Australian Journal of Psychology

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Stevens's theory of scales of measurement and its

place in modern psychology

Joel Michell

To cite this article: Joel Michell (2002) Stevens's theory of scales of measurement and
its place in modern psychology, Australian Journal of Psychology, 54:2, 99-104, DOI:
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 99

Stevens's Theory of Scales of Measurement

and Its Place in Modern Psychology
Joel Michell
University of Sydney

Stevens's theory of scales of measurement has been an important methodological resource within psychol-
ogy for half a century. It advanced the representational theory of measurement and promised to open up to
scientific investigation the issue of the structure of psychological attributes. Its development by Suppes and
Zinnes and the axiomatic measurement theory tradition showed how that promise could be fulfilled.
However, neither Stevens nor the psychometricians who adopted his theory used it in that way. They used it
to foreclose scientific investigation of that issue. This paper examines the way in which this was done and
offers reasons for it.

The method of 'postulating' what we want has many advantages;
they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. (S.S.
Stevens quoting Bertrand Russell).
Stevens's (1946) theory of scales of measurement was
a component of psychology's post-Second World War method-
ological consensus. Repeatedly recited by its author (Stevens,
1946, 1951, 1959, 1968, 1975), it "stood like the Decalogue"
(Newman, 1974, p. 137), defining psychology's paradigm
of measurement. Elsewhere (Michell, 1999), its conceptual
roots and limitations have been identified. This article discusses
its effects. It begins with a sketch of Stevens's theory, although
there is little need to describe it in detail. I then indicate how the
axiomatic measurement tradition, beginning with Suppes and
Zinnes (1963), revealed issues implied by Stevens's theory.
Then the way in which Stevens's theory was actually used
to avoid exploring those same issues is described. Finally, this
article discusses why Stevens's theory was used in this way.
STEVENS'S THEORY
Stevens was a synthesiser. He took from Bertrand Russell
(1903) (who made the numerical representation of order the
centre of his theory of measurement); from H. M. Johnson
(1936) (who considered both classification and ordering under
the general heading of measurement); and from George
Birkhoff, who provided Stevens with the theory of numerical
transformations (Stevens, 1946). Stevens's basic idea was that
measurement involves numerically modelling "aspects of the
empirical world" (Stevens, 1951, p. 23). The aspects modelled
may differ in complexity, giving rise to different kinds
of scales: modelling a classification produces a nominal scale;
modelling an order produces an ordinal scale; modelling
differences between levels of an attribute produces an interval
scale; and, on top of that, modelling ratios between levels
of an attribute produces a ratio scale.
According to Stevens, these different kinds of scale not only
differ with respect to the kind of relations numerically
modelled; they also differ with respect to the group of numeri-
cal transformations that leave the kind of scale unchanged.
Thus, any one-to-one transformation of the numbers used
in a nominal scale maps them into a new nominal scale.
Likewise, any increasing monotonic transformation of the
numbers used in an ordinal scale maps them into a new
ordinal scale. In the case of interval and ratio scales, the
classes of "admissible" transformations are the positive linear
transformations and positive similarities transformations,
respectively. The identification of these groups of transforma-
tions was a unique feature of Stevens's theory.
Stevens's theory was a logically coherent contribution to the
theory of numerical representations. It was not the last word,
but it was a significant step forward. However, he had not
characterised the precise structure that aspects of the "empiri-
cal world" must possess to sustain one or other of his kinds
of measurement scales.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STEVENS'S THEORY
In the 1950s and later, Stevens's theory was elaborated
by a number of researchers, including Suppes (1951) and
Coombs (1956, 1960, 1964). Suppes and Zinnes (1963) speci-
fied structures necessary and sufficient for each of Stevens's
scale types. For example, an empirical structure only leads
to an ordinal scale if it involves at least a weak order relation
upon a set of objects, that is, a transitive and strongly connect-
ed binary relation. These are demanding conditions, for not all
binary relations are transitive and not all transitive ones
strongly connected. Take loving. If Othello loves Desdemona
and Desdemona loves Iago, it does not follow that Othello
loves Iago. Such triangles show that loving is not transitive.
Or, take being an ancestor of in a family tree. This relation
is transitive: if someone, say George, is an ancestor of some-
one else, say Elizabeth; and Elizabeth is an ancestor of another
person, Charles; then it follows that George is an ancestor
of Charles. However, it is not the case that the ancestor relation
connects every pair of people in a family tree (e.g., Charles and
his sister, Anne, are not connected).
As Suppes and Zinnes made clear, identifying an ordinal
scale means first, identifying the objects involved; second,
identifying a possibly suitable relation; and third, checking
to see that the relation has the properties sustaining a weak
order (i.e., transitivity and connexity). If it does not, then there
is no possibility of having an ordinal scale based upon that
relation. However, if it does, then an ordinal scale is secured.
Stevens (1951) specified conditions necessary and sufficient
for a "serial order" (p. 13) although, not in his section on
ordinal scales. However, his treatment of quantitative structure

