1943-1945 Captain in the PETA. During this p eriod he spent
6 months con~ined to his house under arrest for
insubordination.
1945 Commander VI Regt. since foundation of T.K.R.
Merd eka period Commander 35th Regt since foundation of T.R.I.
(T,N,I.)

Questions: Answers:
I. Do you wish to be questioned in I speak and understand Dutch ex-
the Dutch or the Malay language '2 cellently and would Iike to be ques-
tioned in th at language.

2, What were your movel11ents be- I shall make a written statement as

tween 4th- August and the date of accurately as possible on this point.
your arrest? Annex A.

3. Do you know that on 4th Aug. I learnt this later.

both the Republican Government
and the Netherlands Governl11cnt
issued the order " Cease fire "?

4. When did you learn this?
5, Did you receive instructions trom
the Divisional Commander before
8th August?
ft was made known by the civil
authorities. They had been informed
by wireless about 8th August.
Yes, approximately on 6th August
I received a wireless message from
the Commander of VI Division:
" 'Ce ase fire' order does not apply
to Madura.
Continue the fight".

6. Did it not surprise you that in his Yes, it did.

instructions the Divisional Com-
mander used the term " Cease
fire", as officially you knew no-
thing yet of the "Cease fire" order?

89
 , 7. nid you on that account ask for
further instructions?
8. ' What was the reply of the Divi-
sional Commander and when did
you receivc it?
, 9. Are you .as a Military Commander Not ai all, for I never received any
,.. satisfied withwhat happened as authoritative order with c1ear in-
.. regards the receipt of ,'th is most structions, which also appears from
important J' Cease fire" order?
10. Had not you as Military Comman-
der Madura expected personal
orders and instructions trom the
Divisional Commander or the
Government?
11. What happened to the Divisional
. order to continue the fight?
12. Examinee is shown the order dd.
1-9-'47 (Annex B).
Do you admit that you gave this
order?
13. On what grounds did you consider
it necessary to issue this' order on
14th September?
14. How often was this exhortation to
continue the fight repea ted by the
Division in the period between 4
August and 14 November?
15. Examinee is shown the translated
letter from General Soedirman,
dated Djocjakarta 30 September
1947 (Annex C). Do you admit
that you received this letter? .
90
Yes, I asked my Divisional Corit-
mander on wh at grounds this
"Cease Fire" had been issued and
why the fight must be continued.
The reply I received after the mes-
sage of the civil authorities of 8th
August and it ran, "The Cease Fire
order does not apply to Madura as
Madurtlis still being attacked after
the order. (In Malay thisread as
follows, "Boeat Madoera tidak ber-
lakoe perhentian tembak menembak
sebab setelah perintahMadoera te-
tap di serang).
. the fact that I had tb ask what
"Cease fire" meant, while in addi-
tion the first I heard of this order
was from the civil authorities.
Certainly.
My request for instructions proves
that by the peculiar working method
at the higher plan 1 as responsible
commander was put in a most pe-
culiar position.
I passed it on to the troops under
my commando
Yes, I wrote and issued this order
myself.
I didso because the Division COll-
stantly egg~dme: on to acrion on
a bigger scale and also to heighten
the morale of the troops which was
very low.
Altogether about 7 times. However,
these instructions and orders came
not only trom the Oivision but in
one case also trom General Soedir-
man, the Commander in Chief, him-
self.
Yes.
16. Is the translation correct?
1-7. Was the order ofthe day ofSoe-
karno known to you before?
18. Did not you listen in to the ad-
dress yourself?
19. Did not Genera! Soedirman's let-
ter and Soekarno's radio address
raise any problems, for instance
with respect to the general order
to "Cease fire" issued by Soe-
karno?
20. Did you never receive instruc-
tions to observe the van Mook-
line?
21. How aften did you personally
give order to carry out attacks on
our posts and positions after 4th
August?
22. How do you explain the fact that
in many cases the plan for th c
attack as drawn up by the TRI
could not be carried out.
23 . Were not you surprised that th e
Dutch always knew of your plans
beforehand and . were therefore
able to carry out actions at the
right time and place?
I do 110t remember the Malay, but
the purport is quite correct. Thc
underscored passage in your trans-
lated copy, which refers to the sen-
tence " Rather would I see our coun-
try ablaze than a colony", and the
order of the day of President Soe-
karno are literal translations.
Yes, before 30th September I had
heard of the radio address of Presi-
dent Soekarno.
No, I only read a copy of the ad-
dress.
No, for I knew from previous ordèrs
and instructions . that the · "Cease
Fire" order and the van Mook-Iine
did not apply to Madura.
No, I have never officially been told
that there was a van Mook-line in
the island. I only heard of it in
radio reports but I emphatically re-
peat that I · have never been official-
Iy informed of this line or of the
order not to cross it.
On several occasions Iordered at-
tacks on enemy posts and positions,
but they were mostly not carried out
because . the sub-commanders anel
men simply had I}ot the courage.
In many cases the Dutch struck
first at the right moment.
This also applies to attacks and in-
filtrations planned by my sub-com-
manders on their own initiative, anel
often it was reported to me that an
attack which had becn prepared
could not be carried out, because at
the right moment the Dutch had
struck in the right direction.
Certainly, I kn ew that there were
traitors among my own officers and
other personnel and besides the
number of deserters was appalling-
Iy high, so that you cOltld not but
have much informatiol1 about our
plans.
 24. Speaking as one soldier to another,
do you find it understandable
that the Netherlanders undertook
the actions which they carried out
after 4th August?
25. You were speaking of traitors and
deserters. Would you mind tel-
ling us a Iittle more about that?
26. In view of what you stated just
now I should like to hear what
your impression was of the troops
you commanded.
27. To what causes do you aftribute
the condition of the 35th Regi-
ment?
28. What do you mean by these five
points?
92
Certaii11y; to strike the first blowand
thereby to frustrate the enemy's
plans is one of the first principles of
strategy, and further comment, I
think, is superfluous.
Not at all, the translation which you
showed me of a letter from Chief of
S.taff 35th Regiment to commanders
of sectors 1-4 in cl. and to comman-
ders of services and units of 35th
Regiment dd. 18 October 1947, no.
562/PR, subject" Attention" is a cor-
rect translation of a letter sent at
myorders (Annex 0).
I admit that the 35th Regiment was
completely unserviceable as a figh-
ting apparatus.
I could point to a great many factors.
The 35th Regiment lacked:
1. good soldiers,
2. sufficiently trained officers and
non-commissioned officers,
3. a high morale with all of them,
4. the requisite arms and equipment,
5. proper care generally.
1. I was short of trained soldiers.
Although the numbers were suf-
ficient, their training never
amounted to much, that is to say,
I had no instructors to make their
training effective.
And mentally the troops were not
up to their duties.
2. The officers and non~commis­
sioned officers were most in cap-
able and had no prestige with
the troops.
3. As regards all fighting organiza-
tions except the TRI the main
cause of their low morale is in
my opinion the forced and th ere-
fore wrong method of enlisting
by Buro Perdjoeangan. I wrote
to protest against this. I never
had any reply to this letter. Ou-
ring my visit to Ojocja I discuss-
ed the matter with the Minister
of War (Amir Sjarifoeddin) and
 he promised to put a stop to the
arbitrary methods of the various
fighting organisations and to
bring method into it. Among the
TRI in my opinion it is due to the
tact that the ideal of fighting for .
nationalism and Merdeka has not
penetrated deeply enough. Espe-
cially when the Dutch had occu-
pied part of Madura and showed
a different attitude trom what
propaganda had led us to expect,
many began to waver.
This explains also why there
were so many deserters.
4. Arms and equipment were defi-
nitely below the mark. Against
a well-armed opponent we had
not the ghost of a chance.
5. AIthough better than those of the
population, food and care we re
insufficient for a sol dier.

29. Are you of the opmlOn that the
food shortage of the populatiol1
and the TRI may be attributed to
the foodblockade which the Dutch
are alleged to have imposed.
No. As a matter of !fact about
July 1946 proas loaded with food
were conducted to Soerabaya on
the suspicion that they contained
supplies for the TRI.
I protested against th is, with the
result that since then food proas
have been left unmolested by the
Duteh. The anxious food posi-
tion is, then, in my opinion due to
the lack of organisation of the
supply-machinery.
This mistake was made both in
the allotments in Java and by the
distributing machinery in Ma-
dura.
I repeat emphatically that after
my protest against the food-
blockade all proas loaded exc\u-
sively with food have not been
interfered with by the Dutch.

30 .. Was not the food position in Ma-
dura also a matter of transport
difficuIties?
Yes, certainly, both the shortage
of motor-vehic1es and of late, of
course, also the destructions of
the roads are factors which help-
ed to prevent a smooth distri-
bution.
31. What do you know of the most
deplorable food situation that we
found in Kamal, where people
have starved to death?
The interrogators:
(signed)
I. W. A. Kampinga, Capt.
Chief of Staff 4 Inf. Brig.
(signed)
2. Dr. W. J. H. M. Piët, Capt.
Chief lVG 4 Inf. Brig.
Staff 4th Infantry Division
INTER~OGATION
1. Personal data
see Report No. 1
2. Life
3. What was the nature of the
relations between you and the
M<idoera Civil Administration?
4. As Commandant of Madoera, in
what relation did you stand to the
Civil Authorities?
5. By what legal procedure was this
relation regulated?
On this point 1 should Iike 10
give you an elaborate written re-
port (Annex E).
The examinee
(signed)
R. Chandra Hasan.
Lt. Kol. T.N .1. 35 Regt.
Soerabaya, 9 December 1947
REPORT No. 2.
I always acted in accordance with
RepubIican instructions. I never had
any personal difficulties with C.A.
officials, except in one case:
that was recently, with the Resident,
when I freely expressed my opinion
on the activities of the Civil Admi-
nistra tion.
As far as military matters in the
island were concerned, I also held
authority over the Civil Administra-
tion.
In the law cnacted to impose martial
law of the Republic and in the ex-
position of the Governor of East
Java and the Minister of the Interior
of the Republic. These bestowed on
me authority over the Civil Admi-
nistration as far as military matters
were concerned. Otherwise, the C.A.
was allowed to act independently,
hut they were not authorized to issue
orders to me or sections of the T.N.1.
or fighting organizations, though as
regards the fighting organizations
orders of a purely administrative
nature could be imposed.
6. Does th is imply thaf as regards
the tactics and the activity of the
fighting organizations, the Civil
Administration Call110t he held
responsible?
7. What was the disagreemellt be-
tween you and the Resident
referred to in reply to question 3?
8. Were you informed of ins truc-
tions issued by the higher authori-
ties to the Civil Administration in
Madoera?
9. Were you ab Ic yourself to excrt
great personal influence on the
C.A. directly or indirectly?
10: . What was the nature ·of the
relations between the lower T.N.I.
commanders and the C.A.? I mean
the 1eaders of lower rank.
Certainly, as the highest military
authority I am ultimately responsible
for these.
ft was about the care of the C.A .
for evacuees, who in my opinion were
not receiving the necessary care and
assistance. In the end this disag-
reement was amicably settIed,
however, and I took personal
measures.
Normally I was, but not of the orders
received by Major Djamal from the
Governor of East Java.
Co-operation betwecr~ us was good,
which implies that each was master
of his Own domain. By the institu-
tion of the D.P.D. , of which the
Resident was the head and I the
deputy head, a certain authoritative
rela tionship was established, bu t
this applied solely to thisD. P. D.,
for the rest we were on a footing oi
equality.
In the district of Soemenep they
were poor, complaints we re always
being received of the activities of
various T.N.I. commanders. These
complaints referred to ïhe assump-
tion of C.A. authority by my sub-
commanders, the arrest of the
Regent of Soemenep, and many
other farms of moral terrorization,
in the form of threats to C.A.
officials. In the district of Pame-
kasan collaboration was fairly good.
I remember some minor complaints,
but that is all. In my opinion ijl
the district of Sampang then worked
together weil, as I received na
complaints.
From the district of Bangkalan I
heard many complaints during the
period when Asmoro ]oedo was
Regimental Commander. IA 11 the
C.A. officials, the police and other
fightiilg organizations were against
95

11. iWhat did you do to put an end Soemen,ep. Here
to this situation?
. ce with his battalion. On various
him on' account of his despotism
and acts of moral terrorization. Ta
be qui~e honest I must add that I
know this only by hearsay.
When I took over I inherited this
apparently implacable conflict.
Asmoro joedo's sub-commanders
remain ed at their posts. As a sepa-
rate case I must mention Kwanjar,
where my sub-commanders wer'e
continllally more or less at war
with the C.A. This was another
result of the conflict just referred
to.
ordered the
P. T. R. I. to keep a sharp eye on
the incidents reported anel to report
them to me. Besides this I called all
the officers together to give them
a strict disciplinary warning. Af ter
this there was some improvement,
but things never became quite
satisfactory.
I was not able to deprive Major
Madjid of his function as then the
whole Ba ttalion would have tllrned
against me. The Battalion was by
na means averse to sLlch practices
and Major Madjid had great influen-
occasions I punished low-ranking
ofHcers with confinemcnt, but never
qllite achieved the desired result, as
it was not possible always to exert
my influence on all my subordinate
officers.
Pamekasan. I remember one case
here of theft of rice by a second
Iieute"ant, who was sentenced by
court-martial on th is account.
Sampang, J was satisfied with con-
ditions th ere.
Bangkalan. Here I tried to improve
matters, in whfch I was fairly suc-
cessful as regards the C.A. and po-
lice. Relations with the other fight-
ing organizations were disquieting
and remained SO. In this connection
I would refer to my report, which is
appended to Interregation Report
No. las Annex E.
Kwanjar. Here I gave orders for my
 troops to be strictly supervised. The
complaints I received about the beha-
viour of the T .R.!. in this district con-
sisted of extortion, black market
practices, terrorization of the villa-
gers and tradesmen, and also mur-
der. I passed the culprits on to the
court martia!. I am not aware of the
exact senten ces passed, but there
were serious cases. Sy order of the
D.P.D. all trade with Soerabaya was
prohibited and the police and the
T .R.I. had been instructed to see to
the strict observance of th is order.
I personall y gave th e order tha t
anyone infringing this order was to
be arrested, but that the use of fire-
arms against such traders was
stricly forbidden.
The cases in which this was done
notwithstanding I regard as terrori-
zation committed by irresponsible
individuals and i'f discovered the
culprits we re by my order subjected
to court martia!. Shortly after the
D.P.D. 's order had been issued,
however, I condoned trade with
Soerabaya, as I did not wish to
ham per the liberty of the population
unnecessarily and their sailing and
trade with Soerabaya is the only
means of subsistence along th is
coast.
12. Wh at was the relation of the Soemenep. Here tlle relation was
T.R.I. to the population, in the very bad, which is understandable
widest sense of the word? in view of what was said in reply to
the previous question about tlle
commanders concerned.
Many cases of individual theft and
assault were reported to me by the
population. 1 expressly ordered
Major Madjid to subdue these prac-
tices, to investigate matters and to
have the stolen goods returned to
the owners, and the P .T..R.I. exer··
cised closer con trol.
With a view to thess complaints I
allowed the first evacuation to be
annulled, so that everyone who des -
ired to return was allowed to go
home.
The second evacuatiol1 was not or-
 dered by me, and is entir'ely the
responsibillity of Major Madjid, who
could take such measures as local
Military Commander. The arrest of
the Regent of Soemenep, which took
place some time in September on the
orders of Major Madjid, was annul-
led by me.
I referred the whole case to the court
martial, but no verdict was given.
The Regent had been arrested on
suspicion of being in league with the
enemy, but I considered the arrest
unmotivated.
Pamekasan and Sampang. I receiv-
ed no complaints from th ere, and I
think I may assume that there the
reIation between the population and
the T.R.1. soldiers was good.
Bangkalan. The fact th ad most of
the cases of the court martial found
their origin in the area of Bangka-
lan is significant.
Here too, however, one shoulJ dist-
inguish between the administration
of my predecessor and the time when
I was commander of Macbera.
From the first period I remtmber
cases of theft during the eva.:.:uation
of Kamal, theft and looting of proas,
extortion, assauIt and battery. At
first no measures were takcn, but
when I took over command l had
these criminals traeed and prosEcut-
ed when possible. The mattèf was,
however, most complicated, as it
was very difficult to find out who
were the real culprits, there beilIg no
reliable detective force, as will be
seen from the fact that some poiice-
men we re themseIves involved. Dur-
ing my command I tried to impr,wE:
the situation by personal supprvision.
I annulled the evacuation, witiJ fhe
exception of a strip of :WI) m hom
the coast of Kema!.
Although thefts did still occur, these
cases, when they came to light wp.r~
immediately referred to thc COUl t
martiaL This was aIso done in the
comparatively frequent cases of
bribery.
98

13. Wh at can you teil us about the
fate of the Chinese after the
evacuation of Ban gkalan?
14. What do you know of the attitude
towards the civilian population of
the other fighting organizations-
we mean the purely military ones?
15. What can you tell us about the
non-military fighting organizations
with respect to th e population?
I also tried to end this lamentable
state of affairs by attempting a
reconciliation with the population.
I partly succeeded, anlong other
things because I drew the attention of
the civil service to the I"equiremellts
of the population, and also by having
the T.R.I. give · assistarce in the
form of twenty tons of nee monthly.
At my orders these twcnty tons
we re withdrawn from the rations of
the T.R.I.
I know nothing either of tLe evacua-
tion or of the Chin ese you say were
evacuated from Bangkalan. Gene-
rally speaking, I had authorized my
sub-commanders to deal with the
voluntaryevacuation of the popula-
tion. Compulsory evacuation I had
strictly prohibited. Voluntary eva-
cuation I considered to be in the
interests of the population but com-
pulsory evacuation had its con se-
quences in the form of assistanee.
In this respect we could do nothing.
What I have said so far refers only
to the T.R.I. The other military for-
ces, such as ALRI, PTRI, Biru Per-
djoeangan came under my command
at a much later date, and therefore I
never reeeived any complaints about
these forces.
First of all I must explain that the
other fighting organizations were
under my orders only tactically, and
only in those cases where they took
part in military operations and
actions they were indirectly com-
manded by me. I left my 'Sub-com-
manders free in th ei r tactical use of
th ese organizations and sanctionecl
this becau-se it was done by orders
and instructions issued by D jocja .
They have their own leaders and
always act under the direct com-
mand of th ese leaders.
As a soldier I feIt most unhappy
when I was orclered to assume tac-
tical command of these organiza-
tions.
99
 The mutual controversies between
the military fighting órganizations
and the non-military organizations
were considerable in pi aces like
Soemenep and Bangkalan; in other
places the relations were better.
Because the SabilIiIah's are the more
fanatic, it was unfortunately the
members of the military forces who
suffered, and as a matter of fact I
had to take strong action to stop
this arbitrary terrorization particu-
larly of the Sabillilah's by decreeing
that only the P.T.R.I. was entitled
to make arrests.
]udgment af ter arrest and the ver-
dict are exclusively pronounced by
the court-martial.
Gradually things improved, but the
abuse could never be entirely stam-
ped out.
Especially during forced withdraw-
als of our forces the terrorization of
the SabiIlilah's was a deplorable
factor. The attitude of the Pesindo
showed more moderation and they
caused less trouble. Criminal acts
and terrorization of non-military
organizations committed against the
T.R.I. or other fighting organiza-
tions were reported to me. Criminal
acts and terrorization of the popula-
tion were never reported to me, as
I was only tactical commander of
these troops. It is known to me,
however, that often these organiza-
tions planned and carried out on
their own initiative attacks and ope-
rations against Netherlands posts
and positions, for instance at Timoer
Soember, Karangpinang, OmtJen,
Ketapang and Tamberoe.

The interrogators The examinee,

(signed) (signed)

1. W.A. Kampinga, Capt. Chief of CHAND RA HASAN

Staff 4 Inf. Brig. Lt. Col., Cdr 35th Reg.
(signed)
2. W.]. M.]. Piët, Capt. Chief lVG
4 Inf.. Brig.

100
ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM

of

8th December 1947

NETHERLANDS DELEûATION Secretariat
Issue No. 15.

ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM OF THE NETHERLAND DELEûATION.

1. The Committee of Oood Offices' missive of 29th November 1947 is

based on the assumption that the Republican Oovernment's relevant request
to receive economie support is founded en'tirely and soley on humanitarian
grounds.
Viewed in the light of actual facts, the correctness of this assumption
would, however, seem open to doubt. For these facts bring one the conclu-
sion that the Republican Oovernment is on the one hand trying to obstruct
and retard by i'ts request the negotiations to be held and, on the other, it is
endeavouring to strengthen its economic position with the object of developing
its resistance to 'the pacifying measures applied on the part of the Netherlands.
2. The request submitted by the Republican Oovernment to receive
economie aid concerns the following three subj ects:
A. 'the application of measures to promote equitable distribution of food and
consumer goods in all parts of Java, Sumatra and Madura.
B. the speedy resumption of normal trade relations between the territories
of the "Republic" and tlle o'ther parts of Indonesia.
C. the allowance of free trade relations with parts of the "Republic" cut off
"by force".
Each of these subjects will be dealt wi'th in the following with reference
to the actual facts.

Refusal of the Republican ûovernment to cooperate in supplying food for

areas under Netherlands control (Republican food blockade).

Re A. (Economie poliey as regards food supplies) .

. 3. Befare the poli ce action only parts of Java and Sumatra with a large
ri ce deficit were under Netherlands contro!. As it was an imperative necessity
that suffieient rice - the staple food of the Indonesian - should become
available, the Netherlands Indies Oovernment repeatedly called upon the Re-
publican Oovernment, which at that time controlled the rice-surplus areas in
Wes't and East Java, to supply rice for the Indonesian population of areas
under N etherlands con trol.
These negotiations relating to the supply of rice by the Republican 00-
vernment led - in the first instance - to an agreement according to which
the Republican Government was to deliver daily between 11 and 20 railway
trucks of riee - for the population of Batavia - 'to the Allied Military Admi-
nistration, up to a total of at least 20.000 tons of rice.
On their part the Netherlands Indies Department of Economie Affairs
(the Nigieo) was to supply to the Republiean Government 39.000 yards of
textiles and various other commodities.
Although the Netherlands Indies Government anticipated this arrange-
ment, for instance by the allocation of textiles, this agreement was not ho-
nou red by the Republican Oovernmen't.
The Republican Government, which was repeatedly urged to fulfi1 the
obligations it had undertaken, pleaded that it was not able to lay hands on
sufficien't rice in the interior.

103
 · Approximately at ,the same time - i.c. early in April of 1946 - MI'.
Soetan 'S jahrir, the then Premier of the "Republic", undertook to supply
500,000 tons of rice or 700,00,0 tons of gabah (unhusked riee) 10 India,
however. As it was known that there was a grave shortage of riee in the
areas under Netherlands control, this promise in itself was not only direc'ted
against us, but was also highly detrimental to the whole of Indonesia.
The propagandistic nature of this promise is evident trom the fact that
such a large quantity of rice was offered to India, obviously with the intention
of impressing upon foreign countries that there was an abundance of food
in Republican areas-in partieular in Java. This "poliey" is even more evident
if it is remembered that Dr. Oani, the Republican Minister of Economie
Affairs, some months later published at Malang the following pessimistic
figures on the Java and Madura food crops, for purposes of home propaganda
and withthe object of refusing to supply riee andjor any othel' food to
Netherlands-controlled areas.

in fons
Average
1937/ 1941 1945 1946 1947
(estimafed)
Rice (husked) 4,255,000 2,813,000 2,641,000 3,300,000
Maize 2,056,000 930,000 686,000 1,300,000
Cassave 6,250,000 3,119,000 3,521,000 5,632,000
Bataten 1,310,000 1,402,000 955,000 1,248,000
Lieut. ..Oeneral Sir Montague Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of the
"Allied Forces N.E.I.", had meanwhile written a letter on this subject, on
16th April 1946, to Mr. Sjahrir (a copy of this letter is app'ènded), urging
the Republican Government as yet to co-operate in supplying fo od for the
distressed areas.
On 29th April and 1st May 1946 discussions followed b etwee n the
Netherlands and Republican authorHies, in the presence of Allied Officers.
The 'R epublican Governm ent finally promised to co-opera te, undertaking
to supply from Probolinggo and Banjoewangi, where 17,600 tons of padi was
said to be waiting in :the harbours, large quanüties of food to the towns in
Java under Netherlands control. The Republican Government also undertook
to draw rice trom the rice centres of West Java.
In order to facilita'te the transport of all th is food the Allied authorities
offered to supply coal and also fifty trucks, while the Netherlands authorities
undertook to deliver in return textiles, nails, bicyc1es, soap, petroleum, etc.,
to the Republican Government.
Again, however, none of the Republican promises were kept. On the
contrary, .fhe Republican army (Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia, which later
became the Tentara Nasional Indonesia), instituted a food blockade directed
against the areas under Netherlands con'trol. Thus, the demarcMion line along
the river Bekassi was strongly fortified in order to prevent any riee trom
getting through to Ba'tavia from the rich plains of Krawang. The trucks made
available :by the British were, moreover, misused for military purposes.
In October 1946 the rice situation was once more brought up for con-
sideration with the Republican Government. With the assistance of Mr. M. R.
Wright, then belonging to the staff of the British Special Commissioner
(Singapore), an agreemen t was again reached after arduous negotiations.

