Care Daniel Klint Richter M.

BS Legal Management A
vicar dev corp. vs elacosa,777 SCRA 239dec 9, 2015

THE EMPLOYEES ARE CONSIDERED REGULAR IF THEY HAVE BEEN PERFORMING THE
SAME ACTIVITY FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR Vicmar Development Corporation et al. vs.
Camilo Elarcosa et al.
G.R. No. 202215, December 9, 2015Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
CA’s Decision declaring
 that CamiloElarcosa et al. (respondents) were illegally dismissed by Vicmar Development
Corporation and/or Robert Kua, owner, and Engr. Juanito C. Pagcaliwagan, manager (petitioners).
Vicmar Development Corporation (Vicmar) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of
plywood for export and for local sale. Respondents declared that Vicmar paid them minimum wage
and a small amount for overtime but it did not give them benefits as required by law despite of the fact
that they had been performing the heaviest and dirtiest tasks in the plant operations. In 2004, Vicmar
informed respondents that they would be handled by contractors.
 As a result thereof, respondents’ wages substantially decreased. They filed a
Complaint with the
DOLE for violations of labor standards for which appropriate compliance orders were issued against
Vicmar. Respondents maintained that they were regular employees of Vicmar since they were made
to
perform tasks necessary and desirable to Vicmar’s usual business. Respondents averred that
Vicmar dismissed them from service without cause or due process which prompted filing of this illegal
dismissal case with money claims. On the other hand, Vicmar contends that respondents'
engagement was not continuous and insisted that the said contractors' hiring of the said contractors as
part of its management prerogative. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed the complaints and
found that the respondents were seasonal employees of Vicmar, whose work was dependent upon
the extraordinary demands of plywood products and on the availability of logs or timber to be
processed into plywood. In a petition for Certiorari, the CA reversed the rulings of the LA and the
NLRC and found that respondents performed activities necessary and desirable in the usual business
of Vicmar, as they were assigned to departments vital to its operations.

ISSUE:

 Are the employees considered regular if they had performed the same activity for at
least one year?
HELD:

 Yes, the employees are considered as regular employees because they had been performing the
same activity for at least one year. Section 280 of the Labor Code defines a regular employee as one
who is 1) engaged to perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer, unless the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or where the work is
seasonal and for the duration of a season; or 2) has rendered at least 1 year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity for which he is employed and his
employment continues as long as such activity exists. The test to determine whether an employee is
regular is the reasonable connection between the activity he performs and its relation to the
employer's business or trade, as in the case of respondents assigned to the boiler section.

De Castro vs. Court of Appeals,805 SCRA 265 OCT 5,2016

Nuvoland, a corporation formed primarily to own, use, improve, develop,
subdivide, sell, exchange, lease, and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of
all kinds, was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. respondent!
Bienvenido was the principal stockholder and member of the! oard of "directors
while all #artine$%#artine$& was its 'resident.
(He later recruited petitioner Edward de Castro %"e Castro&, a sales and marketing
professional in the field of real estate, to handle its sales and marketing operations,
including the hiring and supervision of the sales and marketing
personnel.   " e   C a s t r o   w a s   m a d e   t o   s i g n   a   # e m o r a n d u m   o f ) a g r e e m e n t )
& wherein #artine$proposed to create a new corporation, through whi
ch the latter compensation, benefits, and
commissions, including those of other sales personnel, would be cou
r s e d .   ) s   i t   t u r n e d   o u t ,   t h e s u p p o s e d l y new corporation contemplated was
Silvericon. "e Castro was appointed the 'resident and minority stockholder of
Silvericon while! Bienvenido and #artine$ were named as stockholders and
incorporators thereof. (Hereafter, Sales and marketing) agreement %
SMA) was purportedly executed by Nuvoland and Silvericon, stipulating that all
payments made for the condominium projects of Nuvoland were to be given directly to
it. Nuvoland terminated the SMA on the ground that Silvericon personnel committed an
unauthorized way! out and abandonment of the Nuovo "city Showroom. #e "Astro and
all t h e   s a l e s   a n d   m a r k e t i n g   p e r s o n n e l   o f   S i l v e r i c o n   w e r e   b a r r e d   f r o m  
e n t e r i n g   t h e   o f f i c e   p r e m i s e s .  Aggrieved, #e "Astro and $laton filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal before the %A and obtained a favorable decision. & However, N%'"
reversed the %A decision. (n appeal, "A affirmed the findings of the N%'" that the
The claim should have been brought before the
instead.