This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 20th Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences, Amster-
dam, The Netherlands, August, 2001.
Address for correspondence: Associate Professor Joel Michell, Department of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia. Email:
joelm@psych.usyd.edu.au,

Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 54, No. 2, 2002 pp. 99-104

I 00 Joel Michell
"in the ordinary sense of the word" (p. 27) (viz., interval and
ratio scales) was incomplete. No definition of either the kind
of structure involved or of clues to its occurrence was
provided. This is where the contribution of Suppes and Zinnes
was important. They specified conditions necessary and suffi-
cient for interval and for ratio scales. This work was taken
considerably further by R. D. Luce and his associates and also,
in Europe, by Pfanzagl (1968). One of Luce's associates refor-
mulated the distinctions between the various kinds of scales
possible using the mathematical theory of automorphisms
and proved that nothing lies between Stevens's ordinal and
interval scales (see Narens 1985, 2002; Narens & Luce, 1986,
for these and other significant results of the axiomatic
measurement tradition).
Hilder's (1901) theorem was used to unify many of the
results produced. Holder had not only defined the structure
necessary and sufficient for ratio scale measurement, but also
the structure that differences must have to be measurable
(i.e., Stevens's interval scales) (see Michell & Ernst, 1996,
1997). If a distinction is drawn between the structure
of a quantitative attribute (quantitative deep structure,
Nieder6e, 1994), on the one hand and, on the other, directly
observable data structures (i.e., quantitative surface structures)
indicative of underlying quantitative deep structure, then
Holder may be seen as defining quantitative deep structure,
while the tradition of axiomatic measurement theory specified
an array of quantitative surface structures. This distinction
is much more important in psychology than in physics because
the attributes that psychologists aspire to measure are not open
to direct observation in the way that some physical attributes
are. Thus, in psychology, evidence for underlying quantitative
structure is inevitably indirect. For such evidence to be
adequately evaluated, the character common to quantitative
attributes must be explicitly specified, as also must the proper-
ties of observable data structures diagnostic of underlying
quantitative structure. That is, in order to diagnose something,
we need to know what it is we are attempting to diagnose and
we need to know what is diagnostic of it. H61lder (1901) speci-
fied the first and Suppes and Zinnes (1963) made progress
with the latter. The subsequent work of Luce and Tukey
(1964) was vitally important to the prospects of measurement
in psychology because it showed that under certain conditions
merely ordinal data could be diagnostic of underlying quantita-
tive structure (see Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971;
Michell, 1990).
Quantitative structure is best appreciated by considering
the case of length. Let a, b, c, ... , be any specific lengths
(i.e., levels of the attribute, length). The quantitative structure
of length is given by the following conditions:
1. For every pair, a and b, one and only one of the following
is true:
(i) a = b;
(ii) there exists a c, such that a = b + c;
(iii) there exists a c, such that b = a + c.
2. For any a and b, a + b > a.
3. For any a and b, a + b = b + a.
4. For any a, b, and c, a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c.
5. For any a, there is a b, such that b <a.
6. For any a and b there is a c such that c = a + b.
7.For every non-empty class of lengths having an upper
bound, there is a least upper bound.
In these conditions the symbols, 'a', 'b', and 'c' do not stand
for numbers, they refer to specific lengths, that is, for example,
specific properties of objects independently of any measure-
