The War in Indochina
Major R. Ronssin du Chatelle, French Armu
T HE Indochinese drama began as
far back as March 1945 when
the Japanese invaded the country.
From that time until March 1946,
when the French Expsditionary Corps
landed at Haiphong, French Govern-
ment control in Tonkln waa completely
loat, and the maintenance of internal
sacurity was in the hands of foreign
troops.
During thie period, Ho Chi-minh
established himself as the leader of
the Nationalist groups and moved to
consolidate his position. He negotiated
a bilateral agreement with France in
March 1946 limiting the authority of
the newly landed French troops by re-
ducing their field of action solely to
the establishment of assigned garri-
sons, prohibiting them from fanning
out over the country.
While negotiations over the future
of Indochina faltered, Ho and his Min-
ister of National Defense, General Vo
Nguyen Giap, accelerated the reorga-
nization and reequipment of the Viet-
minh forces. Ho judged hia military
forces adequate and capable of ter-
minating the French presence. He be-
lieved that the campaign he counted
on would be brief. The Chinese had
left Tonkin, and the French forces
were numerically week and dispersed
in garrieons wh]ch would be ea<syto
ieolate. Thus, the e?lution to the Apo-
litical impasse seemed to him to reside
in an armed contlkt which he prepared
with the utmost eecreey.
Veil of Secrecy lifted
On 16 December the veil of eecrecy
was lifted as Hanoi was invested and
portione of the cit~ seized by rebels.
Simultaneously, the French garneons
of To@h, Hai Duong, Phu Lang
Thuong, Bacninh, Namdinb, and
others throughout Indochina were at-
tacked by fanatic Vietminh troope. It
was a surprise operation, %nd it put
an end to the talks which had been
going on for almost a year. It also
nullifiedthe France-Vietnamese agree-
ment signed in March.
With the resumption of hostilities,
there began a new phase of the Indo.
chlnese problem which France waa to
endure for more than seven years.
The period from 19 December 1946
to December 1949 coneisted of our re-
conquest of Tonkln. It carried us to
the Chinese frontier “andwas followed
by a pacification effort. The Vietminht
after their initial failure, feU back to
their bases in the rear areas of, the
country, avoided combat, and reacted
to our initiatives only by guerrilla ac-
tione of small scope. They concentrated
Translated and digested frem
a two-part article origindg fm.b-
lished in L’AIt@E (France)
March-April 1961 and May 1961,
, under the title, “Tournante Hie-
toriqwee dee Combate dn Tonlctn,
19.$8-195A” Trarzelation by Mr.
LaVergne Dale, Leavenworth,
Kaneaz.
February 13S6
their effortz mainly on preparing and
developing a major fighting fore+-the
principal instrument of their policy
—end in ideological activity with the
population.
New Phase Begins
In December 1949 a new phase of
-the war began ae the enemy, who had
thus far confined himeelf to guerrilla
actions, savagely unveiled his capa-
bilities. He was able to engage 3,000
‘to 4,000 men at a given point for a
period of several daye, and he could
conduct surpriee attacks. The ratio of
forces wae more favorable to him, and
he was able to compensate for hie
qualitative inferiority by concentrat-
ing hie efforts on our weak points.
For ue it became eesential, if we
wiehed to remain in our acquired po-
sitions, to continue our efforts stub-
bornly. We would also have to reex-
amine the military problem which an
ambitioue policy had imposed on ue.
This would be the task of the succes-
sive local commands which were dy-
namic in both thought and action.
Continuing without letup, the enemy
began his first offeneive toward the
end of 1949 with the Le ~1 campaign.
Th]e operation had been underway
since July 1949 in the western part
of Hoa Binh, ”and it won for hlm a
zone which was essential for his com-
munications between Viet Bac and
Thanhhoa. Hoa Binh and Colonial
Route Number 6 seemed, in fact, so
important that General Jean de Lattre
—
de Tassigny reoccupied them, but I.Iat-
talions were swallowed up there, to the
detriment of the Red River Delta
(Figure 1).
