Kahrs - Indian Semantic Analysis The Nirvacana Tradition - Kashmir - Saivism

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE ORIENTAL PUBLICATIONS 55
INDIAN SEMANTIC ANALYSIS
A series list is shown at the back of the book

INDIAN SEMANTIC ANALYSIS
The nirvacana tradition
The Indian tradition of semantic elucidation known as nirvacana analysis repre-

sented a powerful hermeneutic tool in the exegesis and transmission of authorita-
tive scripture. Nevertheless, it has all too frequently been dismissed by modern
scholars as anything from folk-etymology to a primitive forerunner of historical lin-
guistics. Eivind Kahrs argues that such views fall short of explaining both its accep-
tance within the sophisticated grammatical tradition of vydkarana and its effective
usage in the processing of Sanskrit texts. He establishes his argument by investi-
gating the learned Sanskrit literature of Saiva Kashmir, and explains the nirvacana
tradition in the light of a model of substitution, used at least since the time of the
Upanisads and later refined in the technical literatures of grammar and ritual.
According to this model, a substitute (ddesa) takes the place (sthdna) of the origi-
nal placeholder (sthdnin). On the basis of a searching analysis of Sanskrit texts, the
author argues that this sthdna 'place' can be interpreted as 'meaning', the model
thereby providing favourable circumstances for reinterpretation and change.
EIVIND KAHRS is lecturer in Sanskrit at the University of Cambridge.
Bhairava, Nepal, seventeenth century, courtesy of the Victoria and Albert Museum,
London.
I n d i a n s e m a n t i c a n a l y s i s
T h e nirvacana tradition
EIVIND KAHRS
C A M B R I D G E
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP, United Kingdom
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, CB2 2RU, United Kingdom http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA http://www.cup.org
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
© Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Cambridge, 1998
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant
collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the
written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1998
Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge
Typeset in Times Norman 10/12pt in QuarkXPress® [s E ]
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 0 521 63188 2 hardback
In memoriam Nils Simons son
CONTENTS
Preface page xiii-
An outline of strategies 1
Nirvacanasastra 13
Praxis: Saiva Kashmir 55
The universe of Yaska 98
Substitution 175
Epilogue 268
Abbreviations and bibliography 280
Indexes 295
PREFACE
From an early concern with Buddhism, in particular with Madhyamaka and

Yogacara, my interest came to concentrate on the nature of the Buddhist-
Brahmanical controversies in the field of epistemology. However, as my
research progressed, my attention shifted to the question of whether one might
describe a pattern of consistencies underlying Indian Sastric exposition in
general. On a larger scale, I became concerned with the questions of how clas-
sical Indian culture determined what something or someone meant or believed,
how meaning was created and negotiated, how cultural change was promoted
and how it was opposed. Such questions necessarily involve an extensive study
of texts from various areas of Sanskrit literature, the indigenous processing of
these texts, and the models and means of interpretation which were used in that
processing. This led me to investigate the patterns of the Indian linguistic and
ritualistic traditions.
That the linguistic tradition known as vydkarana is one of the most inter-
esting fields of study within the area of Sastric Sanskrit is common knowledge.
What has been less focused upon is that there existed in India another, paral-
lel tradition of linguistic analysis which served a different purpose. This is the
tradition known as nirukta or nirvacanasdstra. Both of these traditions are
classed among the six veddngas, the disciplines auxiliary to the Veda, or, more
specifically, the branches of knowledge designed to preserve it. This, however,
did not prevent them from being widely resorted to by Buddhists and Jains as
well. While the grammatical tradition is well known to us through a number of
treatises, among which the fundamental work is the Astddhydyi, Panini's
famous grammar, only one basic work of nirvacanasdstra has survived,
namely Yaska's Nirukta. But even though only one basic work has come down
to us, the methods and principles of interpretation met with in that work
remained very much alive in Indian Sastric literature. Nevertheless, in modern
Indology the device of nirvacana analysis, basically a method of semantic
elucidation which ultimately involves a theory of meaning (an answer to the
question of what it is for words to mean what they mean), has either been dis-
regarded completely or been interpreted as anything from folk-etymology to
an ancient forerunner of historical linguistics. Such approaches leave one
crucial problem unresolved: how could the method of nirvacana analysis work
xiv Preface
for so many centuries as a highly potent tool in negotiating that intersubjective

but evasive property called meaning which links words and the world?
In this book I venture to show how nirvacana analysis was put to work in
that ordering process whereby a culture is created and how the model under-
lying it fits in with patterns attested elsewhere in the Indian tradition. In
broader terms, this is asking how something comes to mean what it means,
rather than asking what it means. My point here is simply one of logical order:
the question of how something comes to mean what it means is more funda-
mental logically speaking, and an answer to this question may enable us to
carry our investigations of Indian cultural history a step further.
That the method of nirvacana analysis did indeed become a powerful tool
in negotiating meaning, I shall amply demonstrate by presenting and analysing
material from the Sanskrit literature of Saiva Kashmir composed around the
turn of the millennium. How it could become such a powerful tool can be
explained once the method of nirvacana analysis is interpreted according to a
model provided by the Indian tradition itself, namely the model of substitution:
one element appears 'in the place of another. This model - known at least
since the time of the Upanisads, that is to say, since the time when the Indians
consciously started on a quest for meaning in the stronger sense - was refined
and developed in the technical literatures of grammar and ritual. It is only
through a detailed study of these literatures that it becomes possible to inves-
tigate this model of substitution and to find out what it involves. A large part
of the present work consists therefore in detailed analysis of material from
Sanskrit Sastric texts, an analysis which investigates the relation of 'being in
the place of and makes it clear that this 'place' can be interpreted as
'meaning', a circumstance that enables ritual and linguistic elements to replace
other elements under given semantic conditions.
The basic ideas of this book were presented at the Colloque annuel de la
Societe d'Histoire et d'Epistemologie des Sciences du Langage in Paris in
January 1995. 'Interpretation et la tradition indienne du niruktd' will appear in
Histoire, Epistemologie, Langage 20.1, Paris, 1998. 'Some observations on the
sthdnasambandha\ which draws on material from chapter 5 of this book, will
appear in a Felicitation Volume for George Cardona, edited by Madhav M.
Deshpande and Peter Edwin Hook, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
This book would never have been completed without support from a number
of individuals. First of all I would like to express my gratitude to my ddiguru,
the late Nils Simonsson, whose unfailing enthusiasm encouraged me to pursue
the research that has culminated in this book. My gratitude also goes to my
other teachers in Oslo, Knut Kristiansen and Georg von Simson. Albrecht
Wezler was very supportive in the early stages of this work. Since we first met
in 1981, George Cardona has very generously responded to any queries I have
had in the field of vydkarana, within and without the scope of this book. My
opponents at the public defence of my dissertation Substitution and change in
the University of Oslo, Johannes Bronkhorst and Gunilla Gren-Eklund, pro-
Preface xv
vided invaluable criticism and support. The material of that dissertation is

largely incorporated here. I am also grateful to Olav Gjelsvik for stimulating
discussions on philosophical matters. A Visiting Research Fellowship to
Wolfson College, Oxford, in 1982-3 brought me in touch with two persons to
whom I find it hard to express my gratitude in adequate terms, James W.
Benson and Alexis Sanderson. Over the years, these two scholars have not only
supported and criticised my work at various stages, but also generously shared
with me their own ideas in their chosen fields of study. Their example has been
my inspiration; the shortcomings are my own. Since 1987 this work was inter-
rupted several times for a variety of reasons. My thanks are due to my
Cambridge colleagues K.R. Norman and John D. Smith for putting me back
on track, and to my wife Sudeshna Guha for making it shine. I am grateful to
the President and Fellows of Queens' College, particularly to Nigel Leask, for
providing a stimulating environment. Finally, I would like to thank Alison
Gilderdale at Cambridge University Press for being such an excellent copy-
editor when seeing the typescript through the press.
1
An outline of strategies
Traditional societies exploit flexibility while pretending permanence. This is

because belief systems are not legitimated once and for all and therefore
require means to cope with conflict and change without facing the challenge
of admitting that these have taken place. Within traditional Indian culture,
Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, the last of these terms denoting what
indigenous sources refer to as Vaidika, Saiva and Vaisnava forms of religion,
all relied heavily on the scriptural authority of their sacred texts. To provide for
change they provided scriptural change, thus advocating permanence while
exploiting the exegetical potential of a text. This is why intellectual inquiry in
India to a large extent developed, out of necessity, as exegesis for processing
jexts. This is also why it is important to investigate the means of interpretation
made use of in that processing.
Exploring the Indian tradition we are to a considerable extent left to the
resources of texts as our sole material. On the one hand, one may argue that
this leaves us with a severe limitation of sources, in particular with regard to
social status and those cultural undercurrents we have reason to believe must
have existed but only occasionally surface in texts. Moreover, the only direct
conclusions we are permitted to draw on the basis of texts are about ideas and
idealised self-representations, whereas historical or anthropological material
also touches upon those features of a culture which are not exclusively related
to ideas and self-representations and are not necessarily dealt with in texts. On
the other hand, the Sanskrit language served as a cultural vehicle of Indian
civilisation for around three thousand years, and the same texts provide us with
unique source material in that they present us with a number of conflicting
belief systems and their attempts at legitimating themselves, and also with a
rich theoretical literature which enables us to see what the Indians themselves
thought they were doing or said they were doing.
A body of individuals comprising a community builds up patterns of
meaning through which it articulates its cultural identity. Such patterns of
meaning are ways of classifying the world. On this view, the study of another
culture becomes the study of other patterns of meaning.1 The understanding of
1
By this I do not intend to say that 'meaning' is the only gateway to the study of another culture.
a culture therefore requires translation in the widest sense, the fundamental
task being the explication of cultural phenomena within the context of the pat-
terns of meaning to which they belong. There is little in these patterns that is
not specific to that culture, and meaning may exist where the outsider would
not expect to find it.
Although I think of meaning first and foremost as linguistic meaning, I shall
nevertheless treat of meaning in any stronger sense much ift the same way,
since I believe we are dealing with the same thing: a property by virtue of
which language and thoughts are linked to features of the world.
Our task, then, is to find interpretable patterns. But there is a serious obsta-
cle here: there cannot be determinate meanings. Meaning is not stationary,
patiently awaiting its discovery. Meaning is generated in the same way that lan-
guage is generated, and thus subject to change and interpretation. In fact,
meaning is created by people interpreting, be that within the patterns of
meaning specific to a culture or in regard to that quest for meaning with which
one sets out to study a culture.2
If there are no fixed meanings, then the interpretable pattern may change as
meaning changes. Moreover, sentences of one language may be translated into
another in different ways which all accord equally well with accessible empir-
ical evidence. No one of these translations can claim to be 4the right one' for
they may all be equally defensible. Famous in this respect is W.V. Quine's con-
structed example 'gavagai', tentatively translated 'rabbit' by an imaginary field
linguist. But how are we to know that 'gavagai' applies not to rabbits, but to
undetached rabbit parts or to rabbit stages? These differ not only in factual
matter but also in respect of properties. This example is clearly artificial, but
it serves to bring out the point.3 Quine also offers more trivial examples such
as the French 'ne . . . rien' where 'rien' translates equally well as 'anything'
and 'nothing' in English, and the classifiers of Japanese - and, one may add,
Chinese - language.4
2
Perhaps most notably within the field of social anthropology, the methodological shift from
function to meaning brought to light the important epistemological questions this raises; see,
for example, Parkin 1982:xvi. There are other views. According to E. Gellner (1993) 'anthro-
pologists are the anti-scripturalists of the social sciences. Obviously they are not given to the
idea, tempting to at least some historians or orientalists and classicists, that there is no reality
without some document or text.' In this article, which is a feature article in the TLS on the state-
of-the-arts and future of anthropology, Gellner goes on to claim that 'one specific weakness in
current anthropology is an excessive attention to "meaning", equivalent to the "interpretive" or
hermeneutic turn in philosophy. This is the view that meaning rather than structure is the key
notion of the subject.' Apart from the fact that static notions of structure are rather irrelevant,
this excludes from his material the vast bulk of literary sources and the fact that human beings
communicate by means of language. 'What do we need?', Gellner asks, and replies: 'We do
need a language, a typology of societies and institutions' (my emphasis). Can there be a lan-
guage without meaning? To focus on language and meaning is not to treat a culture as 'a self-
sustaining, self-validating system of meaning'. My point is indeed the opposite: there cannot
be determinate meanings, so we have to search for structures and models which take this fact
4
into consideration. 3 For the example, see Quine 1960:51 ff.; 1969:30 ff.; 1990:42, 51.
Quine 1969:33 ff.
One possible source for this indeterminacy of meaning and translation has
been suggested by Quine in the form of what he calls the inscrutability of refer-
ence/ The meaning of a sentence is intimately connected with whether it is
true or false. One may even argue that to know the meaning of a sentence is to
know the conditions under which it is true. The sentence 'Snow is white' is
true if and only if snow is white. Inscrutability of reference is the thesis that if
there is one way of connecting words with objects which gives an account of
truth conditions of sentences, then there will be endless ways. This theme has
variants, but in its simplest form it amounts to stating that you can give exactly
the same truth conditions in a language by making systematic shifts in what
the singular terms refer to and what satisfies the predicates. You get a differ-
ent thought if you get a different sentence to represent it. Reference, then,
becomes a theoretical construct to explain how parts of sentences contribute
to their truth conditions, but there is no unique relation between single exter-
nal objects and words which is the relation of reference.6
This links up with a kind of holism, stressed from the beginning of Quine's
work, which points to another source of indeterminacy.7 Different aspects of
the mental have to fit together into large patterns, and these patterns involve
normative elements. No belief can exist without being surrounded by a whole
•? See, in particular, Quine 1969. The theme has been developed by Donald Davidson (1979). In
more recent work, Quine prefers to call what he is talking about 'indeterminacy of reference'
0
(1990:50).
This, incidentally, deals a blow to correspondence theories of truth. Note that the view of refer-
ence outlined above is not the only prevalent view of reference in philosophical semantics. The
view presented is, roughly, the position of a semantic holism advocated by Quine and later crit-
ically developed by Donald Davidson (see, in particular, Davidson 1984 and 1986). Instead of
proclaiming the concept of reference as the cornerstone in a theory of semantics, Davidson sug-
gests that a theory of semantics is an empirical theory in as much as it is a theory of truth, or,
rather, that it is a theory of semantics based on truth, relying here at the outset on a Tarski-Iike
concept of semantic truth for artificial languages. Roughly, A. Tarski (e.g. 1935; 1956) demon-
strated what it is to call a sentence in a language L true by defining another language, a meta-
language ML, that does not have a truth-predicate but which is a truth-predicate for the first
language L. According to Tarski it is not possible to extend this to natural languages because
these are universal, and one will accordingly end up with the problem of self-reference. Still
Davidson makes use of Tarski's concept of truth in the realm of natural languages. He
renounces the claim that we must have a consistent definition, staying content with a theory of
truth instead of a definition of truth. ML must still be richer than L in that it must always contain
the predicate 'is true in L\ It is no longer necessarily ontologically richer, only ideally richer.
Presupposing meaning, Tarski wanted to throw some light on truth. Davidson wants to throw
some light on meaning, and has admirably succeeded in this although there is still a long way
to go, for example with regard to the adaptation of quantificational logic, or the substitution of
co-referential terms which does not retain the truth-value of sentences. Other philosophers,
such as S. Kripke, K. Donnellan, H. Field, and J. Fodor retain the concept of reference as the
central one in semantics. What they have in common is, roughly, an effort at giving a seman-
tic theory empirical content by linking words and the world by a causal chain through the rela-
tion of reference. This relation between words and the world must be described without the use
of intensional terms. For Davidson it is truth, for others it is reference. That it might be possi-
ble to criticise the position that the concept of reference is the central one in a theory of seman-
tics without resorting to the almost dogmatic idea of indeterminacy or inscrutability of
reference, I shall not enter into here, since the very idea of indeterminacy is instrumental in
bringing forward the points I wish to make. 7 Quine 1951; cf. Davidson 1974.
4 Indian semantic analysis
galaxy of beliefs, and these beliefs fit together according to the rules, of a
certain logic in as much as people try to get as consistent a picture of the world
as possible. But if someone deviates from the normative pattern too much,
you have reason to say that this person does not hold that belief at all.
Moreover, words have semantic properties, that is to say, they do refer to
things in the world. But the meaning of most words depends systematically
on their relations to other words in sentences. Indeterminacy of meaning and
translation may thus arise because someone means different things by the
words than someone else, or means the same things but holds different
beliefs. And even if the facts should happen to lead to a unique way of
working matters out, you have indeterminacy in the form of inscrutability of
reference.
It should be pointed out that this indeterminacy of meaning and translation
applies not only to translation from, say, Sanskrit into English. It applies even
to meaning and 'internal translation' within the same language, even with
regard to one and the same speaker. We often discover - and indeed accept, for
the sake of communication - that other speakers of our language use words in
ways that differ from our own. In this case we carry out 'homophonous' trans-
lation.8
Since meaning is a property which relates words and the world, then, the
most striking variables in interpretation are language and ontology, the
apprehension of what there is for words to mean. The inner dependency of
what words mean and how the world is ordered implies that changes in one
may entail changes in the other.
In as much as meaning exists,.is meaning, within a social context, it is by
definition something shared and, accordingly, subject to negotiation within the
limits of the social context. Although meaning is subject to negotiation, then,
there is nonetheless a strong element of intersubjectivity involved if meaning
is to be socially accessible, which it necessarily is. This makes meanings and
beliefs two sides of the same coin. There has to be a certain overlap in beliefs
for people to talk about the same things, although these beliefs do not have to
be identical. Still, the contents of thoughts, that is, the way beliefs, desires, and
other so-called propositional attitudes are correctly described, do not depend
solely on what goes on inside the head of an individual. Meaning is intimately
related to usage. For example, the causal history of a word becomes part of the
meaning of that word, that is, the causal relationship counts in the sense that a
person's concept of a word depends on the kinds of things by which his use of
words has been conditioned.
8
See Quine 1969:46. More recently Quine seems to have modified his position somewhat on
this point. Having clarified his thesis of ontological relativity (see Quine 1969) by saying that
what this ontological relativity is relative to is a manual of translation (Quine 1990:51), he states
(ibid.:52): 'But if we choose as our manual of translation the identity transformation, thus
taking the home language at face value, the relativity is resolved. Reference is then explicated
in disquotational paradigms analogous to Tarski's truth paradigm . . .; thus "rabbit" denotes
rabbits, whatever they are, and "Boston" designates Boston.'
Now, if you hold a belief, you will be surprised if you recognise that things
are not as you have hitherto believed them to be. For example, if you cross the
threshold between one room and another, you will be surprised if the room you
enter no longer has a floor, provided it used to have one. This surprise requires
some experience of a contrast between your previous belief and your sub-
sequent belief. In other words, the surprise involves a belief about the correct-
ness of the belief, and this belief - the concept of belief - you would not hold
without language. One may argue with D. Davidson, then, that the very fact
that you hold a belief requires some contrast in your mind between what you
previously thought and what you find, so that holding a belief entails the
concept of belief, and this contrast necessarily requires language.9
It is however crucial that we distinguish the holding of a belief from reality
being different from the belief held. It seems hard to imagine a concept of
belief without some concept of truth and falsity, that is, that there are both true
and false beliefs. Meaning has to be intersubjective, and that is sufficient but
also necessary for this contrast to arise. In some way, then, we must have an
idea of intersubjective truth. The notion of truth independent of beliefs cannot
exist unless there is something intersubjective, a shared standard acquired
through linguistic competence. An idea of objective truth is thus an idea of
intersubjective truth, and so there has to be communication if there is to be the
contrast necessary for there to be beliefs. This communication is made possi-
ble by language which is thus a fundamental means of negotiation at the same
time. When people share a language, they share some picture of a common
world. Communication to a great extent depends on the same things being
salient, but these things may be interpreted in different ways, since meaning is
a negotiable entity. At the same time meaning is determined by the commu-
nity in as much as there is a common language only to the extent that there is
a common method of interpretation within a community.
On the one hand, then, meaning is an intersubjective enterprise, while on '
the other it is always subject to negotiation and interpretation. Accordingly, a
culture is not simply a set of fixed patterns of meaning, it is a web of meaning
which is semantically creative and therefore rather to be described as a uni-
verse "of discourse within which there will be different interpretations of the
world. It is this discourse we set out to interpret in some way or other when we
set out to study a culture. Thus the object of our inquiries is nothing fixed, but
rather a pattern of relationships. In order to arrive at qualified interpretations
it is therefore crucial that we draw upon sources that are as wide as possible
and that we look for constants within these.
In order to highlight the importance and validity of the discourse metaphor,
let me take one step further. If we move from the observation of, logically
speaking, fairly simple things to the postulation of relatively more complex
9
See, for example, Davidson 1975. Davidson differs at this point from other philosophers of lan-
guage who consider language a sufficient cause for this contrast to arise. According to
Davidson it is a necessary cause.
and sophisticated things, there has to be a pattern among the simpler things.
So we have to find that pattern. So-called propositional attitudes are theoret-
ical concepts from the point of view of the interpreter. He or she can only
observe the simpler things such as actions and choices, and go from there to
the more complex. But no piece of logic says that if a person holds a certain
belief or has a certain desire he will act in a certain way. He may even prefer
not to act at all. The power of propositional attitudes to underpin and ration-
alise some specific way of acting may thus be merely potential until it is even-
tually actuated in discourse. This also implies that it is impossible to separate
discourse from the notion of power, in particular the power to be semantically
creative. The way we deal with this notion, however, calls for some caution.
It is crucial to differentiate the notion of semantic or philosophical power
from the notion of social power in as much as we are here dealing with power
at two very different levels. On the semantic level we are dealing with
meaning which is social and hence intersubjectively accessible. At this formal
level power has nothing to do with social rules or the power to define or
execute such rules. Still, if a person within a specific culture has the power to
determine the reference of the words of a shared language, then that person
has the capacity to interpret and determine the contents of thoughts. In one
respect he or she may then have the power to define the meaning of objects
and actions, even the power to define others, for this capacity rests not only
on a person's ability to be semantically creative, but also on the same person's
social position to be so. In this way the two notions and levels of power are
linked. If there is no clearly codified system in a community, then it is possi-
ble for those who have the power to do so to reconstruct, reinterpret, and make
existing data fit in as desired. In a ritual, for example, where the purpose or
meaning to some extent has been lost or blurred, it is possible to encode new
meaning into it; so also with scripture. A person possessing both functions of
power, the social as well as the linguistic, may thus be able to orchestrate and
synchronise even the syntax, the very rhythm of life in a community through
such means as narrative events or ritual, or through exegesis of authoritative
texts.
In line with the arguments presented so far, it is clear that our object of
study comes to be the universe of discourse itself, and that it is in the consis-
tency of this discourse that it becomes possible to capture certain constants
within semantically creative patterns of meaning. Now, the recognition that
our matrix is the consistency of discourse does entail a basic shift in our
fundamental question. Instead of asking what something means, we have to
turn to a logically more fundamental question: how do we figure out what
something or someone means or believes etc.? This shift from what to how is
epistemological in nature, and not very different from hermeneutics con-
ceived of as the elucidation of the conditions which make knowledge possi-
ble. It also implies that our investigation will move within the realm of
cognition.
The Indian tradition and its means of interpretation
Given this background it seems justified to claim that it is important to inves-
tigate the methods of interpretation employed in a specific culture and the
models upon which these methods rest. The extent to which such an investiga-
tion is helpful for our understanding or, indeed, possible to carry out at all, may
of course vary from culture to culture. In the case of the Indian tradition the
conditions for carrying out such an investigation are remarkably favourable.
Whereas the Brahmanical tradition basically is ritual and exegesis of ritual,
Buddhism and Jainism present themselves as doctrines. They all represent
certain conflicting ideologies and values, but they have one more thing in
common: they all get their authorisation from scripture. This puts scripture in
a crucial position when it comes to negotiation of meaning and authority.
At the core of mainstream Brahmanism is the Veda, a corpus of scriptures
considered to be revealed; at its fringes are the Agamas (lit. 'received [know-
ledge]'), Puranas ('old [stories and expositions]'), and the groups of heterodox
texts known as Tantras. For the Mimamsaka, the extreme Vedic ritualist, even
myth is arthavada, a rhetorical elaboration of topic-matter coming up in ritual,
designed to encourage or to dissuade. Myth is thus part of religious discourse,
its purpose being to explain and promote a rite. Jainism and Buddhism devel-
oped a canonical literature. With the rise of the Mahayana, Buddhism even
produced an entirely new corpus of Sutra texts which were claimed to have
been assembled by Bodhisattvas at a council of their own and therefore to be
considered as genuinely presenting the Buddhist doctrine on a par with the
earlier Sutra texts attributed to the historical Buddha Sakyamuni. And within
the frame of the Mahayana concept of updyakausalya 'skilful means [of teach-
ing the doctrine]' it was held that there is no right doctrine per se: the doctrine
may be taught in any way that would make people understand the message, the
only important things being the intention of a text and how that intention suits
a particular context. All this involved exegesis and the processing of texts.
When people share a belief system, then assurance of a change in belief
cannot come from outside the system, nor can something inside it produce
support except when it can be shown to rest on something independently trust-
worthy. To some extent such a trustworthy entity exists in the Indian tradition
in ffrerform of established and widely accepted methods of interpretation. In
fact, they have left their traces in several Asian languages far beyond the Indian
borders through the translations of Sanskrit texts which accompanied the
spread of Buddhism. They have permeated the Tibetan translations from
Sanskrit completely, and as recently as the eighteenth century these techniques
were still alive in Manchuria when the Buddhist dictionary Mahdvyutpatti was
translated into Manchu.
But even within such a context of fairly well-established methods of inter-
pretation it would be a mistake to think that we study material which consti-
tutes a logically connected whole. It is therefore important to look for
structures at a level deeper than the material taken at face value, namely to
search at one remove for the models underlying these means of interpretation
through a detailed examination of texts composed by those who were directly
engaged in the study of scripture and performance of ritual. If we can trace
such an underlying model, then we have a constant which can be investigated
further in its own right in order to see how it fits in with models and patterns
emerging from other parts of our material.
One way to execute this task is to focus upon fixed technical methods, that
is, upon systematically ordered ways of interpretation met with over and over
again in the texts, and then see what patterns emerge. In this work I shall con-
centrate on one such consistent means of interpretation, namely the device of
nirvacana analysis. By suggesting a model of thought underlying it, I hope to
show how this method worked - consciously or unconsciously - in the minds
of those who employed it, and how it could become such a powerful tool in
negotiating and defining meaning.
A note concerning method

First of all, an inquiry into culturally specific means of interpretation has to
be carried out through concepts and thought patterns that are clearly indige-
nous. This is not to advocate that form of relativism which holds that a valid
explanation of another culture can only happen through indigenous concepts
and thought patterns. In the attempt to achieve a basis for comparative cultural
studies, I agree that such an approach runs the risk of merely replacing one
set of concepts and values with another. But so does the opposite approach:
an explanation of another culture in terms of concepts and thought patterns
that are clearly imposed on it from the outside. For the comparative endeav-
our I believe one needs both and that it is indeed in the application of both sets
of concepts and values that a fruitful basis for comparison lies. And if we are
able to identify the mechanisms by which another culture transforms its
indigenous happenings into meaningful patterns, we have achieved something
that may contribute to a foundation for comparative studies. But this can only
happen if we first make our inquiries into another culture through concepts
and thought patterns that are recognised within the framework of that culture
itself.
That a better understanding of Indian culture on its own terms is required
before comparative studies can be carried out with any success may be illus-
trated by the example of indigenous Indian grammar. Several scholars have
warned against a tendency among linguists to be more concerned about how
modern linguistic theories relate to indigenous Sanskrit grammar than in what
that grammar actually teaches.10 Such superimposition of modern theories may
10
For example, P. Thieme (1961:x), R. Rocher (1968:339), C. Cardona (1969:3). The issue and
the controversy arising from it have been sensibly discussed by Cardona (1976:236-7).
in fact block the way for a clear understanding of Indian grammar. How can
any comparison be carried out before there is anything to compare?
If one is to investigate systematically applied means of interpretation, it is
obvious that this can only happen through an extensive study of texts. My
method is therefore simply philological in that I shall - as far as possible - let
the texts speak for themselves. I shall use texts as anthropologists use infor-
mants, with the additional advantage that the textual material stems from
various points of a time-span covering roughly 2,500 years. If in that landscape
one finds patterns that are repeated over and over again, it seems to me likely
that one has detected certain basic features of classical Indian traditions, fea-
tures which may then be considered stable points in our understanding and
interpretation of that culture. In ordering and analysing the material I shall, of
course, have to classify and arrange it according to what seems to me consis-
tent and relevant, but I shall invariably proceed on the basis of textual material
and models emerging from it.
Now, if the method of nirvacana analysis is eventually to be understood only
through a model revealed by the patterns that have emerged from its study, the
model is inherent in the material itself. The model is thus not validated until it
has emerged from an analysis of textual material which draws upon sources
that are as wide as possible and then been tested on the same material from
which it emerged. Although this poses some problems, among them a problem
of circularity, I see no real obstacles here.
For practical reasons alone only a limited number of texts can be taken into
consideration. To get around the problem of having to present endless source
material, I shall offer a limited range of suitable sample material from sources
wide apart in time and content. In investigating further the model that emerges
from the fundamental source material, I shall stick to technical literatures since
this is where such models may be expected to stand out most clearly and be
presented and discussed in a 'neutral' manner. Moreover, the very topic of this
investigation - the study of indigenous means of interpretation and their under-
lying models - calls for more than a superficial study of texts. Details are what
counts here. I shall therefore not only let the texts speak for themselves but in
some cases let them speak at great length and provide discussion in extreme
detail. This may make the book tedious to read, but I can see no other way of
getting sufficiently close to the core of the textual material. Only thus will con-
sistent patterns emerge and provide us with a model, and only thus can this
model be investigated further. However, I have deliberately tried to make the
book as short as possible by choosing to present - in relevant contexts - only
exemplary material, that is to say, only whatever evidence I consider sufficient
to make a case even where examples could be multiplied infinitely or where a
case is considered inconclusive in spite of the wealth of material.
The problem of circularity is solved by first exploring what tenets and models
emerge from the textual material and then investigating whether - and how -
these eventually link up with and make sense in the light of tenets and models
known from other parts of Indian Sastric literature, the technical literatures of
ritual and grammar in particular. If it is seen to fit into and link up with such pat-
terns, this test will give the model a platform and justification outside the circle
from which it emerged. At that stage it becomes possible to see how it fits the
original material and my hypothesis for interpreting the device of nirvacana
analysis.
The role of indigenous commentaries

Various positions have been taken with regard to the role that is to be assigned
to indigenous commentaries in the interpretation of Sanskrit texts. With regard
to the relationship between Panini, the author of the AstddhydyT, the core work
of the Indian grammatical tradition, and Patanjali, the author of the
Mahabhdsya or 'Great commentary' on that work, Paul Kiparsky has taken
this attitude (1979:246; emphasis in the original):
The real danger is that we let Patanjali ask our questions for us and thereby accept
his presuppositions about the goals and theoretical foundations of linguistic analy-
sis, instead of trying to see them in Panini's own way. Thereby we lock ourselves
into Patafijali's particular universe of discourse and anachronistically impose the
ideas of Patanjali on Panini, without realizing what a great gulf actually separates
the two.
I am aware that the case of Panini's grammar may be considered special,
but to my mind it is special also because it would have been completely unin-
telligible without the indigenous commentaries in the first place. In other
words, it is only after one has achieved an understanding of the AstddhydyT by
means of the commentaries that one would be able to investigate this text at
all. But I think Kiparsky's view contains tenets acceptable to many Sanskritists
with regard to a number of other texts or to Sanskrit texts in general.
Of course it is sometimes necessary to investigate problems in a particular
text internally or to analyse a text by exploring its internal structure. Kiparsky's
own work is a brilliant example of a study which poses questions with a scope
beyond that of the Mahabhdsya. And of course the commentators sometimes get
it wrong when they try to analyse tricky passages or consciously cover up prob-
lems when they search for an easy way out of internal inconsistencies. But such
incidents should not lead one to exclude the contributions of the commentators.
If we think we can ask intelligent questions, then why should we not accept that
a scholar like Patanjali could? He did, after all, know the vydkarana tradition
pretty well. Bhartrhari, the famous fifth-century grammarian and philosopher
of language, refers in his Vdkyapadiya to Patanjali as the Master (guru)jaid the
Mahabhdsya as the foundation for the justification of all principles of interpreta-
tion employed when grammatical questions are to be settled (VP 2.482):
krte 'tha patahjalind gurund tirthadarsind I
sarvesdm nydyabijdndm mahdbhdsye nibandhane li
An outline of strategies II
Then, when the Mahdbhdsya, the foundation for all justifications of principles of
interpretation, was composed by Patanjali, the Guru, Master of the (various]
systems [of received knowledge] . . .!1
For the present investigation it is precisely the constant factors and the
indigenous interpretations of them at various points in time which are of
interest. The information provided by commentaries is accordingly essential.
My own position in general is that commentaries should be assigned a
central role in our philological investigations. For Sutra texts there is every
reason to believe that oral commentaries existed alongside the texts them-
selves, although this is of course hard to prove. The explanations of a teacher
would fulfil the same function as an oral commentary if they were trans-
mitted regularly from teacher to pupil. And the distinction between a text that
contains or embeds an afterthought - not necessarily articulated very clearly
- and a text with a separate commentary seems to me quite arbitrary. Any
text contains numerous levels of thought made more or less specific. The
difference between some of these invariably latent but vaguely expressed
levels and a commentary may accordingly turn out to be such that the com-
mentary is closer to 'the text'. We have only to be clear about what questions
we have asked on what basis and what is the textual evidence for our
answers. • .-•-••"~>' "' •"*'-•.•- •-•.- ---~-> ---'-"•••-
One may also argue that our motivation for a study of commentaries is not
in the first place linked to the interpretation of beliefs, but rather to the way in
which commentaries, express cognition. A commentary is, of course, a work in
its own right and rooted in its own milieu. Accordingly, it may be fairly unin-
teresting whether Patanjali asks questions which we consider 'intelligent'. In
an investigation of the present kind it may prove more fruitful not to focus so
much on the purpose of a commentator, but rather consider the methods he
applied.
A note on the presentation and citation of text passages

Unless otherwise indicated text passages are presented in the form in which
they appear in the editions from which they are cited with the obvious excep-
tion of passages from manuscripts. Emendations are indicated separately,
either in notes or in the discussion of the passage in question. All text passages
are cited in full and, except in a very few cases, provided with translations.
11
For pdtanjalind of the edition I read patanjalind; the same form pdtanjalind, although not in
the context of this verse, is met with in the MSS. of Aggavamsa's Saddaniti and retained by
the editor of that text, H. Smith (1928-30:710,6). However, I would also there emend to patan-
jalind; cf. Kahrs 1992:190, note 2. Cardona (1978:81) loo quotes the verse with the form patan-
jalind without further comment. I follow the interpretations of nydyabijdndm and nibandhane
suggested by Cardona (ibid.:83, note 4; 87-93), partly based on the commentary of Punyaraja;
tirtha 'where one goes down into water' normally refers to a religious doctrine, but seems here
to be used in a broader sense.
Only thus can a reader follow the arguments presented and unambiguously
judge their foundation, and only thus will my interpretations of text passages
appear in an undisguised form, revealing weaknesses and preferred choices.
Necessary supplements of words in the English translations which are not in
the Sanskrit original are indicated by square brackets. All references to text-
places are given as indicated in the list of abbreviations and bibliography.
Nirvacanasastra
The vyakarana tradition of the Paniniyas is well known to us through a

number of treatises, mainly in the form of commentaries and elaborations on
the works of three grammarians, Panini, Katyayana, and Patanjali. Panini is
the author or compiler of the AstddhydyT, a grammar of Sanskrit which con-
sists of about 4,000 rules in eight chapters (adhydyas), each chapter contain-
ing four sections (pddas). To this work, pivotal to the later tradition,
Katyayana added 5,000 critical remarks (vdrttikas). Finally, Patanjali com-
mented on Katyayana and Panini in his Mahdbhdsya, the 'Great
Commentary'. This monumental work is more concerned with interpretation
than with the construction of a grammar which had been Panini's task a few
centuries earlier, and constitutes the basis for virtually all subsequent discus-
sions on philosophy of language and difficult points of grammar in the
vyakarana tradition. Patanjali can with some certainty be placed in the
second century BC but there is no conclusive evidence for the dating of either
Panini or Katyayana.1 An opinion that is commonly held is that at least one
century separated Patanjali from Katyayana and that at least another separ-
ated Katyayana from Panini.
In stark contrast to the situation in vyakarana, only one basic work of
nirvacanasastra has survived. This is the Nirukta of Yaska. Apart from this
basic text, all we have is three commentaries on it and a commentary on the
Nighantu, the lexicographical work upon which the Nirukta itself is a kind of
commentary.
Yaska
Yaska is attributed with the authorship of the Nirukta; apart from that nothing
is known about him. His date is uncertain, and shall probably remain so. A
good summary of the rather bleak scholarly debate on this issue, which above
all centres around the question of whether Yaska was prior or posterior to
Panini, has been given by G. Cardona (1976:270-3). He reasonably concludes
(ibid.:273): 'After all the arguments and evidence adduced in support of both
1
See Cardona 1976:260-7.
views, I think the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached at present is
. . . that the question of priority remains open.'
It is generally assumed that Yaska is older than Panini, but among those
who have suggested arguments in favour of Yaska's posteriority we find some
of the scholars most intimately acquainted with both vydkarana and nirukta?
This, of course, is not intended as an argument. My own inclination is that
Yaska's date falls within the later period of a possible timespan between the
seventh and third centuries BCE. For most purposes the exact date is not
crucial, but we would certainly get an unfocused intellectual picture if we do
not pay some heed to matters of dating and relative chronology. Of some sig-
nificance is the fact that Patanjali clearly attaches great importance to the
Nirukta. In particular, the Nirukta plays a considerable role throughout the
Paspasdhnika, the introductory chapter of the Mahdbhdsya?
The commentators on the Nirukta
Durga
There are three extant commentaries on the Nirukta, and the problem of dating
pertains to them as well.4 Durga or Durgasimha, author of a Vrtti known as the
Rjvartha, was first assigned by L. Sarup (1920:50) to the thirteenth century,
but on the basis of a more thorough discussion he later concluded that 'Durga
can thus be appropriately assigned to the first century A.D.' (Sarup 1934: intro-
duction, p. 101). On the evidence provided by Sarup, C. Kunhan Raja
(1936:266-7) also places Durga 'long before 600 A.D.'. I have suggested else-
where that Durga lived in the sixth century or earlier.5 My view was based on
an impression of the style of Durga's philosophical language. I would certainly
not object to placing him considerably earlier, but there is no conclusive evi-
dence for doing so. Whatever the exact date of Durga may be, his work is the
earliest, the most independent, and the most informative commentary on the
Nirukta known to us.
Skanda-Mahesvara
The date of the NiruktabhdsyatTkd attributed to Skandasvamin and Mahesvara
is even more problematic because its authorship raises severe difficulties too.
Sarup (1934: introduction, p. 65), who worked with the only extant manu-
scripts of this commentary, assigned Skandasvamin to the end of the fifth
2
For example, P. Thieme (1935; 1958:41), S.D. Laddu (1967), and M.A. Mehendale (1968).
None of their arguments is conclusive, though, and several are refutable; see Cardona
3
1976:270-3, and S. Bhate 1968.
4
This is pointed out also by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen 1986:11.
The dating and other information provided by H. Scharfe (1977:117-18) is extremely unreliable
and provides a good5 example of how information which has been refuted a long time ago is still
in circulation. See Kahrs 1986:140-1.
Nirvacanasastra 15
century or the beginning of the sixth century CE, and Manesvara (ibid.:80) to
the twelfth century. In a later article Sarup (1937) merely repeats this conclu-
sion. Sarup's argument for this is as follows. Harisvamin, the commentator on
the Satapathabrdhmana, mentions in this commentary a Skandasvamin,
author of a commentary on the Rgveda, as his teacher:6
yah samrdt krtavdn sapta somasamsthds tatharkksrutim I
vydkhydyddhydpayan1 mdm snskandasvdmy asti me guruh II
My teacher is the sovereign Sri Skandasvamin who performed the seven basic
Soma-sacrifices, and who taught me the Rgveda after he had composed a com-
mentary thereon.
This could well refer to our Skandasvamin. As for Sarup's dating of
Skandasvamin, it rests on the interpretation of another verse found in a manu-
script of Harisvarnin's commentary at Queen's Sanskrit College Library,
Benares, which gives the date for the composition of Harisvarnin's work as
3740 of the Kali era. The verse runs as follows:8
yaddbddndm9 kaler jagmuh saptatrimsac chatdni vail
catvdrimsat sarrids canyas tadd bhdsyam idam krtamll
When three thousand seven hundred and forty years of the Kali era had passed, this
commentary was composed.
It should, however, be noted that Sarup (1929: introduction, p. 30) remarks
on this verse as follows:
The stanza giving the date of Harisvamin is not found in the edition of Samasraml.
Dr. Mangal Deva, who has examined the Benares MS. describes it as 'unique' and
says 'there is no reason why it (the verse giving the date) should not be regarded as
genuine'. I have not seen the MS. myself and have nothing to say with regard to its
genuineness or otherwise of the stanza mentioned above. I am, however, inclined to
accept the stanza, recording the date, as genuine for Harisvamin can be shown to be
an old commentator by independent evidence.
Not only is Sarup willing to accept this as evidence, he goes quite a bit
further. The verse in question informs us that Harisvarnin's commentary was
written in 3740 Kali era, that is, in 638 CE. But Harisvamin also states that his
ruler is a Vikramaditya, king of Avanti or Malava:I0
srimato 'vantindthasya vikramasya ksitlsituh I
dharmddhyakso harisvdmi vydkhydm kurve yathdmatill
I, Harisvamin, departmental head of Law for the illustrious ruler of Avanti, emperor
Vikrama, am composing a commentary in accord with my own views.
6
7
Quoted from Sarup 1929:29. 0
Emended from the metrically impossible vydkhyd krtvddhydpayan given by Sarup. I suggest
9
that krtvd is an interlinear gloss10which can be removed. 8 Quoted from Sarup 1929:29.
Emended from yadddindm. Quoted from Sarup 1929:29.
The problem is that there was no such ruler of Avanti in 638. Sarup (ibid.:29)
solves the problem in a simple manner: 'This gives 538 A.D. as the date of the
commentary of Harisvamin, for the Kali era began on the 18th of February,
3202 B.C. The Vikrama mentioned in verse 9 [=our verse] was evidently
Yasodharman of Malwa who defeated Mihiragula in 528 A.D. and assumed the
title of Vikramaditya.' Now, it is generally accepted that the Kali era began in
3101 BCE, not in 3202. This would give us 638 CE and not 538. As a matter of
fact, in my copy of Sarup's work (1929) the number 3202 has been meticulously
corrected in black ink by hand, on a close look from 3102. This curious fact
made me suspicious, so I looked up two other copies in different libraries, and,
indeed, the printed numeral 1 has been carefully changed by hand to the numeral
2 in both of them as well. This is too much of a coincidence. Sarup must have
realised, however, that this way out was not very satisfactory, for later (1934:
introduction, p. 57) he 'solves' the problem by emending saptatrimsacchatdni
of the verse in question to sattrimsacchatakdni, an emendation which is not only
totally unfounded but also highly unlikely in as much as he has to insert a -ka
to balance the loss of a syllable created by emending sapta- to sat-. This is the
way in which he changes 3740 to 3640, thereby landing at his desired 538 CE
as the date of the composition of Harisvamin's commentary.
C. Kunhan Raja (1936:261) claims that 'the date of Skandasvamin can
easily be decided by the mention of a date of his disciple Harisvamin', refer-
ring to the verse put forward as evidence by Sarup (1929:29). Unimpressed by
Sarup's attempts at getting what he wanted, Kunhan Raja concludes
(1936:262): 'Such tamperings with dates and facts do not much affect the posi-
tion of Skandasvamin; and he lived about the year 600 A.D. (or 500 A.D.
according to Sarup).' At least we know how he arrived at this date. No mention
is made of the Vikrama king. Kunhan Raja (ibid.:266) considers Mahesvara a
disciple of Skandasvamin and assigns him to the seventh century.
A. Venkatasubbiah (1936), on the other hand, has argued that Sarup's date
for Skandasvamin must be incorrect, and concludes that he must have lived
before 1350 CE, since he is mentioned in Sayana's commentary on the Rgveda,
and after ca. 1060 CE, since in his commentary on the Rgveda Skandasvamin
has borrowed expositions from the commentary of Uvata who,
Venkatasubbiah claims, can be dated with reasonable certainty.
J. Gonda (1975:40) states that 'Indian scholars11 have attempted to deter-
mine the date of Skandasvamin, who left us a fragmentary commentary,12 at
±600 or 650 A.D.', and adds (ibid., note 12):
A relative chronology can in cases such as that before us be established on the basis
of quotations, references and polemics in the pertinent works: an author who is
quoted by nobody else stands a good chance of being the youngest. However, these
commentators do not always indicate that they are quoting from their predecessors.
11
Specifically, two of the three sources he mentions are Kunhan Raja 1936 and Venkatasubbiah
1936. 12 That is, on the Rgveda.
Nirvacanasdstra 17
Cardona (1976:298) states that 'Skandasvamin is probably to be placed

towards the end of the fifth century', but he gives no argument for this apart
from alluding to the same verse in Harisvamin's commentary (ibid., note 518)
which he notes has been interpreted differently by S.L. Katre (1948) who
unconvincingly places Skandasvamin in the first century CE, a date approved
of by Yudhisthira MImamsaka (1965/6: introduction, p.3).
Concerning the authorship of the commentary, we are also facing difficul-
ties. Sarup (1928:9-11) lists manuscript colophons attributing certain sec-
tions to Mahesvara and others to Skandasvamin. On the basis of these
colophons it may be possible, at least in theory, to arrive at some conclusions
by carefully comparing the sections attributed to Skandasvamin with the ones
attributed to Mahesvara. Sarup himself discarded this possibility on the
grounds that the work 'bears the stamp of workmanship of a single individ-
ual' (ibid.: 12).
Sarup (1934: introduction, p. 78) concluded that the commentary as we have
it is the work of Mahesvara in the form of a tikd which incorporates and elab-
orates upon the bhdsya of Skandasvamin. Venkatasubbiah (1936:219) holds a
different view, and concludes that Skandasvamin and Mahesvara were con-
temporaries and co-authors of the commentary. This view is shared by Kunhan
Raja (1936), who, however, assigns them to a different date. The evidence for
establishing the authorship is summarised by Kunhan Raja (1936:263) as
follows:
There are colophons in prose at the end of every section and these colophons assign
the commentary sometimes to Mahesvara and sometimes to Skandasvamin (and to
Sabarasvamin too). But occasionally there is a colophon in verse and this colophon
assigns the work to Mahesvara.
Kunhan Raja also disagrees with Sarup on the interpretation of the title
Niruktabhdsyatikd, He argues (ibid.:264), I think convincingly, that the work
of Yaska is called the Niruktabhdsya and that the commentary is a tiled on this
work, that is to say, on the Nirukta. Accordingly, he concludes (ibid.):
There is scope only for one author; it must be either Skandasvamin or Mahesvara.
It may be that some portions were written by Skandasvamin and other portions by
Mahesvara. Certainly the work does not contain a commentary and another com-
mentary on this first commentary on Yaska.
Clearly, on the evidence available, the dates of Skandasvamin and
Mahesvara cannot be claimed as established, nor can the relationship between
them when it comes to the composition of the commentary. In the present work
I shall, for the sake of convenience, refer to it as the commentary of Skanda-
Mahesvara and refer to its authorship in the plural.
The most important issue for the present purpose, though, is that on the
basis of all the evidence considered — if it be accepted as evidence at all -
Skandasvamin is later than Durga, and the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara
J8 Indian semantic analysis
in the form we have it is later than Durga, whom it quotes repeatedly,'3 and
earlier than Devarajayajvan, the commentator on the Nighantu, who is later
than Sayana14 whom he quotes.l5
The vdrttikakdra
Since the publication in 1931 of Mandanamisra's Sphotasiddhi with the
Gopdlikd commentary of Paramesvara,16 it has been known that a metrical work
entitled Niruktavdrttika existed. Paramesvara refers to it by name and quotes
repeatedly from it. The thought that these quotations must stem from a com-
mentary on the Nirukta earlier than those of Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara who
sometimes attribute verses to a vdrttikakdra was first forwarded by
Bhagavaddatta (1931:215). Kunhan Raja (1940-1) collated such possible quota-
tions and suggested that since Durga quotes verses without mentioning their
source and sometimes attributes them to a vdrttikakdra, and since many of them
cannot be traced to any known work, they were from a hitherto unknown
Niruktavdrttika. He notes (ibid.:7) that among some verses met with in Venkata
Madhava's commentary on the Rgveda, three also occur in Durga's com-
mentary on the Nirukta. However, two of these are found in the Brhaddevata;
so are two verses Durga explicitly attributes to a vdrttikakdra.17 Kunhan Raja
declares that the Brhaddevata is not a vdrttika, and states (ibid.:9):
It is very likely that both in the Niruktavartika and in the Brhaddevata there are
similar passages. In this connection it must be noticed that the passages found in
Madhava are not identical with what is found in the Brhaddevata and in Durga. This
may be only a recensional variation and need not lead one to conclude two separate
sources. But I have to hint at various possibilities.
The possibility that there might have been different recensions of the Brhad-
devata and that the quotations by Durga accordingly could be from a longer
recension of that text, had already been pointed out by Rajavade. Remarking
on a verse attributed by Durga to a vdrttikakdra,18 he states (1921: tippani, p.
221): ayam sloko brhaddevatdydm nopalabhyate I brhaddevatdkdrdn ndnyo
vdrtikakdrah, 'this verse is not found in the Brhaddevatd; there is no other vdrt-
tikakdra than the author of the Brhaddevata'. Similarly, Rajavade (1926:
tippani, p. 221) remarks: ayam sloko 'dhunopalabdhabrhaddevatdydm na
vidyate, 'this verse19 is not found in the extant Brhaddevata". Introducing the
13
Cf. Sarup 1934, appendix I, part IV, pp. 161-311): 'Parallel passages from the commentaries
of Skanda-Mahesvara and Durga.' These are more than parallel passages; they are borrowings
14
from Durga.
15
Sayana, the well-known commentator of Vedic texts, died in Vijayanagara in 1387 CE.
The problems of dating and authorship as well as the condition of the extant editions of the
commentaries of Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara, I have discussed in some detail elsewhere
16
(Kahrs 1980:33-44).
18
Ed. by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras University Sanskrit Series 6. 17 See below.
D 1:705,5-6; Rajavade 1921:600,2-3. 19 D 11:855,14-15; Rajavade 1926:740,12-13.
Nirvacanasastra 19
quotation of a verse with the words uktam ca vdrtike, 'and it has been stated in
avdrttika, Durga (D 11:1050,2-4; Rajavade 1926:897,15-16) quotes a verse in
the following form: madhyamd vdk striyah sarvdh pumdn sarvas ca madh-
vainah / gands ca same maruto ganabheddh prthak krteh. In the Brhaddevatd
(BD 5.49) we find it in a slightly different form: madhyamd vdk striyah sarvdh
pumdn sarvas ca madhyamahl gands ca sarve maruto gunabheddt prthak
prthak. This made Rajavade remark (ibid., p. 189): durgakdle brhaddevatd-
aranthe bhinndh pdthd dsan, 'at the time of Durga there were different read-
ings in the text of the Brhaddevatd'. Although he was aware of these problems,
Kunhan Raja (1940-1:16) nevertheless concluded that Durga is earlier than
600 CE, and that the Niruktavdrttika must be earlier than Durga.
Enthusiastically searching for manuscripts of this work, Kunhan Raja
located in Kerala a manuscript of a Niruktavdrttika, or the Niruktavdrttika as
he called it when he announced the discovery of the manuscript (Kunhan Raja
1943). This is the manuscript which has been edited by Vijayapala (1982)
under the full title Niruktaslokavdrttika. Its author was identified by K.
Kunjunni Raja (1964) as Nllakantha, to whom I shall return below. Vijayapala
(1982:49) dates his work to the twelfth or thirteenth century CE. In other
words, we are dealing with a work several centuries later than Durga.
Arguing against Rajavade (1921; 1926) and apparently unaware of the writ-
ings of Kunhan Raja (1940-1; 1943; 1944) and his discovery, B. Bhattacharya
(1950= 1958:96-109) again postulated that Durga quoted from a lost treatise
entitled the Niruktavdrttika. He claims (1958:105-6):
Professor Rajawade states in his edition of the Nirukta ... that the Vdrttika cited by
Durga is identical with the Brhaddevatd of Saunaka. The ground for this assertion
is that some citations of the Vdrttika correspond exactly with the Brhaddevatd
verses. That some verses attributed to the Vdrttikakdra are not to be found in the
present Brhaddevatd can be explained on the hypothesis that Durga had access to a
different recension of the Brhaddevatd which contained some additional verses and
was apparently larger than the extant text. . . But all these arguments of Professor
Rajawade cannot stand in view of the fact that verses are quoted in a commentary
called Gopdlikd on the Sphotasiddhi of Mandanamisra, the great MImarisist
teacher, which are all ascribed to the author of the Niruktavdrttika, none of them
being traceable to the extant Brhaddevatd.
That they are not traceable to the extant Brhaddevatd has a simple explana-
tion. In 1964 K. Kunjunni Raja, who was then in possession of the
Niruktavdrttika manuscript discovered by the late Kunhan Raja, made it clear
that the verses quoted by Paramesvara in his Gopdlikd were identical with
verses of the manuscript, whereas the vdrttikas quoted by Durga were entirely
different.20
20
Kunjunni Raja 1964:251. Since the edition of Vijayapala (1982) it is possible to give exact
references to the Niruktaslokavdrttika. The verses quoted in the Gopdlikd are, in order of
appearance, NSV 1.6.192, 204, 205cd-6ab, 209-10, and 198cd-9ab.
Bhattacharya (1958:96-105) also attributes fourteen quotations in Durga's

commentary to a Niruktavdrttika. Durga does not, but four of them he attrib-
utes to a vdrttikakdra, 'author of vdrttikas\ Bronkhorst (1985) too postulates
the existence of a Niruktavdrttika known to Durga, however his argument is
weak. Its foundation is the similarity between a passage met with in the
Yuktidipikd (asti ndpatyam anyenajdtam sambhavatity arthah)21 and a passage
from Durga's commentary on the Nirukta (ndsti seso nasty apatyam anyena
jdtam).22 The context is Rgveda 7.4.7c: na seso agne anyajdtam asti. Pointing
to the differences between the two statements, Bronkhorst (ibid.:91) concludes
that the Yuktidipikd does not quote Durga. He goes on to claim that it remains
likely that the Yuktidipikd took the sentence under consideration from a com-
mentary on the Nirukta, since only there was this Rgvedic mantra cited in order
to show that sesah means apatya 'offspring'. Bronkhorst's solution is that the
Yuktidipikd quotes from the Niruktavdrttika. It is noteworthy, however, that
neither of the passages in question mentions a vdrttikakdra, let alone a
Niruktavdrttika. If we assume that Durga was earlier than the Yuktidipikd,
which is highly probable,23 it is perfectly possible that the author of the
Yuktidipikd was familiar with the commentary of Durga and based his analy-
sis of the Rgvedic phrase on Durga's statement without quoting him verbatim.
In any case, Bronkhorst's argumentation does not establish the existence of a
Niruktavdrttika', it takes it for granted.
This leaves us in the following situation. Nowhere does Durga or any other
author mention a Niruktavdrttika which is not Nllakantha's Niruktasloka-
vdrttika. Durga mentions only a vdrttikakdra.
Now, two of the four quotations listed by Bhattacharya (1958:97,101) which
Durga explicitly attributes to a vdrttikakdra are met with also in the Brhadde-
vatd.2A Let me therefore consider again the suggestion made by Rajavade that
at the time of Durga there might have been different recensions of the Brhad-
devatd and that the quotations by Durga accordingly could be from a longer or
different recension of that text. The textual history of the Brhaddevatd is com-
plicated. The manuscripts used by A.A. Macdonell for his critical edition fall
into two groups which constitute two different recensions. Macdonell
21 22
23
YD 38,9. DI 288,9
GJ Larson gives ca 600-700 as the date of the Yuktidipikd (GJ Larson and R.S
Bhattacharya 1987*16), and the introduction to the summary of the Yuktidipikd in the same
volume (ibid *228) states There are quotations in the Yuktidipikd from Dignaga (ca, 480-540
C E., according to Frauwallner and Hatton) and from Bhartrhari (ca., 450-510, according to
Frauwallner), and it would seem that the text overall is older than Vacaspati Misra (who can
be placed m the ninth or tenth century)' Mention is made of the negative evidence that the
Yuktidipikd does not quote the views of Dharmaklrti concerning perception, and that it does
not seem to be aware of the critique of Samkhya by Sankara The conclusion presented is that
'one is tempted to think that Yuktidipikd cannot be much later than the late seventh or early
eighth century R C. Pandeya, on the other hand, cautions against accepting such negative evi-
dence and suggests simply that the Yuktidipikd be placed somewhere between the time of
Dignaga (the
24
sixth century) and the time of Vacaspati Misra (the ninth or tenth century)'
(ibid) D 1.34,8-9=BD 2 102, D II 1050,3-4 = BD 5 49
Nirvacanasastra 21
(1904:xviii) points out that the longer recension contains 133 slokas not to be
found in the shorter, whereas the shorter has eighteen not to be found in the
longer. Macdonell's text contains 1224 slokas, of which 1073 are common to
both recensions; the longer has 1206, the shorter 1091. Macdonell (ibid.)
remarks: 'Continued study has, however, convinced me that the additions of
the longer recension belonged, on the whole, to the original text, and that A [=
the shorter recension] is an abridgement.' As for the authorship of the Brhad-
devatd, Macdonell (ibid.rxxiv) concludes 'that the writer was not Saunaka
himself, but a teacher of his school, who was not separated from him by any
great length of time'. These circumstances do at least allow for the hypothesis
that at the time of Durga there were various recensions in circulation which
belonged to a tradition that goes back to Saunaka but which are not met with
in the Brhaddevatd as we know it today.
The question remains, however, whether the Brhaddevatd or works in a
tradition that goes back to Saunaka, could fall under the label 'vdrttika\ In the
classical period the term applies to two types of commentaries, either in verse
or in a particular prose style. Bronkhorst (1990:142) makes the following
observations:
The name ' Varttika' did not only come to denote works like the Yuktidlpika and the
Tattvarthavarttika. In fact, among the early works called 'Varttika' there are far
more which are of a different type altogether. Most seem to follow the example of
the verses quoted in the Mahabhasya, often called slokavdrttika by the commenta-
tors . . . Indeed, several works are called 'Slokavarttika'. The most famous among
them was composed by the Mlmamsaka Kumarila Bhatta. Another Slokavarttika
was written by Vidyananda and comments on the Tattvartha Sutra. There is also a
Niruktaslokavarttika. Besides the self-styled 'Slokavarttikas' there are many
'Varttikas' which consist of verse.
Bronkhorst goes on to list a series of examples, and concludes (ibid.: 143):
I t is clear from this enumeration that "Varttika" came to designate primarily
a commentary in verse-form.' But this is not always the case. For example,
Kumarila's Slokavdrttika is not a commentary. The Brhaddevatd is also a more
independent kind of work, more in the style of an Anukramanl. The fact that
the Sarvdnukramani borrows heavily from the Brhaddevatd testifies to this.
But the Brhaddevatd is not an entirely independent work either. Its introduc-
tion contains a classification and enumeration of the Vedic deities, and a lin-
guistic discussion which is closely related to the Nirukta. The main body of the
text is a presentation of the Vedic deities in the order of the hymns of the
Rgveda. And, in the words of Macdonell (1904:xxvii), 'it contains a consider-
able amount of other matter, notably about forty legends, meant to explain the
circumstances under which the hymns they are connected with, were com-
posed'.
On the basis of the available evidence, then, it is not possible to identify
Saunaka as the vdrttikakdra with any certainty. However, there is no other
likely candidate, and certainly no compelling evidence for postulating the
existence of a Niruktavdrttika as an independent, lost commentary on the