ments being made. Physical objects have length (i.e., spatial
AustralianJournal of Psychology - August 2002
extension) measured or not and the above conditions are true
of lengths measured or not. Taking an expression like 'a + b
= c', it is tempting to read it as a joined to b gives c. Such
an operational reading is not intended. Most lengths in the
universe are either too big or too small for human operations
and, more importantly, if for any lengths a, b and c, a + b = c,
then that is true regardless of human operations. If operations
upon lengths serve any function it is in attempting to test the
truth of such conditions. The expression, 'a + b = c', denotes
a relation: namely that length c is entirely composed
of discrete parts, a and b. The first four conditions state what
it means for lengths to be additive. The remaining three ensure
that no lengths are excluded. Condition 5 means that there
is no least length; 6, that there is no greatest length; and 7, that
there are no gaps in the length series (the concepts of upper
bound and least upper bound being explained in most elemen-
tary algebra books, e.g., Birkhoff & MacLane, 1965).
Any attribute having this kind of structure is an unbounded
continuous quantity and it is measurable on a ratio scale.
If some attribute is not known to have this structure, but differ-
ences between its levels do, then it is measurable on an inter-
val scale. When an attribute is hypothesised to be measurable
on either kind of scale (as often happens in psychology), then
this is the kind of structure that is implicated. Such a hypothe-
sis is the same as any in science; namely, it is uncritical
to accept it without relevant evidence.
In this respect, Stevens's theory was a map locating the door
to an important opportunity for psychology and its elaboration
by Suppes and Zinnes and others was the conceptual key that
opened that door. For example, a scientist studying intellectual
abilities would want to know how such abilities work in the
production of intellectual behaviour, say how mathematical
ability works in enabling someone to solve a set of numerical
problems. Part of doing this, would be investigating how
different levels of mathematical ability relate to one another,
for example, whether they are quantitative, ordered weakly
or only partially ordered. It might involve constructing
a theory about how different levels of this ability relate to one
another and putting this theory to the test using methods
diagnostic of the various structural possibilities. Having done
this successfully, a psychologist might have evidence for
an interval or ordinal scale of mathematical ability. Stevens's
theory of scales of measurement and its elaboration was
an invaluable resource for psychologists interested in such
scientific questions.
HOW STEVENS'S THEORY WAS USED
However, considering attributes that psychologists have
famously claimed to measure (i.e., intellectual abilities,
personality traits, and social attitudes), the search for research
of this kind will largely prove vain. Indeed, the contribution
of Suppes and Zinnes and its subsequent amplification by such
as Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971) has typically been
ignored in psychometrics (Cliff, 1992; Michell, 2000). Stevens
did not ignore it. He explicitly rejected it, accusing Suppes and
Zinnes of drifting off "into the vacuum of abstraction"
(Stevens, 1968, p. 854). His assessment was misguided:
Stevens's theory merely raises the issue, but provides the
investigator with no explicit guidance as to what to look for.
However, Stevens's theory was not ignored. It was used, but
not to investigate the issue of scale type scientifically.
Stevens (1951) used his theory to support his psychophysi-
cal methods. He was responding to Campbell's (1940) objec-
tion that no psychophysical methods, including Stevens's, are
methods of measurement. Campbell argued that since
psychophysicists had not demonstrated that sensation intensi-
ties are additive, they had no evidence that such intensities are