Philippine national bank vs. andrada electric & engineering

company, 381 SCRA 145, April 17, 2002

FACTS:

On 26 August 1975, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) acquired the assets
of the Pampanga Sugar Mills (PASUMIL) that were earlier foreclosed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) under LOI 311.
The PNB organized the National Sugar Development Corporation
(NASUDECO) in September 1975, to take ownership and possession of the
assets and ultimately to nationalize and consolidate its interest in other PNB-
controlled sugar mills.
Prior to 29 October 1971, PASUMIL engaged the services of the Andrada
Electric & Engineering Company (AEEC) for electrical rewinding and repair,
most of which were partially paid by PASUMIL, leaving several unpaid
accounts with AEEC.

On 29 October 1971, AEEC and PASUMIL entered into a contract for AEEC
to perform the (a) Construction of a powerhouse building; 3 reinforced
concrete foundations for 3 units 350 KW diesel engine generating sets, 3
reinforced concrete foundations for the 5,000 KW and 1,250 KW turbo-
generator sets, among others.
Aside from the work contract, PASUMIL required AEEC to perform extra
work and provide electrical equipment and spare parts. Out of the total
obligation of P777,263.80, PASUMIL had paid only P250,000.00, leaving an
unpaid balance, as of 27 June 1973, amounting to P527,263.80.
Out of said unpaid balance of P527,263.80, PASUMIL made a partial
payment to AEEC of P14,000.00, in broken amounts, covering the period
from 5 January 1974 up to 23 May 1974, leaving an unpaid balance of
P513,263.80.

PAŠUMIL and PNB, and now NASUDECO, allegedly failed and refused to
pay AEEC their just, valid, and demandable obligation (The President of the
NASUDECO is also the Vice-President of the PNB. be sought said official to
pay the outstanding obligation of PASUMIL, inasmuch as PNB and
NASUDECO now owned and possessed the assets of PASUMIL, and these
defendants all benefited from the works, and the electrical, as well as the
engineering and repairs, performed by AEEC).
Due to the failure and refusal of PNB, PASUMIL, and/or NASUDECO to
pay their obligations, AEEC allegedly suffered actual damages in the total
amount of P513,263.80; and in order to recover these sums, AEEC was
compelled to engage the professional service of counsel, to whom AEEC
agreed to pay a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount of the obligation due by
way of attorney’s fees.
PNB and NASUDECO filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to state sufficient allegations to establish a cause of action
against PNB and NASUDECO, inasmuch as there is a lack or want of privity
of contract between them and AEEC.

Said motion was denied by the trial court in its 27 November order, and
ordered PNB and NASUDECO to file their answers within 15 days.
After due proceedings, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of AEEC
and against PNB, NASUDECO, and PASUMIL; the latter being ordered to
pay jointly and severally the former (1) the sum of P513,623.80 plus interest
thereon at the rate of 14% per annum as claimed from 25 September 1980
until fully paid; (2) the sum of P102,724.76 as attorney’s fees; and, (3) Costs.
PNB and NASUDECO appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court in its decision of 17 April 2000 (CA-GR CV 57610. PNB
and NASUDECO filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether PNB and NASUDECO may be held liable for PASUMIL’s

liability to Andrada Electric and Engineering Company.
No. Basic is the rule that a corporation has a legal personality distinct and
separate from the persons and entities owning it. The corporate veil may be
lifted only if it has been used to shield fraud, defend crime, justify a wrong,
defeat public convenience, insulate bad faith, or perpetuate injustice.
Thus, the mere fact that the Philippine National Bank (PNB) acquired
ownership or management of some assets of the Pampanga Sugar Mill
(PASUMIL), which had earlier been foreclosed and purchased at the
resulting public auction by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
will not make PNB liable for the PASUMIL’s contractual debts to Andrada
Electric & Engineering Company (AEEC).
Piercing the veil of corporate fiction may be allowed only if the following
elements concur:

Luxuria Home inc vs, the Court of Appeals,302 SCRA 315

Facts: 

  Aida M. Posadas and her two (2) minor children co-owned a 1.6-hectare

property in Sucat, Muntinlupa, which was occupied by squatters. Posadas

entered into negotiations with Jaime T. Bravo regarding the development of the
said property into a residential subdivision. On 3 May 1989, she authorized Bravo
to negotiate with the squatters to leave the said property. With written
authorization, Bravo buckled down to work and started negotiations with the
squatters. Meanwhile, some 7 months later, on 11 December 1989, Posadas and
her children, through a Deed of Assignment, assigned the said property to
Luxuria Homes, Inc., purportedly for organizational and tax avoidance purposes.
Bravo signed as one of the witnesses to the execution of the Deed of Assignment
and the Articles of Incorporation of Luxuria Homes, Inc. Then sometime in 1992,
the harmonious and congenial relationship of Posadas and Bravo turned sour
when the former supposedly could not accept the management contracts develop
the 1.6-hectare property into a residential subdivision, the latter was proposing.
In retaliation, Bravo demanded payment for services rendered in connection with
the development of the land. In his statement of account dated 21 August 1991,
Bravo demanded the payment of P1,708,489.00 for various services rendered, i.e.,
relocation of squatters, preparation of the architectural design and site
development plan, survey, and fencing. Posadas refused to pay the amount
demanded. Thus, in September 1992, James Builder Construction and Jaime T.
Bravo instituted a complaint for specific performance before the trial court
against Posadas and Luxuria Homes, Inc. On 27 September 1993, the trial court
declared Posadas in default and allowed James Builder Construction and Bravo
to present their evidence ex-parte. On 8 March 1994, it ordered Posadas, jointly
and in solid with Luxuria Homes, Inc., to pay Bravo, et. al. the balance of
the payment for the various services performed by them in the total amount of
P1,708,489.00; actual damages incurred for the construction of the
warehouse/bunks, and for the material used in the total sum ofP1,500.000.00;
moral and exemplary damages of P500.000.00; Attorney's fee of P50,000.00; and
cost of this procedure. The court also directed Posadas as the Representative of
the Corporation Luxuria Homes, Incorporated, to execute the management
contract she committed to do, also in consideration of the various undertakings
that Bravo rendered for her. Luxuria Homes and Posadas appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. The appellate court deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that
James Builder Construction is a corporation and hence could not experience
physical suffering and mental anguish. It also reduced the award of exemplary
damages. Luxuria Homes' and Posadas' motion for reconsideration, prompted
them to file the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: 
 Whether Luxuria Homes, Inc., was a party to the transactions entered into by
Posadas with Bravo and James Builder Construction and thus could be held
jointly and severally with Posadas.
Held: 
 It cannot be said then that the incorporation of Luxuria Homes and the eventual
transfer of the subject property to it were in fraud of Bravo and James Builder
Construction as such was done with the full knowledge of Bravo himself, as
evidenced by the Deed of Assignment dated 11 December 1989 and the Articles
of Incorporation of Luxuria Homes, Inc., issued 26 January 1990 were both signed
by Bravo himself as a witness. Further, Posadas is not the majority stockholder
of Luxuria Homes, Inc. The Articles of Incorporation of Luxuria Homes, Inc.,
clearly show that Posadas owns approximately 33% only of the capital stock.
Hence, Posadas cannot be considered as an alter ego of Luxuria Homes, Inc. To
disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed. Bravo, et.
al. failed to show proof that Posadas acted in bad faith, and consequently that
Luxuria Homes, Inc., was a party to any of the supposed transactions, not even to
the agreement to negotiate with and relocate the squatters, it cannot be held
liable, nay jointly and in solid, to pay Bravo, et. al. Hence since it was Posadas
who contracted Bravo to render the subject services, only she is liable to pay the
amounts adjudged by the Court

FACTS

Azor mfg., inc vs nlrc,303 SCRA 26