104
This tim e 'the Republican Governl11'ènt promised to send every month as from
November 1946 the following quantities of food:
2,000 tons of rice
3,000 " " padi (rice plants)
2,000" maize '
500 " " katjang kedeleh (beans)
500 " " tapioca flour.
At the meeting of the "Joint Civil Affairs Commission" of 6th November
the Republican Governm cnt promised, moreover, to extendthis agreement by
takin g steps '10 deliv er monthly:
11,000 tons of rice for the towns in lava under Netherlands control
1,000 " " " "" " "Sumatra" " "
5,000 " " " " " Eastern islands of the Archipelago
6,000 " " " " "Western " "" "
As before, however, th ese promises were never fulfilled. Th e blockade
imposed by the T .R.I. was tightened; thus Sumatra, Medan and Padang,
for instance, we re so completely cut off from the country behind that, unless
the N etherlands authorities had talren the precaution of importing rice from
other countries, there would have been a serious famine. Conditions in Medan
even became so critical that 'the Republican mayor of Medan of his own accord
requested the T.R .I. commanders outside the town to mitigate th eir action
agains't the transport of food to the town.
In Java, too, the T.R.1. tightened ,the blockade, with the result that
Semarang, for instanee, had fa subsist entirely on imported rice. 'In Sourabaya
the situation also became more tense. The Republican action against provis-
ioning there culminated in the inundation of th e fertiIe Sidoardjo delta, as
a result of which extensive tracts of rice-fields, with the rice standing, were
in danger of being lost to 'the food stocks.
4. Af ter the signing of the Linggadjati Agreem ent the problem of the
supply of rice was at once raised by the competent Ne'therlands authorities,
who trusted that the Republican Governmel1it would now be willing to co-
operate. Wh en this subject was referred to in the discussions On the institution
of a joint food-stocks fund aiming at better distribution of essential foodstuffs
to all parts of Indon esia, it was pointed out to the Republican Government
that it was its duty to give up its surplus rice to the deficit areas of Indonesia.
This Governmen't indeed acknowledged this duty in principle, but wished first
and foremost-appare ntly for political reasons-to fulfil on all points its rice
contract with India, regardless of the needs of Indonesia itself.
Meanwhile the T . R.1. maintained 'the food blockade. Batavia, Semarang
and Sourabaya could only be fed because rice was imported (from abroad) .
The same applied to the already mentioned towns of Sumatra. Wh en in May
1947 th e Chinese consul at Medan paid an official visit to the Republican
headquar'ters at Pematang 'Siantar, to ask for assistance on this point for the
Chinese inha'bitants of Medan, the Republican Gavernor Hasan informed him
that no rice would be provided unless a "tribute" was first paid to the
"Republic" . The T.R .1. went even furth er, demanding fire-arms in exchange
for rice.
In the interests of th e population, which was gravely afflicted by these
food difficulties (prices in Java had risen to f 4.- and f 5.- per kg., and
in Sumatra to f 8.- to f 10. - per kg.) the Netherlands Indies Government
with utmost patience continued th e negotiations.
In the latter part of May 1947 the Netherlan,ds Indies Government at last
seemed 'to be successful. In connection with the negotiations on the lifting of

105
the Australian shipping ban the Republican Minister of Food, Dr. Soedarsono,
said he was prepared at on ce to deliver 70,000 tons of rice-in exchange for
part of the goods waiting in Australia to be shipped to Indonesia-'to the
Netherlands Indies Governm ent, for the areas und er its con trol.
This, again, was a promise that was never etfectuated.

This resulted in there being no rice reserves in the areas under Netherlands
control when the poli ce action was started.
5. What has been said above sub 3 and 4 c1early shows that the
Republican Governm ent-all the efforts of the Netherlands Governl11'è nt not-
withstanding-continued obstinately to refuse to supply any food at all to
deficit areas under Netherlands con trol.
The rice imported by the Netherlands authorities therefore had to be
distributed for consumption immediately, sa that wh en the police action started
there were na rice reserves at all in the Netherlands controlled areas.

Also af ter the police action the food position in Indonesia was precarious.
6. After the police action several important rice centres of Java, to wit:
in West Java: Krawang, Tjikampek, Pamanoekan & Tjiasem lands and
Cheribon;
in East Java: Besoeki, Probolinggo, Pasoeroean and Loemadjang, were
brought under Netherlands control.
Be/are the war (1942') these rice een tres yielded a surplus of about
450,000 tons of ri ce per annum . An excess of this magnitude was not expected
for 1947, as it was known that under Republican management the rice nops
greatly diminished. (vide Dr. Gani's figures quoted above) as a result of the
following factors:
negligence and sometimes even destruction of irrigation works, canals,
etc.
absence of effective agricultural instruction (improvement of methods,
selection of seed, etc.).
the occurrence of pests (rats), due to omission of the necessary preventive
measures.
the shortage of ox·e n needed for the cultivation of the rice fields.
availability of fewer workers.
erosion due to reckless deforestation .
Besides by these factors, the situation was also affected by the shortage
of expert technical staff for responsible posts in the "Republic" and the con-
siderable decrease in the acreage of land under cultivation for producing food
crops.
The following figures are derived from data published by the Republican
Government with referenoe to Central and East Java.

Centra1 Java (in hectares)

Year Padi Maize Cassave Soya beans

1937/41 1,432,550 685,067 409,390 122,895
1942 1,435,495 764,112 426,167 137,620
1944 1,180,660 489,235 366,293 68,122
1945 1,043,588 562,630 276,651 52,098
1946 1,050,046 400,707 277,488 70,054

106
 East Java not including Madura (in hectares)

1937;41 1,130,229 988,403 319,042 262,604

1942 1,108,152 1,044,067 307,382 324,895
1944 1,070,276 561,294 225,758 104,838
1945 914,166 626,670 109,794 80,304
1946 939,119 509,931 171,338 163,204
This serious decrease in the area of cultivated land, therefore, conti-
nued - with the exception of that planted with soya beans - af ter the
Japanese capitulation. The reasons for this continuation are suggested to
be the following:
a. the unrest prevailing in agricultural areas.
b. enforced delivery by the producer of part of his crop to official Repu-
blican bodies (as for collection of rice for I ndia) and to Republican
authorities.
C. shortage of labour ow ing to recruiting for official and semi-official
Republican fighting organizations.
These factors account for the fact th at in the year 1946 the Republican
Government, notwithstanding all the facilities placed at its disposal by India
in the shape of means of transport, lighters and also experts, proved
unable to supply 55,000 tons of rice (gabah) to India. Mr. Sjahrir's state-
ment recently made during an interview with the press in India, to the
effect th at 300,000 tons of rice were in the harbours awaiting shipment to
India, which rice was stated to have been unlawfully confiscated by the
Neth erlands authorities, is therefore manifestly incorrect. The facts are that,
after the police action, not more than 5,000 tons of rice (including gabah,
calcutated on rice equivalent) was found, while there was about 45,000 tons of
rice in the various rice-hulling mills.
In this connection we may cite a letter written by the representative of
the Government of India's Ministry of Food, dated 27th June 1947 to the
Ministry of Economie Affairs, trom which it appears that early in Jun e
about 6,000 tons of padi and rice was held in readiness in the harbours of
Cheribon, Probolinggo and Banjoewangi for shipment to India. (Note: a unit
of padi is equivalent to about 55/l00 unit of rice) .
One of the effects of the combination of factors referred to sub 6 above,
was th at when the various rice centres in Java came under Netherlands
control the prospects of being able to collect sufficient surpluses to relieve
the deficit areas were dubious. After the police action the Netherlands
authorities accordingly at on ce set about purchasing all available stocks so
as to be able improve the distribution of food for the so difficult "pat je-
klik" months (the months preeeding the riee harv est ).

7. Deterioration of food position aft e r the police actio.n as a result of

terrorization, destruction, etc.
Therefore, though the outlook when the W est and East Java rice-produ-
cing country was brought under Netherlands control was none too favoura-
bIe, it deteriorated as a result of the arson, terrorization, etc. organized, or
at least eneouraged, by the Republican Government during and af ter the
poliee action.
To this end the bands - operating under instructions trom Djokja -
coneentrated on the food stocks and rice-hulling mills. Thus, in West Java

107
near Tjikampek, Pegaden Baroe, Djatibarang and Indramajoe thousands of
tons of rice of the population or in the rice-hulling mills, were lost through
arson. In East Java the damage to food stocks was even greater: in the
district of Banjoewangi 18.000 tons of rice was destroyed and 5.000 tons of
rice carried off by T. N. I. gangs.
Innumerable rice-hulling mills were destroyed or bumt down. The
extent of this damage is evident in the following survey.

Total number Number destroyed Destroyed Condition .In Working

of rice or damaged during or damaged unknown order
hulling mills the war and during and
before the before police after po-
war action Iice action

West Java 238 38 102 33 65

Central Java 80 9 29 18 24
East Java 126 12 46 38 30
To these destructions must be added the measures of intimidation
towards the Indonesian population applied by the bands. For the result of
this was not only a shortage of labour for harvesting and transporting rice
(thus it is not possible at present to dispatch about 17.500 tons of gabah in
Djember awaiting shipment), but, moreover, the planting of rice for the new
erop is held up. In areas where law and order have not yet been entirely
restored, the "tani" is repeatedly driven off his fields, or' threatened with
death if he eultivates them. The danger that the deereased aereage of riee
land diminishes still more, is by no means imaginary. In iIIustration a state-
ment follows of the aereage planted in the regency of Krawang.
Regency of Krawang (78. 139 hectares).
Area in hectares Planted Percentage
Golongan I and I I 36,667 21,800 60
(section)
111 11,486 3,380 30
IV 15,574
" V 14,412
"
It is impossible to say what object the Republicans think is served by
this senseless terrorization, which sa greatly damages the interests of the
whole of Indonesia. For its aetion as referred to above is not in the firs~
plaee directed against the Netherlanders, but against the Indonesian popu-
lation, the Indonesian being almost entirely dependent on his rice, his staple
food, while he is the first to suffer wh en the crop is not harvested or the rice
not sown at the right time or in insufficient quantities .
Besides the Indonesian population, the Chinese are affected, as the great
majority of the riee hulling mills are Chinese property.

Importation of rice only partIy solves the problem.

8 . While the Netherlands Indies Food Stocks Fund continues the
purchase of all available rice, the Netherlands Indi es Government - at the
same time - endeavours to obtain as much rice as possible from abroad.
In this respect it is mainly dependent on the allocations of the Inter-

108
national Emergency Food Council. As, however, there is a world shortage
of riee, these allocations are not suffieient. Thus the Netherlands Indies
Government, upon application for 255.000 tons of rice for the first six months
of 1948 for the areas under its control (allowance was made for the home
production of these areas and the calculation based on a low ration ), recei-
ved an allocation of only 140.000 tons.
Accordingly, in the interests of the Indonesian people and disregarding
the high expenditure of foreign exchange involved, the Netherlands Indies
Government exerted every effort to buy rice obtained on I.:E.F.C. allocation
in other countries. Although af ter great trouble it has succeeded in obtaining
at high prices a few small shipments of rice in the Philippines, the U.S.A.
and Brazil, the total quantity received trom abroad will be barely suffieient
to maintain the target rat ion of 200 grammes per day per head until the next
harvest in May-August 1948.

Conclusion : economie aid to Republican Government at present impossible

9, Apart trom the fact that there is no reason to assume that the
Republican areas have a greater need of rice than those under Netherlands
control. it wiU be apparent from the above that - also as a result of
Republican action - it is at present impossible to help out the Rep:u blicans
by supplying rice trom Netherlands-held areas. What has been stated here
with regard to rice applies equally to other food crops, such as maize,
kedeleh (beans), cassava, etc.
The International Emergency Food Council will not be able to give
this assistance either, considering the world shortage of rice, while the
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East does not concern itselt with
providing food supplies.
Assistance by providing other commodities only obtainable by import
is made impossible by the precario us foreign exchange position of the
Netherlands Indies Government and by the extent of the needs of the ransacked
Indonesian population in the areas taken over since the police action.
The behaviour of the Republican Government even before the police
action has gre~tly retarded Indonesia's economie recovery; its ilIegal trad e
with other countries has cost many millions in precious foreign exchange
to Indonesia (vide Re C); now again it is the cause of large sums of foreign
exchange being expended on the import of rice, which would have been
unnecessary if the Republican Government had trom the outset co-operated
in improving the food situation, instead of giving tree rein to its destructive
te ndencies - mainly at the expense of the Indonesian population - upon
food stocks and food producing centres .
Re B. (Resumption of normal trade between the Republican areas and the
other parts of Indonesia).

Before the police action trade by land was encouraged by the Netherlands
Government.
10. In considering " commercial intercourse of the Republic with the
rest of Indonesia" a distinction must be made between trade by land (with
geographically adjacent parts of Java and Sumatra), and trade by sea, with
the other islands of the archipelago. This inter-insular trade will be dealt
with sub C. '

109
 Commercial intercourse between Republican areas of Java and Sumatra
and those under NetherIands con trol was seriously hampered by the food
blockade referred to sub A. AI ready before the concJusion of the Linggadjati
Agreement the NetherIands Governmént tried to change this state of affairs
by granting facilities as regards examination and transport. These efforts
were at last in so far successful that goods trains regularly ran between
Batavia and the Republican interior. These trains carried from RepubIican
areas charcoal, wood, tobacco, kedeleh and other inland produets to Batavia,
returning with textiles, medicine, manufactured goods, etc.
This gradually developed into a fairly lively trade. During the last
months before the police action the trains concerned shipped - in both
directions - upwards of ni ne million guilders worth of goods per month.
Besides this trade by train there was some bartering "from hand to
hand" of goods across the demarcation line at several places (e.g. at Modjo-
kerto in East Java) .

Stoppage of this trade by the Republican Government

11. Wh en, however, towards the end of May 1947 the Netherlands
Indies Government urged the RepubIican Government to abide by and impIe-
ment the Linggadjati Agreement, the latter began to "squeeze" th is trade,
bringing It he traffic by the goods trains al most to a standstill even before the
police action. With the poIice action the local exchange of goods came to
an end.

Resumption of this traffic is impossible because of terrorization etc. on the

part of the Republic.
12. Resumption of this traffic by land is impossible in the present
stage.
As long as the Republican Government contil1'ues to cncou rage its policy
of terrorization and intimidation, the development of normat trade relations
between the various districts of Java and Sumatra must be considered out of
the question.
Moreover su eh traffic would provide an opportunity to the Republicans
of conveying extremist elements to the Netherlands controlled areas in
order to increase the economie resistance of the roving bands operating in
these areas.
In the interests of the various groups of the population established in
its territories, incJuding Indonesians, Chinese and Europeans etc., the
Netherlands Undies Government is bound not to take any risks of th is nature.
The ex tent of the terrorization of citizens still prevaiIing in the Nether-
lands controlled areas can be best iIIustrated by some recent instanees.
In the month of October 1947 alone in the neighbourhood of Soeka-
boemi ten Soendan ese leaders were murdered, while fifty-two Soendanese
were abducted. Besides during th is same month one hunderd and twenty-
one houses of Indonesians we re looted or set fire to in the neighbourhood of
Soemedang.
. During the same month in the neighbourhood of Tasikmalaja six
Chmese were brutally murdered, while in the Krawang dis-triot fourteen rice-
hulling mills we re set fire t~.
Quite recently a ei reu lar letter of the Republic, dated 11 th November
1947 (Djocja), was distributed in Poerwakarta, in which it was stated that
110
the Dutch were going to withdraw, and in which the people were incited to
further sabotage; estates, plantations etc. shoulcl be prevented from opera-
ting and anyone working for or with the Dutch should be done away with.
On 22nd October uit. the planters Artz and Van Oent were murdered on
the Oambeng plantation near Bandoeng; early in November the manager of
the Bodjong-Oedeh plantation near Buitenzorg, van den Akker, was abducted
and killed.
These cases were folowed by the murders of the planters Sieberg of
Pasir Angin near Buitenzorg; Romswinckel of Tjikopo Zuid near Buitenzorg
and Ruhaak of the Nijkerk plantation near Medan.
Meanwhile during the ·month of November 1947 numerous attacks and
cases of arson took place, in West Java alone on no fewer than ten planta-
tions:
Pasir Karet near Buitenzorg attack
Tjikopo Zuid
Ooenoeng Oeulis " " "
arson
Djaja Negara "" Paroeng
" Koeda attack
Ooenoeng Anaga Poerwakarta arson
Maswati "
Ooenoeng Soesoetoe " " "
Bajabang " "
Kembang iKoening " " "
Tjibening " "
attack
" "
Between 4 and 19 November 1947 the plantations in the Pamanoekan
and Tjiasem lands were attacked as many as eleven times (vide attached
annex).
Re C (Decontrol of foreign and inter-insular commerce of the Republic ).

Regulations and restrictions regarding sea traffic before the police action
(regulations of 28-1-'47)
13. In elucidation of the regulations of January 1947 regarding commer-
cial traffic by sea - regulations which the Republican Government, with
complete disregard for the actual facts, has repeatedly attempted to repre-
sent as an economie blockade - it seems advisable to outline the situation
as it had developed in Indonesia before the war.
The inter-insular goods traffic in Indonesia and the goods traffic
between Indonesia and foreign countries were subject to various restrictions.
The most important relevant regulations are: the Crisis Export Ordinance
(Crisis Uitvoer Ordonnantie) of 1939, Government Oazette (Staa't sblad)
No. 658 and the Crisis Export Regulation (Crisis Export Verordening) of the
same year, Government Oazette (Staatsblad) No. 660, and the pursuant
executive regulations, together with the Exchange Ordinance (Deviezen
Ordonnantie) of 1940, Oovernment Oazette (Staatsblad) No . 205, and the
Exchange Regulation (Deviezen Verordening) of 1940, Oovernment Oazette
(Staatsblad) No. 291.
The aim of these regulations was to bring about a system which made
it possible in the interests of the community (e.g. with regard to food sup-
plies) to impose restrictions on the commercial intercourse between the
various islands of the Indian Archipelago, the purpose of exchange control
being, in the interest of purchases necessary for the community, to make the

111
best possible use, through an exchange fund, of currencies obtained in
foreign countries by the export of goods.
While post-war conditions of scarcity of commoditities and acute shor-
tage of foreign exchange made it imperative that these regulations should ~e
most rigidly enforced, the Republican Government made use of these condI-
tions apparently for political reasons by conveying, to the detriment of the
inhabitants of certain localities, scarce products to other parts of! the Nether-
lands Indies, and by exporting commodities to foreign countries whieh we re
urgently needed in the country itself. This may be illustrated by the consi-
derable republican exports of rice, sugar, coco-nut oi! and copra, ' all artieles
whieh were needed by the Indonesian community.
This i1legal trade, whieh is counter to the interests of 'the community,
moreover misused the circumstance that long after the japanese 'occupation
considerable quantities of arms and ammunition were stored in various places
in the Netherlands Indies, by supplying arms andl other ' articles of th is nature '
to other districts, where these supplies in conjunction with the infiltration of
Republiean fighting groups increased public insecurity. '
In this connection. we may point to military infiItrations in'Bali, Celebes,
South and East Borneo. Repeatedly Republican proas, heavily laden 'with
machine-guns, carbines and handgrenades attempted to cross fromCheribon,
Toeban and ' Probolinggo to Borneo and Celebes.
In addition the T.R.I. regularly planned raids, on Bali trom Banjoewangi,
of which occasionally Balinese in kampongs (Tabanan) ' were the victims.
Adjacent foreign countries, which in many cases insufficiently controlled
their exports, unfortunately added to the impairment of public security by
the import, in exchange for commodities exported by the RepubIicans, of
military and semi-military articles. '
Finally it should be pointed out that a state of economie disorganization
existed in the ' Netherlands Indies after the japanese occupation, because
many owners of Western concerns and plantations had been expelled from
their properties by the japanese and the majority interned, these owners
being unable to return after the Japanese surrender owing to the unsettled
conditions prevailing at the time, As a resuIt large quantities of plantation
products had accumulated in the interior, whence they could easily be
removed by unauthorized traders.
In spite of numerous protests trom the Netherlands Indies Government,
the Republican Government has not only countenanced this ilIieit tra de, but
even encouraged it, so that vast quantities of these products were smuggled
to foreign countries where, as a rule, they were sold far below their real
value. Apart from its iIIegitimate character this export trade is to be condem-
ned because it has seriously injured the exchange position, at the expense of
the population, who received inadequate supplies in exchange for valuable
Indonesian products. Moreover these imported supplies mostly consisted of
commodities which were either unfit for use or not of primary importance,
In order to put a stop to these intolerable conditions, the Netherlands
Indies Government, after several earnest but vain attempts to arrive at a
solution in consuItation with he Republican Government, on 28th january
1947 put into operation a complete import, export and transport system.
The regulations of 28th january 1947, which maintain the exchange
control system, are based on the following principles:
a. the import, export and transport system must never hinder the distribu··

112
 t1on 'ûf 'food ' supplies'; on the contrary, wherever possible it shouJd be
conducive to a better delivery of primary food supplies;
b. the transport of scarce native products must be made subject to asystem
of permits; , '
c. transport and export of military and semi-military goods, as weil as of
goods required for the industrial rehabilitation must be partly prohibited,
partly be possible only with permission trom the competent militaryand
civil authorities';
d; Ure transportation and export of estate produce cannot be permitted in
those cases where the interests of the rightful owners are prejudiced
because the latter have no say in the transactions concerned;
e. impodation of military and semi-military goods is either to be prohibited
or to be made subject to a permit.
When these measures - which 'are entirely in keeping with the
sovereign rights over Indian waters exercised by the Netherlands - are
viewed in the light of existing pre-war regulations and the most serious
economic plight of Indonesia at the end of the war, the absolute necessity
of these measures is at once evident, the more so as apparently the Republi-
can Government began to make use of the prevalent chaotic conditions to
take "economico - politicaI" steps at the expense of the seriously impover-
ished Indonesian community.
That this further impoverishment of the Indonesian community for the
sake of a "fighting fund" in foreign exchange, and mostly for the good of a
small group of privileged officials (both civil and military) is no empty
phrase, may be illustrated by the figures of the calculated extent of trade
outside Netherlands control between the Republican areas and Malaya and
Singapore. 1n the period from the ]apanese capitulation to the end of
November 1947 th is "trade" resuIted in a nett [osS- of foreign exchange to
Indonesia of roughly Straits dollars 265,000,000.-. The illicit exports, Le.
the unlawful exportation of good at the expense of rightful owners, amoun-
ted during the same period to not less than Straits; dollars 115,000,000.-.
Measures of 28-1-'47 always applied in the most lenient possible manner.
14. In order to interfere as little as possible with the commercial rela-
tions between the Republicans and foreign countries, a regulation was issued
by the Director of Economic Affairs, on the same date as the above-men-
tioned measures, stating that, in so far as Republican controlled areas we re
concerned, in deviation from the regulations affecting foreign exchange, the
expert of al goods, with the exception of estate products and goods destined
for industrial rehabilitation, was permitted. .
It should be remarked that this genera I permission involved a conside..,
rable loss to Indonesia of foreign exchange. For in this way a continuous flow
of goods was withdrawn trom the ,Indies currency-system, while as a result of
the very disadvantageous basis of exchange immoderate profits feil to foreign
traders. '
That consequently th is commerce between the Republican areas and
the Malayan peninsuIa remained considerable, will appear from the following
figures, ,
(in millions of Str. Dollars) Exports to Imports from
peninsuIa peninsuIa
2nd half of 1946 167 i9 '
Ist half of 1947 132 43

113
 As appears from the principles mentiorted above sub a - e, the impor-
tation of al goods to Republican areas is entirely unrestricted in so far, of
course, as it does not involve military or semi-military goods.
The above-mentioned import and export system therefore does not in
any way interfere with the economical machinery of the Republican Govern-
ment, in so far as it is on a legitimate basis. The same applies to the inter-
insular traffic.
The only restriction of any importance, which applies not only to the
Republican Government, but also to the territories under Netherlands control,
is that t-he transport of agricultural food produce such as rice and maize, is
subject to a system of permits in order to ensure the best possible distribution
of food supplies in the interests of the Indonesian population, who mainly
depend on these products.
When therefore the Republican Government wishes to export from the
territories under lts control, rice and maize to other localities in the Archipel-
ago, a permit is required from the Netherlands lndies Government (Depart-
ment of Economic Aff~irs); in so far as normal, and not "political", supplies
of food are concerned, this permit is always granted.
When in May 1947 the Republican Government wished to export rice
and maize from East Java to areas where there was a shortage, and objected
to the delay expected from the permit-system, the Netherlands Indies Govern-
ment immediately took steps to prevent delay by ordering the Royal Nether-
lands Navy not to deflect the transport ships to some port for examination,
but to conduct a superficial examination at sea so that the ships could
continue towards their destination.
The standpoint adopted by the Netherlands Indies Government with
re gard to food suppIies, and to which it still adheres, appears from a telegram
sent in this connection by the Department of Economic Affairs to its rep re-
sentative at Soerabaya on 22nd March 1947, which reads,
,,338 In consequence our regulation 28 January transport ri ce maize unoc-
cupied Java to Madura subject permits BUZ (i.e. export office)
" however unintended hinder traffic stop Decided following procedure
" colon Navy stops proas, Commander wires Navy Commander Soera-
" baya, latter each case telephones 10r your permission stop Request
" your cooperation permission always grant readily enable Navy Com-
" mander promptly order release of stopped proas".
" On this point no more complaints have been made by the Republican
Government.
For a correct appreciation of the position at that time - i.e. before the
police action - one should bear in mittd the strong contrast existing between
the attitude of the Netherlands Indies Governmen with regard to food sup-
plies, and the attitude adopted by he Republican Government.
Although the Netherlands Indies Government had abundant reason to
suspect that the Republican Government made an improper use of the ship-
ments of rice permitted, by aUotting this rice exclusively to the T.R.I.
(T. N. 1.) insteadof distributing it to the population, or by smuggling this
ri ce - e.g. from Madura - to foreign countries, the Netherlands Indies
Government, as explained above, tried to meet the Republican Goverilment's
wishes as much as possible.
,The Republican Government, on the contrary, maintained the food
blockade by land (vide Re A.) ~ while furthermore RepubJican pubJicatioils
which feil into the hands of Netherlands authorities, show that before the

114
police action the Republican Government also attempted to prevent, with all
the means at its disposal, the transportation of ri ce by sea to the areas
under Netherlands contro!. Thus in the course of 1946 the coast of Japara
was closed by the Republican Government to prevent the existing smuggling
trade trom selling food stuffs to the "opponents" . The Republican Govern-
ment further ordered a "policy of restriction" to be caried out in the Residen-
cy of Pekalongan with re gard to the export of goods (read, food stuffs) to
"enemy occupied territori es".