measurable (on a ratio scale). Stevens replied that ratio scale
measurement could be achieved without a demonstration
of additivity. He reasoned like this: pairs of weights that leave
a beam balance horizontal for a fixed, non-central fulcrum
position, will all be in the same non-unitary ratio; thus, the
discovery of such pairs could be used to establish a ratio scale
of weight without identifying any relation of additivity.
Stevens saw this situation as analogous to his psychophysical
method. In his method, participants were instructed to judge
whether pairs of sensation intensities are in the same fixed
ratio. If the former method leads to a ratio scale of weight
then, Stevens concluded, his method leads to a ratio scale
of sensation intensity.
However, Holder (1901) had shown that an attribute only
sustains ratios if it is quantitative and therefore additive,
as Campbell claimed. Thus, Stevens's method could only
establish a ratio scale if sensation intensities are additive
in structure. In claiming that no one had shown this, Campbell
was right. So Stevens's argument begged the question of the
internal structure of the attribute of sensation intensity. The fact
that experimental participants respond to instructions to judge
equal ratios does not mean that there are ratios there to be
judged. This question needs to be investigated in its own right.
This is why Stevens preferred to ignore Suppes and Zinnes
(1963). Unlike Stevens, they had specified a structure that
attributes must have to sustain ratio scale measurements.
Stevens's reasoning was of this form: couched in the context
of his theory of scales, a question-begging argument was used
to conclude that the desired level of measurement had been
attained. To those prepared to beg the same question, Stevens's
reasoning seemed cogent and, so, this pattern became the
model in the more high-profile area of psychometrics.
Consider Kerlinger (1964). He expounded Stevens's theory
and then asked "What kinds of scales are used in behavioral
and educational research?" (p. 425). His answer was: "Mostly
nominal and ordinal are used, though the probability is good
that many scales and tests used in psychological and educa-
tional measurement approximate interval measurement." (p.
425). He gave no argument for the claim that some are ordinal,
simply asserting, "Intelligence, aptitude, and personality test
scores are, basically and strictly speaking, ordinal"
(p. 425, italics in original). Then, assuming that the underlying
psychological attribute is actually quantitative, he argued that
if two or more ordinal indices are linearly related, then "equal
intervals can be assumed" (p. 425). Thus, he concluded:
"The best procedure would seem to be to treat ordinal
measurements as though they were interval measurements"
(p. 427) citing Guilford (1954) as his authority. Guilford had
asserted that psychological practices "often approach the condi-
tion of equal units" (p. 15), that is, interval scale measurement.
Now, test scores, considered in isolation, are neither ordinal
nor interval. This is because, as such, they are not measure-
ments of any kind. If, for example, they are a count of the
number of correct answers, then they are simply frequencies,
nothing more and nothing less. However, considered in
relation to hypothetical psychological attributes (such as abili-
ties, traits or attitudes), the issue of measurement can be raised.
Clearly, test scores can only approach interval scale measure-
ments of such hypothetical attributes on condition that differ-
ences within such attributes are quantitative. Thus, until the
structure of such attributes is known, claims like those
of Kerlinger and Guilford beg the question.
Nunnally (1967) also discussed this issue at length.
He identified the "fundamentalist view"; namely, that
"(1) measurement scales have empirical reality in addition to
being theoretical constructions and (2) the investigator must
show evidence of the scale properties of particular measures"
Australian Journal of Psychology - August 2002
Stevens's Scales of Measurement I 101
(p. 21). Of course, this is just the view that in claiming a scale
to be interval, something is being said about the structure
of the attribute involved and, furthermore, that such claims
cannot be accepted safely without evidence. Calling the
standard, critical, scientific attitude fundamentalist was a sign
of things to come.
Suppose, he says, that the "fundamentalist" view is true.
This would imply, he thought, that only length and weight
could be shown to be measurable on anything better than
an ordinal scale, for it is only with these two attributes that the
additive structure of the attribute can be directly seen.
He claimed that in all other cases of measurement, a correlate
is used to measure the attribute involved (as, e.g., length
is used to measure temperature) and that the correlate cannot
reveal the structure of the measured attribute. Now, while
a fundamentalist may find this debilitating, treating a correlate
as if it provided interval scale measurement loses very little,
according to Nunnally. The reason he gave is that the product-
moment correlation coefficient "between two variables is
affected very little by monotonic transformations of the
variables" (p. 25). So, Nunnally concluded, if the correlate is
ordinally related to the attribute of interest, it will also be
highly correlated with it (in the sense of the product-moment