Then, during the first days of 1950,
a second campaign, Le Hong Phong
.-.‘I, took place in the northweet around
Laokay. The goal was the liberation
of the entire west bank of the Red
31

River. The post at Pho ,Lu, which had
defended itself heroically in 1949, was
obliged to cease fighting. When the
post at Ngida Lo was attacked, it was
saved by the brilliant stand of its de-
fenders and the timely intervention of
an airborne battalion.
We reacted offensively by a demoli-
tion raid in the region of Yen Bay and
—.
Figure
by the occupation of Than Uyen. Calm
returned aud continued until autumn.
Counterguerrilla atilvity was then or-
ganized with the eupport of the moun-
taineers who refused to submit to the
yoke of the V@tminh.
At the same time, eetWity wee re-
sumed in the northeast zone. The Dong
Khe post on Colonial Route Number 4
wee tsken on 27 May and reoccupied
a Militmy Review
““--l
the same afternoon; reinforcements
were sent to That Khe and Lengson;
and we carried out cleaning-up opera-
tions in the approaches to Colonial
Route Number 4. But the Vletminh
did not tighten their dispositions any
less because of them.
On 16 September 1950 the order was
given to pull back to Caobang and
1.
Dong Khe. It was then that the enemy
(informed of our plan and detetined
to oppose it) unleashed a new cam-
paign, Le Hong Phong II. It wee de-
signed to destroy the vital French
forces, liberate the frontiers, and ex-
pand the national territory to permit
the development of the army.
The facta of this dark period are
well known. The Dong Khe post fell
again on 16 September, and we were
unable to reoccupy it. The Lepage and
Cbarton columns bore the brunt of an
attack by an enemy willing to accept
heavy 10SSSZ in order to win a victory
that would count. The annihilation of
thsse columns, the loss of eight of 6ur
elite battalions, the evacuation of That
Khe and Lsngson, and the total aban-
donment of the northeast frontier
were the sadly eloquent resolts of what
was called the disaster of Caobang.
There was no longer any limit to
the ambitions of the adversary who
maintained his momentum and at-
tempted” to seize the coastal zone,
There, however, he was stopped on
Colonial Route Number 18.
SituetkmImproves
In 1950 only the delta brought us
any satisfaction as pacification took
place over a wide area. In spite of the
political and military efforts accom-
plished by the agenta and popular
forces of the Vietminh, the situation
at the end of 1950 had clearly im-
proved over that of the preeeding year.
In the south, protection of National
Route Number 5 extended as far as
Song Thai Binh. The pacification of
Thai Binh-a difficult task because it
was a “model fief” of communism—
was effected durihg the course of the,
firet six months; it ended the “libera-
tion” of the delta east of the Red
River. Gradually, Vietnamese unite
occupied the country and thue freed
a number of our regular units which
then became mobile reserves.
On the right bank of the Red River
other improvements were made, in-
cluding the installation of a territorial
infrastructure, and we began to se-
cure the area of Thai Nguyen and of
Dong Trieu. The enemy suffered
losses, and the population came over
to our eide. Thus, during the autumn
Fobrmrf 1966
of 1950, the pacification of the’ delta
seemed to be going well. The economic
life resumed its course, and, in order
to facilitate it, we readjusted the ad-
ministrative and military boundaries
of the zonea. The reconstruction of
roads, dikes, and bridges was nearly
finished, and this had improved our
capability for tactical maneuver.
Plsn of Defense
The problem of the internment of
some 30,000 Chinese Nationalists hav-
ing been solved, we established a plan
of defense against a Chinese Commu-
nist invasion. The plan celled for the
withdrawal of our forces te successive
lines until they reached the Haiphong
redoubt whose reorganization was be-
gun without delay.
By the end of 1950, the Vletminh
offensive had succeededin bkwking our
action in the mountahous region. We
had been able to achieve positive re-
sults in the deltz which we now ec-
cupied almost completely, but, be.
cause we lacked reserves, we had
abandoned Hoa Binh, Colonial Route
Number 6, and the entire northeast
frontier) whose ethnic minorities were
particularly faithful to us. We noted
a serioue lose of prestige on the part
of the populations over which we had
control; a deep+eated uneeeineestook
possession of tbe French Expedition-
ary Corps.