Nirukta.
Nilakantha
As noticed already, the Niruktavdrttika manuscript discovered by Kunhan Raja
has been edited by Vijayapala (1982) under the full title Niruktaslokavdrttika.
Kunjunni Raja (1964:251-3) identified its author as a Nilakantha Gargya from
a Yajurvedin Brahman family of Kontayur in Kerala who later became an
ascetic under the name Padmapada or Padmabhagavan. Kunjunni Raja
(ibid.:254-5) also makes it clear why Kunhan Raja (1944) thought the author's
name was Sankara Bhagavan. Kunhan Raja had at that time not seen the manu-
script in full, and the reference to Sankara Bhagavan is easily explained by the
fact that Nilakantha took the ascetic name Padmapada or Padmabhagavan and
as an ascetic would be referred to as Sankara; thus Sankara Bhagavan.
Regarding the date of Nilakantha, Kunjunni Raja (ibid.:261-2) pointed out
that all that we can definitely say is that he is earlier than Paramesvara who
belonged to the close of the fourteenth century. He goes on to state that
'Nilakantha does not seem to be older than Durga or Skandasvamin, though he
does not quote them', and concludes (ibid.): 'Probably Nilakantha may be one
or two centuries earlier than Paramesvara.'
Nllakantha's date is also considered by Vijayapala (1982: upodghdtah, pp.
45-9). Referring to Kunjunni Raja, Vijayapala places Paramesvara towards the
end of the fourteenth century which is thus the upper limit for Nllakantha's date.
Pointing out that the mention in the manuscript of Godavarman as the ruling
king is of no avail in dating Nilakantha since it is such a common name for
Kerala kings, Vijayapala instead makes an attempt to establish the lower limit
by comparing passages from the commentaries of Durga and Skanda-
Mahesvara with corresponding passages in the Niruktaslokavdrttika, He claims
(ibid.:46) that Nilakantha echoes Skanda-Mahesvara, and adduces several
examples to support his claim. Vijayapala concludes (ibid.:49) that there is no
scent of the views presented in the Niruktaslokavdrttika in the commentary of
Durga, and argues that Nilakantha refutes 'with pleasant words' views met with
in the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara without referring to them by name.25
The upper limit for Nllakantha's date is Paramesvara, and the lower limit is thus
fixed by the date of Skanda-Mahesvara.26 As we have seen, this is not neces-
sarily very helpful, and Vijayapala (ibid.) goes on to point out that there is diver-
gence among the learned as to whether Mahesvara belongs to the twelfth
century or is earlier than that, and that whether Skanda, the author of the
NiruktatTkd, is identical with the author of tht Rgvedabhdsya or is more modern
25
durgavydkhydne tv asya paksasya gandho 'pi nopalabhyate I ato manydmahe - ndma
26
grahanam vinaiva nilakanthah skanda-mahesvarapaksam madhurayd vdcdpratydcas
tatas ca skanda-mahesvarayoh paramesvarasya cdntardle kale nilakanthah sakyate st
ituml
Nirvacanasastra 23
has been a matter of dispute.27 Vijayapala (ibid.) therefore considers what he

calls a middle position preferable: that Nllakantha Padmapada lived either in
the twelfth or thirteenth century CE.28 He also mentions that verses belonging
to the Saunaklya recension met with in Verikata Madhava's commentary on the
Rgveda are quoted in the Niruktaslokavdrttika, and since linguistic usage in
both is quite similar, they cannot be too far apart in time. Vijayapala (ibid.)
places Venkata Madhava in the twelfth century.29 Although this argument is not
convincing, it is noteworthy that Nllakantha came from a family of learned
Vaidikas. I am inclined to accept Vijayapala's date as roughly correct.
With Vijayapala's edition we thus possess a third commentary of the
Nirukta in about 5,000 Slokas. The text is based on a single manuscript which
breaks off at Nirukta 6.17. As a commentary on the Nirukta, the
Niruktaslokavdrttika is a very valuable addition indeed.
This lengthy exposition of the state-of-affairs of commentaries on the
Nirukta, extant or lost, is intended to establish once and for all that, as far as
we know, there are and have been only three commentaries on the Nirukta, in
chronological order composed by Durga, Skanda-Mahesvara, and Nllakantha.
To get these matters straight is important for the following reason: Durga's
commentary is the earliest we have; it is also a word-for-word commentary
which thus contains the whole text of the Nirukta as it existed for Durga. The
Nirukta is full of later interpolations; in fact, the very nature of the text invites
them. If a passage is not met with in the commentary of Durga, there is every
reason to be suspicious of it. This has some bearing on the present study.
More importantly, perhaps, the above discussion may serve to establish that,
although scanty, there was a continuous tradition of commentaries on the
Nirukta and thus a continuous tradition of nirvacanasastra which is distinct
from the vydkarana tradition. The two traditions run as parallel streams. Their
methods as well as their terminology remain to a large extent separate. This,
of course, is not to say that they were not mutually aware of each other and that
one and the same author was not familiar with or made use of both.
The study of the Nirukta

A more complete outline of research done on the Nirukta has been provided
by me elsewhere (Kahrs 1980:24-32). Since then I became aware of the short
27
mahesvarakdlah khnstiyd dvddasasatdbdi vd tatah prdn veti vidusdm vipratipatt
niruktatikdkdrah skandah rgvedabhdsyakdrdd abhinno bhinno vdrvdkkdhka ity api v
28
padaml
ato 'yam madhyamah paksah sddhiydn pratiyate - khnstiydydm dvddasasatdbdydm
29
trayodasasatdbdydm vd nilakanthah padmapddah samajdyateti I
api ca, venkatamddhavakrtdydm rgarthadipikdydm uddhrtdh saunakiydh slokd niruk
vdrttike samdndnupurvyd samupalabhymdndh, abhiyogddisabdds cobhayatra sa
'rthavisese prayujyamdnd upodbalayanh - amu granihakdrau kdlato ndtiviprakrstdv
ihl venkata-mddhavasya kdlo 'pi khnstiyadvddasasatdbdidesiyah svlkriyata aiti [sic]
avidbhih I
but important contribution of Kunjunni Raja (1979). Further studies per-

taining to the general nature of Yaska's work have been made by J. Bronkhorst
(1981; 1984), Vijayapala (1982), Kahrs (1983; 1984), and M.A. Mehendale
(1986).
In order to reveal some of the background of the present study, suffice it to
say that when the text of Yaska's Nirukta became accessible through the editio
princeps established by Rudolph Roth in 1852 Sanskrit scholars in Europe
were deeply immersed in the discoveries of comparative philology.
Accordingly, they set out to study the Nirukta with the ideas of this field in
mind. In fact, they also took it for granted that similar ideas were at work in the
mind of Yaska. As pointed out by Bronkhorst (1981:1), August Wilhelm von
Schlegel had attempted the same with Panini's grammar, which he, at least
indirectly, criticised for not having taken other languages than Sanskrit into
consideration. But Panini's grammar does not easily lend itself to an historical
interpretation, and Schlegel's contemporaries, for example Franz Bopp and
Wilhelm von Humboldt, were fully aware that the Indian Vaiyakaranas had not
concerned themselves with historical problems.
To look at the Nirukta through the spectacles of comparative Indo-
European philology must have been even more inviting, Yaska's analyses in
the eyes of the early European continental comparativists being primitive
analyses into verbal root and suffix in the sense that every noun is derived from
a verbal root. It is true that one of the fundamental features of nirvacana analy-
sis is that all nouns are regarded as related to some activity. This activity,
expressed in analysis by a finite verb or merely hinted at by the mention of a
verbal root, is considered the reason for a noun signifying that which it signi-
fies. But nirvacana analysis is indeed not simply etymological in the sense that
it does not reflect the findings of historical linguistics which probably is how
we understand 'etymology' today. The only way it could be considered
etymological is with reference to the Greek word etymos 'true' from which the
word 'etymology' itself is derived. Inevitably, such an approach imposed
heavy presuppositions upon the interpretation of the Nirukta. In fact, the
comparative philologists of last century made Yaska look like a predecessor
in the field of historical linguistics. The Nirukta, accordingly, appeared as a
kind of 'diachronic' linguistic study mainly seeking the etymology or history
of a given word. Later, this interpretation was more or less adopted also by
Indian scholars, foremost among them Lakshman Sarup, and it has kept its
position up to the present day. The fact that it is even retained, maybe uncon-
sciously, by a modern-day pandit such as Shivanarayana Shastri (1969; 1972),
provides a good example of how cultures create each other. Ironically, it was
the very discovery of the Sanskrit language which provided European philol-
ogists with the necessary material for developing the ideas of comparative
philology.
Indeed, one obtains a poor understanding of Indian linguistics if one
Nirvacanasastra 25
approaches that field with the ideas of Indo-European comparative philology

in mind.30 By offering a new interpretation of what a nirvacana analysis is and
what purpose it was meant to serve, I shall in this work amply demonstrate that
the two indigenous linguistic traditions of vydkarana and nirvacanasastra are
not only compatible with each other, but in fact work with similar models
within a similar framework. And this basic model within which the Indian
grammarians worked is really something quite different from the one at the
core of Indo-European linguistics, most notably with regard to the notions of
linguistic change and language development through time, as well as to the
comparative idea on the whole.
The background of nirvacana analysis

From the Nirukta itself we know that Yaska was part of a longer tradition,
although what little we know of his predecessors is based on a few scanty
remarks and quotations.31 One part of the picture, however, is clear. The main
intention behind a nirvacana analysis is to explain the tattva, the 'that-ness' or
'essence' of things by stating explicitly the semantic content of the words that
denote them. This practice has its basis in the universe of the Vedic Indian as
met with in the Brdhmana literature. The task there is to explain ritual and its
implements, including formulas, acts, and material substances, by discovering
their real nature and establishing their internal relations. To account for these
items, their purpose and meaning in ritual, the famous equations so numerous
in this later Vedic literature were made. Such an equation or bandhu 'tie; nexus'
is not only established by considering the entity in itself. It is established
through its name, specifically through a connection with some activity, which
in these Vedic texts often is of a mythological kind. A few examples quoted by
Sayana in the introduction to his commentary on the Rgveda may serve to illus-
trate (Say p. 29): 'tad dhutindrn dhutitvanC itil 'tarn idandram santam indra
ity dcaksate* (Ai. A. 2.4.3) itil 'yad aprathayat tat prthivyai prthivitvam'32
(Tai. Bra. 1.1.3.6-7) iti ca, 'this is the ahuti-ness of the dhutis (sacrificial obla-
tions)'; 'being truly idandra ("it-seer"), they call him Indra'; and: 'that he
caused [it] to spread {aprathayat), that is the Earth-ness of the Earth'.
A growing awareness of relations between linguistic elements becomes
apparent already in the Vedic Samhita literature, for example in the following
verse from the Rgveda (7.75.5):
vdjinivati suryasya yosd citramaghd raya Tse vdsundml
fsistutd jardyanti meghony usa ucchati vdhnibhir grndnall
30
See in this respect
31
K Kunjunm Raja (1979), E. Kahrs (1980, 1983, 1984), and J Bronkhorst
32
(1981). See Bhattacharya 1958 62-95 for a survey of these
The ed of Max Muller (1849.39) reads prthivydh prthivitvam as one would expect The
TaittirTyabrdhmana, ed Mahadeva Sastri (1908 17), reads as above
The young woman of the sun, carrier of the prize,33 who bestows dazzling bless-
ings, she rules over riches, over treasures. Praised by the sages, the generous Dawn
shines upon the awakening [world] besung by the performers [of sacrifice].34
The phrase usa ucchati, literally 'Dawn dawns', is a sentence in itself and
establishes too much of a relation between its two elements for this combination
of words to be a coincidence: the name Usas 'Dawn' is associated with the activ-
ity of shining, dawning (^vas/ucch). Fundamentally speaking, this is all there is
to nirvacana analysis. Not postulating any parallels with regard to purpose and
scope, I cannot help thinking of Quine's proposed reform of language with
certain advantages, where a name such as 'Socrates' should be replaced by a
description 'the Socratiser' where 'Socratises' is an invented predicate, and the
description should then be eliminated by Russell's method, implying that a
name really is an abbreviated or disguised definite description 'the x such that
Fx*; Frege specifically said that such a description gave the sense of the name.
The advantage is obvious, although the purposes served for formal logic were,
of course, not at stake for the Vedic Indians. 'Socrates Socratises' is in any case
different from a nirvacana which could certainly be called a definite descrip-
tion, but of a kind where both the name and the description must mean what they
do because we recognise what the explanations mean and that these meanings
are arrived at through the name itself and in accord with metaphysics.
In the Nirukta (2.18) the above analysis appears in a technically more elab-
orate form: usdh kasmdtl ucchatiti satydh, 'Why [is Usas called] Usas?
[Because the name is] of her who really exists so that one says "she
dawns/shines" (ucchati: Avaslucch)' I shall return to the technicalities of this
analysis in due course.
In the later Samhita literature the attempts at creating and clarifying rela-
tions between names and activities, or between nouns and verbs, become more
conspicuous. A good example is provided by the following verse from the
Atharvaveda (3.13.2); consider in particular the narration of events:
ydt presitd vdrunenac chibam samdvalgata I
tad dpnod indro vo yatis tdsmdd apo dnu sthana II
When driven forth by Varuna, you swiftly came rushing along; then Indra got hold
of you as you flowed, hence you are Waters thereafter.
Here the author has noticed a connection between the action (dpnot:
'obtain; get hold o f ) and the term dpah 'Waters'. He has even made an attempt
at giving his explanation a logical form, and made it clear what role is played
in the action by the thing signified, that is to say, as agent, object, instrument,
etc. And, notably, the event is related in the past tense.35
33 34
35
On vajinivatT, see Renou EVP III 21 On vdhnibhih, see Renou EVP III 25.
For further examples, also from the Brahmanas and Upanisads, see J. Gonda 1955, F Singh
1962, M A Mehendale 1978b 66-70, S Dlksa 1989, N Verma 1991, M Singh 1994, and M.
Deeg 1995.
Nirvacanasastra 27
In a more explicit way such reflections are frequently met with in the
Brahmanas. The Atharvaveda example reappears in the Satapathabrdhmana
(6.1.1.9) in a more condensed form: yad dpnot tasmdd dpah, 'that he got hold
of [them], on account of that: dpah\ This is clearly a more technical way of
expressing exactly the same thought. Note that the temporality element is kept,
while the event itself is presented in a more abbreviated manner.
The same analysis is found in the Nirukta (9.26) in the formulation dpah
dpnoteh where the nirvacana is expressed in a technical manner which I will
give considerable attention further on. If the way in which I would interpret an
analysis of this kind is correct (in the present case: 'dpah is of dpnotiK), then
no temporality is expressed at all. In the Atharvaveda and in the Sata-
pathabrdhmana the mythical activity which is given as the ground for using
the name dpah is expressed in a past tense, thus referring to one specific event.
This timelessness of the Nairuktas conflicts with the Aitihasikas, the legendar-
ians, who refer to real events and persons in the past; the Nairuktas prefer alle-
gorical interpretations. A quick example is found in the Nirukta, concerning
the identity of Vrtra who is slain by Indra as laid out in Rgveda 1.32. Yaska
remarks (Nir 2.16): tat ko vrtrahl megha iti nairuktdhl tvdstro 'sura ity aiti-
hdsikdh,36 'but who is Vrtra? A cloud according to the Nairuktas; an Asura,
son of Tvastr, according to the Aitihasikas'. The Nairuktas in general dissolve
historicity. I shall later argue why I think this is so.
What is really important about the Nirukta, then, is that it is the single text
we possess which applies a certain method designed to give a semantic analy-
sis of nouns, in the widest sense of that term. Moreover, the Nirukta contains
lengthy discussions of linguistic and philosophical import. To Yaska a term,
singular or general, is simply equipped with a meaning, and for a language user
it is not necessary to keep this meaning in mind while using the term. The
meaning is embedded in it, hence is objective and can be grasped inter-
subjectively, and nirvacana analysis provides the device for doing so. In other
words, the meaning is secured through the term itself by nirvacana analysis
which is considered an objective way of determining what meaning is ascribed
to each word. In fact, every noun is treated as an information-invoking singu-
lar term.
In Sanskrit terms the word nirvacana has been aptly defined in the follow-
ing way: nirvacanam ndma sabdasya yathdrtham vyutpattih, 'what we call nir-
vacana is the analysis of a word in accordance with [its] meaning' (Vijayapala
1982: upodghdtah, p. 7).
The Nirukta
As mentioned already, nirukta or nirvacanasastra is traditionally considered
one of the six veddngas (lit. 'limbs of the Veda'), the disciplines auxiliary to
36
The last phrase is omitted by several MSS
the Veda, the branches of knowledge designed to preserve it. From the Nirukta
of Yaska it is clear that already by his time there were difficulties in under-
standing Vedic words and passages, a fact which indicates that the tradition had
been broken as far as understanding the meaning of the hymns is concerned.
It is to restore or achieve this meaning that the method of nirvacana analysis
is outlined and put into practice in the Nirukta. Yaska describes the situation
as follows (Nir 1.20):
sdksdtkrtadharmana rsayo babhuvuhl te 'varebhyo 'sdksdtkrtadharmabhya
upadesena mantrdn samprdduhl upadesdya gldyanto }vare bilmagrahandyemam
grantham samdmndsisuh I vedam ca veddngdni ca/
The Rsis ('Seers' of the Vedic hymns) had direct access to Dharma (ritual and social
duty); through [this initial] instruction they transmitted the Vedic hymns to later
generations who did not have direct access to Dharma; later, inferior generations,
being ill at ease with regard to the instruction, compiled this delimited work (= the
Nighantu) for the comprehension [of the meaning of the Mantras] bit by bit;37 more-
over [they compiled] the Veda and the Vedangas.38
In principle Yaska's Nirukta is a commentary on this compilation, a list of
words known as the Nighantu (nighantuh, singular, but also frequently
nighantavah, plural) or the Naighantuka. This is the earliest lexicographical
work that has survived in India. Whether or not Yaska was the compiler of the
entire Nighantu has been a matter of dispute,39 but I do not find this issue at
all crucial in as much as there is reason to believe that the Nighantu available
was not the only one of its kind. The words listed in the Nighantu are mainly
Vedic, most of them occurring in the Rgveda. There are, however, a few
insignificant but puzzling occurrences of non-Vedic words, for example nfrdm,
listed under udakanamdni 'names for water' (Nigh 1.12), which is a word of
Dravidian origin and first attested in the Mahdbhdrata.
The Nighantu contains three kdndas in five adhydyas. The first, known as
the Naighantukakdnda, consists of three adhydyas which give groups of syn-
onyms where one word indicates the meaning of the whole group, as in the
case of udakanamdni mentioned above. But the synonymity met with in this
kdnda is not of the ordinary kind. By way of example, Nighantu 2.5 lists no
less than twenty-two names for finger (angulindmdni). This would be a
remarkably high number in any language, but it is even more remarkable in the
present case in as much as the great majority of these words are feminine and
in the plural, and the only obvious occasion for mentioning fingers would be
the recitation of sacrificial formulas by the officiating priest at the sacrifice.
Moreover, they show curious similarities, for example: svdsdrah 'sisters',
jdmdyah 'siblings', and sdndbhayah 'having the same womb (umbilical cord)'.
37
I am not confident about the meaning of bilmagrahanaya, and, accordingly, about my trans-
38
lation.
Rajavade (1940: notes, p. 290) expresses the view
39
that vedam ca veddngdni ca is an interpola-
tion; I would not be surprised if he is right. See, for example, Skold 1926.
Nirvacanasastra 29
The second kdnda, consisting of one adhydya, is known as the Naigamakdnda

or Aikapadikakdnda. It contains a list of words of more than one meaning
(anekdrtha) and words of which the grammatical formation is hard to under-
stand (anavagatasamskdra). The last kdnda, which then is also the last
adhydya, is called the Daivatakdnda and gives a list of Vedic deities grouped
in six sections. There is reason to believe that this list is compiled by Yaska
himself.40
Outlining the purpose of nirukta (niruktaprayojanam) in the introduction to
his commentary on the Rgveda, Sayana refers to the Nighantu as nirukta. He
also notes that the word nighantu commonly refers to lexicographical works
arranged as collections of groups of synonyms signifying a single meaning
(Say p. 28):
atha niruktaprayojanam ucyatel arthdvabodhe nirapeksatayd padajdtam
yatroktam tan niruktaml 'gauh gmd jmd ksmd ksd ksamd1 ity drabhya 'vasavah
vdjinah devapatnyo devapatnyaK ityanto yah paddndm samdmndyah samdmndtas
tasmin granthe paddrthdvabodhdya pardpeksd na vidyatel etdvanti prthivindmdni
etdvanti hiranyandmdni ity evam tatra tatra vispastam abhihitatvdt I tad etan
niruktam trikdndaml tac cdnukramanikdbhdsye darsitam -
ddyam naighantukam kdndam dvitiyam naigamam41 tathdl
trtiyam daivatam ceti samdmndyas tridhd sthitahll
[. . .] ekdrthavdcindm parydyasabddndm samgho yatra prdyenopadisyate tatra
nighantusabdah prasiddhah I tddrsesu amarasimhavaijayantThaldyudhddisu dasa
nighantava iti vyavahdrdtl evam atrdpi parydyasabdasamghopadesdd ddyakdn-
dasya naighantukatvam I tasmin kdnde trayo 'dhydydh I tesu prathame prthivyddilo-
kadikkdlddidravyavisaydni ndmdni I dvitTye manusyatadavayavddidravyavisaydnil
trtTye tadubhayadravyagatatanubahutvahrasvatvddidharmavisaydni 11
Now the purpose of nirukta is stated. That [list] wherein a class of words has been
stated (-ukta) independently (nir-) [of other words] with regard to grasping [their]
meaning, that is nirukta [= the Nighantu]. [That is to say,] that traditional compila-
tion of words (samdmndyah) which has been handed down (samdmndtah),42
0
The basis for this assumption is Nirukta 7.13 where Yaska mentions certain extant lists of
deities which include even their special epithets; he goes on to remark: yat tu samvijhdna-
bhutam sydt prddhdnyastuti tat samdmane, 'but that [appellation] which is generally recog-
nised as a conventional [epithet of a deity] and through which [that deity] is mainly praised,
that [appellation] I repeat [in my limited list]'. I ought probably to mention that the form samd-
mane, 1. sg. present dtmanepada, is not read by Skanda-Mahesvara who read (SM 111:72,4)
samdmanet, 3. sg. optative, instead.
Reading, with Macdonell (1886:60), naigamam against the editor's naigama.
The words samdmndyah samdmndtah are the opening words of the Nirukta. Sarup (1921:5)
translates: 'A traditional list (of words) has been handed down (to us).' The commentator
Durga has a lot more to say on this phrase, and I find it worthwhile to quote the relevant passage
in extenso since his wording in many respects is reflected in Sayana's words (D 1:30,1-4):
gavddir devapatnyantah sabdasamuddyah samdmndya ucyatel samdnpurvasya m
abhydsdrthasya karmani kdrake samdmndyah I samabhyasyate maryddaydyam iti s
ndyah I sa ca rsibhir mantrdrthaparijhdndyoddharanabhutah pancddhydyisdstrasa
habhdvenaikasminn dmndye granthlkrta ity arthahl
beginning 'gauh gmdjmd ksma ksd ksamd" and ending 'vasavah vdjinah devap-
atnyo devapatnyah\43 in that text the consideration of other [words] does not take
place in order to grasp the meaning of words. For all over this has been expressed
very clearly in the manner of: 'so many are the names of the Earth, so many are
the names of gold'. This very nirukta [=the Nighantu] has three sections. That is
also shown in the commentary on the Anukramanikd:44 First the Naighantuka
section, second the Naigama, and third the Daivata - thus the samdmndya is estab-
lished as threefold. [. ..] The word nighantu is well known with regard to [a text]
that chiefly exhibits a collection of synonymous words signifying a single
meaning,45 since it is common practice to refer to such works as Amarasimha,
VaijayantI, Halayudha, etc. as 'ten nighantavaK. Thus also in the present case the
property of being a Naighantuka pertains to the first section since [this] enunci-
ates a collection of synonymous words. In this section there are three chapters. As
far as these are concerned, names whose scope are substances such as the Earth,
and such as the worlds, the regions (space), and time, are in the first. In the second
are those whose scope are substances such as human beings and their parts. In the
third are those whose scope are qualities such as the property of being thin or
many, or the property of being short.
Sayana goes on to say that Yaska's work too is called nirukta (ibid.):
pahcddhydyarupakdndatraydtmake etasmin granthe paranirapeksatayd paddrtha-
syoktatvdt tasya granthasya niruktatvaml tadvydkhydnam ca ' samdmndyah
samdmndtaK ity drabhya ltasyds tasyds tddbhdvyam anubhavaty anubhavatV
ityantaih dvddasabhir adhydyair ydsko nirmamel tad api niruktam ity ucyatel
The property of being nir-ukta ('stated independently') pertains to this text [=the
Nighantu], since in this text, which consists of three sections forming five chapters,
the meaning (artha) of words has been stated (-ukta) independently (nir-) of other
[words]. And Yaska composed an explanation of it in twelve chapters beginning
Footnote 42 (cont.) ,
The collection of words beginning with gauh and ending with devapatnyah is called a
samdmndyah. When the kdraka karman (object) is to be denoted [the word] samdmndyah
belongs to [the verbal root] mnd which has the meaning of repetition [cf. Dhp 1.976 mnd
abhydse], preceded by [the preverbs] sam and dN (a). It [i.e., the samdmndya] has been
repeated jointly (sam) in as much as [it presents] a limit [maryddd giving the meaning of
dN; cf. A 2.1.13 an marydddbhividhyoh], thus [it is called] sam-d-mndyah. That is to say, in
order that [we shall get] knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic verses, the Rsis have also
made it into a text that serves as an example in the form of a compendium of the Sastra which
consists of five parts in one single (ekasmin glosses the preverb sam; cf. Nir 1.3: sam ity
ekibhdvam) dmndyah - 'repetition within limits'.
A more pregnant interpretation of the genitives in the technical expression samdnpurvasya
mndter abhydsdrthasya samdmndyah than 'belongs to' will emerge in due course later in this
work. Durga accounts for the feature of 'the limit' in the following passage Where he states that
there is no limit to words worth mentioning and that there would be no end to the Sastras if
one were to mention all of these. The Nighantu is accordingly a limited antf unified specimen
collection of Vedic words, a samdmndyah.
43
44
These are the first and last words of the Nighantu.
The passage occurs in Sadgurusisya's commentary VeddrthadTpikd on Katyayana's
45
Sarvdnukramam on the Rgveda, ed. Macdonell 1886:60-1.
The expression ekdrthavdcindm suffers from the same ambiguity as the term artha itself, an
issue to which I shall return below.
Nirvacanasastra 31
'samdmndyah samdmndtaK and ending 'tasyds tasyds tddbhdvyam anubhavaty

anubhavatV. This too is called Nirukta.
Indeed, elsewhere in his commentary it is the Nirukta of Yaska he com-
monly refers to as nirukta.46
The bulk of Yaska's work, then, is devoted to the analysis of Vedic words,
and in keeping with his habit of analysing a word in the context of a Vedic
stanza, a nigama, Yaska comments on hundreds of these. This makes the
Nirukta the earliest extant commentary on Vedic texts, albeit in an unsystem-
atic manner. The second kdnda of the Nighantu, known as the Naigamakdnda,
concentrates on particularly abstruse Vedic words. In the words of Sayana
(ibid.):
nigamasabdo vedavdcil ydskena tatra tatra 'apt nigamo bhavatV ity evam
vedavdkydndm avatdritatvdt, tasmin nigame eva prdyena vartamdndndm sabddndm
caturthddhydyarupe dvitiyasmin kdnde upadistatvdt tasya kdndasya naigamatvam I
The word nigama signifies Veda. For all over [the Nirukta] Vedic passages have
been brought forward by Yaska in the following manner: 'and there is a nigama...';
[and] since in the second section, which forms the fourth chapter, the words that
have been specified chiefly occur in that nigama [= Vedic text] only, the property of
being related to a nigama (naigamatva) pertains to this section.
As a commentary on the Nighantu, however, the Nirukta displays a feature
which at first sight may seem curious: the first three adhydyas, the
Naighantukakdnda, are hardly commented upon at all. This fact led previous
Nirukta scholars to draw some rather hasty conclusions, for example Skold
(1926:178):
As far as I can see, these facts corroborate the conjecture which has been put forth
elsewhere viz. that the first three books of the Nighantu have been amalgamated
with the other parts of the same work only in a relatively late period.
This conclusion is wrong, and the feature is easily explained if one keeps in
mind that Yaska was primarily concerned with semantics. As mentioned
above, the first three chapters of the Nighantu contain groups of synonyms,
each group headed by an adhikara-word which indicates a meaning common
to all the words in that particular group. From Yaska's point of view, it is there-
fore sufficient to determine the meaning of the adhikdra-woid.41 The two
remaining kdndas, on the other hand, would require a much more detailed
treatment which, indeed, they do receive.
Yaska states (Nir 1.15) that 'without it (= nirvacanasastra) a clear under-
standing of meaning in respect of Vedic stanzas is not possible; nor is there a
proper indication of accent and grammatical formation for someone who does
46
E.g. at RV 1.158.2: tathd ca niruktam - 'gaur itiprthivyd ndmadheyam yad duram gatd bha
yac easydm bhutdni gacchanti gater vaukdro ndmakaranah' iti. This is clearly a quotatio
47
from Nirukta 2.5. Examples could be multiplied.
For a more lengthy discussion of this, see Kahrs 1984:149-50.
not have a clear understanding of the meaning' (idam antarena mantresv

arthapratyayo na vidyatel artham apratiyato ndtyantam svarasamskdrod-
desah). This makes him go on to characterise his branch of knowledge
(vidydsthdna) as vydkaranasya kdrtsnyam svdrthasddhakam ca, 'a comple-
ment to grammar, moreover something which is a means to its own end' (ibid.),
implying thereby that nirukta takes care of that part of linguistic analysis which
vydkarana does not cover. Alternatively, vydkaranasya kdrtsnyam could be
taken quite literally as 'the totality of grammar', thus also in this case imply-
ing that nirukta serves to make grammar complete. Claiming that to Yaska
grammar would to a great extent coincide with Vedic grammar, S.D. Joshi and
J.A.F. Roodbergen (1986:12) even suggest that the phrase could be interpreted
'to mean, not that the Nirukta is the whole of grammar, but, rather, that it serves
to make Vedic grammar complete'. Although I do not think this is directly
wrong, I do not think that Yaska's statement necessarily is intended to be that
way delimited.
Illuminating in this respect is the following statement (Nir 2.2): athdpi
bhdsikebhyo dhdtubhyo naigamdh krto bhdsyantel damundhl ksetrasddhd itil
athdpi naigamebhyo bhdsikdhl usnaml ghrtam iti, 'moreover, Vedic primary
nouns are analysed on the basis of verbal roots belonging to classical Sanskrit,
such as damilndh, ksetrasddhdh, but also classical [primary nouns] on the
basis of Vedic [roots], such as mnam, ghrtam\ The intricacies of these roots
and the meaning of the words adduced as examples need not concern us here.
What is interesting about this statement is that it indicates that for Yaska bhdsd
and chandas or naigama were two domains of the same language, but not lin-
guistically separate in time. In other words, he would not treat of them differ-
ently. Yaska, who was primarily concerned with the analysis of words which
by vydkarana would be considered avyutpanna 'underivable', simply set out
to analyse 'also Vedic words, the grammatical formation of which is not
immediately clear' (anavagatasamskdrdms ca nigamdn; Nir 4.1). Accordingly,
he was not very interested in words which yield their semantic content through
a regular morphological analysis, though he is in no way opposed to grammar.
As a matter of fact, the two methods overlap. Conversely, grammarians make
frequent use of nirvacana analysis. For example, the famous grammarian
Patafijali makes use of it in his Mahdbhdsya, and the method is a design feature
in the twelfth-century Pali grammar Saddaniti of the Burmese monk
Aggavamsa. With regard to the relationship between vydkarana and nirukta,
the Tibetans speak of two traditions of linguistic analysis, sgra bzin du 'accord-
ing to sound' and don bzin du * according to meaning'. This is reflected also in
a statement quoted to me in December 1993 in Madras by Agnihotram
Ramanuja Tatachariar, one of the living authorities of Vaidika Srauta religion:
sabdapradhdnam vydkaranam, arthapradhdnam niruktam, 'vydkarana has
linguistic items as its predominant concern, nirukta has meaning as its'.
Sayana, who generally maintains a tradition of ritualistic Veda interpreta-
tion, faces the problem of a broken tradition as far as the meaning of the Veda
Nirvacanasastra 33
is concerned. He is quite clear about the relationship between vyakarana and

nirukta, and frequently quotes Yaska's nirvacanas although he may suggest
alternatives of his own. And sometimes Sayana has based his exegesis on the
Nirukta, although he fails to make this clear. The following example will
suffice to demonstrate this. Sayana glosses aksanvdntah of RV 10.71.7 by
aksivantah 'who possess eyes', the word aksi 'eye' being explained as follows:
anena drsyate sarvam ity aksi I yad vdl taijasatvdt anyebhyo 'rigebhyo vyak-
tataram, 'everything is seen by means of it, hence [it is called] aksi\ or else:
because it is made of fire (tejas) it is more visible (vyaktataram) than any other
part of the body'. As nirvacanas these explanations do not make immediate
sense. They do, however, when their reliance on the Nirukta is made clear.
Sayana first interprets the word aksi as karanasddhana, that is to say, as the
instrument of the act of seeing, the verbal root ^drs 'see' being a synonym of
Îcaks by means of which the word is analysed in the Nirukta (Nir 1.9). There
Yaska also cites an alternative analysis, attributed to Agrayana, by the verb
anaktih (âfij). Among the meanings attributed to the verbal root yanj in the
Dhdtupdtha (Dhp 7.21 ahju vyaktimraksanagatisu) is vyakti 'make appear;
reveal', hence Sayana's vyaktataram. In this way the Nirukta has infused a
whole tradition of Vedic exegesis.
And Sayana is quite unambiguous when it comes to the purpose served by
nirvacanasastra (Say p. 29):
evam granthakdrenoktdh tattatpadamrvacanavisesdh tattanmantravydkhydndva-
sare evdsmdbhir uddhansyante I na ca nirvacandndm nirmulatvam sankanlyaml
etadvyutpattyartham eva brdhmanesu padamrvacandndm kesdmcid uktatvdtl [...]
granthakdro 'pi tatra tatra svoktamrvacanamulabhutabrahmandny uddhansyati I
kesdmcin nirvacandndm vydkaranabalena siddhdv api na sarvesdm siddhir asti I
ata eva granthakdra aha - 'tad idam vidydsthdnam vydkaranasya kdrtsnyam
svdrthasddhakam ca' itil tasmdt veddrthdvabodhdyopayuktam niruktaml
Thus various nirvacanas of this or that word which have been stated by the author
[= Yaska] will be quoted by me on the occasion of interpreting this or that mantra.
And there is no reason to suspect that nirvacanas are unfounded. This is because
some nirvacanas of words have been stated in the Brahmanas for the sheer purpose
(artha) of derivational analysis (vyutpatti) of them. [. ..] Also the author [=Yaska]
will all over be found to quote Brahmanas in support of nirvacanas he himself has
stated. Even though some nirvacanas are established on the strength of grammar
(vyakarana), not all are established [by that means alone]. And for this very reason
the author [=Yaska] has stated: 'this branch of knowledge [= nirukta] is a comple-
ment to grammar, moreover something which is a means to its own end'. Therefore
nirukta is useful for grasping the meaning (artha) of the Veda.
Sayana, then, uses the authority of Veda (Brahmanas) to argue for the valid-
ity of nirvacana analysis as an exegetical tool. In fact, Sayana says, although
some nirvacanas are established on the strength of vyakarana alone,
nirvacanasastra is needed as a supplement. And, significantly, to Sayana the
purpose served by nirvacanasastra is to establish the meaning of Vedic
Mantras. But, as will be evident further on, the Brahmanical tradition did in no
way delimit the device of nirvacana analysis to the meaning of Vedic texts
alone.
Indeed, as an exegetical tool nirvacana analysis is not even confined to the
Indian tradition and Indian languages. The method permeates the translations
of Sanskrit texts into other Asian languages through the spread of Buddhism.
Suggestive examples from the Tibetan translations have been offered by N.
Simonsson (1957:238-80). I shall confine myself here to a single example from
the Chinese.
In Paramartha's 48 translation of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhdsya we
meet with a striking translation of the word sdstra 'teaching; doctrine', in this
context the Buddhist teaching and more specifically the Abhidharmakosa
itself.49
The common derivation of sdstra is from the root sds 'instruct; teach' by the
instrumental suffix -tra, in the sense of 'something by means of which one
teaches'. This is no longer Paramartha's basis for translation. Here - and
remember that Paramartha was an Indian who no doubt knew his vydkarana
and nirukta well - the word is rendered by the two characters W* mieand dk
ji. The first means 'extinguish; exterminate; destroy', the second 'to cross a
stream; aid; relieve'. The word mie is commonly used in the translation of nivrtti
or nirodha, the cessation of suffering in the context of the third so-called noble
truth of Buddhism; also of nirvana, as blown out, extinguished; but above all
of nirodha in the sense of the destruction or suppression of the passions, or
klesas - the defilements of the mind by virtue of which actions (karman) gather
force and fruitfulness and necessarily produce retribution, notably a new exis-
tence. An aim in Buddhism is accordingly to destroy these passions and melt
away all traces of them (vdsand).50 The word ji has the double meaning 'cross
over' and 'aid; save' - to cross over the sea of existence to nirvana is a common
image in Buddhist scriptures.
Now, how does this come about? Paramartha has split the word sdstra into
its two syllables sds and tra. The first he relates not to Asds 'instruct' but to
Asas 'destroy'. The second part, tra, he relates either to Atrai (trdyate, trdti)
'save; rescue', or to At? 'cross over' (tarati) and its causative tdrayati 'cause to
48
Paramartha was an Indian Buddhist monk who arrived m China in the year 546 AD He stayed
for two years m Guangzhou (Canton), then went on to the Liang capital where he was well
received by the emperor Wu The emperor wanted to establish a translators' bureau under
Paramartha's leadership, but political turmoil put an end to this plan, and Paramartha spent the
rest of his life travelling around in China, homesick and miserable to the point that he even
attempted suicide Saved by his disciples, he died of illness instead a year later, in 569 But
during his years in China he managed to translate a large number of Buddhist texts into
Chinese, among them the Abhidharmakosabhdsya of Vasubandhu
49
Taisho 1559, vol 29, p 161c That we are dealing with a translation of the word sdstra and not
of (sisya-)sdsana as maintained m the index of A Hirakawa et al (1973 351 sdsana-, 352
sisya-) will become clear from the following exposition Indeed, this is a good example of how
50
important it is to master nirvacanasdstra for any kind of lexicographical work
Cf,eg,E Lamottel974
Nirvacanasastra 35
cross over; save; rescue'. The root Vff (Dhp 1.1018 tf plavanataranayoh) would
neatly carry the same double meaning as ji, but the problem with this root is
that it would not give us tra without some morphological violence. Still, the
parallel double meaning must be more than a coincidence. In any case, we have
here a full interpretation of the sdstra, the Buddhist doctrine as expounded in
the Abhidharmakosa, as that which destroys [the klesas] (basically, impedes
ignorance) and therefore saves, that is, makes one cross over the sea of exis-
tence. No wonder Chinese Buddhist texts can seem hard to Sinologists. Indeed,
any reader of Sanskrit texts who is not familiar with the devices of
nirvacanasastra will soon face textual difficulties.
Yaska's exposition of nirvacanasastra: a brief outline

As mentioned already, one of the fundamental features of nirvacana analysis
is that all nouns are regarded as related to an activity expressed in language by
a verbal form. Yaska formulates it thus (Nir 1.12): tatra ndmdny dkhydtajdmti
sdkatdyano nairuktasamayas cal na sarvdniti gdrgyo vaiydkarandndm caike,
'with regard to this [=the four classes of words], nouns arise because of [the
actions denoted by] verbs, according to Sakatayana; this is also the doctrine of
the Nairuktas; not all [nouns], according to Gargya and some of the
Vaiyakaranas'. This is how I think this statement is to be interpreted, and cer-
tainly not as giving support to the 'historical interpretation' of the Nirukta. The
arguments for this will be developed throughout this book. Suffice it here to
say that Yaska himself states that his purpose is a semantic one. That this
purpose is achieved through an analysis into linguistic elements which, when
possible, agree with the grammatical derivation of a word, is hardly to be held
against it.
With this in mind, let me now turn to some of the general principles for nir-
vacana analysis as laid down by Yaska in the second chapter of the Nirukta.
The opening words of his exposition are (Nir 2.1): atha nirvacanam, 'now
[follows an exposition of] nirvacana [analysis]'. The word nirvacanam here is
defined by Durga in the following manner (D 1:154,18-19): apihitasydrthasya
paroksavrttdv atiparoksavrttau vd sabde nihkrsya vigrhya vacanam nirvac-
anam, 'nir-vacanam is a statement {vacanam) of the hidden meaning, extract-
ing {nihkrsya = nir-) [it], that is, isolating [it], m a word of which the
grammatical formation is out of sight (unintelligible) or completely out of
sight (completely unintelligible)'.
Such a statenienlXy^ggngm) consists lnjtnjanj^s^
^ is called
thereby e s t a b l i s h i n g \ 3 J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ x ^ ^ h ^ j ^ i ^ ^ ^ may be a simple
fasETasin the case of a word which lends itself to a straightforward grammat-
ical derivation; it may also be quite complicated. The terms paroksavrtti and
atiparoksavrtti, referring to words with grammatical formations that are hard
to figure out and extremely hard to figure out, respectively, are commonly
resorted to by the commentators. In addition to these they operate with a third

category: words which are pratyaksavrtti 'of an evident formation'.
It is with reference to this latter category that Yaska continues his exposi-
tion (Nir 2.1): tad yesu padesu svarasamskdrau samarthau prddesikena
gunendnvitau51 sydtdm tathd tdni nirbruydt, 'so, in the case of words where
accent and grammatical formation would be in agreement with the meaning
{samarthau) [which is to be expressed] [and are] accompanied by a [phonetic]
quality which is in accordance with the grammatical derivation, they should
be analysed in a regular manner'.52 In other words, this lays down that in prin-
ciple one should go for the obvious first. If a word seems to contain, an element
which in an obvious way links it to a verbal root and another element which is
known as or looks like a suffix, this is how the word should be analysed and
its concealed meaning revealed. As pointed out by Mehendale (1978b:73), one
may also include all the words dealt with by the grammarians in the
Unadisutras under the scope of this rule.
Matters are not always that straightforward, so Yaska goes on to say (ibid.):
athdnanvite 'rthe 'prddesike vikdre 'rthanityah parlkseta53 kenacid vrtti-
sdmdnyena, 'but when the meaning is not accompanied [by a regular accent
and grammatical formation] [and a phonetic] modification is not in accordance
with the grammatical derivation, one who is intent on a meaning should
examine [the word] through some similarity with a [phonetic] formation
[accepted by the grammarians in other cases]'. This means that in cases where
the accent and grammatical formation are not regular and therefore do not
reveal the concealed meaning of a word, and the phonetic modifications of the
stem do not give any indication of a verbal root, one should proceed to analyse,
with a particular meaning in mind, on the basis of similarity with a phonetic
change that has been accepted by the grammarians for the explanation of some
51
Samp (1927) reads vikarendnvitau, but the v.l. gunena0 occurs frequently and is also the
reading of Durga (D 1:155,3) and Nllakantha (NSV* 1.4.18). It is discussed as a variant (and
indeed read by one Ms) in the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:2,4-5). If Sarup's
reading is preferred one would have to translate '... accompanied by a [phonetic] modifica-
tion which is in accordance with the grammatical derivation'. On this evidence, there is every
reason to emend Sarup's text. What might speak against doing so is the continuation of Yaska's
text: athdnanvite 'rthe 'prddesike vikdre 'rthanityah parikseta kenacid vrttisdmdnyena
below). Were the reading vikarendnvitau retained, it would provide a rather neat parallelism
52
with this subsequent passage.
The cumbersome wording and my translation here is due partly to the previous statement at
Nirukta 111 {tad yatra svarasamskdrau samarthau pradesikena vikarendnvitau [or, p
ably, v.l. gunendnvitau] sydtdm), partly to the cryptic formulation and the words chosen; the
interpretations and translations among commentators and modern scholars vary; see
Mehendale 1978a (= 1978:57-62) and 1978b:73, and the modifications of Mehendale's inter-
pretation suggested by Bronkhorst (1984:5-6). The translation of prddesikena as 'in accor-
dance with the grammatical derivation', or 'which fits the [grammatical] derivation'
(Bronkhorst) is based on an interpretation of pradesa and hence of prddesika suggested by
Scharfe (1977:121-2). If this is not accepted, I suggest one interprets prddesikena gunendnvi-
tau as *[and] accompanied by a [change in the phonetic] quality [of the stem caused by a
53
grammatical operation] which is indicating [the activity expressed by a verbal root]'.
Sarup (1927) inserts a danda here which is totally unwarranted.
Nirvacanasastra 37
other form elsewhere. In other words, this rule reflects the situation in which
one is facing a formation referred to by the commentators as paroksavrtti 'out
of sight (unintelligible)'. It is difficult to figure out, but by analogy with similar
phenomena elsewhere in grammar it might be done.54
The situation may be even more difficult, so Yaska continues by laying
down a principle for how one should deal with a form referred to by the com-
mentators as atiparoksavrtti 'completely out of sight (completely unin-
telligible)' (ibid.): avidyamdne sdmdnye 'py aksaravarnasdmdnydn nirbruydt,
'even when [such] a similarity [with a phonetic change accepted by the
grammarians in other cases] is not found, one should analyse on the basis of
[a possible similarity] in syllables or in single sounds'.55 He underlines this by
adding (ibid.): na tv eva na nirbruydt, 'but never indeed should one not
analyse'.
These three basic rules, crowned by the statement that one should never give
up analysing, lay down the most fundamental principles of nirvacanasastra.
They also display an increasing slackness with regard to a strict application of
the rules of grammar, a fact Yaska makes unambiguously clear when he goes
on to remark (ibid.): na samskdram ddriyeta I visayavatyo hi vrttayo bhavanti,
'one should not pay attention to the grammatical formation, for [phonetic]
changes possess a wide range56 [of possibilities]'. That is to say, one should try
to stick to the rules of grammar as far as possible, but if this is of no avail in
bringing out the hidden semantic content of a word one should abandon them
54
This rule too has been subject to a great variety of interpretations and translations. My inter-
pretation of vrttisdmdnya above is the one suggested by Mehendale (1978a) who has discussed
the passage and the various attempts at interpreting it in great detail. Mehendale argues as
follows (ibid.:61—2): 'The word vrttisdmdnya seems to mean "commonness of behaviour (of
a given sound), i.e. the phonetic change undergone by it". What Yaska means to say is that m
cases of difficult words - i.e. words, the accent and the grammatical formation of which are
not regular (ananvite arthe) or in cases of words where the word to be derived is not indica-
tive of any action (aprddesike vikdre), e.g. a word like indra - in such cases one should first
take a root similar in (sound and) meaning with the word to be derived and derive it from that
root on the basis of the commonness of behaviour in undergoing a phonetic change, that is he
should try to see if the phonetic change implied in such a derivation has any similarity with a
phonetic change accepted by the grammarians for the explanation of some other forms in the
grammar.' He adduces the examples of indra and hasta. If indra is related to the root indh, one
would have to account for the change of dh > d\ if this can be observed in acceptable grammat-
ical formations, for example dadhdti and not *dhadhdti in the reduplicated present form of
Îdhd, there is some justification in accepting indra for *indhra as related to îndh. Similarly,
if hasta is to be related to han, a phonetic change n > s has to be accounted for by finding some
similar change elsewhere in grammar. Mehendale concludes (ibid.): 'This is what is really
meant by vrttisdmdnya, viz, commonness of behaviour (of sounds).' Bronkhorst (1984:4)
reviewing Mehendale (1978a) argues that 'it seems better to translate ananvite 'rthe "when the
meaning is not accompanied [by the right accent and formation]" and apradesike vikdre "when
the modification is not such as fits the [grammatical] derivation"'. What is lost when the
passage is taken in this way (which is what I have done above) is the parallelism between
prddesikena gunendnvitau (or even vikdrendnvitau) of the preceding rule and the wording
55
ananvite 'rthe 'pradesike vikdre in the present one.
Again I follow the interpretation of Mehendale (1978a), assuming sdmdnye = vrttisdmdnye; see
56
preceding note.
Durga (D 1:157,6) glosses visayavatyah by bahusamsayavatyah 'possessing lots of doubt'.
and proceed by analysing on the basis of similarities in syllables and single