coefficient). Such an argument, if valid, would have obvious
application in psychology: it would imply that if test scores
were an ordinal correlate of psychological attributes, they could
be treated as interval scale measures of such attributes.
Of course, this argument begs the familiar question.
It assumes that the relevant attribute is quantitative and,
furthermore, that the correlate is at least an ordinal index of it.
However, if the structure of the correlate reveals nothing about
the structure of the relevant attribute, neither of these assump-
tions is safe. Suppose that the psychological attribute were
merely ordinal, then the correlate could be nothing better than
an ordinal index of it. If the psychological attribute were
merely a partial order, then even ordinal scaling would be
impossible. If nothing could be known of the psychological
attribute then, ipso facto, it could never be known that any
correlate measures it on any 6f Stevens's four kinds of scales.
Nunnally's characterisation of the fundamentalist view is,
however, a caricature. Standard accounts of extensive measure-
ment (e.g., Helmholtz, 1887/1996; Holder, 1901; Campbell,
1920; Suppes & Zinnes, 1963) show that the additive structure
of quite a few attributes (e.g., "mass, volume, length, angle,
period, force, electrical resistance, current, voltage" (Campbell,
1938, p. 127)) can be demonstrated directly. Furthermore, the
then recently published work of Luce and Tukey (1964)
showed that conjoint measurement provides an indirect route
for identifying additive structure, one which covers all other
physical attributes (Krantz, et al., 1971). Moreover, the theory
of conjoint measurement specifies conditions under which the
structure of a correlate provides information about the struc-
ture of underlying attributes. Nunnally's argument misrepre-
sented the scientific approach so badly that the approach
appeared unworkable. His misrepresentation set the scene for
exposition of his preferred position.
Nunnally's preferred position was that there is no intrinsic
interval scale structure, that is, that there are no "'real' scales"
(Nunnally, 1967, p. 26). Thus, he concluded "It is much more
appropriate to think of any measurement scale as a convention
- an agreement among scientists that a particular scaling
of an attribute is a 'good' scaling" (p. 26), 'good' scales being
those that "work well in practice" (p. 28, italics in original).
Three points can be made about this position. First, as noted,
interval scale structure is non-trivial and the issue of whether
any attributes possess it is an empirical one. Lacking this kind
of structure, an attribute may still be ordered. It is known that
102 Joel Michell
treating ordinal attributes as if they were interval structures
may lead to invalid conclusions (Luce, Krantz, Suppes,
& Tversky, 1990; Michell, 1986) and, in such cases, methods
tailored to ordinal structures are preferable (Cliff, 1996). More
specifically, ordinal attributes cannot relate quantitatively
(e.g., linearly or multiplicatively) to other attributes and,
so, methods presuming quantitative relations (e.g., factor
analysis) would be of dubious value in identifying underlying
attributes. Also, the hypothesis that the underlying attributes
are ordinal cannot be taken for granted. If, for example, the
psychological attributes that lie behind test performance are
only partially ordered, then even ordinal methods of data
analysis could be misleading. Thus, if psychological attributes
do not possess interval structure, as Nunnally suggests, treat-
ing them as interval measures is unsafe. Furthermore, the
scientific task of discovering their actual structure remains.
Second, Stevens's theory made the place of convention
explicit. The numbers employed in a measurement scale are
constrained more and more by nature as one proceeds from
nominal to ratio scales and, as a result, convention plays
a diminishing role. With ratio scales, only the unit of measure-
ment is a matter of convention and once that is agreed to,
numerical scale values are uniquely determined. With interval
scales, not only the unit but also the zero point is a matter
of convention. Once they are agreed to, numerical scale values
are again uniquely determined. With ordinal and nominal
scales it is simpler to specify what is not conventional about
them, than what is. Nominal scales only reflect sameness
or difference and, so, the sameness or difference of the numer-
als assigned to levels of the relevant attribute is the only non-
conventional feature. As well as that, ordinal scales represent
the order of levels of the attribute, so the order of the numerals
assigned is non-conventional as well. Aside from conventional
features, the numerical values used relate to real features of the
attributes involved and, so, are determined by nature. To claim
that a scale is interval, for example, is to claim that the
attribute possesses the relevant natural structure. Since this is
an empirical hypothesis, it can only be satisfactorily investi-
gated using empirical methods. Of course, as already
indicated, Nunnally believed that (with the exception of length
and weight) the attribution of interval scale properties
to measurements was always a matter of convention. This was
a misunderstanding: the kind of scale obtained depends
entirely upon the kind of empirical structure modelled.