In the other camp, on the contrary,
the victories increased the military
and economic capabilities of Ho ChL
minh, attracted the people to him, and
raised the morale of his troops. They
symbolized the victorY of intqmational
communism at tbe very moment when
the forcez of the United Nations were
suffering reverses in Korea.
The enemy believed that the time
had come to deatrey th~ vital French
forces. Without a letup he was now
3s
INDOCHIHA
going to attempt a double and dan-
gerous effort on the northern periph-
ery of the deIta. In January and
March, the, regions of Vkzh-Yen and
Dong Trieu were successively the tar-
gets of powerful attacks linked with
secondary actiona. The numerical
strength of these forces engaged was
never again attilned by the enemy.
In Vkih-Yen, the Vietminh com-
mand was planning to open tbe Hanoi
Estensive fortifications, not boIstered by
enough troops, were of fittle use
route for their “own use after the de-
struction of our forces. At the end
of the intense four-day battle, we were
still] holding our positions while the
enemy, thwarted in his intentions, re-
treated to his bases of departure.
In Dong Trieu, the action was on
an even larger scale, involving ele-
ments of two divisions from the ma-
jor fighting forcee and two territorial
regiments. The fighting lasted a week,
mainly around the post of Mao~Khe,
the pivot of our defense on Provincial
Route Number 18. There, again, the
exhausted enemy was obliged to break
off the fighting. The d letmhh failures
40
this time were complete, and the losses
suffered were cruehing. For Dong
Trieu alone, they added up to around
4,000 men including 400 prisoners,
while we lost only 200.
Reorganization Stsrta
Our side had undergone a change.
A prodigious upsurge of morale had
nccurred with the arrival of General
de Lattre whoee prestige and author-
ity electrified our troops. An immedi-
ate reorganization of our forces had
been started by the new commander
in chief. Step by step, with the sup-
port of large reinforcements from Co-
chln Ghfna and France, our reserves
were reconstituted, raising the num-
ber of mobile battalions to 11, then
to 23. Two special purpose divisions
were organized to provide for more
dynamic operations; our military’ po-
tential increased; and we regained the
initiative.
The adversary, however, did not
stop. A month after his thorough de-
feat at Dong Trieu, he was back
again. Moving hb regular units along
the southwest face of the delta, he be-
gan a new campaign, Quang Trung.
The objective for the Vietminh was
to procure rice and recruits and to op-
pose our developing occupation. Ninh
Binh and Phat Diem were momentar.
ily threatened until reinforcements
from Hanoi arrived. For the third
time, the enemy was forced to fall
back into the mountains, this time
leaving more than 1,200 dead. After
tbie, he became reluctant to engage in
large-scale operation in tbe delta
where our fire superiority was appar-
ent. He contented himself, thereafter,
with guerrilla actions on a vast esale.
Therefore, in April, the Thai vil-
lages were again threatened, includ-
ing Than Uyen which was overrun
and later reoccupied. In October, the
Mlliiary Review

Nghia Lo sector was the scene of a
major new Vietminh campaign, Ly
Thong ~Ie. Its objective waa tbe sei-
zure of the Thai Blanc territory, and
the entire 312th Vietrninh Division
participated.
Enemy Offensives End “
A brilliant success wze needed to
lift the lowered morale of our regular
troops. Our reply wee magnificent.
The Nghia Lo post, center of the rebel
attacks, held, and the 312th Division
withdrew after 2,000 men were
wounded and 1,000 were killed. A
large quantity of weapons waa taken
from the, enemy, and the Vietminh
political and military organization
was broken up. This ended the enemy
offensives for 1951.
The initiative was now entirely oura. forces commander, of northern Vie&
We took advantage of this to turn our
attention to the Cho Ben gap, and
extended our syetem of fortbicatton
farther to the weat. A powerful raid
waa conducted against Colonial Route
Number 6, and Hoa Binh wm reoccu-
pied, cutthg the Vietminh north-south
line of communication and permitting
us to control the hfuong country
again.
