G.R. No.
138200               February 27, 2002 injunction. On 25 April 1996, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, Jr. filed his
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO MABALOT, respondent.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
validity of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, dated 19 February 1996, and Department
Order No. 97-1025, dated 29 January 1997, both issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
The facts are uncontested.
On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.,
issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation
Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin, viz:
"In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer of
regional functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the
creation of a regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.
"Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a
concurrent capacity subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central
Office."
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,1 against
petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 81,2 praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735
be declared "illegal and without effect."
On 20 March 1996, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
petitioner from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. On 08 April 1996, the
lower court, upon filing of a bond by respondent, issued a writ of preliminary
answer to the petition.
Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued the
assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, to wit:
"Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for
purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by
virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby established as the
Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB
in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.
"The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the Department until
such time that its appropriate budget is included in the General Appropriations Act."
After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the hearing in
the lower court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present Department Order
No. 97-1025. In an Order dated 18 February 1997, the lower court granted the
motion.
On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Petition
assailing the validity of Department Order No. 97-1025. On 14 May 1997, the OSG
presented Department Order No. 97-1025 after which petitioner filed a formal offer of
exhibits.
In an Order dated 09 June 1997, the lower court admitted petitioner’s documentary
exhibits over the objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower court admitted the
supplemental petition filed by respondent to which petitioner filed an answer thereto.
On 31 March 1999, the lower court rendered a decision the decretal portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order Nos.
96-7333 dated February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997 of the
respondent DOTC Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being
violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of
the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from
holding any other office or employment in the Government.
"The preliminary injunction issued on May 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"It is so ordered."
Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue
of validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
In his Memorandum4 , respondent Mabalot principally argues that "a transfer of the
powers and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a DOTC Regional Office or
the establishment of the latter as an LTFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional" for
being "an undue exercise of legislative power." To this end, respondent quoted
heavily the lower court’s rationale on this matter, to wit:
"With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of powers and
functions, specially those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be effected through
legislative fiat. Not even the President of the Philippines can do so. And much
less by the DOTC Secretary who is only a mere extension of the
Presidency. Among the powers of the LTFRB are to issue injunctions, whether
prohibitory (or) mandatory, punish for contempt and to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum. These powers devolve by extension on the LTFRB
regional offices in the performance of their functions. They cannot be
transferred to another agency of government without congressional approval
embodied in a duty enacted law." (Emphasis ours)
We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or
statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, this Court upholds
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and
valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the
lower court, the President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter
ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as
the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and
the law on public officers that a public office may be created through any of the
following modes, to wit, either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by
law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.5
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has been settled
by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing
the President to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.6 Thus,
at various times, Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize
executive agencies and redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such
statutes have been held to be within the authority of the President.7
In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office
was made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed
for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or an order
of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission8 pursuant to
Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Administrative Code of
1987. In the case before us, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum
and Department Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the
President,9 dated 23 September 1987, Section 1 of which explicitly provides:
"Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various
departments and other agencies of the National Government that are currently
authorized to maintain regional offices are hereby directed to establish forthwith
their respective regional offices In the Cordillera Administrative Region with
territorial coverage as defined under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 220 dated July
15, 1987, with regional headquarters at Baguio City."
Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not merely
authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies
of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their
regional offices in the CAR. To us, Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and
unequivocal directive and mandate - no less than from the Chief Executive - ordering
the heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the establishment of
their respective regional offices in the CAR.
By the Chief Executive’s unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order No. 36
ordering his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to effectuate the
creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, the President, in effect, deemed it fit and
proper under the circumstances to act and exercise his authority, albeit through the
various Department Secretaries, so as to put into place the organizational structure
and set-up in the CAR and so as not to compromise in any significant way the
performance of public functions and delivery of basic government services in the
Cordillera Administrative Region.1âwphi1
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and
establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC
Secretary, as alter ego of the President, directly and merely sought to implement
the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order.
To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates:
"The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
By definition, control is "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."10 It includes the
authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to
assume a power directly vested in him by law.11
From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times
to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter ego.12 As this Court
enunciated in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior,13 "without minimizing the
importance of the heads of various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President." Thus, their acts, "performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower court’s pronouncement - that the
transfer of powers and functions and in effect, the creation and establishment of
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, may not be validly made by the Chief Executive, much
less by his mere alter ago and could only be properly effected through a law enacted
by Congress -is to say the least, erroneous.
In Larin vs. Executive Secretary,14 this Court through the ponencia of Mr. Justice
Justo Torres, inked an extensive disquisition on the continuing authority of the
President to reorganize the National Government, which power includes the creation,
alteration or abolition of public offices. Thus in Larin, we held that Section 62 of
Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) "evidently
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned":
"Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise created by
law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes
in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this act."