sounds. Accordingly, Yaska concludes the passage by adding (ibid):
yathdrtham vibhaktih sannamayet, 'the divisions [into syllables and single
sounds] should be interpreted according to meaning'. This statement does not
necessarily imply that he considers syllables and single sounds to,be meaning-
ful units, a view that is certainly not shared by vydkarana; maybe all it says is
that someone who is intent on a particular meaning (arthanityah) should keep
this in mind when setting out to analyse a word on the basis of syllables and
single sounds. On the basis of his general practice, however, I am inclined to
conclude that Yaska considers syllables and single sounds to be meaningful
units.
Another important statement is the following (Nir 2.7): tdni cet samdna-
karmdni samdnanirvacandni I ndndkarmdni cen ndndnirvacandni I yathdr-
tham nirvaktavydni I itimdny ekavimsatih prthivindmadheydny anukrdntdni,
'if the activities [associated with a word] are uniform, the analyses are uniform;
if the activities are multiform, the analyses are multiform: [and] they should be
analysed according to meaning; with this statement in mind, the twenty-one
words for Earth are dealt with'.
That Yaska is all in favour of grammar and that he deems it essential that
a nairukta is well versed in vydkarana is evident from the following state-
ment (Nir 2.3): naikapaddni nirbruydtl ndvaiydkarandyal ndnupasanndyal
anidamvide vdl nityam hy avijhdtur vijndne 'suydl upasanndydtu nirbruydtl
yo vdlam vijndtum sydtl medhdvinel tapasvine vd, 'one should not analyse
single words57 to someone who is not trained in vydkarana, who has not for-
57
The exact meaning of the term ekapada is unclear. Mehendale (1978b:75) reads naikapaddni
nirbruydt as a separate statement and interprets: 'one should not attempt etymologies of single
words without knowing their context'. The technical term ekapada occurs only twice in the
Nirukta (2.2, 2.3); so does its derivative aikapadika (1.14,4.1). In an attempt at explaining the
meaning of aikapadika at Nirukta 1.14, Mehendale (1968a = 1978:22-30) contrasts aikapadika
with prdtipadika and concludes (1978:30): 'If the meaningful units of a word into which it has
been analysed explain only a single word, i.e. if the stem or the suffix so obtained can be
observed in only one example, it is an aikapadika.' Noting that the word ekapada occurs only
at Nirukta 2.2 and 2.3, Mehendale remarks (1978:29, note 20): 'In the former case it occurs in
the sense "simple word" or primary formation as opposed to secondary formation (taddhita)
and compounds {samdsa). At Nirukta 2.3, ekapada occurs in the sense "a word out of context"
(prakarana-upapada-rahitdni, Durga; asahdydni avdkyasthdni ity arthah, Skanda
Mahesvara).' In a review of Mehendale (1978), Bronkhorst (1984:2) criticises Mehendale's
interpretation of aikapadika on the grounds that he ascribes two different meanings to it in the
two single instances where it occurs, that he does the same to the related word ekapada, and
that he cannot substantiate his claim that either the stem or the suffix of the enumerated words
are of unique occurrence.
Bronkhorst (ibid.:5) offers another solution to the aikapadika problem by looking at the
objection Yaska tries to answer Nirukta 1.14. A critic has objected that if all nouns were related
to verbs, they should have a form from which the meaning and the action would be understood,
that is to say, words should take on the regular primary (krt) endings which their meanings
require. Bronkhorst points out that 'there are words with regular krt endings.which do not have
the meanings demanded by those endings and the roots to which they are attached'. On this
basis he argues as follows: 'If we now understand Yaska correctly, his sentence santy alpa-
prayogdh krto 'py aikapadikd[h] must convey the meaning that there are words, of rare occur-
Nirvacanasastra 39
mally approached a teacher, or to someone who does not understand it, for the
disdain of the ignorant towards knowledge is endless; but one should analyse
to someone who has formally approached a teacher, or someone who would be
fit to understand, or to the wise or an ascetic'. The statement is obviously
intended to prevent, in particular, frivolous analysis based on the principle of
aksaravarnasdmdnya 'similarity in syllables or in single sounds'. As will
become clear later on, in this respect Yaska failed.
The results achieved by these means may not correspond to what we regard
as relevant linguistic facts. But they are certainly relevant semantic facts if we
want to understand the texts and traditions that employed these techniques
throughout the centuries and in a most striking manner.
Three basic terms: artha, anvartha, and kdraka
artha
It has already been revealed that nirvacana analysis is concerned with seman-
tics, with linguistic meaning. Meaning is a property in virtue of which a sen-
tence such as 'John cooked the rice' can be used to communicate the
information that John cooked the rice. The Sanskrit term for 'meaning' in this
sense is artha. This term requires a few remarks. First of all, 'meaning' is itself
a slippery term. We may, for example, say 'what's the meaning of all this?', 'I
did not mean it', 'the meaning of this word is ...', etc. As pointed out by Quine
rence, which, though ending in krt suffixes, must be treated as grammatically unanalyzed
words . . . Normally grammatical analysis (including the analysis of the Unadi sutras) helps
him in his endeavour; in the case of the words damunas etc. it does not. These words are aika-
padika "belonging to the unanalyzed words (ekapada)" ? Accordingly, Bronkhorst (ibid)
ascribes the meaning 'unanalyzed word' ('i.e., a word where grammar does not help to reach
at the meaning') to ekapada. His reasoning may be sound, but one crucial question remains:
why should an unanalysed word be termed ekapadal Moreover, Bronkhorst is unfair on
Mehendale when he claims Mehendale would have to offer two different translations of the
word aikapadika in the two different instances where it occurs. Anyone, including Bronkhorst,
would have to do that. At Nirukta 4.1 aikapadika refers to the section of the Nighantu of that
name, and will invariably have to be interpreted as 'the section which deals with ekapadas'
regardless of how we interpret ekapada. With regard to the latter, its occurrence at Nirukta 2.2
serves to distinguish ekapadas from secondary formations and compounds. In a similar
sense ekapada occurs in the Mahdbhdsya of Patanjali (Mbh 1:6,22-3): atha vd santy eka-
paddny apy avadhdrandni, 'or else, there are restrictions even in the form of single words'.
Kaiyata (MbhP I:60b) explains that when one has a restriction where the word eva is explic-
itly used, we have a restriction which consists of two words, but when the restriction is by force
of sdmarthya with no use of the word eva, then the restriction is said to be ekapada, consist-
ing of one word; as pointed out in the Chdyd of Vaidyanatha Payagunda (ibid.), ekapada is
here a bahuvrlhi compound. The term occurs also in the first vdrttika on A 1.1.63 na
lumatdngasya (for which see J. Benson 1990). The vdrttika runs (Mbh 1:165,15): lumati
pratisedha ekapadasvarasyopasamkhydnam, 'in the prohibition regarding [suffixes] with the
element /w, an additional statement [has to be made] of the accent of a single word'. Still,
Bronkhorst may well be right when he says (1984:6): 'Where and when no grammatical analy-
sis is possible, Yaska speaks of ekapada' I do not think the problems are solved, though, by
rendering it 'unanalysed word'.
(1953/1961:9) there is also a gulf between 'meaning' and 'naming' even in the
case of a singular term which is genuinely the name of an object, He takes
from Frege the example of 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star'. Both of these
terms name the same thing but they cannot be said to have the same meaning.
There is no reason to assume that the Indians worked within a modern frame-
work which distinguishes clearly between meaning and reference. Indeed, the
term artha frequently refers to that which is designated by a term, to the thing
meant.
It might be useful to begin by looking at the entries on the term artha in L.
Renou's Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit (Renou 1942/1957; 59-60):
artha 'sens, signification (d'un mot, etc.); chose a exprimer, notion (not. dans
paddrtha, vdkydrtha, q. v.); objet, but' P.; ifc. 'ayant le sens de' ou 'ayant pour effet,
servant a': tadartha 'qui a tel sens ou tel objet, utile a cela, qui existe en vue de' P.
(v. tddarthya); evamartham et kimartham M. 'dans telle intention' et-dans quelle
intention?' yathdrtham M. 'selon le sens'; °arthe 'au sens de' P., ainsi dans mat-
varthe, q. v.; pardrtha 'qui a lieu en vue d'un su. ulterieur' ou 'en vue de qqch.
d'autre' M.; uktdrtha 'dont le sens a ete deja formule' M.; v. encore, svdrtha,
uttardrtha, kriydrtha, ekdrtha, dhdtvartha, anarthaka etc.
'Empechement,=nivrttV Pr. 14 48 DV. VII1 24 (cf. BR. n° 10 et Nachtrag V).
He goes on to list compounds with artha as the first member and various
derivatives. A second entry runs (ibid.:378):
artha 'sens': l'un des elements permettant de realiser unpdda R. XVII25 (975), de
differencier les nipdta XII 26 (708). Le mot est defini par a° V. Ill 1; a° est l'ele-
ment essentiel selon BD. II 99. Pratiquement a° = 'phrase' dans arthddi 'initiale de
phrase' Bhas II2. Ifc. 'qui a le sens de' ainsi nayatyartha toute forme 'ayant le sens
de nf-' R. V 57 (373), i.e. une forme quelconque de la racine rii-. aneka°, v. ce mot;
ekdrtha, v. ekasabda; arthavant 'pourvu de sens' (dit des mantra) opp. a anarthaka
N. 116. Les termes de la langue parlee sont arthapurvaka V. 12, glose prayojanapu0
Uv.; les particules sont en principe arthavdcaka R. XII26 (708) et les preverbes le
sont en jonction avec le nom ou le verbe XII 20 (702); arthiya ifc. N passim (dans
evam° pratisedha0 upamd° etc.). Les phonemes valent sous leur forme authentique
(prakrtyd) au moment ou le sens est en jeu (arthaveldydm, non 1'etude phonetique)
Pratijn. 21. - Le theme nominal est arthavant GB. I 26.
In his review of Renou (1942/1957) P. Thieme (1958:26) is rather critical of
this:
I should not finish but start with the general value 'purpose' (objet, but), from which
all the others derive: the 'purpose' of [the use] of a grammatical element, a word,
and a sentence amounts to what we call 'meaning' (sens, signification), and only
insofar as the 'purpose' of a word may be to name a 'concept' (notion) does artha
amount, in certain contexts, to 'concept'. Proceeding in this way, we have not only
the theoretical advantage of having given a linguistically correct explanation of the
different usages; we have also offered practical help to the non-specialist. He will
now understand the different 'meanings' which must otherwise seem to him an
unorganized aggregate of arbitrary values.
Nirvacanasastra 41
Thieme goes on to claim that his approach succeeds when we are dealing with
certain derivatives, such as anarthaka which Thieme renders 'purposeless'.
This may hit the target in a general way, but I am not at all happy with his ren-
dering (ibid.:27) of samartha as 1) 'of the same purpose' (samdno 'rtho yasya)
and 2) 'furnished with purpose' (arthena sahita-), and the important derivative
sdmarthya- is just mentioned in passing in the expression sdmarthyayogdt (from
Mbh 111:54,4), translated (ibid.:27) 'since it is fitting (yukta; -yogat short for
-yuktatvat) that it [the teaching of Panini] be furnished with purpose'. These
terms are extremely complex and do not easily lend themselves to the 'general
value' of 'purpose'. It is, however, clear that Thieme has a point when it comes
to establishing 'purpose' as a kind of logical semantic continuity, a constant
basis for the rendering of the term artha.5* Indeed, 'purpose' is often the ren-
dering resorted to by Sanskrit authors. For example, Kaiyata, the eleventh-
century commentator on the Mahdbhdsya, glosses anarthaka by nisprayojanam
'without purpose' (MbhP I:32b). These quotations from Renou and Thieme may
suffice to illustrate that the term artha is a slippery one. In the context of nirva-
cana analysis this is important in as much as a nirvacana analysis is an analysis
of words with regard to how they are related to things, and this is where the
semantic range of the term artha becomes crucial. With the above background,
let me now turn to some indigenous discussions of the term artha.
An easy entry into the indigenous discussions of paddrtha, the artha of a
word, is provided by certain sections of the Paspasdhnika of the Mahdbhdsya.
Patanjali introduces the problem as follows (Mbh 1:6,8-11):
58
I take it that Thieme does not mean to say that artha always is to be interpreted as 'purpose'
although this would be in keeping with the method that was advocated by Thieme and H.
Luders in the interpretation of Vedic hymns, namely, that a certain Vedic word should be trans-
lated in one and the same way in all contexts. This has proved an untenable straitjacket. An
example from Vedic is the term rtd, the ordered and regular (and thereby right, natural, and
hence true) structure of the cosmic, human, and ritual course. Luders (1951:13ff. and 1959)
argues that the term should be translated 'Wahrheit' (truth), partly on the basis that the word
dnrta with the negative prefix an- in later language is opposed to satya- ~ 'true; truth'. But
how then does one explain RV 1.105.12: rtdm arsanti sindhavah satydm tdtdna suryah, 'th
floods streamed rtd, the sun spread satyd out' ? The real guardian of rtd is Varuna. Luders and
Thieme strived to explain Vedic deities as developments of rather abstract concepts. Thus,
Luders (ibid.) interpreted Varuna as 'Oath'. Thieme (1957) interpreted the deities Mitra and
Aryaman, both related to Varuna, as 'Contract' and 'Hospitality' respectively, and Varuna as
'True speech' (based on an etymology first suggested by A. Meillet that varuna < I.E. *wer
'speak'). But it is very hard to claim that one has explained Varuna's mythological functions
unless one has succeeded in explaining, for example, the antagonism between him and Indra,
or the image of Varuna and the cask with the bottom up (RV 5.85.3: nictnabdram ... kdvan-
dham). There are many aspects that cannot be explained by Varuna = True speech. Why, for
example, is Varuna related to the night and Mitra to the day? Moreover, we have to ask, what
did words corresponding to 'Wahrheit', 'contract', etc. mean to the Vedic Indian? A concept
such as 'cosmic contract' would already change the picture quite a bit. Thieme considers it
something close to a poetic and religious masterpiece that the Indians were able to colour an
abstract concept so strongly. But the Vedic poets, in spite of their licentia poetica, did not have
a carte blanche which allowed them to do whatever they felt like. The greater context requires
something less narrow than 'true speech'. The same could be said with regard to translating
artha as 'purpose'.
kirn punar dkrtih paddrtha dhosvid dravyaml ubhayam ity aha I katham jndyate I
ubhayathd hy dearyena sutrdni pathitdni I dkrtim paddrtham matvd jdtydkhydydm
ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasydm ity ucyatel dravyam paddrtham matvd
sarupdndm ity ekasesa drabhyate II
Now, what is the artha of a word: a class (dkrti) or rather an individual thing
(dravya)!59 Both, he (=Patanjali) says. How do we know? The Teacher (=Panini)
has formulated rules in both ways. Considering a class {dkrti) to be the artha of a
word, it is stated [by A 1.2.58] that when there is designation of a class (jdti 'class;
genus; species') the plural may optionally be used with regard to one single thing.
[And] considering an individual thing (dravya) to be the artha of a word, the [fact
that there should be a] single remainder is taught by [A 1.2.64 which begins]
sarupdndm 'of elements showing the same form'.60
Kaiyata remarks on this as follows (MbhP I:56b):
tatra jdtivddina dhuh - jdtir eva sabdena pratipddyate, vyaktindm dnantydt
sambandhagrahandsambhavdt I sd ca jdtih sarvavyaktisv ekdkdrapratyayadars-
andd astlty avasiyate I tatra gavddayah sabdd bhinnadravyasamavetdmjdtim abhi-
dadhatil tasydm pratitdydm taddvesdt tadavacchinnam dravyam pratiyatel
suklddayah sabdd gunasamavetdm jdtim dcaksatel gune tu tatsambandhdt
pratyayah, dravye sambandhisambandhdt I samjhdsabddndm apy utpattiprabhrtyd
vindsdt pindasya kaumdrayauvanddyavasthdbhede 'pi sa evdyam ity abhinna-
pratyayanimittd ditthatvddikd jdtir vdcydl kriydsv api jdtir vidyate, saiva dhdtuvd-
cydl pathati - pathatah - pathanti - itydder abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhdvdt
tannimittajdtyabhyupagamahll vyaktivddinas tv dhuh - sabdasya vyaktir evdbhi-
dheyd, jdtes tupalaksanabhdvendsrayandd dnantyddidosdnavakdsah II
This being so,61 those who hold the view that a jdti 'class; genus' [is the artha of a
word] state: it is only a class that is conveyed by a word, for [otherwise] it is not
possible to grasp the relation [between a word arid its artha] because there is an
endless number of individual things. And it is established that there is such a thing
as a jdti since we perceive the cognition of a single shape (akdra) with regard to all
individuals [of the same class]. This being so, words such as gauh 'cow' denote a
jdti which is inherent in different individuals. When this [jdti] has been understood
[as the artha of a given word], we understand an individual thing (dravya) limited
by that [jdti] since it possesses that [individual]. Words such as sukla 'white' signify
a jdti which is inherent in a quality. And in the case of such a quality, cognition
takes place because of [its] relation to it [= to the jdti], [while] in the case of an indi-
59
A word of caution seems necessary here. In Nyaya-Vaisesika paddrtha is the technical term
for a 'category', and dravya and sdmdnya 'universality' ox jdti 'class; genus' figure among
these. It could therefore be the case that Patanjah is playing around with words here in order
to point out various possibilities: we are dealing with something (paddrtha) which could be
dravya as well as jdti and not the one excluding the other.
60
A 1.2.64 sarupdndm ekasesa ekavibhaktau is the rule which teaches that out of a series of
stems showing the same form, only one is retained before one single case ending. In other
words, this is the rule which accounts for the fact that we say vrksdh 'trees', and not vrksas ca
61
vrksas ca vrksas ca, 'a tree and a tree and a tree'.
The context concerns the application of the two views with regard to two panbhdsds, general
rules of interpretation. This need not concern us here.
Nirvacanasastra 43
vidual thing (dravya), cognition takes place because of [its] relation with the
relatum.62 Even words which are proper names express a jdti such as ditthatva
'Dittha-hood', [a property] grounded on an unchanging cognition so that one says
'this is that very same [person]', although there is change of [his] body in the stages
of youth, adulthood, etc. from birth to death. With regard to actions too we find a
jdti; indeed, it is expressed by the verbal root. Because an unchanging cognition is
present from such [verbal forms] as pathati 'he recites', pathatah 'the two of them
recite', [and] pathanti 'they recite', a. jdti is accepted [in the case of verbal forms]
as the cause of that [unchanging cognition]. Those, however, who hold the view that
a vyakti 'individual thing' [is the artha of a word] say that it is only an individual
manifestation {vyakti) which is denoted by a word. But since the jdti is resorted to
by implication, there is no occasion for such error as [having to assume] an
innumerability [of relations].
Patanjali's initial discussion concerns directly only the context of the
AstddhydyT, although Kaiyata places it within a larger frame. Later on,
however, Patafijali puts his initial statement to good use in his discussion of the
compound sabddrthasambandhe in the phrase siddhe sabddrthasambandhe,
traditionally considered the first part of the first vdrttika of the Mahdbhdsya.63
Patafijali states (Mbh 1:7,8-10):
atha kam punah paddrtham matvaisa vigrahah kriyate siddhe sabde 'rthe
sambandhe cetil dkrtim ity aha I kuta etatl dkrtir hi nityd dravyam anityamll atha
dravye paddrthe katham vigrahah kartavyahl siddhe sabde 'rthasambandhe cetil
nityo hy arthavatdm arthair abhisambandhah II
Now, with what artha of the word [siddha] in mind have we analysed [the com-
pound] as siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe ca, 'when the word-form, [its] artha, and
the relation [between them] are permanently established' ? He (= Patafijali) says: the
dkrti 'class'. How come? Because the dkrti is permanent (nityd), [while] the dravya
'individual thing' is non-permanent. Now, if the artha of a word is the dravya, how
do we then analyse [the compound]? [As:] siddhe sabde 'rthasambandhe ca, 'when
the word-form and the relation with [its] artha is permanently established'. For the
relation between things which possess an artha and the arthas is permanent.
If the artha of the word siddha 'permanently established' is an dkrti 'class',
Patafijali interprets the compound entirely as a dvandva. If, however, the artha
is a dravya 'an individual thing', he keeps the last two members of the com-
pound as a unit, itself now a tatpurusa compound: arthasambandha, 'the rela-
tion with the artha\ Kaiyata elaborates on this as follows (MbhP I:62b):
dravyapakse dravyasydnityatvdd arthagrahanam sambandhavisesandrtham
updttaml anitye 'rthe katham sambandhasya nityatd - id cet, yogyatdlaksanatvdt
sambandhasya I tasyds ca sabddsrayatvdt — sabdasya ca nityatvdd adosah II
62
The jdti 'class; genus' (such as suklatva 'white-ness', the property of being white) is inherent
in the guna 'quality' which is inherent in the dravya 'individual thing'. In this way the jdti is
63
indirectly related to the dravya through the guna.
The most recent discussion of what constitutes the first vdrttikas of the Mahdbhdsya has been
provided by Bronkhorst 1987; see also Wezler 1994, note 4.
On the view [that a word signifies] a dravya 'individual thing', because the dravya
is non-permanent, the [word] artha has been mentioned for the purpose (artha) of
qualifying [the word] sambandha 'relation'. [But] if [someone asks:] when the
artha is non-permanent, how can the relation [with the artha] be permanent, [we
answer that this is] because the relation is defined as yogyatd 'suitability'.64 And
because the word-form is the substratum of that [relation], there is no fault since the
word-form is permanent.
Patanjali continues his discussion as follows (Mbh 1:7,11-12; 18720):
atha vd dravya eva paddrtha esa vigraho nydyyah siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe
cetil dravyam hi nityam dkrtir anitydl katham jndyate I evam hi drsyate lokel... /
dkrtdv apipaddrtha esa vigraho nydyyah siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe cetil nanu
coktam dkrtir anityetil naitad astil nitydkrtihl katham I na kvacid uparateti krtvd
sarvatroparatd bhavati dravydntarasthd tupalabhyate I
Or rather, this analysis [of the compound] as siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe ca,
'when the word-form, [its] artha, and the relation [between them] are permanently
established', is proper only when the artha of the word [siddha] is the dravya '-
material substance'. For the dravya 'material substance' is permanent, [whereas]
the dkrti 'shape' is non-permanent. How do we know? Because so it is seen in daily
life . . . [But] this analysis [of the compound] as siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe ca,
'when the word-form, [its] artha, and the relation [between them] are permanently
established', is proper also when the artha of the word [siddha] is the dkrti 'shape'.
Weil, but it was said that the dkrti is non-permanent. That is not so; the dkrti is
permanent. How? By making out that when it has come to an end in a certain place,
it has not come to an end everywhere, but is [on the contrary] observed as remain-
ing in other individual things (dravydh).
Here Patanjali considers other meanings of the terms dravya and dkrti,
taking them in the completely different senses of 'material substance' and
'shape; form' respectively. He goes on to offer examples of how a material sub-
stance (dravya) such as clay or gold is permanent (nitya), while the shape
(dkrti) of things made from them may vary and is therefore non-permanent
(anitya). Taking dkrti in the sense of 'shape; form' he then turns the argument
around, claiming that the dkrti is indeed permanent in the sense that although
it comes to an end somewhere, it will still remain in other dravyas, thus inci-
dentally resorting to the previous sense of dravya as 'individual thing'. Tired
of the discussion, Patanjali concludes (Mbh 1:7,23-5):
atha vd kim na etenedam nityam idam anityam itil yan nityam tarn paddrtham
matvaisa vigrahah kriyate siddhe sabde 'rthe sambandhe cetil
Or rather, what is the use of our saying 'this is permanent', 'this is non-permanent'?
Thinking that whatever is permanent (nitya), that is the artha of the word, this
analysis [of the compound] is made: 'when the word-form, [its] artha, and the rela-
tion [between them] are permanently established'.
64
That is to say, words are assumed to be permanently suited to signify, that is, refer to the things
meant.
Nirvacanasastra 45
Kaiyata remarks on this in the following, illuminating manner (MbhP

I:64b):
yan nityam Hi I buddhipratibhdsah sabddrthah, yadd yadd sabda uccdritas
taddrthakdrd buddhir upajdyate - Hi pravdhanityatvdd arthasya nityatvam ity
arthahll
'Whatever is permanent'. The artha of a word is the appearance of a cognition.
Whenever a word is pronounced, then a cognition appears with the shape of the
artha; that is to say, the artha is permanent because it is permanent in the form of
a continuous flux.
Nagesa, the late seventeenth- to eighteenth-century author of the
MahabhasyapradTpoddyota, or Uddyota for short, elaborates on Kaiyata's
statement as follows (MbhU I:64b):
yan nityam Hi I vyaktijdtydkrtTndm madhye yan nityam ity arthahll nanu
sasasrngddipaddrthdndm katham nityatvam, tesdm svarupasyaivdbhdvdd ata aha
— buddhipratibhdsa Hi I bdhyah paddrtho na sdbdabodhe visayah, kirn tu
bauddhahl sa ca pravdhanitya Hi bhdvahll etac ca mahjusdydm vistarena
nirilpitam II
'Whatever is permanent'. That is to say, whatever is permanent among the vyakti
'individual thing', the jdti 'class', or the akrti 'generic shape'. Well, but how can the
artha of words such as sasasrnga 'the hare's horn' be permanent, since these have
no form of their own? Therefore he (= Kaiyata) states: 'whatever appears in the
mind'. In linguistically based cognition the object (visaya) is not the external artha
of a word, but a mental one. And that is permanent in the form of a continuous flux.
This is what Kaiyata means to say. And this [topic] has been discussed at length in
the Manjusd.65
From Nagesa's last remark it is evident that this brief presentation is not in
any way an exhaustive discussion of the indigenous elaborations on the term
artha. But it has sufficiently established that the distinction between meaning
and thing meant is extremely blurred, and that the discussion revolves around
three possibilities: that the artha of a word is a class (jdti, dkrti), a shape or
form that appears in the mind (akrti, dkdra), or an individual thing (dravya,
vyakti). It is also clear that in vydkarana questions of meaning become ques-
tions of reference. The gulf between 'meaning' and 'naming' has narrowed
considerably, and this is one of the reasons why it is possible to arrive at the
artha or 'meaning' of a term through that term itself by means of nirvacana
analysis.
Now, it is also clear that the term artha is used in a more abstract way than
simply referring to the thing meant. As far as I know, it is in the Nirukta itself
(Nir 1.3) that we find the earliest extant discussion on whether certain linguis-
tic elements express an artha 'meaning' or 'purpose' (arthdn nirdhuh). The
65
For example m Nagesa's Vaiydkaranasiddhdntalaghumanjusd {bauddharthamrupana,
203-369).
context is the meaningfulness of upasargas - preverbs or prepositions. This

serves to demonstrate that the term artha implies more than just 'thing' or 'ref-
erent', since the meaning of preverbs surely is rather abstract.
The term artha is also used to denote meaning in a broader sense, more
specifically with regard to the meaning of a corpus of texts. Sayana, for
example, concluded his exposition of nirvacanasdstra in the following manner
(Say p. 29): tasmdt veddrthdvabodhdyopayuktam niruktam, 'therefore nirukta
is useful for grasping the meaning {artha) of the Veda'. Similarly, the com-
mentator Durga remarks with regard to the Nighantu (D 1:30,3-4): sa ca
rsibhir mantrdrthaparijndndyoddharanabhutah paficddhydyisdstrasamgra-
habhdvenaikasminn dmndye granthikrta ity arthah, 'that is to say, in order that
[we shall get] knowledge of the meaning (artha) of the Vedic verses, the Rsis
have also made it [=the sam-dmndya] into a text that serves as an example in
the form of a compendium of a Sastra which consists of five parts in one single
[ekasmin-sam, cf. Nir 1.3] dmndyah (repetition within certain limits)'.
Clearly it is the meaning of the Veda Yaska has in mind when he quotes the
following verse (Nir 1.18):
yad grhitam avijndtam nigadenaiva sabdyate I
anagndv iva suskaidho na taj jvalati karhicitll
What has been taken [from the teacher's mouth] but not understood [and] is uttered
by mere recitation, that never flares up, like dry firewood on a non-fire.
The verse is quoted also by Patanjali in the Paspasdhnika of the
Mahdbhdsya (Mbh 1:2,15—16),66 a clear example of how Patanjali shows Yaska
respect in this introductory chapter.
Yaska also comments on a Vedic verse (RV 10.71.4) which makes his atti-
tude quite clear (Nir 1.19):
utd tvah pdsyan nd dadarsa vacant utd tvah srnvdn nd srnoty endm I
utd tvasmai tanvdm vi sasre jdyeva pdtya usatf suvasdhll
And many a one, [although] seeing, does not see Speech; and many a one,
[although] hearing, does not hear Her; and to many a one She spreads out [Her]
body, like a wife wearing clean clothes, having desire for [her] husband.
This verse too is quoted by Patanjali (Mbh 1:4,2-3). His interpretation agrees
more or less with Yaska's, except for one significant point: to Yaska the wife
who uncovers herself uncovers knowledge, the illumination of meaning (artha)
(svam dtmdnam vivrnute jndnam prakdsanam arthasya), and the verse is a
praise of one who knows the meaning (arthajnaprasamsd); to Patanjali the verse
says that speech uncovers itself to someone who knows speech (vdg vdgvide
svdtmdnam vivrnute), that is to say, to the grammarian. Yaska (Nir 1.20) goes
on to quote the subsequent verse (RV 10.71.5), and remarks: artham vdcah
puspaphalam aha, 'he declares the meaning of speech to be its fruit and flower'.
66
Reading adhitam 'studied' for grhitam.
Nirvacanasastra 47
Finally, the following passage from the Mahdbhdsya may serve to illustrate
the intricacies of the term artha (Mbh 1:363,24-8):
apravrttih khalv apy arthadesanasya I bahavo hi sabdd yesdm arthd na vijfidyante
I jarbhdnturphdritull antarena khalv api sabdaprayogam bahavo Wthd gamyante
'ksinikocaih pdnivihdrais call na khalv api mrjhdtasydrthasydnvdkhydne kim cid
api prayojanam asti I yo hi bruydt purastdd dditya udeti pascdd astam eti madhuro
gudah katukam srngaberam iti kim tena krtam sydtll
There will, in fact, be no attempt at instruction in meaning {artha). For there are
many words whose meanings are unknown, such as jarbhdn turphdntu.61 In fact,
many meanings are understood without the use of words, by closing the eyes or by
doing things with the hands. Indeed, there is no purpose whatsoever in explaining
meaning which has [already] been understood. For he who says that the sun rises in
the east and sets in the west, that sugar is sweet, [or] that ginger is pungent, what is
accomplished by him'?
Let these considerations suffice to establish that the term artha is as
complex an entity as its English counterpart 'meaning' which I shall use to
translate it. Let it also be clear that we shall first and foremost be dealing with
linguistic meaning in the sense that we deal with the meaning of singular and
general terms. In that context questions of meaning are primarily questions of
reference. In order to account also for the broader and the more abstract senses
of artha, however, I shall confine myself to saying that words signify. That this
is a sensible safeguarding is also brought out by the related term anvartha
which plays a central role in nirvacana analysis and to which I shall now turn.
anvartha
In the introduction to his Rgvedabhdsya Sayana remarks on the lexicograph-
ical work Nighantu in the following way (Say p. 28): pancddhydyarupakdnda-
traydtmake etasmin granthe paranirapeksatayd paddrthasyoktatvdt tasya
granthasya niruktatvam, 'the property of being nir-ukta (stated independently)
pertains to this text [= the Nighantu], since in this text, which consists of three
sections forming five chapters, the meaning (artha) of words has been stated
(-ukta) independently (nir-) of other [words]'. Sayana gives a similar analysis
of the name of Yaska's Nirukta (ibid.:29): tad api niruktam ity ucyatel
ekaikasya padasya sambhdvitd avayavdrthds tatra nihsesenocyante iti vyut-
patteh, 'according to the analysis: "the presumptive (sambhdvitdh) meanings
of the constituent parts (avayavdrthdh) of each individual word68 are stated
(ucyante: -ukta) fully (nihsesena: nir-) in it", this too is called Nirukta\ Both
these analyses are worked out with an eye to the nature of what the terms
denote. An analysis of this kind as well as a term treated in this manner are
67
68
RV 10.106.6
Or, possibly, ekaikasya could mean 'of one word after the other' with reference to the list of
words constituting the Nighantu
both said to be anvartha: 'in accordance with that which it signifies', or 'in
accordance with the meaning and nature of that which it denotes', or, even,
'purposive'.
So when a term or expression is anvartha, it is inherently significant or pur-
posive so that there is a direct semantic link between the term and the nature
of that which it denotes. Without entering into the complexities pertaining to
singular reference, it is clear that the name 'John' does not in itself tell us any-
thing about the man so named. It is just a label by which he is called. But a
term such as 'Bhairava' is actually descriptive. It conveys the nature of that
which it denotes in the sense that we may learn about Bhairava's nature from
the name 'Bhairava' itself. So such terms are descriptive terms as well as
names. It should be noted that this feature is in no way limited to proper names
within the context of Indian linguistic speculation. It applies to all nominal
words.
The term 'Bhairava' is thus treated as a descriptive name in the sense that
the term itself contains the necessary elements to provide the uniquely true
description. It is thus similar to a name such as 'Jack the Ripper'. In ordinary
English very few names can be considered descriptive names in this sense.
Within the Indian mode of thinking, however, any name, any noun, may in
principle be considered a descriptive name in as much as it is susceptible of
nirvacana analysis, semantic analysis on the basis of the term itself. The
explanatory expression provided through such analysis is thus linked up with
the linguistic item itself; any uniquely true description not so linked would not
do. In other words, it is the very power of nirvacana analysis to give for any
term a unique description of its referent through the term itself, thus forcing
the term to reveal its semantic content. This is fundamental to the way in which
a nirvacana analysis works. Linguistic entities are treated as inherently signif-
icant, and this significance can be arrived at through the linguistic element
itself because the linguistic element is anvartha.
The term anvartha is well known also from vydkarana. On several
occasions in the Mahdbhdsya Patafijali states (Mbh 1:206,24; 11:366,25;
111:409,2): anvartham khalv api nirvacanam, 'the nirvacana 'does indeed
correspond to that which [the term] signifies'. Patanjali also repeatedly states
that the purpose of making a long technical term in grammar, a mahati
samjnd, is that it should be recognised as an anvarthasamjhd, 'a technical
term which is in accordance with that which it signifies'.69 A single example
69
Kiparsky (1979:210) expresses a different opinion when he concludes: 'In any case, such
outside meanings have at most a mnemonic value and are strictly irrelevant within the theory.'
He adds in a note (ibid.: note 1): 'This is against the opinion of Patanjali, who often seeks a
special significance in "long" terms.' This is not only against the opinion of Patanjali, but
against the opinion of the entire vydkarana tradition. Kiparsky is probably right, though, in
claiming that Panini himself coined or viewed a certain term as an anvarthasamjnd. As pointed
out by Cardona (1977:340), if one were to attribute such a view to Panini, one would also have
to consider one rule vacuous (A 1.1.41 avyayibhdvas ca [avyayam 37]). Cardona goes on to
say (ibid.):
Nirvacanasdstra 49
will suffice.70 A 1.4.23 kdrake introduces the technical term kdraka, lit.
'accomplishes doer', as the technical term for participants in actions. This
term plays a considerable role with regard to nirvacana analysis, and as such
I shall discuss it in some detail below. On A 1.4.23 Patanjali remarks (Mbh
1:324,7-10):
kdraka iti mahatT samjhd kriyatel samjhd ca ndma yato na laghvtyahl kuta etatl
laghvartham hi samjhdkaranam I tatra mahatydh samjhdydh karana etat prayoj-
anam anvarthasamjnd yathd vijhdyeta I karotiti kdrakam iti I
[The term] kdraka is made as a long technical term. But a technical term {samjhd)
is that than which nothing is shorter. How come? Because technical names are made
for the sake of brevity.71 In that case, the purpose in making a long technical term
is this that it should be recognised as a technical term in accordance with that which
it signifies (anvarthasamjnd), [according to the analysis]: 'it accomplishes [some-
thing], hence [it is called] kdraka\
Yaska too analyses technical terms in the manner of an anvarthasamjnd.
His analysis of the technical term nipdta 'particle' as presented by Sayana will
serve to illustrate this. Sayana states (Say p. 29):
tatra hi'catvdri padajdtdni ndmdkhydte copasarganipdtds cay iti pratijhdya 'uccd-
vacesv arthesu nipatantV iti nipdtasvarupam nirucya evam uddhrtam - 'neti
pratisedhdrthlyo bhdsdydm ubhayam anvadhydyam nendram devam amamsateti
pratisedhdrthlyaK iti; 'durmaddso na surdydm ity upamdrthiyaK (Niru. 1.1; 4) iti
cat tac ca loke kevalapratisedhdrthiyasydpi nakdrasya vede pratisedhopamdlaks-
anobhaydrthoddharanam asmin granthe 'vagamyate I
For therein, having asserted that 'there are four classes of words: nouns, verbs, pre-
verbs and particles' (Nir 1.1) and having proclaimed (nir-ucya) the real nature of [the
word and that which is referred to by the word] 'particle' (nipdta) through [the analy-
sis:] 'they occur (nipatanti)12 in all sorts of meanings' (Nir 1.4),73 he exemplifies in
Footnote 69 (cont.)
Though this is a small point, its repercussions are not. Let us agree that Panini did indeed
take such terms from earlier grammatical work. Since Panini also formulated rule 1.1.41, it
follows that he did not consider the term avyayibhdva significant in the sense that from this
term alone one knows that an avyayibhava is an avyaya. On the contrary, this term denotes
any compound formed by a rule under the heading of 2.1.5 (avyayibhdvah). Now, we also
knowfromPatanjali that some grammarians defined classes of compounds in terms of their
meanings [...] and that Panini did not. It would be reasonable - though unprovable - to say
that the two things go together: the use of avyayibhdva as an anvarthasamjna and the seman-
tic scheme for classing compounds. One would then have to say that Panini represents a
break with such a system, if indeed this is all pre-Paninian, and a move towards formalism,
towards defining classes relative to operations proper to them.
This, however, does not have any bearing on the fact that the grammarians after Panini
exploited the fact that major technical terms are considered significant.
70
Other examples are found Mbh 1:81,26-9; 88,27-89,3; 96,11-13; 215,7-11; 346,16-18;
71
378,17-19; 11:3,5-8; 76,6-10.
As pointed out by Cardona (1969:29, note 76), the Padamahjarl on the Kdsika at A 2.1.5 (KasP
II: IB) even72claims that a monosyllabic technical term should be coined: ekdksard samjnd
73
kdryd. Lit.: 'they fall into'; glossed vartante by Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:46,3).
This nirvacana is quoted by Sayana also at RV 1.124.12, as noted by Sarup (1927:30, note 3).
the following manner: [the particle] na has the sense of negation in colloquial lan-
guage, [but] both [senses, that is, negation and comparison,] according to that which
is to be studied74 [= Veda]; [thus, in] 'they did not consider Indra a god' (RV 10.86.1)
it has the sense of negation, but [in] 'like people drunk on wine' (RV 8.2.12) it has
the sense of comparison.75 And this is an instance met with in this text [=the
Niruktd] of both senses of the syllable na, indicating negation and comparison in
Veda while in colloquial language it has the sense of negation alone.76
It appears to me, then, that just like the meaning of declarative sentences,
the meaning of an anvarthasamjnd or the outcome of an acceptable nirvacana
analysis of any singular or general term, is intimately connected with whether
it is true or false, the sentence as a sentence, the term as to whether it is an ade-
quate name. The sentence 'John cooked the rice' is true if and because John
cooked the rice. The nipdtas are nipdtas if and because they nipatanti 'occur
[in all sorts of meanings]'.
Several of the text-passages I shall turn to later on deal in some detail with
the notion that terms are anvartha.
karaka
Before I turn to text-passages which illustrate the workings of nirvacana analy-
sis in practice, I find it necessary to address one more issue fundamental to
nirvacanasdstra. This is the notion of karaka mentioned above.
In Paninian grammar the term karaka (lit.: 'doer; accomplished) applies to
74
This is how I interpret the word anvadhydyam (Nir 1.4), that is, as karmavyutppttika, as a noun
liable to an analysis as the object of the verbal action involved. Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other
hand, prefer to interpret as karanavyutpattika, as a noun liable to an analysis j
as the instrument
of the verbal action involved (SM 1:46,6):
anvadhydyam ity adhydyasabdah - 'adhydyanydyodydve'ti karanddhikardnayor nip
The item adhydya in anvadhydyam is ready-made {nipdtyate) in the senses of instrument or
location in accordance with [A 3.3.122:] adhydyanydyodydvasamhdrd[dhdrdvdyd]sca.
This rule teaches that also the ready-made or irregular forms (nipdtana) adhydya 'chapter',
nydya 'rule; maxim', udydva 'mixture', samhdra 'destruction', and [according to the Kdsikd
and the editions of Vasu (1891) and Katre (1987) also] ddhdra 'support' and dvdya 'cloth-mill'
(so Katre) are derived with the krt-snffix GHaN to form nouns in the masculine in the sense
of instrument or locus. The example offered by the Kdsikd is adhlyate 'sniinn ity adhydyah
'[something] is studied in it, thus adhydya\ in the sense of 'chapter' or 'lesson', but from the
continuation of the commentary it is clear that Skanda-Mahesvara have the instrumental alter-
native in mind: adhiyate 'nena '[something] is studied by means of it' (ibid.^ 6-8):
vedas ca yady apy adhyayanasya karma, tathdpi karmanah kvacit karanatvena viv
drsyate, odanena bhunkta itil ato 'tra karanatvena vivaksite vede varttatel
But even though Veda is the object of the act of studying, one nevertheless meets with a
desire to speak of the object as an instrument, as in 'he eats by means of rice'. Thus it occurs
here in the sense of Veda which there is a wish to express by [its] property ©f being an instru-
ment [of study].
75
76
Cf. Nirukta 1.4.
In this passage it would certainly be possible to translate artha as 'purpose'; for example, a
nipdta such as na serves the purpose of negation.
Nirvacanasastra 51
direct participants in actions.77 Such a participant is a means of realising the

action, a sadhana™ and every participant is assigned to one of a set of six
kdraka categories. In Panini's grammar these are defined in the following
order:79 apdddna 'stable point when there is movement away', sampraddna
'recipient; indirect goal',80 karana 'instrument', adhikarana 'locus', karman
'object; goal', and kartr 'agent'. Moreover, a subcategory of agent is defined,
namely hetu, the causal agent.
The abstract syntactic level at which kdrakas are introduced in the grammar
serves to mediate between the levels of semantics and morphology. By this
device Panini is able to account for the relationship between possible seman-
tic choices on the side of the speaker and some basic features of Sanskrit syntax
and morphology. In practice, the advantage is that at the abstract syntactic level
of kdrakas these structures can be treated as identical and thus share opera-
tions. For example, a passive sentence is in no way derived from an active sen-
tence. Both are simply alternative manifestations of what at the underlying
abstract kdraka level is represented as the same idea. This means that in the
process of derivation the starting point is semantics, semantics here including
such features as past, present, and future time, active, passive or stative voice,
and the participants in actions.
Such participants in actions are, at the level of kdraka syntax, assigned to
particular karate-categories. In a similar way the set of lakdras, a set of ten
suffixes marked with an L, are introduced after verbal roots at the same abstract
level. At this level all verbal endings, except for the bhdva ones, can be said to
signify agents and objects in relation t o activities and can thus be treated
according to what they at this level have in common. By A 3.4.69 lah karmani
ca bhdve cdkarmakebhyah an L-suffix is added to a verbal root to denote - in
addition to the agent (kartari, A 3.4.67) - the object, or, in the case of verbal
roots which are objectless (akarmaka, that is, intransitive verbs), the mere
activity expressed by the verbal root (bhdva, lit.: 'being'). Moreover, these L-
suffixes serve to mark tenses. For example, A 3.2.110 lun teaches that the aorist
L-suffix IUN is added after a verbal root (A 3.1.91 dhdtoh) when the action
refers to the general past (A 3.2.84 bhute). These abstract L-suffixes are sub-
sequently replaced by finite verbal endings or by participial suffixes.
When the relevant semantic choices have been considered on the side of the
speaker, the abstract syntactic level of kdrakas and lakdras is sorted out. The
correct distribution of case endings and finite verbal endings is then accounted
for in the syntax of a Sanskrit sentence by means of operational rules. By
letting sentences be subject to shared operations at the abstract syntactic level,
77
On kdraka in Paninian grammar, see, for example, G. Cardona 1967; 1974; 1976:215-24;
78
1988:160-2; S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen 1975; P. Kiparsky 1982.
79
I analyse this term as sadhyate 'nena, '[something] is realised/accomplished through it'.
80
Rules A 1.4.24-55.
As G. Cardona hasrightlypointed out (1976:340, note 273; 1988:168-9), the terms apdddna
and sampraddna do not easily lend themselves to any one translation. The apdddna category,
for example, includes a stable point when there is movement away, an object of fear, etc.
Panini is able to account for the relationship between semantics and case
endings, between sentences with finite verbs in the active, passive or imper-
sonal passive (stative) voice, and between sentences containing finite verbs
and nominal sentences. Moreover, he succeeds in accounting for syntactic
problems pertaining to such areas as control81 and ellipsis.82
An example may serve to clarify this. Consider the following sentences:
puruso vrksam chinatti, 'the man is cutting the tree', and purusena vrksas
chidyate, 'the tree is being cut by the man'. To end up at one or the other of
these levels, derivation proceeds through three stages. My intention here is
simply to give the skeleton of the procedure, so I do not list the rules which
map level (1) onto level (2) or level (2) onto level (3), nor do I list the condi-
tions which affect these rules at level (2) and level (3).
(1) Semantic level introducing the participants in the action of cutting:
DUriiSa^svatantra' lê m(*ependent participant) _j_ yy.^^{ipsitatama, that which is most desired by
the agent) i -\Jrhid + JATivartamdna, present time)
(2) Abstract syntactic level; participants assigned to karaka categories:

purusa(kartr) + vrksa(karman) + Îchid+lApkartan)
or:
purusa{kartr) + vrksa^karman) + ^lchid+lApkarmam)
(3) Surface level of morphology:
purusa + sU+ vrksa + am + A chid+SaP + UP —> puruso vrksam
chinattP
or:
purusa + Td + vrksa + sU+ Îchid+yaK + te ->purusena vrksas
chidyate
Thus, looking back at given semantic conditions, kdrakas and la-kdras
serve to derive correct Sanskrit sentences by sorting out an abstract syntax on
the basis of which operational rules distribute the proper morphology.
It should be noted, however, that the above two sentences could equally well
81
That is, the problem of accounting for the implied agents and objects of non-finite verbal form
such as absolutives and infinitives Consider, for example, the shift of agent lathe case of abso-
lutives as illustrated by the two English sentences 'Having arrived in the village, John cooked
82
the rice', and 'Having arrived in the village, the rice was cooked by John'
That is, the problems linguists face as a result of the fact that words may be elided in sentences.
The Piccadilly Line' is a statement one can only imagine would occur as the reply to a ques-
tion such as 'Which line do I take to get to South Kensington9', and as such an incomplete sen-
tence for To get to South Kensington you take the Piccadilly Line.' Panini treats constructions
such as edhebhyo vrajati, 'he goes for firewood', as elliptical, equal to edhdn dhartum vrajati,
'he goes to fetch firewood' For recent discussions of case, control, and ellipsis in Pamman
83
syntactic theory, see P. Kiparsky 1982 and M.M. Deshpande 1985a.
We may at this stage speak of a fourth level of phonetics at which the correct sandhi rules apply,
but that need not concern us here
Nirvacanasastra 53
appear in the form of corresponding nominal expressions. With an agent noun

and a genitive construction we get puruso vrksasya cchettd, 'the man [is] a
cutter of the tree', and with a past participle in a passive construction and the
agent in the instrumental case we get purusena vrksas chidyamdnah, 'the tree
[is] being cut by the man'.84 Disregarding details of morphology, the deriva-
tion procedures would be the same.
But kdrakas do not pertain to the derivation of sentences alone. Any verbal
noun derived by a &rr-suffix (a primary suffix) is considered to denote either
a participant in an action and thus assigned to one or the other of the kdraka
categories, or the mere activity expressed by the verbal root and thus assigned
to the category of bhdva 'being; state of action'. In other words, a certain krt-
suffix is added to a verbal root when a particular kdraka, participant in the
action denoted by the verbal root, is to be denoted, or when the mere verbal
process or state of being {bhdva) is to be denoted. By way of example, the
suffix LyuT {-ana with guna and presuffixal accent) is introduced to form
neuter action nouns {bhdve) (by A 3.3.115 lyut ca), but also to derive nouns
expressing the instrument or the locus of the action expressed by the root (by
A 3.3.117 karanddhikaranayos ca). This means that when analysing a partic-
ular word alternative interpretations are often possible. For example, the word
yajana can be interpreted as bhdvasddhana, that is to say, as an action noun
(with LyuTby A 3.3.115 lyut ca) denoting the mere activity of sacrificing. But
it could alternatively be interpreted as adhikaranasddhana, that is to say, as a
noun denoting a locus, 'place of sacrifice'; or even - theoretically - as
karanasddhana, as a noun denoting a means of sacrificing (the two latter
formed with LyuTby A 3.3.117 karanddhikaranayos ca which teaches that this
suffix is added also to denote the instrument and the locus). This, roughly, is
how kdrakas work in the Paninian tradition.
What this brings out is crucial: not only are kdrakas not limited to the
derivation of sentences, but any verbal noun derived by a fc/t-suffix (a primary
suffix) is treated as if it were a sentence in its own right. To Yaska and within
the realm of nirvacana analysis this is the case not only for primary nouns but
for all nouns.
Let me return briefly to the verse from the Atharvaveda (3.13.2) quoted
earlier. The second half of the verse runs: tad dpnod indro vo yatis tdsmdd apo
dnu sthana, 'then Indra got hold of you as you flowed, hence you are Waters
thereafter'. By this formulation the author has formulated an analysis of dpah
as karmasddhana, as a noun denoting an object, karman. The same holds good
with regard to the more technical formulation in which this reappears in the
Satapathabrdhmana (6.1.1.9): yad dpnot tasmdd dpah, 'that he got hold of
[them], on account of that: dpah\ The same analysis has found an even more
technical formulation in the Nirukta (9.26): dpah dpnoteh. Here the nirvacana
is expressed in a way which is not immediately illuminating with regard to
84
For an overview of such core paradigms of Sanskrit syntax, see P. Kiparsky 1982 2-3
kdraka analysis. The reader will have to make his own interpretation. It seems
to me to be embedded even within? a condensed version of a more elaborate
expression. If an analysis does not bring out an obvious interpretation with
regard to kdraka, the commentators invariably supply one or, quite frequently,
several. This issue will be addressed at length further on.
However, Yaska frequently formulates a nirvacana in a more elaborate
manner which leaves no doubt with regard to kdraka. A few examples will
suffice to illustrate the point. We meet with a clear apdddnasddhana, an analy-
sis as a noun denoting that from which there is movement away, of the word
dhanvan (Nir 5.5): dhanvdntariksaml dhanvanty asmdd dpah, 'dhanvan, i.e.
antariksa (the intermediate space between heaven and earth): [something]
flows (dhanvanti) from it, [namely] water'. The word ahar 'day' is interpreted
as adhikaranasddhana, as a noun denoting a locus (in this case as the time in
which something is done) (Nir 2.20): ahah kasmdtl updharanty asmin
karmdni, 'why85 ahar! [because] one carries out (updharanti) [something] in
the course of it, [namely] actions'. The word gnsma 'summer' is also given an
interpretation as adhikaranasddhana (Nir 4.27): grismo grasyante 'smin
rasdh, 'grismah: [something] is devoured (grasyante) during it, [namely]
juices'.
Whether or not a nirvacana is explicit with regard to kdraka analysis, one
of its crucial features is nevertheless that the term analysed is linked to some
action, and that ideally it is also specified in what way that which the term sig-
nifies participates in this action, in exactly the same way as nouns formed by
Art-suffixes are assigned to kdraka categories, or participants of actions in the
derivation of sentences in Panimya grammar.
With this background, let me now consider how this framework is applied
in practice.
85
See Kahrs 1983 for this interpretation of kasmat in the Nirukta
3
Praxis: Saiva Kashmir
In the Appendices to his translation of Kalhana's Rajatarangini, Marc Aurel