In the deIta a sealing-off and
mopping-up operation was carried on
throughout tbe entire territory in SC- , to the winds a false idealism and in-
eordance with new tactical procedures
which at first eurprised the enemy.
The Vietminh subversion of the popu-
lation and the establishment of fortL
tied baaes continued, especially in the sive defeats which he had suffered
southern zone, and they intensified
guerrilla eethities against our axea
of communication and our weak village
self-defense poets. .
Since it was important that we
thwart hie efforta, Thai Binh, Ninh
Binb, the region of Phu Ly, Tien
Leng, and Ninh Giang, the southern
and the southeastern zones of Ke Sat,
Fehrmry 1364
INDOCHINA
and the Canal of the Bamboos were
the objects of large cleanup eetions.
Results were good at first, but the en-
emy adapted himself to our new pro-
cedures and succeeded in eluding us.
We were unable ta achieve a decision.
Extensive fortification was begun in
1961. Around the periphery of the
delta and in the Haiphong redoubt
where a Chinese threat first was felt,
a system of concrete supporting pointe
wea built to provide a bstter defense
for tbe city. But aa is the case with
all lines which lack depth and are not
bolstered by enough tioops, the sys-
tem was to be of little mre.
Territorial Reorganisation
A territorial reorganization of the
zones was then begun. The ground
nam was given the mobile forces of
Tonkin whose employment bad thus
far been reserved to the commander
in chief. The developmentof the Vie&
namese Anuy was given a new and
energetic boost. This gave museto the
hope that at last the old auepicion of
colonialism of which we had been ~c-
cuaed worild vanish. Already the Cath.
olics had abandoned their Nationalist
neutralism and were aligning them-
selves with us. The United States eest
creased her financial and material aid
to France.
And so, at the end of 1951, the en-
emy was feeling strongly the succes-
beeauee of excessive ambitions. His
troops had shown an aggressiveness
that wee at times fanati~ but they
were still not battle hardened and they
lacked training. With us, the situation
had definitely improved. Although lim-
ited, the initiative had been regained,
and morale waa excellent.
But the Vietdnh strengthened
INDOCHINA
their forces. Chin&e aid in the form
of equipment and training increased
aetione in the interior of the delta.
Before any major eetion, be had to
reconstruct those delta bases which
had been knocked out by our opera-
tions of 1950-51. Vietminh directives
also stipulated that an aggressive at-
titude was to be maintained against
our territorial infreetrueture, wblle
they were bringing in the required
men and supplies from outside our
cone.
42
Before doing this, the enemy had
to break the blockade we were im-
tuting mobile reserves for, ourselves
(the surveillance of Colonial Route
Number 6 alone immobilised 11 of our
battalions) and, consequently, of fall-
ing back from Hea Binh.
In wanting to deal a decisive blow
to the. enemy, we had, in reality,
played intn his hands. Now we were
unable to pursue our main objeetive
—the pacification of the delta-end at
the same time conduct operations in
MilitaIY
Wow
strength outaide of it. After Caobang,
this new and ead experience definitely
showed the hanhful effects of a dis-
persion of efforta. The command of
North Vietnam had alwaye considered
the delta the essential stake of the
battle. But the enemy had seised every
opportunity to draw us outside into
a terrain more favorable for his ma-
jor fighting forces.
It was, therefore, in the delta that
we were obliged to concentrate our ef-
forts to thwart the rebel plan, to seek
the annihilation of his infiltrated
units, and to develop. our territorial
infrastructure. In consequence, 1952
was marked by large cleanup and pac-
ification operations carried on at max-
imum tempo by the continual swing-
ing back and forth of our interven-
tion forces across the territory.
Statistics
Statistic give an idea of the in-
tensity of the fighting as compared
with the preceding year: some 5,000
ambushes and engagements in 1952
as opposed to 2,000 in 1951; around
2,700 acts of sabotage in 1952 as com-
pared to 700 in 1951. These efforts re-
sulted in the elimination of nearly all
the infiltrated regular Vietminh units
from our controlled zone. But this did
not give us much cause for optimism.