Same leniency applied by Royal Navy in its con trol.

15. The Royal Navy during its control at sea - for its duties included
the enforcement of the regulations of 28th January 1947 - was equally
mindful of the interests of the freighters and owners concerned.
The ships stopped for control we re therefo re examined as quickly as
possible and immediately released when no infringem ents were found.
In some cases (vide above, food shipments) the examination was even
reduced to a minimum, and permission was granted telegraphically.
AIthough the rights of the Navy to exercise police con trol at sea are
fully acknowledged in International Law, and although according to interna-
tional rules the extra-expenses incurred by the exe rcise of these rights
(detour expenses, anchorage fees, loading costs etc.) are charged entirely
to the ship's account, the Netherlands Indies Government has gone so far
as to charge to th eir account the unloading and stowing expenses resulting
hom the examination of the cargo wh en no infringements we re committed.

Australian "shipping-ban".

16. In spite of the facilities described above, the regulations of

28th January 1947 remained objectionable in the eyes of Republicans who
apparently feared to lose their profitable smuggling trade.
As a result, even after the Linggadjati Agreement had been concluded,
the Republican Governm ent stipulated that it would only request the Austra-
Iian Government, or at least the "Union" concerned, to lift the " ban", when
beforehand the regulations of 28th January 1947 had been withdrawn.
When, ho wever, the Australian Government sent repres entatives to
Indonesia (Batavia) to settle the matter, the Republican Government could
not but relinquish this standpoint. The followin g facts, howeve r, will show
that this was only an apparent change.
After discussions had bee n held on 10th and 12th May betwec n rep re-
sentatives of the Netherlands Indies Government and the Republican Govern-
ment concerning the Iifting of the Australian shipping ban, ari agreement was
concluded on 24th May 1947 between Mr. van Hoogstraten, Director of Eco-
nomic Affairs, and Or. Gani. The purport of th e agreement was that -
immediately after the ban had been Iifted, to which effect a request had
been made both by the NetherJands Indies Government and the Republican
Government - the goods ready for shipment in Australia would be conveyed
to Indonesia in ships that were at the disposal of the Netherlands Indies
Government.
The goods would th en be divided, the part destined for the " republican
territory" to be unloaded at a republican-held port, in exchange for an
equivalent quantity of rice to be delivered by the Republican Government.

11 5
 On the part of the Netherlands the agreement was sttictly observed,
complete lists of the goods in question having been transmittedto the
Republican Government to facilitate their selection; two ships were also
immediately directed to Australia for freightage .
On the part of the Republican Government the Agreement was acted
upon in so far that on 31 st May 1947 Dr. Soedarsono offered 70,000 tons of
rice in exchange for the goods assigned to the Republican Government.
However, no further developments took place. Already in June 1947 at the
Sobsi congress at Malang the Republican Government urged the reinstitution
of the "ban" . Immediately after the police action had begun, the Republican
Government even declared in an official radio message to Australia that it
was not desirous to have the goods in question shipped, this in spite of the
fact th at the Netherlands .Indies Government in its Notes of 20th and 22nd
July 1947 had expressly undertaken fully to honour the agreement of 24th
May 1947.

Situation at sea after police action (shipping ban).

17. From what has been stated above it must be concluded that before
the police action the Republican Government had almost complete freedom
with regard to legal commerce and that it has continually made or attempted
to make the worst possible use of this freedom .
In view of this attitude on the part of the Republican Government, and
in view of the fact that the coastal waters we re rendered unsafe by brigan-
dage, while in addition it was necessary to prevent arms etc. being put
ashore, tDP. Royal Netherlands Navy was compelled - simultaneously with
the police action - temporarily to close to shipping the North coast of Java
and the greater part of the East coast of Sumatra.

Mitigation of this shipping ban.

18. At the earliest possible moment, however, the Netherlands Indies
G0vernment mitigated these measures by once again allowing shipping to
proceed to certain regions where the population came to feel detrimental ef-
iects of these measures, though a mild system of con trol continued to be
imposed.
'In this way various ports on the North and East coasts of Java have
successively been opened to shipping (for other ports this measure depends
i.a. on the sweeping of old minefields ), while as early as 13th September
1947 the import, under certain conditions, of foodstuffs, textiles, medical sup-
plies and salt was permitted to Bengkalis and Bagan-siapi-api, as weil as
the export of timber and saIted fish respectively.
On 25th September shipping was also permitted via Batavia to Telok
Betong, and on I st November, restricted to certain goods, between Bagan-
siapi-api and Medan.
Fur.ther mitigation of the measures taken is, however, seriously impeded
by contmuous attempts on the part of the Republican Government to frus-
trate legitimate commerce, notably by repeated attempts to smuggle arms into
the territory under their con trol by way of the waters re-opened to shipping.
Annexes: two.
Batavia, 8 December 1947.
116
 "INCIDENTS" ON THE PAMANOEKAN & T]IASEM LANDS
NOVEMBER 4th-19th 1947.

Date:
4th Nov. All mandoers returned to Soebang from Tjigaroekgak, where
they were afraid to remain, owing to intimidation and threatening letters
(said to be from T.R.I.) Some 500 T.R.I. reported to be in neighbourhood
of Serangsari.
Estate. military guard sent there.
Assistant's house Tjipeundeuj Estate burned out, and Indonesian assis-
tant tied up (but otherwise not hurt) . Cupwashing shed on same estate
burned.
5th Nov. Road PoerwakartalSegalaherang closed for reasons of security.
Kampoeng house Tjipeundeuj burned out.
Indonesian Assistant's house (Tjihamboeloe division) burned out.
Kapok and rice destroyed.
7th Nov. Mandoer, Loerah, wakil-Ioerah kidnapped at Manjingsal: 1 bag
ri ce stolen..
No labour on Soemoerbarang.
8th Nov. 18 bales Kina, f.3.60 and 100 sarongs stolen at Boekanagara
and godown burned down.
Watchman at Soekamantri (7 Km. N. Tjipeundeuj) murdered (he had
. acted as guide to Dutch sol di ers when pig shooting).
9th Nov. Head mandoer and watchman at Tjipeundeuj reported missing:
2 bodies reported found in river. Note found on post warning people not
to work for the "Blanda" - No labour on estate.
10th Nov. ;At Poerwadadi, action between Chinese guard and T.R.I.: 2 Chi-
nese, 1 Jap, 1 T.R.I. killed.
Tjipeundeuj (Gandaria) office stores, patjols, saws, sacks, rice, etc.,
looted and office burned. No labour in gardens. On, Eastern Block
(Majingsal, Soemoerbarang and Tjigaroekgak), work in gardens stop-
ped because of looting, arson and intimidation.
14th Nov. jWangoenradja state office broken open: one old typewriter
desttoyed.
15th Nov. 2 kampoeng houses near Pasirboengoer (Pamblengan) burnt
down.
17th Nov. Two kapok sheds at Tjikaoem set on fire reportedly by Indo-
nesian with petrol bottle): 35 tons kapok destroyed, 1 shed seriously
damaged. '
18th ~ov.. 8 corps es reported to have been found in river near Majasoeta
with ",doorgesneden hals". (thraats cut).
19th Nov. Tandjoengan kampoeng (near Soekamandi) set on fire: 3 houses,
1 shed destroyed, 2 sheds damaged; inhabitants had all fled.
Work in gardens practically stopped, GandarialTjiomas (Tjipeundeuj).
no workpeople.
(Signed) C. Jackson.
24-11-'47.

117
 "INCIDENTS" ON THE PAMANOEKAN & TJIASEM LANDS
2nd-6th DECEMBER 1947.
Dec. 2nd. Pasirbo engoer Estate. In the estate kampoeng of Majasoeta
Idivision, 1 Assistant's house, 6 mandoer houses, 4 coolie houses, 2 wa-
roengs, 1 godown were bumt down by a band of about 50 terrorists,
armed with big knives, and using a Petromax lamp.
Three typewritten warnings against collaboration with the "Blanda",
signed "Tentara Siloeman", we re left behind .
All estate work in the adjoining gardens (Tandjoengan /Waladin) was
stopped through lack of labour.
Dec. 3rd. APamanoekan & Tjiasem train On the 60 cm. steam line hetween
Manjingsal and Tjigaroekgak estate was ambushed by a party armed
with rif Jes and hand grenades.
Three Indonesian passen gers had flesh wounds from bull ets, two we re
hit bygrenade splinters, two were hurt when jumping oft the train.
The attack was from both sides of the track.
Dec. 3rdj4th. Pasirboengo er Estate. The 3 Kampoeng houses at Pablengan
which had remained intact af ter the attack on 15th November, were
destroyed by fire. About 000 sisal plants in the neighbouring field were
aIso destroyed, by slashing.
Dec. 4th/5th. Pasirmoentjang Estate. The Assistant's house, 1 go down with
rice and cocoa, 2 other godowns, the estate office were destroyed by fire
(Full report not yet received). It was reported th at the firing heard in
Soebang during the night started with two shots into the P .M.C.'s room.
Dec. 5th j6th. Pasirboengoer Estate. The Assistant's house and two kam-
poeng houses on Koemendoeng division were bumt.

(Signed) C. Jackson .
6-12-'47.

From. Lt. Gen. Sir Montagu Stopford

KBE, CB., DSO., MC.
H.Q. Allied Forces, N.E.I.
Dated 16 April 1946.
No. 2009j29/Q.
Dear Sir,
Your attention has in the past been drawn to the food situation in Java
and especially how it affects the Indonesian population of those areas occupied
by the Allied Forces. Your liability to provide food for these lndonesians has
already been given public recognition by you and, while promising to send
in supplies you have in fact unfortunateJy sa far faited to send in supplies in
any rice into any of these areas.
As aresult the population has been fed from Allied resources, and mainly
from rice stocks bought and imported by the Dutch Authorities. These supplies,
as you are weil aware, have been distributed equally without regard to natio-
nality.
At the same time the World food situation is now so grave th at it is
impossible to expect other countries to send rice to the N.E.J., especially as I
118
understand you have stated recently that you have 500.000 tons of ricesurplus
and available for export to India. .
Therefore invite your co-operation to ensure an adequate and immediate
distribution of this surplus rice in Soerabaja, Semarang, Bandoeng, Buiten-
zorg and Batavia areas. If you should require any assistance to transport
the rice, either by sea or land, I shall be very willing to help you. I suggest
the only arrangemen'ts required are those to enable the ri ce to be brought
from the present dumps to the areas mentioned. There, the rice can be
handed over to my food committees which, as you are aware, are responsible
for the equal distribution of all supplies.
In view of the urgency of the situation, will you please let me have a
reply at your very earliest convenience.

Yours sincerely,

To: Dr. Soetan Sjahrir.

Cc.: Graaf v. Bylandt.

119
 MEMORANDUM

on the

BONDOWOSO-INCIDENT
NETHERLANDS DELEGATIO~ Secretariat
Ag. No. 562 jCOD/Cor."
Issue Nr. 64.

Batavia, 30th December 1947.

Sir,
Further to my letter of t st D~cember last I have the honour to transmit
to you a memorandum concerning the death ot 46 Indonesian prisoners in
the course of a journey from Bondowoso to Soera:baya on 23rd Novt;mber
1947.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo

Chairman of the Netherlands
Delegation . .

To the Cairman of the

Security Council's
Committee of Oood Offices
en the lndonesian Question.

MEMORANDUM ON TUE TRANSPORT OF PRISONERS fROM

BONDOWOSO TO SOERABAYA ON 23rd NOVEMBER 1947.
With reference to this Delegation's letter of t st December 1947 the
following additional information may be brought to your cognizance with
regard to the deplorabIe incident which took place on 23rd November, as a
result of which 46 people met their death.
An investigation into the circumstances under w ich the transportation
taok place was at on ce ordered by the territorial commander concerned, who
is also the commanding officer at Soerabaya. The following facts can now
be given as a result of this investigation.
To relieve the prison at Bondowoso, 100 prisoners detained th ere were
transported to Soeraba ya en 23rd N ovem'ber t 947 .
. Three good trucks were used for the transport. The number of prisoners
per truck was not too large. JWhen cIosed, however, the trucks had insufficient
ventilation. At 5.30 hours the prisoners were taken to the station and entrained,
after which the doors were shut. Contrary to general usage, through gross
Ilegligence the doors were not opened at the stations on the way, nor the
prisoners provided with food and water until the arrival at Soerabaya, some
13 hours later.
There it proved that in the last truck all the occupants, 38 in number,
had died; in the second truck, which contained 31 prisoners, 8 had diedj in
the front truck, which conveyed 32 prisoners, all proved to be alive on arrival.
The difference must be attributed to the tact that ventilation in the last truck
was extremely poor, in the second truck insufficient, while only the first truck
was adequately ventilated.

123
 Jnso far -as the cause of 'death could be a~~e~taJned post mortem, and in
view of the statements made by the survivors, it must he assumed that death
was -ca:tlseçl ,byhèat stroke (warmtestuwing) and lack of oxygen,.
A sergeant-major and four marines were in charge of the transport.
The enquiry has shown that before the departure of the train inadequate
instructions to see to proper care of the prisoners during the journey we re
issued. Apart from that, the guards are charged _with _not looking aft er the
prisoners on their own initiative during the journey, in particular with regard
to ventilation and supplying them with water at stations on the way.
The soldiers and officers responsible for the incident will be committed
for trial shortly. In view of the responsible battalion commander's rank, the
case will have to be tried by the High Military Court of justice in the Nether-
lands. : - -
Without : anticipating the findings of the competent court, it may be
stated on the strength of the ,d ata at present available th at there seems no
d6Ubtthat this tragic occurrence must be ascribed to a number of factors,
including gross neglicence, insufficient sense of responsihility, the excessive
heat on that particular day and possible other contributory causes which are
still under investigation. -
The Army Command at onee took eifective measures to prevent a recur-:
rence of such a tragic event.

Bafavia, 30th December -1947.

124
 MEMORANDUM

on

ALLEGED

NETHERLANDS BREACHES & VIOLATIONS

OF THE TRUCE OF 4 AUGUST 1947

NETHERLÄNDS DELEGATION
Bat,avÎla, 10 January 1948.

Sir,
On December 13 the Republican Ministry of information issued a state-
ment on the subject of the precent cease fire discussions, to which statement
a list was appended of pretended most outstanding breaches and violations
by the Netherlands forces of the truce of August 4th 1947.
I have the honour to transmit herewith a commentary on this list, in which
information is given relative to these pretended violations.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient servanf,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch .

To
The Chairman of the Security Council's Committee
of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question.

COMMENTARY ON TUE LIST OF MAJOR INFRINGEMENTS OF TUE

CEASE FIRE AFTER IST NOVEMBER 1947 AS PUBLISUED BY TUE
REPUBLICAN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

I . The actions indicated by the Republican Government in its text as mop-

ping up operations and actions to extend the territory are hereafter
considered one by one.
2. First of all it should be remarked that these actions are the logical con-
scquence of the Netherlands standpoint th at in the areas delimited by
the so-called van Mook-line, the Netherlands Indies Government is and
remains responsible for law, order and security.
3. The data provided by jhr. van Vredenburch during 'ihe 6th meeting of
the ;Special Committees on board the USS R'~nviIIe on 9th December last,
c1early show that a great many acts of injustice are still being perpetrated
in the areas occupied by the Netheriands, only too often on the instigation
of Republican authorities who do not hesitate to use brigands and mur-
derers in order 'io spread unrest and harass the population.
4. Witha few exceptions all the actions denounced by the Republican
Government took place within the so-caIIed Van Mook-Iine. In the
exceptional cases where action was taken ou'tside this line sound motives
for doing so existed, as will appear from what is said bel ow.
Re 1 & 2.
5. The actions described under numbers 1 and 2 were carriect out by air...
planes against the headquarters of the TN ( at BAND jARNEGARA,
which was held responsible for the laying of mines in ,the Residencies
of PEKALONGAN and BANjOEMAS. The action was a punitive measure
against the headquarters concerned and was effective in that no mines
were (aid for a considerable time after.

127
 Re 9-13 incl. and 16-18 incl.
6; Referènce is made ·t6 the me~orandum of the Nether:lands Delegation
on the development of the military situation in Madoera since 4th August
1947.
. 7. From the examination of the Commander of the 35th Regiment of the
l'NI, Chqndra Hasan, it appeared that he had never received any official
. . order _regarding the cease fire. Having heard rumours ·about .it he had
asked for instructions, but never received any other directions than the
order of 30th September 1947 .
. 8. Charidra Hasan, therefore, ordered several attacks. This explains the
unrest prevailing in the island before the occupation was ·completed.
9 Áfter the occupation the administration of the island was carried on by
practically all the officials appointed by the Republican Oovernment.
Re 3.
10. KOLEtLET was occupied neither before nor after Sth November; on Sth
November there was a clash between patrols 2 km NW. of KOLELET;
there we re indications that it had been visited by unruly elem e nt~ prior
to 5th November 1947 and plundered.
Re 4.
11. Action against BOENGBOELAN was opened on 19th November 1947;
at first there was some opposition which ceased later.
· Re 5.
12. POENTEN was re-occupied on 6th November 1947; this measure was
taken to put a stop to the almost daily firing on BAT OE, which had
been occupied by Netherlands troops before 4th August 1947. It is point~d
out that POENTEN had temporarily been occupied by Neiherlands troops
before 4th August 1947 during the advance from TRETES to BATOE.
Re 6.
13. Action was taken beca-use from; the TNI headquarters there, actions were
led against the Netherlands post of TANOGEUNO, while these head-
quarters were also held responsible for frequent firing on patrols and
vehicles between TANGOEUNG and SOEKANEGARA.
Re 7.•
i4. MA~t APOERA (South Sumatra) lies within the van Mook-Iine and had
been patrolled by Netherlands troops before 4th August 1947. From
MARTAP:OERA and the area NE of it infiltrations were carried out into
the OOAN region,causing great unrest especially in BATOERAD JA,
in the neighbourhood of which mines were also laid. .
Since . the occupation of MARTAPOERA, BATOERADJA is quiet.

Re 8.
l5. Tlie incident mentioned sub 8 took piace as foiJows. An R.P.-vessel was
fired at from a wooden structure on the coast near PASIAN. · The fire
· was returned: ( R.P. boats only carry machineguns and 4 cm. gun ) .
· Re :14 and .15. ·
16. These actions took place to restore law, order ànd security.

128
 Re 19.
17. The facts reported are not correct. On 20 November 1947 2 Pipercubs
were flying NW. of Tandjoeng Poera when they were fired at from rifles
and automatic weapons. A few -hand grenades were thrown at the snipers.

Re 20.
18. On 24 November 1947 there was no action in the neighbourhood of Paron,
but there was some activity about 5 km to the East.

Re 21.
19. The place Dares is not know n ; on the date reported therewas a fight
about 3 km S. of Goemel en (NW. of Gombong) , which is weil within
the van Mook-Jine.

Re 22.
20. Nothing is known of this alleged exchange of fire.

Re 23.
21 . In the neigh\;Jourhood of Soemowono action repeatedly had to be taken
against opposing sections and minelayers. Various vehicles struck mines
in that neighbourhood.
To put an e nd to this, on 25 November we occupied Tegaron in the
direction of Kaloran, whence the activity of the opposing forces originated.
The docum ei1t of the Republican Ministry of Information does not say
th at approximately at that time the nei g hbourhood of Soemowono was
subjected to artillery fire!

Re 24, 25 and 27. .

22. SW. of Modjokerto repeated clashes occurred . It should be noted that
the frontline concerned here existed before 21 july 1947, but the Repub-
lican forces continued carrying out harassing actions even af ter the
previous truce was concluded. For instance, they continued to destroy
bridges with the object of hampering the evacuation of Chinese from
Djombang to Modjokerto.

Re 26, 28 and 29.

23. On the Tjerme front the Netherlands troops have never taken off.ensive
action ; their activities were restricted solely to driving oH hostile troops
trying to ensconce themselves too near to Netherlands posts, which con-
stituted a danger.

Re 30, 32, 35 and 36.

24. East of Demak repeated action had to be taken against hostiIe elements
crossing the van Mook-Iine. In this area many mines were laid causing
severa\ casualties to the Netherlands side.

Re 31.
25. Netherlands warships patrol Netherlands territorial waters. Whereas only
a sovereign state can have territoria\ waters the republican Government
cannot claim any authority whatever over any part of (he sea .