Stein discusses the texts known as mdhdtmyas and connected to all the more
important tirthas of Kashmir. These mdhdtmyas are primarily handbooks for
the purohitas of the particular tirthas, that is to say, for the priests who receive
the pilgrims. The purpose of a mdhdtmya is to ascertain and expound the
sacred nature of the tirtha and the spiritual rewards for visiting it. With few
exceptions the mdhdtmyas claim to be extracted from Puranas or Puranic
collections, but Stein offers some quite revealing insights here. Concerning the
Purohitas, he has the following to say (Stein 190011:380):
These local priests known in Kasmlr as thdrfpqt1 (Skr. sthdnapati), are as a rule
quite as ignorant and grasping as their confreres, the Pujarls, BhojkTs, etc., of India
proper. They are held deservedly in very low estimation by the rest of the Brahman
community. That their condition was more or less the same in earlier times too,
though their influence and numbers were probably greater, can be safely concluded
from more than one ironical allusion of Kalhana. These are the people to whose
keeping the Mahatmya texts have always been entrusted.
Stein (ibid.) points out how not only the route of the pilgrimage, but the very
site of the tirtha had sometimes been changed in times relatively recent to his
visit. Obviously, the choice of these subsidiary cult-places must have depended
on local considerations from the very beginning. When these considerations
changed, variations in the pilgrimage routes inevitably followed. Stein explains
how this affected the mdhdtmya texts (ibid.:381):
To bring the text of the Mahatmya into accord with these successive changes was
a task which devolved upon the local Purohitas, and the texts we have discussed
above bear only too manifestly the traces of their handiwork. Sound knowledge of
Sanskrit and literary culture are likely to have been always as foreign to this class
of men as they are at present. When it became necessary for them to introduce the
names of new localities into the text of the Mahatmya, there was every risk of these
names being shown, not in their genuine old forms, but in hybrid adaptations of
their modern Kasmlrl equivalents. This risk naturally increased when Sanskrit
ceased to be the official language of Kasmir, and the knowledge of the old local
names became gradually lost even to those maintaining scholarly traditions in the
country.
As 'another potent cause' that seems to have co-operated in this vitiation of

the mdhdtmyas' local nomenclature, Stein points to 'popular etymology', that
is to say, the imprints of nirvacanasdstra. He says (ibid.)'.
We have already referred to the tendency displayed throughout these tracts of
making the names of localities, rivers, springs, etc., the starting point of legendary
anecdotes. For men of such very scant knowledge of Sanskrit as the Thanapat1s
invariably are, it was naturally far easier to explain such etymological stories when
they were based on the modern local names. It is undoubtedly this reason which has,
e.g., led the author of the present Harumukutagangamahatmya to substitute the
name KarankanadT for the old Kanakavahinl. By the latter name the stream coming
from the Harumukuta lakes is designated in all our old texts, as explained in my note
on Rajat. i. 149, 150. By turning Kdnkanai, the modern derivative of this old name,
into KarankanadT, the 'skeleton-stream', the compiler of the Mahatmya got an occa-
sion to treat his readers to a legend likely to appeal to their imagination. The river
is supposed to have received this appellation because Garuda had dropped at its
Samgama with the Sindhu the skeleton (karanka) of the Rsi Dadhlci which Indra
before had used as his weapon, etc.1 This story, it is true, is wholly unknown to the
Nllamata or any other old text. But, on the other hand, it has the great merit of being
easily explained and proved to any Kasmirl pilgrim. The latter cannot fail to realize
the manifest connection between Karanka and his familiar J^ranz, 'skeleton'.
As Stein points out, it would be easy to multiply examples showing the
strange vicissitudes to which old topographical names are exposed at the hands
of the local Purohita. Let the previous one suffice to illustrate how
nirvacanasdstra was put to good use in religious discourse as recently as the
late nineteenth century.2'
This is a good example of how meaning is created by the community, by
1
As pointed out by Stein (ibid., note 150), the story is spun out at great length in Patala iii. of
2
the Harumukutagangamahatmya, No. 221.
I find it irresistible, however, to add one further example of how a text is not a given entity but
liable to innovation, change, interpretation, and tampering. Stein (ibid.: note 153) tells the fol-
lowing story: 'I am glad that chance gave me an opportunity of gaining some personal experi-
ence of the manner in which Mahatmyas are occasionally produced. Some ten years ago the
Purohitas or Bachbattas of the Ganapatyar quarter in Srlnagar recovered an ancient Linga from
a mosque and began to erect a small shrine for it near the river Ghat of MaPyar. Guided by a
local tradition which, as far as I can judge, may be genuine, they believed this to have been the
site of the shrine of Siva Vardhamanesa, mentioned already in the Rajatarangim (see note ii.
123). The Linga was re-consecrated accordingly by this name. In 1891 when examining old
sites in this part of the city, I also visited the temple of Vardhamanesa then under construction.
The interest I showed in the old Linga and the tradition regarding it, coupled with an appropri-
ate Daksina, soon secured me the confidence of the head-Purohita of the little shrine. Pandit
T. R., a man more intelligent than the average of his fraternity, was not slow to confess to me
that the Mahatmya of the Tirtha in spe was as yet under preparation. Some weeks later, when
in camp near Srlnagar, I received the visit of my Purohita from Vardhamanesa's shrine. He
brought me the draft of the new Mahatmya and asked my assistance in revising it. I found it
consisting chiefly of extracts from the Vitastamahatmya. The passages dealing with
Vardhamanesa and the neighbouring Tirthas within the city had been suitably interlarded with
laudatory verses in the usual Mahatmya style culled from other texts. The vested interests of
other local shrines had received due recognition by being included in the Ydtrd of
Vardhamanesa. I did what I could to indicate the genuine old names of these localities. This
quasi-antiquarian co-operation does not seem to have detracted from the popularity of the new
Mahatmya among the Bachbattas of Ganapatyar.'
people interpreting, and of how the capacity of defining meaning and thus the
contents of thoughts rests not only on somebody's ability to be semantically
creative, but also on the same person's social position to be so. It also illus-
trates how there is a tradition in exegesis.
However, to illustrate the role played by nirvacana analysis in exegesis and
metaphysics, I shall not stay with Stein's Purohitas but turn instead to the
learned Sanskrit literature of Saiva Kashmir around the turn of the millennium,
a literature to which similar practices, albeit more sophisticated, are not
unknown. More specifically I shall turn to the exegetical activity focused on
Tantric Saiva scriptures from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries CE. The
reason for this choice is the intensely active exegesis the scriptural revelations
known as Tantras were subject to during this most articulate and formative
period of Tantric Saivism. Moreover, these Kashmirian systems of ritual and
exegesis of ritual became the backbone of Tantric orthodoxy in southern India
from the eleventh century onwards; from there they spread throughout India.
In a narrow sense, the term tantra is used with reference to a set of rituals
or basic instructions and to the texts which teach them. Those who act in
accordance with these practices and the scriptures related to them are known
as Tantric (tdntrika) as opposed to those who hold as authoritative Vedic scrip-
tures (vaidika). For a general introduction to Saivism and the Tantric traditions,
I refer to Alexis Sanderson (1988/90).3
The Saivas were not the only Tantrics, and certainly not the only ones to
make use of nirvacana analysis in their exegesis. One could instead have
turned to the Vaisnava Tantric tradition of the Pancaratra, in particular to the
Ahirbudhnyasamhitd of the Pancardtrdgama, a text composed in south India
in the eleventh century.4 The great prestige of the non-dualism propagated by
the Kashmirian Saivism is evident from the fact that it was incorporated into
the framework of this text, but the reason it makes a special case for nirvacana
analysis is because the Pancaratra tradition felt a need to put on a Vedic image
when it moved south. At first it incorporated Taittirlya material in their ritual,
then it went further in colonising pan-Brahmanical material. The relevant sec-
tions of the Ahirbudhnyasamhitd put nirvacana analysis to use in careful
analysis of Vedic mantras; an absolutely universal mantra such as the Gayatrl
is, for example, forced into a strictly Vaisnava meaning.5
The case of Bhairava: preliminaries

As my prime focus of study I have chosen the name of the Tantric deity
Bhairava. The names of Tantric deities are extremely important since the ritual
3
I shall use the term Tantric in a general way to cover both Tantric and Kaula forms of ritual;
5
see A. Sanderson 1990, note 1. 4 See Sanderson 1990:34, note 16 for this dating.
ABS, adhyaya 57 ff., the pahcahotrmantra (58), the purusasukta (59); other examples are the
visnumantras in adhyaya 52 and the jitantastotras in adhyaya 53 (where each word is analyse
metaphysically), or adhyaya 54 dealing with the cult of the sudarsanacakra, an aspect of
Narasimha.
of these Tantric cults is mainly concerned with their evocation by means of

mantras, sequences of power-laden syllables. These mantras too are therefore
at the core of religious practice. There is one more reason for introducing a
proper name as an example: utterances containing proper names are dependent
upon the existence and coherence of a general practice of reference.6
In short, Bhairava is a male deity known from south Indian inscriptions
dating from around 400 CE as the object of an exclusive theistic cult.
Accordingly, his status as a major deity is established from at least that time,
but it probably dates back to a considerably earlier period. Among later evi-
dence we find that iconographic features of Bhairava are mentioned in a
Tevdram hymn, the most famous portion of the Tirumurai, a collection of
Tamil Saiva hymns composed from the sixth century onwards. The Saiva
Kailasanatha temple at Ellora (founded c. 775) contains a Bhairava shrine.
Bhairava is clearly associated with Rudra, and is seen to hold a strong position
among the Kapalika (from kapdla 'skull') cult of power through impurity asso-
ciated with the Saiva culture of the cremation grounds.7 This non-dualistic
Kapalika Saivism was based scripturally in the Bhairavatantras,8 texts which
have the form of Bhairava's teachings to the Goddess BhairavT (Devi), but
embraced also the Bhutatantras, concerned with control of various powers
through the worship of Bhairava, and texts concerned with the worship of Kali,
the cult of whom was later to be considered the highest form of Saivism with
the incorporation of the goddess-worship adapted from the system known as
the Krama. The term Krama refers to a number of esoteric cults of intense Kali
worship in a sequence {krama) of sets of divine Powers; the Krama conceives
of ritual as a means of liberating insight, and the sequences consist in the
worship of goddesses which represent the cycle of cognition frotti initial to
final voidness.9
In Kashmir towards the end of the first millennium a particular Bhairava
cult had become what seems to have been the norm. But the deity of this cult,
called Svacchandabhairava 'Autonomous Bhairava', was no longer the blood-
thirsty deity of the cremation grounds. We find him here as a slightly domes-
ticated and modified version of the wilder Bhairava, and worshipped together
with his female consort Aghoresvarl.
At the time of Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE)10 this cult of
Svacchandabhairava with his female consort was, as it has remained, the basic
Saivism in Kashmir. To the one side of this cult was the du&listic Saiva
Siddhanta, originally an exoteric system of Saiva temple worship based on a
well defined corpus of texts.11 Here Siva is worshipped as Sadasiva,12 and
6
See G Evans 1982 373 7
ff for a discussion of this and of proper names and problems of refer-
8
ence in general. See Sanderson 1985 200 ff with note 106, 1988/90 136-48
9
See Sanderson 1988/90 for an account of the divisions of the Saiva Tantras.
10
For an outline of the Krama, see Sanderson 1988/90 151-2, 164-7
11
For the date of Abhinavagupta and other Saiva authors I rely on Sanderson, e.g. 1988/90
12
For a brief outline of the Saiva Siddhanta, see Sanderson 1988/90.136, 159-60
In the early Kashminan Siddhanta, Sadasiva is worshipped without a consort. Then
ManonmanI appears as his consort on some occasions but not as part of the regular (nitya)
Saiva Siddhanta ritual is in general more congruent with the Vedic world. To
the Vedic world itself, from the point of view of the extreme Vedic ritualist, the
Mimamsaka, Bhairava was simply the recipient (sarnpraddna) of a certain set
of dubious rituals.
To the other side of the Saiva middle ground, however, we meet with a cluster
of charismatic cults based on the unorthodox Bhairavatantras. Here we find the
gnostic non-dualism known as the Trika which Abhinavagupta and his follow-
ers tried to expound. Trika Saivism is briefly described as a system of ritual striv-
ing to assimilate the power of a triad (trika) of three goddesses: Para, Parapara,
and Apara, the first mild and benevolent, the other two raging and terrifying. At
the outset the Trika propagated the cult of these three goddesses alone, but this
is not the only triad encompassed by the name. Indeed, it is the wide distribution
of this model of triadic power which facilitates the ambition of Abhinavagupta's
Trika to attain the state of a universal Saiva exegesis by the process of assimi-
lating the older triads to the metaphysical conceptions which it gives to its own.13
This esoteric fringe set itself up as a separate division, offering what it consid-
ered a better way to salvation. It sought to incorporate the doctrines of the wilder
Kaula14 and Krama practices, concerned in ritual with impurity, sex, and death,
and centred around the goddess Kali and her emanations.
At the turn of the millennium, then, Trika Saivism found itself competing
with the dualistic and more conservative Saiva Siddhanta. Hence it tried to res-
urrect the wilder Bhairava within the cult of Svacchandabhairava, and to read
a gnostic non-dualism into a basically dualistic corpus of texts. In other words,
Abhinavagupta's task was to displace the dualistic exegesis of the Saiva
Siddhanta, as well as to incorporate the more heterodox elements of the teach-
ing he sought to propagate, while at the same time offering an exegesis that
was acceptable within a general system of shared beliefs.
Primarily Abhinavagupta's exegesis is a rather narrow exegesis of the
MdlinTvijayottaratantra15 which he takes to be the fundamental scriptural
authority of the Trika. He regards this as the summit and summation of all Saiva
traditions, and develops a theory which accommodates the rest of Saivism
within his own metaphysical system. Through his exegesis of the Mdlinivijay-
ottara Abhinavagupta tries to cover a wide range of Saiva scripture and to estab-
pnvate ritual, normally only in the context of establishing external idols where the Sakti is the
throne. ManonmanI is the highest of the nine Saktis that form his cosmic throne, and is placed
m the centre (see H Brunner-Lachaux 1967 167-75, 1977 590 and note 42) In the later
13
Siddhanta she appears as Sadasiva's regular consort
Sanderson (e g 1988/90 164) suggests that we may speak of at least three major phases m the
evolution of the Trika The second phase sees the triad of the three goddesses subsumed within
the goddess Kali The third phase Sanderson (ibid) describes as follows. 'Finally we have the
Pratyabhyna-based Trika of Abhinavagupta with its two aspects, the first being the Kali-based
cult of the Tantrdloka, and the second the condensed cult of Para as Solitary Heroine'
(ekavird) See Sanderson 1988/90 for a detailed exposition
14
Developing from withm the Yogml cults, the erotico-mystical Kaula Saivism (Jcula, lit
'family; lineage' but later interpreted to mean 'body, totality') carried the Kapahka cult of
power through impurity into the Krama and from there got incorporated into the Trika See
Sanderson 1988/90 147-58 for an exposition of Kaula Saivism.
15
See, e.g , TA 117-18, and Sanderson 1992 292.
lish a basis of hermeneutics. His task in exegesis was first and foremost to incor-
porate into the non-dualist Trika the cult of the goddess Kali or KalasamkarsinI,
Kali as the destroyer of time.
The ritual and metaphysics of the MdlinTvijayottara, however, lack the
Goddess as well as the idea that the universe is a projection in and of
consciousness. Indeed, as A. Sanderson (1992) has pointed out, it also lacks
the doctrine of non-dualism so fundamental to the Trika. Still, it is on this basis
that Abhinavagupta seeks to establish that the various branches of Saiva liter-
ature embody modes of consciousness which collectively form a structure that
perfectly reflects and therefore is the expression of the core of female powers
which is inherent in Siva/Bhairava and therefore constitutes the essence of all
phenomena. It is, however, important to remember that Abhinavagupta wrote
against a ritual background. The Trika Saivism he propagates sought to direct
its sect-defining ritual inwards in such a way that it could be abandoned alto-
gether once the gnostic insight was no longer in need of ritual support. Indeed,
this Saivism is ritual, and in its philosophical form ritual internalised. In its
interiorisation it is thus strikingly similar to the way in which sacrifice was
interiorised in late Vedic times.16
So, when Abhinavagupta's pupil Rajanaka Ksemaraja (fl.c. 1000-1050 CE)
wrote his commentary on the Svacchandatantra Tantra of the Autonomous',
he wrote it to defeat the prevalent adherence to the dualistic Saiva Siddhanta.
The voluminous Svacchandatantra is in form a dialogue between Siva as
Svacchandabhairava 'Autonomous Bhairava' and his Sakti Tower' as
Bhairavl, and is mainly concerned with rituals of initiation and the desiderative
practices of the Sadhaka. It is accordingly not particularly concerned with
metaphysics, and no more non-dualistic than the MdlinTvijaya}1 In order to
displace the dualistic exegesis of the text, however, Ksemaraja enters straight
into its very name Svacchandatantra to demonstrate that its doctrine is non-
dualistic. At the end of his subsequently authoritative commentary, the
Svacchandatantroddyota 'Illumination of the Tantra of the Autonomous',
Ksemaraja writes (SvTU 6[15]: 146,11-16):
ndmnaiva bhedadrstir vidhutd yendsvatantratdtattvd I
srimatsvatantratantram bhedavydkhydm na tat sahate II
bhedadarsanasamskdratantusantatam dditah I
svacchasvacchandacitsvdtmasatattvam neksate janah II
gatdnugatikaproktabhedavydkhydtamo 'panut I
tenddvaitdmrtasphitah svacchandoddyota umbhitah II
This illustrious Tantra of the Autonomous (Svatantratantra = Svacchandatantra)
cannot tolerate dualistic exegesis since dualism, the nature of which is lack of auton-
omy (asvatantratd), is eliminated by its very name. People do not seeihat their iden-
tity is pure, autonomous consciousness, since it is enmeshed from the beginning by
the threads of their deep conviction of the truth of dualism. Therefore this
Svacchandoddyota (Illumination of the [Tantra of the] Autonomous) has been com-
16
A thorough analysis of meaning m Tantric ritual is provided by Sanderson 1995
17
See Sanderson 1986 208 and 1992.306
posed, rich with the nectar of non-dualism, m order to dispel the darkness of the
duahstic exegesis propagated by the blind followers of tradition.
Ksemaraja thus leaves us in no doubt as to why he wrote his commentary
on the Svacchandatantra. It is significant that according to him the very name
of the text eliminates heteronomy, and so it cannot be subject to a dualistic
interpretation. Ksemaraja makes a similar statement towards the end of his
commentary on the Netratantra (NeTU 2[22]:343,21-2)18 on which too he
imposed his non-dualistic exegesis.
Enmeshed by the threads created by his dualist view, the Saiva Siddhantin
is unable to see his true identity, to see the infinite autonomy of his own self,
which ultimately is Bhairava, as revealed by Ksemaraja's non-dualist, idealist
interpretation.
With this background we shall see how these non-dualists were able to
reveal the true nature of Bhairava by means of his name alone, so that the cult
of an envigorated Bhairava could arise from its existence on the obscure
boundaries of the Vedic world to its position within the high Brahmanical
culture of Saiva Kashmir.
A mangalasloka by Ksemaraja
Ksemaraja, in the first mangalasloka - auspicious introductory verse - of his
commentary on the Vijndnabhairavatantra,19 encapsulates the nature of
Bhairava by referring in a highly condensed fashion to certain features of the
deity's excellence. These features, as will be seen later, are not picked out at
random, but rest on established explanations of Bhairava's name, explanations
arrived at through the device of nirvacana analysis. It is impossible to appre-
ciate the power of this verse as a statement in religious discourse, indeed to
make sense of the verse at all, unless we are able to place it within its proper
exegetical context. In order to amplify this, I shall first of all present and trans-
late Ksemaraja's verse (VBhU 1,2-5):
hhirundm abhayaprado bhavabhaydkrandasya hetus tato
hrddhdmni prathitas ca bhiravarucdm Tso 'ntakasydntakah I
bheram20 vdyati yah suyoginivahas21 tasya prabhur bhairavo
visvasmin bharanddikrd vijayate vijhdnarupah parah221I
18
19
For the reading utthitah here, read umbhitah as m the SvTU passage above.
20
Ksemaraja's commentary, the Vijndnabhairavoddyota, covers as we have it VBh 1-23.
So read for bhiram The emendation is supported by the reading of the MahdrthamanjarTpari-
mala which quotes Ksemaraja's verse (MMP 180,1-4), further by the nirvacana given at TA
1.98 and TAV 1(1)141,15, as well as by Sivopadhyaya at VBh 130 (KSTS 8:116,4). Last but not
least it is supported by Ksemaraja's own commentary on the Svacchandatantra (SvTU
1[1]3,12 ff) The confusion of e and F is common among Kashmiri-speakers, see G.A
21
Gnerson 1932 41,44-67 * Most Kashmiris seem to be unable to distinguish the two sounds'
So read for svayogf, cf MMP loc cit. The reading of sva° for su° is most certainly caused by
22
the similarity in the Sarada script of -va and -u
MMP (loc cit) reads sivah for parah The two emendations suggested above, but not the present
reading, are supported by an otherwise very corrupt transcription of this verse inserted after
Bestowing absence of fear for those who are terrified, he is the cause of the crying
out from fear of transmigratory existence, and from that [cry] he becomes manifest
in the domain of the heart; he is the Lord of those who delight in their terrifying
roaring, the death of death. Being the Master of that flock of excellent Yogins who
blow on time, he is Bhairava; as the author of sustaining etc., he extends his Power
throughout the universe, the Supreme whose form is consciousness.
What may at first sight emerge as a patchwork of incompatible elements
makes perfect sense when viewed against the background of various nirvac-
anas current among the non-dualist Saivas of Kashmir. Indeed, the verse is a
striking example of how the method of nirvacana analysis developed into an
ingenious device in cultural discourse. All of the nirvacanas embedded in the
verse are contained in Abhinavagupta's discussion at Tantrdloka 1.95-100.
Some of them are even met with in the Vijndnabhairavatantra itself, or at least
grounded on statements met with in that text. What the various nirvacanas
have in common is that they all serve as valid introductions to the name
'Bhairava', thus bringing forth the very nature of the deity. This situation may
serve to remind us that meaning is generated in the same way that language is
generated, and thus subject to change and interpretation, that meaning, in fact,
is created by people interpreting.
This raises the following questions. What are the criteria for considering
something an adequate introduction to a name? How do the explanatory
expressions, whose semantic properties are a function of social practice, act in
the minds of the individuals who use them? I have already argued that no belief
can exist without being surrounded by a whole galaxy of beliefs, and that these
beliefs fit together according to the rules of a certain logic in as much as people
try to get as consistent a picture of the world as possible. The inner dependency
of what words mean and how the world is ordered implies that changes in one
may entail changes in the other. Now, it will be illustrated beyond doubt by the
Tantrdloka passage dealing with the term 'Bhairava' that the nirvacana device
enables those who mastered it to enforce or modify beliefs by encoding
meaning into already existing terms. As pointed out earlier, meanings and
beliefs are two sides of the same coin. There has to be a certain overlap in
beliefs for people to talk about the same things, although these beliefs do not
have to be identical. Still, would any nirvacana make an adequate introduction
to a name simply by fact of its depending on some current belief? In simple
Footnote 22 (cont)
the final colophon of a Malayalam MS of the Isvarapratyabhijndkdrikdvrtti of Utpaladeva
(Umv MSS Library, Tnvandrum, Ser. No 2317, Ace No. 8900 A (See Alphabetical Index of
the Skt. MSS in the Univ. MSS Library, Tnvandrum, Vol 1 (A to NA), p 91))
sitikantham abhayaprado bhavadaydkandasya hetus tato
bhutvdtiprathitas tadiya vacasdm Tso ntakasydntakah I
bheram vdyati yah suyogmivahas tasya prabhur bhairavo
visvasthidabharanddikrd vijayate vijhdnarupah parah//
On this evidence I have retained the reading parah I owe this reference to Alexis Sanderson
words: could a nirvacana be suggested if it were not resting on beliefs already

common, and, conversely, if a nirvacana does rest on current ideas or beliefs,
are there no limits to the applicability of such a device? These questions could
be multiplied, but those posed already seem sufficient to demonstrate the
necessity of investigating in detail the indigenous cultural underpinnings of the
relation which holds between a given term and its corresponding explanatory
expression.
The Tantrdloka and Tantrdlokaviveka: anvartha revisited

As a starting point I shall examine in detail the Tanlrdloka section dealing with
the term 'Bhairava', together with its commentary Tantrdlokaviveka by
Jayaratha,23 and then some passages of other texts of the Sanskrit Saiva litera-
ture which pertain to the analysis of 'Bhairava' as well as to the notion of nir-
vacana in general, passages which will be seen to shed some light on several
of the questions involved.
Jayaratha introduces the first verse of the Tantrdloka section in the follow-
ing way (TAV 1[1] 139,7-8):
bahusaktitvam eva ca etad abhidhdyakdndm pravrttinimittam ity aha . . .
And it is this very possession of many Powers that is the ground for the use of the
various [terms] which denote [Siva].24 Therefore he [= Abhmavagupta] states [in the
next verse]: . . .
Here Jayaratha tells us quite clearly that he considers the usage of terms
which in their particular significations denote the deity to be grounded on the
fact that He 24 possesses many Powers. In the preceding passage (TA 1.60c-94)
Abhinavagupta has argued that Siva/Bhairava being absolutely autonomous is
the sum and ground of all Powers, these, even in their most particularised form
as individual phenomena or events in consciousness being no more than his
single and essential power, his Power as Autonomous Agent (svdtantryasakti).
That is to say, the various aspects which constitute his nature provide the
grounds for using his various names. This implies, first of all, that what some-
thing means depends on what someone believes.
A no less fundamental point is made by Abhinavagupta himself in his
opening verse which reveals certain basic considerations completely on a par
with the tradition of the Nirukta and nirvacanasdstra (TA 1.95):
23
Jayaratha (fl c. 1225-75 AD) was a representative of the Tnka-based Kaula cult of the goddess
TnpurasundarT, or Srlvidya So was the much later Sivopadhyaya (fl c 1725-75) whose com-
ments I shall examine below. For an outline of the cult of Tnpurasundarl, see Sanderson
24
1988/90 156-7
Alternatively, one could take etadabhidhayakanam to be a compound and translate 'and it is
the very possession of many Powers that is the ground for the use of the various [terms] which
denote Him' In this context etat 'this' would mean 'this [absolute]' which equals Paramasiva
'Supreme Siva'.
devo hy anvarthasastroktaih sabdaih samupadisyate I

mahdbhairavadevo 'yarn patir yah paramah sivah II
This is a statement of considerable importance. However, difficulties of
interpretation to a certain extent vitiate a clear translation of the verse. As I
read it devah in the first part is neutral or general ('the Deity'). The first half
could thus tentatively be translated:
Indeed [this nature of] the Deity is fully revealed {samupadisyate) through [the use
of] terms which are inherently significant (anvartha) and traditional (sdstrokta)...
I shall return to details concerning the translation of some of these words.
The real difficulty is the interpretation of the word sabdaih which I have so
far translated fairly neutrally 'through terms'. If this word is interpreted in the
light of Jayaratha's abhidhdyakdndm, then the abhidhdyakdh sahddh 'the
various terms which denote [Him]' are: (1) 'Bhairava', (2) 'Deva', (3) 'Pati',
and (4) 'Siva'. This interpretation is supported by the fact that these are the
terms contained in the latter half of Tantrdloka 1.95 as well as the fact that
they are dealt with in the sections of the Tantrdloka immediately following the
present verse. The anvarthasdstroktdh sabddh 'descriptive terms of the tradi-
tion' are thus [Maha-] Bhairava (TA 1.96-100), Deva (101-4b), p a t i (KHc-e 1
[up to tena patih]) and Siva (104e^ [sreyomaya eva sivo ndsivam kim api
tatra]). The word sabdaih could, however, be taken to include .even the
explanatory expressions, the nirvacanas, which are also descriptive and
taught in sdstra. If we forget about the last mentioned difficulty for a moment
and consider the verse as a syntactically coherent unit we may translate it in
the following manner:
Indeed [this nature of] the deity is fully exhibited/taught (samupadisyate) through
[the use of] terms/names which are inherently significant (anvartha) and tradi-
tional (sdstrokta): this great 'Bhairava'-'Deva', who is the 'Pati', the Supreme
'Siva'.
Although one may entertain a number of reservations about points of detail,
the verse does in any case reveal highly interesting information. A clear inter-
pretation depends, however, not only on the solution of the difficulties already
mentioned, but also on the exact meaning of some of the words used, in the
first place on the exact meaning of the verbal from samupadisyate. Turning to
the major Sanskrit lexica, including the Vdcaspatyam, one finds that the verbal
base sam-upaAdis is surprisingly rare. In fact, it is listed only in the diction-
ary of Monier-Williams (MW): 'P. -disati, to point out or indicate fully, show
MBh.; to assign (with ace. of person and of thing), R.', the very few references
being limited to the epics, and the meanings assigned not being particularly
exact. Jayaratha does not remark on the word at all. To get closer to the meaning
of sam-upaAdis it may thus be justified to start from the common upaAdis,
with the assumption that the preverb sam carries the sense of samyak 'fully;
thoroughly; rightly' or at least in some way the sense of reinforcement. Now,
upa^dis moves semantically within the range of such meanings as 'point out;
indicate; exhibit; teach; instruct'.25
Whatever type of terms or expressions the word sabdaih refers to, these are
clearly said to be anvarthasdstrokta, which I take to be a dvandva. But of what
kind is the relation sustained between the two words anvartha and sdstrokta]
Is there intended to be an opposition here, so that the expressions referred to
are either anvartha or sdstroktal The commentary of Jayaratha does not offer
any clear answer to this at all, although his gloss is of considerable interest. His
remarks on the entire verse run as follows (TAV 1[1] 139,13-14):
anvarthaih vyutpannaih niruktaih sdstroktaih sdmayikaih II
This agrees well with the interpretation as a dvandva compound.
Abhinavagupta states that the deity is fully taught or referred to or fully exhib-
ited by linguistic expressions that are anvartha, in accordance with that which
they signify.
Jayaratha, who glosses anvarthaih by vyutpannaih niruktaih, does not seem
to distinguish sharply between the terms vyutpanna and nirukta. Strictly speak-
ing, a vyutpatti is an analysis in accordance with that process of grammar by
which a form is derived from radical elements by the addition of suffixes etc.,
while a nirvacana or nirukti goes into the tattva of the referent, the 'that-ness'
or unchangeable essence of something by means of which it can be recognised,
and so tells us why something is called what it is called. Words which are
nirukta are thus capable of semantic analysis. A vyutpatti, on the other hand,
does not necessarily help us to the real nature of that which is denoted by a word,
it is just capable of producing the word in grammar with a basic semantic range
thus provided. Accordingly, to say that a word is vyutpanna means that the word
is capable of grammatical derivation. It may be that Jayaratha understands the
term anvartha to include both vyutpanna and nirukta, because a regularly
formed word like pdcaka 'a cook' is certainly anvartha and at the same time
vyutpanna, analysable on a formal level. Not all terms that are nirukta are
however vyutpanna. From the terminology of the present context, it seems thus
reasonable to understand vyutpatti as the narrow term and nirvacana as the
larger one. I consider, then, the terms vyutpannaih and niruktaih in Jayaratha's
commentary to be related by a missing ca 'and' or vd samuccaye, '"or" in the
conjunctive sense'. Otherwise one would have to understand niruktaih as a
further gloss of vyutpannaih, a possibility one should certainly not rule out.
Jayaratha's commentary continues: sdstroktaih sdmayikaih. This brings us
back to the trickier bit of interpretation, namely the relation between the two
* members of the compound anvarthasdstroktaih, that is, between anvartha and
sdstrokta. Jayaratha seems to gloss sdstrokta 'taught in sdstra" by sdmayika
which could be translated 'established by convention'. Now, is he contrasting
25
According to Panmlyas, the root ^dis with the preverb upa denotes the act of uttering, e g
upadista 'uttered'; see Cardona 1988 640
sdstrokta with anvartha or is he not? I am inclined to think that he means to say

that the terms in question are both anvartha and sdstrokta, in which case this is
not a dvandva but a karmadhdraya.26 This seems to be right since these terms do
not only happen to reflect the nature of that which they signify, so that 'Bhairava',
as will be seen, actually tells us something about the nature of the deity. The fact
that we use the term 'Bhairava' is not purely an arbitrary description, but it is
something that is established by the' conventions of the sdstra - the verbal codi-
fication of the teaching in the tradition. On this basis anvarthaih and sdstroktaih
ought to go together, and that is why we have no particles introduced here.
Taking into consideration, then, that a nirvacana in grammatical literature
is said to be anvartha, it is not unlikely that the statement sabdaih samupa-
disyate, 'is taught/fully exhibited through names/expressions/linguistic items',
actually includes the various explanations of a term such as 'Bhairava', that is,
the formulations of the nirvacanas themselves or the underlying elements
which constitute the basis for these explanations, and that these terms too are
sdstrokta in as much as they are both in accordance with the meaning and
nature of that which they uniquely describe and are established through the
verbal codification of the teaching in the tradition.
But this creates an additional problem which begs for a solution. If it is the
case that the form sabdaih refers to linguistic items in such a way that these
include the explanatory nirvacana expressions, and that these are also to be
sdstrokta, taught in sdstra, then the possibility for making up any new nirvac-
ana of a term would seemingly be severely reduced. This would go against the
very idea of nirvacana analysis. So it may be that what is referred to by the
word sdstrokta is not only the strict formulation of a nirvacana in itself but also
those ideas or predicates which are associated with a term in the tradition and
more or less loosely hinted at by linguistic elements in scripture, those ele-
ments which constitute the basis for the full formal statement ofâ nirvacana.
Thus, while the representational properties of the term JBhairava' can be
explained exclusively on the basis' of the term itself, this cannot happen inde-
pendently of the ideas and purposes current among those who use the term.
These ideas are sanctioned by the authorities of the tradition as is clear for
example from Abhinavagupta's own statements27 that through nirvacanas a
term is known by the teachers, that is to say, according to Jayaratha, by those
who are responsible for the codification of various doctrines in the tradition.
But these ideas may be challenged by changes in doctrine, so how?strong is this
reliance on the authority of the tradition?
Abhinavagupta on nirvacana analysis and reliance on tradition

At Tantrdloka 6.30-3 Abhinavagupta makes it absolutely clear tKat he consid-
ers any term met with in scripture to be susceptible of nirvacana or nirukti
26
Cf the opemngwords
27
of Yaska's Nirukta: samamnayah samamndtah, see p. 29, note 42,
above. TA 1.100 and 102; see below.
analysis. At Tantrdloka 6.30 he offers two interpretations, dualist and non-

dualist respectively, of the term adhvan, literally 'route; way; channel'.28 The
passage, together with Jayaratha's commentary on it, is worth discussing in full
(TA 6.30/TAV 4[6]30,ll-31,8):
nanv atrddhvasabdasya pravrttau kim nimittam ity dsankydha
adhvd kramena ydtavye pade samprdptikdranam I
dvaitindm bhogyabhdvdt tu prabuddhdndm yato 'dyatell 30//
'ydtavyepade' in sivatattvdtmani I bhedadasdydm hi tattattattvollanghanakramena
sattnmsam sivatattvam prdpyatvenoktaml bhogyabhdvad ity adamyatvdt; adhi-
gatasamvittattvd hi sarvam svdtmasdt kurvantiti bhdvahl tenddhvaivddhvd, adyata
ity adhvd ceti II 30//
What motivates the use of the word adhvanl To answer this he (= Abhinavagupta)
says:
The word adhvan denotes for the dualists the means of reaching a goal by stages
But for the enlightened [i.e., the nonduahsts (prabuddhdndm)] an adhvan is so
called because being the object of experience {bhogyabhdvdt) it is devoured
(adyate).
ydtavye pade 'the goal to be reached' means siva-tattva (Siva-Reality).29 Because
m the duahstic system,30 the thirty-sixth [tattva], namely siva-tattva, is defined as
that which is to be reached by means of an ascent through tattva after tattva.
Because it is bhogya, that is, because it is to be devoured.31 The point is that those
who have realised the reality of consciousness, turn everything into themselves
(svdtmasdt kurvanti)?1 [So there are two nirvacanas:] adhvaiva adhvd, 'adhvan is
just a path', and adyata ity adhvd, 'adhvan is so called because it is devoured'.
So these are the two interpretations of adhvan: according to the first
(dualist) adhvan simply occurs in its common sense of 'a path', according to
the second (non-dualist) adhvan is interpreted by means of nirvacana analysis
to mean that which is devoured, internalised. This context prompts
Abhinavagupta to remark that one must always presuppose that scriptural
terms are anvartha. The text continues (TA 6.31ab/TAV 4[6]31,9-32,2):
nanu sarvasabddndm samayamdtrdd evdrthapratipddanam siddhyet, - iti kim
atrdnu\nvartha]smaranena na hi sarvatraivaitat sambhaveft ity dsankydha
iha sarvatra sabdondm anvartham carcayed yatah I
yady apy arthdbhidhdne sabddndm trayi gatir yaugiki rudhd yogarudhd cal tatrdpi
yaugikyd eva prddhdnyam sanimittam tatra tasydh pravrtteh, ata evdnyad dvayam
28
In brief, the term denotes certain evolutionary units m the structure of Saivite cosmology On
29
the concept of adhvan, see A Padoux 1963 261 ff, 1990 330 ff
This form of Saivism operates with levels of reality (tattvas) where Siva is ultimately a reflec-
30
tion in and of a single, unified consciousness
The reading °dasaydm of bhedadasdydm is rather odd here One wonders whether it is not a
31
corruption for darsane Either way the expression has to be taken as meaning 'dualism'
32
That is, because it is such that it cannot be internalised.
That is, they present to themselves everything, subjectify everything, internalise everything
atraiva yathd katham cid antarbhdvaniyam yena sarvatraivdnvarthacdrcd pdram

ydydtll
Surely, the capacity of any word to convey its meaning may be established by mere
convention. So what is the point of reminding us here that [a term] accords with that
which it signifies, for this can certainly not be applicable in all cases? He
(= Abhinavagupta) answers the objection by saying:
Because in this system one must always analyse words in accordance with that
which they signify.
Although there are three ways in which words may denote their object, namely
etymologically, by convention, and by combination of the two,33 nonetheless the
etymological (yaugiki) is the predominant among them, because that one is
caused.34 So it is that the other two (rudhd and yogarudhd) should be included
within this, as far as it is possible by whatever means are available so that an analy-
sis in accordance with [that which the term] signifies may be accomplished in all
cases.
Abhinavagupta goes on to elaborate on this. He quotes the Trika scripture
Nisdtanatantra35 on the three categories of words, and asserts that even though
this particular nirvacana of the term adhvan does not occur in scripture, it is
to be understood whenever the word is used, for, he argues, how much can be
contained in any single book? The text runs as follows (TA 6.31cd-33/TAV
4[6]32,3-33,8):
tad aha
uktam snmannisdcdre samjndtra trividhd matdll 3111 j
naimittikiprasiddhd ca tathdnyd pdribhdsikil '
purvatve vd pradhdnam sydt tatrdntarbhdvayet tatah II32 //
ato 'dhvasabdasyokteyam niruktir noditdpi cetl
kva cit svabuddhyd sdpy Whya kiyal lekhyam hi pustake II 3311
l<
prasiddheti, sanimittatve 'pi kva cid eva rudhehlyad uktam tatra
'samjnd hi trividhd jheyd sivasastresu sarvadal
pdribhdsikanaimittT siddhd cdsau prasiddhibhdk 11
iha naimittiki samjhd nimittdt tu samdgatdT
33
As in pankaja 'lotus' - it 34is derived frompanka 'mud' andya '-born' but has a meaning estab-
35
lished by convention. That is to say, its derivation is transparent.
The text is known only from citations. Alexis Sanderson informs me that there is a surviving
MS from the eleventh century in Nepal (NAK 1.1606) which has the title Nisisamcdra in the
colophon. This is one of the names under which this text is cited (Nisdtaha, Nisdcdra,
Naisamcdra, Nisisamcdra), but the work is not identical with the text as known from citations.
The MS has similar subject matter to the Nisdtana {Naisamcdra) passages cited at TA
15.83c-97b for a particular view of the internal correspondence of external sites of worship,
but the similar passage of the surviving MS disagrees with it in a number of important par-
ticulars in the list of sites and their internal location. In other words, the MS is obviously
another redaction of the same sort of material. The text is probably to be classified as one of
the Trika sources, and almost certainly a late Trika source in that it seems already to be intro-
ducing non-dualism.
itil evam iha sarvasamjndndm nimittatdpy avasyam vdcyety atraivam uktam ity aha
'aid1 itil nanu yady evam tat sarvatraiva kasmdd evam noktam ity dsahkydha
noditetyddil kiyad iti, na hy atra sabdavyutpddanam prastutam iti bhdvahll 33 //
Therefore he (= Abhinavagupta) says:
It has been stated in the Nisdcdra that for us a term is threefold: [it can be] occa-
sioned36 (naimittiki), established [by convention] (prasiddhd), or technical
(pdribhdsiki). 31
Furthermore,37 this is in descending order of importance.38 Therefore one
should subsume under this [also the other two].39 32
So it is that I have stated this nirukti of the word adhvan. But even if I had not
stated it, it might well have been inferred through your intelligence. For how
much detail can one put into a book? 33
'Established', that is, by convention, in a particular, restricted sense, even though
[the term is] occasioned.40 As has been said in that text, [i.e. in the Nisdtana]:
For in the Saiva Tantras a term should always be understood as of three kinds: it
is established as being respectively technical {pdribhdsiki), occasional (naimit-
tiki) and conventional (prasiddhibhdk). Of these three an occasional term is one
that arises from an occasion.
So it has been said in this very text that all terms must thus necessarily be shown to
be occasions41 [for their objects], so he says 'therefore'. If so, then how come he has
not done this in the case of every word? To answer this objection he has the passage
beginning 'if it were not given' (noditd). [On] 'how much' (kiyad iti) [etc.]: for here
[in this work] it is not a treatise on language that has been undertaken, that is the
point.
This is a very important statement, reminding one of the characteristic way
of arguing on the basis of what may have been contained in lost or inaccess-
ible parts of the Veda.42 It was thus assumed in the tradition that the know-
ledge of humans is imperfect and subject to constant improvement. In the
present context it would be dangerous from the exegete's point of view to
36
Or 'intentional', although 'occasioned' is really the strict sense. There is something in the
occasion which occasions the word; there is something in an adhvan which causes the name,
whereas there is nothing in John that causes the name 'John'. In this way causality enters the
37
picture as well.
I am not quite happy about the vd because it does not fit in its proper sense of indicating an
alternative. It could simply be that it is there to show connection with the preceding, that is to
38
say that it be taken samuccaye, in the sense of 'and; moreover; furthermore'.
Lit.: 'in being former there is predominance' or 'to be earlier in this list is to be more impor-
tant'; we really want here prddhdnyam 'predominance', so one has to take pradhdnam here in
39
the sense of bhdva: in other words, purvatve pradhdnatvam.
That is, one should subsume under naimittikT as much as possible, one should try to include
40
the other two, reduce the other two to this one.
As mpanka-ja 'lotus', lit. 'mud-born', derived from panka and ja thus still being sanimitta,
41
having an occasion for its use in language, but also conventional.
It is tempting to emend nimittatd to sanimittatd since it is not the word which is a nimitta but
42
its object.
Cf. Taittiriyabrdhmana 3.10.11.4: anantd vai veddh, 'infinite indeed are the Vedas'.
reverse this order of naimittikT, prasiddhd, and pdribhdsiki and say that the
pdribhdsiki is the most important, because then you are closing the text to
further analysis.
The present passage thus provides us with Abhinavagupta's clear answers
to some of the questions posed earlier. Of particular interest is his statement
that one must always presuppose that scriptural terms are anvartha and thus,
by implication, that any scriptural term is susceptible of nirvacana analysis. It
is also evident from what Abhinavagupta says, that such analysis must not nec-
essarily rest on scriptural evidence.
It is at the same time obvious that Abhinavagupta does lean on the author-
ity of the tradition when he can. Quite often he quotes or refers to earlier
authors when presenting nirvacanas of various terms. The following example
may serve to illustrate this. Immediately after his lengthy exposition of the
name 'Bhairava', he goes on to analyse the word deva 'deity' (TA1.101-4).
In this respect he relies first of all on various meanings of Vdiv met with in
the Paninlya dhdtupdtha (Dhp 4.1): divu knddvijigisdvyavahdradyutistuti-
modamadasvapnakdntigatisu. The nirvacanas he gives do not correspond to
every one of these senses. They do, however, correspond exactly to the senses
ascribed to Vd/v by Abhinavagupta himself in his Pardtrimsikdvivarana (PTV
8,2): divu knddvijigTsdvyavahdradyutistutigatisu, 'the root divU occurs when
the meanings "play", "urge to conquer (transcend)", "conduct", "radiance",
"praise" or "movement" are to be denoted'. In the context this appears to be a
quotation. Whether this indicates that the meaning entry of the dhdtupdtha
employed by Abhinavagupta actually read like that, or that only these senses (
were of interest to him, is hard to tell. i
Of greater significance is the fact that the section of nirvacanas of the terml
'Deva' 43 is a paraphrase, or possibly a quotation, of Brhaspati's Sivatanusdstra.
Abhinavagupta states (TA 1.102):
iti nirvacanaih sivatanusdstre guruhhih smrto devahl '! v
Thus, through [the aforementioned] nirvacanas, [the significance of the term] deva
is recalled by the teacher44 in the Sivatanusdstra.
Jayaratha (TAV 1[1] 146,11) identifies gurubhih 'by the teacher' as brhas-
patipddaih 'by the revered Brhaspati'. This Brhaspati is the author of the
43
In the 'deciphered' form suggested by Jayaratha (TAV 1[1] 144-6) the nirvacanas of the word
'deva' are as follows* divyati [so read for devyati, cf the following] kridati (144,14). . divyati
vijigisate (145,6) divyati vyavaharati (145,9) divyati dyotate dyotayati va (145,12)
divyate stuyate (146,1) divyate jdndti prasarati ca iti vd devah (146,6). The latter nirvac
ana draws on the 'hermeneutic rule' sarve gatyarthd jhdndrthdh which says that all words
having their significance within the semantic field of 'movement' at the same time carry a
sense within the field of 'knowledge' * Thus gati 'a going' is interpreted as jhdna and
prasarana, and divyati gacchati may be rephrased as divyati jdndti prasarati ca, '[he is calle
"deva" because he] divyati, that is, understands and pervades'
44
ddare bahuvacanam
Sivatanusdstra, an early work of the Saiva Siddhanta in Kashmir. Along with

Sadyojyoti, Brhaspati is referred to by Ramakantha45 as a Siddha to be vener-
ated even by Gurus, but no manuscript has come to light in South India or
Kashmir, and his work seems to be lost. It is, however, frequently quoted by
Abhinavagupta, as in the present case where he relies on it for the analysis of
the term 'deva\
One more instance of Abhinavagupta's reliance on the tradition deserves
mention at this point. At Tantrdloka 5.135-6 he refers to the nirvacanas of
'Bhairava' met with in the Vijndnabhairavatantra 13046 by quoting the last part
of that verse (TA 5.135d-6ab):
bhairavo vydpako 'khile/l 135//
iti bhairavasabdasya samtatoccdrandc chivah I
One will become Siva by constantly contemplating in mental utterance the term
'Bhairava', understanding that it means: '... Bhairava is he who pervades the entire
universe'.
From this it is again evident that Abhinavagupta relies on the tradition and
refers to nirvacanas found in scripture. Of even greater importance, however,
is the claim here that one will become Siva by contemplating in mental utter-
ance the term 'Bhairava' and the fact that this claim of the Vijndna-
bhairavatantra is given in the context of explaining Bhairava's name. It goes
without saying, then, that the power attached to nirvacana analysis in the tradi-
tion is strong. In fact, it is exactly this reliance on the tradition whenever pos-
sible combined with the inherent capacity of nirvacana analysis to reveal the
semantic content of any term which makes this a powerful tool in the
hermeneutics of religious discourse.
Bhairava restored
So this is the basis on which Abhinavagupta puts his exegetical skills to use.
With this background it is now possible to return to the Tantrdloka section that
gives the various explanations of Bhairava's name and investigate in detail
Abhinavagupta's exegetical procedure of reducing Bhairava into a set of
Brahmanically acceptable metaphysical terms. As will become evident, the
naked term 'Bhairava' is itself the sole medium Abhinavagupta needs to estab-
lish the very nature of the deity, since the deity is fully exhibited by expres-
sions that are in accordance with its nature and codified by the teachings of the
distinct but definitely interrelated Saiva traditions of Kashmir. Metaphysics are
thus superficially not superimposed on his name, but discovered from within
the name.
45
In the second mangalasloka of his Matangaparamesvardgamavrtti (ed N R Bhatt 1977 1)
46
For further reference to this verse, cf pp 83f with notes 68-70 below
Deriving the substance of his arguments from fundamental tenets of Saiva

doctrine, Abhinavagupta demonstrates by novel interpretations that the term
'Bhairava' may have been used to refer but without a fully acknowledged and
proper understanding of the reference. Such a procedure becomes possible
when there is a certain confusion in the name-using practice, so that in the
Saiva community any statement that involves the name 'Bhairava* would be
flawed even if the conversants should happen to be in full agreement.
Abhinavagupta can take full advantage of this inherited confusion in usage. It
enables him to establish a coherent practice by making true statements about
the nature of the deity by means of its name - true because these statements
rely at the same time on the verbal codification of the teaching in the tradi-
tion. In this way meaning is inter subjectively determined. Resting satisfied
that he does not bring in anything outlandish, Abhinavagupta can even go
beyond the referential feature and identify Bhairava as the absolute deity of
Saivism in accordance with a general conception of the divine nature accept-
able to the Saiva middle ground. From the platform he has secured in this way,
he can proceed to the more heterodox elements of the teaching he seeks to
propagate, in particular the incorporation of the cult of the goddess Kali/
Kalasamkarsinl.
The first verse to tell us why the absolute deity is referred to by the term
'Bhairava', a wonderfully condensed piece of Sanskrit, begins as follows (TA
1.96):
visvam bibharti posanadhdranayogena41 tena ca bhriyatel
[He is called 'Bhairava' for the following reasons: because] he carries {bibharti) the
universe, according to [his] nourishing [it] and supporting [it]; also [because] he is
carried {bhriyate) by it.
Jayaratha comments (TAV 1 [1] 141,1-4):
bibharti - dhdrayati posayati ca svdtmabhittisamlagnatvena tadulldsandt I tena iti
visvena, bhriyate iti dhdryate posyate ca — tasya visvamayatvenaiva sarvatra
sphurandtl
'He carries', that is, he supports and nourishes [the universe], because he manifests
it as fused with the surface of appearance which is his own existence. 'He is carried',
that is, he is [also] sustained and nourished 'by that', that is, by the universe; because
he is manifest in everything in as much as it is he that is embodied as the universe.
The universe has no existence except as a reflection on the surface of
Bhairava.48 So it is he that supports the universe; so it is he that gives the uni-
47
Ktdd posana0 for purana0. The commentary has posana. This could, of course, be a secondary
gloss on purana, but the Dhdtupdtha leaves no doubt (Dhp 3.5): dubhrh dhdratiaposanyoh
Sivopadhyaya, commenting upon Vijndnabhairavatantra 130 (VBhV 115,12), also reads
48
posana0.
Cf., e g., TA 3 65 which concludes the argument that the universe is a reflection in conscious-
ness:
verse its life, nourishes it.49 But Bhairava can only be himself in as much as he
is embodied in the universe, and so the universe sustains and nourishes his
nature. To express this, Abhinavagupta draws on the well-established senses
ascribed to the verbal root Abhr in the meaning entry of the Dhdtupdtha. By
interpreting 'Bhairava' as both agent and object in relation to the activity
denoted by Îbhr, that is, as kartrsddhana as well as karmasddhana, he brings
out the essential doctrine of Trika Saivism that the absolute is both transcen-
dent and immanent.
This nirvacana is rendered complete by the continuation of the verse (TA
1.96):
savimarsatayd ravarupatas ca
Moreover, because his form is rava, the roar, by fact of his being endowed with self-
cognition.
Bhairava has awareness or ideation, vimarsa, as his dynamic essence. And
that ideation in its most subtle form is AHAM T , a self-awareness which is the
supreme mantravirya, the inner essence of mantras,50 or rava 'the roar'.
What we have here, then, is a nirvacana on the basis of two verbal activities
expressed by two verbal roots, Îbhr 'nourish; support' and Vrw 'sound'.51
Jayaratha explains this as follows in his commentary (TAV 1[1] 141,4-5):
ravarupatah iti sabdanasvdbhdvyat, tena bharandd ravandc ca bhairavah ity ayam
niruktahl
'Because his form is rava (roar)', that is, because his nature is [the activity of]
sounding. So this [term] 'Bhairava' has been semantically analysed (niruktah) on
the basis of [the activities of] supporting/nourishing and roaring.
The word sabdanam would most easily lend itself to an interpretation as
bhdvasddhana, that is, as a noun denoting the mere activity of sounding. This
would imply that Bhairava is the sounding. It is also possible to interpret
Footnote 48 (cont.)
ittham visvam idam ndthe bhairaviyacidambare I
pratibimbam alam svacche na khalv anyaprasddatah II
Thus this universe is a reflection in the perfectly transparent void of the consciousness of
Bhairava, the Lord. And it exists as a reflection without depending upon anything else.
49
Cf. BPD 4.
sa eva bhairavo devojagadbharanalaksanah/
svdtmddarse samagram hi yacchaktyd pratibimbitam II
This [controller of Power (saktimari)] is the deity Bhairava, [so called because] he is defined
by sustaining (bharana) the universe, for by his Power he has caused everything to appear
in that mirror which is his own identity.
50
51
On the concept of the mantravirya, see A. Padoux 1963:303 ff.; 1990:383 ff.
Dhp 2.24* ru sabde. Incidentally, the name 'Rudra' is analysed by the same verbal root at
Nirukta 10.5; cf. Kahrs 1980:248.
sabdanasvdbhdvydt as 'because it is his nature to produce sound'. The distinc-

tion is however rendered less crucial since there is no difference between agent
and object (kartrkarmdbheda) with regard to Bhairava here, moreover because
sabdanasvdbhdvydt in this special context means that Bhairava is aware of
himself in this inner language which is the instinct of consciousness, the
instinct of the light of reality. So his nature is a constant roaring of the great
mantra of T , AHAM.52
Thus the term 'Bhairava' refers to unconditioned subjectivity as the essence
of all phenomena. A similar analysis is met with also in the Para-
trimsikdvivarana where Abhinavagupta presents it in the following form (PTV
63,11-12): bhairavo bharandtmako mahdmantraravdtmakas ca, 'Bhairava is
he whose nature is carrying (bharanam) and the roar (rava°) which is the great
mantra (AHAM)\
So he is called 'Bhairava' because he supports the universe and is supported
by it, because he nourishes it and is nourished by it (bharandt: ^bhr), and
because he roars (ravandt: Vrw), being the tanscendental subject that internal-
ises the universe. Now follows another analysis (TA 1.96):
samsdrabhiruhitakrc call 96//
[He is] also [called Bhairava because] he favours those terrified (bhlru) by samsdra.
Jayaratha elaborates on this analysis as follows (TAV 1[1] 141,5-7):
bhirundm ayam hitakrt iti bhairdvah, bhirutve ca nimittam samsdrah tena
samsdnndm abhayapradah ity arthahl
He is one who favours those who are terrified: thus [he is called] Bhairava. And the
cause of this state of terror is samsdra, the cycle of births and deaths. That is to say,
therefore, that he bestows absence of fear upon those who are trapped in samsdra.
Bhairava is he who frees from fear those trapped in samsdra, the endless
cycle of births and deaths. The basic element here is bhiru, on^which the
name 'bhairava' is formed as a secondary derivation. Now, this is also the
acceptable analysis according to a Paninlya grammatical derivation: A
3.2.174 bhiyah kruklukanau teaches that the krt suffixes (A 3.1.1 pratyayah)
Kru (-ru) and KlukaN (-luka with presuffixal accent) are added after (A 3.1.2
paras ca) the verbal root (A 3.1.91 dhdtoh) bhl 'fear' to form primary deriva-
tions denoting an agent (A 3.4.67 kartari krt) on the condition that he per-
forms the activity of fearing as part of his nature, either habitually or as a
duty, or that he performs an act well (A 3.2.134 a kves tacchilataddharma-
tatsddhukdrisu).
This gives us the krt or primary formation bhiru in the sense 'whose habit
or duty or skill it is to be afraid'. From this we get the taddhita or secondary
formation bhairava according to the following derivation:
52
Cf TA 3 221c-3b Summarising his exposition of the matrkdeakra (from a to ha with the
bindu [am] containing all the phonemes), Abhinavagupta explains how AHAM (A-HA-M)
denotes/is the totality. Here we border on ma^ra-analysis.
A 4.3.120 tasyedam bhiru aN