Petitioner’s contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were riders,
deserved scant consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule that every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding for all intents and purposes.15
Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar provisions as
embodied in Section 72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled "Organizational
Changes" and Section 73 (General Provisions) thereof entitled "Implementation of
Reorganization." Likewise, R.A. 8250 (G.A.A. for FY 1997) has Section 76 (General
Provisions) entitled "Organizational Changes" and Section 77 (General Provisions)
entitled " Implementation of Reorganization."
In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executive’s
authority to reorganize the National Government, viz:
"Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise,
the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with
law." (Emphasis ours)
This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the
law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree
No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create
and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."16 So far,
there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees."
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1772, reads:
 "1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the
President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good
government and responsive national development, including but not limited to
the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:
"xxx
"b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be
necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct
of government functions, services and activities;
"c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and
personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or
instrumentality to another;
"d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
"e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;
"f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities,
agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as
well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers,
functions, and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned
or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other
relevant aspects of their charters. (As added by P.D. 1772)
"g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes and objectives of this decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis
supplied.)
In fine, the "designation"17 and subsequent establishment18 of DOTC-CAR as the
Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the
concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-
CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President
to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and Communications.
Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was
decreed "in the interest of the service"19 and "for purposes of economy and more
effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative
Region."20 In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith
if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.21 To our
mind, the reorganization pursued in the case at bar bears the earmark of good faith.
As petitioner points out,22 "tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the eventual creation of
the LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms of manpower and resource
requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the
government."
Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O. 29223 and
Section 4 of E.O. 202,24 the Secretary of Transportation and Communications,
through his duly designated Undersecretary, shall exercise administrative
supervision and control25 over the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (Board).
Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order No. 97-1025,
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to the direct supervision and control of
LTFRB Central Office. Under the law,26 the decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Franchising and Regulatory Offices shall be appealable to the Board within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision; the decision, order or resolution of the
Board shall be appealable to the DOTC Secretary. With this appellate set-up and
mode of appeal clearly established and in place, no conflict or absurd circumstance
would arise in such manner that a decision of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is
subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.
As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution, we hold
that the assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate the aforementioned
constitutional provisions considering that in the case of Memorandum Order No. 96-
735, the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designated to
perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to
the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a
regular LTFRB Regional Office.1âwphi1
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:27
"To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with
additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some
cases, a public officer may be designated to a position in an acting capacity as when
an undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending
the appointment of a permanent Secretary."
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR
shall be holding more than one office or employment at the same time as a result of
the establishment of such agency as the LTFRB-CAR pursuant to Department Order
No. 97-1025, this Court is of the firm view that such fact still does not constitute a
breach or violation of Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. On this matter, it
must be stressed that under the aforementioned constitutional provision, an office or
employment held in the exercise of the primary functions of one’s principal office is
an exception to, or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in
Section 7, Article IX-B.
Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to clearly
establish that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any
additional, double or indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of
the Constitution. In the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to show any
breach or violation of said constitutional prohibitions, this Court finds no cogent
reason to declare the invalidity of the challenged orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated 31 March 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City-Branch 81 in Special Civil Action Case No. Q-96-26868 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 133132           January 25, 2000
ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A.
PUREZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL L.
ADIONG, ROMEO L. CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The central issue posed before this Court in the present case is the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8851 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,"1 by virtue of which petitioners herein,
who were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were
separated from office. Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally
guaranteed right to security of tenure.
The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975),
entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized
Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under
RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres,
Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong.
Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991 for a six year
term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado
was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another
Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995,
Canonizado was re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on
January 2, 1997 for a similar term of six years. Respondent Adiong's appointment to
the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the
time the amendatory law was passed.2
On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current
Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Pursuant thereto,
President Ramos appointed Romeo L. Cairme on March 11, 1998 as a member of
the NAPOLCOM for a full six year term. On the same date, Adiong, was given a term
extension of two years since he had served less than two years of his previous term.