129
 Re 33 and 34.
26. As far as we can find out no action was carried out on 6th December '47
in the proximity of Tjikoepa. However, on 5 December 1947 a Netherlands
section was fired at W. of Tjikoepa, upon which this fire was returned.
27. Conclusion.
a. All the Netherlands measure~ taken were either defensive or taken in
order to put an end to intolerable conditions;
b. In no cases is there any question of aggression toobtain extension
of territory beyond the van Mook line.
c. According to paragraph 2 of the Republican document, the Republican
Government on 4th August 1947 issued an order to the "armed forces
civil administration and the population who were fighting shoulder
to shoulder with the army, to standfastand cease all hostilities"!
From the numerous incontestably proven infringements of this order
by Republicans since that date, it may be concluded, however, that:
ei~her the Republican "armed forces, civil administration and the
population" do not obey the order issued by their Government,
or the Republican Government itself was of the opinion that the
Security Council 's Resolution of Ist August 1947 only referred
to the issuing of orders and not to their observance, as may be
exemplified, for instance, by General Soedirman's order to the
Commander of the Troops of Madoera, dated 30th September
1947.
d. The allegation in paragraph 5 of the document already referred to,
"the Dutch have suggested an immediate cease fire, but in fact this
would only be a limited cease fire", is not entirely in accordance with
what was really stated by Jhr. van Vred-: nburch (vide 3rd paragraph
of page 3 of the stencilled copy of Jhr. van Vredenburch 's speech at
the 6th meeting of the Special Committee on board U.S.S . "Renville").
In the speech it was only suggested th at "the Republican Government
should inform all troops and civilians thai although there is as yet
no complete cease fire, that consequently rOPPOSING MILITARY
FORCES may still defend themselves when aftacked, the CAMPAIGN
AGAINST CIVILIANS must stop, etc."
ANNEX I NETHERLANDS ACTIONS

NR: DATE: PLACE: Verifications from

Ne'therJands data: PARTICULARS :

1. 4/11/47 BANDJER- Date correct Situation report in question does not

NEOARA show that 2 attacks were made.
2. -do- -do- Action carried out after it had been
outside van ascertained th at TNI HQ at BAN-
Mook-line DjARNEOARA had ordere"d laying of
line mines within v. Mook-Iine and after
V Brigade own Josses sustained from traction
bombs had risen to 4 killed, 3 heavily
and 1 slightly wounded.
3. 5/11/47 KOLELET Probably refers to Circa 5/11 action took place at point
(Tangerang) action 2 km from 6888, 12 km WNW of SERPONO and
1 Inf. Brig Op KOLELET 2 km NW of KOLELET. According
to situation reports place was looted
before 5/ 11. Place not occupied bij us.

130
NR : DATE: PLACE : Verifications from PARTICULARS:
Ne'therlands data:

4. 5/ 11 / 47 B OENG- Correct Action carried out from TjlKADjANG

BOELAN except date on 19/ 11, not on 5/ 11.
(3 Inf Brig Gp) Place not occupied until afternoon of
inside v. Mook- 27/ 11.
line Only initial opposition (Iosses sustained
4 wounded)

5. 6/ 11/47 POENTEN Correct At date ' men'tioned place was actually

MA LANG SectorPlace temporarily re-occupied. Had already been tempo-
inside v. Mook- occupied before rarily occupied during police act ion
line 4 Aug. 1947. in advance from TRETES to BATOE
on 30/ 7.

6. 7/ 11/47 TjlKETOEG Correct Commando-raid carried out by sm all

(1 Inf. Brig Gp) However, action IVB patrol against G BONGKOK,
inside v. Mook- of very small pat- 11 km SE of TANGGEUNG.
line rol to put wireless
station out of ac-
tion

7. 7/ 11/47 MARTAPOERA Correct Mopping up action OGAN-KOM-

inside v. Mook- Place temporarily MERING area after continued infil-
line occupied before trations in sector KAjOEAGOENG.
4 Aug. 1947. Opposition negligible. No losses
sustained.
MARTAPOERA had been temporarily
occupied before 4 Aug. '47 (railway
stocks we re then captured there).

8. 9/ 11 / 47 PASIAN Naval action Rpboat (115) fired at at 13.25 hours

MADOERA from shed oft P ASIAN which firing
N-coast was sile·nced.

9. 10/ 11/47 PAKONG Correct No opposition. Aim: to safe guard po-

MADOERA pulation and objects of economie
importance.

10. 11 / 11/47 SOEMENEP Correct Slight resistance. No losses sustained.

MADOERA

11. 12/ 11/47 MANDING Correct Only de'monstration of air forc es ;

MADOERA only when plan es were fired at fire
was returned with machine-guns.

12. 12/ 11 / 47 AMBOENTEN Naval action No bombing by air-force;

MADOERA
N-coast
13. 12/ 11147 ROEBAROE Incorrect No air-bombardrnent of MADOERA
took pla·ce.
14. 12/11/47 BAROE- Correct 3 P 51 fighters attacked heavy
TOENGGOEL Actions were part machinegun position and inf. positions
(BANDOENG of mopping up on top of hili near BAROETOENG-
SOUTH) operations in are- GOEL with machineguns and rockets.
as GOENOENG
HALOE and PA-
TOEHALANDS

131
NR: DATE: PLACE: Verifications from PARTICULARS:
Ne'therlands data:

15. 13/11/47 RANT.lABALI RANTJABALI probably used as tem-

(BANDOENG) porary encampme'nt during march in
(SW) night of 13th. Heavy opposition en-
countered. Action formed part of mop-
ping up operations SW of TJIWlDEJ.

i6. 13/11/47 KARANG- Possible. Not mentioned in situation report

TENGAH dd 14/11/47. Dislocation A-Div. se-
MADOERA cond half November gives garrison
in KARANGTENGAH.

17. 13/11/47 ROEBAROE ? Not mentioned by A-Div. either in

NW SOEMENEP situation report or in OOT.

18. 14/11/47 AMBO ENTEN Correct AMBOENTEN was reached and pas-
N-coast EX CEPT DATE sed on 14, 15 and 16 Nove'mber Oc-
MADOERA cupied on 17 November.

19. 20/11/47 TG POERA Action not correct- 2 Pipercubs were flying near TG
MEDAN Iv represented. POERA and we re twice fired at from
inside v. Mook- Tg. Poera occu- rifles and automatic weapons. The-
line pied by Neth. reupon handgrenades were dropped.
troops before
4 Aug. 1947.
20. 24/11/47 PARON ? B-Div does not report this action.
SOUTH PEKA- Reports were received of an action
LONGAN INSI- on 24 Oct. near SENGON, 15 km S.
DE v. Mook- of WELERI, in which casualtie's of
line other party were 2 killed.
21. 24/11/47 DARES? ? Action not known. Action reported
Neighbourhood 24/11 at TRENGILING Republic
POERBALING- mentions withdrawal of Neth. troops
GA inside v. in the direction of KOEMELEM Own
Mook-line losses: 1 man wounded; losses of
other party were: 20 killed.
22. 24/11/47 DEIES ? Unknown.
S-PEKALONGAN

23. 25/11/47 SOEMOWONO LANDJANG AND ON 24/11 a band of 80 men driven

T Brig TJAND! GARON hom country SW of SOEMOWONO
inside v. Mook- unknown. On 25/11 a skirmish near KA WE-
Jine DOESAN, 10 km W of AMBA-
RA WA
On 25/11 a forward post was esta-
blished at TENGARON (Tandji Ga-
ron?), because the opposing forces
continued to take action from the di-
rection of KA LORAN (SW of SOE-
MOWONO). regularly laying mines in
the SOEMO WONO - AMBARA WA
road.
In the night of 25 to 26 Nov. the
neighbourhood of Soemowono was
fired at by artillery and the post
Tengaron by mortars.

132
 Verifications from PARTICULARS:
NR: DATE: PLACE: Netherlands data:

24. 26/11/47 WONOSARI ? No report on th is item from A-Div.

SW MODjO-
KERTO
inside v. Mook-
line
----------------------------------------------------------- ---
25. 28/ 11/47 WAROE (?) ? The only mention of Nethe'rlands
MODjOKERTO activity on Modjokerto front on
28/ 11 says that a Neth. patrol was
fired at near kampong PESANAN,
5 km SW of MODjOKERTO,

26. 29/ 11 / 47 DJAIRAN (?) ? A-Div makes no mention of any

TjERMEE action on the Tjermee front on 29/ 11 ,

27. 29/ 11 / 47 WONOREDjO Apatrol contacted a band at Wono-

MODjOKERTO redjo and its surroundin gs , for in-
stance at Seketi, wh enc e the patrol
was fired at. No mention was made
of the use of artillery.
Casualties of opposing forces: 7 kil-
le'd altogether.

28. 1/ 12/ 47 DALI (?) Unknown, On 1/12 report of action near Tjer-
TjERMEE mee: " patrol dispelled a band near
TjERMEE", (Tj ermee is a Nether-
lands post, its occupatio n dating
trom the latter half of 1946),

29. 2/12/47 NGERING Unknown, No mention by A-Div of th is

TJERMEE skirmish.

30. 4/ 12/ 47 SAMBIROTO Correct, Netherlands patrol di spersed a band

BasCo SEMA- 9 km E of DEMAK (ju st SW of
RANG E of SAMBIROTO and situated within the
DEMAK v. Mook-Iine) . Later on the patrol
was fired upon from GEDONG-
GALAS,

31. 4/ 12/ 47 TG AWAR Naval action The Royal Netherlands Navy patrols
AWAR near the' coast of TOEBAN dail y,
TOEBAN Whereas only a so vereign state can
have territorial waters the republican
Government cannot claim any autho-
rity whatever over any part of the
sea,

32. 6/ 12/47 GENTAN? Action unknown GENET AN (SW of KA RANG-

KARANGANjAR ANJAR, E of DEMAK) is perhaps
are a? meant.

33. 5/ 12/ 47 TjlKOEPA Possible Netherlands patrol was fired at near

TANGERANG 6393, due West of TJIKOEPA, upon
which the Neth e'rlands patrol retur-
ned fire.

34. 6/ 12/ 47 TjIKOEPA ? No mention of th is action by C --

TANGERANG We'st-java.

·133
NR : DATE: PLACE: Verifications from
Netherlands data : PARTICULARS :

35. 7/ 12/ 47 WEDOENG Unknown. No report by B-Div.

DEMAK area

36. 8/ 12/ 47 TRENGGOELI Unknown. An action was reported near

DEMAK area GENTENG, where a well-armed band
consisting of 30 men we re driven
from position within the v. Mook-
line.
Casualties to opposing forces : 12
kill ed, I prisone'r.
Arrns and 2 areal borns were cap-
tured.

134
PERIODIC REVIEWS

of

TERRORISM
 COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretariat
NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.

Paleis Rijswijk. Batavia, November 21st, 1947.

Sir,
In the memorandum of November 6, 1947, which was submitted to your
Committee, a few examples were given to show that the Republican authori-
ties, in spite of the cease fire orders issued on August 4th, 1947, have syste-
matically continued with every means at their disposal, to endeavour to create
disquiet and confusion in the non-Republican are as of Indonesia.
These activities did not cease after November Ist, 1947.
In order to give an impression of the intimidation and terrorization within
the controlled areas, notably of Indonesian officials and chiefs co-operating
with the Netherlanders, and of the attacks by Republican armed groups at
the perimeters of the controlled areas, a list has been made of the most salient
facts that occurred in the first week of November, a copy of which you will
find encJosed.
If so desired, proofs of the related events can be submitted to your
committee.
I am Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo

Ta the Chairman
of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian
Question.

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretariat

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT I ssue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.
2 ri ce hulling miIls at Tegalsari set on fire in the night of 31 October to
1 November. (W. Java).
1 November, arson in tobacco warehouse at Adjoengala near Kalisat.
(E. Java).
40 km. S.W. of Bindjai, Boegara es ta te destroyed by fire. Also buildings
of Merlok estate (N. Sumatra).
The L,oerah of Ngidjo, which is 8 km. N. of Malang, was attacked by
armed gang. He himself managed to escape, but his wife and child were
abducted (E. Java) (on 1 November).
N. of Leuwiliang a house was set fire to by TNI and aserial bomb
deposited. '
137
 Gang started fires in severaL houses in kampongs near Tjikoepa, 12 km.
S.W. of Tangerang W. java on 1 Nov.
On 1 November a member of the auxiJiary poJice force of Soetawangi
was abducted (W. java).
On 1 November hand-grenade thrown towards the hom~ of a member
of the Security Service of 'the Brigade of Marines at Asem Bagoes (E. java) .
On 1 November a house at Poelo, 7 km. N.E. of Pasirian where dessa
council elections we re to be held, was set fire to.
The neighbourhood of Tjilendog near Tjibaroesa (W. java) was
pillaged by a gang of pseudo-policemen. The day before this gang had reas-
SlJred the populaHon and advised ,them to dig up their hidden valuables.
On 1 November bridge 793098 near Tegalsari was destroyed (W. java) .
In the night of 31 October to I November barricades were made at 4672
and 4471 on the W . Tasik road.
Also 3 km. S. of Kawali and 2 km. E. of Tjiamis (W. java).
Bridge destroyed 1 km . S. of Kabandjahe (N. Sumatra).

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.

On 2 November the planter van den Akker, living at Bodjong Gedeh,

was abducted at 100 m. from the home of the Manager and murdered
(W. java).
On 2 November hand grenades were thrown at the native assistant of
the Pamanoekan and Tjiasem Landen at Randjabango (W. java); he ma-
naged to escape, however.
On 2 November at Roto, 22 km . E. of Klakah, murder of a so-called
Nica "spy", whose eyes we re afterwards exhibited to the public (E. java).
On 2 November at Tambakoekir traps were found containing poisoned
spears. They we re removed .
Gn 2 November the Djember-Banjoewangi train ran oft the rails
between Djember and Kalisat. The cause was the unscrewing of the rails.
Five people were killed, twenty were wounded, the train was completely
destroyed !J:. Java).
Two bridges 10 km. W. of Arnhemia were destroyed (N. Sumatra).
100 m. of the road S.W. of Lahat (S. Sumatra) obliterated. At three
points N.E. of Batoeradja the railway line was broken up. (S. Sumatra).
Bridge 595883 near Tegalsari destroyed, also-brIdge 665877. (W. Java).

138
 COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t
NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES~

At Poedjer, 10 km. S.E. of Bondowoso, the irrigation reservoir ran dry

owing to sabotage (E. Java).
Near Soebang a mass grave was discovered. Thirteen persons lay
buried in a weil, among them some English women. (W. Java) .
6 km. S.W. of Arnhemia a kampong was destroyed (N. Sumatra).
At Randegankoelon twenty T.N.1. armed with carbin es and klewangs
abducted a former policeman on 3 November (E. Java).
The regent of Bondowoso was again threatened with abduction; pres u-
mably the non-cooperativ€ Republican officials are responsible. (E . Java).

Between Tg. Boerian and Oelak Patjeh tank traps were constructed by
the opposing forces . (In the area 15 km. upstream from Sekajoe - S. Su-
matra).
übstruction was placed on the railway at Pondok Leungsir 8 km. W. of
Soekaboemi on 3 November. (W. Java).
On 3 November the train from Soekaboemi was derailed owing to the
rails having been taken up. The telephone wires had also been cut.
Batavia - Paroengpandjang railway line damaged by explosives.
(W. Java).

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.

Factory near Kedaton, 10 km. W. of Djember, destroyed;

Night of 3 to 4 November "Nica accomplices" abducted at Ngoeier, 3
km. N. of Pasirian. (E. Java).
3 to 4 November mandoer of Kerasaan estate, 3 km . W . of Kerasaan,
was abducted by a gang. (N. Sumatra).
At Bantarsari, 16 km. S. of Pemalang, two Chinese were murdered on
4 November. (C. Java).
At Ngoeter, 2 km. N. of Pasirian, a civil policeman was kidnapped on
4 November.
Head '. of kampong of Wawengasem, 10 km. N.W .. of Soemedang
murdered on 4 November. (W. Java).
Lootings in kampong Saban, 5 km . S.E . of Goeboeg (C. Java) on 4
November.
In the neighbourhood of Tji'kamoening 1524, 5 km. W. of Soemedang,
T.N.1. confiscated ri ce of the population. (W. Java).
In passar Bondowoso posters we re found threatening anyone accepting
Nica money with death (found on 4 November).
Two kampongs some 16 km. N.W. of Loemadjang destroyed by fire.
(E. Java).

139
 3 km. N.W. of L. Aloeng about 50 m. of the metals of the railway we re
taken up. (c. Sumatra).
1 km. W. of Pasirian a mine was found on 4 November. (E. Java).
4 November: bridge 215413 at Poegeran damaged. (E .. Java).
Wire stretched across road at Kebon Agoeng tore cover off passing truck
(E. java).
On 4 November the non-metalled road to Waled, N.W. of Djatibarang
was destroyed (W. Java).
In S.E. sector of West java two bridges were destroyed, one result being
considerable slowing down of traffic betwe'2n Garoet and Tasik.
Bridge near Toemoergoemoek, 14 km. S. of Djember, destroyed.

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue No. 95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.

Rice hulling mil! Wanasepi, 4 km. N. of Gedoenggede partly destroyed

(W. Java).
Manager's house and office of Avros concern burnt down 8 km. S. of Tg.
Morawa.
Assistant-Wedana of Ledokombo (E. Java) murdered for conspiracy
with the Netherlanders.
On 5 November members of their own party murdered at Pageroengoeng
near Lawang (E. Java).
Six prauws with some hundred men landed at Moearatjiparaga N.E. of
Krawang and murdered two Indonesians (W. Java).
At a meeting of kampong chiefs at Djonggol several loerahs we re not
present owing to intimidation (W. java) .
At Larangan 150 Sabilillahs and TNI men attempted to set fire to the
assistant wedana's house. This was prevented by the dessa police, who took
two men prisoner.
On 5 November arson in western perimeter of Tjiamis (W. Java).
Arson in Tal-Moeara-Tirau, 15 km. N. of Sekajoe (S. Sumatra).
On 5 November a school at Gerang, 5 km. N.E. of Pasirian was burnt
down by mischief-makers and another was damaged (E. java). :
Bridge 665877 and 595883 on Krawang Tjilamaja road were destroyed
(W. java).
Bridge 070747, 10 km . S. of Loemadjang destroyed on 5 November
(E. Java). .
On 5 November bridge near Tjitjalengka destroyed. (W. java) .
On 5 November bridge destroyed near Kebonagoeng (E. Java).
On 5 November bridge destroyed near Sendoera (E. java) , obstructions
placed near Senboera.
On 5 November bolts were found to have been removed from rai/way
metals 5 km. W . of Kalisat (E. Java).
Night of 4 to 5 Novemberrailway line near T. Rasa stop, 10 km. E. of
Tjikampek taken up (W. Java).

140
 Night of 4 to 5 Nov.ember obstruction near Balonggandoe, N.E. of Tji-
kampek in the shape of a railway carriage across the road; telephone wire
cut (W. java).
Night of 4 to 5 November large obstruction near Tjilewo, N.E. of Tji-
kampek (W. Java).
On 5 November road between Soekamandi and Tjikalong heavily
obstructed (W. java).
On 5 November two anti-tank mines found 10 km. S. of Tangerang.
Three mines found in the road near Wates, 2 km. W . of Djember (E.
java) .
In kampong Sitoenggaling, 10 km. W. of Seriboedolok, three land mines
were found and dismantled (N. Sumatra) .

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE Secretaria t

NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT Issue NO.95.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES.

Estate 20 km. W . of Bindjai on the Sei Wampoe partly destroyed by

fire (N. Sumatra).
The same was done to buildings of an es ta te W. of Tandjoeng Slamat
(N. Sumatra).
In the night of 5 to 6 November two rice hulling mills we re reduced to
ashes in Djatisari near Tjikampek (W. Java).
Manager's house of Soesoeroe estate set fire to. (W. Java ).
Krawang Rengasdendlok tram assaulted. Tram returned empty to Kra-
wang. Sixteen men of SS staf were missing (W. java).
On 6 November at Pasanggrahan two Indonesians were carried off in
the direction of Poedjon (E. Java).
A Chinese in Maesan was shot on 6 Novemb er and his house set fire to,
12 km. S.S.W. of Bondowoso (E. Java).
Petinggi of Tringgondani ill-treated, his wife and child murdered, 15 km .
S.E. of Bondowoso (E. Java).
On 6 November, Chinese ri ce merchant abducted from Toenggakdjanti
near Krawang.
On 6 November the Soekaboemi Tjibadak train and workmen on the rail-
way line between Tjisaat and Karangtengah were shot at.
On 6 November train between Tjigenea and Bendad, South of Poerwa-
karta was shot at.
Modjokerto in night of 5 to 6 November; arson in the house of the We-
dono of Modjosari. In the same night a Bailey bridge in the neighbourhood
was partially destroyed (Not all the aerial bombs placed lexploded).
Also two bridges (287538 and 307533) slightly damaged (Modjosari is
situated 17 km. within the old line of demarcation E. java).
On 6 November bridge across irrigation callal near Tjilamaja destroyed
(S. Sumatra).
On 6 November a suspension bridge S. of Lahat was damaged by an
explosion (S. Sumatra).
S. of Singkawat (N. Sumatra) two bridges were destroyed.

141
 COMMITTEE REPRESENTINO THE Secretaria t.
WITH THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES. Issue No . 95.

On 7 November Soembergoedji kapok concern 5 km . W. of Pandakan

destroyed (E. java) .

On 7 November cashier Tjan Hwa Sing of the regency bureau found

murdered at Koeripan (E. java) .
On 7 November Tjari of Soembersokar, 9 km . N.W. of Malan g, abducted
(E. java).
On 7 November mine exploded behind last carriage of train between
Kalisat and Soekawana (E. java) .
In Klampok, 3 km . W. of Brebes, one Chinese was kidnapped by pillagers
(c. Java).
In night of 6 to 7 November looting in kampong Tjipare N. of Bandoeng
(W. java).
'On 7 November police barracks at Kalisat shot at (W. java).
I

Detachement of field police of Poerwakarta shot at with automatic

weapons in night of 6 to 7 November (W. java).
Gang set fire to houses in kampong Tjireunden, in the same neighbour-
hood as the foregoing and made off with two OX'èn (W. java).
Market of Parakan Moentjang near Tjitjalengka set fire to (W. Java) .
The staff of Wonoaseh sugar mills stopped work as a result of threatening
letters and murders in the vicinity.

Bridge near Tjikalong, N.E. of Tjikampek broken and Djatisari Patjing

road 7487, N.E. of Tjikampek, obsfructed and de-surfaced (W. Java).
Road obstructions S.W. of Koeningan (W. java).
Telephone connection with Sindangwangi destroyed (W. Java) .
On 7 November (bridge 12 km. S. of Tanggoel partially destroyed.
Telephone wires to Poeger, Amboeloe and Baloeng cut on 7 November
(E. java).
In the night of 6 to 7 November four bridges, one of which was a large
Bailey bridge, were destroyed at Tasik and Tjiawi (W. java).
Aerial bomb under bridge across Kali Spandjang near Glenmore, 12 km.
N.W. of Genteng (E. java) .
Obstructions on the Bondowoso Besoeki road (E. java).

142
Committee representing the Secretariat
Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices
PALEIS RIJSWIJK. Batavia, November 27th, 1947.
MOST SECRET.

Sir,
Further to my letter of November 21 st, 1947, I have the honour to
transmit a second list of subversive acts, committed during the second week
of November.
I am Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
(Signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo.
To the Chairman.
of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices.
on the lndonesian Question.

Committee representing the Secretariat

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with thO
e Committee of Good
Offices
8 November.
1n the night of 7 to 8 November a gang came to Sidoardjo rice hulling
mills. The watchmen and police assaulted, disarmed and bound. (E. Java).
On 8 November policeman murdered at Bondowoso (E. Java).
On 8 November the Tjari of Daoe, 9 km N.W. of Malang, abducted .
(E. Java).
Our informer was held up near Modjokasri and severely manhandled.
(E. Java).
On 8 November hand-grenades we re thrown at the house of a VDMB
(security service of marine brigade) at Wedoesan, 30 km S.E. of Probo-
Jinggo . (E. Java).
In the night of 7 to 8 November railway line S.W. of Poerwakarta
taken up between Tjiganea and Bendoel.

Committee representing the Secretaria t

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices
9 November.
Retired Netherlands Indies army sergeant kidnapped in kampong Tjita-
lang near Poerwakarta.
In the night of 8 to 9 November the loerah (head) of kampong
Gocnoeng-Toempang 10 km E. of Salatiga, was abducted. (C. Java). On

143
9 November Chinese kidnapped on the road S. of ,Kalisat. (E. Java).
The penggoeloe of Robatal, who was abducted on .3 November, mur-
dered at Karangpinang.
Gamiran harassed by a gang, many people being wounded (E. Java).
A troop of 35 men raided Penanggeran, 20 km N. of Moeara-Enim; the,
attack was beaten oH by the population.
The village elders of kampong Tjiwaroe, N.W. of Leuwiliang received
threatening letters (W. Java) .
Bomb found deposited under railway bridge 10 km E. of Loemadjang.
(E. Java) .
Near Modjokerto three bridges ' destroyed, two of which have been '
repaired. (E. java) .