i i i
A 7.2.117 taddhitesv acdm ddeh ai >t
4 ' 4
A 6.4.146 or gunah o
i ' I
A 6.1.78 eco 'yavdydvah av
bhairava
A 4.1.83 prdg divyato 'n teaches that the taddhita suffix aN {-a with vrddhi
strengthening of the first vowel) is added under meaning conditions given in
rules up to rule A 4.4.2 tena divyati khanatijayatijitam. That is to say, A 4.1.83
is a general rule (utsarga) which teaches the addition of a/*/unless it is blocked
by some other suffix under conditions specified by a special rule (apavdda).
Rule A 4.3.120 tasyedam teaches the addition of aN in the sense 'this pertains
to it'. The taddhita suffix aN is thus very loose in sense and covers almost any
relation (sambandhamdtra) in as much as it denotes whatever relation can be
marked by a genitive case suffix. It is worthy of notice that Abhinavagupta
exploits this fact that the suffix aN is very general in sense, and he can thus
specify its meaning to suit his own purposes: samsdrabhiruhitakrt 'he favours
those whose habit it is to be afraid because of samsdra'.53
But surely a regular grammatical analysis of 'bhairava' does not prevent
further analysis of the name which is quite rich in possibilities. Here again
nirukta adds to the possible meanings arrived at by vydkarana.5A
Still another sense of the term is revealed by the next verse based on the fact
that pardmarsa 'self-awareness' can be taken to be the sense of rava because
the former is the sound of self-awareness (see, e.g., TAV 3[4]205,5-6)
(TA 1.97):
samsdrabhitijanitdd ravdt pardmarsato 'pi hrdijdtahl
[He is referred to as Bhairava because] he is born in the heart from the roar or55
awareness produced by terror of transmigratory existence.
The terror of what it is to be trapped in this endless cycle of births and deaths
produces a roar or subjective awareness which makes Bhairava arise in the
heart. So the analysis is in this case: bhT(ti)-rava-jdtah, that is, Bhairava is he
53
The wording °hitakrt might suggest that Abhinavagupta had in mind A 5 1 5 tasmai hitam
which teaches taddhita formations in the sense 'good or beneficial for it', implying that
Bhairava is he who is good for the afraid This would account for hitakrt as his chosen wording
The problem is of course that bhiriindm is a genitive, not a dative form. In any case, the analy-
sis here involves a derivation with bhiru and a taddhita suffix -a that triggers vrddhi strength-
ening of the first syllable This alternative will not work, though, because aN does not extend
as far as A 5 1 5, that is to say, it is not taught there
54
Cf Yaska's statement at Nirukta 115 where he characterises nirvacanasastra as vydkaranasya
kdrtsnyam svdrthasddhakam ca, 'a complement to grammar, moreover something which is a
55
means to its own end', see p. 32 above.
The particle api in the sense of vd 'or', according to Jayaratha.
who is born from a roar of fear. Jayaratha comments on this as follows (TAV
bhih56 samsdratrdsah, tayd janito yo 'sau ravah bhagavadvisaya dkrandah

pardmarso vd tato jdtah iti bhairavah, tendkrandavatdm pardmarsavatdm ca hrdi
paramdrthabhumau sphuritah iti ydvatl
[The word] bhi means fear, that is, terror of transmigration. The roar which is pro-
duced by that [fear] means a crying out to the Lord, or rather, awareness [of the
Lord]. [And] being born from that [cry or that awareness, he is called] Bhairava. So
this means that [Bhairava] is manifest within the heart - that is, on the plane of ulti-
mate reality - of those who call out in terror or those who direct their awareness [to
the Lord].
Becoming aware of the fear of* what it is to be trapped in samsdra, that
endless cycle of births and deaths, produces a crying out to the Lord, or rather,
it produces an awareness of the Lord, an awareness which turns to the Lord as
a result of this terror. Bhairava is thus conceived of as the object of awareness
and as produced in the heart as a result of that awareness. In terms of kdraka
analysis, then, we have in this case an interpretation as karmasddhana, that is,
as the object of the activity expressed by the verbal root associated with the
name 'Bhairava'.
Abhinavagupta offers further explanations of the term in the continuation
of the verse (TA 1.97):
/
prakatibhutam bhavabhayavimarsanam saktipdtato yena II 97 // /
['Bhairava' means] he by whom awareness of the fear of finite, transmigratory exis-i
tence (bhava) is made manifest through the descent of Power. ,
Jayaratha gives the following elucidation (TAV 1 [1] 141,11—14):
bhavdd bhayam bhis tasya ravo vivecanam vimarsanam tasya saktipdtamukhena
ayam kdranam iti bhairavah, samsdravaimukhye 'pi ayam eva nimittam iti bhdvahl
He is the cause - through the descent of Power - of that roar {ravah), that dis-
crimination, that awareness of bhayam - that is, fear - of transmigratory existence;
hence [he is called] Bhairava. The sense is that he alone is instrumental even in one's
turning away from samsdra.
The underlying analysis is in this case: bhiravasya kdranam iti bhairavah,
'[he is] the cause of the fear-cry, hence "Bhairava"'. Bhairava is instrumental
in producing the roar of fear, or rather, the discrimination or understanding of
that terror which arises from the state of transmigration and causes - through
56
The text reads bhayam bhih. If bhayam is a gloss on bhih it is both superfluous and in
the wrong place. Jayaratha has lifted this from Ksemaraja's Uddyota at the beginning of
the Svacchandatantra (SvTU 1[1]:3,14), but there as well it is likely to be a corruption of the
last word of the preceding clause. What we have above is then an example of an insertion
of an interlinear gloss. For a discussion of the Ksemaraja passage, see p. 87 with note 74
below.
the descent of Power, that is, grace - one's reversion from the state of self-
representation as a transmigratory being.
Now we have a very elegant nirvacana coming up (TA 1.98):
naksatraprerakakdlatattvasamsosakdrino ye cal
kdlagrdsasamddhdnarasikamanahsu tesu caprakatah/l 98//
['Bhairava' means] he who is manifest among those whose awareness is devoted to
that trance which devours time, that is, in those who desiccate that essence of time
which is the propellor of the celestial bodies.
Here the term has been divided up as follows: ([(bha \=naksatra\ + lra —>
bhera) + va] —> bherava) —> bhairava, thus derived as a vrddhi formation of
bherava. The item bha, which is taken to mean naksatra 'celestial
body/bodies; constellation; asterism', is combined with the item Ira in the
sense of preraka 'motivator; propellor' (Vzr 'move; rise; agitate') to form the
item bhera and hence a synonym of 'time'. From bhera we get bherava by
adding the item va, obviously thought of as related to the verbal root va 'blow;
move'.57 For these bheravdh are further specified as samsosakdrinah, the des-
iccators of bhera 'time': as they blow on it they dry it out completely. They are
the yogins who desiccate time by having their attention centred in that trance
which is called the devouring of time. The master among them is Bhairava, the
supreme Bherava, the supreme desiccator of time, being vividly manifest as
that which devours time, bhairava thus derived by vowel-strengthening
{vrddhi) of bherava.
The linguistic items which provide the basis for this elaborate analysis of
the term 'Bhairava' are hardly mentioned in the verse itself but are identified
by Jayaratha (TAV 1[1] 141,14-142,4):
bhdni naksatrdni irayaii prerayati iti bherah kdlah tasya tattvam ksanddydtmakam
svarupam, tasya samyan nihsesena sosam abhibhavam kurvanti iti kdlam vdyanti
iti bheravdh - kdlagrdsasamddhirudhdvadhdnd yoginah, tesu ayam svdmltattvena
prakatah sphuritah iti bhairavah I
It causes to move (irayati) - or propels {prerayati) - the bhdni, that is, the heav-
enly bodies, hence [it is called] bhera, time. Those who blow on time's essence
{kdlam [=bheram] vdyanti), that is, on its nature consisting of moments etc., that
is, those who completely {sam = samyak=nihsesena) dry it out {sosam kurvanti =
,* sosakdrinah) in the sense that they conquer {abhibhavam kurvanti) it, those are
the bheravdh, those Yogins whose attention is centered in that samddhi which is
called kdlagrdsa, the devouring of time. So that master among them, who is
^ Dhp 2.41: vd gatigandhanayoh, 'the root vd occurs when the meanings "moving" and "blowing
(spreading of fragrance)" are to be denoted'; cf. also Dhp 1.969 ovai sosane, 'the root vai
- occurs when the meaning "drying up" is to be denoted': the wind dries something while
s blowing. Historically, the two roots were at one stage one and the same. Presumably, the short-
ening of vd to va above involves A 3.2.3 ato 'nupasarge kah which teaches that the krt suffix
Cv
Ka (-a) is added after a verbal root which ends in a when it is not preceded by a preverb but
co-occurs with a noun that denotes its direct object This accounts for forms such as goda-
'giverof cow(s)'.
vividly manifest - that is, who has burst into view - as that [which devours time
(tattvena)], [is accordingly called] Bhairava.
To sum up, bhera 'time' is that which propels the heavenly bodies. And
those Yogins who desiccate time by having their attention centred in the
samddhi called 'the devouring of time' are called the bheravdh. The master
among them is Bhairava. He is the supreme Bherava, the supreme desiccator
of time, being vividly manifest as that which devours it.
While the preceding explanations represent fairly general Trika doctrine,
the following analysis leads into the Krama system. As mentioned already, the
term Krama Saivism refers to a cluster of extreme, charismatic cults centred
around the goddess Kali and her emanations. It is that part of Kaula Saivism
which has most clearly retained Kapalika elements. At the time of
Abhinavagupta, Krama doctrine was permeating the Trika. In fact, the
incorporation of Krama elements into the Trika is partly what Abhinavagupta
wanted to achieve. The strong presence of the female in the esoteric liturgies
of the Krama is that feature which most clearly disagrees with the Saiva
Siddhanta where Siva was, at least originally, worshipped without his consort,
that is, without any personification of his female Power (sakti).
So, in the next explanation Abhinavagupta introduces the Krarna doctrine
of the goddesses Khecarl etc. (TA 1.99-100):
samkocipasujanabhiye ydsdm ravanam svakaranadevindm I
antarbahiscaturvidhakhecaryddikaganasydpi II99 //
tasya svdmT samsdravrttivighatanamahdbhimah I ,
It is difficult to make sense of this verse without including the first half of
the subsequent verse, or at least its opening words tasya svdmT 'the master of
that'. Stressing the item -bhi- in the word mahdbhimah 'most terrible', one
might possibly understand the compound samsdravrttivighatanamahdbhimah
to represent a separate analysis, although I consider this to be an unlikely
possibility. I shall return to this point below. As it stands, one may ihterpret the
text in the following way:
['Bhairava' means] he who, being most terrible in the act of shattering those pro-
cesses which constitute the cycle of births and deaths, is the master of those god-
desses of one's faculties whose roar causes terror to contracted, bound individuals,
and [who is the master] also of the fourfold collection within and without of [the
goddesses called] Khecarl etc.
These goddesses are essential in the Krama deification of the cycle of
cognition. So we see it in the commentary of Jayaratha (TAV 1[1] 142,4-10):
samkocino bhedaprathdmayasya pasujanasya bhiye tattatsukhaduhkhddyupa-
jananatrdsdya ravanam sabdardsisamutthakddikaldvimarsamayo ravo ydsdm tdh
svakaranadevya indriyasaktayah, tathd antarbahih pramdtrprameyddydtmd
caturvidhah catusprakdrah khecaryddiko ganah khecari-gocan-dikcan-bhucaryo
bhiravds tdsdm ayam svdmlbhairavah I
Those whose roaring (ydsdm ravanam) - that is, that roar which is their awareness
of these various elements such as [the sound] ka arising from the totality of sounds
- causes fear (bhiye) - namely that terror which gives rise to the various emotional
states of pleasure, pain, etc. - to those who are in the state of contraction
(samkocinah), that is, embodying the manifestation of plurality, to bound individ-
uals (pasujanasya) - [namely] these goddesses of one's faculties
(svakaranadevyah) - that is, Powers of the senses - and likewise that internal and
external (antarbahih) fourfold, that is, quadruply-moded group beginning with
Khecarl, that is to say, Khecarl, Gocarl, Dikcarl and Bhucarl, embodying [as it
does] the agent of cognition, the object of cognition, etc. - those are the Bhlravas
{bhiravdh). [And] this master (svdmi) of theirs is Bhairava.
This requires some explanation. Bhairava is said here to be the master of the
bhiravdh. Hence he is termed bhairavah 'the master of those whose roar
causes fear'. These Bhlravas are firstly the goddesses of one's faculties. Now,
why are they called Bhlravas? Because their active state in consciousness, that
is, that roar (rava) which is their awareness of the energies that arise from the
various sounds of the language, causes fear (bhi) to bound souls who are in the
state of contraction, that is, to those who embody the manifestation of plural-
ity. And what is this fear (bht)l It is, says Jayaratha, that terror which gives rise
to the various states of pleasure, pain, etc.
The idea here is that the sense-faculties, or rather the faculties in general -
the faculties of action, cognition, and internal cognition - express themselves
in consciousness through the sounds of the language. The sounds of the lan-
guage exist in a subtle state. As such they have been expounded at length by
Abhinavagupta.58 But their gross combination gives rise in consciousness to
the various emotional states. Thus there are the ideations or representations
embodied in the series of letters, as opposed to the represented or external,
objective world. The distinction between vdcya 'expressed' and vdcaka
'expressor'59 corresponds in the metaphysics of the Trika to the distinction
between the modes of prakdsa 'manifestation; light' which is Siva and vimarsa
'awareness; ideation', the dynamic essence or Sakti. So it is the sounding forth
of those Powers of one's faculties in consciousness which causes terror. And
that is why they are bhi-ravdh - 'they whose roar causes terror'.60
So that is the first group of Powers that is called bhiravdh, those whose roar
causes terror. The second group is the fourfold collection beginning with
khecari, that is to say, the Powers of Khecarl, Gocarl, Dikcarl and Bhucarl.
58
59
TA 3 66 ff.
Cf. Jayaratha TAV 2[3]74,12: iha hi visvasya vdcyavdcakdtmand dvidhd avabhdsah, 'for in t
60
system the universe is represented in two modes, as expressed and as expressor'.
Cf. SivasutravimarsinT on Sivasutra 1.3-4 (SSV 16,11-17,2) Ksemaraja explains how the
mdtrkd, an order of the sounds of the Sanskrit language from a to ksa and considered to repre-
sent Siva, gives rise to these various limited forms of knowledge such as 'I am incomplete', 'I
am thin', 'I am fat', 'I am one who has performed the Agmstoma sacrifice'. Through per-
meating the various terms which denote those states, they assume the form of grief, surprise,
joy, attachment, etc.
These are said in Abhinavagupta's verse to be both internal and external, which
Jayaratha explains as 'embodying the agent of cognition, the object of cogni-
tion, etc ' What he is getting at is the following Khecarl (She who pervades
the void61) is the Power of consciousness in the sphere of the parah pramdtd,
the unlimited agent of cognition Gocarl (She who pervades speech62) is the
energy of consciousness in the internal faculties Dikcarl (She who pervades
the [ten] directions) is the Power of consciousness in the faculties of cognition
and action, the ten indnyas Bhucarl (She who pervades the field) is the same
Power of consciousness embodied in the external objects of perception So the
sequence of the four sets of energies - Khecarl, Gocarl, Dikcarl &nd Bhucarl
- represents the expansion of consciousness m the process of cognition from
the inner state of the subject, through the internal faculties of the mind, into
the external faculties of cognition and action, and finally into the objects them-
selves In the Krama system these four Saktis are transcended by a fifth called
Vyomavamesvarl (the Lady who emits the void[s]), who represents the
absolutely transcendent state before any projection of agency of cognition 63
These Saktis are highly developed in the Spanda-texts which have a very
direct link with the Kali cult Being a kind of almost sect-neutral exegesis of
the Kali tradition, these texts have a very strong connection with the Krama 64
With Vyomavamesvarl as the first, Khecarl and Bhucarl are the second and
third among five goddesses which in Krama ritual represent the cycle of cogni-
61
62
That is bodhagagana 'the sky of consciousness', according to the Spandamrnaya (SN 38,5)
Literally 'cows' In the Nighantu (111) the word gauh is listed among vannamdm, the names
for speech Ksemaraja explains in the Spandamrnaya (SN 38,9) gaur vak tadupalaksita.su
samjalpamayisu buddhyahamkaramanobhumisu carantyo gocaryah, 'the goqaryah
called because] they are pervading/moving within the levels of the three faculties of internal
cognition - the mtrovertive and extrovertive mental organs and the ego awareness, [levels] of
conversation implied by gauh that is speech', cf Vairagarbha's commentary on the
Hevajratantra quoted and translated as follows by D Snellgrove (1959, ptl 86, note 2)
Likewise by saying that these are the five faculties of sense the eye and so on, with the name
63
of cow (go), &c '
This Sakti is also known as Vamesvari, cf Ksemaraja in his Pratyabhijnahrdaya (PH
28,12-29,4)
kim ca citisaktir eva bhagavati visvavamanat samsaravamacaratvac ca vamesvarya
sati khecan gocan dikcan bhucanrupaih asesaih pramatr antahkarana bahiskarana
bhavasvabhavaih pansphurantT0
Moreover, this divine Power of consciousness being called Vamesvari - because of its
pouring forth (vamanat) the umverse and because of its moving against the current
(vamacaratvat) of [the extnnsicist perception which constitutes] samsara - radiates as all
agents of cognition, inner faculties, external faculties, and external objects, [these radiations
in these four spheres are] in the form of Khecarl, Gocan Dikcarl and Bhucarl [respec-
tively]
64
The text goes on to explain how this radiation takes place
See, for example, the Spandamrnaya of Ksemaraja where these Powers of Khecarl, Gocarl,
Dikcarl and Bhucarl are dealt with (SN 38,21) There they are mentioned m the plural (khe
caryah, etc ) and collectively referred to as four wheels of divinities, catvan devatdcakrani
(ibid 38,3) Abhmavagupta himself may be cited, however He deals with these Powers in the
Paratnmsikdvivarana (PTV 39,12-40,3) and m the Paryantapahcasikd 26-8 (see K C Pandey
1963 84)
Praxis Saiva Kashmir 81
tion from initial to final voidness, according to the Mahdnayaprakdsa (MNP

64,4-8) 65
So those too are the bhlravdh, those whose roar causes terror Now, the idea
is that these same Powers can be either binding or liberating 66 Consciousness is
always the embodiment of these four levels, but those energies can bind you or
release you They will bind you if you do not realise that all appearance is the
dynamics of consciousness, they will release you once this realisation is effected
And so, in the worldly state, the roar of the Bhlravas does indeed lead to terror,
to the terror of reincarnation, to the terror of limited states of consciousness
* Bhairava is the master of these Bhlravas, and it is for this very reason that
he is referred to by the term 'Bhairava' He is the material cause and at the
same time the efficient cause of this deployment of Powers Thus, when you
are in control of those Powers, when you realise that they are simply the
•shining of consciousness, you are no longer contaminated by them you are
Bhairava, since that is the state of Bhairava You are then the Cakresvara, the
'Lord of the Wheel of these Powers And in this way Bhairava is considered
IsamsdravrttivighatanamahdbhTmah, 'he who is most terrible m the act of
Shattering those processes which constitute the cycle of births and deaths' So
1 take this expression to give the reason for Bhairava's being the master of
ithese two groups of goddesses or Powers whose roaring causes fear He is the
jnost terrible, mahdbhimah, among them
Jayaratha has very little to say here (TAV 1 [1] 142,10-11)
mahdbhima iti bhisanah, tendtra bhairavasabdah samketitah iti bhavahll
[The word] mahdbhimah [simply means] terrifying, [and] so it is that the term
'Bhairava' is agreed upon here, that is the point
These remarks do not suggest that the expression mahdbhimah represents
an explanation in its own right, that is, that it should be considered an explana-
%on separate from the preceding words tasya svdmT and the connected verse
J)9 Other factors too warrant the conclusion that this was not Abhmavagupta's
intention
| First of all, the word mahdBHImah would by itself suggest an explanation
$f the element bhai- only, not of the element -rava One might supply
ÂVArupatah (from verse 96) or some similar expression that would account
| 5 See also the Mahdrthamahjanpanmala of Mahesvarananda (MMP 89,4-90,6) Khecari and

Bhucarl are also met with in esoteric Buddhism for example in the Hevajratantra At the
zenith and nadir with regard to the wheel of yogmls presented there, they represent samsara
and nirvana (Snellgrove 1959, pt 1 74), and are associated with the spheres of thought and
touch respectively (ibid 126-7) One would thus have expected Khecari to represent nirvana
and Bhucarl to represent samsara This may be parallel to Khecari being the Power of
consciousness in the sphere of parah pramata, the unlimited agent of cognition, while Bhucarl
is the same Power in the sphere of external objects According to Snellgrove (ibid 28,128),
however, the 'formula of personality' associated with the Yoginis Khecari and Bhucarl in the
Hevajratantra is speech and body respectively
?6 Cf the Spandamrnaya of Ksemaraja (SN 38,17-21)
for the latter half of the term 'Bhairava'. But that would not be in accordance
with Abhinavagupta's ordinary practice, a nirvacana usually being stated in
full, or, if not, being easily inferred from what has actually bee;i enunciated.
Second, the expression mahdbhimah does not add any knowledge not already
revealed by the previous explanations. Third, there is the fact that Jayaratha's
preceding words tdsdm ayam svdmT bhairavah refer to that which is signified
by the term 'Bhairava', not to the term itself. Jayaratha's usual procedure in con-
cluding his elucidation of each nirvacana is to state Hti bhairavaK. Fourth, the
text here can easily be read as a continuous whole, the editor's danda being
superfluous:'... this master of theirs is Bhairava, [because he is] mahdbhimah,
that is to say, terrifying, [and] therefore the term "Bhairava" is agreed upon
here'. The latter part of his remark does explicitly refer to the term itself. It is
the fact that he is mahdbhimah 'most terrible' which renders possible the pre-
vious explanation of the term 'Bhairava': 'so it is that the term "Bhairava" is
agreed upon here; that is the point [of stating °mahdbhimahy.
Incidentally, one might ask whether samketitah 'agreed upon; used accord-
ing to convention (samketaY here is referring us back to the previous
sdstroktaih sdmayikaih67 thus indicating that the word is used in a slightly
more limited sense. This, however, is difficult to ascertain.
What has emerged from the above analysis of the Tantrdloka passage is as
many as six different nirvacanas of the term 'Bhairava'. These may conve-
niently be summed up by the following six structures, indicating the funda-
mental elements of each explanation. The linguistic items referring to the
activities or relations considered basic to each specific analysis are pointed out
within brackets:
1. bharandd ravandc ca: (BHARANA: ^BHR+RAVANA:
2. bhirundm hitakrt: (BHIRU+the taddhita suffix aN).
3. hhijanitdd ravdj jdtah: (BHI + RAVA + the taddhita suffix oAf).
4. bhiravasya kdranam: (BHI+RAVA + the taddhita suffix aN).
5. bhdni naksatrdmrayatiti bherah kdlas tarn vdyanti (sosayanti) iti bheravdh
(kdlagrdsarasikd ye yoginas) tesdm svdmT: (((BHA + IRA) BHERA + VA)
BHERAVA + the taddhita suffix 'aN).
6. bhiye ravanam ydsdm td bhfravd indriyadevyah khecaryddisaktayas ca
tdsdm svdmT mahdbhimah: ((BHI + RAVA) BHIRAVA + the taddhita suffix
aN).
Since the term 'Bhairava' refers to the absolute deity, it is to a Certain extent
an ill-chosen example with regard to illustrating ^rate-analysis, that is, the
assignment of categories according to how the referent is thought of as a par-
ticipant in the activities associated with the term. In this respect the alterna-
tives indicated by each analysis ate not always entirely clear. While the term
'Bhairava' refers to unconditioned subjectivity as the cause and substance
67 l
TA 1 95; TAV 1[1] 139,13-14, cf p. 65 above. '
of all phenomena, we nevertheless meet with the persistence of a theistic

code in metaphysics which evinces a conception of the deity as an ideal self-
representation. It is thus not surprising that various interpretations of
'Bhairava' as a noun denoting an agent (kartf) or object (karman) are sug-
gested rather than an interpretation as an action noun denoting mere being or
state of action (bhava). The different fcarafca-interpretations seek to establish
a reality which is to be recognised through contemplation by the devotee. And
so the term 'Bhairava' is subject to fcarafaz-analysis just like any other noun to
the extent there exist activities argued to be the causes for the use of the term.
Thus the elements bhT 'fear' and rava 'roar' are taken as the basis for inter-
pretations of 'Bhairava' as, for example, karman (3) - he is produced from a
roar of fear, karana 'instrument7 (4) - he is the means of producing that roar
of fear which turns one away from transmigratory existence, or kartr (5) - he
is the supreme Bherava, the supreme desiccator of time.
Through exegesis of his name alone, Bhairava is thus established as the uni-
versal object of awareness and worship, while the ultimate identity of the indi-
vidual is reality itself as an unconditioned Power of self-representation which is
' nothing but Bhairava, the Self who is the identity of Selves. Abhinavagupta states
in his Bodhapancadasikd (BPD lied): sa eva khalu samsdro yo vibhisakah, 'the
cycle of births and deaths which terrifies is itself this [his Power of spontaneous
self-representation]'. Liberation is just the complete recognition of this fact.
Abhinavagupta now concludes the passage in the following way (TA 1.100):
bhairava in gurubhir imair anvarthaih samstutah sdstrell 100//
Through these [explanations] which are in accordance with what they signify, he is
known {samstutah) through [the term] 'Bhairava' by the Gurus throughout sdstra.
Here the word anvarthaih seems to mean niruktaih. There is, however,
reason to be suspicious of the text here as Jayaratha points out. He comments
as follows on the above statement (TAV 1[1] 143,1-11):
gurubhih tattacchdstrdvatdrakaih, imaih ebhih samanantaroktaih anvarthaih
arthdnugatair vdcakaih, samstutah pancitah sdstre visesdnupdddndt sarvatraiva
]
arthdd uktahl atha ca anvarthaih samyak sakalajagadbharanddisdmarthyaprati-
pddanadvdrena stutah ity arthah, yad uktam
'bhnydt sarvam racayati6* sarvado vydpako 'khile/
iti bhairavasabdasya samtatoccdrandc69 chivahlT
^ The editor reads (TAV 1[1] 143,6) ravayati with v.l racayati The form ravayati is problem-
atic as the causative of \rw, but seems to be the accepted reading by Sivopadhyaya (see pp
89 ff. below) and Anandabhatta (VBhK 52,6) They both gloss it by vimrsati 'ideates' which
as a technical term m this system of Saivism equally well could gloss racayati, but it is there-
* ' fore difficult simply to emend Vijnanabhairavatantra 130, tempting though it is, without a
proper consultation of the extant manuscripts. There can be no doubt, however, that racayati
'he produces' is Jayaratha's reading and not a corruption, for he quotes the verse also at TA
5.135 (TAV 3[5]488,14—15) and in his commentary there he glosses racayati by antar bahir
vd karoti, 'makes internal or external', clearly a reference to Vrac 'produce'
69
So read for satato°\ cf TA 3 136b, VBh 130
l
itiltatha
\ . . bharandd bharitasthitih I'
nil imaih iti cintyaml gurugaditair iti tu sresthah pdthahll
In the verbal codification of the teaching - that is to say, throughout it, because no
particular [texts] are specified - he is samstutah, known, spoken of by the Gurus,
that is, by those who are responsible for the verbal codification of various doctrines
in the tradition, through these expressive terms which have just been mentioned
[and which are] anvartha, that is,! which are in accordance with that which they
signify. Moreover, [there is another meaning of samstutah:] he is properly (samyak
= sam) praised (stutah) [throughout Sastra] by means of these [explanations] which
are in accordance with that which they signify since they prove his great Power as
the sustainer of the entire universe etc. As stated [in the Vijfidnabhairavatantra]:
'One will become Siva by constantly contemplating in mental utterance the term
"Bhairava", understanding that'it means: "he who sustains the universe, he who
produces [it], he who bestows all and is pervading the entire universe".'70
Likewise:
\ .. his state is all-containing in as much as he sustains the universe.'71
This [reading] 'imaih' is suspect. The best reading is gurugaditaih 'taught/related/
spoken by the Gurus'.
As noted by Jayaratha, one carinot be quite happy with the reading imaih
here, simply because this is not good Sanskrit. Such an instrumental plural
form is found in Agama and in Buddhist Sanskrit,72 but not even there is it
common. Now, it is unlikely that Abhinavagupta should slip from the best
Sanskrit or make a mistake in grammar. It is therefore more likely that some-
thing is wrong with the text at this point. But the reading gurugaditair0 which
Jayaratha claims to be the lectio potior is clearly a conjecture since otherwise
he would have read it. While this circumstance does vitiate any interpretation
of the passage, it seems to me that Abhinavagupta is recapturing his intro-
ductory remark anvarthasdstroktaih sabdaih. Moreover, there is fio reason to
doubt the reading of the word samstutah. This is taken by Jayaratha to mean
'known' or 'fully/properly praised'. So it is established that Bhairava is known
or praised as the referent of the name 'Bhairava' in Sastra, the verbal codifi-
cation of the teaching in the tradition. Bhairava is thus determined as the refer-
ent of his name by fact of his satisfying the property of being known as
Bhairava in the tradition, that is, by a certain authorised group of speakers, the
70
VBh 130. The reading bhriydt, precative of the active of ^bhr (I bharati), is not adopted by
the commentators although it does reflect the notion of bharana or the sustaining of the uni-
verse. Sivopadhyaya (eighteenth cent.) reads (VBh 130) bhayd 'by [his] radiance'; cf. p. 89 ff.
below. Ananda Bhatta (seventeenth cent.) reads (VBhK on v. 128) bhiyd 'by^fear', moreover,
sarvago0 'who 71
moves everywhere' for sarvado 0
'who bestows everything'. At TA 5.135 (TAV
3(5)488). VBh 24. Sivopadhyaya reads bhantd sthitih.
72
MVUT 2.8; 2.48, 2.58; Edgerton BHSG 21.72.
Gurus. And Abhinavagupta is quite explicit on how he understands the term

guru (TA 1.235-6):
ydvdn asya hi samtdno gurus tdvat sa kfrtitahl
samyagjndnamayas ceti svdtmand mucyate tatah II235 //
tata eva svasamtdnam jndni tdrayatity adah I
yuktydgamdbhydm samsiddham tdvdn eko yato munihll 236//
As much as it is his lineage, to that extent it (= the lineage) is recognised as the Guru
and as consisting of correct knowledge. Therefore by [the salvation of] that [line]
he releases himself. So it is established by reason and scripture that the enlightened
'saves' his spiritual lineage, for the whole is the one master.
It is thus evident from Abhinavagupta's own statements that the use of the
name 'Bhairava' depends on a certain practice within the Saiva community.
Semantics is a very wide social practice founded in the cognitive abilities of
individuals which, at least in this case, rests on the authority of the tradition.
But, and this is extremely important, one is brought beyond the referential
feature to identify the deity as Bhairava through the term itself. An adequate
idea of the referent is achieved through analysis of the term 'Bhairava' in which
the essence of certain specific ideas is present.
The truth-conditions for identifying Bhairava are thus established by means
of the nirvacana technique. And it is probably these nirvacanas that are implied
by the word imaih 'by those' in the passage.73 According to Jayaratha, the word
imaih refers to those just mentioned (samanantarokta), namely those nirvac-
anas which have just been dealt with. And these nirvacanas are anvartha: they
correspond to the meaning and nature of that which the term signifies. It seems
worthy of notice that Jayaratha glosses the term anvarthaih by arthdnugatair
[vdcakaih '[known] through expressive terms which correspond to [this its]
f
artha\ It is therefore more than a remote possibility that the word sabdaih
\ 'through terms/expressions/linguistic items' of Abhinavagupta's initial state-
r ment (TA 1.95) includes each full explanation of the name 'Bhairava', the
êxplanations through which the deity Bhairava is known. Jayaratha's proposed
f variant gurugaditair0 would just mean that the explanations discussed have
been sanctioned by the Gurus, the referential performance thus clearly consid-
>
• ered a social event in that it relies on a certain practice with regard to its usage
[as well as to its explanation. So the passage makes it clear that the term
- 'Bhairava' is used in accordance with the ideas expressed in these explanations
which show the equation between the term and that which it signifies, thus
taking us from the grammatical to the ontological significance of the name.
In nirvacana analysis Abhinavagupta thus finds a powerful means of rein-
yigorating Bhairava by assimilating Brahmanically acceptable metaphysical
conceptions into the idea that the universe is a projection in and of conscious-
ness, the term 'Bhairava' now referring to unconditioned self-representation
73
Cf. the almost parallel statement at TA 1.102; see p. 70 above.
as reality itself. Similarly, nirvacana analysis is for Abhinavagupta an effec-

tive means of absorbing the Sakta traditions, the traditions of- Goddess-
worship, into established forms of Saivism.
Abhinavagupta can proceed as he does since in the case of a deity the use
of its name rests on some common practice. However, the situation may arise
that the reference is - from one point of view or other - regularly "confused,
fully or in part. Various features pertaining to various deities or tp different
religious practices have become merged so that there exists a practice of using
a name but with no single reference. Such a situation may be taken advantage
of by a skilled exegete such as Abhinavagupta. By connecting the relevant bits
and pieces he is able to establish a coherent practice that suits the religious
ideas he propagates. In Abhinavagupta's hands the nirvacana device becomes
a powerful means of semantic creation, a device which is ultimately capable
of establishing subjective truth as objective truth, that is, as intersubjective
truth.
This is how a person within a specific culture has the capacity to interpret
and determine the contents of thoughts, provided that person has the power to
determine the reference of the words of a shared language. And, again, he or
she may then have the power to define the meaning of objects and actions, even
the power to define others, for this capacity rests not only on a person's ability
to be semantically creative, but also on the same person's social position to be
so.
Ksemaraja's mangalasloka revisited

With this background it is possible to return to the interpretation of the
mangalasloka from Ksemaraja's commentary on the Vijhdnabhairavatantra.
It should be obvious by now that the question of meaning can be properly
answered only by answering the more fundamental question of how we come
to understand this verse. The evidence is provided by Abhinavagtipta's elabo-
rate analysis of 'Bhairava' and it is only on this basis that the verse by
Ksemaraja, Abhinavagupta's pupil, can be appreciated as a powerful statement
in religious discourse. A fresh look at the verse reveals the extent to which it
is fused with the nirvacanas of the term 'Bhairava' (VBhU 1,2-5):
bhirundm abhayaprado bhavabhaydkrandasya hetus tato
hrddhdmni prathitas ca bhiravarucdm Tso 'ntakasydntakahl
bheram vdyati yah suyoginivahas tasya prabhur bhairavo
visvasmin bharanddikrd vijayate vijhdnarupah parah II
Bestowing absence of fear for those who are terrified (bhiru) [cf. (2) bhirundm
hitakrt], he is the cause of the crying out (dkranda = rava) from fear of trans-
migratory existence (bhavabhaya) [cf. (4) bhiravasya kdranam], and from that [cry]
he becomes manifest in the domain of the heart [cf. (3) bhijanitdd ravdd dhrdi
jdtah]; he is the Lord of those who delight in their terrifying roaring [cf. (6) bhiye
ravanam ydsdrn td bhiravds tdsdm svdmT], the death of death. Being the Master of
that flock of excellent yogins who blow on time (bhera), he is Bhairava [cf. (5)
bherah kdlas tarn vayantiti bheravds tesdm svdmi]; agent of sustaining etc. [cf. (1)
bharandd ravandc ca; visvam bibharti tena ca bhriyate], he extends his Power
throughout the universe, the Supreme whose form is consciousness [i.e., Vijndna-
bhairava].
All the nirvacanas suggested by Abhinavagupta are contained in this verse.
They are, in fact, the very basis of the verse. We see the same formulations in
Ksemaraja's commentary on the Svacchandatantra (SvTU 1[1]:3,12-4,7):
bhairavo - visvabharanaravanavamanarupah, bhirundm abhayam iti vyutpattyd
samsdrindm abhayado 'yam, bhih14 samsdratrdsah tayd janito ravah dkrandah
bhiravah tato jdtah taddkrandavatdm sphuritah, asyaiva bhiravasya samsdrabha-
yavimarsanasydyam saktipdtavasenotthdpakah, bhdni naksatrdni Trayati iti bherah
kdlah tarn vayantiti bheravdh - kdlagrdsasamddhirasikdh yoginah tesdm ayam iti
dntarah svabhdvah, bhiye pasujanatrdsdya ravah — sabdardsisamutthdkdrddi-
kaldvimarso ydsdm khecarigocaridikcaribhucaricakrarupdndm samviddevindm
tdh bhiravah tdsdm ayam svdmi bhairavah, tathd bhairavo bhisanah samsdra-
vighatanaparah, evam dgamesu niruktatvdt, sribrhaspatipddaih sivatandv
anvarthavydkhydtasvarupatvdc ca I
[And] 'Bhairava' means: 'he whose nature it is (i) to support/nourish the universe
// to be supported/nourished by the universe, (ii) to roar [as the transcendental
subject that internalises the universe], and (iii) to project75 [the universe so that it
appears to be other than him] [cf. (1) bharandd ravandc ca; visvam bibharti tena ca
bhriyate]', 'he who bestows absence of fear for those in transmigratory existence',
in accordance with the derivation 'security for the fearful' [bhiru- + the taddhita
suffix aNby A 4.3.120 tasyedam] [cf. (2) bhirundm hitakrt]; 'he who is born from
the fear-cry (bhT-rava)\ the roar, the crying out produced by fear, by terror at [the
thought of] transmigration, [that is to say], 'he who becomes manifest to those who
cry out at this' [cf. (3) bhijanitdd ravdd dhrdi jdtah]; ['he who produces the fear-
cry'], he who gives rise to this same cry of fear, [this same] awareness of terror at
[the thought of] transmigration, by causing his Power to descend [cf. (4) bhiravasya
kdranam]; 'he who belongs to the Bheravas', he who is the inner nature of these
Yogins who desiccate bhera, time, the driver of the celestial bodies, [the Yogins]
5 who devote themselves to the trance of the devouring of time [cf. (5) bherah kdlas
, tarn vayantiti bheravds tesdm svdmi]; 'he who is the Master of those whose sound
terrifies (bhiravdh)\ [i.e., the Master] of the goddesses of consciousness whose
r nature is the spheres of Khecarl, Gocarl, Dikcarl and Bhucarl, and whose roaring
(-ravah), that is to say, ideation of the elements from A [to KSA] that arise from
74
The text reads samsdrindm abhayadah, bhayam bhih°. Although this is how the text has been
taken over by Jayaratha (see p. 76 above), I am suspicious of bhayam before bhih. If it is a gloss
on bhih it is both superfluous and in the wrong place. I conjecture that it is a corruption of the
* last word of the preceding clause and propose the emendation samsdrindm abhayado0 'yam,
^ bhih°. This emendation is supported also by the reading bhirundm abhayaprado in the
rV mangalasloka quoted above.
f5 The element vamana 'emission; projection' does not appear in Abhmavagupta's list, but cf.
| the passage by Mahesvarananda discussed p. 88 below. Its inclusion here may betray
Ksemaraja's adherence to the Krama.
Sabdarasi (the prediscursive matrix of articulate awareness), has the effect of terri-
fying the uninitiated (pasujanatrdsdya < bhi-) [cf. (6) bhiye ravanam ydsdm td
bhiravds tdsdm svdmT]; and also 'Bhairava' means 'the frightening' in as much as
his purpose is the destruction of transmigratory existence. [I have explained the
words devam and bhairavam at Svacchandatantra 1.1 in this way] because this is
how they have been semantically analysed (niruktatvdt) in the scriptures and this is
how the nature [of Deva and Bhairava brought out by these terrris] has been
explained in accordance with [the nature of] that which they signify (anvartha0) by
the revered Brhaspati in his Sivatanu.
This passage too consists entirely of nirvacanas of 'Bhairava', the six
known from before, and an additional seventh: tathd bhairavo bhisanah, 'and
also "Bhairava" means "the frightening"' which is probably the most obvious
lexical meaning of the word bhairava. Interestingly, this last analysis is kept
separate from the already established ones by the word tathd and the repetition
of the word bhairavah. The passage also makes it evident that there is a tradi-
tion in exegesis, a tradition of nirvacana analysis which is founded on Agama
and the revered Brhaspati, author of the Sivatanusdstra.76
Indeed, the entire later non-dualistic Saiva tradition relies upon these nir-
vacanas. The ritual and metaphysical systems developed in Kashmir at the
time of Abhinavagupta became powerful in southern India from the eleventh
century on, and spread from there all over India. Thus Bhairava appears in rein-
vigorated form in the same South India where he seemingly enjoyed wide-
spread worship from an early date. Turning to the Mahdrthamafijariparimala,
a Pratyabhijiia influenced Krama scripture by Mahesvarananda (fl.c.
1175-1225) of the famous Saiva centre Cidambaram in South India, we meet
with the nirvacanas of 'Bhairava' and find that it elaborates on Abhinava-
gupta's list, adding at the end (MMP 179,25-6):
visvam prati bharanaramanavamandndm11 prayojayiteti vd bhairava^ty ucyatel
Or, it is he who directs the sustaining (bharana), the resting (ramana) and the emis-
L
sion (vamana) of the universe, hence he is called Bhairava.
This nirvacana splits the name into three parts, in accordance with
Bhairava's activities of emission (vamana) or projection (srsti), sustaining
(bharana) or immersion (sthiti), and the bringing to rest (ramana) or resorp-
tion (samhdra) of the universe.78 Mahesvarananda quotes (MMP 180,1-4) the
mangalasloka of Ksemaraja, indicating that the bharana-ramana-vamana nir-
vacana is implied by the expression bharanddikrt 'agent of sustaining etc' in
the final line of that verse.
76
77
Abhinavagupta too relies on the Sivatanusdstra, see p. 70 above.
78
v 1 vamanam according to the editor This should probably be vamandndm
These three phases constitute one of the grounds for the name Tnka (lit. 'triad'), cf. also the
tetradic cycle of cognition as found in the Krama, where srsti, sthiti, samhdra and the Nameless
Fourth (andkhya) are worshipped in ntualâs the four sequences (krama), the fourth pervading
the three See Sanderson 1986 197, cf. TA 1.107.
Turning to later Saiva authors, it has already been demonstrated that

Jayaratha (fix. 1225-75) expounds the nirvacanas of 'Bhairava' in detail in his
commentary on the Tantraloka. Later in the same commentary (TAV 3[5]488)
he brings up some individual details pertaining to the nirvacana of 'Bhairava'
met with in the Vijhdnabhairavatantra (VBh 130), but these are of no partic-
ular interest here.79
Towards the boggling point: analysis through single sounds

Having thus shown that the nirvacana device as a means of linking language
with metaphysics is an integral and powerful constituent of cultural discourse,
let me now turn first to a more extreme form of nirvacana analysis, namely that
which is based on the semantics of single sounds, and then to some reserva-
tions or objections to the nirvacana device met with in the Kashmirian Saiva
tradition itself.
A good illustration of this is provided by the lengthy analysis of 'Bhairava'
presented by Sivopadhyaya (fix. 1725-75) in his commentary on Vijhdna-
bhairavatantra 130 (VBhV 113-16). The whole passage deserves close
reading, on the one hand simply because it offers an analysis of the sort exhib-
ited above by way of single syllables, and on the other hand because it attacks
well-established nirvacanas. For the present purpose I shall however confine
myself to certain points of major interest.
Sivopadhyaya breaks the term 'Bhairava' down into the four syllables bhd-
< ai-ra-va. The syllable BHA, which in itself means 'radiance', is identified as
samvidrupah prakdsah, 'that effulgence or manifestation which has the form
of consciousness'. The syllable AI represents kriydsakti, the Power of action -
actually its second movement (E-AI-O-AU),S0 when precognitive impulse
(icchd, I) and its development (Tsana, I) is englobed within the bliss (dnanda,
A) of the ultimate ground (anuttara, A). Sivopadhyaya also quotes the
> Ekdksarakosa which identifies AI with Mahesvara, the Supreme Lord. The syl-
lables RA and VA are contained in the verbal form ravayati 'causes to roar'81
which is further explained by vimrsati 'ideates; becomes aware of himself.
'Sivopadhyaya sums this up as follows (VBhV 114,7-9):
bhayd samvitprakdsarupayd aikdrah kriydsaktimdn mahesvarah sarvam ravayati
vimrsati iti bhairavah in etad eva abhidheyaml
Being endowed with the Power of action as the syllable AI by virtue of the radiance
(BHA) which is the effulgence of consciousness, the Supreme Lord causes [the
X
79 80
See, however, p 83, note 68 above.
81
See TA 3.94c-104b
The causative of ^ru is strictly speaking ravayati, and I strongly suspect that ravayati is a
corruption of racayati 'produces' which is the reading of Jayaratha at Vijhdnabhairavatantra
• 130; see TAV 1(1)143,6 and 3(5)448,14 The corruption is probably due to the influence of
I Abhmavagupta's analyses which involve Vrw, but also the nirvacanas which involve the ele-
ments bharana, ravana or ramana, and vamana, cf p. 87 with note 75 and p 88 above, and
p. 91 with note 84 below.
universe] to roar (RAVA-yati), that is, ideates (vimrsati) the entire universe: thus [he
is called] 'Bhairava'; this alone is what is meant.
Sivopadhyaya goes on to give an alternative version of this (ibid.: 114,9-10):
yad vd bhayd jndndtmikayd saktyd aikdrena mdhesvaryavyanjikayd kriydsaktyd
sarvam vimrsati I
Alternatively, he ideates the universe by means of [the syllable] BHAI [his] radiance
which is the Power of cognition [and] by the syllable AI which is the Power of action
which makes manifest [his] deity.
Next he suggests a nirvacana based on the meaning of Vijndnabhairava-
tantra 130b: sarvado vydpako 'khile, 'he who bestows all and pervades the
entire universe'. This implies the following analysis (ibid.: 114,14):
tayd bhayd sarvam subhdsubham rdti daddti sarvam vdti anugacchati vydpakatayd
iti bhairavah0
By this [his] radiance [BHA] he bestows [RA: rdti = daddti 'gives'] everything, good
and evil, and pervades [VA: vdti = anugacchati vydpakatayd 'he moves along with,
m as much as he pervades'] everything, hence [he is called] 'Bhairava'.
Here he clearly leans on the authority of the tradition in letting the nirva-
cana be implied by the two attributes sarvadah and vydpakah. He retains the
syllable BHA, but transforms the linguistic items - da 'who gives' and vydpaka
'who pervades' into the phonetically attractive verbal roots Vra and Vva which
carry the same meanings.
Sivopadhyaya goes on to criticise the reading of Vijndnabhairavatantra
130a which runs bhriydt sarvam rdvayati. Whether this is the reading accepted
by Abhinavagupta or not, it is probably known to him as indicated by
Abhinavagupta's nirvacana (TA 1.96) based on the roots Îbhr and Vrw.82
Sivopadhyaya's view is the following (VBhV 115,10-13):
ke cit tu bhriydt sarvam ravayati iti pathanti, tat na sddhu — yadi bhrravah ity ddi-
padasiddhih sydt tarhi etat samgaccheta I yady api pracurapustakesv api esapdtho
}
sti, tathdpi dhdranaposandrtho bharatih katamad aksaram apeksya yojanfyah0
Some, however, read [VBh 130a] 'bhriydt sarvam ravayati'. That is not correct. If
the original term were established as 'bhrravah', then this would be the suitable
construction. Although this reading is found in numerous manuscripts: with regard
to which of the [three] syllables is bharatih, which means 'support' and 'nourish',
to be joined?
The reading bhriydt, precative of the active of ^bhr (bharatih), is thus con-
sidered unacceptable, 'although it is found in numerous manuscripts', on the
grounds that it would account for the form 'bhrravah* but not ibhairavah\ This
warrants the conclusion that Sivopadhyaya considers only such readings accept-
82
Jayaratha actually quotes VBh 130 with the reading bhnyat See TAV 1(1)143,6, 3(5)448,14,
cf pp 83 f with note 70 above Sivopadhyaya prefers the reading bhayd
able as would be in accordance with a nirvacana that by some grammatically,

or rather phonetically acceptable standard would correspond to the analysed
item, 'bhairavah'. The form ravayati, however, does not seem to bother him.
Interestingly, he tries out and rejects an explanation which would save the
nirvacana that involves the elements bhr and ru. This explanation, he says,
relies on the 'crow's eye principle' 83
{bhr ->) Bhaira
rava (<— ru)
where the item ra covers both the prior and the posterior.
Finally Sivopadhyaya rejects, 'for all its antiquity', the nirvacana which
involves the three elements bharana, ravana and vamana, met with in the
Svacchandatantroddyota and the MahdrthamanjarTparimalau and discussed
above. This nirvacana, he claims, fails to account for the syllable ai.
The passage invites a number of observations. According to Sivopadhyaya,
a nirvacana has to account for every part of the word that is analysed, other-
wise the analysis is not acceptable. Moreover, every part of the word should be
infused with meaning. A phonetic link has to hold between the word, or part
of the word that is being explained and the explanatory expression. It is also
clear that Sivopadhyaya turns to scriptural authority for the ideological founda-
tion of a nirvacana. This ideological foundation pertains to meaning, not to
form. For example, the Vijndnabhairavatantra (VBh 130) ascribes to Bhairava
the attribute sarvadah 'who bestows all'. This is the verbal codification which
provides the semantic basis for claiming that rdti 'gives' is the explanation of
the corresponding element ra in bhai-RA-va. This, of course, opens a consid-
erable potential for exegesis, although in the case of Sivopadhyaya it is evident
that he sticks to his criteria for determining what is a valid nirvacana and what
is not, thus trying to limit the anarchy of infinite possibilities. In this respect it
is worthy of notice that he does not fight shy of attacking well-established nir-
vacanas.
One should however note that Sivopadhyaya in no way objects to analysis
by means of syllables and single sounds. Such a procedure is in perfect agree-
ment with the statement made by Yaska at least twenty centuries earlier (Nir
2.1): avidyamdne sdmdnye 'py aksaravarnasdmdnydn nirbruydt, 'even when
[such] a similarity [with a phonetic change accepted by the grammarians in
other cases] is not found, one should analyse on the basis of [a possible]
similarity in syllables or in single sounds'.85 Yaska goes on (ibid.): yathdrtham
vibhaktih sannamayet, 'the divisions [into syllables and single sounds] should
83
The kdkdksinydya. According to this metaphor, crows are considered to have but a single
eyeball which is supposed to roll from the one cavity of the eye to the other as required by the
84
situation
Like Ksemaraja, Sivopadhyaya reads (VBhV 115,18) bharanaravanavamandrtho bhairavah,
probably intending by ravana the same sense of samhdra 'resorption' Mahesvarananda reads
85
ramana 'the resting' which more obviously gives this sense.
Cf pp 37 f. above.
be interpreted according to meaning'. This attitude is reflected in the concept

of varnasdrupya 'conformity with single sounds' which is frequently resorted
to in the exegetical traditions of Saiva Kashmir. Within the domain of mantra-
analysis it provides the basic device,86 but it is also employed, as by Sivopa-
dhyaya, in the analysis of ordinary words.
As a matter of fact, in his MahdrthamanjarTparimala Mahesvarananda
quotes Yaska verbatim (MMP 89,3-4) to defend analysis by means of sylla-
bles and single sounds. He also accepts by quotation (MMP 89,3-4) the view
proclaimed by Yaska (Nir 2.1): na tv eva na nirbruydt, 'but never indeed
should one not analyse'. This, obviously, implies support for analysis by jneans
of syllables and single sounds. A clear example of this kind of analysis is found
in the explanation of the word ATHA, whose ordinary meaning is approxi-
mately 'now; then' (non-temporal). As quoted by Abhinavagupta in his
Pardtrimsikdvivarana (PTV 99,9), Somananda (fl.c. 900-50) states: Akdrah
siva ity uktas THAkdrah saktir ucyate}1 The linguistic items a and tha are iden-
tified as symbolic representations of Siva and Sakti respectively. The context
here is the word atha in the fifth sloka of the Pardtrimsikd. Incidentally,
Abhinavagupta admits something far stranger here when he suggests that the
element tha of atha in the statement athddyds tithayah sarve svardh, '. . . all
the 15 vowels beginning with a' may be euphonic (sukhoccdrandrtha) (PTV
101,9).
But even a niruktapriyah, lover of the nirvacana device, such as Ksemaraja,
feels the need to draw the line somewhere. This is clear from his commentary
on Sivasutra 3.29: yo 'vipastho jfidhetus ca. Partly applying Ksemaraja's own
interpretation (SSV 115,8 ff.), one may roughly translate: 'He who (yah)
resides (°sthah) among the protectors (°pa°) of individuals (avi°, lit.
'animals'), [that is, who controls the Powers thus called,] is indeed (ca) a cause
of knowledge (jndhetuh)' But Ksemaraja rejects the following interpretation
of the sutra, where the original items are indicated by capital letters: YOgTndro
VIjndnaPAdaSTHAh JNAtd HEyas TUcchaH (= visargasaktyd) CA (= implica-
tion of kartd [i.e.jndtd kartd ca, 'the agent of knowledge and action']). Since
this is rather dense it may be worthwhile to quote the SivasutravimarsinT
passage in full (SSV 116,7-118,4):
anye tu ' aksarasdrupydt prabruydf iti niruktasthityd 'yo' iti yogindrah, 'vV iti
vijhdnam, 'pa* iti padam, lstha* iti padasthah ity asya antyam aksaramI ijna> iti
jhdtd, 'he' iti heyah, 'tu' iti tucchaid, visarjamyena visargasaktih, cakarena crnuk-
tasamuccaydrthena karta pardmrsyate ity dsritya, yo yogindro vimarsasaktyd
svarupdtmavijhdnapadasthah, sa jhdtd kartd ca avagantavyah; tadd ca asya
86
Cf. Abhinavagupta at TA 5.142. Analysing the pardblja SAUH (cf. Padoux 1963:350 ff.;
1990:416-22) he identifies S with the sensation of the initial cognition of sukha, sitkara, sat,
and samya. See also PTV 239,4-7: sakdras tdvat . . . satyasukhasampatsattddindm
87
paramdrthikam vapuh. \
From Somananda's lost vivrti, itself quoting unidentified or lost scripture according to
Abhinavagupta who speaks of dgamapradarsanam, 'reference to Agama' (PTV 99,10).
heyatdm tucchatdm nihsdratdm, na tu upddeyatdm dsddayati iti vydcaksate Ietac ca

na nah pratibhdti, paddrthasangater ndticdrutvdt; pratisutram ca Tdrsavydkh-
ydkramasya sahasraso darsayitum saktyatvdtll
But others, through the settled rule of the Nirukta that one should analyse [even] on
the basis of conformity with [single] syllables, [interpret:] [the element] yo [con-
forms with] yogindrah 'the great Yogin', vi [with] vijndnam 'knowledge', pa [with]
padam 'state'; stha is the last syllable of padasthah 'abides in the state'. [The
element] ywa: [conforms with] jfidtd 'the agent of knowledge', he [with] heyah 'to be
renounced', tu [with] tucchatd 'vanity', the Power of creative energy (visargasakti)
[is implied] by the visarjaniya (h), kartd 'agent' is referred to by the conjunction ca
which [here] means that something unstated [but necessary to complete the sense
in context] is conjoined. Having resorted to [conformity with syllables in this way],
they explain [Sivasutra 3.29 as follows]: 'he (yo°), the great Yogin (yogindrah), who
abides in the state of knowledge of the self which is his real nature (svarupdtmavi-
jhdnapadasthah) through the Power of [self-]awareness, should be recognised as
[the individual] agent of [both] knowledge and action; and at the same time he real-
ises that this [individual agent of knowledge and action] is to be transcended, is
trivial, that is, is without value, that it is not fit to be the object of his aspiration.'
But this [interpretation] does not find favour with us since this correlation of terms
and meanings is an offence against literary taste. Moreover, since a series of such
lines of interpretation could be produced by the thousand for each siltra.
Ksemaraja thus clearly objects to such an interpretation, claiming that by
this kind of exegesis one could cook up an infinity of interpretations. Yet this
reason is second to the specific objection that this particular nirvacana gives
an ill-coordinated result as far as meaning is concerned.
The necessity of shared beliefs