Cairme and Adiong both took their oaths of office on April 6, 1998.3 Completing the
membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, who
were appointed by President Estrada on June 30, 1998 and who took their oaths of
office on July 2, 1998.4
According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Section 4,
amending section 13 of Republic Act No. 6975, provides —
Sec. 13. Creation and Composition. — A National Police Commission,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is hereby created for the purpose
of effectively discharging the functions prescribed in the Constitution and
provided in this Act. The Commission shall be an agency attached to the
Department for policy and program coordination. It shall be composed of a
Chairperson, four (4) regular Commissioners, and the Chief of the PNP
as ex-officio member. Three (3) of the regular Commissioners shall come
from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the
police or military, one (1) of whom shall be designated as vice chairperson by
the President. The fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law
enforcement sector either active or retired: Provided, That an active member
of a law enforcement agency shall be considered resigned from said agency
once appointed to the Commission: Provided further, That at least one (1) of
the Commissioners shall be a woman. The Secretary of the Department shall
be the ex-officio Chairperson of the Commission, while the Vice Chairperson
shall act as the executive officer of the Commission.
Meanwhile, section 8 states that —
Upon the effectivity of this Act, the terms of office of the current
Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their
reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for
current Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their
terms of office who may be appointed by the President for a maximum term
of two (2) years.
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551
violates their security of tenure.1âwphi1.nêt
It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.5 As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for
cause provided by law.6 The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to ". . .
reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in
the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."7
Public respondents insist that the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that
the terms of petitioners' offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to
impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization. In support of their theory, public respondents cite the various
changes introduced by RA 8551 in the functions, composition and character of the
NAPOLCOM as proof of Congress' intention to abolish the body created under RA
6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more civilian in nature, in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Petitioners' posit the theory that the
abolition of petitioners' offices was a result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM
allegedly effected by RA 8551.8
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.9 It is
acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the
officer's right to continue in the position held10 and that such power may be exercised
for various reasons, such as the lack of funds11 or in the interest of
economy.12 However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good
faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional
security of tenure of civil service employees.13
An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes.14 Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal
nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents v. Rasul15 we said:
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the
incumbent the right to security of tenure. [De la Lanna v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
(1982)]. However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH
and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of
the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and
the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good
faith. [Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4,
1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)]. We hereby apply the principle enunciated
in Cesar Z. Dario vs. Hon. Salvador M. Mison [176 SCRA 84 (1989)] that
abolition which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and
does not result in the removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of
the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are
valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the
duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same. . . .
(emphasis supplied)
This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal,16 wherein we declared that the
substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in
the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.
We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is
whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by
Congress. More specifically, whether the changes effected by RA 8551 in reference
to the NAPOLCOM were so substantial as to effectively create a completely new
office in contemplation of the law. In answer to this query, the case of Mayor
v. Macaraig17 is squarely in point.
In that case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
671518 insofar as it declared vacant the positions of the Commissioners, Executive
Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission and
provided for the removal of the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of
their successors.19 The Court held that the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional
since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly or impliedly abolish the offices of
petitioners, there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and
functions of the petitioners' offices under the old law and the new law. Thus:
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that
office is vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to
abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce
those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders
thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an
infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will
have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the
professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications,
ranks, and salaries or emoluments.
This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do — declare the offices of petitioners
vacant, by declaring that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are
deemed expired," thereby removing petitioners herein from the civil service.
Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona
fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.
RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions. In order to determine
whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the
changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the
NAPOLCOM.
Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the
Department of the Interior and Local Government,20 (Department) whereas under RA
8551 it is made "an agency attached to the Department for policy and program
coordination."21 Contrary to what public respondents would have us believe, this does
not result in the creation of an entirely new office. In Mayor, the NLRC, prior to the
passage of the amendatory law, was also considered an integral part of the
Department of Labor and Employment. RA 6715, however, changed that by
declaring that it shall instead ". .be attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program coordination only. . . ." making it a more autonomous body.
The Court held that this change in the NLRC's nature was not sufficient to justify a
conclusion that the new law abolished the offices of the labor commissioners.
Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the
NAPOLCOM's composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM
from four to five Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-
officio member. In addition, the new law provided that three of the regular
Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former
members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular Commissioner shall
come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired. Furthermore, it is
required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman."22 Again, as we
held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature
of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted
that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in section 20 of RA
6975 as amended by section 10 of RA 8551,23 remains essentially the same and that,
except for the addition of the PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the
NAPOLCOM is also substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws,
the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated
by the President.24
Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by
the amendments. Under RA 6975, the Commission has the following powers and
functions:
(a) Exercise administrative control over the Philippine National Police;
(b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and
administration;
(c) Foster and develop policies and promulgate rules and regulations,
standards and procedures to improve police services based on sound
professional concepts and principles;
(d) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such
purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities, and facilities of
all police agencies throughout the country;
(e) Prepare a police manual prescribing rules and regulations for efficient
organization, administration, and operation, including recruitment, selection,
promotion and retirement;
(f) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;
(g) Conduct surveys and compile statistical data for the proper evaluation of
the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the country;
(h) Render to the President and to Congress an annual report on its activities
and accomplishments during the (30) days after the end of the calendar year,
which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the
organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities
and provinces throughout the country, and recommendation for appropriate
remedial legislation;
(i) Approve or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary actions involving demolition or dismissal from the service
imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the
Philippine National Police;
(j) Affirm reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel
disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed
upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over
administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for
police benefits;
(l) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days
before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention;
(m) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms and,
after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for insignia of
ranks, awards and medals of honor;
(n) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining to the
discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who among its
personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths in connection
therewith; and
(o) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act and as the President may direct.