Committee representing the Secretariat

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96.
with the Committee of Good
Offices.
10 November.
On 10 November the buildings belonging to Kamar-Tengah and Keto-
soeko plantations were destroyed. (E. java).
Civilian wounded by a gang throwing hand-grenades at Pandanwangi
(10 km S. of Loemadjang, E. Java).
On 10 November a ch ief of the village police force and another inhabi-
tant were murdered at Boto, 18 km S.W. of Probolinggo. (E. java).
On 10 November two persons abducted trom Kendon, 11 km E. of
Malang, one being the petinggi (elder). (E. java).
Arson in school-building at Toempeng, 16 km N. of Pasirian (E. Java)
on 10 November.
On 10 November posters found at Tapaan 7634 near Pasoeroean,
containing a threat to seven people including the petinggi.
Rails and sleepers removed trom bridge N.W. of Martapoera and from
another small bridge (S. Sumatra). Bridge 5 km S.W. of Koeningan destro-
yed on 10 November. (W. java).
Arson on bridge near Pasirian.
Bridge near IKadoegede neighbourhood Koeningan destroyed on 10 No-
vember (W. java).
On 10 November a bridge near Djatisari destroyed. (W. java).
Near Leuwiliang 60 metres of telephone wire stolen on 10 November
(W. Java).
In the night of 9 to 10 November four anti-tank mines were found in the
road near Oedjoengbroeng. (W. java).
On 10 November a 75 kg aerial bomb was pointed out by the vil1age,rs
at kampong Kopeng. (C. Java).

144
Committee representing the Secretariat
Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices

11 November.
At the cinchona plantation Gabes, 10 km N. of Batoe, 5 hectares were
grubbed by the TNI. Written instructions to do so we re captured by our
troops. (E. Java).
On 11 November four persons were abducted by a gang at Sei Lang-
garan (S. Sumatra).
In the night of 10 to 11 November a school teacher at Modjosarie and
his wife were wounded by hand grenades. (E. Java).
On 11 November a pro-Netherlands citizen of Kalisat was kidnapped.
(E. Java).
On the 11 November ! a gang of twenty men armed with six rif Jes ab-
ducted three people fromthe passar at Krai, 12 km. S.E. of Loemadjang
(E. java).
Sawah-Lebar was looted by a gang of 300 men (25 km. SIW . of Sekajoe).
In the night of 10 to 11 November a servant of the military nibal was
kidnapped from Tysang Toempak, 2 km W. of Modjokerto (E. java).
On 11 November hand-grenades thrown at house of wedana Probolinggo.
(E. java).
On 11 November three Chinese we re murdered at Poeloketjil 8 km N.
Goedoeng Gede. (W. java).
On 11 November arson in Chinese shop at Probolinggo, another Chinese
shop was plundered. Two members of the town police force disappeared with
their carbines. (E. java) .
The entil'e railway line in the district 5 km N.E. of Tjibatoe was taken
up (W. Java).
In the night of 10 to 11 November road carpets of two bridges 7 km. trom
Koeningan were demolished (W. java) 5 km E. of Salatiga a fused artillery
shell was found in the road. (c. java).

Committee representing the Secretari at

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices.

12 November.
On 12 November .the Sooko rice hulling mills at Modjokerto we re looted.
(E. Java).

Car belonging to Hussars of Boreel struck a mine between Soekanegara

and Tanggeung. (W. Java).
. Station of the General Police at Kalisat fired at in the night of 11 to 12
November. (E. java).

1-15
 On 12 November during a gamelan performance at Gratitoenon, 10 km
S.E. of Pasoeroean, where Netherlands soldiers we re present, a hand grenade
was thrown. (E. java).
At Soemowono two M.K. 11 mines we re found (C. java) .

Committee representing the Secretariat

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices.

13 November.
On 13 November the assistant-wedana of Djatisari was abducted. (W .
java).
On 13 November employees of Bermi plantation, 5 km S.E. of Probolinggo
were shot at.
On 13 November policeman murdered at Besoekagoeng, 8 km E. · of
Kraksaan. (E. Java) . .
An ox-cart on its way to Tegal was fired at, two waggoners were killed,
onE' wounded. (C. java).
On 13 November arson in kampong Tegal Kedoe, 4 km N.E. of Tjiba-
roesa. (W. java).

Railway line at Tjitjalengka blown up along a stretch of 250 m. In the

night of 12 to 13 November, S. of Poerwakarta, between Tjiganea and
Bendoel, the clamps and sleepers were removed from the railway line along
th~ length of two metals (W. java) . Between Oedjanmas. (S. Sumatra) and
Tal Toengkopr a traction mine was discovered.

Committee representing the Secretaria t

Netherlands Government Issue No. 96
with the Committee of Good
Offices

14 November.
On 14 November a traction bomb exploded on the railway line between
Pasirian Loemadjang near kampong Bedok 0018, 5 meters in front of an
approaching train; one person was wounded. (E. java).
At Ngoeling, on the road to Probolinggo, a Chinese was dragged from
a pony-trap by a gang. The man was rescued. (E. java).
Some pedestrians near Sekarpoetih were attacked and robbed on 14
November.
On .14 Novefl1 be.r an attempt was made to set fire to kampong Leran ,
fhè fire was extinguished by the population .

, On Î4 November the wires of the telephone of the irrigation works of

Pandakan to Soerabaya were removed. (E. java).
146
 Bridges destroyed at two points 10 km E. of Krawang on 14 November,
(W. java). Roads round Rengasdengklok broken up and obstructed at three
points on 14 Nevember. (W. java). .
The population of Sarikemoening, 10 km from Loemadjang pointed out a
land mine. (E. java).

MOST SECRET Batavia, November 29th. 1947.

PALEIS RIJSWIJK.

Sir,
Further to my letter of 27 November 1947, I have the honour to transmit
a third list of subversive acts, committed during the third week of November.
I am, "Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo
to the Chairman
of the Security Council's Committee
of Good Offices on the Indonesian
Question.
15 November.
Arson at house of own informer at Pr'obolinggo on 15 November (E J
java) .
In the night of 14 to 15 Novemb er two bombs were placed near a Chinese
dwelling in a town kampong of Modj okerto, which did not explode because
the fuses failed (E. Java).
In the night of 14 to 15, November arson in a school and a tobacw
shed at Tamanan (E. java).
In the night of 14 to 15 Novemb er the dike of the river wàs pierced at
Doekoeh 6380, near Indramajoe (W. java).
16 November..
10 km S,S.E. of B. Serangan the buildings belonging to a plantátion we re
destroyed. (N. Sumatra). ,
Arson at Soemberwadoeng plantation , 5 km N.W. of Geilteng on 16
November.
Policeman murdered by Tentara s (regular soldiers) at Klewang-Lor ,
15 km S.E. of Probolinggo o.n 16 November (E. Java).
At Penawoengan a member of the auxiliary police force was murdered.
(E. Java).
)The assistant-We,dana of Ranoejoso, 5 km N. of Klakah, was abductect
(E. java). .
In the vicinity of N. Trasi (N. Sumatra) patrols of plantation guards and
general police on security duty during the rice harvest we re fired at. (N. Su-
matra). On 16 November hand-grenades we re ihrown into the dwelling qf the
Loerah (chief) at Boering, S. of Malang (E. Java). .
Arson in Chinese dwelling at Djember on 16 November. _
Arson in tobacco shed near Maosan , 12 km S.S.W. of Bondowoso . .
On 16 November the manager s housè at Wonowiri and bridges in the
neighbourhood of Kalisanan were destroyed. (E. Java).

147
 Water main destroyed near Soemberpang, 10 km W. of Malang (E .
java) .
2 km S. of Matas a land-mine exploded in front of a jeep (10, km N.
of Soegiwaras).
On 16 November a wire a hand-grenad e attached to it was stretched
across the road near Pagelaran, 12 km S. of Soekanegara (W. java).
Sabotage to telephone Iines to Rangotedjo, 10 km S. of Genteng on 16
November. (E. java). .
Between Tg-Enim and Soegiwaras (S. Sumatra) the road was min ed.
At a point W. of Batang-Serangan a small bridge was destroyed. (N . Su ..
matra) .
The population of Tanggoel was urged by means of leaflets on 16 No-
vember to .accept no Nica money. (E. java).
At Maosan an anti-Netherlands poster was found on 16 November
(E. java).
17 November.
On 17 November arson on the Kalitelopak concern near Genteng (E.
java) .
On 17 November the Ambonese manager of the Airingen es ta te was
manhandled and wounded by members of the Barisan Banteng (E . java) .
Near kampong Babakan a carrier feil into the river because a bridge had
been put out of order. (W. java).
-On 17 November looting took place on the grounds of the B.P.M. concern
at Malang (E. Java) .
7 km N. of Genteng a gang set fire to twelve houses. (E. java).
4 km W. of P.-Oesang ten empty houses were set fire to by unruly ele-
ments. (c. Sumatra).
Bridge 4 km S.E. of Tasik destroyed on 17 November. (W. java) .
On 17 November bridge destroyed 5 km N.E. of Randegan Koeion (E .
java) .
Telephone line Krawang - Rengasdengklok out. (lW. java).
Between Soreang and Bandjaran 40 metres of telephone wire were re-
moved. (W. Java).
18 November.
On 18 November an inhabitant of Tjoerahdami, 3 km W . of Bondowoso,
was severely man-handled on account of his anti-republican attitude. (E.
java).
15 km N.W. of Salatiga, on the road to Semarang (C. java) a th ree-ton
truck struck a mine. The truck was destroyed. Near Soemowono (C. java) on
the road to Bandoeng an ambulance hit a mine; one man was wounded and
the car was destroyed (c. Java).
Kampong Poelau Pinang, 8 km N. of Soegiwaras, was visited by a gang
consisting of two japanese and seven Indonesians.
Night of 17 to 18 November. Armed men in black uniforms set fire to
the house of a Chinese who informed us.
On 18 November train between Poerwakarta. and Plered was fjred at
from automatic weapons. (W. java) .
Looting in 'kampong Sodeng, 3 km S.W. of Salatiga on 18 November (C.
java).

148
 On 18 November arson in Wonoredjo, near Kent jong (E. java).
Looting in Perning in the night of 17 to 18 November. (E. java).
On 18 November a bridge was destroyed by a bomb, near Reksosari
(c. Java).
On 18 November th ree bridges elestroyed 6 km S.E. of Tjiawi at ten
o'clock at night. (W. java).
On 18 November sabotage to the telephone line between Tjitjoeroeg and
Tjigombong. A threatening letter, in the Netherlands language, had been
affix ed on the spot. (W. java) . .

PALEIS RIJSWIJK. Bafavia, December 5th 1947.

Sir,
Further to my letter of 29 November 1947, and to my letters of Decem- .
ber 1/ 2, 1 have the honour to transmit a fourth list of subversive acts, com-
mitted during the perioeI of 19th to 25th November, inclusive.
I am, Sir,
Your obeelient Servant,
(Signed) Abdulkadir .Widjojoatmodjo.
To the Chairman
of the Security Council's
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question .

19 November 1947.
I. On 19 November dessa policeman of Karangtengah, 10 km S. of Pa-
soeroean, murdered. (E. java).
2. On 19 November 30 SabiJlillhas abducted the head of a school and his
son at Sohobana (on the N. coast of E. Java).
3. At Boender near Poerwakarta a truck and its driver were abducted by
a gang of 7 men armed with carbines. (W. java).
4. In kampong Kasang the village head and a member of the "Ronda kam-
pong" we re shot dead by members of a gang. The chief of the gang
was wounded by the villagers, but managed to escape. (C. Sumatra).
5. In the night of 18 to 19 November the assistant Wedana and two CDO
officials at Poerwakarta were kidnapped. (W. java).
6. On 19 November at Winangan, 10 km S.E. of Pasoeroean, three daugh-
ters of the former wedana of Soerabaya were kidnapped. (E. java).
7. On 19 November a Netherlands civilian with five plantation guards were
set upon by a gang about 30 km W . of Boenoet (N . Sumatra) . The
civilian was woundeel and kielnapped.
8. Arson in four houses on 19 November at Madjalengka (W. java).
9. At the indication of the population an ME II mine was found near Am-
barawa on 19 November. (C. Java) .
10. At a point 10 km W. of Tasik a mine with a traction device was found
to the left of the road. (W. java).
11. On · 19 November a bridge in Tasik was destroyed by a high explosive
charge (W. Java).
12. On 19 November sabotage to telephone connections of Kesilir anel
Moentjar (E. Java).

149
 20 November 1947.
1. An Indonesian was kidnapped at Gedoenggede. (W. java).
2. jW . of Tjilongkok, 5 km E. of Adjibarang a carrier struck a mine, two
occupants being wounded.
3. On 20 November a mine exploded in front of the train near Manggoel,
E. of Lahat. A bridge and rails were slightly damaged; the train was
able to confinue on its way. (S. Sumatra).
4. In the night of 19 to 20 November kampong Wanasigra, 10 km S. of
Garoet, was burnt down. (W. java).
5. Arson in the house of th e Loerah (viIlage head) of Tjendal , 4 km N. of
Tjampea (W. java).
6. On 20 November all the buildings in Negara Dolok, 20 km E .. of Goe-
noeng-Marla. (N. Sumatra) were burnt to the ground.
· 7. On 20 November arson in a house at Ma'd jalengka. (W. java).
· 8. In the night of 19 t~. 20 November, looting in kampong Bawit, near Tji-
baroesa'. Also at kampong Bagogog, 10 km S. of Tjileungsir. (W.
java). House of the Loerah of Bodjong, 8 km W. of Tjibaroesa, set
fire t~. Also in kampong Marikil near Tjampea. (W. java) .
9. In the night of 19 to 20 November arson in the dwelIing of the fore-
man of Tjimoentjang plantation , 20 km North of Bandjar. (lW . java).
10. On 20 November the plantation guard of Tamboeng-Sialang, 15 km
S.E. of Loeboek-Pakan, captured six T.R.1. soldiers. (N. Sumatra).
11. Rails removed from bridge W. Lahat by opposing forces .
12. On 20 November a bridge 8 km W. of Malang near Toeri was destroyed.
(E. java).
13. On 20 .November a tank trap was found across the entire road at Soe-
koliIlo, 15 km S. of Balang. (E. java).
14. In the night of 18 to 19 November a bridge was blown up 11 km S.W.
of Salatiga. (C. java).
15. On 19, November bridge destroyed at 'Bring, 6 km N. of Malang. (E.
java); also a bridge at Boeloelawang, 11 km S. of Malang.
16. In the ,d istrict about 10 km W.S.W. of Tg. Balai, obstructions by means
of trees were found . (N. Sumatra) .

21 November 1947.
1. On 21 November a capok shed was set fire to in Probolinggo; shots
were fired at those who tried to extinguish it. (E. java).
2. On 21 November an inhabitant of Bonda'Aroem was murdered by a
gang (10 km E. of Bondowoso, E. java).
3. On 21 November a Dessa policeman at Bagoe near Pasirian was ab-
ducted by TNI.
4. From Sambirato, 8 km E. of Soegiwaro, one Indonesian was abducted.
(S. Sumatra).
5. In the night of 20 to 21 November a detachment of field police and a
rice-huIIing mill at Tjimalaja were fired at. (W. java).
6. On 21 November a VDMB (Security Service of the Marine Brigade)
information agent at Djatian, 4 km S. of Kali.san, was murdered. (E.
java) .
7. The Krie (head of the kampong) of Panggal-Panggil, 234d, abducted
by a gang of 5 men; 13 weapons collected by him were taken. (25 km
W. of Batoeradja - S. Sumatra).

150
 8. On 21 November 5 regular soldiers razed the house of a VDMB inform-
ation agent at Sapikorep, 4 km S. of Soekapoera. (E. Java).
9. On 21 November a gang of five abducted an inhabitant of Kosambiram·
pak, 8 km S.E. of Besoeki. (E. Java).
10. On 21 November a motor-car was fired at near Tjo.ekoergoeling, 10 km
SE of Pasoeroean. The car was burned out completely. (E. Java) .
11. On 21 November a truck struck a mine between Djember and Rambi-
poedji. (E. Java).
12. On 21 November possessors of Nica mony were manhandled by regular
soldiers at Danotoro, 7 km SE. of Soekapoera. AU the personnel of the
S'ugar mill Gen;ding is threatened with murder. To lend force to these
threats a foreman of this factory was slaughtered before his house at
Maron Wetan, 10 km SE. of Kraksaan, in the night of 20 to 21 No":
vember. (E. Java).
13. On 21 November a bridge 4 km: S. of Berali partly destroyed. (W. Java).
14. On 21 November a telephone cable was cut along a length of 40 km
near Baringin.

22 November.
1. On 22 November a VDMB (Security Service of the Marine Brigade)
information agent was abducted trom Probolinggo by regular soldiers,
but managed to escape (E. Java).
2. In the night of 21 to 22 November the loerah of kampong Wirogomo,
7 km. of Ambarawa, was ahducted (c. Java).
3. On 22 November the deputy head of the dessa was abducted at Tle-
koeng, 4 km. S. of Batoe (C. Java).
4. On 22 November looting at kampong Tjilanggoek, 8 km. ' N. of Ban-
dO'2 ng (W. Java).
5. Terrorism continued in the neighbourhood of the sugar mi\l Gending
during 22 November, many dweIlings we re burned down (E. java) .
6. On 22 November a traction bomb was found on the road between, the
sugar mills Goenoengsari and Somboro (E. Java).
7. On 22 November the dike along the Kali Pangkalan was pierced in some
20 places. (20 km. W.S.W. of Indramajoe, (W. Java).
8. On 22 November, sabotage to telephone lines near Moentjar and Temoe-
goeroeh, 10 km. NE. of Gent'eng (E. java).
9. On 22 November a boobytrap was placed in a bridge 10 km. N. of
Tasik (E. Java).
10. In the night 'Of 21 to 22 November bridge destroyed 8 km. E. of Tasik:
on 22 November a bridge was 'damaged in the same region (W. Java).
11. In the night of 21 to 22 November, various fierce fires at Tasikmalaja
(W. java) .

23 November.
1. On 23 November at Braniwetan, 8 km . SW of Kraksaan a dessa police-
man murdered and the petinggi wounded (E. java) .
2. In the night of 22 of 23 November the petinggi of Kanigaran, 4 km. S.
of Probolinggo was murdered (E. Java) .
3. On 23 November a gang of 100 men armed with a machine-gun, 7
carbines and side-arms attacked Bintara, 3 km NE. of Djember (E. Java).
4. In the night of 22 tot 23 November the field police detachment of Plered
was attacked by armed persons. The detachment of 24 m'è n was disarmed,

J.'i!
 the whole detachment together with the assistant-wedana and their
.families being abducted. The assistant-wedana and two policeman
managed to escape. (W. java).
5. Aerial bomb found on railway Jine at a point 2 km of Tjisoek (W. java).
6. On 23 November bridge blówn up at point in Pasirian (E. java).
7. On 23 November 1200 m. of wire were stolen from the telephone con-
nection Bangil~Lawang near Senganagoeng (E. java).
8. On 23 November wooden bridge, 5 km E. of Soekaboemi set fire to
(W. Java).
9. On 23 November a wire was stretched across the Tjermee-Boender
road (E. java) .
10. On 23 November a TNI patrol painted anti-Netherlands slogans on the
,h ouses at Ngadar arrd Monokerto, 22 km. SE. of IPasoeroean. ObIiteration
of these slogans would be punished by death.
24 November.
1. On 24 November an irrigation dam was destroyed at Oajam, with the
result that the fields were inundated (3 km. S. of Pradjekan, E. java).
2. On 24 November at 23 hours, attacks were made on the yards of the
Djajanagara estate, 14 km. W. of Tjitjoeroeg. The attacks were beaten
off by planters and plantation police (lW. java).
3. On 24 November an inhabitant of TO\~ndjoengan, 14 km. S. of Loema-
djang abducted (E . java).
4. On 24 November a gang of 20 men abducted the Loerah and Tjarik
of Tenggoeloenan, 5 km. SW. of Malang (E. java).
5. On 24 November a gang fired at workers in a sugar plantation at
Plampekan, 10 km. SE. of Bondowoso (E. java).
6. On 24 November the Petinggi of Rondokoening, 3 km. SW. of Kraksaan
was murdered together with five other people (E. Java).
7. On 24 November looting took place by a gang in Bandaragoeng 20 km.
N. :of Batoe-'Radja (E. java).
8. A track inspector of the State Railways was attacked near Oloembang
30 km. NE. of Praboemoelih hy a gang, but managed to escape
(S. Sumatra).
9. Abductions continue at Lontar, 5 km E. of Soegiwaras (S. Sumatra).
10. On 24 November arson at Passar and a few houses at Soember, 15 km.
N. :of Bandoeng (W. java).
11. On 24 November arson in a tobacco shed at Karangredjo, 10 km. SE.
of Loemadjang (E. java).
12. At a point near Bobotsari (C. Java) an artillery shell with pressure fuse
was dug up.
13. On 24 November, 10 km. NW. of Tandjoeng-Timam a bridge was
destroyed.
14. Near Gloembang, 30 km. NE. of Praboemoeling there was sabotage to
the railway lines.
15. On the road from Martapoera to Tg. Karang there are at a point some
17 km. S. of Martapoera many road-blocks constructed of trees.
16. A provocative pamphlet was affixed to the Wedana's office at Lahat (S.
Sumatra).
25 November t 947.
1. On 25 November the electricity plant of the Martal textile factory at
Poegeren was destroyed by an explosion at 0030 hours (E . java, section
Modjokerto) .

152
 2. In the night of 24 to 25 November the manager and plantation poli ce of
the. Kaoem Pan dak rubber plan'tation, 10 km. N. of BuHenzorg beat oH
an attack by a gang. (W. java).
3. an25 November the manager of the Navy encampment at Tretes was
wounded by six persons with a kl ewang. (E. java).
4. A gang of the Pesaroean Perdjoangan Rakjat abducted the petinggi of
Bintara and murdered several citizens (5 km S.E. of Djember, E. java).
5. A gang of 8 men killed a woman and burned down 3 houses at Karang-
Agoeng, 10 km W. of Pagardewa. (S. Sumatra).
6. On 25 November inhabitants we re abducted and manhandled at Pate-
goehan, near Pandakan. (E. java). .
7. On 25 November looting at Toendjoengan , 14 km S. Loemadjang. (E.
java).
8. The police detachment at Tjilampeni was broken up by a gang of
some 50 men. Police casualties were 2 dead and 2 wounded. (W. java).
9. On 23 November a train was 3 times fired at near Poerwakarta. (W.
java). . '
10. On 25 November all the cattle was stolen at Kebonsari 1273, 10 km SE.
of Loemadjang. (E. java).
11. On 25 November arson took place at Djatikanteng (6 km S. of Besoeki);
.the house of the Wedana was fired at. (E. java).
12. Scoutcar of 1-3 RI ran into a mine, 3 km E. of Wangon (C. java).
13. On 25 November jeep ran into mine near Bandogankoelon. (E. java).
14. On 25 November jeep ran into wire across the Arosbaja te Klempisroad.
(E. java).
15. On 25 November bombs were placed at Karangpanas, 4 km NE. of La-
wang. (E. java).
16. On 25 November 11 bombs with traction wires were found near Tosari;
stolen telephone wire had been used for the pursose. (E. java).
17. On 25 November telephone connection with Besoeki 'd estroyed. (E. java).
18. On 25 November tanktraps we re dug in the road and bridges destroyed
at Gesang and Toempeng, near Pasirian. (E . Java).

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
Secretariat.
Issue No. 54.
Ag. No. 524/ CGD/ Cor.
Batavia, December 2lst, 1947.
Sir,
Further to my letter of 5 December 1947, I have the honour to transmit
herewith a fifth list of subversive acts, committed during the period of 26th
Nuvember to 7th December, inclusive.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo.
To the Chairman of the
Security Council's Committee
of Good Offices on the
Indonesian Question.