Our action against subversion, begun
,
too late and slowed by tbe require-
ments of Hoa Binh, was proving more
and more ineffective. Results were be-
coming more superficial, more ephem-
eral in their duration.
The Vietnamese administration
gave insufficient aid, sometimes con-
trary to the ends sought. But how
could one expwt a population which
had been subjected to guns and aerial
bombs to give active and spontaneous
aid in defense of a cause of which it
knew little?
Febreerg 1363
Worked on in depth by a tireless
and insidious line of propaganda, and
kept in the proper mood by the contin-
uous presence of the most dynamic
representatives of a hostile power, the
population had a tendency to orient
itself toward ita new “masters.” Our
policy of pacification was unable to
counteract the reatistic, dynamic, and
sometimes brutal methods employed
by the Communists.
Major Fighting Form
The Vletminh &alized, however,
that g Jerrilla actione alone were in-
capable of achieving the decision. It
was to their major fighting force,
which was ceaseteesly being strengthe-
ned, that they would assign t~ls tisk.
This would force us also to constitute
a major fighting force capable of oP-
posing theirs.
The Vletminh could constitute this
force without diminishing their “ares
forces”; we could not. This was to
dominate our strategic and tactical
concepta to the end of tbeconfllct. On
the eve of the greet battles of October
1952, the Vietminh were in an emi-
nently fayorable situation: they had
had apariod of eight monthatopre-
pare the divisions of their major fight-
ing force while our elements had bc$m
worn down @ counterguerrilla actions.
On 14 October 1952 some 30,000
Vietminh left the zones on the pariph-
ery of the delta and headed for the
broad mountainous and wooded areas
of the northwest. This was the violent
beginning of the third and last period
of the war-the resumption of the
strong Viehninhofiensivas in a grow-
ing strategic and ta&lcal framework.
War of movement and siege warfare,
linked with large-scale delta guerrilla
actions, were now tn be carried on
over a territory equal in area to half
that of France, without it being pos-
sible for us to launch asinglegeneml
offensive action, even briefly.
To be sure, the Vietminh were not
to eq”oy complete success. Our reac-
tions, es open to criticism as they may
have been from the standpoint of the
application of the principles of war,
would prevent the adversary from
gaining a decision.
Pinal Phase Approaches
Even Dien B]en Phu, with ita tragic
losses (more than twice those of Cao-
bang), did not mark that victory so
often promised by Ho Chi-minh and
his emulators. General Giap would
have had to wage battle in the delta
to succeed in this, and he could not
manage it. He had to content Wlmself
with secondary theaters whare he
knew how to attract us. But without
any doubt, that final phase of the gen-
eral counteroffensive was rapidly ap- Iished at Luang Prabang and in the
proaching; only the Geneva agree- Plain of Jare te the northeast. On tbe
ment prevented its realization.
The great Vietmhh offeneive in the
Thai country began with powerful at-
tacks in Phu Yen and against Nghia
Lo which fell on 18 October 1952. It
continued with the s izure of the
mouths of the Black Riv which were
firmly defended by our tro up to with the population, and to establish
the end of the month. \
Outnumbered by the adversa’~~nizztion.
could only delay hie advance. Wecon-
traetcd into a few centers of reziatance
along the axea of communication and
planned to defend these points. It per-
mitted us, in this initial phase of the
battlq to reorganize the fortified camp
at Nzean, the center of our defense.
It aleo made it possible to evacuate
Than Uyen and ensure contact with
Lzi Cbau (Figure 2).
From 1 November to 15 December,
the battle for Nzean wae fought. The
Vietminh offensive wae at ita culmi-
nating point.
44
Dien Bien Phu fell; the troops in
Tuan Giao and Muong Sai were forcsd
back; and, in the southern part of the
delta, a new threat of infiltration was
beginning to take shape. But the four
V]etminh attackz onthe forthled Na-
eancemp were unsuccezeful, and they
withdrew with heavy losses.