Meanwhile, the NAPOLCOM's functions under section 5 of RA 8551 are:
a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the
Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:
1) Develop policies and promulgate a police manual prescribing rules
and regulations for efficient organization, administration, and
operation, including criteria for manpower allocation, distribution and
deployment, recruitment, selection , promotion, and retirement of
personnel and the conduct of qualifying entrance and promotional
examinations for uniformed members;
2) Examine and audit, and thereafter establish the standards for such
purposes on a continuing basis, the performance, activities and
facilities of all police agencies throughout the country;
3) Establish a system of uniform crime reporting;
4) Conduct an annual self-report survey and compile statistical date
for the accurate assessment of the crime situation and the proper
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of all police units in the
country;
5) Approve or modify plans and programs on education and training,
logistical requirements, communications, records, information
systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting;
6) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board,
personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from
the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police
by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
 7) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate
boards over administrative cases against policemen and over
decisions on claims for police benefits;
8) Prescribe minimum standards for arms, equipment, and uniforms
and after consultation with the Philippine Heraldry Commission, for
insignia of ranks, awards, and medals of honor. Within ninety (90)
days from the effectivity of this Act, the standards of the uniformed
personnel of the PNP must be revised which should be clearly distinct
from the military and reflective of the civilian character of the police;
9) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in matters pertaining
to the discharge of its own powers and duties, and designate who
among its personnel can issue such processes and administer oaths
in connection therewith;
10) Inspect and assess the compliance of the PNP on the established
criteria for manpower allocation, distribution, and deployment and
their impact on the community and the crime situation, and therewith
formulate appropriate guidelines for maximization of resources and
effective utilization of the PNP personnel;
11) Monitor the performance of the local chief executives as deputies
of the Commission; and
12) Monitor and investigate police anomalies and irregularities.
b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and
administration;
c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its
activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the
calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in
the organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities,
cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendations for
appropriate remedial legislation;
d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days
before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention
program; and
e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act and as the President may direct.
Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,
supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with
administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA
6975 it only exercised administrative control should be construed as evidence of
legislative intent to abolish such office.25 This contention is bereft of merit. Control
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the that of the latter."26 On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee,
to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or
the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.27 Thus, the
power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the
phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not
bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that
a completely new office has been created.
Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the
NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners' offices. We hold that there has
been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them.28 It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions.29 Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's position through removal or
abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the
test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison:30
. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event,
no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because
the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would
not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing
else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to
defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition"
takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
 positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as provided under
funds. section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.33

It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the
PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one
having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is
given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to
Congress.31 As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been
preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control,
authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership,
nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief
of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a
reorganization.
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by
Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent
Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from
office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must
therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners' removal from office by
virtue of section 8 of RA 8551, we find that there is no longer any need to pass upon
these remaining constitutional questions. It is beyond doubt that the legislature has
the power to provide for the composition of the NAPOLCOM since it created such
body. Besides, these questions go into the very wisdom of the law, and
unquestionably lie beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.34
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring section 8 of
RA 8551 unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners' right to security of
tenure. The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such
unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their
stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to REINSTATEMENT
and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were
removed from office.35
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there

are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that
when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never
became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The
new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.32

At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30,
1998, Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector
General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to sections 40 and 41
of RA 8551 and that he took his oath of office before the President on July 7, 1998.
However, this is a mere allegation on the part of public respondents of which this
Court cannot take judicial notice. Furthermore, this issue has not been fully ventilated
in the pleadings of the parties. Therefore, such allegation cannot be taken into
consideration by this Court in passing upon the issues in the present case.

Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 8551 insofar as it limits

the law enforcement sector to only one position on the Commission and categorizes
the police as being part of the law enforcement sector despite section 6 of Article XVI
of the Constitution which provides that the police force shall be civilian in character.
Moreover, it is asserted by petitioners that the requirement in section 4 that one of
the Commissioners shall be a woman has no rational basis and is therefore
discriminatory. They claim that it amounts to class legislation and amounts to an