'153
 29 November.
The rubber factory, 15 km . W. Bindjai was partially destroyed by unruly
elements (N. Sumatra).
Hand-grenades were thrown at the Gending~Probolinggo tram. (E. Java) .
A mandoer (head-servant) was murdered at Alassapi, 3 km S.E. of Gen-
ding. (E. Java) .
A planter was killed by fire trom opposing forces at Tjiawi. (W. Java).
A petinggi (head of desa) abducted from Tebas, 10 km S.S.W. of Pa-
soeroean (E. Java) . .
In the night of 28 to 29, November arson in kapok shed in Probolinggo
(E. Java).
Looting in kampong Pongangan, 7 km S.W. of Salatiga (M. Java).
A gang fired at the house ot the wedana 'Ûf Tamanan (E. Java) .
A pony-trap ran into a mine near Soekadana, 3 km. N. of L'Ûemadjang.
The population of Ngasinan, 6 km. S.W. of Ambarawa dug up and han-
ded in two fused artillery sheIls: (M. Java).
The population of Kebonsari Wetan and Probolinggo were threatened
with having their houses set fire to unless they took part in an attack to be
made upon Probolinggo early in December (E . Java).
A bridge was blown up near Tjiwedej (W. Java).
The telephone line to Pakisan and Besoeki was cut (E. Java).
Sabotage to Soekadnan-Padang telephone line .
Sabotage to Pasoeroean-Probolinggo telephone line (E. Java) .
Road carpet removed from bridge 9 km . W . of Namoe-Oekoer (N. Su-
matra).
30 November.
A gang abducted two native servant-girls working at the Netherlands
post of Gondang Wetan, 6 km. S. of Pasoeroean (E. Java).
Petinggi abducted from Trate, 8 km . S. of Pasoeroean (E. java) .
A gang murdered VDMB (security service of marine brigades) infor-
mation age nt at Goenoeng-Pandak, 6 km. S.E. of Probolinggo (E. Java).
Looting in kampong Pesirir, 5 km. W. of Probolinggo (E. java).
Looting at Djoembatoe, 10 km. N.W. of Malang (E. Java).
A gang set upon a trade.r and looted his shop at Kroboengan, 15 km .
S. of Kraksaan (E. Java).
Kampongs Paulamoelo and Oedjoeng Barat, 10 km. W.S.W . of Am-
hernia bumt down by opposing farces (N. Sumatra).
The Pemimpin (head) of Tjelakat (kampong on the fringe of Malang)
received a threatening letter from the Gagak Hitam (Black Crow), ordering
him to leave the town (E. java).
Sabotage to telephone line to Goetjialit, 14 km. N.W. of Loemadjang.
In the night of 29 to 30 November wires stretched across the Probolinggo-
Tongas road (E. java).
A mine in the road near Soekadana, 3 km. N. of Loemadjang (E. Java).
,Obstructions in the raad between Poerwakarta and Batavia.
Wires stretched across raad near Parapatan, 8 km. W . of Palimanan
(W. Java).
In the night of 29 to 30 November viaduct 6 km. W. of Probolinggo
blown up. Also a railways bridge 8 km . W. of Probolinggo (E . Java).
Rubber parcels containing explosives had been used . Near the bridge
papers had been affixed saying, "Do not take vengeance upon the population,
this was done by the TNI".

'154
 1. December.
Three civilians at Pasanggrahan, 8 km. S. of Malang were shot by a
gang (E. Java). .
At Kedoengmiri, 5 km . S. of Probolinggo, a gang of some 15 men, arm ed
with side-arms, butchered 5 persons in a cowshed.
At the same place an information agent of the Marine Brigade was
manhandled (E . java).
The Loerah (head) of kampong Lemboe, 3 km . N.E. of Dadapajan,
was abducted. Also the Loerah of kampong Paloemoetan, 3 km. farther to
the North . (M. Java).
Two Javanese drove into a mine on the road from Malang to Konda-
dajak. Both were killed. (E. Java) .
Arson took place in two houses and the office of the dessa Tjipendej,
10 km. W. of Tjikalong Wetan. (W. Java) . .
Hi gh tension cable near Kalisat cut (E. Java).
Telephon e connection with Besoeki cut as a result of sabotage. (E. java).
In night of 30 Novemb er to 1 December, 500 m. of telephone wire and
300 m. of field cable were stolen near Bagong, 6 km NNE. of Tjilimoes.
The road from Bandar to Simbing is obstructed in 2 places.
The road from Bandar to Wanatoengal was destroyed in two places. (M.
java) .
Landmines found at two points W. of Soemowono. (M. Java).
In the neig,hbourhood of Go enoeng-Batoe the roads were obstructed in
several pI aces by means of trees, while two bridges were destroyed.
A tanktrap was found some 2 km. W. of Pasirian (E . java) .
In night of 30 November to 1 December bridge destroyed 5 km. N.E.
of Tjiwidej (W. Java) .

2 December.
The assistant-wedana of Djatiredjo, near Dinajo, and his family were
abducted (E. Java).
At Soemberwaroe, 16 km . N.W. of Loemadjang the assistant-wedana
and two members of the village police were wounded during an attack by
a gang (E. Java).
The Tjisaroea estate was fire'd at; 4 men of the estate police disap-
peared with their weapons (W. Java).

In night of 1 to 2 December 7 members of the fieJd-police of Tjikampek

disappeared with their weapons. In the kampongs between Tjikampek and
Poerwakarta kidnapping occurs of personnel of th e State railways (W. java).
Own truck ran into mine 1 km. N.W. of Ambarawa, 1 man was killed
(M. java).
The pawnshops at Pasoeroean were c10sed as a result of visits to the
managers of people who threatened to abduct them.
5 km. N.E. of Poerwakarta a pamphlet was found containing achallenge
to the Netherlands troops (W. Java).
In night of t to 2 December north and south of the bridge near Sindang,
7 km. S.S.W. of Indramajoe the dike was pierced (W. java).
Sabotage to the telephone connections of Tosari Pleret (E. java).
In kampong Parapatan, near Palimanan wires we re found stretched
across the road (W. Java) .

155
 3 December.
A water train 20 km. N.E. of Buitenzorg had hand-grenades thrown at
it and was fired at from automatic weapons (W. java).
At 00.00 hours a patrol of the district police of Bandoeng was fired at
in the Western Park (W. java).
10 km. N.W. of M;-Koeang opposing forces removed 40 m. of telephone
cable (S. Sumatra) .
A railway bridge near Soemberpasir was blown up (11 km. E. of
Malang).

4 December 1947.
Loerah of kampong NgAsinan 5 km . E. of Ambarawa was severely
manhandled (C. java) .
. Fighting arose at kampong Bakah between the population and police
on the one side and a gang of 20 men on the other. On either side there
were 3 killed and a number of wounded (some 15 km. NNW of Loemadjang) .
5 Sawah-workers abducted near kampong Pitoro-wetan, near Benaren
(c. java) .
Cases of arson in kampong Kemit, near Gombong (C. java).
In night of 3 to 4 December arson at pasar at Tjikampek.
In nigth of 3 to 4 December looting in dessa Tjimenjan, 7 km. NE of
Bandm;ng; two persons were murd ered (W. java).
Arson by armed gang at house of cash ier of the Wonoaséh Sugar mill
6 km. S. of Probolinggo (E. Java).
5 km.IW. of Soemowono a traction bomb was found (M. java) .
Wire-obstruction and stone-obstruction W . and E. of Singaparna
respectively.

5 December.
Soekanda, 3 km. N. of Loemadjang the house of the assistant-wedana
was attacked (E. Java). 1 member of the police was abducted; the car-
bines of four others were taken.
An engineer of Kasau-estate, 15 km. E. of Tebeng-Tinggi was kid-
riéfpped, and 2 coolies disappeared (N. Sumatra).
An ex-member of the field police of Kraksaan was drowned by a gang
(E. java).
At 23.30 hours a gang of 20 men attacked the house of the assistant-
wedana of Poegeran. The gang captured 3 rifles .and ammunition; two
members of the field-police were ki lied.
In night of 4 to 5 December an inhabitant of Sapan 10 km. SE of
Bandoeng was butchered .
A member .of the "Politie Negara of Kraksaan was murdered in kam-
pong Ketompen, 4 km. S. of Kraksaan (E. java).
Own information agent attacked and l1l;anhandled at Kepoenklagen, near
. Perning (E. java). .
. During patrol the body of the planter who had bei:! n abducted on 19
November was found some 25 km. W . of Boenoet (N . Sumatra).
Numerous acts of terrorization in the group of kampongs W. of Cheri-
bon. Looting in: 3 houses at Kali Kowa. 1 house at Tjireres, 1 house at
Cheribon, 1 house at Kedoendjawa (W. java) .

156
 Sabotage to telephone connections of the posts Kesilir and Djadjag
(E. Java).
Telephone connections from Bondowoso to Tamanan and Wonosari
were cut (E. Java).
Tree-obstructions observed N. of Martapoera (S. Sumatra). In night of
4 to 5 December railway line from Tjikampek to Tandjo~ ng-roso taken up
along a stretch of 300 m. (W. Java).

6 December.
Arson at Ronga tea factory, 40 km. WSW of Bandoeng (W. java).
Near Bentar, 10 km. N. of Bobotsari, inhabitants of a kampong stepped
on a landmine which had been dug into the road. Two people were killed
and a bridge abutment was damaged (C. java) .
Three trucks belönging to the truckyards of the Military Transport
Service at Probolinggo were set fir e to in the town by unruly elements (E.
Java).
The dessa guards of Lombok Wetan, 8 km . SE of Bondowoso, dispelled
a small gang (E. java).
Three tanktraps were found in the road 3 km. NW of Pasirian (E. java) .
A bridge destroyed near Kedoengredjo, 7 km. E. of Malang (E. Java).

7 December.
An attempt to abduct the Pasirah of Manggoel (5 km. E. of Lahat)
failed (S. Sumatra).
At Tal Tjare, 15 km. N. of Serajoe, some houses were burned down
by a gang of rioters (S. Sumatra).
A train fired at 4 km. S. of Poerwakarta (W. java) .
A car of the general police ran into a landmine at Selakopi, ne ar Tji-
badak (W. Java) .
An aerial bomb exploded without doing any appreciabie damage near
ê. 15 cwt. truck S. of Bobotsari (C. java).
In night of 6 tn 7 December 4 members of a gang fired carbines at
an inhabitant of Soemberkemoening, 2 km. NE. of Tamanan (E. java).
Two rioters caught at kampong Tjimahi, 5 km. W. of Soekaboemi (W.
java) .
In night of 6 to 7 December bridge destroyed in road from Tasik to
Manondjaja (W. java) .

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
Bafavia, janué}ry 5, 1948.

Sir,
Further to my letter of December 21, 1947 I have the honour to transmit
herewith a sixth list of subversive acts, committed during the period of
December 8 to December 25 inclusive.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch .

To the Chairman of the Security Council's Committee

of Good Offices on the lndonesian Question.

157
 ~. December 1947.
1. 12 Chinese of Sagarantan (30 km S. of Soekaboemi) were abducted by
Indonesian troops to Tjoeroegkember (W. of Sagaranten), and another
group of 12 Chinese was abducted by one, Abas, Head Mas.hoe~mi to
some unknown place. (W. java).
2. Opposing troops consisting of members of the Hizboelah, L.R. troops
and a small number of TNI men concentrated in the area about 25 km
W. of Buitenzorg, wh ere the population is suffering severely under their
terrorization. (W. java).
3. Sabotage to telephone wires between Tjibadak and Soekaboemi.
(W. java).

9. December 1947.
1. When one of our own posts at Probolinggo was being fired at, in the
town 2 people were butchered by the TNI. (E. Java).
2. In Probolinggo a hand-grenade was thrown at a Chinese house, setting
fire to it. (E. java).
3. 8 km S. of Arnhemia near Medan a kampong was burnt to the ground
by hostiIe forces. (N: Sumatra).
4. S.W. of Reksosari a bridge was blown up (C. java).
5. Bridge partially destroyed 10 km S. of Loemadjang (E. java) .
6. Bridges about 20 km N.W. of Bindjai, which were repaired by us on
8 December, we re again destroyed by opposing forces. (N. Sumatra).

10. December 1947.

1. During a night attack on a kampong in S. Bali by a gang of 25 men,
2 villagers were killed and 3 wounded. A telephone connection was des-
troyed.
2. The Tigadja-concern, 10 km S.S.E . of Poerwakarta was destroyed by fire.
(W. java).
3. Near Bindoe, about 30 km N.E. of Batoeradja, an attempt was made
to derail a rail-jeep by laying stones on the rails. The attempt failed.
(S. Sumatra).
4. . A three-ton truck struck a mine on the road from Tjibeber to Soekanagara .
5. Fused artillery shells found E. of Goeboeg.,

11. December 1947.

I. During attempt to escape 14 political prisoners were kiIled at Pakong,
15 km N.E. of Pamekasan. At Padjoedan and Poentjoek Prigi (near
Pakong) some fugitives were shot and one was burnt to death. (Madura) .
2. In S. Bantam the following kampongs were burnt down: Tjisoengsang,
Tjibonkong, Tjimadja, Tjikempoel, Rabig, Nanggerang, Tjikarang, Tji-
sitoe, Gg. Bangkok, Tapoa and Tjitjemet. (These places are all in an
area about 25 km N.W. of Palaboean Ratoe). (W. java).
3. In the Krawang district practically all the plantations (rubber and tea)
were robbed, and work cannot go on . Rice hulling miIls in the N. sector
nearly -alldestroyed. (85 % ). ( W. java).
4. In the neighbourhood of Pameungpeuk the rubber factory of Boenisari
was gutted by fire. Superintendant's house near Padarome still intact
but rifled. (W. java). At Tjidadali 2 houses intact, sheds still serviceable.
Buildings on plantations at Tjitjadas entirely destroyed.
5. In kampong Limaumanis, 8 km N.W. of Bindjai, the kampong head and

158
 an inhabitant we re murdered by a gang who had infiItrated into the 'a rea.
(N. Sumatra). .
6. During withdrawaJs in the neighbourhood of Goerissen, 6 km N.W. of
Sibaulangit, some 200 Indonesians were murdered by opposing forces.
(N. Sumatra).
7. At Bant'~ n a gang of some 25 men rampokked Chinese. 17 Toko's were
burnt down and 6 Chinese abducted, who were liberated near Blitang.
(S. Sumatra).
8. A gang attacked a kampong in Central Bali and ki lied one inhabitant.
In N. Bali alocal "cooperator" was abducted.
9. A gang from Lamparan 15 km W.S .W. of Besoeki attacked the inhabi-
tants of kampong Kalisari 9 km S.W. of Besoeki. Some people were
ki lied. (E. java) .

12 December 1947.
1. A gang from Bales, 10 km 'S. of Besoeki, committed arson in Wino-
pajoeng, 8 km S.E. of Besoeki. (E. java).
2. The Kris of Pajaraman, 5 km W . of Betoeng, was abducted by a gang
'of about 40 men. (S. Sumatra).
3. 9 proa men who had been rob bed of their money and clothes by the
AL RI near Toeban, arrived at Kramatandap (near Grissee). (E. java).
4. Sabilillahs set fire to some houses and a school at Wrin gin, W km S.S.E.
of Besoeki. (E. java).
5. Gang of 20 men attacked Kalisari (N.E. coast, near Besoeki). Their arms
consisted 'Of 12 carbines, 6 inhabitants were killed, 4 seriously wounded.
(E. java).
6. Mine found 3 km W. of Pasirian on South-Smeroe road. (E. Java) .
7. Sabotage to telephone Pakisan-Bondowoso. (E. java).
8. Sabotage telephone connection between Dinojo and Djatiredjo in the
district of Modjokerto. (E. java).

13. December 1947.

In kampong Tjoekilan, 10 km E. of Salatiga, 4 members of the 'kampong
police were abducted by a gang.
In N. Bali a group of terrorists killed an Indonesian and wounded one.
5 km W. of Gombong a truck (?) ran into a mine. (C. java).
An attack was made on a police station in Pekalongan, 1 policeman,
and 3 civilians were killed. The leader of the attack, hadji-Weri, was
killed. Gang of 30 men fired at villagers of Madjadoengkoet, 10 km
S.E, of Besoeki. No Josses reported. (E. Java) .

14 December 1947.
1. As soon as Kandangtepoes post was removed (15 km N. of Pasirian,
district of Loemadjang) terrorization of the population started. The
petinggi was abducted, one villager was kilJed, 5 houses set fire t~.
About 80 % of the population fled eastwards. (E. Java).
2. At Watoe-Oerip 5 km E. of Datiro~o an agent of the dessa-police was
shot down by 4 men of the T.N.!., in the district Loemadjang. (E. Java).
3, At Prûbolinggo a handgr.enade was thrown at a Chinese toko. The culprit
was arrested. He proved to be acting on orders of a gang at Boeloedjaran,
14 km S.S.E. of Probolinggo (E. java). .

159
4. The railway-Iine was taken up 17 km W.N.W. of Lahat. (S. Sumatra).
5. 600 meters of telephone wire were removed from the line from Bangil
to Lawang, and 200 meters from the !ine from Bangil to Sidoardjo .
(E. java).
6. Sabotage to telephon e lines of Hiler and Bajoekidoel, 15 km N. of Gen-
teng, in the district of Banjoewangi. (E. java).
15 December 1947.
1. In Central Bali 4 attacks on kampongs were carried out in 2 days qy
armed gangs of some 6 to 30 men.. 12 People were killed, and 5 wounded,
while 11 houses were set fire to.
2. At the Tjoeroeg es ta te, 7 km S.W. of Tjikampek all curing sheds and
living houses we re burnt down. (W. java).
3. The house of the Krio of Tandjoeng Boeniet, 15 J{m E: of PraboemoeIih
was burnt dow n by terrorists. (S. Sumatra).
4. 600 meters of railway line taken up 14 km E. of Tjikampek. (W. java).
16. December 1947.
Looting at Dresel. One villager murdered. (3 km S. of Batoe in E. java).
Gang abducted and murdered the Clerk of Koloersari near Bangil in
E. java.
Body of a European found in kampong Si rap, 15 km N.W. of Soeme-
dang. The body had been cut to pieces, the head had been roasted and buried .
(W. java).
17. December 1947.
Near Pisanggambo, 8 km S. of Krawang, 19 Chinese were murdered.
(W. java).
Djember sector (E ..java) Mutilated body of Chinese found at Baloenglor.
Soemberdjambe plantation, 30 km W.S.W. of Genteng, completely
clestroyed. (E. java),.
Gang of 40 men abducted some people from Oambiran, near Majang.
(E. java) .
At Soemberwoeloe, N.W. of Pasirian, all factory buildings were
destroyed, anel also the houses on the plantations at Kebonagoeng anel Dja-
roenggandoel. (E. java).
On the airfielel of Bengkoelen N. zig-zag ditches we re cut through the
landing strip. Sumatra.
Hospital Djoenti Koelon, 20 km E. of Djatibarang shot at. (W. Java).
18. December 1947.
1. In the irrigation canal at Baloenglor, 18 km W.S.W. of Djember, the
body of a Chinese was found; the hands and feet we re bound, the head
had been struck a blow. E. Java).
2. Gang of 40 m~ n abducted 2 Indonesians from Krangean, lOS. of
Soekapoera. (E. java).
3. Attack early in the morning at Amboeloe post. Some Chinese were
abducteel. (E. Java) . .
4. Djember-Bondowoso train fired at from machine guns and rifles at 6
places. (E. java).
5. Arson at Tjikampek. (W. java).
6. Loerah of Leles missing. (W. java).
7. Sabotage to telephone Iines of Kesilir and Pelotan, 20 and 10 km S.
of Genteng, respectively. (E. java) .

160
 8. Sabotage to telephone Iines near Lembangan, 4 km S.E. of Kalisat.
(E. java).
9. Sabotage to all telephone lines near Lembangan, near Kalisat. (E. java).
10. Djember-Banjoewangi and Kalisat-Sempolan telephone connections cut.
(E. java).
11. Banjoewangi-sector. Telephone cut to Kesilir and Pelotan. (E. java).
1'2. Djember sector. Telephone connection near Lembangan cut. (E. java).
19. December 1947.
I. Thc Tentara Police at Tembilahan reported the following to the Ten-
tara Police at Rengat on 18 December:
"According to reliable information, 5 Nica soldiers in a motor boat
were killed by KRIS pemoec!as, taking sugar from Java to Singapore
in the proa "Ruplin". The murders we re committed at sea between
K. Toengkal and K. Retih. The bodies and weapons were givcn up to thc
authorities in Toengkal; the motor boat drifted away on the tide" .
(Sumatra) .
2. Market supervisor of kampong Pesajangan, S.W. Batang-Serangan, shot
by gang. (E. java).
3. Several cases of looting at Danejangwoeloeng. (E. java).
4. Soenggikamboe plantation, IW.S.W. of Genteng large ly burnt down and
destroyed. (E. java) .
5. Bridge destroyed 5 km from Tjilamaja; 6 villagers missing. (W. java) .
6. Guards of Djember-:Bondowoso railway track caught a gang tea ring up
the rails, 5 km N.E. of Djember (E. java) .
7. Sabotage to telephone line to Moentjar. (E. Java).
20-21 December 1947.
I. 6 people were kil led anc! many valuables stolen by 2 gangs of 20 anc!
25 men, respectively. (C. Bali).
2. Civilian tmck fired at near Se roet, 5 km W. of Djember; one European
killed, one member of plantation police seriously wounded. (E. Java) .
3. Tjemerekanoeng looted by armed gang, one villagel' abducted .
(E. java). ,
4. Armed gang abducted the loerah of Gadang, 3 km S. - of Malang.
(E. Java).
5. New tank traps in square 0344. (M. Sumatra).
6. Patrol at point 948331 cleared away heavy tree obstructions and 4
English land mines. (W. Sumatra). -
7. A Tjakra soldier was attacked in the pasar of Wnoasih, 4 km S. of
Probolinggo, wounded and robbed of his rifIe. (E. java).
8. Between Dolok-Nasihoel and Negeri-D olok 6 excavations were observed.
About 15 km S. W. of Kisaran tree obstructions were observed .
(Sumatra).
9. Telephone to Asel1lbagoes and Glenl1l0re cut. (E. java).
21 December 1947.
1. South side of bridge at Menangbesar obstructecl. Tank traps made in
both approaches. (Sumatra).
2. The railway bridge 6 km NNW of Loeboekaloeng was taken up.
(Central Sumatra).
3. N.E. of Poerwaredja a carrier ran into a buried mortar shell. (M. java).
'4. Telephone to Soepitoerang, 20 km W. of Pasirian, cut. Sabotage to tele-
phone near Asel1lbagöes. (E. java).

161
 -I
5. Banjoewangi-Asembagoes-Glenmore telephone cut. (E. java).
6. Banjoewangi sector. Telephone to Soepitoerang cut. (E. j ava).
22 December 1947.
1. In night of 22 to 23 December looting took place in kampong Tjoekoer-
gondang.
2. :Whiledestroying a bridge near Tjilamaja, a gang was driven off by the
viIIagers with hoes. (W. java).
3. Air reconnaissance reported 20 m railway bridge destroyed at 198304.
4. During the night attack on Labroek, 3 km S.W. of Loemadjang, the
railway bridge there was blown up. (E. java).
5. Car shot at near Sawah 25 km NW of Buitenzorg.
6. During the night the telephone lines from Probolinggo to Kraksaan and
Tongas we re cut. (E. java).
23 December 1947.
1. Villager abducted by terrorist gang of 5 men. (N. Bali).
2. Arson at Won{)kerto, 12 km N.W. of Loemadjang. (E. java).
3. Two houses set fire to at Wonokerto. (E. java).
4. Telephone connection to Moeqtjar and Pedotan cut. (E. Java).
5. Telephone to Asembagoes cut. (E. java).
6. Malang-Ket1dalpajak telephone cut. (E. java).
7. Malang-Kendalpajak telephone cut. (E. java) .
24 December 1947.
1. Hand-grenade thrown in pasar, 1 person ki lIed, 6 wounded. (Near
Probolinggo, E. java).
2. By the population of Petamang, 10 km N. of Praboemoelih, 3 looters
were arrested and given up to the authorities. (S. Sumatra) .
3. Official of Karang-Dalem abducted with 6 members of his family. (S. of
Reksosari. (M. Java).
4. Population and traders at Kandangtepoes and Tjarik are terrorized by
a gang of 20 men. (E. java).
5. Thefts of cattle have been reported from the districts Randoengoeng
and Oemboel Banjoepoetih. (Loema'djang, E. java) .
6. S.E. of Batoeradja a rail-jeep ran off the rails as a result of sabotage.
(S. Sumatra).
7. E. of Kedoengdjati a tractiQn bomb was discovered. (c. java).
8. On a bddge 4 km S. of Bodjam a 3" shell was found. (C. java).
9. The bridge near Oedjoeng-Karang was slightly damaged by partial
explosion of liquid explosive (5 km N. of Padang, C. Sumatra).
25 December 1947.
1. Continuation of terrorization, especially in Central Bali. 20 people were
ki lIed, 3 wounded, houses and food stores burnt. (Bali).
2. Bajeman, Mantripasser demands contributions from Chinese population
for support of guerillas. For a Chinese abducted 3 days ago a high
ransom wasdemanded (Probolinggo, E. java).
3. In kampong Oelikkapal, 3 km N. of Goenoeng Bat{)e (Palembang) a
bridge was destroyed and a house burnt down.
4. Patrol discovered a shell buried in the road near Polokdampit. (E. java).
5. A bridge was destroyed and a house burned down in kampong Oelik-
kepal, 3 km N. of Goenoengratoe. (S. Sumatra).