We have seen how meaning is subject to negotiation through the device of nir-
vacana analysis. It remains to point out that people were not entirely deceived
by it. If meaning is to be socially accessible, and meaning necessarily is, there
will have to be a strong element of intersubjectivity involved. Meanings and
beliefs are thus two sides of the same coin. It is this intersubjectivity that neces-
sitates the contrast between true and false beliefs. There has to be a certain
overlap in beliefs for people to talk about the same things, and we shall now
see what befalls the nirvacana device if beliefs are not shared.
By way of example I may point to the great eleventh-century Kashmirian
Vaisnava satirist Ksemendra who gives some wonderfully derogatory nirvac-
dnas of the terms diksa and guru, denoting respectively the Tantric ritual of
initiation and the teacher who performs it. However, these two elements are the
cornerstones of Saivism in practice. For example, Abhinavagupta talks about
diksd as follows (TA 1.237-40):
tendtra ye codayanti nanu jndndd vimuktatd I
diksddikd kriyd ceyam sd katham muktaye bhavetll 237//
jhdndtmd seti cej jhdnam yatrastham tarn vimocayetl

anyasya mocane vdpi bhavet kim ndsamahjasaml
iti te mulatdh ksiptd yat tv atrdnyaih samarthitam I1238 //
malo ndma kila dravyam caksuhsthapatalddivat I
tadvihantrlkriyd diksd tv anjanddikakarmavat I1239//
tat purastdn nisetsydmo yuktydgamavigarhitam I
malamdydkarmandm ca darsayisydmahe sthitimll 240//
Therefore radically refuted are those who argue that if liberation is caused by
knowledge, such actions as initiation {diksd) could not bring release, saying that if
the ritual of initiation is knowledge it could still bring about release only of that
person in whom it resides (i.e., the Guru) and that there would be^no question of
its serving to liberate another. As for the claims of others in this matter that impur-
ity is a substance like a membrane covering the surface of the eye (cataract) and
that ritual initiation destroys with an effect analogous to that of antimony (in the
case of a cataract), we shall refute them later, being as they are excluded both by
reason and revelation; we shall also demonstrate the true nature of mala, mdyd, and
karman.
Before turning to the nirvacanas of guru and diksd suggested by Ksemendra,
it may be useful to see what prevalent Saiva nirvacanas of the two terms look
like. As a traditional nirvacana of the term diksd in non-dualist Saiva sources
we may choose the one cited by Ksemaraja in his Svacchandatantroddyota
(SvTU3[5]76,17-18):
dTyate jhdnasadbhdvah ksiyate pasuvdsand I
ddnaksapanasamyuktd diksd teneha kirtitdll
Through it knowledge is imparted, and there is destroyed the impression [of contrac-
tion] which characterises [the consciousness of] the individual. Therefore, in as
much as it is connected with [these activities of] giving and destroying, it is termed
'diksd"' here [in this system].
So here the nirvacana is based on the activities expressed by the roots Add
'give' and Aksi 'destroy', the destruction (ksapana) of the impressions left in
the mind being what is intended.88
For a similar nirvacana of the term guru, we may turn to Mahesvarananda's
MahdrthamahjarTparimala (MMP 4,10):
sa ca guruh grndti prakdsayati visvavyavahdram iti niruktyd sarvanugrdhakah I
And he is a guru in as much as he facilitates everything, according to the nirukti:
'he proclaims {grndti), that is, illuminates all practice'.
Ksemendra, however, interprets the two terms diksd and guru rather differ-
ently in his Desopadesa (Des 8.3):
88
Concerning various nirvacanas of the term diksd common among the Saivas of the Siddhanta,
see H. Brunner-Lachaux 1977:3-4. Common to most of them is that they claim diksd to be so-
called because it gives the essence of knowledge {^dd 'give') and destroys {^ksi 'destroy') the
three impurities etc.
gunarahito rutakdri sisyavadhunam sadd gurur gaditah I

dindraksayakarandd diksety uktd krtd tenall
Being worthless [lit., deprived of qualities, GUna°] and because he makes the wives
of his disciples squeal (RUta°), he is called a guru. He performs diksd, so called
because it bankrupts you [lit., it causes destruction (KSAya°) of DIndra 'gold
(coins)'].
Evidently, a strong overlap in beliefs is necessary for the nirvacana device to
work properly. A nirvacana is an interplay between properties and names, and
thus an attempt to repeat a process of initial baptising through the name itself.
Therefore the causal history of a word enters the picture in the sense that a
person's concept of a word depends on the kinds of things by which his use of
words has been conditioned. This is how the tradition becomes important. The
method itself gives legitimacy to a nirvacana analysis, but if a nirvacana can be
based on ideas sanctioned by the authorities of the tradition, then its power
increases. If a nirvacana has no such basis at all, it serves just to mock; one man's
nirvacana may then be another man's con.89 At one extreme, then, it might be
held that the range of possible nirvacana analyses is as wide as the range of pos-
sible maximal sets of beliefs and that these are as wide as the possible maximal
set of sentences consisting of any words beginning with the individual sounds
making up the word. Thus^ one reaches a boggling point. But coherence with
which beliefs creates a presumption of truth? As noted already, meaning is deter-
mined by the community in as much as there is a common language only to the
extent that there is a common method of interpretation within a community.
Preliminary reflections and conclusions

It should by now be clear that a nirvacana analysis is much more than a deriva-
tion from a verbal root, and that Yaska's task was different from that of a
comparative philologist. Although not every extreme is accepted, it should be
evident from the preceding discussion that nirvacana analysis is a powerful
device in manipulating the apparently neutral elements of cultural discourse.
The obvious question then becomes: how did it come to be so powerful? The
above investigation of 'Bhairava' may warrant the following reflections and
tentative conclusions.
When people share a belief system, then assurance of a change in belief
cannot come from outside the system, nor can something inside produce
support except as it can be shown to rest on something independently trust-
worthy. Within a context of shared beliefs, the nirvacana device of interpreta-
tion is such a trustworthy entity.
89
It seems natural in this context to refer to the well-known mrvacanas of the names of the four
varnas, the classes of the Indian social hierarchy, in the Aggahha-Sutta in the Digha-Nikdya
of the Pali canon (sutta 27 in the PTS edition); cf. U. Schneider 1954:578 ff.; A. Mette
1973:33-5; G. v. Simson 1988; R. Gombnch 1992,1992a.
In as much as it is anvartha, the explanatory expression of a nirvacana or

nirukti analysis corresponds to the sense and nature of that which is denoted
by the term being explained. To determine the reference of a term it is thus suf-
ficient to analyse the term itself. Aiming to persuade the unpersuaded, a nir-
vacana goes right into the mechanics of a term, pretending to discover meaning
in what is already there and seemingly giving the factual affirmation that
certain beliefs are true. For example, on the evidence of the nirvacanas of
'Bhairava' presented in the Tantrdloka passage and the other works consulted
it is possible to claim that the significant expression of each explanatory unit
has the semantic power to identify the nature of a deity such as Bhairava.
Whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent prop-
erties depends simply on the way it is described. The important feature of nir-
vacana analysis is that it is not sufficient to say that a certain property belongs
to X, or that a number of properties belong to X, so often or in such ways that
people in general believe that X is such that it is recognised by these proper-
ties. In nirvacana analysis the attribution of properties happens through the
name itself.
Now, if this is the case, it is actually possible to argue that the linguistic unit
of each explanatory expression is semantically equivalent to the term which is
explained, a term such as 'Bhairava' or any singular or general term. The
explanatory expressions are thus ideal linguistic forms, arrived at through an
analytic procedure accepted by the tradition, and it is really the ideal forms
which determine the reference of the term which appears as a linguistic sub-
stitute for the ideal one.
If, then, these explanations are ideal linguistic forms and if such an ideal
form justifies the actual practice of using a term in a specific sense, then the
following question becomes crucial: how is it possible that the device of pre-
senting ideal forms of linguistic items - even syllables and single sounds - by
means of nirvacana analysis has come to be a hermeneutics *6f the highest
esteem? In the universe of discourse only that will count as justification which
refers to what is already accepted, and there is no way to get outside the set of
shared beliefs and language to find a model for such justification.
The answer to this crucial question seems surprisingly simple in that the
Indian tradition itself provides us with the model, namely the model of sub-
stitution. Here we have, I suggest, a key to a pattern of consistencies within the
Indian universe of discourse. Whether substitution may licitly be considered a
pattern in Indian thinking in general may be a matter of dispute. It is however
settled beyond doubt that it is an established pattern within Brahmanical reli-
gious literature ever since the quest for meaning in the fundamental sense
started with the Brahmana and Upanisadic literature, later to become techni-
cally refined in ritual and grammatical treatises.
I put this forward tentatively as a hypothesis to be considered. On this view,
a nirvacana works because it is an ideal formulation of the term that is to be
explained. The term to be explained is the substitute we meet with in language
for a fuller statement with the same semantic content. The nirvacana is a
rewording, a rewriting, which is both explanatory and semantically equivalent.
Because both expressions are part of the Sanskrit language, in a way nothing
new is introduced. 'Bhairava' must mean all these things, because we recog-
nise what the explanations mean and that these meanings do accord with meta-
physics. You can give exactly the same truth conditions in a language by
making systematic shifts in what the singular terms refer to and what satisfies
the predicates. You get a different thought if you get a different sentence to
represent it. If you say 'bhairavaK instead of 'yo bibharti\ then it is a neces-
sary truth that the deity referred to is he who sustains the universe. But it is
because of the name 'Bhairava' that it is treated as a necessary truth.
Now, what challenges does this assumption contain or entail? First of all it
becomes crucial to determine the exact relation sustained between a substitute
and its corresponding ideal formulation(s), that is to say, the relation between
a term and its corresponding explanatory expression. If the above assumptions
are valid, this means the Indian conceptions of the relation 'being in the place
of. The obvious place to start an investigation of the relationship between term
and explanation is Yaska's Nirukta. This is partly because this text laid the
foundations of nirvacanasdstra and so established a certain practice, but more
importantly because in this text we meet with certain fixed technical methods
for expressing a nirvacana analysis. Systematic ways of expression applied
over and over again assure us that we are dealing with thought patterns repre-
senting implicit models that make up the universe of Yaska, models inherited
by the entire subsequent tradition. Secondly, it becomes imperative to investi-
gate the indigenous model of substitution itself, in particular in grammatical
literature where it found its most articulate elaboration. Then it remains to see
whether the relationship between term and explanation and the interpretation
of the explanation as an ideal formulation for which the term met with in the
real language is a substitute are compatible with the results of such an
investigation.
4
The universe of Yaska
It is evident from the Saiva examples that a nirvacana analysis can be

expressed in non-technical language. This is the case also in the Nirukta, for
example (Nir 10.22): krstaya iti manusyandmal karmavanto bhavantil
vikrstadehd vd9 'krstayah is a name for human beings: they possess action [i.e.,
they are active] (karmavantah), or: their bodies are stretched out (vi-krstdh)\
Although certain patterns seem to underlie all of Yaska's nirvacanas in the
sense that he is establishing a relation between a name and an action or an
event, only those explanations which are formulated in a highly technical
manner can be expected to give systematic information about the relation sus-
tained between a term and its corresponding explanatory expression. Within
the limits of such a bound methodology the Nirukta presents us with five
clearly distinguishable ways of analysing words. To facilitate a general
presentation, the following constructed examples for the word meghah 'cloud'
may be considered:
(1) megho mehandt
(2) mehatiti meghah
(3) megho mehateh
(4) megho miheh
(5) megho mehatiti satah
Obviously, if we interpret all of these simply to mean 'the word megha is
derived from the root miti as has been the habit in modern Indology, the differ-
ences between the various ways of expressing an analysis are not accounted for
at all. I shall discuss each one of them in turn.
The reason for a name: analyses in -andt

Yaska explains 109 words in the Nirukta by a construction which involves a
verbal noun in -andt. This number is surpassed only by the analyses of the -teh
type which is by far the most frequent one. A representative example of the
-andt construction is: sindhuh syandandt (Nir 9.26). I suggest the following
interpretation: 'sindhu (the river Indus) [is so called] on account of the stream-
ing (syandana)\ A phonetic link is established between the term sindhuh and
a verbal element alluded to by the verbal noun syandanam which is to be inter-

preted as a neuter nomen actionis or bhdvasddhana if we adhere to Indian ter-
minology, that is to say, as 'a streaming'.1 The Sanskrit dictionaries most
widely used, record that the verbal nouns in -ana employed in this type of
construction are quite frequently attested only in the Nirukta. This warrants the
conclusion that these forms are in principle derived by Yaska himself for a
technical purpose. The name 'sindhiC is related to the verbal noun by an abla-
tive construction which explains why 'sindhu* came to signify the river of that
name, and the construction is thus a natural way of answering the kasmdt
'why?' 2 with which Yaska frequently introduces an analysis. It is also linked
to the formula etasmdd eva, 'for the very same reason'.3 A causal interpreta-
tion of the ablative is strongly supported by the commentators. For example,
Durga remarks on the analysis of vrsabha (Nir 9.22) as follows (D 11:924,3):
vrsanat4 retovarsandd dhetoh bhakdram upajanikrtvd vrsabha ity ucyate,
'vrsandt, that is to say, because of the raining of semen, for that reason (hetoh),
having made the addition of the syllable bha, he is called vrsabha"? Finally,
Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara repeatedly refer to constructions of the -andt
type as a hetunirdesa 'explicit statement of the reason'.6 With this background
it can be concluded that the -andt construction is a causal explanation reveal-
ing the action or event which caused the initial baptising of the river.
An analysis of this kind gives no explicit information about how that which
is signified is related to the action considered the cause of the name, that is to
say, no kdraka analysis is given. In this particular case an interpretation as
kartrsddhana is obvious,7 but in most cases we are left to choose among alter-
native possibilities. This indicates that as a technical analysis it is less precise
than several of the other types, a circumstance that is important with regard to
the later tradition which finds itself free to choose from the set of possible
interpretations that exist within the frames of the model set up by Yaska.
As a method of analysis, the -andt construction is older than Yaska. It is met
with in the oldest Upanisads, for example in the Brhaddranyaka (5.7.1): viddndd
vidyut, 'on account of shattering (viddna) [it is called] vidyut (lightning)'. It is
1
It is difficult to find direct evidence for this m the Nirukta itself since the nouns in question
always appear in the ablative case, but the commentators support the above conclusion By way
of example, Skanda-Mahesvara consider dhananam to be the nominative of dhanandt (SM
1:5,4), niparanam that of niparandt (SM II 74,9), pananam that of panandt (SM II 95,13), and
2
samnahanam that of samnahandt (SM II 260,14)
3
For this interpretation of kasmdt, see Kahrs 1983
4
A full discussion of this formula is given pp. 131-52 below.
Durga seems to read vrsanat for varsandt as met with in all editions of the Nirukta, only one
5
MS reads varsandt
As further examples one may mention Durga's use of tatah and hetoh in his remarks on the
analysis of nighantavah (D 1.31,5,16), his statement kim kdranam, 'what is the reason9' before
the analysis virodhandt (Nir 6 1), or Skanda-Mahesvara's °hetutvdt (SM II 28,4)
6
7
See, for example, Durga on visravandt (Nir 5 5) and virohandt (Nir 6 3), cf Kahrs 1980 84-9
Cf. Durga (D II 931,11-13) sindhuh kasmdt I syandandtl sd hy avicchedena visesatah syan
data iti, 'why sindhuh^ syandandt for she streams (syandate) in a special way by never ceasing
to stream' Note that Durga considers sindhu- to be feminine.
also clear that the -andt type of analysis was established within the nairukta
tradition before the time of Yaska. This is evident from the fact that it is the only
strictly technical method employed by his predecessor Aupamanyava whenever
he is quoted in the Nirukta. An example is (Nir 2.2): dando [. . .] damandd ity
aupamanyavah, 'danda (stick; punishment) [. . .] [is so called] "on account of
the taming (damanam)", according to Aupamanyava'.8
Evidently a condensed way of expressing typical Brahmana formulations,
the -andt construction and the causal way of thinking that underlies it are
rewardingly elucidated by a fresh look at the analyses of dpah 'Waters' met
with in the Atharvaveda and the Satapathabrdhmana.9 In the Brahmana the
analysis appears in the form yad dpnot tasmdd dpah, 'that he got hold of
[them], on account of that: dpah\ If in the place of yad dpnot we substitute the
verbal noun dpana and put this in the ablative case instead of adding tasmdt,
we would arrive at the construction dpandd dpah, 'on account of the getting-
hold-of [them, they are called] dpah\ This indicates that in a construction of
this kind the verbal noun in -ana is not merely a way of indicating a verbal root.
It contains in an ambiguous way the various specific aspects of action which
we can attribute to a verb.
Not all scholars have interpreted the -andt constructions in the way sug-
gested here. Lakshman Sarup (1921:23) translates the above analysis dando
[. ..] damandd ity aupamanyavah (Nir 2.2) as follows: " T h e word (danda) is
derived from (the root) dam", says Aupamanyava.' I shall argue why I do not
think this is the way to translate a construction of this kind.
Yaska's analysis of vrsabha 'bull' at Nirukta 9.22 presents the way of rea-
soning underlying an -andt analysis quite well: vrsabhah prajdm varsatiti vdl
atibrhati reta iti vdl tad varsakarmd varsandd vrsabhah,10 ' vrsabha: [because]
he rains offspring or because he emits semen excessively; therefore he is one
whose activity (°karmd) is to rain, [and] because of the raining [he is called]
vrsabha'}x l
The fact that the starting point for the analysis of a word is an action or event
related to that which it signifies, makes it possible to suggest alternative analy-
ses for one and the same word according to the action considered to be its
foundation. An example is the analysis of devah (Nir 7.15): devo ddndd vdl
dipandd vdl dyotandd vd.n But these three alternatives also reveal that an
8
The method is also met with m later texts, for example Visnupurdna 1.5.41: yaksas tu yaksandt,
'as for yaksa: on account of the eating (yaksanam)\ and Abhidharmakosabhasya explaining
the word dharma at AK 1.2: nirvacanqm tu svalaksanadhdrandd dharmah, 'as for the nirv
9
cana: on account of10[its] holding (dhdranam) [its] unique particular, [it is called] a dharma\
11
See p. 26 above. The context is vrsabhah at Nighantu 5.3.
Sarup (1921.146) translates prajdm varsati as 'rains down offspring'. The word prajd can also
mean 'semen', but Yaska uses retas for 'semen' in the following sentence. Still, both mean-
ings may be implied. Durga gives support to this (D 11:923,15): vrsabhah kasmdtl sa hi prajam
varsati / prajotpattikdranam retah sincati yonau, 'why vrsabhahl Because he rains prajd, th
12
is to say, he emits semen which causes the production of offspring in the female womb.'
For further examples, see the analyses of bilvam (Nir 1.14), mustih (Nir 6.1) or pdthah (Nir
6.7).
analysis of the -andt type does establish a phonetic link to a verb or a verbal
root in as much as the meaning of dipanam and dyotanam is very much the
same.13
This raises a question of predominance: is the phonetic link central or is the
semantic aspect the primary one? This question finds its answer in the fact that
there are instances where there is no trace whatsoever of a phonetic link
between the word that is analysed and the verbal noun in -ana. This, I believe,
supports the claim that Yaska was primarily concerned with semantics. An
example is rasmir yamandt (Nir 2.15).14 Here one would be hard put to trace
any phonetic link between the two words whatsoever. Nevertheless, this is one
of the examples adduced by S. Varma when he states (1953:29): 'Some ety-
mologies of Yaska shock the philologist on account of their absurdities, as they
wildly go against the fundamental laws of phonology.' This, however, is no
'etymology' at all. As noted already, the first three chapters of the Nighantu
contain groups of synonyms, and each group is headed by a word which serves
to indicate the meaning common to all the words of that particular group.
Accordingly, Yaska had no reason to analyse each and every word of the group.
He had, on the other hand, every reason to analyse and determine the meaning
of the adhikdra-word, and this is indeed his common practice. In the Nighantu
(1.5) we find fifteen words grouped under the heading rasmindmdni. The state-
ment rasmir yamandt is made from a purely semantic point of view. Yaska is
simply telling us that the word rasmi 'ray; rein' can be used as the adhikdra-
word of Nighantu 1.5 because of the meaning yamana 'restraining', a meaning
common to all the fifteen words of the group. The entire passage of the Nirukta
runs (Nir 2.15):
rasminamany uttardni pahcadasal rasmir yamandt I tesdm dditah sddhdrandm
paficdsvarasmibhih I
We are forced to interpret:
The following fifteen [words] are names for rasmi 'ray; rein'; rasmi [is the
adhikdra-word of the group] on account of [the meaning] yamana 'restraining'
[common to all the words of the group]. Among these [fifteen words], the first five
are simultaneously denoting horse-reins.
Durga has not much to say here, but Skanda-Mahesvara comment as follows
(SM 11:90,3-4): rasmir yamanad ity arthakathanam etat, na dhdtupradars-
anam,15 'rasmir yamandt: this relates to the meaning and is not a reference to
a verbal root'. They go on to give a linguistic analysis (ibid.): raser eva rasmih,
13
Cf. Dhp 1.177 dyuta diptau and 4.42 dipT diptau. Durga too sees no difference m meaning here
and remarks (D 1:796,2): dyotanad va dhdtvanyatvam arthaikatvam, '[as for the analysis]
dyotanad va there is a different root, [but] the meaning is the same'. For a similar instance, see
14
Durga on the analysis of angam at Nirukta 4.3 (D 1:356,6-7).
Other examples are muksijd mocandc cal sayandc cal tatandc ca (Nir 5.19) and vratatir
varandc cal sayandc cal tatandc 15
ca (Nir 6.28). The problem has been discussed at greater
length by Kahrs 1980:61-76. MSS B and C read dhdtusabdapra0.
'rasmih is indeed of16 rasih (Vra/)'. The Paninlya dhdtupdtha does not list any
root ras, but it is met with in Devaraja's Nighantutikd (Mor 1952:52): rasir
yamandrtho dhdtuh (sau°), 'rasih is a (sautra) root with the sense of restrain-
ing'. Skanda-Mahesvara too operate with a root ras (SM 11:90,4-6):17
rasand rasmir iti katipayaprayogavisaya1* evdyam rasih, rahatyddivat}9 na sarva-
tra, bandhanapratiter yamanad ity aha - ekatrodakasydparatrdsvdndm I
As in the case of [roots] such as rah (rahatih), this [root] ras has only a limited
domain of usage [and occurs only in the words] rasand and rasmih, that is to say,
not in every instance [of yamana]; but since there is an understanding of [the sense
of] binding [for all the words in this section of the Nighantu], he says yamandv, in
one context, of water, in another, of horses.
What Skanda-Mahesvara indicate here is that Yaska preferred yamandt to
rasandt because a root ras would only be acceptable in the cases of rasand and
rasmi, not for the other words in this section of the Nighantu. A more
straightforward explanation would be that Yaska probably did not know of a
root ras. Be this as it may, Skanda-Mahesvara's remark supports the view that
rasmi 'ray; rein' can be used as the adhikdra-word of Nighantu 1.5 because of
the meaning yamana 'restraining', a meaning common to all the words in this
section.
This interpretation is supported by an investigation of similar constructions
in the context of other adhikdra-woxds in the Nighantu. A good example is the
apparently redundant analysis stotd stavandt (Nir 3.19). The grammatical
16
This is a preliminary and neutral way of interpreting genitives of the -eh and -teh kinds; such
17
analyses will be discussed in detail further on.
The unddi analysis is by adding the suffix mi to as which is replaced by ras; so, for example
the DasapadT (DPU 1.15): ase asa ca. The Vrtti comments: aser dhdtor mipratyayo bhava
rasa ity ayam ddesahl asu vydptau sau°, asa bhojane krai° I asnute asnatiti vd rasmi
mayukahl karttd, 'the suffix mi is added after the root as, [and] this [element] ras is [its] sub-
stitute; the fifth class root as when the sense of attaining [is to be denoted] or the ninth class
root as when the sense of consuming [is to be denoted]: it attains or it consumes, hence rasmi,
i.e., a ray of light; [it denotes] the agent [of the actions denoted by the two roots as]\
Ujjvaladatta comments on PPU 4.46 as follows: asu vydptau// ato mihl dhdto rasddesahl
rasmih kirano raj jus ca, '[the root] as [occurs] when [the meaning] vydpti [is, to be denoted];
[the suffix] -mi [is added] after it; the substitute ras [occurs] in the place of the root, [which
gives you] rasmi [in the senses of] ray of light and rope/rein'. A similar interpretation is met
with in Hemacandra's Unddisutra 688 (Kirste 1895:116): aso ras cddih, '[the suffix -mi (687)
is added] after [the root] as and r [occurs] as the beginning'. Hemacandra himself comments
(ibid.): asauti vydptau I ity asmdn mih pratyayo [bhavati] rephas ca dhdtor ddir bha
rasmih pragraho mayukhas ca, '[the root] as [occurs] when [the sense of] vydpti [is to be
denoted], [and] after it the suffix -mi [is added] and r appears as the beginning of the root,
[which gives you] rasmi [in the senses of] rein and ray of light'. Further information is yielded
by Hemacandra's analysis of the word rasand (Kirste 1895:47): aso ras cddau, '[the suffix
-ana is added] after [the root] as and r [occurs] at the beginning'. In his commentary
Hemacandra remarks (ibid.): rasim eke prakrtim upadisanti sd ca rdsi rasand rasmi ity a
prayujyata ity dhuh, 'some teach rasih as the stem, and say that it is used here: rasih, rasand,
[and] rasmih\
18
MSS B and C read katiprayaprayoga0. The passage occurs in Devarajayajvan' 0
s commentary
19
on the Nighantu, and the 0
edition of Mor (1952:52) reads katipataprayoga
0
.
MS D reads haratyddi and Devaraja (ibid.) reads bharatyddi .
formation of stotr is so completely regular that no further analysis seems to be

called for. In Paninian terms, the krt (A 3.1.93 krd atin) suffixes (A 3.1.1
pratyayah) NvuL (with -aka replacing NvuL by A 7.1.1 yovor andkau) and trC
(-tr) (A 3.1.133 nvultrcau) are added after (A 3.1.2 paras ca) a verbal root (A
3.1.91 dhdtoh) to denote the agent (A 3.4.67 kartari krt). The wording
stotrndmdny uttardni trayodasal stotd stavandt (Nir 3.19) shows to better
advantage if we interpret: 'the following thirteen [words] are names for stotr
"one who praises"; stotd [is the adhikdra-word of Nighantu 3.16] on account
of [the meaning] stavana "praising" [common to all the words of the group]'.
Just like rasmi in Nighantu 1.5 the word stotr 'praiser' is the suitable adhikdra-
word of Nighantu 3.19 because of the meaning stavana 'praising' common to
all the words in this group.
To conclude, it is evident from this that constructions of the -andt type can
refer exclusively to the semantic content of a word. This important fact also
explains why such constructions occur as additional semantic elucidations to
analyses of the -teh type.20 There is accordingly every reason to be cautious
even when a phonetic link seems to be established between a term and the
verbal noun in -ana. To regard these constructions in the Nirukta as first and
foremost grammatical analyses is apt to lead one astray. They are causal
explanations revealing the action or event which caused the initial baptising of
that which is signified by a term.
Another way of giving a reason: mehatiti

Yaska has one more way of giving a causal explanation for why something is
called what it is called, exemplified above as mehatiti meghah, '[being
characterised by the description] "it rains (mehati)" [he is called] megha\ The
thought pattern underlying it is also to a certain extent identical with the one
underlying the analysis of dpah 'Waters' met with in the Atharvaveda
3.13.2c-d: tad dpnod indro vo yatis tdsmdd apo dnu sthana, 'then Indra got
hold of you as you flowed, hence you are [called] Waters thereafter'.21 This is
a more complex causal explanation in as much as the author has made it clear
just how the Waters participated in the action considered the cause of their
name. And, noteworthy, the narrative is in the past tense, thus referring to one
specific event. The Nairuktas in general dissolve historicity, and use the
present tense instead. In other words, an analysis of the type mehatiti meghah
is an instance of expressing a familiar karate-analysis.
Let me briefly return to the examples of kdraka-an&lysis in the Nirukta
adduced previously22 and reconsider them as examples of a particular type of
nirvacana analysis. Yaska analyses dhanvan (dhdnva, Nigh 4.2) as follows (Nir
5.5): dhanvdntariksaml dhanvanty asmdddpah, 'dhanvan, i.e. antariksam (the
20
See Kahrs 1980:110-24; by way of example: disah kasmdtl disatehl dsadandtl api vd-
21
bhydsandt (Nir 2.15);
22
pdsyd pdsasamuhah I pdsah pdsayatehl vipdsandt (Nir 4.2).
See p. 26 above. See p. 54 above.'
104 Indian semantic analysis ?
intermediate space between heaven and earth; atmosphere), [is so called

because something] flows (dhanvanti) from it, [namely] water'. Yaska thus
suggests an interpretation as apdddnasddhana: the atmosphere is that from
which water flows, and because of that flowing it is called dhanva. Another
example is the analysis of ahar 'day' (Nir 2.20): ahah kasmdtl updharanty
asmin karmdni, 'why aharl [because] one carries out (updharanti: upa-d-Ahf)
[something] in the course of it, [namely] actions'. Yaska gives an analysis as
adhikaranasddhana: & day is that in which actions are carried out, and because
of that carrying out, it is called ahar. Likewise the word grisma 'summer' (Nir
4.27): grismo grasyante 'smin rasdh, 'gnsmah [is so called because something]
is devoured {grasyante) during it, [namely] juices'. Yaska gives an interpreta-
tion as adhikaranasddhana: the summer is the season during which all juices
are devoured, and because of that devouring it is called grisma.
It is clear that an analysis of the type mehatiti meghah gives a causal
explanation and also an interpretation with regard to kdraka. It is in the latter
respect that it differs from an analysis of the -andt type which does not specify
how that which is signified participates in the action considered the cause of
the name. As for the relationship between a term and its corresponding
explanatory expression, it is also in this case a causal one.
Analyses in -teh and -eh

It is now time to turn to the method exemplified as megho mehateh. The first
thing one has to face is that mehateh terminates in a case form which is not
immediately clear. The method presents the 3rd sg. present active form of the
verbal root Amih treated as a nominal /-stem to make it declinable. So far in
modern Indology the ending -eh has been interpreted as an ablative ending, the
interpretation 'derived from' being taken for granted. Without excluding the
ablative possibility - although the ablative would definitely have to be inter-
preted differently from what has been common so far - 1 shall in what follows
present evidence which suggests that it is a genitive ending. This would open
up for far more interesting interpretations, in particular with regard to the rela-
tion between the word analysed and the expression used to analyse it. The
mehateh type is by far the most common technical method of analysis met with
in the Nirukta. In a very few instances, however, the analysis is given in the
form megho miheh. In this case the verbal root is turned directly into a noun
by the addition of the nominal suffix -/. Both of these constructions, mehatih
and mihih, are sanctioned by Katyayana as valid ways of referring to a verbal
root.23 With this background, let me now turn to the type of nirvacana
expressed by means of a formal analysis in -teh and what it entails in more
detail.
Because most of the -teh material from the Nirukta adds little to our know-
23
A 3 3 108, vt 2 ikstipau dhdtunirdese
ledge about this type of analysis as such, I see no point in discussing this
material in extenso. Instead, as a sample of what we are dealing with, I shall
begin by presenting the first fourteen analyses occurring in the text, together
with the relevant remarks by the commentators. I shall then proceed to discuss
in detail the possibly interesting cases.
In what follows the ending -teh has been translated very neutrally as 'of,
denoting the relation of 'belonging to', under its aspect as a possible genitive
ending, and as 'from', denoting th$ relation 'being from', under its aspect as a
possible ablative ending. The analyses are presented in the same order as they
occur in the Nirukta, and numbered by reference to the chapter and passage in
which they occur. If further distinction is required, a letter is added after the
paragraph number.
(1.4a) vaydh sdkhd veteh I vdtdyand bhavantil
vaydh, [meaning] branches, is of/from vetih (A/VF 'move'). They are such as move m
the wind.
This refers to RV 6.24.3 which exhibits the form vaydh (pi.), thus inciden-
tally analysed in this context. Skanda-Mahesvara annex the attribute gaty-
arthasya to veteh, hence considering it a genitive form (SM 1:51,9): vayah
sakha veteh gatyarthasya. Similarly, Nllakantha (NSV 1.2.55): gatyarthasya
vayah sakha veter dhdtor uddhrtdh.24 Nllakantha here adds the word dhdtoh,
genitive singular of dhdtu- 'verbal root'. To determine the exact sense of the
word uddhrtdh could be of some importance for understanding Nllakantha's
way of interpreting an analysis of this kind. It seems to me most likely that the
word carries the general sense of 'related; declared; said to be'.
The phrase vdtdyand bhavanti I would consider an additional explanation
which states the reason for choosing the activity expressed by the root Vvf as
the basis for the analysis of vaydh which reasonably lends itself to an inter-
pretation as kartrsddhana, that is, as expressing the notion of agency with
regard to the activity denoted by the verb vetih: Vvf 'move'. Skanda-Mahesvara,
on the other hand, take vdtdyand bhavanti to be a separate analysis of vaydh25
(SM 1:51,11):
vatayana bhavantln dvitiyam nirvacanam, vdto 'yano ydsdm vdtena yds cdlyanta ity
arthahl
'vdtdyand bhavantV is a second analysis: those for which the wind is a mover, that
is to say, those which are caused to move by the wind.
This indicates a karmasddhana interpretation of vaydh, more in accordance
with the meaning of the noun vdtdyanam (neuter gender) met with in classical
24
25
According to the editor, the MS reads veteddhdtoruddhrtam.
So also NSV 12.56, however the lacuna in the text is filled up with the relevant words from
the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara The editor may be justified in doing so since
v Nllakantha obviously relied on this commentary, cf in this respect Vijayapalah 1982 46 ff
(upodghdtah).
Sanskrit, namely, 'an opening in the wall through which the wind can pass; air-
hole; window', though this strictly speaking would require adhikaranasddh-
ana. The word vaydh could thus be understood to denote branches in the sense
of 'such through which the wind moves/such as are moved by the wind',
maybe involving the element va- from vdta 'wind', that is to say; from Vva26
'blow', and -ya from Vi 'move'.
Durga does not cite or comment upon the words vdtdyand bhavanti which
may therefore be a later addition. Sayana quotes the entire passage at RV 1.59.1.
(1.4b) sdkhdh khasaydhl saknoter va/
sdkhdh, that is, khasaydh 'such as abide in the air'; or it is of/from saknotih iîsak
4
be able').
The word sdkhdh is analysed here since it is the synonym given for vaydh
(cf. 1.4a). The analysis saknoteh is cited by Skanda-Mahesvara and Nllakantha
(NSV 1.2.58). It is repeated and once more recognised by Skanda-Mahesvara
at Nir 6.32.27 Durga, on the other hand, ignores the analysis altogether.
(1.6) cittam cetatehl
cittam 'mind; thinking faculty' is of/from cetatih (^cit 'perceive; reflect').
The context is RV 1.170.1. The analysis is not quoted in Skanda-
Mahesvara's commentary where, iti fact, the latter part of Nir 1.6 is omitted or
missing. It may be noted, however, that the analysis is included by Nllakantha28
who generally follows Skanda-Mahesvara.29 Durga suggests karanasddhana
(D 1:77,16): cetaty anendrthdn iti cittam, 'one perceives [something] by means
of it, [namely,] things/meanings, hence cittam - means of perceiving'.
(1.7a) magham iti dhanandmadheyam I mamhater ddnakarmanahl
mag ham, being a name for dhanam 'wealth', is of/from mamhatih (^mamh) which
denotes (lit.: has) the activity of giving.
The context is RV 2.11.21. The word magham is listed among dhanandmdni
Nigh 2.10, and the finite verb mamhate among ddnakarmdnah Nigh 3.20. The
commentators suggest karmasddhana, for example, Durga (D 1:79,13): diyate
hi tat, 'for it is given'.30
26
Shortened to va by A 3.2.3 dto 'nupasarge kah which teaches that the krt suffix Ka (-a) is
added after a verbal root which ends in a when it is not preceded by a preverb but co-occurs
with a noun 27that denotes its direct object. This accounts for forms such as goda- 'giver of
28
cow(s)'. The NSV breaks off at Nirukta 6.17.
NSV, unnumbered sloka concluding the second pdda of the first adhydya: cittam vijndnam
evdha cetater jhdnakarmanah. The gloss vijndnam may indicate bhdvasddhana although th
word may lend itself29to almost any kdraka analysis, an interpretation as karanasddhana being
quite common. Vijayapalah 1982:46 ff. (upodghdtah).
30
Cf. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:68*14): tad dhi diyate; Nllakantha (NSV 1.3tl0). mamhyate
diyate tad dhi tena tan magham ucyate, 'for it is bestowed (mamhyate), that is to say, given;
hence it is called magham'.
The universe ofYaska 107
(1.7b) daksind daksateh samardhayatikarmanah I vyrddham

samardhayatiti I
daksind '[rite of] the ceremonial reward(s)'31 is of/from daksatih (^daks) which
denotes the activity of fulfilling: it fulfils that which is unfulfilled.32
The context is RV 2.11.21. Durga (D 1:79,14) substitutes samardhayaty-
arthasya for samardhayatikarmanah which he thus considers a genitive form.
Whether or not Yaska suggests an analysis as hetu, causal agent, in choosing
the causative samardhayati is hard to tell. If not, an interpretation as
kartrsddhana seems reasonable.
(1.7c) daksino hastahl daksater utsdhakarmanah Iddsater vd sydd
ddnakarmanah I
daksinah 'the right' - that is, the hand - is of/from daksatih (^daks) which denotes
the activity of being strong; or it may be of/from dasatih (Îdds) which denotes the
activity of giving.
The analysis is given incidentally in the context of daksind (1.7b). In the
commentary of Durga utsdhakarmanah is replaced by utsdhdrthasya (D
1:79,19) and ddnakarmanah by ddndrthasya (D 1:80,1), both forms thus con-
sidered genitives.
The first analysis suggests an interpretation as kartrsddhana (utsahate 'acts
with strength'), while the second implies karanasddhana. So Durga (D 1:80,1):
tenaiva hiprdyena diyate, 'for with this alone is [something] usually given';
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:69,6): tena hi diyate yad deyam, 'for with this is
given what is to be given'.33
(1.7d) hasto hanteh/
hastah 'hand' is of/from hantih (^han 'hit; slay').
The analysis comes up through the preceding analysis of daksinah 'right
hand (hastahy (1.7c). Durga suggests an interpretation as karanasddhana (D
1:80,2): tena hi hanyate, 'for with it [something] is struck'.
(1.7e) bhago bhajatehl
bhagah 'share; happiness' is of/from bhajatih (^bhaj 'divide; share; enjoy').
The context is RV 2.11.21. The analysis is not cited by Durga or Skanda-
Mahesvara. Nilakantha, on the other hand, quotes it and interprets it as
31
On the complex notion of the daksind, see Malamoud 1976; cf. review by Heesterman (1979);
further Gonda 1955:75-6. Malamoud (1976.173, note 3) also deals with the present Nirukta
32
passage and its continuation. See in this respect also Kahrs 1980:110-13.
To fit the context of RV 2.11.21; otherwise perhaps: 'it makes successful that which is unsuc-
cessful'; cf. Durga (D 1:79,14): yajhe hi yat kirn cid vigatardhikam bhavati tad lyam samar
; dhayati visistam yajnasya sddhanam etad iti, 'for whatever is deprived of (vigata = vz) succes
33
at the sacrifice, that it makes successful, it is a particular implement of the sacrifice'.
NUakantha follows Skanda-Mahesvara (NSV 1.3.19): diyate tena yad deyam na savyena
nisedhatah
karmasddhana (NSV 1.3.21): sevyate34 sa sukhdrthibhih, 'it is worshipped/

enjoyed by those who strive for pleasure'. It could even be the deity Bhaga that
Nllakantha has in mind.The analysis bhajateh appears Nir 3.16 (cf. 3.16a).
(1.7f) viro virayaty amitrdnl veter vd sydd gatikarmanah vlrayeter vdl
virah 'hero': he agitates/scatters {vlrayatih wvilr)35 enemies; or it is of/from vetih
( vvf) which denotes the activity of moving; or else it is of/from vlrayatih (yvlr\ viray
'be heroic').36
The context is RV 2.11.21, suvirdh. Durga (D 1:80,5) explains gatikarmanah
by gatyarthe vartamdnasya, '[of vetih] which occurs in the sense of going',
clearly a genitive interpretation. Moreover, he adds the genitive attribute
vikramdrthasya to viray ateh (D 1:80,6); cf. Dhp 10.355 vira vikrdntau, '[the
root] vir [occurs] when courage [is to be denoted]'. Nllakantha gives the gen-
itive gatyarthasya for gatikarmanah (NSV 1.3.26): gatyarthasydtha vd veter
amitrdn prati gacchati31 'or else it is of vetih which has the sense of moving:
he moves against the foes'. This interpretation as kartrsddhana seems reason-
able also with regard to the other explanations.38
(1.8a) gdyatram gdyateh stutikarmanah I
gdyatram (ritual chanting in gdyatrl metre) is of/from gdyatih (Îgai) which denotes
the activity of praising.39
The context is RV 10.71.11. Durga (D 1:84,10) replaces stutikarmanah by the
unambiguous genitive stutyarthasya and goes on to suggest an interpretation
of gdyatram as karanasddhana:40 stuyate hy anena, 'for something is praised
with it'.
34
35
Cf. Dhp 1.1047: bhaja sevdydm. j
Sarup (1921:10, note 7) makes the following unjustified remark: 'Durga paraphrases Vlrayati
by ndndprakdram mdmyati, i.e. "he kills in various ways". He seems to take vir as a non-
compound root, and is supported in this interpretation by Dhatupdtha, xxxv,49, where vir is
enumerated as a verb of the tenth class. But Yaska appears to take it as a compound of vi + Ir
(to disperse), for he distinguishes it from the denominative verb, cf. his third derivation.' Sarup
is probably misled by the reading found in the edition by Satyavrat Samasraml (1882-91). The
reading mdmyati is only met with there, while all other editions or MSS of Durga's com-
mentary read ndndprakdram Trayatity arthah, 'that is to say, in various ways (^vi) he agitates'.
Sarup is of course right when noting that Yaska's first analysis vlrayati is of vi + ^lin
36
pw gives: 'viray, vlrayate sich mdnnlich -, sich tapfer beweisen. Act. einer Etymologie
bewdltigen.' The assumed parasmaipada is probably based on this very analysis; cf. MW '2.
vir, cl.lO.A. (Dhatup. xxxv,49; rather Nom. fr. vird below) virdyate, to be powerful or valiant,
display heroism, RV.; VS.; TBr.; (P. vlrayati) to overpower, subdue, Nir. i.7.\ But there is no
reason to establish lexically a parasmaipada form vlrayati on the basis of this passage since
Yaska pays no heed to the circumstance that a verb may occur only in the dtmanepada when
37
he refers to it as an /-stem in the masculine as, for example, vlrayatih.
Cf. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:69,10): gacchaty amitrdn prati.
38
Cf. Durga, note 35 above, and Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:69,9): vividham Irayati prerayati,
'variously (vividham = vi) he agitates, that is, sets in motion'; cf. Dhp 2.8 Ira gatau kampane
39
ca.
Yaska thus gives gdyatih stutikarmd. The Nighantu lists gdyati and stduti under arcatik
rmdnah (Nigh 3.14). The Paninlya dhatupdtha gives gai sabde in the bhvddigana (Dhp 1.965),
while the meaning entry40gd stutau is met with in the juhotyddigana (Dhp 3.25), yielding the
present form jigati. Similarly Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:73,1).
(1.8b) sakvarya rcahl saknotehl

sakvaryah, [meaning] Stanzas, is of/from saknotih {^sak 'be able').
The context is RV 10.71.11 which exhibits the form sakvansu, locative
plural of sakvarT-. The Nighantu, however, includes sakvarT among
bdhundmdni (Nigh 2.4), evidently as the nominative dual of a stem sakvari-41
and also among gondmdni (Nigh 2.11) where it appears to be the nominative
singular of a stem sakvarT-.42
Yaska himself suggests karanasddhana: tad yad dbhir vrtram asakad
dhantum tac chakvarmdm sakvantvam, 'that he [= Indra] was able to slay Vrtra
by means of these, that is the sakvarT-ness of the sakvaryah'.43 The analysis is
not met with in the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara.
(1.9a) aksi casteh I anakter ity dgrdyanahl
aksi 'eye' is of/from castih (^caks 'see'); it is of/from anaktih {âhj 'reveal; make
appear', according to Agrayana.
The context is RV 10.71.7, aksanvantah. Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara
interpret casteh and anakteh as genitive forms: Durga adds the attribute
pasyatyarthasya to casteh (D 1:87,18), while darsandrthasya is preferred by
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM I:75,7);44 to anakteh is annexed the attribute vyakty-
arthasya in both commentaries (D 1:87,19; SM 1:75,7), Skanda-Mahesvara
employing a more complex way of expressing the information considered nec-
essary: anakteh - 'ahju vyaktimraksanagatisu' ity asya vyaktyarthasydksity
dgrdyanah, 'according to Agrayana aksi belongs to anaktih, that is, to that con-
cerning which it has been stated [Dhp 7.21]: "[the root] anj [occurs] when
appearing, anointing or moving are to be denoted", that is, to that which has
the sense of appearance'.
Under the first alternative, an interpretation as karanasddhana is suggested
?by the commentators, for example by Durga (D 1:87,18): drsyate hy anena, 'for
.[something] is seen by means of it'.45 Under the second alternative, however,
Jit seems reasonable to interpret it as kartrsddhana (NSV 1.3.113: anakti . . .
tyyaktikaroti 'it makes manifest') or as karmasddhana (NSV 1.1.114: svayarn vd
vyaktam anyebhyo bhrsam tejasvi projjvalam, 'or it is itself made manifest,
f Cf. Devaraja Yajvan (ed. Mor 1952:1:207): saknutah karmdni karttum, 'those two are able to
) perform activities'.
f Cf. Devaraja Yajvan (ed. Mor 1952:1:246): saknoti0, 'it is able ...'.
f: It seems reasonable to assume that this is a quotation from some Brahmana text, although I
, have not been able to trace the source. Sarup (1927) refers to Kausitakibrahmana 23.2 and
>"
44
Aitareyabrdhmana 5.7.3 where similar passages are met with.
NSV 1.3.112: caster darsanakarmanah, probably for metrical reasons since Nflakantha in
^;5 general follows the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara.
f Cf. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:75,7): drsyate hi tena\ Sayana at RV 10.71.7: anena drsyate
sarvam, 'by means of it everything is seen'; Nilakantha (NSV 1.3.113): caste 'nena, '[some-
/ thing] becomes visible / one looks at [something] by means of it'. Patanjali (Mbh II: 119,19-20)
^ gives an analysis as karanasddhana by asnotih (^las 'reach; obtain') with the unddi-suffix si
asnoter ayam aunddikah karanasddhanah sipratyayahl asnute 'nenety aksi II cf. howev
Bhdsya at rule 8.2.48, vt. 3 (Mbh 111:408,21 ff.).
being vehemently [more] brilliant, that is, luminous, than any other [parts of
the body]'; cf. below).
Sarup (1921:12) takes ânj in the sense of 'be beautiful'. This is possible,46
but I prefer the sense of 'cause to appear; reveal'. Durga comments in the fol-
lowing way (D 1:88,4-6):
ete aksini itarebhyo 'ngebhyo vyaktatare spastatare prakdsatare bhavatah andha-
kare 'pi hy ete prakdsete naktamcarddindm na tathetardny angdm°
The two eyes are more revealed, that is, more clear, more visible, than any other
parts of the body, for even in the dark these two become visible, that is, of night-
creatures etc.; not so the other parts of the body.
Similarly, Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:75,8): taddhy ujjvalatvddvyaktataram
anyebhyo 'ngebhyah, 'for it [=the eye], because it is luminous, is more visible
than any other parts of the body'.
(1.9b) karnah krntateh/ nikrttadvdro bhavati I rcchater ity dgrdyanahl
karnah 'ear' is of/from krntatih (Îkrt 'cut'): its aperture has been cut into it; it is
of/from rcchatih (Vrcc/i/r 'move'), according to Agrayana.
The context is RV 10.71.7, karnavantah. That the form krntateh is consid-
ered a genitive by Skanda-Mahesvara is evident from the statement (SM
1:75,9): karnah krntateh 'krti chedane* ity asya, '"karnah is of krntatih", that
is, of that concerning which it has been stated [Dhp 6.141]: "[the root] krt
[occurs] when cutting [is to be denoted]"'.
The remarks by Skanda-Mahesvara on the analysis rcchateh are worthy of
notice (SM 1:75,11):
artter gatyarthasya 'pdghrddhmdstha* ity rcchddesavidhdndd rcchatir gatyarthah I
tasya karna ity dgrdyanah I
Since, according to [A 7.3.78] pdghrddhmdsthd etc., the substitute rcchA is taught
for arttihlr which has the sense of movement, rcchatih has the meaning movement.
[The word] karnah is of this [tasya = rcchater gatyarthasya], according to
Agrayana.
Here rcchateh is clearly considered a genitive form. Moreover, the passage
demonstrates how meaning is involved when one linguistic item is replaced by
another, since here it is argued that rcchatih is gatyarthah by force of its replac-
ing arttih which is listed as gatyarthah, 'having the sense of movement', in the
Dhdtupdtha: rccha gatTndriyapralayamurtibhdvesu (Dhp 6.15), further r
gatiprdpanayoh (Dhp 1.983) and r gatau (Dhp 3.16).47 The meaning gati is
common to all the meaning-entries.
46
Several dhdtupdthas include kdnti 'beauty' in their meaning-entries for Va/z/, for example the
MddhavTya Dhdtuvrtti (ed Dwarikadas Shastri 1964 504) anju vyaktimraksaiiakdntigati
Likewise the Kdsakrtsna-dhdtuvydkhydnam 47
(ed Yudhisthira Mlmamsaka 1965/6a:174). See
also Bhaglratha Prasada Tnpathl 1965.7. Cf. Nir 2.25. artter gatikarmanah.
With regard to kdraka, it seems reasonable to interpret it as adhikaranasdd-

hana under the first alternative, since Yaska states that an aperture has been
cut into it, nikrttadvdro bhavati^ Under the second alternative, karnah lends
itself to an interpretation as kartrsddhana on the basis of the untraced quota-
tion offered by Yaska here: rcchantiva khe udagantdm, 'moving, as it were, the
two ears went up'. 49
(1.9c) dsyam asyateh/ dsyandata enad annam iti vdl
dsyam 'mouth' is of/from asyatih (âs 'throw'); or: food is streaming (d^syand)
towards it, thus [dsyam].
The context is RV 10.71.7, ddaghndsah 'which reach to the mouth'. Yaska
takes a in the sense of dsyam.50 The genitive attributes ksepdrthasya and
ksepandrthasya are attached to asyateh by Durga (D 1:89,4) and Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM 1:76,9) respectively.
The analysis asyateh opens up for a number of different kdraka-
interpretations. Durga suggests adhikaranasddhana (ibid.): ksipyate hy
etaddbhimukhyendnnam, 'for [something] is thrown towards it, [namely] food'.
Nllakantha, following Skanda-Mahesvara,51 proposes adhikaranasddhana
(NSV 1.3.121): ksipyate hy annam asminn ity dsyam asyateh, 'food is indeed
thrown into it, hence [the analysis] dsyam asyateh'. The wording here is worthy
of notice since it illustrates beyond doubt that it is the whole analysis dsyam
asyateh that is justified by the faara&a-interpretation, not only the word dsyam.
Finally, Skanda-Mahesvara offer an alternative analysis as kartrsddhana (SM
1:76,9): ksipati vd varndn, 'or, it throws [out] speech-sounds'.
The material presented so far represents a fair sample of analyses in -teh, all
together the first eighteen occurrences in the Nirukta, including alternative
analyses. From the material of the Nirukta presented so far, it is difficult to
determine whether the forms in -teh are genitives or ablatives. With a few
exceptions which will be dealt with in detail, this is the situation throughout
the Nirukta. The only attribute to forms in -teh which occurs regularly is
°karmanah, & bahuvrThi compound in the masculine used to indicate the
meaning of a verb, or, more precisely, the action referred to by a verb. This
48
Cf Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1.75,10) sa hi . chinnadvdro garbhdvasthdydm kendpi
krtabilah, 'for it is something which has its aperture cut, that is, at the embryonic stage an
"* opening has been made by some [power of fate]' Note that kha (n.) which carries the sense of
,49 'ear', basically means 'hollow; apeiture'
Sarup (1921 12) translates* 'Going upwards, as it were, they have protruded in space' He thus
* considers khe to be the locative singular of kha (n) 'space', although the lack of proper sandhi
^ suggests that khe is nominative dual of kha (n ) m the sense of 'ear', the dual ending -e being
xs pragrhya, uncombmable The point is discussed at length by Skanda-Mahesvara (SM
1:75,13-76,8) who conclude as I have suggested m my translation See also NSV 1 3 117-20
> The close association of sound with space is a common feature m Indian thought Samkhya,
for example, considers dkdsa 'space' to be the substratum of sound
|° Cf. Sayana at RV 10.71 7 dsyasabdasya prsodardditvdd dkarddesah, 'since the word dsya i
4-
51
of the prsodarddi-type, the syllable a occurs as its replacement'.
SM 176,9: ksipyate hi tatrdnnam
leaves us with the same problem as before: has °karmanah a genitive or an

ablative case ending?
The situation changes drastically when we turn to the commentaries. We have
no guarantee, of course, that the interpretations offered by the commentators
represent the view of Yaska. If they are all in agreement, however, it would not
be unreasonable to assume that they have kept a tradition. It is therefore note-
worthy that when they make their position known, they invariably treat the forms
in -teh as genitives. Durga quotes or comments upon sixteen of the eighteen forms
in -teh; nine of these are clearly taken to be genitives, none as ablatives. Skanda-
Mahesvara quote or comment upon fifteen; six of these are clearly interpreted as
genitives, none as ablatives. Nllakantha quotes all eighteen, clearly taking two of
them as genitive forms, none as ablative.52 With very few exceptions, this situa-
tion prevails throughout the commentaries. This consensus speaks for itself:
there is every reason to think that we are dealing with a genitive form.
First of all, however, it is necessary to examine in detail the exceptional
instances in the Nirukta where the extant text offers attributes in the genitive
or the ablative case to analyses of the -teh and -eh types.
Attributes to -teh/-eh forms in the genitive case