Third, the criterion of working well in practice is generally
interpreted in psychology to mean something like enabling
useful predictions. Psychological tests are useful in many
practical contexts. Such usefulness is often assessed using the
product-moment correlation coefficient or the methods
of linear regression. The idea that an approximate linear
association between test scores and criterion variables supports
the conclusion that such scores are interval scale measures is
the main argument given in psychometrics. Lord and Novick
(1968), in the most important psychometric work of the
twentieth century, put it this way:
If we construct a test score by counting up correct responses
(zero-one scoring) and treating the resulting scale scores as having
interval properties, the procedure may or may not produce a good
predictor of some criterion. To the extent that this scaling produces
a good empirical predictor the stipulated interval scaling is justified.
(p. 22).
Such an argument overlooks the fact that the predictive useful-
ness of psychological tests is logically independent of the issue
of whether test scores measure anything at all.
It is possible that scores on a test might not measure
anything, and yet they could still be useful in making predic-
tions. Test scores (generally the number of correct answers)
are perfectly sensible quantities in their own right and do not
Australian Journal of Psychology - August 2002
have to be treated as having "interval properties" in order to be
correlated with a criterion variable. The question of interval
scaling only arises when test scores are hypothesised to be
indices of latent psychological attributes. This fact was recog-
nised by Cronbach and Gleser (1957), who recommended
replacing the rhetoric of measurement with statistical decision
theory in practical contexts. Likewise, even if tests measure
psychological attributes, it does not follow that they are useful
predictors. That depends upon the complexity of the causal
processes linking those attributes to performance on the
relevant criteria.
Of course, if a particular test is useful in predicting some
criterion, one possible explanation of that usefulness is the
hypothesis that the test measures a psychological attribute
relevant to that criterion. However, the hypothesis that this
is what is going on is not confirmed by the existence of a high
product-moment correlation because test scores may correlate
highly with criteria whether or not they measure anything
on an interval scale. If, for example, the relevant psychological
attribute was merely ordered and that attribute was causally
connected to the criterion variable, then a high correlation
would be expected because "product-moment correlation
mainly is sensitive to the rank order of individuals" (Nunnally,
1997, p. 25). So, the issues of predictive usefulness and inter-
val scale measurement are different and confusing them does
not advance our understanding.
While this paper has focused upon the arguments
of Kerlinger (1965) and Nunnally (1967), it should be noted
that their arguments are entirely typical of those advanced
in psychology, both in the past and today. Recent texts
continue to draw the same conclusion. For example, Kline
reassures his readers that "the vast majority of psychological
tests measuring intelligence, ability, personality and motiva-
tion ... are interval scales" (Kline, 2000, p. 18) and Lehman
insists that "interval measurement is probably the most
common scale in psychology" (1991, p. 54), while Whitley
concludes that "most measures of psychological states and
traits and of constructs such as attitudes and people's interpre-
tations of events are interval level" (1996, p. 117). The most
recent edition of Kerlinger's text still claims that "the probabil-
ity is high that many scales and tests used in psychological and
educational measurement approximate interval measurement"
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 635). These are general texts cover-
ing quantitative methods and such conclusions perpetuate
psychology's attitude of wishful thinking.
Wishful thinking about these issues is not confined
to general texts on research methods. The texts of Nunnally
(1967), Lord and Novick (1968), and Kline (2000) are special-
ist texts in psychometrics of varying levels of complexity.
Experts in psychometrics typically fudge the issues as much as
any psychologists. For example, in recent decades, item
response theories (IRTs) have come to dominate psychomet-
rics (see, e.g., Embretson & Hershberger, 1999). IRTs are
theories that relate the probability of a response of a given kind
upon a test item of some sort (say, a correct response to a
dichotomous item on an ability test) to supposedly quantitative
attributes of the person doing the test (say, to that person's
level of the relevant ability) and the test item (say, the item's
level of difficulty). Perhaps the best known of these theories is
that proposed by Rasch (1960), the so-called Rasch model.
Within the context of the present paper, it is interesting to note
that the Rasch model is related to the theory of conjoint
measurement (Keats, 1967) and, thus, is potentially useful
in investigating whether the attributes involved (ability and
difficulty) are quantitative, ordinal, or of some other structure.
Some see the Rasch model as being conjoint measurement's
"practical realization" (Wright, 1999, p. 80) and Wright