162
 Bafavia, 9 January, 1948.
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION

Sir,
I have "the honour to transmit herewith a somewhat more detailed list
of subversive actions in the Regencies of Buitenzorg, Krawang, Cheribon,
Indramajoe and Koeningan.
I remain, Sir, .
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch .
To the Chairman
of the Security Council's
Committee of Good Offices
on the lndonesian Question .

GENERAL POLICE
BUITENZORG
Statement of acts of terrorization or infringements of the truce by looting
and terror-gangs and ot her Republican fighting organ izations in the Residency
of Buitenzorg during period of 1 November to 15 December 1947 incl.

Date Brief description of event.

1. BU/TENZORG
2-11-1947 planter v.' d . Akker or Goenoeng Poeri rubber Concern (Bo-
djonggedeh) abducted by armed gang of some 30 men and butchered
in a rubber plantation near thi s estate,
2-11-1947 Chinese Gouw Tjiang Koey from dessa Babakan-Pasar, Bui'-
ten zorg, abducted from d essa Tjikeas, east of Tjiawi, by armed gang
and taken towards Goenoeng Garoengsang, east of Gadok.
11-11-1947 House of Ahli at Bantarkemang (kampong on the fringe of Bui-
"ten zorg) looted during the night by armed gang.
19-11-1947 Soedjana, a police information-agent, abducted from kampong
Tjilendok, Buitenzorg, by armed gang of some 25 men, cut up with
goloks (bowie knives), and thrown into a weil at Tjimanggoe. Victim
admitted to hospital severely wounded.
26-11-1947 Police post at Batoetoelis fired at during the night by infiltratecl
T.N.I. gang of some 15 men, from automatic weapons. .'
7-11-1947 Chinese Ue Kim Hoat, a resident of Rantjamanja (Tjiogreg),
abducted near Batoetoelis by armed gang.
15-12-1947 Seditious leaflets and threats to th e <General Police ancl similar
Netherlands authorities found at Buitenzorg.
2. Police-detachment TI/AW/ (district TI/AW/)
2-11-1947 Watchman Roib of the Pondok Gedeh estate, Tjigombong
shot in dessa Tj iboerajoet by armed gang of some 15 men.
4-11-1947 'Employee's house of the Goenoeng Geulis Concern, east bf Ga-
doks; looted during the night and set fire to by armed gang of some
30 men.

163
 7-11-1947 Warong (booth) of Hadji Effen di, on the main road near
Tjiawi looted during the night by armed gang of some 30 men.
10-11-1947 Distribution shop of Lie Tauw Ang on the main road near
Tjisaroea looted during the night by armed gang of some 20 men.
10-11-1947 The Pentjalang of dessa Rantjamaja shot during the night by
armed gang of some 15 men.
11-11-1947 Distribution shop of Bok Seng at Seuseupan, on the main road
near Gadok looted during the night by armed gang of some 20 men.
15-11-1947 Houses of Loerah of dessa Peundeuj and Pentjalang of kam-
pongs Sawah and Pentjalang of kampong Sindangsari (sub-district Tji-
saroea) looted during the night . by armed men.
17-11-1947 Hadji Saät of kampong Pasanggrahan (sub-distr. Tjisaroea)
kill ed by goloks (bowie knives) c1uring the ni ght by armed ga ng of
10 men.
20-11-1947 Rice hulling mill of Tan Liong Djin at Moeara (near Tjiawie)
looted by armed gang of 12 men; the same gang looted that night the
rice hulling mil! at Tadjoer.
21-11-1947 House of the Pentjalang of dessa Hardjasari (sub-distr. Tjisa-
roea) looted by armed gang.
22-11-1947 Military information service at Tjipajoeng fired at during the
night by armed gang of some 30 men hom automatic weapons.
23-11-1947 House of Gouw Boen' jong at Moeara (dessa Kopo) looted
during the night by armed gang.
28-11-1947 Pasar Angin tea concern near Oadok attacked during the night
by armed gang and fired at from automatic weapons. Planter Sieburgh
kil!ed.
29-11-1947 Employee ROl1lswinkel of Tjikopo-Zuid concern surprised in
bright daylight by armed gang and killed by means of side-arms.
3-12-1947 House of employee Cianetti on Tjisaroea-N oord, tea plantation
on the main road to the Poentj ak, fired at from automatic weapons; the
gang abducted 4 persons.
Military jeep fired at by armec\ gang from automatic weapons on main
road near sanatorium Tjisaroea.
4-12-1947 House of employee Cianetti at Tjisaroea-Noord again fired at
hom automatic weapons by armec\ gang.
5- 12-1947 Salil1l Bawazir, owner of Tac\joer tea concern on the main road
to Tjiawi shot in his house by "armed gang of 12 men, who looted the
pI ace.
8-12-1947 Warong (booth) of Tjék Adé at Tjipajoeng lootec\ during the
night by armed gang of 10 men.
3. Police detacl1l1lent PASIR EURIH (sub-district TjIOMAS)
21-11-1947 House of Ass. Wedana at Tjiomas fired at by armed gang from
rifl,es and automatic weapons during the night.
26-11-1947 The Pentjalang of Bobodjong (sub-distr. Tjiomas) shot by
armed gang of 8 men and mutilated; during the night fhe same gang
fired at and looted the houses of 2 police-detectives at Krétég, 'sub-
district Tjiomas.
3-12-1947 Amil of dessa Soekahardja, 'sub-district Tjidjeroek, abducted
during the night by 6 armed TNI men who looted his house.
4-12-1947 Poli ce patrol at Tjiloebang (sub-district Tjiomas) shot at from
automatic weapons during night by armed T.N.I. gang of some 14 men.

164
 4. Police detachment TJIAMPEA (district TJIAMPEA)
11-12-1947 Sarmin of kampong Tjiangsana (district Tjiampea) butchered
by armed gang of Lasjkars.
5. Sub-district SEMPLAK, KEDOENG HALANG and Police detaclz-
ment TJILOEWER
10-11-1947 Two members of tlle field police at Paroeng attacked by armed
gang nea r Tj iseëng (sub-district Semplak) durin g the night.
One was stabbed to dea tll, tlle other severely injured ,
14-11-1947 House of Loerah of Tjendali (sub-district Semplak) looted and
set fire to by armed gang.
The bodies of the Loerah anc! two Pentjalangs of dessa Paboearan (sub-
district Semplak) were found in a weIl, apparently butchered by the gang
of Laskars who had abelucted them some weeks before.
15-11-1947 Mandor Inang of dessa Kedoeng Halang (Kedoengwaring ill.
sub-district Keeloeng Hal ang ) was butchered and beheaded by armeel
ga ng of some 30 Lasjkars. .
20-11-1947 Seven members of tlle Biroeang Merall caught near Semplak.
25-11-1947 Administrator's house of Kaoem Pandak rubb er concern near
Tjiloewer fired at by armed ga ng of some 20 men from rifles and auto-
matic weapons.
30-11-1947 Lauw Oey at Goenoeng Boeboe t (sub-elistrict Semplak) ab-
ducted by 4 armeel Lasjkars.
2-11-1947 Loerah Is/wk of kampon g Kedoeng Halang abducted from his
house at tlle Tjileboetse weg at eight o'c1ock in the morning by six
armed men, and butchered. His body was found to be severely
mutilated.
14-12-1947 At about 4 o'clock in tlle afternoon tlle station at Tjileboet was
attacked by a gang of about 40 men who took the money and smashed
everytlling to pieces . A sedi ti ous Icafle! aga inst the Netllerlands Ineli es
Army was affixed to the building.
Adistributioll shop op posite the stop Tjil eboet was set fire to.
16-12-1947 At about 2 o'clock in the aftefllOoll tlle station Tjileboet was
again attacked by an armed ga ng with rifle and machine-gun fire.
A European railway official was seriollsly wouneled .
6. SOEKABOEMI ol1d district
17-11-1947 Police station Soekamana anel Sawahlega fired at during the
night bi armed gang.
18-11-1947 Fires in kampong Tjisere; police station Soekamana again
fir,ed at.
20-11-1947 Ouring the night fires in kampongs Rawajan and Tjiaoel; house
of Wedana of Soekaboemi fired at.
24-11-1947 Fire near Tjikopo; bridge near kampon g Tjibeureum, near
Slawi set fire to by unruly elements.
25-11-1947 Soldiers fired at near Karang Gantoeng; police pat rol fired at
near kampong Blandongan (Tj ipanengah).
26-11-1947 Police station at Tjikondang fired at from bren-guns by armed
gang; fire at kampong Rambadaja.
29-11-1947 Police station at Tjikondan a aaain fired at during the night;
fires in kampong Kebonkawoeng anct Wangoenredja.

165
30-11-1947 During the night 2 mel~bers of the town police of Soekabo~mi
were abducted from their houses by an armed gang. The next mornIng
their severely mutilated bodies we re found at Waroengdojong.
1-12-1947 Poli ce station at Tjikondang fired at during the night.
2-12-1947 Administrative office of police at Soekaboemi fired at during
the night.
4-12-1947 Police station at Tjipeusing fired at during the night.
5-12-1947 Atjoetof kampong Lio butchered by the gang of Kosim, a Ja-
panese.
8-12-1947 Unidentified lndonesian murdered during the night by armed
gang at kampong Tjiseureuh. Fire at kampong Sitoegedeh.
9-12-1947 Police patrol fired at near kampong Tjigingkik; a policemen
was wounded by a sniper at Tjipanengah.
10-12-1947 During the night the police station at Tjipeusing was attacked
and fired at by armed gang.
12-12-1947 Police station at Sawahlega fired at during the night from
bren-gun . Truck of the M.T.D. (Motor Transport Serv:ice) fired at
. near kampong Tjipeudjeuh (Barosweg) by TNl gang and snipers Driver
killed and 4 persons wounded. The truck was subsequently set fire to
by the TNI gang.

7. T]/AND]OER and district

3-11-1947 The police of Tjirandjang found the mutilated body of Atmadja,

dessa police man of Bodjongsari, who had been abducted some days
previously.
17-11-1947 Sanoesi of dessa Bodjong Pitjoeng (sub-district Tjirandjang)
was abducted by armed gang of 10 men.
18-11-1947 Soeratma, of thè dessa police of Tjikadang (sub-district Tji-
randjang) was attacked by an armed gang of 8 men and shot.
19-11-1947 The dessa of Tjibalagoeng (sub-district Tjirandjang) was
attacked by an armed gang of TNI men, 5 people being seriously injur-
ed and 5 houses set fire t~.
20-11-1947 AdjlG of dessa Koebang (sub-district Pat jet) abducted by armed
gang.
21-11-1947 House in dessa 1K0ebang set fire to by unruly elements (sub-
district Pat jet) .
Hadji Sabana of dessa Sindanglaja (sub-district Tjirandjang) was
assaulted by an armed gang.
23-11-1947 House of Embrik at dessa Djati (sub-district Tjirandjan g )
reduced to ashes by armed gang. The Balé dessa of Bodjongsari (sub-
district Tjirandjang) was set fire to by 7 armed men.
25-11-1947 Jo Giok Soen, manager of the Sindangdjaja concern in dessa
Bodjongsari (sub-district Tjirandjang) was abducted by en armed gang
of some 20 men; this gang also set fire to the house of the teacher
Nata at Bodjongsari. -
26-11-1947 Ahoed of dessa Tjihaoer (sub-district Tjibeber) abducted by
armed .gan.g. Sahim of dessa Seladjambe (sub-distr. Tjirandjang) mur-
dered In hlS house by armed gang, who afterwards set fire to the house
Poedin of kampong Moendjoel (sub-district Pat jet) abducted by armed
gang. A mandoer of dessa Tjiwalen (sub-district Pat jet) was mur-
dered by an armed gang.

166
27-11-1947 House in dessa Waroengdojong set fire to by armed gang (sub-
district Tjikalong Koelon) .
29-11-1947 Loerah Odjo of dessa Bodjong Pitjoeng (sub-district Bodjong
PitIoeng) attacked and murdered by armed gang of some 20 men.
House of the loerah of Bodjongsari (sub-district Tjirandjang) set fire
to by armed gang, who also burned down the dessa school.
12-11-1947 Station-commander Doorman and sergeant Timmermans
(K.L.) shot by snipers during combined patrol near Tjibeber.
Buitenzorg, December 17 1947.
Signed Insp. of P.1.
(Signed) j. Brürer.
Coun tersigned
Chief of corps
R. jasper.

STATEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE

REGENCY OF KRAWANG.
Date Brief description
6-11-1947 At Tamiang Koening rubber plantation the factory and shed
with 25 tons of sheet rubber were bumt down.
Near Djatisari, joeng Foen Kay's rice hulling mill was burnt down.
7';8-11-1947 Near Diatirangas, Sam Hin's riee hulling mill burnt down.
8-11-1947 Near Tjibening a manage r's house and smoking shed were
bumt down.
Near Tjikoempaj an employee's house was bumt down, 2 rifles were
stolen.
Near Goenoeng Poetri fires were started, rubber sheds being burnt down.
Near Goenoeng Soesoeroeh plantation installations bumt down some
persons abducted.
Near Panghoetan tea plantation bumt down .
Near Djatisari part of Khioen Hin & Co's rice hulling mill was bumt
down.
Near Tanggoel, Kwee Lian Tie's rice hulling mill was burnt down.
Near Tjiakaleng 2 sheds of riee hulling mills were burnt down., Railway
track between Tjiganea and Bendoel undermined.
10-11-1947 Near Waewati a smoking shed was bumt down.
10-11-1947 Rails removed from Tjiaganea - Bendoel railway.
11-11-1947
Near Lamaran, Goan Hang Tjiang's riee hulling mill was burnt down.
Near 'Lamaran, Khoe Pee Sioe's rice hulling mill was burnt down.
Near Tjilewe, Sien Boat's ri ce hulling mil! was bumt down.
Near Wadas, Tjiong Boey Hoey's rice hulling mill was burnt down.
Near Wadas, Hoe Liang's riee hulling mill was burnt down.
Near Wadas, Sam Hin's riee hulling mil! was bumt down.
18-11-1947 Station near Tjiganea partly destroyed.
Rubber factory near Goenoeng Poetri bumt down.
19-11-1947 Station of Bendoel destroyed.
28-11-1947 About 500 m of railway track between Daoean and Kesambi
torn up.

167
29-11-1947 Rails torn up between Sadang and Tjikampek.
8-12-1947 Smoking sheds and dwellings burnt down near Tjoeroeg.
Near Thimahi (Tjimahi?) 2 houses were set fire to.
10-12-1947 Rubber plantation burnt down near Tjigadjah .
11-12-1947 24 Chinese murdered near Tangkil.
13-12-1947 A shift of workmen repairing a bridge was fired at near P elonl.
14-12-1947 Bridge destroyed 10 km NW. of Tjikalllpek.
A number of houses set fire to near Klari.
Weapon carrier fired at 10 km N. of Tjikampek and again 18 km N. of
Tjikampek, its front wheel being hit. It had to be left behind and was
set fire to at night.
Employee's house burnt down near Goenoeng Poetri.
15-12-1947 Bridge set fire to 20 km SE. of Poerwakarta .
2 Indonesians murdered at Tiilamaja.
Several houses set fire to at Tjikampek.
16-12-1947 Railjeep fired at between Tjikampek and Poerwakarta.
3 Bridges destroyed 20 km SE. of Poerwakarta .
Near Telagasari 3 emergency bridges on the road to Lemahabang were
destroyed.

TERRORISM IN THE REGENCY Of CHERIBON AS fROM

NOVEMBER lst 1947.

Cheribon Sinclanglaoet Tjilecloeg Pl oclllbon Paliman- Ardjawi-

an nangocll
Munders 16 1 1 16
Arson 2 9 17 2
Kidnapping 5 1 32 2 3
Looting 39 2 43 2 2
--~- -- ._--

STATEMENT Of SUBSERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE

DISTRICT Of INDRAMAjOE.
Date Brief description .
7-1 1-1947 7 cases of arson to houses.
8-11-1947 6 cases of arson to houses.
10-11-1947 4 cases of arson to houses.
24-11-1947 A market shed was set fire to in the dessa of Tj ibereng, sub-
district Tjikedoeng, district Losarang.
24/ 25-11-1947 In the night Kasan, the new head of the dessa of Kerta-
semaja, sub-district Kertasemaja, district Djatibarang, was abductecl.
In the night Solichin, the new head of the dessa of Oedjoenggaris, sllb-
district Bangodoea, district Djatibarang, was abducted.
19 houses were looted in the dessa of Haoergeulis, sub-district Haoer-
geulis, district Kadanghaoer.
25-11-1947 An attempt was made by terrorists to abduct Abdoelrasid, head
of the dessa of Tjibareng, sub-district Tjikedoeng, district Losarang .
He managed to escape, but was fired at and wounded by the abdllctors;
he was taken to the hospital in Indramajoe.
26/ 27-11-1947 In the night Masngad, the new head of the dessa of Boen-
der, sub-district Bangoedoea, district Djatibarang, was abducted .

168
29-11-1947 The dwelling of the village head Sàrkim was set fire to in
Gempol, dessa Pagagan, sub-district Losarang.
3/ 4-12-1947 In the night Tjastam, head of the dessa of Temijang, anc!
Tjatrab, Clerk of the same dessa , sub-district Gaboeswetan, district
Kandanghaoer, were abducted.
4-12-1947 10 houses were looted in the dessa of Bantarwaroe, sub-district
Haoergeulis, district Kandanghaoer.
7-12-1947 In the night 4 members of the dessa police were abducted.

STATEMENTS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE DISTRICT OF

KOENINGAN.

2-11-1947 Nata Achjar, Nata Timoe and his daughter, who was employee!
at the office of the Recomba, all three living at Awirarangan, were ab-
e!uctec!. Nata Achjar was taken to Tjiniroe, where h e was murderec! .
8-12-1947 An M.T.D. truck in which some Chinese civilians wer e getting
a lift was .fired at with automatic weapons from an ambush, 2 Chinese
being wounded.

16D
 INCIDENTAL REPORTS

ON PREVAILING TERRORISM
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION. Secretariat.
.Issue No. 43.
Ag. No. 466 j SCjCor.

Batavia, December 17 th, 1947.

Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith reports of two broadcasts of the
Voice of Free lndonesia for the information of the Security Council's Com-
mittee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question.

remain, Sir,
Your Obedicnt Servant,
(Signed) G. C. Stuyt,
Secretary of the Netherlands
Special Committee.
To the Chairll1an
of the Security Council's
Coml11ittee of Good Offices
On the lndonesia Question.

ANNEX I.
Secretariat.
Issue No. 44.
"Republican circ1es are not so optimistic about the Indonesian;
Dutch negotiations."
DJOCJAKARTA, 11 December (V.O.F.I.). For the birth of thc Rcnvillc
negotiations now being held between the Republic of Indon esia and Holland
under thc supervision of the United Nations Good Offices Committee, we may
congratulate the United Nations Good Offices Coml11ittee, who have spent
considerable time and energy for fin ding a speedy settlement of the Inclonesian-
Dutch dispute.
Thc activities of the Uniteel Nations Good Offices COl11mittee are clearly
aimed at preventing by all means thc two negotiating parties from breaking
into a colonial war again, with the disastrous repercussions which would be
feit in all the countries, directly or indirectly interested in Indonesia.
There is one of the most powerful governments in the world ~ the
American government ~ in this regard, which has taken every possible l11eans
to furnish the negotiating parties with the available facilities. However, despitc
all this, political circles in the capital anel those in Djakarta take a rather
pessimistic stand towards the outcome.
They take the view that these Renville negotiations are the vaguest
negotiations held between these two equal countries.
This pessimistic stand has been aggravated by the fact that of the three
original members of the United Nations Good Offices Committee, only one
member, namely Prof. Frank P. Graham of the United States, is left. Mr. Paul
van Zeeland who is supposed to return to Indon esia aga in , departed for 8e!-
gium before the opening of the Renville negotiations, while Mr. Justice Kirby of
Australia could only make his opening address at th e inauguration of
the negotiations, after which he went on his journey back to A1ustralia.

173
This sudden 'departure o.f Mr. justice Kirby to. lAustraIia has, to. so.me
degree, caused a feeling o.f pessimism o.n the part o.f the Indo.nesians who. are
o.f the o.pinio.n that with the 'departure o.f Mr. Kirby, Indo.nesia has lo.st Us
champio.n.
We are no.w trying to. co.nvince the internatio.nal wo.rld that the real and
pure Indo.nesians differ fro.m tho.se Indo.nesian gro.ups who. are willing to
co.o.perate with the Dutch and ,do. no.t agree with the status o.f the Republic.
This co.uld o.bvio.usly be seen fro.m the appo.intment o.f Mr. Abdulkadir, an
unkno.wn perso.nality o.f dubio.us ability as he ad o.f the Dutchdelegatio.n in the
present Renville nego.tiatio.ns. No. o.ne with co.mmon sense co.uld deny the c1ear
distinctio.n between. the rea! and pure Indo.nesians who. represent the Republic
and tho.se Indo.nesians who. takethe si de o.f the Dutch who. are anxio.us to. re-
install their co.lo.nial system in Indo.nesia.

A N N EXil.
Secretaria t.
Issue No.. 45.
Batavia, 12 Dec. 1947.
DJOCJAKARTA, 11 December (V.O.F.I.). So.me circles feared that if the
Dutch sho.ul'd co.ntinue their so.-called po.lice actio.n, Indo.nesia wo.uld go.
co.mmunist.
Viewing the present po.litical situatio.n in Indo.nesia, Dr. Halim, member o.f
the Republican parliamentary wo.rking co.mmittee, in this article published by
the Republican daily Nasio.nal, urged that the Renville nego.tiatio.ns be a great
step fo.rward, fo.r it has always been the po.licy o.f the Dutch to. refuse any
I

nego.tiatio.ns with the Indo.nesian Republic befo.re a settlement o.nthe military

proQlem has been achieved.
Dr. Halim further expressed his satisfactio.n that the Three Natio.n Co.m-
mittee is favo.urably dispo.sed to. the Republican standpo.int o.f co.nsidering the
po.litieal questio.n o.f prime impo.rtance. He also. gave his o.pinio.ns as to. the
Chinese ánd In'do.nesian members o.f the Dutch delegatio.n. Dr. Halim o.pined
that this is an internal questio.n o.f the Dutch themselves, pro.vided these members
represent the Dutc~ go.vernment and are given the autho.rity to. act as such.
The Dutch are in a bad situatio.n, Dr. Halim said, o.n acco.unt o.f the
heavy military expenditures and no.n-co.o.peratio.n o.f the peo.ples in the areas
invaded by them . The Go.o.d Offices Co.mmittee, Dr. Halim went o. n, feared
that if the Dutch co.ntinued their so.-called po.lice actio.n, Indo.nesia wo.uld incline
to. co.mmunism.
All this, Or. Halim co.ntinued, ' and the sincerity o.f the Indo.nesian
Republic in trying to. fin'd a so.lutio.n alo.ng peaceful ways in co.ntrast with the
Dutch Aggressive and greedy attitude willundo.ubtedly exercise its infl;uence
o.n the Three Natio.n Co.mmittee.
ft is a great obstacle to. bo.th the Indo.nesians and the Duteh, Dr. Halim
po.inted o.ut, that amo.ng the Dutch peo.ple there is no.t o.ne stro.ng man who.
has the co.urage to. frankly admit th at the Dutch co.lo.nial po.licy is wrong and
must be radieally changed acco.rding to. 'demo.cratie principles.
Dr, Halim, o.n the o.ther hand, also. admitted that the state o.f affairs in
the Indo.nesian Republic still needed mo.re efficiency.
He co.ncluded by stating that it is the duty o.f the Indo.nesian peo.ple to.
give every suppo.rt to. the 100do.nesian delegatio.n and that the Indo.nesians must
ever be \ prepared fo.r a flare-up o.f the Dutch so.-called po.liee actio.n .