In what follows I shall present all the material from the text of the Nirukta itself
which may offer attributes in the genitive case to analyses of the -tehl-eh type.
(1.17) athdpidam antarena padavibhdgo na vidyatel avasaya padvate
rudra mrda/ itil padvad avasam gdvah pathyadanam I avater
gatyarthasydso ndmakaranahl tasmdn ndvagrhnanti I
If one phrases this as the editor, Lakshman Sarup, does, I see only one way
of translating it:
Xl
Moreover, without it [= nirvacanasdstra] the [correct] division of words is not pos-
sible. 'Be gracious to the footed provision, O Rudra.' Here padvad avasam,
[meaning] cows, [is] food for the journey, [and] asa is a noun-maker (i.e., suffix) of
avatih which has the sense of moving; therefore [the authors of the Padapdtha] do
not divide [ava and sam].
This, as will soon be evident, is not the only possible way of interpretation.
Yaska's intention in this paragraph is to make it clear that a correct division of
words, as carried out in the Padapdtha, is impossible without the science he
represents. As his example he takep the word avasaya, dative sg. of avasa- (nt.)
as attested in RV 10.169.1 avasaya padvate and thus not to be split up. He
follows this up by contrasting it with ava saya, absolutive of ava^lso and as
such to be divided in the Padapdtha.
52
Nllakantha reveals his view relatively seldom because he normally retains the compounds in
°karmanah for metrical reasons whereas Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara often replace these by
°arthasya
Sarup (1921:17) translates this passage very differently: T h e footed wan-

derer, i.e. cows, provision for the journey: (avasdya) is derived from (the root)
av, meaning to go, with the suffix asa\ it is therefore not analysed (in the
Padapdtha)' Sarup may be doing the right thing in translating avasa- as 'wan-
derer', thus trying to follow Yaska. Sarup may be wrong, but let us for a moment
assume that he is right. If he is, then avateh is unquestionably a genitive since
it occurs with the attribute gatyarthasya. Sarup nevertheless translates as he
usually does, taking avateh to be an ablative and conceiving of the ablative in
his special way. The fact that gatyarthasya is genitive does not seem to bother
him at all. But obviously other scholars too took this fact lightly. That artha is
used here instead of the usual karman triggered off the following remark from
B. Liebich (1922:4, note 1): 'Dieses vereinzelte gatyarthasya fiir gatikarmanah
ist offenbar als lapsus calami eines Abschreibers erst spater eingedrungen.'53
This is not so obvious to me as it is to Liebich since artha occurs in similar
constructions at several other places in the Nirukta. It is, of course, possible that
rather than being changed by a scribe, we are in these cases dealing with later
interpolations from a time when only the °a/t/za-alternative would occur to a
Sanskrit speaker, although, obviously, he would be familiar with the other alter-
native from the Nirukta if he were to interpolate in that text.
Be this as it may, the question is first of all whether the passage is of any
real interest for the present investigation. The genitive, as is clear from my ten-
tative translation above, could also be construed with aso ndmakaranah, and
the passage would then no longer contain an analysis in -teh. Durga (D 1:131,1)
glosses ndmakaranah with the technical term pratyayah 'suffix' which prob-
ably would not so easily construe with a genitive, although such a usage is met
with in Panini's technical language, for example in the context of rule A 6.4.1
angasya. However, there is every reason to assume that Durga's gloss is
mechanical in that he employs the standard technical term for a suffix well
known from grammar without paying too much heed to the genitive construc-
jjyon. Yaska makes use of the term ndmakaranah, clearly his name for a krt-
|tiffix, also at several other places in the Nirukta.54
The passage is not commented upon further by Durga, but Skanda-
|lahesvara remark as follows (SM 1:104,14):
evam atrdvasdyeti na syater avapurvasya lyabantasya riipam, dhdtupasargayor
lyapas cdtrdrthdsambhavdt I padvata ity anena sdmdnddhikaranydc caturthyan-
tatvdvagates calkim tarhil avater gatyarthasyaso namakaranah, ndma knyate yena
sabdasya sa ndmakaranah pratyaya ucyatel tasmad etad padam navagrhnanti
padakdrdh, avagrahasydrthabhedapratipddandrthatvdt, tasya cehdbhdvdtl
sporadic gatyarthasya for gatikarmanah has obviously occurred only later as a slip of
the pen of a scribe.'
kakso gdhateh I ksa in namakaranah / (2 2), gaur iti prthivindmadheyam I. I gdter vau
^ndmakaranah/ (2 5; cf Sayana at RV 1158 2), ksiram ksaratehl ghaser vero ndmakarana
(2.5), anur anu sthaviydmsam I upasargo luptandmakaranah I yathd sampratil (6 22), m
nau kasmdtl minotih srayatikarmd I thu iti ndmakaranah I thakdro vdl (7..29), seva i
sukhandmal sisyatehl vakdro ndmakaranah I (10 17). These will be discussed below.
So, in this case avasdya is not a form of syatih preceded by the preverb ava and
ending in [the absolutive suffix] LyaP (-yd), since the sense of root and preverb and
LyaP is impossible here because of the syntactic agreement with 'padvate' and the
understanding that it ends in a dative case suffix. How is it then? [The answer is]
avater gatyarthasydso ndmakaranah', that by means of which a noun is made,55 that
is called the ndmakaranah, suffix, of a linguistic item. Therefore th6y', namely the
authors of the Pada[-pdtha], 'do not divide' this word, since a division has as its
purpose to convey a division in meaning and that does not exist here.
Here Skanda-Mahesvara seem to think that the genitive avater gatyarthasya
is an expression similar to avasdyeti na syater avapurvasya lyabantasya rupam
and that the words dso ndmakaranah are a separate addition to the real analysis
since they only explain further the term 'ndmakaranah'. However, a complica-
tion arises with sabdasya which appears to be more or less superfluous if the
sentence is phrased by placing a comma after yena. One could imagine that it
reflects the genitive avater gatyarthasya, but one would then expect dhdtoh and
not sabdasya. The interpretation offered is therefore not absolutely certain.
If dso ndmakaranah really is to be conceived of as a syntactically separate
addition, then avater gatyarthasya would be a completely ordinary analysis in
-teh and unambiguously expressed in the genitive case. Nllakantha seems to
think this is the case, presenting the analysis in the following Sloka (NSV 1.6.28):
gatyarthasydvater dhur avasam pratyaye 'py ase56/
avanty anena gacchanti tatas sydd avasam hi tat II
He says avasam is of avatih in the sense of gati ' motion' when there is also57 the
suffix asa: avanti, that is, they move by means of it, so therefore this would be
avasam.
As stated already, I am not sure that this is how the Nirukta passage is to be
understood, but the only way to achieve a clearer picture of the situation is by
comparing this passage with the other instances where the term ndmakarana
is used in the Nirukta. The following instances occur: *
(1) Nir 2.2: kakso gdhatehl ksa iti ndmakaranah. This seems to support
Nllakantha's interpretation, kakso gdhateh being the nirvacana proper fol-
lowed by the additional information that 'ksa' is a ndmakarana: 'kaksali
"armpit" is of/from gdhatih {4gdh "stir"); ksa is a/the ndmakarana'. Durga
remarks (D 1:169,8-10):
kakso gahater vilodandrthasya I kaksayor eva hi balena vilodayati stn dadhyddi
dravyaml atra punah ksa iti namakaranah/ sarvam anyad ddyantaviparyayddi
yathopadarsitam yathdsambhavam yojyam tatra tatra I
'kaksah is of/from gdhatih' which has the sense of stirring, for by means of thd
strength of the very armpits a woman stirs such things as curd; but here 'ksa is |
ndmakarana'. Everything else starting with the inversion of initial and final shoul<|
55
57
An analysis as karanasadhana. 56 Emended by the editor from °apasampratyatepy asaifi
Nllakantha is not too careful with particles, evident also from the hi in pada d. *
be construed wherever necessity arises as far as possible in the way that has been
exemplified.
It is clear from this that Durga understands ksa iti ndmakaranah as a separ-
ate addition. It is not clear to me, however, what he refers to by his additional
remark, although I do not think it has any bearing on the way he understands
the analysis. The term ddyantaviparyayah is well known from Nirukta 2.1
where Durga comments by listing several examples of metathesis, for example,
scyutir ksarane tasyddyantaviparyayena stokah, '[the root] scyut when [the
meaning] ksarana [is to be denoted]; [the form] stokah [appears] by inversion
of the initial and final [sounds] of it' (D 1:161,1-2). It is therefore to be assumed
that Durga refers to the phenomenon of metathesis, and the fact that this seems
hard to apply directly to the example kaksah gdhateh is of less interest for the
present purpose.58 What is important here is that kaksah is stated in immedi-
ate connection with gdhateh which therefore naturally is to be conceived of as
"an ordinary -teh analysis and as such clearly taken as a genitive by Durga.
There are no relevant remarks by Skanda-Mahesvara.
(2) Nir 2.5: gaur iti prthivindmadheyaml yad duram gatd bhavatil yac
cdsydm bhutdni gacchantil gdter vaukdro ndmakaranah. This passage is
inconclusive. The first two analyses are as kartr59 'agent' and adhikarana
^'locus' in relation to the activity expressed by ^gam 'go; move': 'gauh is a
name for the Earth, since it stretches out (lit. "is gone") far, and since living
Beings move on it'. But the alternative analysis brings up similar problems as
Before. Is okdro60 ndmakaranah to be construed with a genitive gdteh, or is it
fan additional remark and gdteh a separate analysis of the ordinary kind?
f Turning to the commentators, we do not find much to guide us. Durga
remarks as follows (D 1:179,7): gdter vd 'gdn gatau' ity asya dhdtor okdro
ridmakaranah pratyayah. This could easily comprise both alternatives: 'Or
{gauh] is of/from gdtih (^gd), [and] "the syllable o is a noun-maker", [or]
|uffix, of this root [which is listed Dhp 1.998:] "gdn when [the sense of] motion
|is to be denoted]".' It is equally possible that the remark is to be read as two
|eparate statements or, indeed, that it is to be read as one long statement where
§ateh is to be construed with okdro ndmakaranah, the rest to be conceived of
I I commentatorial additions structurally determined by the original syntax.
Skanda-Mahesvara remark (SM 11:42,12): 'gdteh' vd stutyarthasya,
%ykdrapratyayah. This is not very helpful, apart from making it clear that
%oteh is to be understood as a genitive form.61 The phrasing suggested by the
^Possibly he thinks along the following lines: gd + ksa>kdgsa (by inversion)>kaksa.

Sf So Durga (D 1:179,6) and Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:42,12).
H Or aukdrah, but see Durga below.
Încidentally, gd is here given the sense of stuti 'praising', so Skanda-Mahesvara obviously
Uiink of Dhp 3.25 gd stutau. They remark (SM 11:42,13-14): giyate stuyate 'sdv iti gauh,
$dyanti vdsydm sthitd iti gauh I iha ca pilrvatra ca nirvacane knyaikatve kdrakabhed
f giyate, that is to say, it is being praised, thus [it is called] gauh; or else: they praise who are
located on it, therefore [it is called] gauh; and here, and in the preceding nirvacana, when there
is [reference to] a single activity, there is a difference with regard to kdraka'.
116 Indian semantic analysis >
editor, Lakshman Sarup, is peculiar. His inserting a comma seems to indicate

that he thinks of the first part as a separate analysis and aukdrapratyayah as an
addition. But as a compound the latter would not serve such a function. The
question is therefore whether it is a compound or whether we are facing a
mistake by the scribes or by the editor or, simply, a misprint. Why Sarup reads
aukdra and not okdra like Durga does is also unclear.
(3) Nir 2.5: ksiram ksaratehl ghaser vero ndmakaranah I mTram hi yathd.
The first analysis is clear: 'ksTram "milk" is of/from ksaratih (^ksar "stream")'.
The alternative analysis presents the same problems as before. Whether or not
it is of any significance that the form ghaseh is based on the naked root and
not on a finite form of the verb and therefore more attractive in a formal
grammatical statement such as 'Tra is a noun-maker of ghasW is hard to tell.
An explanation near at hand is that Îghas does not occur in the present.
Moreover, there are several instances of forms in -eh instead of -teh in the
Nirukta, and, as mentioned already, Katyayana sanctions both possibilities as
valid ways of referring to a verbal root (A 3.3.108, vt. 2: ikstipau dhdtunirdese).
There is accordingly every reason to treat the present instance as completely
parallel to the preceding ones. The parallelism extends to the ambiguity of the
expression; one could equally well translate 'or else it is of/from ghasih; Tra is
a noun-maker, just as in usTram'62 and 'or else Tra is a noun-maker of ghasih,
just as in usTram'. But there is one crucial difference in this passage. It is natural
to see ksiram ksarateh and ghaser vd as parallel constructions and therefore to
be interpreted in the same manner. Accordingly, we would have to divide the
phrase differently from Sarup: ksTram ksarater ghaser vd/ Tro ndmakarana
usTram iti yathd, 'ksTram is of/from ksaratih, or else it is of/from ghasih [and]
Tra is a noun-maker, just as in usTram\ As is evident, it is even hard not to make
the two possibilities overlap. Durga comments as follows (D 1:180,8-11):
ghaser vero namakaranah63 / ader ghasl ddesah knyate atas tenajva siddharupena
nirdisyate I dhdtvantaram iti vd ke citl jndpakam ca daddtil uslr^m iti yatha/ vasa
kdntau tasya krtasamprasdranasya TrapratyayenosTram iti bhavatil tad dhi
saugandhydt kdntam bhavatil
'ghaser vero ndmakaranah'''. [the root] ghas is made the replacement of ad 'eat',64
therefore [the analysis] is given by means of just this established form. [The
meaning is:] or else, according to others, it is a different root, and he gives an indi-
cator [for this possibility:] 'just as in usiram\ '[The root] vas [occurs] when beauty
[is to be denoted]' (Dhp 2.70), [and] 'usTram' is of this, which has been subject to
samprasdrana, through the suffix Tra; for this [usTram] is beautiful because of its
fragrance.
62
63
A particularly fragrant plant-root.
Rajavade (1921*145) gives the text as follows 'ghaser vd/ Tro ndmakaranah' - pratyayah
64
Note his phrasing.
A 2.4.37 lunsanor ghasl teaches that the verbal root ad is replaced by ghas before the drdha-
dhdtuka la-kdra replacements of the aonst and the desiderative; A 2 3 39 bahulam chandasi
teaches that in the domain of Chandas this happens diversely
The sentence vasa kdntau tasya krtasamprasdranasya TrapratyayenosTram

iti bhavati, may give a hint that Durga considers Tro namakaranah syntactically
independent of the genitive ghaseh in the Nirukta, but I am far from certain
about this.
The remarks of Skanda-Mahesvara are brief but illuminating (SM 11:45,3):
ghaser vd, Tro namakaranah I adyate hi tat I irah pratyayah. Here it seems that
Tro namakaranah is considered a separate addition. Skanda-Mahesvara first
give a karmasddhana, an analysis as object: 'for this is eaten (adyate = *ghasy-
ate65)\ Thereafter the commentary simply establishes that Tra is a suffix.
This Nirukta passage itself, then, could point towards the conclusion that
Tro namakaranah is a syntactically independent addition preceded by a -tehl-eh
analysis. Skanda-Mahesvara certainly seem to hold such a view, maybe also
Durga.
(4) Nir 6.22: anuranu sthavTydmsaml upasargo luptandmakaranah, 'anuh
"[something] minute; small", inferior to that which is abundant, [i.e., small],
[is the] preposition [anu] with the suffix elided'. Clearly, this has nothing to do
with the construction under investigation.
(5) Nir 7.29: mithunau kasmdt I minotih srayatikarmd I thu iti namakaranah I
thakdro vd, 'why mithunau "couple"? [Because it is of/from] minotih (Vmz
"fix") which denotes the activity of depending; thu is the ndmakarana, or else
it is the syllable tha\ This is quite revealing. In as much as there is no genitive
construction here at all, thu iti namakaranah must be a separate addition. That
the analysis is expressed in the nominative case is, however, atypical.
(6) Nir 10.17: seva iti sukhandmal sisyateh I vakdro namakaranah I
antasthdntaropalingiI vibhdsitagunah. This seems to support the view that we
are dealing with two separate statements, sisyateh being the nirvacana proper
followed by the additional information that the syllable va is a ndmakarana'.
'[the word] sevah is a name for happiness [and] is of/from sisyatih (^sis "stir");
the syllable va is a/the ndmakarana, [and this suffix] occurs as a substitute66
in the place (antara) of the final sound (antastha) [s]; [and] optionally it takes
guna\ Durga comments as follows (D 11:981,12-13): seva iti sukhanama/ tat
kasmdt/ sisyateh/ vakaro namakaranah/ sisir dhdtuh, vakdrah pratyayah sisa
ity asya. On the one hand, since Durga states tat kasmdt, 'why is that?', sisyateh
must be the answer to that question and is accordingly not to be construed with
the following. On the other, it is theoretically possible that he wants it both
ways since vakdrah pratyayah sisa ity asya could be interpreted 'the syllable
va is a suffix of this [root] sisa (ssis)', but sisa ity asya could certainly also be
a rephrasing of the analysis sisyateh.
* Skanda-Mahesvara do not add anything clarifying here, but it is significant
that elsewhere in the commentary they occasionally use the term ndmakarana
in constructions similar to the ones that have been examined. I shall adduce
65
66
See the remarks of Durga above.
The term upahngin occurs only here in the Nirukta, and I am not confident about my transla-
tion
two examples. Commenting on Nir 3.11 tatra kutsa ity etat krntateh, 'among
these [names for vajra] this kutsdh is of/from krntatih (Vfc/t "put")', they
remark (SM 11:152,17): tatra kutsa ity etad yadd vajrah, tadd krntateh,
chinattiti kutsah, rkdrasyokdrah so ndmakaranah, 'tatra kutsa ity etat: when
it is a Vajra, then: krntateh, [that is to say,] it cuts, hence kutsah; the syllable u
[occurs] in the place of the syllable r\ sa is a ndmakarana\ Similarly, at Nir
3.18 svd suydyil savater vd sydd gatikarmanah, 'svd "dog": it moves (ydyt)
swiftly (su)\ or else it could be of/from savatih (^sav) which denotes the activ-
ity of moving',67 they comment on savateh (SM 11:183,10): gatyarthasyopad-
hdlopah ankdro ndmakaranah, '[or it is of/from savatih] which has the sense
of moving; there is elision of the penultimate; the syllable an is a ndmakarana\
Both of these instances speak for themselves and may indicate that this is the
way Skanda-Mahesvara conceive of the matter in general.
To sum up, then, this little detour leaves us with the following information.
In addition to Nir 1.17, there are five other relevant passages in the Nirukta. As
for Nir 1.17, Nllakantha considers it an ordinary analysis in -teh. Nir 2.2 kakso
gdhatehl ksa iti ndmakaranah appears to contain two separate statements,
gdhateh being a -teh analysis. Thi$ seems to be supported by Durga. Nir 2.5
gaur iti prthivindmadheyam . . . gdter vaukdro ndmakaranah is inconclusive,
also in the commentaries. Nir 2.5 ksirarn ksaratehl ghaser vero ndmakaranah
seems to indicate that we are dealing with an analysis in -teh, taken to be a
genitive by Skanda-Mahesvara. Nir 7.29: mithunau kasmdtl minotih
srayatikarmd I ihu iti ndmakaranah I thakdro vd contains no possible genitive
construction, but is quite revealing in that minotih srayatikarmd and thu iti
ndmakaranah must be syntactically separate expressions. Nir 10.17 seva iti
sukhandma I sisyateh I vakdro ndmakaranah etc. also seems to indicate that we
are dealing with two separate expressions. Finally, such a view is supported
also by usage in the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara. On this Evidence one
ought to conclude that Nir 1.17 padvad avasam gdvah pathyaddnaml avater
gatyarthasydso ndmakaranah also consists of two separate statements, avater
gatyarthasya being an analysis of the -teh type. Still, I cannot help feeling that
one would have to twist the construction quite hard if one were to achieve this
result. Note, however, that if we really are dealing with an analysis of the -teh
type, we are here dealing with a genitive case suffix.
(3.18) simhah sahandtl himser vd sydd vipantasyal sampurvasya vd
hantehl samhdya hantiti vd/
simhah 'lion' [is so called] because of the conquering (sahandt: sahm); or it could
be of himsih (^hims 'injure') which has been inverted; or else it is of hantih (V/ian
'kill') preceded by [the preverb] sam\ or [it is so called because] leaping up
(sam^lha) it kills (Îhan).
67
68
Nigh 2.14 lists savati under gatikarmanah
The meaning of sah is uncertain. Dhp 1 905 gives saha marsane and 4 20/1 saha suha cak-
yarthe The commentators explain its meaning as abhibhavah, 'be powerful, conquer'
The universe of Ydska 119
This passage contains one analysis of the -andt type and two analyses of the
-tehl-eh type, both of these with attributes in the genitive.
The short form himsih may have been resorted to because hinastih would
not so readily create associations to hims. It is, however, possible to argue that
this analysis is an interpolation. Durga does not quote or comment upon himser
vd sydd vipantasya. The source for its later addition could be Patanjali's
Mahdbhdsya (Mbh 11:87,16) where the analysis himseh simhah occurs. The
assumption that the analysis is an interpolation is supported also by Durga's
remark (D 1:318,13): simhavydghrasabdayos tu anulomam eva nirvacanam0',
'the analysis of the words simhah and vydghrah goes only with the grain (anu-
lomam, that is to say, is not inverted)'. This indicates that Durga knew of the
analysis himseh but not from the Nirukta. It seems reasonable to think of
himseh as a more formal grammatical analysis, necessitating a translation
'simhah is [a form] of himsih which has been inverted'.
Also in the case of sampurvasya vd hanteh/ samhdya hantlti vd there is
ample reason to doubt the text since these two phrases cannot represent more
than one analysis in as much as both parts refer to sanAhan. If samhdya were
a separate analysis (sanvlha) then the subsequent hand is slightly problematic.
As far as I can see, there are three possible solutions to the problem: (1)
sampurvasya vd hanteh is a later addition, inserted to give a formally more
precise explanation of samhdya hantlti vd which would thus represent the orig-
inal text; or (2) iti vd or at least the last vd is a later addition; or (3) sampurvasya
va hantehl samhdya hantlti vd provides us with two possible analyses - in the
first, sam is the upasarga of V/ian, in the second, sam is the upasarga of V M ,
but the following hanti is what provides the second syllable of simha.
Durga remarks (D 1:318,5-6): sampurvasya vd hanteh upasargasyetvena I
samhaya hantlti va vaiydkarandndm esd vyutpattih, 'or [simhah] is of hantih
preceded by [the preverb] sam, in as much as [the sound] / [appears instead] of
[a in] the preverb: samhdya hantlti vd\ this analysis belongs to the grammari-
ans'. The editor of the text, H.M. Bhadkamkar, does not indicate sampurvasya
vd hanteh typographically as a pratika which would be his usual practice.
Whether or not it is a coincidence or he in fact considers the words to be
Durga's own, is hard to tell. It is certainly possible that the words sampurvasya
vd hanteh have crept into the extant text of the Nirukta on the basis of Durga's
commentary.
The other possibility, that vd or iti vd is a corruption, is expressed by
Rajavade (1940, notes p. 508): 'iti vd after hanti seems interpolated both in the
?Jext and in Durga's Vrtti'. Skanda-Mahesvara do not read a vd after hanti. On
ihe contrary, we meet with the following remark (SM 11:183,14): °hantlti
piirvasyaivdrthavacanam I ato vety apapdthah,' [samhdya] hanti is just a state-
ment explaining the meaning of the preceding [sampurvasya vd hanteh]; a vd
after that is a corrupt reading'.
In any case, the passage contains no more than two analyses: (1) sahandt
and (2) sampurvasya vd hanteh/ samhdya hanti (iti) or only samhdya hantlti
vd. If sampurvasya vd hanteh is Yaska's own analysis, we are dealing with a

formal analysis in -teh clearly expressed in the genitive case. This is clearly
how Skanda-Mahesvara understand it, with samhdya hanti added for further
elucidation.
(4.10) saktuh69 sacateh/ durdhdvo bhavatil kasater vd sydd vipantasya I
vikasito bhavatil
saktuh 'coarsely ground barley5 is of/from sacatih (4sac 'accompany; stick
together'); it is difficult to rinse; or it could be of kasatih (^kas 'move; split'70)
which has been inverted; it is split open.
Here there is no option at all; vipantasya is an attribute to kasateh which
accordingly has to be interpreted asâ genitive. The reading is confirmed by the
commentators who add nothing further of interest (D 1:372,6; SM 11:221,1-2).
Unfortunately, this is not all there is to this seemingly clearcut^case. In the
Mahdbhdsya the passage is quoted almost verbatim, but with-an ablative
viparltdt (Mbh 1:4,12): saktuh sacater durdhdvo bhavatiI kasater vd vipantdd
vikasito bhavati. Matters are not made easier by Kaiyata's remark (MbhP
I:46a): sacater itil 'saca secane1 ity asya, 'sacateh: [that is,] of [the verbal
root] saca (sac) [which according to Dhp 1.176 occurs] when secanam "sprin-
kling" [is to be denoted]'. This makes it clear that he considers sacateh to be a
genitive. He goes on to say (ibid.) kasater itiIprsodardditvdd varnavyatyayah,
'kasateh: there is transposition of sounds because [saktuh] belongs to the
prsodarddi group [i.e., gana on A 6.3.109]'. Since Kaiyata takes sacateh to be
a genitive it is reasonable to assume that he would also take kasateh as a gen-
itive. It is noteworthy that he does not cite the word vipantdt. Nagesa's
Uddyota does not contain anything indicative of his view.
It is hard to see any clear way out of this mess. As matters stand, however,
the extant text of the Nirukta and the commentators of that text clearly read
vipantasya, and kasateh is accordingly to be considered a genitive form.
(6.30) vikato11 vikrdntagatir ity aupamanyavah I kutater vd sydt
[vipantasya] vikutito bhavatil
vikatah 'horrible [famine]' [is so called] because its ways of moving are crooked,
according to Aupamanyava; or else it could be of kutatih i^lkut 'be crooked') which
has been inverted; it is very72 crooked.
Sarup gives vipantasya in brackets as it is omitted by several MSS.
Rajavade (1940:97) notes it as a variant reading. Bhadkamkar (1918=D
1:697,2) includes it in the text with the following note: 'vipantasya has not
69
70
The context is RV 10.71.2.
The meaning is unclear. The verb kasati is listed under gatikarmanah Nigh 2 f4 and Dhp 1.913
71
lists kasa gatau. A more explicit meaning than 'moving' is required in this context, though.
72
The context is RV 10.155 1.
The exact meaning of vikutitah is not clear Durga glosses it (D I 699,10) by kubjibhutah 'has
become crooked/humpbacked'
been noticed by Durga arid is omitted by three Mss. of Bi [= Bibliotheca Indica

edition]. The omission appears to be preferable. We retain it, however, as it is
supported by an overwhelming majority of Mss.' Bhadkamkar is certainly
right in claiming that the omission of vipantasya would be preferable. For
though several MSS read it, it gives no sense in as much as an inverted kut
would give you tuk and thus not get you any nearer to vikatah. Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM 11:494,3), however, rather surprisingly claim the inversion
refers to a occurring in the place of u. They do not cite the genitive form
vipantasya, though. Skold (1926:322) remarks: 'No inversion is necessary to
explain the etymology; the grammar wants vipantdd; so vipantasya should be
cancelled.' The grammar does not want anything in particular, and his remark
shows how narrow-mindedly scholars have thought an ablative is the only
conceivable way to interpret a form in -teh.
Once again, we are in an inconclusive situation. If we believe vipantasya is
a genuine reading, there is no doubt about kutateh being a genitive form, if not,
then there is no evidence for this being so.
(9.11) ratho ramhater gatikarmanah I sthirater vd sydd vipantasya I
rathah 'chariot' is of/from ramhatih i^ramh 'hasten') which denotes the activity of
moving; or else it could be of sthiratih {^sthir) which has been inverted.
Concerning sthiratih, there is no such verb in the Nighantu, nor is a corre-
sponding root listed in any dhdtupdtha. Skold (1926:309) nevertheless indi-
cates sthir as the root and gives the meaning 'to stand firmly'. S. Varma
(1953:110) indicates that this is the root, but he gives no meaning for it. Sarup
,(1921:142) translates: 'Rathah (chariot) is derived from (the root) ramh,
rineaning to speed, or from sthira by metathesis', with the note: 'i.e. sthira>
Hhara, and by metathesis ratha? Skanda-Mahesvara confirm the reading (SM
\ III: 153,12): sthirater vd viparltdksarasya, that is 'with inverted syllables'.
Purga quotes the Nirukta text but does not add anything of interest. Here, then,
we have an attribute in the genitive case without anything in particular to cast
doubt on it.
(10.10) parjanyas trpehl ddyantaviparltasyal
[The name of the deity] parjanyah is of trpih (^trp 'be satisfied') which has the first
and the last [sound] inverted.
Here we have a clearcut case of a genitive, although the analysis, expressed
by a short form of the root, seems more than usually designed to bring out the
elements involved in the grammatical derivation of the word parjanyah. This
claim is supported by the remarks of Durga (D 11:970,9-10): parjanyas trper
adyantaviparltasya/ 'trpa trptau1 ity asya dhdtohl sa katham bhavatil ddy~
!antaviparyayena, '"parjanyah is of trpih (Îtrp 'be satisfied') which has the
first and the last [sound] inverted", [that is, it is] of this root [which is listed
(Dhp 6.24 and 10.276:] "trp when [the sense of] satisfaction [is to be denoted]".
How does this [derivative] come about? Through inversion of the first and the
last [sounds]'. Skanda-Mahesvara, confirming the genitive reading, offer a
similar remark (SMIV: 13,15). Sayana quotes the analysis at RV 5.83.1.
(10.31) madhu dhamater vipantasyal
madhu 'honey; sweetness; water (?y73 is of dhamatih {^dham 'blow; melt') which
has been inverted.
The context is RV 4.38.10. The commentators come up with various
explanations of the semantic relationship between madhu and Adham which
need not concern us here. They do, however, confirm the genitive reading (D
11:1008,11; SM IV:38,14), so dhamateh is indisputably a genitive form.
(11.5) cam rucer vipantasyal
cdru 'bright; lovely'74 is of rucih {îruc 'shine') which has been inverted.
The genitive viparltasya is confirmed by Durga (D 11:1040,4). Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM IV:57,8) prefer to rewrite by viparyayena 'through inversion'.
Skold (1926:246) remarks: 'Gen. for abl. We expect rocater' Why take this for
granted? Moreover, there is no reason to expect rocateh; ruceh.xs perfectly
acceptable and, indeed, the form cameh occurs in the previous sentence. This,
then, is another instance of an analysis expressed with a genitive case ending.
(12.26) visam ity udakandmal visndteh I [vipurvasya sndteh
suddhyarthasaya I] vipurvasya vd sacatehl dydvdprthivyau ca dhdrayatil
'visani' is a word for water,75 [and] is of visndtih (vi^lsnd 'bathe'), [that is to say,] of
sndtih preceded by [the preverb] vi with the sense of purifying; or else it is ofsacatih
(Îsac 'accompany') preceded by [the preverb] vi; it supports heaven and earth.
The reading vipurvasya sndteh suddhyarthasaya is omitted by several MSS
and therefore bracketed by the editor. It is, however, met with in the com-
mentary of Durga (D 11:1132,12-13). Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other hand,
do not support the reading. Instead we find (SM IV: 125/7): visndteh
saucdrthasya, 'of visndtih which has the sense of purification'/This clearly
suggests an interpretation of visndteh as a genitive form, although the addition
saucdrthasya seems to be their own elucidation. It is therefoie possible that the
words vipurvasya sndteh suddhyarthasaya have been included in the text of the
Nirukta on the basis of Durga's commentary. The second analysis, vipurvasya
vd sacateh, is supported by both commentaries (D 11:1132,13; SM IV: 125,7).
On the basis of the Nirukta itself, then, we have a clear case of an analysis of
73
74
madhu is listed under udakandmdni at Nigh 1.12. *•
Yaska quotes RV 10 85 19 as a stanza pertaining to it, but it is not clear who or what is referred^
75
to in this context
So Nigh 1.12, so also Grassmann ('Wasser, Flussigkeit') but rejected by Mayrrjofer who thinks
the only meaning of this word is 'poison'.
the -teh type clearly to be understood as a genitive form, and maybe one more
instance of the same. Sarup (1921:192) nevertheless translates: The word
visam is a synonym of water, derived from the verb vi-snd from snd preceded
by vi, meaning to purify, or from sac (to accompany) preceded by vi.'
This concludes the material from the Nirukta offering possible attributes in
the genitive case to technical analyses of the -tehl-eh type. So where do we
stand? We have eleven instances of possible attributes. Of these I would
dismiss himser vd sydd vipantasya (3.18) and vipurvasya sndteh
suddhyarthasaya (12.26), maybe also kutateh . . . vipantasya (6.30), as later
additions. Moreover, avater gatyarthasydso ndmakaranah (1.17) I would prefer
to keep aside as a special case, although the rest of the material from the
Nirukta and the remarks of the commentators point to its inclusion among
genuine cases. This leaves us with eight or nine seemingly clearcut cases of
attributes with a genitive case ending, all of them supported by the com-
mentaries and none of them contradicted by evidence of any kind with the
exception of kasateh . . . vipantasya (4.10) which the Mahdbhdsya cites (Mbh
1:4,12) with the ablative vipantdt, although Kaiyata seems to conceive of it as
a genitive. The important thing is that these eight or nine cases do occur. It is
of course always possible to argue that they are the result of later tampering
with the text; it is impossible to guard against interpolations. But even in that
case the fact remains: why was the genitive case chosen?
It is now necessary to investigate whether the Nirukta itself offers contrary
evidence in the form of attributes with an ablative case ending.
Attributes to -teh/-eh forms in the ablative case

(3.13) mahanndmdny uttardni pahcavimsatih I. . . tatra vavaksitha
vivaksasa ity ete vakter vd vahater vd sdbhydsdtl
This is a difficult passage. Nigh 3.3 lists the forms vavaksitha and vivaksase
under mahanndmdni, names for 'great'. This is rather surprising since they are
[verbal forms. The form vavaksitha I would be inclined to take as the 2. sg. perfect
pf^lvaks 'increase', however Yaska relates it to Vvac 'speak'. The second form,
Mvaksase, is even worse. Grassmann notes: "vivaksase lasst sehr verschiedene
Deutungen zu [von vaks mit vi, Desid. von vac oder vah, 2. s. med. oder Dat.
AQS Inf.; der Sinn nicht klar, da es nur als Refrain vorkommt] \ 76 Geldner remarks
at RV 10.21.1: 'vi- vivaksase ist das Desider. von vi-vac mit der ratselhaften
Endung se, die hier einmal an den Desiderativstamm antritt.77 Vgl. das gleich-
tfalls vereinzelte Intens. cdkrse 10,22,1. Naigh. 3,3 zahlt vivaksase unter den
P6 'vivaksase allows for very different interpretations [from vaks with vi, desid of vac or vah, 2
sing, middle or dat of the inf., the sense is not clear because it only occurs as a refrain].'
'7 Geldner adds in a note that the accent is explained by the separation of the refrain by the
«, inserted pdda d
Wortern ftir "groB" auf, Yaska 3,13 sieht darin eine reduplizierte Form von vac
oderva/i.' 78
In addition to this we face the possibility that sabhyasat could be taken as
an adjective simultaneously qualifying both vakteh and vahateh: These one
would accordingly have to interpret as ablative forms. The question remains,
though, whether this is a necessary and correct interpretation.
The word sdhhydsa occurs only once in the Nirukta. However, several times
Yaska uses the adjective abhyasta 'reduplicated'. This refers directly to the
nominalised verb he makes use of in the analysis.79 Moreover, we meet with
the noun abhydsa 'reduplication [in a verbal stem]; reduplicated syllable'.80 If
all Yaska wanted to do was to qualify further vakteh and vahateh, he could
simply have used the adjective abhyasta. On the other hand, there is reason to
assume that he wanted to make clear that vavaksitha and vivaksase are redu-
plicated forms and that this is the reason they are to be related to vaktih or
vahatih. In that case sdbhydsdt would refer to vavaksitha and vivaksase
directly, that is to say: 'because [these are forms] with reduplication'. Support
for this interpretation is given by Iênou (1942:377): 'sdbhydsa forme verbale
"redoublee" N. Ill 13 (ex. vivaksase)'}1 However, one could also translate:
'vavaksitha and vivaksase are from a reduplicated form of vaktih or vahatih\
although in that case one gets even more severe difficulties with regard to
number.
Sarup interprets the passage in the following way (1921:46): 'With refer-
ence to these, the two words vavaksitha and vivaksase are the reduplicated
forms either of (the root) vac (to speak) or of vah (to carry).' It is noteworthy
that here, where he really has every opportunity to stick to his usual ablative
interpretation in the sense 'derived from [the root]', he translates as if we were
facing a genitive form.
Durga comments as follows (D 1:292,6-7): tatra tasmin mahanndmagane
vavaksitha vivaksase ity ete dkhydtel te punar ubhe vakter va vahater va
dhdtoh sabhyasat, 'moreover, both of these are from vaktih or vahatih, [that is
to say,] from a root with reduplication'. It is, however, possible to translate:
' "with regard to these", [that is,] with regard to the group of names for "great",
"these two" [forms] "vavaksitha [and] vivaksase" are verbs; moreover, both of
these "are [forms] of vaktih or vahatih because" the root "has reduplication"'.
The passage is therefore not very illuminating.
Turning to the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara, we meet with the fol-
lowing passage (SM 11:156,11-13):
tesu vavaksitha vivaksase ity ete dkhydtapade iti sesahl te tu vakter va vahater va
sabhyasat - sanndbhydsasya dve api na yathdsamkhyena I artharupasya cobhaya-
78
*vi — vivaksase is the desiderative of vi-vac with the enigmatic ending se which attaches itself
to the desiderative stem. Compare the also sporadic intensive cdkrse 10 221 Nigh 3 3 lists
vivaksase among
79
the words for "gxt2X">,{mahatah), Yaska
80
sees it as a reduplicated form of va
81
or vah ' See, for example, Nir 2.12, 4.23,' 4.25 For example, Nir 2 2, 2 3.
'sdbhydsa "reduplicated" verbal form Nir 3 13 (ex. vivaksase)'
tra sambhavat, atisayavato vacandd vahandd vd mahattvasydpi pratiteh, mahan-

ndmasupapannah pdthah I
No interesting variant readings occur. In a note to sdbhydsdt, the editor
remarks: agre *sanndbhydsasya' ityasyasthdne' sdbhydsasya' itipdthahyuktahl
sdbhydsdd iti sasthyarthepancamiiti bhdvah. This amounts to saying: 'In what
follows (= with regard to the following word), the correct reading is "sdbh-
ydsasya" instead of this "sanndbhydsasyd". This means that [according to the
commentary] the fifth case ending of sdbhydsdt occurs in the sense of a sixth.'
It is not quite clear to me whether Sarup means to say that it is the view of
Skanda-Mahesvara that the ablative occurs in the sense of a genitive, or whether
he himself thinks so, uncharacteristic though this would be. As seen above, he
certainly translates vakteh and vahateh, probably also sdbhydsdt, as if they were
genitive forms. Sarup is probably right in considering sanndbhydsasya a corrupt
reading, and sdbhydsasya is indeed a good candidate. Another, less likely,
possibility would be to read sannabhydsasya, san being the technical term for
the desiderative suffix. Reading sdbhydsasya, one could translate:
'With regard to these, the two [forms] vavaksitha [and] vivaksase' are verbs, thus
[the statement] is to be completed. As for these two, [they] 'are from/of vaktih or
vahatih because they have reduplication/which have reduplication', [that is to say,
they are forms] of [these two roots] which have reduplication, although the two
[words] are not [derived] respectively [from those two roots]. And since meaning
and form [?] are possible in both cases, [and] since there is a clear understanding of
'greatness' because of excessive talking (vacanam) and carrying (vahanam), [their]
reading among the names for 'great' is acceptable.
Skanda-Mahesvara continue by quoting examples intended to illustrate the
occurrence of vavaksatha and vivaksase in the sense of 'great'. It is clear from
this passage that sdbhydsdt is glossed by a genitive form. Whether this gives
us reason to doubt the reading sdbhydsdt with an ablative ending is hard to tell.
It may be of no importance, but I do find it worthy of notice that the analy-
sis is immediately followed by an analysis undoubtedly expressed with a gen-
itive case ending: grhdh kasmdtl grhnantiti satdm. While the reading in the
extant manuscripts of the Nirukta is undisputably an ablative sdbhydsdt, I am
nevertheless in doubt as to its interpretation and therefore reluctant to consider
this a clear-cut case.
(3.20) ardham harater vipantdtl dhdrayater vd sydtl uddhrtam bhavatil
\ rdhnoter vd sydtl rddhatamo vibhdgahI
At first sight vipantdt appears to be an adjective related to harateh which
accordingly would be an ablative form. Renou (1942:494) remarks: 'vipanta
"metathese" de phonemes N. passim; "phenomene inverse" R. XIV 42 (800),
| 6 (804), Sarvanukram., Ping, passim'. Abhyankar (1961/1977:356) has the
following entry: 'vipanta (1) in the opposite or reverse way; cf. viparitdc ceti
vaktavyamlpdrdvdnnah M.Bh. on P. IV.2.93, Vart. 2'.
Surprisingly, Rajavade (1940, notes p. 525) remarks: 'ardha comes from hr

{harateh). [. . .] harateh vipantasya [sic] = of hr the two parts of which are
reversed'. Clearly, Rajavade considers vipanta an adjective, but he quotes the
text with the genitive form vipantasya. This is all the more surprising since he
reads vipantat in his edition of the text (ibid :53). Could he have changed it to
make it translate as an adjective? Of course, most past participles can be used
as either.
If it is conceived of as an adjective, vipantat ought to refer to dhdrayateh
as well since the same phonetic complication occurs in this analysis, as noted
by Varma (1953:73): 'arddha- (°arddham dharayater vd sydd uddhrtam
bhavati, N. Ill, 20) is traced to Adharay with metathesis, lit. "that which is
carried away".' But although vipantat is neither repeated nor stated in the dual,
it may have been intended to work with both analyses. This would work more
easily if it is conceived of as a substantive. It is, of course, also possible that
dhdrayateh is a later addition, or that something is wrong with the text here.
Sarup (1921:53) interprets: 'Ardha (half) is derived (1) from (the root) hr
(to take away) by metathesis.' This gives no clear indication as to whether he
interprets vipanta as an adjective or a substantive. It seems possible to inter-
pret as a substantive, that is to say, vipantat 'because of inversion'. The forms
in -teh could then be genitive as well as ablative, and the whole passage could
be interpreted:
ardham 'half is of/from haratih {\lhr 'take'), since there is inversion; or it could be
of/from dhdrayatilf2 (Îdhr 'carry', caus.): it is carried away/removed; or it could
be of/from rdhnotih i^rdh 'thrive'): it is the richest part [into which something can
be divided].
Unfortunately we do not have much material from the commentaries here.
Skanda-Mahesvara are non-existent, and Durga is suspiciously brief. He gives
the text as above, adding only (D 1:331,10) °uddhrtam hi tat bhavati, and gloss-,
ing rddhatamah by abhisampannah.
On the evidence available here I would hold that the passage is inconclu-;
sive, but it is certainly possible that vipantat is an adjective and that haratetii
therefore is an ablative form. This possibility may be strengthened by th%
passage to be discussed next. f $
(4.25) amhatis cdmhas cdmhus ca hantehl nirudhopadhdt I vipantat I
The context is RV 1.94.2 where amhatih 'distress' occurs. Here it is clea$
that nirudhopadhdt can only be a masculine bahuvnhi meaning 'with the!*
penultimate put aside [i.e., to the front]', and vipantat would most naturally bej
taken as an adjective as well. But this is not absolutely certain. The lack of am
82
: -h
The analysis dharayateh
0
is a bit uncertain since the text without a danda would
°vipantdd dharayater . It is therefore just as possible that we are dealing with the causative I
hr, hdrayateh. MW traces uddhrta to ud^lhr. One of the meanings attributed to the causativ
hdrayati by MW is 'to have taken from one's self, be deprived of, lose'.
expected ca 'and' could be explained by the very fact that the two expressions
are to be understood differently, the first as an adjective and the second as a
substantive giving the reason why the penultimate has been put aside. In any
case hanteh has to be considered an ablative form. We could translate:
amhatih, amhah, and amhuh [all meaning 'distress, trouble, anxiety'] are from
hantih (Îhan 'strike, kill') with the penultimate put first as a result of inversion/ and
inverted.
Apart from confirming the reading in a pratika, Durga has no remark of
interest here. Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other hand, comment as follows (SM
11:270,18-20):
hanter upadhd yd akdrah sanniskrsya*3 udhah prdpito nita ddau yasya sa
nirudhopadhah I ydv api hakdranakdrdvayavau tdv api vipantau yasya sa
viparltdvayavatvdd vipantahl
The [root] han, of which the penultimate sound, a, is extracted and brought to the
front, that is nirudhopadhah. And that of which those two parts which are the syl-
lables ha and na have been inverted, that is [called] inverted because its parts have
been inverted.
This makes it quite clear that not only is nirudhopadhdt considered a
bahuvnhi and thus an adjective, but vipantdt is as well.
There is every reason, then, to take this passage as an instance of at least one
and possibly two attributes in the ablative case.
(5.26) tdlu taratehl tirnatamam angaml latater vd sydd
[lambakarmanahf4 vipantdt I yathd talaml latety aviparyayahl
tdlu 'palate' is of/from taratih (Vfr 'cross over'): it is the most crossed over organ
[of the body]; or it could be of/from latatih (Vto 'be long'85) [which denotes the
activity of hanging down] because of inversion/which has been inverted, just like
talam 'surface'; laid 'creeper' is [formed] without inversion.
Again, we face the same problem as in the two preceding passages, but here
the use of the substantive viparyaya in forming a compound with the negative
particle a may indicate that vipantdt is to be interpreted as an adjective agree-
ing with latateh which then would have to be an ablative form. Speaking against
tjus is the inserted lambakarmanah which would make such a construction
Cumbersome, and again one would miss a ca 'and' as in the preceding passage
||.25); however, the insertion is excluded by a number of MSS (see note). Durga
IP 1:566,12) glosses vipantdt by ddyantaviparyayena 'by inversion of first and
last'. This may indicate that he takes vipantdt as an ablative of cause, although,
^ The edition reads sanmkrsya, but this is clearly explaining the nih part of nirudhopadhah and
m
we want the meaning 'drawn out', so I think this small emendation is necessary.
Omitted by several MSS; not read by Durga or Skanda-Mahesvara; included by Bhadkamkar
1918 (=D I); excluded by Rajavade 1940.
**,No V/af is met with in the Dhatupathas or the Nighantu; Palsule (1955) lists it as a Sautra root.
as noted above (11.26), Skanda-Mahesvara chose to explain a genitive

vipantasya by viparyayena (SM IV:57,8). But Durga adds as an explanation of
latd (ibid., 13-14): asyeiva latater lambandrthasya latety etac chabdarupam
aviparyayoS6 'viparyayena bhavati, '[also] of this very latatih, which has the
sense of hanging down, is this linguistic form latd which is without inversion,
[that is,] it is [formed] by non-inversion'. This statement suggests that Durga
considers latateh a genitive form and vipantdt an ablative form meaning 'by
inversion; as a result of inversion'.
On the evidence available, I consider the present case inconclusive,
although we might have an attribute in the ablative case here.
(6.3) salalukam*1 samlubdham bhavatiIpdpakam iti nairuktdhl
sararukam^ vd sydtl sarter abhyastdft9/
salalukam means [something] confused; [it means something] bad according to the
Nairuktas; or else it could be sararukam, [that is to say,] from sartih (Vsr 'flow')
which is reduplicated.
First of all, the meaning of salalukam, and that of sararukam as well, is
unclear. Mayrhofer notes: 'salaluka-, nur RV 3, 30, 17 °am:unklar. Meist
durch "Umherschweifen, umherschweifend" iibersetzt (PW, bzw. Grassmann);
glaubhafter Pischel, Ved. Stud. Ill 204f. (s. auch Oldenberg, Noten I 239,
Geldner I 365): "Nachsicht, Geduld". In diesem Falle ware vielleicht an sar-
"sich erstrecken" zu denken (s.u. sisarti)'90 The commentators have rather
lengthy discussions of the meaning, but they need not concern us here.
What is of immediate interest is that we seem to have an instance of an
attribute in the ablative case here, although some caution is called for. In spite
of discussing the passage at length, Skanda-Mahesvara neither quote nor
discuss sarter abhyastdt. Durga remarks as follows (D 1:581,17-582,2):
evam atra salalukam iti lubher mohandrthasya sabdasdrupydt samlubdham ity
upapadyatel sarter apy atra sdrupyam astlti sararukam va syad ity uktam
bhdsyakdrena I raksovisesanam caitat tasya hi sammoho vd ndsanqm vdbhistam
itui * ,'
Thus, in this case, because of similarity in sound with [the root] lubh which has the
sense of confusion, 'salalukam' is established [with the sense of] 'samlubdham'.
Also, there is similarity [in sound] with [the root] sr here, [and] thus it has been
stated by the author of the Bhasya^that 'alternatively it could be sararukam'. And
this is a qualifier of a demon who wishes confusion and destruction.
86
87
Excluded by several MSS and omitted in the edition of Rajavade (1921)
88
The context is RV 3 30 17, salalukam occurs Nigh 4 3
89
So read for sararukam with several MSS, Durga and Skanda-Mahesvara.
90
A fair number of MSS read ahyasndt
'salaluka-, only RV 3 30.17 °am : unclear Mostly translated as "aimless wandering, wander-
ing aimlessly" (PW, Grassmann, respectively), more credible is Pischel, Vedische Studien III
204 f. (see also Oldenberg, Noten 1239, Geldner 1365) "forbearance, patience". In this case
one could perhaps think of sar- "to stretch oneself (see under sisarti).'
If the genitives lubher mohandrthasya and sarteh are constructed with

sabdasdrupydt and sdrupyam, respectively, one would have to translate as
above, and I do think that is the most likely interpretation. In that case we have
no technically expressed analyses here. If the genitives are not constructed with
sabdasdrupydt and sdrupyam, however, it is possible that Durga rewrites the
analysis of salalukam into the more technical expression lubher
mohanarthasya, clearly a genitive form, and takes sarteh as an alternative
analysis.91 In any case Durga does not quote the word abhyastdt at all, and the
analysis sarteh is attributed to the bhdsyakdra, the author of the Bhasya. In
grammatical literature this is normally no other than Patanjali, the author of
the Mahdbhdsya. This analysis is not found in the Mahdbhdsya. In fact, it is
evident that Durga thinks of the Nirukta itself as the Bhasya in question, and
that it is Yaska he has in mind. This is his common practice, for example at
Nirukta 6.8 (D 1:615,10) and Nirukta 6.21 (D 1:667,16). The Nirukta passage is
quoted in the form given above by Venkata Madhava and Sayana in their
respective commentaries on the Rgveda.
The fact that abhyastdt is not commented upon or quoted by any of the com-
mentators warrants the conclusion that the last analysis is an interpolation in
the extant text of the Nirukta. This conclusion is supported also by the fact that
the identification of salalukam with pdpakam is attributed to the Nairuktas
among whom one would tend to include Yaska. There is therefore no evidence
that sarteh, even if genuine, would be an ablative form. That some later inter-
polator has added the ablative abhyastdt is, of course, of interest in itself, but
(Joes not tell us anything about Yaska's own position.
(7.9) suvidatram92 dhanam bhavatil vindater vaikopasargdtI daddter93 vd
sydd dvyupasargdt I
suvidatram means wealth; either it is from vindatih (Vv/d 'find') with one preverb,
or it could be from daddtih (^dd 'give') with two preverbs.
Here we seem to have two clear-cut instances of an analysis of the -teh type
ôccurring with an attribute in the ablative case. Both readings are supported
:by the commentators (D 1:772,7-9; SM 111:55,8).
Some caution seems called for, though, since there are instances in the
extant text of the Nirukta where compounds with the word upasarga as their
final member seem to be later additions. An example is Nir 6.11: agham han-
tehl nirhrasitopasargahl dhantlti. Sarup (1921:97) translates: 'Agha (evil
deed) is derived from (the root) han with the preposition a shortened, i.e. it
kills.' That is to say, Sarup translates as if nirhrasitopasargah were a bahuvrlhi
In syntactic agreement with hanteh, a possibility precluded by the fact that it
91
In that case one would have to translate the passage 'Thus, in this case, because of similarity
in sound, salalukam is of lubhih which has the sense of confusion, [and thus] samlubdham is
[an] appropriate [synonym]. Also, it is of sartih [in as much as] there is similarity here, [and]
92
thus it has been stated by the author of the Bhasya
93
that alternatively it could be sararukam'
The context is RV 10.17.3 = AV 18.2.54. v.l. dadhatir0.
appears in the nominative case, admittedly itself a rather curious feature.