illustrated how the theory of conjoint measurement could be
applied to data relevant to the Rasch model (Perline, Wright,
& Wainer, 1979). Despite this and related work (e.g., Karabat-
sos, 2001; Michell, 2002; Scheiblechner 1995,1999), the
reluctance of those applying IRTs to address the question of
whether the relevant attributes are quantitative or something
less is palpable. The theory of conjoint measurement describes
a hierarchy of conditions - the so-called cancellation condi-
tions (Michell, 1990) directly diagnostic of the ordinal-quanti-
tative distinction. However, in general, those applying IRTs
show no inclination to employ this conceptual resource.
Instead, the prevailing tendency is to evaluate an IRT via
indices of goodness of fit that are not necessarily diagnostic of
quantitative structure (Karabatsos, 2000). Even in this poten-
tially promising area of psychometrics, practitioners generally
follow the time-honoured tradition of Stevens, begging the
question that the attributes of interest are quantitative, instead
of investigating it.
It is nothing short of a scientific scandal that psychology,
at the commencement of the 21st century, should be no closer
to treating this issue as an empirical research issue than it was
at the beginning of the last century. At least then the excuse
could be given that the science was young and the conceptual
resources needed to investigate the issue undeveloped. Despite
that, the issue was taken seriously then (e.g., Boring, 1920;
Titchener, 1905). Now, following Stevens's example, the issue
is deflected. The challenge for the current generation of
psychologists is to stop pretending that they can measure and
to come to grips with this fundamental, foundational issue.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE VALUES OF SCIENCE
For 50 years psychologists have wished that their tests
produced interval scale measurements and they have been
prepared to claim, without any supporting scientific evidence,
that their wish is fulfilled. Presentation of Stevens's theory
of scales of measurement, with its distinctions between types
of scales, is generally used only to create the illusion
of a considered treatment of the issue. Within that context,
the assertion that psychological tests provide ordinal indices
of underlying attributes has an air of plausibility to minds
uncluttered by knowledge of the structural conditions neces-
sary for an ordinal scale. Once that is accepted, those wishing
for interval scales are apparently satisfied by suitably framed
question-begging arguments.
Of course, psychologists are free to believe whatever they
like about test scores as measures of psychological attributes
in the privacy of their own minds. Furthermore, the hypothesis
that scores on some test are interval scale measures of some
theoretical construct is a perfectly coherent speculation.
However, as scientists, we are not free to claim this belief
or speculation as a scientific result in the absence of evidence.
Yet this is precisely what psychologists do when they present
their tests to the scientific and lay communities as instruments
capable of interval scale measurement. Science is committed
to moderating its claims according to the weight of the
relevant evidence. To abandon this commitment because one
is more interested in wished for possibilities than in what is the
case, is to cease doing effective science. Members of the lay
community whose lives are affected by the claims of scientists
have an obvious interest in scientific moderation and none
in scientists' wishful thinking. Within both communities,
it is now widely believed that psychologists are able
to measure all manner of attributes using psychological tests.
On this issue, wishful thinking has been victorious and science
the loser. Why?
Stevens's theory formed part of a methodological consensus
that took shape in psychology in the decades immediately after
Australian Journal of Psychology - August 2002
Stevens's Scales of Measurement 103
the Second World War. Those decades witnessed an unprece-
dented expansion of government investment in scientific
research, especially in the United States, which ushered in the
era of Big Science. Suddenly, research grants became the main
vehicle by which, not only individual careers, but also the
aspirations of entire disciplines, progressed. This led to what
Schorske has aptly called "the new rigorism" (1997, p. 309).
By this, he does not mean that disciplines like psychology
actually became more rigorous, only that they devised method-
ologies aping the rigour of the physical sciences, misrepresent-
ing their resemblance to those sciences in the hope
of attracting financial support. Thus the politically constructed
economy of Big Science cemented the post-war methodologi-
cal consensus. Psychology was already biased towards
measurement (Michell, 1999) and this, combined with the new
economy, explains why psychologists used Stevens's theory
to shut the door upon the very questions that it promised
to open up to investigation. In short, it was done in order
to avoid facing the possibility that psychological attributes
might not be quantitative within a socially contrived economic
context in which quantitative science was seen as favoured
over non-quantitative.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These investigations were supported by the Federal Govern-
ment of Australia via an ARC grant for research into the
tensions between quantitative and qualitative methods
in psychology. I am grateful to Fiona Hibberd, Agnes Petocz,
David Grayson and to the anonymous reviewers appointed
by this journal for their helpful comments.
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