174.
 The Dutch colonial administration put Republican officials in jaiI who
refused to work for the Dutch. Official reports revealed that severaI members
of the Republican state police headquarters at Poerwokerto, ce11ltral Java, and
many other Republican officials, who at the time of the Dutch invasion had
been arrested with their famili es at a neighbouring viIIage, we re taken into
custody by Dutch patrols and transported to Poerbolinggo, a village north-
east of Poerwokerto.
Among these Republicans were Mr. Soemarto, deptlty chief ot the
Republican state police, two poli ce inspectors and poIice ....... Soedarto(?).
The deputy chief of the Republican state poli ce, Mr.Soemarto, whom the
Dutch ordered to act as superintendent of the Dutch police, refused and was
consequently put in jaiI at Poerwokerto. Mr, Soemarto preferred to be in prison
to becoming a servant of the Dutch colonisers.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION. Secretaria t.

Issue No. 53.
Ag. No. 525j CGD j Cor.

Batavia, December 20th, 1947.

Sir,
I have the honour to draw your attention to the encIosed broadcast on
December the 18th of the Voice of Free Indonesia .
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) G . C. Stuyt,
Secretary of the Netherlands
Special Committee.
To the Chairman of the Security
Council's Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

Dj okjakarta, 18 Dec. (V. O. F. 1.) - Antara correspondent reported

from Djakarta th at there are as yet no indications of a satisfactory outcome
of the present Renville negotiations. PoliticaI observers said that by launching
accusations against the Republic, the Dutch attempted to frustrate the speedy
progress of the official negotiations. These accusations even caused th e
Australian represenfative fo say fhaf fhere is no goodwill on th e Dufch side
to bring the Indonesian matter to a quick and satisfactory outcome. WeII-
informed circ\es decIared that the Dutch delegation has no fuIl authority in
the present negotiations. This is evidenced, they said, by the way the Dutch
are tryin g to postpone the negotiations. The Dutch wish to bring down the
position of the Indonesian Republic on the same line as the puppet East Indo-
aesia. The formation of the Indonesian federation committee as weIl as the
intention of setting up an autonomous state of West Java cIearly show the
Dutch aims of hampering the progress of the Renville negotiations.

\75
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION. Secretariat.
Issue No. 52.
Ag. No. 226j CGD/ Cor.
Batavia, 22nd December, 1947.
Sir,
I have the hOl1ollf to draw your attention to the article entitled "Bung
Tomo" which appeared in the Republican newspaper "National" on Decem-
ber 18th.
In this article an explanation is given of the ,decision of the Republican
Government to prohibit further broadcasts by Major General Bung Tomo,
indicating that " it is only a tactical gesture".
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenbllrch .
To the Chairman of the
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat

SPECIAL COMMITTEE Issue No. 61.
Ag. No. 530/CGDjSCICor.
Bafavia, 23rd December 1947 .
Sir.
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an order issu ed
by Major Soemardhi, Commander T.N.I., Barisan V1/29, Battalion 17, dated
November 29, which was fOllnd recently in Soerabaya.
Vour obedient Servant,
I remain, Sir,
(Signed H. van Vredenblll'ch.
To the Chainnan of the
Security Council's Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Qllestion.

TRANSLATION
Order No. 825jB.A./Xlj47.
November 29th, 1947,
10.30 hOllfs.

From Major Soel1larcli, Commancler T.N.I. , Barisan V1/29,

Battalion 17,
To Captain Sarilan.
On account of the behaviollr of a member of the Civil Administration in
the area held by the enemy (Modjokerto), who does not work to our satisfac-
tion, we have issued the following order:
1. Immediately af ter th e issue of this order the Regent of Modjokerto must
be arrested and if necessary be killed.
2. The result of this arrest must at on ce be announced to me. I expect this
order to be adequately carried out.
3. End of message.

176
 Batavia, 23 December 1947.
Sir,
I have thehonour to transmit herewith a translation of a pamphlet which
was found recently in Pasirian, East Java.
I may draw the special attention of your Committee to the alleged arrest
of the resident of the island of Madoera.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the
Security Council's Committee
of Good Offices on the
Indoncsian Question.

TRANSLATION OF A PAMPHLET FOUND 23 December 1947

RECENTLY IN PASIRIAN (East Java) .
BROTHERS OF THE "TJAKRA" TROOPS TAKE TH IS INTO YOUR
CONSIDERATION! WHAT ARE THE DUTCH SOLDIERS
DOING IN MADURA?
The Dutch are defrauding the people of their rights and rob their pro-
perties.
The Dutch are violating the honour of Madurese girls.
The Dutch are robbing the foodstuffs of th e people and take them to
Madura.
Murders are carried on constantly,
The father of the Madurcse, th c Resid ent of Madura, was arrested by the
Dutch because he refused to help the Dutch.
However, it is very amazing, that up till now there are still Madurcse
sons who are willing to cooperate with the Dutch and help them.
The soldiers of the "Tjakra" troops have become and are up till now the
tooI of the Dutch and they are fighting against their own people.
Brothers, do not you realize that you are being us ed as cover by the
Dutch .
Brothers of the "Tjakra" troops. How do you feel as human beings? are
you not the sons of Indonesia? why are you helping the Dutch, while in reality
the Dutch are planning to colonize your own people,
Come lo your senses, brolhers. ft is now not )Iet too late.
Com e fo us again.
Use the weapons you get from the Dutch to resist them.
We Indonesian young men are watching your attitude. Let us fight the
Dutch together.
Do not remain astray forever .
Com e back fo the righf path.
Come 'back fo your people.
Do not believe the promises made by the Duteh.
TETAP MERDEKA!
Yourbrothers the Indones'ian people.

177
NETHBRLANDS DELEGATION
SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Secretaria t.
'Issue No. 59.
Ag. No. 541/CG:D/Cor.
Batavia, 23rd December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith an instruction issued by the Chief
of the General Staff, Commando Central Sumatra, Boekit Tinggi, to C. Brigade
11 and C. Brigade B at Taroetoeng, whieh seems to constitute a c1ear order to
sabotage Iines of communication, to in1iltrate into Netherlands held territory,
to destroy supplies and apply the scorchedearth poliey.

I remain, Sir,
Vour obedient Servant,
(Signed H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the
Security Council's Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

The Chief of the General Staff, Commando Central Sumatra, Boekit Tinggi
sent to C. Brig. 11 and C. Brig. Bat Taroetoeng the follewing instruction.
Main .outlines of our preparations.
. I. Principle: as long as the last Netherlands soldier has not yet left our-
territory, we must remain alert.
11. The consolidation and stabilization of the Government (polities),
economy, military leadership and unity in the army are essential.
111. Our measures against the enemy:
a. The institution of a safety zone round occupied territory with a radius
of 10 km., calculated from the nearest enemy posts.
This is necessary to prevent any thrust by the enemy.
1. Our Defence must be organized better.
2. Bridges and roads within the zone with a radius of 10 km. must be
destroyed, eliminated and obstructed. Obstructions must also be
placed in the rivers.
3 . Guerilla troops must carry out attacks in the flanks of enemy
communication and supply lines.
4. Make infiltrations into enemy-held territory.
5. Commit sabotage to supply een tres and storage depots of the
enemy.
b. Wa ge <:ounter propaganda directed against occupied territories:
1. Internal conditions
2. Information
3. Regulations regarding wor kers and agricultural labourers:
c. Scorched earth policy and sabotage in occupied areas.
d. Measures against traitors.
e. Propaganda in enemy circles, making use of controversies.

' 178
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.
Batavia, 24th December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a pamphlet found
affixed to a tram pylon on December 12th.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Serevant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburc'h.
To the Chairman of the
Security Council's
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question .

MERDEKA
Our leaders are in conference with the Dutch. What have the Pemoedas
prepared for the days th at will come; after the conference, if it fails? Shall
we also sit back quietly at the attacks of the Dutch? Pemoedas, where are
your promises and your oaths? Do you not realize yet that we are being
cheated to our faces by the Dutch? During discussions during armistiee, the
Dutch have constantly attacked, plundered and trampled our lands that were
quiet. They say they will liberate the people trom oppression and menace ?
They said they would assist the people who were suffering and in
misery. Was not all this deception? jWho we re supposed to be liberated, we,
the people who were continuously threatened by the Dutch bayonet, or the
people that Iived in peace under the protection of the Republican Government?
While our people in the Netherlands-held areas themselves asked to be liberated
and to evacuate to Republican areas, is it possible that the people of the
Republican hel'd areas desire to go to Netherla'nds territory to surrender, to be
oppressed? That is the foul poliey of the Dutch. Therefore, because there are
indications that the conference will be a failure and that the Dutch will continue
their attacks, therefore it is now right, brothers, that you should prepare
yourselves.
Have the umbrella ready before the rain starts.
Ever in freedom
"Ogah" = Batavia dialect word for Tida maoe (do not want to) .

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.
Secretariat.
Issue No. 63.
Ag. No. 560i CGDICor.
Batavia, 30 December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit a translation of a document found in the
first days of November 1947 near BANjOEMAS, in which the population was
incited to revolt on October 31 st at midnight.
179
 I may add th at according to informatîon received from the competent
authorities, various encampments in the area concerned have been attacked
between October 31 st and November 2nd.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
In the absence of
Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo,
(Signed H. van Vredenbur.ch .
To the Chairman of
the Security Council's Committee
of Oood Offices
on the Indonesian Question .

TRANSLATION OF A DOCUMENT FOUND AT BANJOEMAS.

Command Post Sector XII Guerilla troops.

Army order No. 46.

The entire population is instructed as from 31st October 1947 at 24.00

hours (in the night of Friday, Legi 15 Besar 1878 at 12 hours midnight) to
rise in revoIt as follows .
I. All roads to be destroyed, torn up, obstructed;
2. All bridges to be destroyed, obstructed;
3. The "scorched earth" policy to be appIied to all buildings occupied by
the enemy; they must be burned down;
4. All enemy persons to be exterminated, killed;
5. All railways (rails, telephone wires, sleepers) to be destroyed.
Sector XII, 27 October 1947.
the Commander,
(Signed) HADIBROTO

NETHERLANDS DELEOATION.
Secretariat.
Issue No. 65.
Ag. No. 560jCOD /Cor.
Batavia, 30 December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a pamphlet found
in Batavia on December 14, 1947.
I remain, Sir,
In the absence of
Raden A.adulkadir Widjojo.atmodjo,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of
the Security CounciI's Committee
of Oood Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

180
 TRANSLATION Of A LEAfLET fOUND IN BATAVIA
ON 14th DECEMBER 1947.
IMPORTA NT
BROTHERS-IN-ARMS!
It has now been proved that the Netherlanders are imposing
upon us, especially upon us, Indon esian soldiers of the Royal Nether-
lands Indies Army. We are called brave, stalwart, skilled in using our
rifles, but our bravery is only tried upon our own people, we are skilful in
shooting people of our own race, we are educated and trained to be sent into
action against our own families and our own relations.
/We are praised as faithful to their service; an important quality in a
human being. But, after all .. . which is more faithful, the master of the house
in guarding his own home or the dog that keeps watch? Obviously the dog is
more faithful than a man! Far into the night, even all night long, he does not
sleep, sa as to guard his master's house. Is it then not rational that the dog is
called a faithful animal?
But, however long the dog must keep watch, what is all the reward he
gets? Not more than the burnt crusts and the cold remnants of rice left by the
master in insufficient quantities, less than half a coconut full. We of course pity
the .dog, don't we?
But compare him with ourselves, who are soldiers for the Netherlanders,
wh at difference is there between us? What we feel when we look at that dog
is what our people feel when they see us (Netherlands soldiers-soldiers of the
Royal Netherlands Indies Army). They pity us, but they are more disgusted
with us than with a dog. \Acknowledge your faults, all who are willing!
If not, time wil\ show you your error.
Realise that we are now hated by the people, later on we shall be killed
by the people and then burn in purgatory as a punishmel1t of the Lord to
traitors.
We already feel an unquiet in our minds, which means that Dur spi rits are
troubled.
From your brothers in arms.
"00 AH " .

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.
Batavia, 30th December 1947.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit a translation of part of a braadcast by
Radio Nusantara on December 23 last.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedierllt Servant,
In the absence of
Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the
Security Council 's Committee
of Oood Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

181
 NOESANTARA EDUCATING NETHERLANDS SOLDIERS.
Netherlands colonialism, Japanese Fascism and open terrorization.

RADIO NOESANTARA, 23 December 1947.

Netherlands soldiers, while you regard the Indonesian Republic as a
fascist republic, you yourselves have to contend with fascism, which has been
terrorizing the Netherlands people for the last five years.
Netherlands soldiers, the army now fighting against the Indonesian
people consists chiefly of foreigners, among wh om are many Germans.
This "foreign division" consists of six regiments (?) It was recruited
from the countries of N. America, England and France, from parts of Germany,
and this battalion is led by one Mengeler (?) and in it there is a man called
Storbach from Csecho-Slovakia, who is famous, or rather infamous, for
his execution of students in 1943.
Several units of this foreign division have already arrived in, or returned
trom, Indonesia. .
Netherlands soldiers, This 'd eath battalion, which has killed many men
and women in concentration camps, these men, are now fighting on your side
against the Indonesian Republic.
Is it not evident th at this open terrorization rules where fascism rules?
. These people cannot possibly live in a democratie community - why ? ~
because they are used to kiIIing. HitIer used them in the Ukraine in the second
world war.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Batavia, 31 December 1947.

Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of part of a written
and signed statement made by a T.N,I, Ueutenant, dated 11 th December.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
In the absence ot Raden Abdulkadir
Widjojoatmodjo,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the Security Council,
Committee of Good Offices On the
Indonesian Question.

Extract from written and signed statement made by a T.N.I. Lieutenant,

dated lUh December 1947.

The abovementioned lieutenant stated that when he was Commandant

of the military prison at Pamekasan (Madoera) , where political prisoners
were detained, he had received the following orders:
a. Prom Colon el Chandra Hasan:
"Any political prisoner attempting to escape must be kiIIed".
b,. Prom Major Aboedjamal:
"If any political prisoner commits any infringement of the regulations
he must be killed or burnt alive".

182
 On account of the latter order 2 incendiary bombs and gasoline were
kept in the building, in which there we re at that moment 28 political pri-
soners.
In an attempt to escape when the Netherlands troops were approaching
Pakong, 15 km N .E. of Pamekasan, 17 of the 28 prisoners made good their
escape, the 11 others were shot. After some days 3 fugitives were arrested
and also shot. Subsequently, at Padjoedan and Poetjoek Prigi (near Pa-
kong) some more of the fugitives were caught and al so killed. One of the
remaining fugitives was arrested by the Sabils of Plakpak and bumt alive.
The possessions of the political prisoners were given in loan to the
guard troops, and the gold and silver rings were sold by the lieutenant to
his own profit.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

Secretaria t.
Issue No. 62.
Ag. No. 558/ COD/ Cor.
Batavia, 30th December 1947:
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a document which
was captured at SOEKARAD JA (2 km South of Soekaboemi) in the begin-
ning of December and to which I may draw your special attention.

I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
In the absence of Raden Abdulkadir
Widjojoatmodjo,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the Security Council,
Committee of Oood Offices on the
Indonesian Question.

DOCUMENT CAPTURED EARLY IN DECEMBER AT SOEKARADJA.

(2 km S. of SOEKABOEMI)

Studerits' Army Battalion I,

West-Java. . .
We who belong to the staff of th: stude~ts' A.rmy, Battalton!'
of We~t­
Java, are sending you herewith some mstructlOns Issued by the vice-Premier
Dr. Oani. . h h t d
Or. Oani gave these instructions to our representahve w en e gran e
the latter an audience at Batavia.

INSTRUCTION . . .
1. Workers must go on strike and should recelve fmanclal. support.
2 Houses belonging to the people may no longer be set flre to.
3: Stop all killing of your own people. (Suspected individuals, leaders in
particular, may only be arrested). ,. '.
4. Create disturbance in the town, destroy all the ene~y s hl mets of commu-
nication (bridges), destroy all their head quarters In t e owns.
183
 5. All army organizations must always be maintained. No independent
measures may be taken. Every army command must be able to issue
funds to soldiers (who are on the si de of the revolution), so that the
soldiers may obey the order given by their respective commanders.
This is the vice-Premiers' instruction,. It must be circulated on every
front.
For the Commander of the Students' Army of West-Java,
(Signed) Wahhab.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat

Issue No . n.
Ag. No. 587/COD jCor.
Batavia, Januari 3, 1948.
Sir,
I have the honour to traf\smit herewith a translation of a pamphlet which
I was found in Manjar (Orissee) on 27th November.
I remain, Sit,
Your obedient Servant,
In the absence of Raden Abdulkadir
Widjoj oatmodj o,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch .
To the Chairman of the Security Council,
Committee of Oood Offices on the
Indonesian Question.

TRANSLATION OF A PAMPHLET FOUND IN MANJAR ON

27th NOVEMBER 1947.

To the people of Gresik

Brothers, you all know why the Dutch have attacked our Republic, their
sole aim is to dominate again over our people . Since 21st July 1947 the
Netherlands soldiers have been destroying our towns and killing many of
our peopJe. , The Dutch have crossed into our territory, harassed our popu-
Jation and robbed them of their possessions. The Dutch are not to be trusted ,
they are worthless. People of Oresik! Do not remain idle! Our struggle will
continue! Do not remain indifferent! Rouse yourselves, attack the Dutch. If
the people are united, the Dutch cannot repel the fury of the people.
Do you wish to remain independent, or do you wish to be the sJaves
of the . Dutch? If you really choose freedom, give clear proof of it. Guerilla
brothers, continue the guerilla. Follow the example of the peopJe of Batu
(Malang) ! The people of Batu fought the Dutch because the Dutch soJdiers
were uncouth, they dishonoured our women and girls. The' people of Batu
are imbued with the spirit of freedoril, they refuse to be made use of by the
Dutch.

184
 Brothers of Gresik, descendants of Soenan Giri, assert yourselves, Do
not bend to the Dutch! Do not let yourselves be ordered about by the Dutch!
We are already independent, we have our own Oovernment, the 00-
vernment of the Republic of Indonesia. All we have to do is to acknowledge
this Goverment.
The Dutch soldiers are real disturbers of the peace, looters, murderers,
extortioners, tyrants . Therefore they must be swept away!
Tetep Merdeka! Freedom for ever!
Your brothers, the people of
Indonesia.

NETHERLANDS DELEGATION Secretariat

Issue No. 73.
Ag. No. 588/COD/Cor.
Batavia, Januari 3, 1948.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a leaflet found
in Rawahgede on 9th December 1947.
I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman of the Security Council's
Committee of Oood Offices on the
Indonesian Ques'tion.
Translation of leaflet found in Rawahgede (Krawang) on 9th December
1947.'
MEROEKA
ZOOR BERMAHKOTA.
To:
All Pemo~da-tools of the Dute/l .
Hullo, Pemoeda-tools of the Duteh, whose double game is getting
jammed.
For the Corned-beef, the bread and the butter you ~orget your family.
Repent, Awake! .
Use your common sense, if you really want to regard yourself as a
living being Whom are you defending?
Many Dutch have stated that it will not be long before they return to
their country.
When the Dutch leave, where will you be?
Will they take you?
No, they will certainly not take you, for the fa,:t is their own position
is not certafn, because their country is ruined!
Oefertd your own native soil, do no think only of bread and milk.
If you cannot get rid of that idea, the Mothercountry wip take revenge.
The fighter against the oppressor.

185
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.
Batavia, January 6, 1948.
Sir,
I have the honour to draw the special attention of the Committee of Good
Offices to the enclosed document containing a translation of an instruction
of the so-called people's Army found in Batavia on December 15, 1947.

I remain, Sir,
Your obedient Servat,
In the absence of
Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.

To the Chairman of the Security Council's

Committee of Good Offices on the
Indonesian Question.

Translation of a Document found in Batavia on December 15. 1947.

Headquarters People's Army
Leader of Sector 11.
Subject; Disarmamellt.
Measl.1res prescribed for disarming Netherlands soldiers.
Merdeka!
In view of the desire of the entire population of the city of Batavia to
start a general revoIt as soon as possible, as it can no longer await the Ü'lltcome
of the negotiations, and considering that for an independent state, peace alone
is not sufficient, although the world tries to avoid war, and considering that
this independence has alrea'dy been attended by fighting, I, in my quality
of leader of Sector II, hereby charge every leader of a branch or section to
act as follows:
I. When an order in issued by Headquarters to the leader of the Sector,
the latter passes this on to every branch and section leader in the order
as arranged, according to the fifth column system and in code.
11. When the proper time has come, which wiII be announced by the arranged
signal, all must work together; if the arms have fallen into our hands
we may proceed to hold up every passer-by so as to include him in our
troop and to provide him with arms so that he can assist us; this applies
in particular t6 the bet ja drivers.
lIJ. Every road of any importance is to be guarded.
Next,soldiers wiII have to be arrest~d and the police and Pao An Tui, in
short, every organization that the Dutch have equipped with arms.
IV. Every leader of a branch or . section is bound to report at onee to us
when the places arranged have been occupied. If the work of the fifth
('oll1mn fails, we shall have to have reeourse to arson and to fighting, so
that the whole town is in flames. We shall also have tO create disorder
lest the fa te of Batavia be the same as that of other towns in the interior.

186
NETHERLANDS DELEOATION.
Batavia, 9 January 1948.
Sir,
I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an instruction
issllcd by the Commander of Wehrkreise 111 Southen area of the 2nd Division
of the T.N.I. on 16 November 1947.
I remain, Sir,

your Obedient Servant,

(Signed) H., van Vred enburch

To the Chairman
of the Security Council's
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question .

Translation of an Instruction issued by the T.N.I.

on 16 November 1947.
TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA D1VISION 11
H.Q. WEHRKREISE 111 SOUTHERN AREA.
Instruction
1. Incitement to greater activity of social elements opposing the Netherlands
Government.
2. Disturb peace and order as much as possible (encaurage looting and
violation) .
3. The following persons should be punished:
a) pro-Netherlanders
b) accomplices of the Netherlanders
c) pro-Netherlands looters. .
4. Extension of sabotage and boycott. None of our people may work with
the Netherlanders or give them food.
5. Extension of armament by the organization of gangs who must acquire
these arms by robbery.
6. Give sound information to the population after disturbances of the peace
.3.nd incidents, so that these may be convinced that full independence can
only be gained by a massacre and the greatest possible sacrifices.
The man in charge who receives these instructions must see to it that
they are carried out.

16 November 1947

Commander Wehrkreise 111

Southern Area
Lieutenant II
(Signed) SABAR.

187
NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
Batavia, 9 January, 1948.
TOP SECRET.
Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the three following documents:

1) Directive for the Ministry of Propaganda at Djocjacarta.
2) Translation of an article of the daily newspaper "Min Pao" of 3rd
January entitled : "The experiences of the Chinese on Java during
the year 1947."
3) Extract from a report on the situation in East Java on 27 December
1947.

On the basis of the documents regarding the prevailing terrorism which

the Netherlands Delegation has transmitted so far to the Committee of Oood ...
Offices, the Netherlands Governments now considers that sufficient proof
has been given that this campaign of terrorism since the 1st of November
has not only been maintained by the Government at Djocjakarta, but that
th at Government has even tried to intensify this campaign and to perfect it.
In view of the above the regular transmission of documentary material
on this subject will be discontinued. The Netherlands Delegation reserves
the right nevertheless to bring to the knowledge of your COlTImittee outstan-
ding illustrations of the afore-mentioned campaign.

I remain, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) H. van Vredenburch.
To the Chairman
of the Security Council's
Committee of Good Offices
on the Indonesian Question.

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