We were thue permitted to drive the
enemy out of tbe Naean region, to
resume control of Provincial Route
Number 41, and to reorganize the
northwest zona in anticipation of new
enemy activities in that region.
A New Offensive
At the end of March, a new Viet-
minh offensive of 40,000 men was un-
leashed inthe high Thai country and
in northern Lees. In order to ward off
the threat to the capital of Laos, an
air-ground defense was rapidly e@ab-
eve of the rainy season, the enemy,
having failed to achieve his objectives
suddenly, returned to lds bases in the
Phu Tho ares.
We then began operations around
Nasan which enabled us to destroy
enemy bases, to resume our inflnence
a more effective counterguerrilla or-
since Naean Was now teo
far from the center of our operations
and was tying down un]ts needed in
the delta, it wae secretly evacuated in
August 1953 under the very nose of
the enemy.
The situation had not improved in
the delta since the start of the great
fall and winter offensive. The Viet-
minh, closely coordinating the opera-
tions of major forces in the high re-
gion with those of guerrilla forces in
the delta, were continuing to build
up in the midst of our ares. They con-
structed new bases from whkh attacks
Militwy Review
were launched against our poste, para-
❑ilitary forces, and communications
system. The regional or regular units
which participated in these actions
were developing at an accelerated rate,
end their combat value wee equal to
that of the unite of Vietxninh major
battle forcee.
Our occupation had ehrunk danger-
ously. Grouped around forWied zones
designed to protect our rear areas and
our command organisatilons, it was
Pigqre 2.
nothing more than a maneuver net-
work based on pos@ whose chances
fer survival were in constant jeopardy.
T&s, in May 1953 there was a deteri-
oration of our territorial infrastruc-
ture in the delta and a regression in
the pacification of a population.
.
Felvmry
1333
The newly assigned commander in
chief determined to revive the offen-
sive spirit of troops who had a tend-
ency to “endure” rather then to de-
liver blows. From the etrategic stand-
point, actions were still defensive for
awhile, because we did not have the
means to do otherwise. But from the
local standpoint, operations became
aggressive and included raids and
spoiling attacks.
We then found it necessary to re-
--- fiphtins force
constitute our major
and simultaneously strengthen our in-
frastructure in the absence of rein-
fbrcementa from Metropolitan France.
We attempted to solve this problem by
incorporating into our forces French
Union unite previously assigned to
45
INDOCHINA
static posts and newly created mobile
Vietnamese forces.
Ciril organisations
At the same time, a new effort at
pacification would be made by seW]ng
up civil organizetione-mob]le admin-
istrative units-charged with dxpond-
ing in depth the political and social
efforte of our infrastructure unita.
These reorganization and pacification
efforts were to be undertaken in con-
junction with 10cMcleanup operations.
But the enemy had underetoud the
dangere of the new policy; he reacted
violently in furious attacks againet
the young and inexperienced Vietna-
mese battalion. Since” we were thin-
ning out our infrastructure by the
reduction of posts, we were losing
control of the delta. The next Viet-
minh offensive would begin in the
framework of an “unstable balancefl
to the distinct advantage of the ad-
versary in tbe south center of the
delta.
Thus, the period from May to Oc-
tober 1953 would be devoted tu the
preparation of a major fighting force
at the espense of a territorial infra-
structure. In spite of this thinning out
of the infrastructure, it wee still nec-
aeeary to leave 40 French Union bat-
talions assigned. It was a period of
waiting for uncertainties.
Having again readied hie major
fighting force, the enemy was capable
of resuming a powerful offensive by
October. It was in hie intereat to do
thie before the Navarre plan entered
its phase of full development; he+too,
had need of attempting to deliver a
“psychological blow.”
This major fighting force-stronger
than ever, battle hardened, well lad,
well train~ and reinforced with mod-
ern material-was waiting for ita ea-
signad objective.
48
Initially, everything pointed tu this
objective behg the delta. But our pre-
ventive operations againet Phu Nho
Quan seamed to have modMad Giap’s
plans. And on 25 November, a week
after our oeeupetion of Dien Bien Phu,
he hmnched his troops on a new cam-
paign in the northwest. This time it
was 100,000 men who were to operate
at a distance of some 360 kilometers
from their bases for more than six
months. Tids emphasizes the magni-
tude of the battle which was to occur.
6eneral Attack
The evenb which followed are w$ll
known. We shall re@l only that the
advereary, having &osen Dien Bien
Phu as hie objective, invested it pa-
tiently and vigorously while one of
hie divisions, the 308th, turned off,
pushing in the direction of Luang
Prabang to eliminate all threat against
the south flank of the besieging forcee.
Having drawn in his lines ae close
to the camp as poeeible, the enemy be-
gan his general attack on the fo~]fied
camp on the afternoon of 13 March.
The two supporting points which cov-
ered the airdeld on the north and the
northeeet fell; from that point on,
our use of the airtield rapidly became
impoeeible.
On 30 March a new attack was
launched; the enemy gained a foothold
in the supporting points covering our
main center of resistance on the eaet.
Our forces were being worn down in
coetfy counterattacks. The aritiaircraft
defense and the contraction ,of our
dropping zones were rendering the
dropping of men and materiel more
hazardous.
Beginning on 6 April the Vietminh
initiated a tactic of suffocation; our
actions degenerated into trench fight-
ing in which the artillery and aviation
were powerkes to aid. The result wee
Milifsry
Rwhw

a tightening of the enemy’e encircle-
ment around our exhausted foreas and
their 1,000 wounded. No more could be
asked of the garrison than to hold its
own; only outside intervention could
save it.
The advereary resumed hia atteck$
in force in early May and succeeded
in overrunning our last peripheral po-
eitione, then our central redoubt, and,,
finally, the eouthern supporthg point
which had failed te break out. On 9
May ‘Dien Bien Phu paseed into his-
tory.
In the d,elta during ‘this period we
had succeeded only in retaining our
principal communieetione and in safe-
guarding our over-all infrastructure.
But the enemy took 20 peats from ue
and continued suhvereion, especially
in the weetern cone. Itmust also be
stressed that, in order to maintain
even the bare essential, we had tn de-
mand a greet deal from troops who
had been ‘continually in the breach.
Immediately after the fall ‘of Dien
Bien Phu, there wee the problem of
the defense of the delta, and the prob-
lem of the eafety of the French Ex-
peditionary Corps-the major concern
of the government. Tlds wee not solely
a political and diplomatic matter. At
Dien Bien Phu, 17 battalions includ-
ing seven parachute bettalione had
been ewallowed up, and in the delta
we bed bean losing one battalion and
three poets per week.
Febnmy 1963
INDOCNINA
&
From the military standpoint, the
situation had thus deteriorated rap-
idly. The relationship of forces wee
now unfavorable to. ue: we had only
120 to 125 heterogeneous battelione,
many of which were worn down. The
23,000 men of the Vletminh major
fighting force put out of action at
Dien Bien Phu had been vplecad,
which ehowad the reserve potential the
adversary had created. Our superior-
ity rested solely on our atilllery, tanks,
and aviation.
This was the situation, aggravated
by the threat of the disintegration of
the Vietnamese Army and by the la-
tent danger of a generalised insurrec-
tion, in which we were going to have
to conduct the lest battle of the delta.
Following a brief preliminary phase
of preparation to make the defense
sector forces mobile, tlds battle wae
fought. It consietad first of a with-
drawal operation in the southern cone,
then defense on a new line. Reinforced
by three mobile groupe from the south,
we finally auccaadedin halting the en-
emy at the new positions after hard-
fought battles at Hung Yen, Luc Nero,
and Vinh-Yen. The adversary, in feet,
wae not able to take advantage of hh
opportunity. Diepareing h]e forces, he
, suffered heavy losses without gaining
the decieion.
On 27 July 1964 the military pheee
of the Tonkin campaign ended with a
Vietminh defeat.
..
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