Durga does not comment upon this analysis at all, a fact which indicates that
we are dealing with an interpolation. And Skanda-Mahesvara remark (SM
11:425,14): agham hanteh purvasydno hrasvatvena, '"agham is of/from
hantih", because of shortening of the preceding dN (= the preverb d)\
(7.23) dasyur94 dasyatehl ksaydrthdtl upadasyanty asmin rasdhl
upaddsayati karmdnil
dasyuh 'Dasyu' is from dasyatih (^das 'waste, exhaust') which has the sense of
destruction: the juices are exhausted m him, or he causes [ritual] actions to be
wasted.95
Here we seem to have a straightforward attribute in the ablative case, were
it not for the fact that Durga does not seem to support the text at this point. He
quotes the word dasyum with an accusative case ending which is how it appears
in the stanza in question (RV 1.59.6), and goes on to say (D 1:812,5-6): ddsay-
itdram upaksapayitdram rasdndm susyanti hi tadanudgame sasydni96
karmandm vopaddsayitdram andvrstidvdrena tarn dasyum0, 'him who causes
exhaustion, [that is to say,] who causes waste of the juices, for the crops dry up
when he does not go away; or else, he is the extinguisher of [ritual or agricul-
tural?] actions by causing the lack of rain - that Dasyu'. There is no reflection
here of the wording ksaydrthdt as met with in the extant text of the Nirukta.
The remarks of Skanda-Mahesvara do not simplify the case (SM
111:89,1-2): dasyateh 'tasu upaksaye dasu cd* ity asya ksaydrthe vartamd-
nasyeti sesah,' "dasyateh", [that is to say,] of this [about which it is stated Dhp
4.106-7:] "[the root] tas [occurs] when wasting [is to be denoted], so also [the
root] das"; it is of that which occurs when there is the sense of destruction, thus
the statement is to be completed'. Here too we fail to fin<f any reading
ksaydrthdt\ instead we meet with two attributes in the genitive case. On this
evidence, I think there is reason to doubt the authenticity of the wording of the
Nirukta here.
(9.14) sankdh91 sacatehl sampurvdd vd kiratehl
sankdh 'conflicts' is from sacatih (^sac 'accompany; suffer'); or if is from kiratih
l 'scatter') preceded by [the preverb] sam.
Again, we face an apparently clear-cut case of an attribute in the ablative
case, although it is not met with in Durga's commentary. In the commentary
of Skanda-Mahesvara we meet with three different analyses, but any trace of
sampurvdd is missing (SM 111:156,1): sankdh sacater gatikarmanah sangac-
chante vd tatra yoddhdrah samklrtyante vd, 'sankdh is of/from sacatih which
denotes the activity of moving; or else [they are so called because] warriors
94
95
The context is RV 1.59 6.
96
That is, /:arafoz-interpretations as adhikarana and hetu, respectively
So read with Rajavade for sasyani. 91 The context is RV 6.75.5.
come together (sam^lgam) in it, or they [= the warriors] are praised (sarplkirt)
[in it]'. This does not reflect the extant wording of the Nirukta very well either,
and the analysis should therefore be dismissed as a later interpolation.
(11.24) dga9S dnpurvdd gamehl
dgah 'sin' is from gamih (Îgam 'go; move') preceded by [the preverb] dN (a).
This appears to be a straightforward case of an attribute in the ablative case.
Durga quotes the text as above and adds (DII: 1067,11): avasyam evaitad dgac-
chati kartdram ity dgah, 'most certainly it comes (d^garri) to the one who
commits [it], thus [it is called] dgah\ The commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara
is missing at this point. On this basis there is no reason to doubt the text here.
The only point of uncertainty is that Yaska elsewhere (Nir 1.3) refers to the
preverb d not by its technical name dN known from vydkarana, but simply by
stating d iti.
This material leaves us with eleven possible attributes in the ablative case
to technical analyses of the -teh/-eh type. I would consider four of these possi-
ble but inconclusive, namely, vakter vd vahater vd sdbhydsdt (3.13), ardham
harater vipantdt (3.20), hanteh . . . vipantdt (4.25), and latater vd sydd
[lambakarmanah] viparltdt. Further, I would dismiss sarter abhyastdt (6.3)
and sampurvdd vd kirateh (9.14), maybe also dasyateh ksaydrthdt (7.23), as
later additions. This leaves us with four cases of attributes with an ablative case
ending, three of which should be treated with some caution, and the four pos-
sible instances mentioned already. In other words, the material is not over-
whelming, but, as in the case of the possible attributes with a genitive case
ending, the important thing is that ablative endings do occur.
It is evident from the above investigation that it is not possible to rule out
either the genitive or the ablative interpretation of forms in -teh and -eh on the
basis of possible attributes in the Nirukta itself.
Further reason: etasmdd eva

It is now necessary to investigate a formulaic expression which is frequently
resorted to in the Nirukta in cases where a nirvacana analysis is followed by
the analysis of a homonym or a similar word: x apy etasmdd eva. It would cer-
tainly not be fanciful to assume that if this expression occurs immediately after
an analysis of the -teh type, it could refer back to it and thus give support to the
interpretation that the forms in -teh are ablatives: 'x too is derived from this
t [root]'. I do not, however, think that this is how the formula was intended in the
i first place. On the contrary, it is perfectly possible that the formula is to be seen
, in relation to the most fundamental aspect of nirvacana analysis: why is some-
thing called what it is called? In other words, it would link up with the inter-
rogative kasmdt 'why?' 99 so often rhetorically used to introduce an analysis,
98
The context is RV 1.94.15. " See Kahrs 1983.
and with formal analyses of the -andt type giving the reason why something is
called what it is called. Accordingly, the formula 'x apy etasmdd eva' would
have to be interpreted as 'x too [is so called] for the very same reason'. Since
the overall tendency among scholars, notably Sarup (1921), Skold (1926) and
Rajavade (1940), has been to take etasmdt as a pronoun referring back to a form
in -teh which therefore would have to be a form in the ablative case, I deem it
necessary to present in extenso the material from the Nirukta exhibiting this
formula, and then see what conclusions can be drawn from a detailed investiga-
tion of it.
(1.20a) bhimo bibhyaty asmdtl bhismo 'py etasmdd eval
bhirnah 'fierce; terrible' [is so called because] one is afraid (Vfr/iF 'fear') of it;
bhismah 'terrible; dreadful' too [is so called] for the very same reason.
Can there be any doubt that this gives us a causal explanation? I believe not.
Durga (D 1:151,9) merely quotes the text, not even finding it worthwhile to
comment. The same is the case with Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:119,11) and
Nllakantha (NSV 1.6.233).
(1.20b) girih parvatah I samudgirno bhavatil. . . I meghasthdylI megho
'pi girir etasmdd eva I
ginh means a mountain; [it is so called because] it is elevated (sam-uch\gf)\ . . .
'seated on a cloud': meghah 'cloud' too is [called] ginh for the very same reason
[i.e., because that too is elevated].
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:120,6-7) comment: megho 'pi girir etasmad eva,
samudgxrnatvdt so 'pi hi samudglrna ivdntariksena, '"meghah 'cloud' too is
[called] girih for the very same reason", [that is to say,] because of the fact that
it is elevated, for that too is elevated, as it were, by the atmosphere'. There is
no doubt that they take etasmdd eva to be a causal statement.
Nllakantha is of the same opinion (NSV 1.6.151): udgirna via megho 'pi
vdyund vd svarena vdI etasmdd itipurvoktam udgirnatvam uddhriam, 'a cloud
too is as if elevated, by wind or by sound [?], and is called [girih] "for the
[same] reason", that is, the aforementioned property of being elevated'. This
refers back to samudgirnatvahetutah 'for the reason of being elevated' (NSV
1.6.238).
(2.5) gaur iti prthivyd ndmadheyam I yad duram gatd bhavatil yac easy dm
bhutdni gacchantil gdter vaukdro ndmakaranah I athdpi pasundmeha
bhavaty etasmdd eval
gauh is a name for the Earth, since it stretches out (^gam\ lit. 'is gone') far, and since
living beings move (^gam) on it; or it is of/from gdtih (Îga 'go' or 'sing; praise' 10°),
ioo £>urga (D i 179J) takes it to be Vga 'move', that this root occurs only in the dtmanepada as
a second class root is no indication that he is wrong since Yaska often treats roots occurring
only in the dtmanepada as a noun in -ft, it seems to have troubled Skanda-Mahesvara, though,
who stick to Îgd 'sing, praise' (SM 11*42,12)
[and] the syllable o is a noun-maker;101 moreover, it is a name for a tethered animal

here, for the very same reason.
Here it is possible that etasmdt refers back to gateh. It is, however, perfectly
possible to stick to the interpretation I have suggested, and understand Yaska
to say that a cow is called gauh for the very same reason that the Earth is called
gauh, because it moves and because it is praised. But the commentators com-
plicate the picture here. Durga states (D 1:179,8-9): etasmad eva dhdtudvaydd
gamer gdter vd. The only natural way to interpret this is: 'etasmad eva, that is
to say, from these two roots, namely Îgam or ^gd\ Skanda-Mahesvara (SM
11:43,1) too add dhdtudvaydt after etasmad eva. It is of course possible to inter-
pret dhdtudvaydt as 'because there are two roots', and Durga's statement to
mean: ' "for the very same reason", that is to say, because there are two roots
it is either of Îgam or of Vga'. Admittedly this would be a bit forced. But some-
thing does not make sense here. Clearly, yat is in both instances to be under-
stood as yasmdt 'since; because'; so also Durga (ibid.,5-6). This makes it
natural to interpret etasmad eva as 'for the very same reason(s)' which would
link it to the two alternatives first presented. Skanda-Mahesvara (ibid.) take iha
'here' in the sense of iha loke 'here in this world' and add, to be on the safe
side, vede ca 'and also in Veda'. Durga, on the other hand, (ibid.,8) explains
iha as kdrakadvaye, 'where a two-fold [interpretation with regard to] kdraka
[is possible]'. This refers directly back to the alternative interpretations as the
agent of the act of going ('it stretches far') or the locus of the act of going
('living beings move on it') which he has already presented us with (ibid.,6—7):
evam kartrkdrakam adhikaranam vd yojyam, 'thus it suits [to interpret as] the
agent-participant or the locus'. It is possible, then, that the commentators
simply quote the familiar expression etasmad eva but consider it necessary to
add dhdtudvaydt 'from these two roots', namely Vgam and Vga, since there is
some confusion here as to what Yaska had in mind in as much as an interpreta-
tion as adhikaranasddhana is a bit difficult in the case of a cow. There is,
however, nothing to determine what Yaska had in mind, and the passage as it
stands does not very easily lend itself to any one particular interpretation.
(2.6) vir iti sakunindmal veter gatikarmanah I athdplsundmeha bhavaty
etasmad eva
vih is a name for bird: it is of/from vetih (Vvf) which denotes the activity of moving,
moreover, it is a name for arrow here, for the very same reason.
Once again it is possible that etasmad eva refers back to veteh which would
|hus have to be an ablative form, but it is by no means necessarily the case. As
|he text stands, the context is vayah 'birds' from RV 10.27.22, but there is
*fvery reason to be suspicious of the text here since the passage is not quoted
<br commented upon by Durga or Skanda-Mahesvara in the customary way.
M
See pp. 115 f above for a discussion of gdter vaukaro ndmakaranah
I am therefore inclined to dismiss it as a later addition, and from that angle it

is possible to argue that in both this and the preceding passage we>are dealing
with later interpolations by someone who sloppily thought etasmdd eva was
used to refer back to forms in -teh, that is to say, by someone who was only
interested in the formal grammatical derivation.
(2.8) yonir antariksaml mahdn avayavah I parivito vdyundl ayam apitaro
yonir etasmdd eva I pariyuto bhavatil
yonih means atmosphere: it is a vast part (avayavah: ava^lyu); [it is] encompassed
(parivitah),102 [that is to say,] by wind (vayund)', this other yonih 'womb' [is so
called] for the same reason: it is embraced/surrounded (parblyu).
This does not add anything specific; it is of course possible that etasmdt
refers to the element yu that is part of the formation of avayavah and then
repeated by the element yu that is part of pariyutah. This is how Samp
(1921:27) interprets: This other (meaning, i.e.) a woman's womb, is derived
from the same root also: it is surrounded.' I do not find this convincing, though,
since the nirvacanas are expressed;n a non-technical language. Instead, I think
it refers back to the meaning of being encompassed, embraced, surrounded.
This seems to be how Durga too understands the situation (D 1:191,1-2): ayam
apltarah strlyonir etasmad eva/ asdv api pariyuta eva bhavati sndvnd mdmsena
ca, '"also this other \yonih\\ that is, a woman's womb, [is so called] "for the
very same reason", for this too "is surrounded", that is, by sinews and flesh'.
Skanda-Mahesvara remark as follows (SM 11:63,5): itarah strlyonir etasmad
eva rupasdmdnydt prasakto nirucyate,' "this other", namely a woman's womb,
[is so called] "for the very same reason"; it is incidentally analysed because it
is identical in form'. This is how I understand this remark, which, then, tells us
nothing. The other possibility is that rupasdmdnydt 'because it is identical in
form' glosses etasmdt, but I find this less than likely. In other words, the com-
mentators are not very explicit here, and the instance remains unclear.
(2.13) vratam iti karmandmal nivrttikarma vdrayatiti satah/ idam
apitarad vratam etasmdd eva vrnotiti satah/103
'vratam' is a name for an action; [m its sense of] act of abstention (i.e., vratam in
the sense of 'vow') it is of that which really exists so that one says [of it]: it restrains
(Vvr 'cover; hide', caus. 'restrain');104 this other vratam too (i.e., vratam in the
general sense of 'action') [is so called] for the very same reason: it is* of that which
really exists so that one says [of it]: it covers [you] (Vvr 'cover').
Here it is quite impossible that etasmdt refers back to vdrayatiti satah sincq
satah here and elsewhere in constructions of the same type has been proven tq
102
103
The context is RV 1.164 32 = AV 9 10 10 where the word panvftah occurs.
104
See Kahrs 1980.132, 234-6
A more exhaustive way of interpreting an analysis of the iti satah type will be argued for later,
be a genitive form.105 Rather, it refers to the reason why vratam is so called: it

causes to be enveloped. The only difference between the two analyses is that
in the first we have a causative and in the second a present indicative form of
the same root Vvr 'cover': vratam in the sense of nivrttikarma, that is to say,
4
vow; vow of sexual abstention', keeps you back, restrains you (vdrayati), while
vratam in the sense of karma, action in general, envelops you and binds
(vrnoti) you with regard to the consequences.
The context here is RV 1.24.15; vratam is listed under karmandmdni Nigh
2.1. Although it does not seem to be of importance from the present point of
view, it ought to be mentioned that Durga (D 1:207,15-208,2) reverses the
analyses. That is to say, he gives the text as vratam iti karmandma vrnotlti
satahl idam apitarad vratam etasmdd eva nivrttikarma vdrayatiti satah.
Skanda-Mahesvara too (SM 11:84,18-85,4) support such a reading, which
would indeed be preferable on the grounds that one would then move from
vratam in the general sense of 'action' indicated in the Nighantu to the more
special sense of 'vow'. However, this situation does not affect the interpreta-
tion of the etasmdd eva construction. Here it has to mean 'for the very same
reason'.
Sarup (1921:30) translates the passage as follows: 'The word vrata is a
synonym of action, having the sense of abstaining: because it enjoins. This
other meaning of vrata (i.e. a vow) is derived from the same root also: because
it chooses.' This may serve as a good illustration of how blind Sarup is to the
nuances of the various types of technical analyses. So is Skold, who remarks
(1926:331): 'The words vrmtiti [sic] sato contradict the preceding statement,
or else etasmdd eva are out of place.' Their confusion is not diminished by their
taking vrnoti as a form of Vvr 'choose'. Rajavade (1940: Notes, p.357) does not
confuse the roots, but remarks:
This {idam) other (itarat) vrata also comes from this (etasmdt) very (eva) root; a
performer of the Soma-sacnfice, for instance, binds himself to perform certain acts;
these acts bind him from first to last; he must carry them out according to prescrip-
tion; vrata in this sense comes from vr (=to cover, to bind).
Apart from his taking etasmdd eva to mean 'comes from this very root',
Rajavade gives a long list of reasons why vratam is so called.
(2.17) ahir106 ayandtl ety antarikse I ayam apitaro 'hir etasmdd eva I
nirhrasitopasargah I dhantlti I
ahih 'cloud' [is so called] on account of [its] moving (ayanam: VJ): it moves in the
atmosphere; this other ahih ('serpent') too [is so called] for the very same reason;
[or?] with the preverb shortened: 'it kills' (d^lhan).
This seems to be straightforward: ahih in the sense of 'cloud' is so called
because it moves (eti), and ahih in the sense of 'serpent' is so called for the
*05 See Kahrs 1980 130-48, 233-50, and 1984 150-2 106
Nigh 1.10.
very same reason, that is, because it moves. This interpretation is supported by
Durga who simply adds (D 1:219,11) asdv api hy eti, 'for it too moves'. Skanda-
Mahesvara, on the other hand, complicate matters when they state (SM
11:95,11-12): ayam apltaro 'hih sarpa etasmad eva eteh I asdv api hi bhumydm
eti. Here etasmad eva is followed by eteh which could be a gloss. In that case
Samp's 'from the same root also' would be correct. It is, of course, also pos-
sible to think of eteh as an added formal analysis without its having to be a
gloss, in which case it does not give us any information on how etasmad eva
is to be understood. That this is the case will become clear below.
The third analysis met with in tjie Nirukta, as a derivation from orphan with
the preverb shortened, comes rather abruptly and without indicating it as an
alternative as is commonly done. Both Durga (D 1:218,11) and Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM 11:95,12) add atha vd and yad vd 'or else', respectively. Durga
(ibid.,12) rephrases this alternative as: dnpurvasya hanteh, 'of tiantih (Îhari)
preceded by dN (d)\ This clear display of a genitive case ending excludes the
possibility that Durga would consider etasmad eva equivalent to eteh.
(2.22) parjanyo vdyur ddityah sitosnavarsair osadhih pdcayantil anupd101
anuvapanti lokdnt svena svena karmandl ayam apltaro 'nupa etasmad
eva I anupyata udakenal
Rain, Wind, and Sun: with cold, heat, and rain they ripen plants; [so these three]
anupah 'sowers'108 [are so called because they] sow (anuvapanti: artwlvap 'scatter;
sow') the worlds with their respective activities; this other anupah ('watery place;
marshland; shore or riverbank'109) too [is so called] for the very same reason: it is
sown/scattered (anupyate: amAvap) with water.
This would seem straightforward were it not for the fact that Durga remarks
on etasmad eva in the following manner (D 1:229,1-2): vapaterdhdtor asdv
api hy anupyate 'nuprakiryate110 nityakdlam udakena, '[that is, It is] of/from
the root vapatih for this too "is scattered", that is, perpetually thrown at "with
water"'. This, of course, makes it possible to argue that Durga actually glosses
etasmdt by vapateh dhdtoh, but this would not be in keeping with the fact that
Durga invariably treats of the forms in -teh as genitives. It is equally possible
that Durga holds that etasmad eva means 'for the very same reason' and then
adds the formal analysis. Skanda-Mahesvara do not quote the words etasmad
eva but add (SM 11:106,7) vaper eva which clearly is a reference to Îvap and
the added eva may indicate that it is linked to reflect the expression etasmad
107
108
This is how Yaska understands anupah in RV 10.27.23. The word occurs only twice in the
Rgveda. In the present context Geldner translates anupah by 'Buffer vpr 'am Wasser
wohnend', in the context of 9.107.9 by 'Marschland'. Yaska's derivations of anupa have been
dealt with in detail by M.A. Mehendale (1965/78). For other views on this word, see the refer-
ences in VB III; R. Turner (1979), in a review of Mehendale 1978, supports the derivation of
anupd- from dp- 'water' by adducing examples 109
of related words from middle and modern lan-
110
guages (Pali, Prakrit, Hindi, Sinhalese). So Durga (D 1:229,1).
vX.prakiryate.
eva. Once more, this makes it possible, but by no means certain that vapeh is
intended as a gloss of etasmdt.
In other words, on the basis of the Nirukta passage itself, it seems perfectly
reasonable to interpret etasmdd eva as 'for the very same reason', but the
remarks of the commentators no longer make this absolutely straightforward.
The next passage to be discussed, however, offers a good reason for ruling out
the possibility that vapeh in the commentary of Skanda-Mahesvara is a gloss
of etasmdt.
(3.9) dhurm dhurvater vadhakarmanah I iyam apitard dhur etasmdd eva I
vihantivahaml
dhuh 'finger; pole' is of/from dhurvatih (^dhurv) which denotes the activity of
hurting;112 this other dhuh ('yoke') too [is so called] for the very same reason: it
hurts the shoulder [of the ox].
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:142,15) replace vadhakarmanah by vad-
hdrthasya, genitive. This effectively rules out the possibility that etasmdt
should pick up dhurvateh. Durga, on the other hand, adds dhdtoh vad-
hakarmanah after etasmdd eva (D 1:274,11-12). This leaves us with the
possibility that he intends to gloss etasmdt by these words, although I find it
more likely that he adds these words as an explicit formal analysis, a conclu-
sion supported by Durga's remarks on the following passage.
(3.10) khala iti samgrdmandma1131 khalater vdl skhalater vdl ay am
apitarah khala etasmdd eva I samdskanno bhavatil
khalah is a name for battle: either it is of/from khalatih (^Jkhal 'tremble; shake'), or
it is of/from skhalatih (^skhal 'stagger; stumble; fall'); this other khalah ('threshing-
floor; granary') too [is so called] for the very same reason: it is scattered over.
Since alternative explanations are given here, it seems feasible that if
etasmdt were a pronoun referring back to a form in -teh, it can in this case only
refer back to the last one, namely skhalateh; on the assumption that etasmdt
gives a reason, this would also seem to be the case. Durga comments on the
passage as follows (D 1:281,14-17):
khalater va bhrasyatyarthasya bhrasyanti hi tatra yodhdhl skhalater va
v himsdrthasya himsyante hi tatra parasparena I ayam apitarah khalah dhdnyakhalah
etasmad eva tatrdpi hi bhrasyanti cumyamdndni dhdnydni himsyante va curnyanta
ity arthah I atha va samaskannah asau bhavati viprakirnaih114 dhdnyaih I
111
Yaska is commenting on Nigh 2 5 anguhndmani 'names for finger' where dhurah is listed.
n
As his nigama Yaska quotes RV 10.94.7.
}113 Nigh 2.19 lists dhurvati under vadhakarmanah.
"m Nigh 2.17; as his nigama Yaska quotes RV 1O'.48.7.
So read for viprakirneh; ed. Rajavade (1921) reads viprakimo with v.l. viprakirnaih,
Bhadkamkar (D 1.281, note to text) states 'a. d. viprakimo for viprakirnaih ofbi.' which indi-
cates that viprakirneh is a mere misprint.
'Either it is of khalatiK which has the sense of falling,115 for warriors fall in it; 'or
else it is of skhalatiK which has the'sense of injuring,116 for warriors ate injured by
each other in it. This other khalalv too', [that is to say,] a threshing-floor, [is so
called] 'for the very same reason', for on that too grain which is being ground falls;
or else it is being injured, that is, ground - that is the meaning. Or else [it is so called
because] it 'is scattered over', [that is to say,] with grain that has been thrown about.
This passage is quite illuminating. First of all, Durga takes khalateh and skha-
lateh to be genitive forms. This rules out that etasmat refers back to any of them.
Secondly, it is not only clear that etasmdd eva gives the reason, but that Durga
lets it refer back to both alternatives: battle is called khalah because warriors fall
in it, threshing-floor is called khalah because grain falls on it; or battle is called
khalah because warriors are injured in it, threshing-floor is called khalah
because grain is injured or ground on it. Finally, Durga takes samdskanno
bhavati as a separate analysis, which I find surprising. The same position is
taken by Skanda-Mahesvara, as will be clear below. The explanation could be
that the meanings of Akhal and Askhal seem to present some difficulty to the
commentators who cannot make any of them fit the meaning of samdskannah.
Skanda-Mahesvara comment on this passage in an equally illuminating
manner (SM 11:149,7-9):
khala iti samgramanama, khalater va mathandrthasya, mathyante hi tatra yodhah,
skhalater va, skhalanti hi tatra yodhah I ayam apityddi, etasmad eva khalateh/
tatrdpi hi sammathyante ksudyante sasydnil skhalantiti va, skhalanti tvaramdnds
tatra karsakdh I samaskanna iti nirvacandntaram I
'khalah is a name for battle: either it is of khalatiK which has the sense of hurting,
for warriors get hurt in it; 'or it is of skhalatiK, for warriors stumble in it; 'also this'
etc., 'for the very same reason' is of khalatih, for on this too [something] is crushed
to pieces, that is, trampled upon, namely corn; or else '[they] stumble', that is,
ploughmen who move with speed stumble on it; samdskannah ('it is scattered over')
is a separate analysis.
It is quite obvious that Skanda-Mahesvara consider khalateh to be a geni-
tive form and that they add it after etasmdd eva. If we demand just a minimum
of consistency within one and the same paragraph, the only reasonable conclu-
sion one can draw from this is that when they add a form in -teh after etasmat,
here and elsewhere, they do not intend the form in -teh as a gloss of etasmat
but as a repetition of the formal analysis - in the genitive case, u
(4.5) musow musikd ity arthahl musikdh punar musndtehl muso 'py
etasmdd eva I
115
Dhp 1.578, however, gives khala samcaye (calane); bhrasyatyarthah is not known from any
dhdtupdtha. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM II: 149,7) give the meaning mathanam 'whirling around;
116
shake; churn; hurt; destroy' to ykhal, this is not met with in any extant dhdtupdtha either.
Dhp 1.577, however, gives skhala samcalane (samcaye ca)\ no dhdtupdtha gives skhala
117
himsdydm.
Nigh 4.1.1 take the form to be the nom. pi. of mils-. Sayana quotes the analysis at RV 1.105.8
where the form musah clearly is nom. pi.
musah, that is to say, musikdh 'mice'; musikdh, again, is of/from musndtih (Vmws
* steal'); musah too [is so called] for the very same reason.
Here it is certainly imaginable that etasmdt refers directly to the analysis
musndteh, however this is not how Durga takes it (D 1:364,2-4):
adhundkhydnaprasaktasya musikdsabdasya nirvacanam karoti - musikah punar
musnateh/ 'musa steye" ity asyal musah api ca etasmad eva te hi haranti
dhdnyddinil
Now he makes an analysis of the word musikd 'mouse' which has come up [because
it has been used] in the explanation [of musah\: 'musikdh, again, is of musndtih\
[that is to say,] it is of this [which has been listed Dhp 9.58 as] '[the root] mus
[occurs] when [the sense of] stealing [is to be denoted]'; and 'musah too [is so
called] for the very same reason', for they snatch such things as grain.
This leaves no room for doubt: musndteh is taken as a genitive form, and
etasmad eva is taken to indicate the reason why musah is called musah.
Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other hand, comment as follows (SM 11:208,17):
tathd cdyarn muso 'py etasmad eva dhdtos tathokiah. It is perfectly possible to
translate this as 'and thus also this [word] musah is in that way stated as from
this very [same] root'. Here it would seem that dhdtoh picked up etasmdt
directly. It is not quite certain that this is the way to interpret it, though, since
Skanda-Mahesvara at the previous passage (3.10) added a formal analysis in
-teh, considered to be a genitive form, after etasmdt. One could then take
dhdtoh in the present passage as a genitive form and translate: 'and thus also
this "musah [is so called] for the very same reason", [that is,] it is of the [same]
root as stated'. In any case, the passage demonstrates clearly the very intimate
link between a formal analysis and the reason why something is called what it
is called.
(4.8) madhum somam ity aupamikam mddyatehl idam apitaran madhv
etasmad eva I
madhu ('mead'?), metaphorically meaning Soma, is of/from mddyatih {^\mad 'be
* exhilarated; exhilarate'); this other madhu ('honey; water'?119) too [is so called] for
the very same reason.
It is not entirely clear what senses of madhu Yaska has in mind, but this is
not of primary importance here.120 Durga (D 1:371,1) adds mddyateh after
118 119
120
The context is RV 10.71.2. madhu is listed under udakanamdni Nigh 1.12.
The first word madhu is necessarily the one used metaphorically of Soma. Indeed, the two
words often occur side by side in the Rgveda as in the verse in question here (3.47.1), and
madhu therefore seems to refer to an intoxicating drink in this context; cf. H. Luders
(1959:343 f.): 'Ebenso emdeutig ist die Bezeichnung des madhu als "geprefit" (sutd), der
Prefisteine sowohl als somasut wie als madhusut, und endhch das standige Nebenemander-
gu stehen von soma und mddhu, oft in demselben Verse. Aber gerade ein Ausdruck wie somydm
** madhu scheint mir zu beweisen, daB madhu ursprunghch emen andern Trank bezeichnete und
r
der Name nur auf den Soma ubertragen ist.' By the 'other' madhu I think Yaska intends
3
simply honey, which m itself is considered to possess intoxicating qualities, and not neces-
sarily any intoxicating drink. This is not quite how the commentators take it though. Durga
etasmdd eva, Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:218,2) add dhatoh. Again it would

seem that these were added as glosses of etasmdt.
One should also see the present Nirukta passage in the light of another
analysis of madhu offered by Yaska at Nirukta 10.31: madhu dhamater
vipantasya, 'madhu "honey"121 is of dhamatih {^dham 'blow; melt') which has
been inverted'.122 This is one of the few apparently genuine instances in the
Nirukta where Yaska identifies a form such as dhamateh as a genitive form.
(4.13) api vd sira ddityo bhavatil yad anusete sarvdni bhutdnil madhye
caisdm tisthatil idam apitarac chira etasmdd eva I samdsritdny etad
indriydni bhavantil
Or else sirah 'the head'123 is the sun, since it goes to rest along (anu^lsi) with living
beings, and it stands in their middle; this other sirah ('head of a living being') too
[is so called] for the very same reason: the sense-faculties [rest=] are dependent
upon (sam-d^sri) it.
I find this passage puzzling, and not very illuminating for the present
investigation. The commentators are not very helpful here either, and one may
suspect that they did not quite see what the underlying idea may have been.
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:226,19) point out that in the case of the second word
sirah we are dealing with the human head, and again they add dhatoh after
etasmdd eva. They continue: tad api anupravisya caksurddibhutdnindriydni
tisthanti, 'having entered into it, the sense-faculties consisting of the eye etc.,
remain [there]'. This would indicate that the reason referred to by etasmdt is in
fact madhye tisthati 'it stands in [their] middle'. It seems in any case clear that
samdsntdni etc. is a statement intended to give a reason, and not a separate
analysis. This interpretation is supported by Skanda-Mahesvara (§M 11:227,2)
who refer to it as an upapattivacanam, 'a statement of evidence'. What is not
clear to me is the following. If etasmdd eva were to indicate that the human
head is called sirah for the very same reason that the sun is called sirah and
the reason indicated for that is anusete sarvdni bhutdni, clearified as madhye
tisthati, then we are facing some problems. First of all, whether anusete be
transitive or not, it has to identify the sun as the agent of the activity expressed
by that verb, whereas the human head is the karman, the object of the activity
carried out by the senses. If the same reason is hard to find, one would have to
consider the possibility that etasmdtreally refers only to a formal analysis here,
that is to say, that it refers back to anu^lsT, the meaning of which is not very
obvious in the context and the formal reference to which is much too vague for
it to be picked up simply by the etasmdd eva construction.
Footnote 120 (cont)
(D 1-371,1) identifies it as maksikam ('honey' according to MW), and Skanda-Mahesvara (SM
II 218,1-2) as maksikam, bhrdmaram ('bee-related, honey' MW), or ksaudram ('honey,
121
species of honey L , water L' MW)
The context here is RV 4.38 10, a Dadhikra hymn, where it is stated that the words should be
mixed with honey,mcf. Renou (EVP XV* 164)123 'impregne de miel ces paroles-ci\ and Luders
(1959.347-8). Cf p. 122 above. The context is RV 1.163.10.
To take etasmdd eva as referring to the derivation from a verbal root does
not make much sense here. By way of example, Sarup (1921:60-1) translates:
'Or else siras refers to the sun, i.e. it follows all created things to rest, and
stands in their midst. This other (meaning of) siras (i.e. the human head) is
derived from the same root also: the senses depend upon it.' S. Varma
(1953:92) is more explicit in indicating which verbal root he has in mind: ' "the
sun" or "head", is traced to w " t o lie", lit. the former, because "it lies among
all creatures", the latter, because "the organs of sense rest i.e. depend upon it"'.
(4.16) upddarsi sundhyuvahl sundhyur ddityo bhavatil sodhandtl tasyaiva
vakso bhdsddhyuhlam I idam apitarad vaksa etasmdd eva I adhyuhlam
kdye I sakunir api sundhyur ucyate I sodhandd eva I udakacaro bhavati I
dpo 'pi sundhyuva ucyante I sodhandd eva I
'[Her breast (vaksah)] lets itself be seen [like that] of the sundhyU'124 (RV 1.124.4);
sundhyuh is the sun, [so called] on account of the cleansing (sodhanam: ^sudh,
caus.); its very breast (vaksah) is raised/abundant (adhyudhah: adhi + ^lvah 'carry')
with light; this other vaksah ('breast [of human or animal]') too [is so called] for
the very same reason: it is raised on the body; a bird too is called sundhyuh on
account of the very same cleansing, [for] it lives in water; the waters too are called
sundhyuvah125 on account of the very same cleansing.
Note that the explanations with a form in -andt, clearly causal explanations,
are exactly parallel to the etasmdd eva construction; when they are repeated
they even contain the word eva. This supports the hypothesis that etasmdd eva
has to be interpreted as 'for the very same reason'. To assume that etasmdt were
to refer to a well concealed verbal root here would be far-fetched. Sarup,
missing out one sentence, nevertheless translates (1921:62): 'The pure one is
the sun, (so called) from purifying. This other (meaning of) vaksas (breast) is
derived from the same (root) also: it is exalted in the body.'
Durga (D 1:388,5) adds vaher dhdtoh and Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:237,2)
add dhdtoh after etasmdd eva\ in both commentaries this is followed by an
expanded version of the reason given by Yaska. Once again, I think they feel a
need to explicate because the analysis in the Nirukta is a bit cryptic and so they
add a formal analysis or at least point out the connection with the preceding one.
124
The context is RV 1124 4 upa adarsi sundhyuvo nd vdkso° The hymn is to Usas Here the
form is gen sg., in the feminine. The meaning of the word is not quite clear Geldner trans-
lates* 'Es zeigt sich lhre Brust wie die erne Sundhyuvogels', and remarks in a note* 'sundhyu
nach Say. em weiBfarbiger Wasservogel, nach Durga der Madgu Auf ein Tier weist auch 8,
24, 24' Renou, on the other hand, translates (EVP 111*61). 'Sa poitnne se laisse voir comme
celle de la courtisane', and remarks in a note (ibid..63) 'Sundhyu nom d'animal possible,
surtout s'll est perrms de considerer aussi comme n d'animaux admasdd et nodhds Noter
qu'au Livre X (138, 5), par possible meconnaissance de notre passage, U. elle-meme est
appelee sundhyu Le mot est aisement etymologisable comme ep quahficative et se dit au
fern d'une jeune femme X 39, 7, des juments du char solaire I 50, 9, de la pensee poetique
VII. 88, 1 La traduction par "courtisane", mcertaine en soi, vaut en fonction de rensemble
des hy. a U'
125
The form must be nom pi. in the feminine. Rajavade (1921; 1940) reads sundhyavah
(4.18) kacchapo 'py akiipdra126 ucyate I akupdro na kupam rcchatltil

kacchapah kaccham pdtil kacchena pdtiti vdl kacchena pibatiti vdl
kacchah khacchah khacchadahl ayam apitaro nadikaccha etasmdd eval
kam udakaml tena chddyatel
A tortoise too is called akupdrah, [that is to say,] a-kupa-arah: it does not (a = na)
move (ara-\rcchati) in a well (kupa-)\ kacchapah 'tortoise' [is so called because]
it protects (^pd 'protect') its mouth-and-neck (kacchah), or [because] it protects
with its mouth-and-neck, or [because] it drinks (^pd 'drink') with its mouth-and-
neck;127 kacchah ('mouth-and-neck of a tortoise'), [that is to say,] kha-cchah, that
is, kha-cchadah 'which covers (chddayati) space (khani)'; this other river-kacchah
('river-bank') [is so called] for the very same reason: kam, that is, water - it is
covered (chddyate: Îchad 'cover', pass, caus.) by it.
Again, it is perfectly reasonable to interpret etasmdt causally, in line with
the other explanations given in this passage. Durga supports this interpretation
when he adds after etasmdd eva (D 1:402,20): kasamjnakena udalcena chddy-
ate Hi kacchah, 'by means of the thing called ka9 that is, by water, it is being
covered, thus [it is called] kacchah9.
(4.19) harihm somo haritavarnahI ayam apitaro harir etasmdd eval
harih means Soma, [so called because] its colour is tawny; this other harih
('monkey') too [is so called] for the very same reason.
Clearly, etasmdt gives a reason. Durga supports this (D 1:417,1): ayam
apitaro harih markatah etasmad eva iti haritavarnatvdd dharir ucyate, ' "also
this other harih", that is, a monkey, "for the very same reason", that is, it is
called harih because of the fact that its colour is tawny'. So do Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM 11:255,19): etasmad eva varnasdmdnydt, '"for the very same
reason", that is to say, because the colour is the same'. ;
(4.21) bandhuh sambandhandtI ndbhih samnahandtl ndbhyd sdnnaddhd
garbhdjdyantel ity dhuhl etasmdd evajfidtTn sandbhaya ity dcaksatel
sarnbandhava iti ca/jfidtih samjndndtl
bandhuh 'tie; nexus; [maternal] relative' [is so called] on account of the binding
together (sambandhanam: sant\bandh)\ ndbhih 'navel; umbilical cord; binding' [is
so called] on account of the tying together (samnahanam: sam^nah); it is said: 'foe-
tuses are born tied by the umbilical cord'.129 For this very reason one refers to close
relatives (jndtayah) as sa-ndbhayah ('who have the same ndbhiK) and also as sam-
bandhavah ('who have the same bandhuh'); jhdtih 'close relative' [is so called] on
account of [his/her] being well known (samjhdnam: sam^ljfid).
126
127
The context is the word dkuparasya RV 5.39.2.
Most scholars take kacchah to mean 'mouth' or 'shelF as it suits them. Skanda-Mahesvara
(SM 11:247,6) claim the kacchah of a tortoise is located on its back (kacchapasya prsthe yat
129
kaccha ucyate0). m The context is RV 10.101.10.
The quotation has not been traced; Sarup'( 1927:75, note 6; 1921:66, note 9) remarks: 'Cf. TS.
vi. 1. 7. 2.' The resemblance is rather slight.
The context here is RV 1.164.33: dydur me pitajanita nabhir dtra bdndhur

me mdta prthivimahiydm0'. Only pita, which is also analysed in this passage
of the Nirukta, occurs at Nighantu 4.1 which is the passage presently being
commented upon. Durga comments only on Yaska's analysis of pita apart from
offering his own comments on the verse. This indicates that the passage may
be a later addition. It is commented upon in full by Skanda-Mahesvara who
explain etasmdd eva by sannahandt sambandhandc ca, 'because of the tying
together and the binding together' (SM 11:260,16). Even though there is reason
to doubt the text here, the passage nevertheless provides a clear example of how
etasmdd eva can be used at the beginning of a clause as a clear statement of
cause. This is also how Skanda-Mahesvara take it.
(4.27) eko 'svo vahati saptandmddityah1301 saptdsmai rasmayo rasdn
abhisanndmayanti I saptainam rsayah stuvantiti vdl idam apitaran
ndmaitasmdd eva I abhisanndmdt I
One horse with seven names (sapta-ndman-) draws: that is, the sun [draws]; seven
rays bring the juices to bow towards (abhi-sanAnani) him, or seven sages praise
(ynam in the sense of Îstu) him; this other ndma ('name') [is so called] for the very
same reason, that is, on account of the bending towards {abhisanndmdt: abhi-
sarrnnam).
Here Yaska himself adds a word expressing a cause after etasmdd eva.
Durga remarks (D 1:445,9-10):
idam apltarat sabdah nama etasmad eva abhisamnamat tad api svam arthatn
pratydyayitum kriydpadasya vd gunabhdvendbhimukhyena samnamatil
'Also this other' word 'ndma [is so called] for the very same reason, that is, on
account of the bending towards', [that is to say,] that too bends towards (directs
itself) in order to make its own meaning recognised or [that] of a word denoting an
action, directly as a subordinate.131
Skanda-Mahesvara add (SM 11:281,18-19) natam hi svasmin ndmavati, 'for
it is bent towards its own name-possessor'.
This, then, is an instance where both the Nirukta and the commentators
make it absolutely clear that etasmdd eva gives a causal explanation.
(5.1) tamo 'py andha ucyateI ndsmin dhydnam bhavatil na darsanaml
andham tama132 ity abhibhdsante I ayam apltaro yndha etasmdd eva I
130
131
Rajavade (1921: tippanT, p. 148): vdkye dkhydtam pradhdnam itarat sarvam gaunaml e
krtvd ndmdny api svdrthadyotane knydrthadyotane vd dbhimukhyena visesato guni
samnamantil gumbhavantity arthah, 'in a sentence the verb is primary, everything else sec-
ondary; in recognition of this, nouns too, becoming especially subordinate through being
directed to the manifesting of their own meaning or the meaning of an action, bow towards;
132
that is to say, they become subordinate'.
Sarup (1927) reads andhantama0; Bhadkamkar 1918 and Rajavade 1921 read andhamtama0;
in Samp's translation, however, we find (1921:72): 'People also use the expression andham
tamas, i.e. "blinding darkness".' This is in agreement with the edition of Roth (1852). It seems
Darkness too is called andhah (andhas-):133 there is no (na = a) focusing (dhydnam:

Îdhya) on it, no seeing; one talks about blind darkness; this other andhah (andha-
'blind') [is so called] for the very same reason.
This passage is followed by pdsyqd aksanvan nd vi cetad andhah, 'he who
has eyes sees, he who is blind cannot know' (RV 1.164.16) as a nigama. This
is quoted by Durga (D 1:458,5), but ayam apitaro 'ndha etasmdd eva is not.
The analysis may therefore be a later addition, maybe even on the basis of
Durga's commentary since he says (ibid.,7) itaras tu yo 'ndhah0, 'but that
which is this other [word] andhah . . .' followed by a long explanation which
need not concern us here. Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other hand, quote the
analysis and add (SM 11:286,14) darsandbhdvdt, 'because there is no seeing',
revealing both that they take etasmdd eva to allude to a causal explanation and
that they identify that which is to be expressed by the preceding na darsanam
in the Nirukta. The analysis may not stem from Yaska, but it is clear how
Skanda-Mahesvara understand an analysis of this kind.
(5.2) anyena mad ahano134 gaccha ksipraml dhamsiva bhdsamdnety
asabhyabhdsandd dhand iva bhavatil etasmdd dhanah sydtl
'With someone other than me, O unchaste one' go quickly; speaking [in this way] you
hurt (d^han) [me] as it were; [that is,] she is an dhanah 'unchaste woman' as it were,
because of [her] vulgar talking; because of this it would be dhanah 'O ufichaste one'.
This does not contain the typical set phrase with its ordinary syntax, but the
underlying idea is the same, I believe. So does Durga (D:466,8): etasmad eva
kdrandd ahanah syat°. Not only does he add eva to arrive at the familiar set
expression, he even adds kdrandt 'for this reason' which is giving very explicit
support to the interpretation of etasmdd eva as 'for this very reason'. Sarup,
on the other hand, translates (1921:73): 'Go at once, O wanton,, with some
person different from me. Speaking in this manner, thou hurtest me as it were.
Ahand (a wanton) is (so called from) her lascivious speech. Ahanah (i.e. the
vocative) is derived from the same.' This simply does not add up very well.
(5.4) vardho135 megho bhavatil vardhdrahl varam dhdram dhdrsih136/ iti
ca brdhmanaml vidhyad vardhdm tiro ddrim dstd1311 ity api nigamo
Footnote 132 (cont.)

to me preferable to take it as two words, particularly because Panini teaches the addition of
the taddhita samdsdnta aC to the nominal stem tamas- when it is compounded with andha-
as the first member, the resulting form being andhatamasa- 'blind darkness' (A 5.4.79
133
avasamandhebhyas tamasah).
andhah Nigh 4.2; vardhdh has already been explained as a name for food (andha ity
134
annandma).
Both Sarup (1927) and Bhadkamkar (1918 = D 1:459) read ahano, but the nigarha offered here
is RV 10.10.8 which would require dhario. The context is dhanah Nigh 4.2.
135 ^gh 42; the word is listed under meghandmdni Nigh 1.10.
136
The quotation has not been traced; Sayana quotes it, obviously with reference to the present
passage of the Nirukta, at RV 1.61.7; Sarup (1927) notes that several MSS, all of them belong-
137
ing to the longer recension, read it after etasmdd eva; Durga does not quote it.
RV 1.61.7. *
bhavatil ay am apltaro vardha etasmdd eval brhati muldnil varam varam

mulam brhatiti vdl
vardhah is a cloud: it brings about the best (vara + d^lhr); there is also a Brahmana
passage: 'You have brought about the best food/livelihood.' 'He pierced the cloud
by throwing the thunderbolt across'; this too is a quotation from Veda. This other
vardhah ('boar') [is so called] for the very same reason: it tears up the roots, or else
[because] it tears up root[s] to its heart's content (varam varam) (i.e., varam mulam
brhati [vrhati] = vardhdrah).
The only natural interpretation is to take etasmdd eva in a causal sense.
Durga supports this (D 1:479,17-18): asdv api hi varam muldkhyam dhdram
dharaty eva, 'for this too does indeed fetch (dharati) [for itself] the best
(varam) food (dhdram) known as roots'. So do Skanda-Mahesvara who add
after etasmdd eva (SM 11:303,11): vardhdratvdd vardharanatvdd vd, 'because
it brings about the best, or because it fetches the best'.
(5.7) arir amitra rcchateh I Tsvaro }py arir etasmdd eval
arihm [in the sense of] someone who is not a friend is of/from rcchatih (Îr/rcch
'move; attack; invade; hurt'); a lord too [is called] arih for the very same reason.
Here it seems possible that etasmdt refers back to rcchateh, and Durga (D
1:500,1) adds dhdtoh which could certainly be a gloss of etasmdt. Skanda-
Mahesvara, on the other hand, remark as follows (SM 11:322,12-13):
yathd arir rcchater gatyarthasya satrun prati gacchaty asau tair vd aryate I evam
Isvaro 'pi tena tena bhutdnugrahena sarvapravrttir gatih I
Just as (yathd)139 'arih ("enemy") is of rcchatih' which has the sense of moving,
[because] he moves against his enemies or [because] he is moved [against] by them,
in the same way (evam) a ruler too: through this and that favour to living beings,
there is activity for all, that is, movement.
: The addition of gatyarthasya makes it quite clear that etasmdt does not refer
|to rcchateh: it indicates a cause, not a formal analysis. But the passage is a good
Example of how both elements are involved: just as140 arih 'enemy' is of
hcchatih because of this and that, in the same way arih 'lord' is of rcchatih for
|tjie very same reason. Note, however, that it is the causal link which is primary;
t at is to say, etasmdt does not refer to rcchateh [gatyarthasya] but states the
ason why there is a grammatical link between arih and rcchatih.
jg| (5.14) puskaram141 antariksamIposati bhutdniI udakam puskaramI
| p pujdkaramlpujayitavyaml idam apitaratpuskaram etasmdd eval
| g puskaram vapuskaram vdl
$
P Analysed in passing.
The editor (Sarup) remarks: '"yatha" ity asya padasya sthdne ca "yatah" iti pdtho yuktah
sydt\ that is to say, 'instead of the word yathd, the correct reading should be yatah "since;
\%i because'". This would of course give the whole passage a different meaning. I am not con-
p-1 vinced by this because of the following evam. 140 But see the note on yathd above.
p The context is puskare RV 7.33.11; puskaram is listed under antariksandmdni Nigh 1.3.
puskaram means the atmosphere: it sustains (^pus) living beings; water is [called]
puskaram [because] it is [a means of] performing (-kara) worship (pujd) [or
because] it is to be worshipped; this other puskaram ('lotus') [is so called] for the
very same reason; or else puskaram [is really vapuskaram, so called because] it
creates (-kara) a beautiful appearance (vapuh).
Once more, we are obviously dealing with an expression which suggests
that puskaram 'lotus' is so called for the very same reason that water is called
puskaram: either because it is a means of performing worship, or because it is
the object of worship. Durga is quite explicit here (D 1:527,8-10):
idam apltarat puskaram padmam etasmad eva kdrandt puskaram ity
ucyate tad api hi pujakaram pujayitavyam ca sobhanatvdt tasyal
'this other puskaram', that is, a lotus, is called puskaram 'because of that very
same', that is to say, reason; for that too is a means of performing worship and is
[itself] to be worshipped because of its beauty. u
Not only does he spell things out by changing it into the unambiguous expres-
sion etasmad eva kdrandt, 'for that very reason'; he also states what the reason
is, namely the same two reasons that were given in the previous analysis.
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:345,12) add dhdtoh, and continue by giving the
causal explanation (ibid.,13) tendpipujyate pujyate vd tad evam sobhanatvdt,
'worship is performed by means of it too, or it is [itself] worshipped in this way
because of its beauty', explanations as karana- and karmasddhana respec-
tively.
(5.22) krttih142 krntatehl yaso vd/ annam vd/ mahiva kfttih sarana ta
indra I sumahat ta indra saranam antarikse krttir iveti I iyam Izpitard krttir
etasmad eva I
krttih is of/from krntatih (^krt 'cut') [and means] either fame or food: 'O Indra, your
protection is great like fame/food' (RV 8.90.6), [that is,] your protection in the
atmosphere, Indra, is very great, like fame/food; this other krttih ('hide; skin;
patched-up cloth') [is so called] for the very same reason [or: is from the same
(root)].
Here etasmdt could easily refer back to krntateh, but taking it as indicating
a causal explanation works without any problem: because of the cutting. Durga
remarks (D 1:554,10-11): sdpy etasmad eva krntateh sd hi vastrdvayavaih
krttair grathitd bhavati. This could be translated 'this [krttih 'patched-up^
garment'] too is from this, that is, from krntatih, for that is put together by
means of parts of garment which has been cut'; but it could equally well bei
translated 'for the very same reason the [krttih] too is of krntatih, for that is put
together by means of parts of garment which has been cut'. In other words, it
may work both ways. The possibility that we are dealing with ^krt 'weave;
spin' as indicated by Varma (1953:130) is ruled out by the fact that this would
142
Nigh 4.2; kfttih also occurs Nigh 3.4 under grhanamani 'names for house';
require krnatteh and not krntateh. Skanda-Mahesvara, obviously having the

sense of 'skin; hide' in mind, add a causal explanation after etasmdd eva (SM
11:371,5-6): bahudhd krttd hi sd sarirdt, 'for this is cut in various ways from
the body'.
(5.26) kosah143 kusndtehl vikusito bhavatil ayam apltaro kosa etasmdd
eva I sancaya dcitamdtro mahdn bhavatil
kosah 'pail; bucket'144 is of/from kusndtih (^kus 'tear; force out; extract'): it is torn
out; this other kosah ('treasure') too [is so called] for the very same reason: it is a
great collection the size of what has been accumulated.
Parallel to the previous instance Durga (D 1:566,2) adds kusndteh after
etasmdd eva, and again I do not think there is any reason to assume, contrary
to Durga's ordinary practice, that this is intended as a gloss on etasmdt. This
conclusion is supported by Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:380,4): ayam apltarah
kosa etasmad eva dhdtor vrddhyarthasyeti sesah, ' "this other kosah too for the
very same reason": it is of the [same] root which has the sense of growth, thus
[the analysis] is to be completed'. This makes it quite clear how they think
matters work: etasmdt gives the reason why something is called what it is
called; this establishes a link with a verbal root; to complete the analysis they
sometimes add dhdtoh and sometimes a form in -teh depending on how
obvious the grammatical analysis is; these are genitive forms and therefore not
glosses of etasmdt as vrddhyarthasya makes evident.
(6.1) sucih145 socateh I jvalatikarmanah I ayam apltarah sucir etasmdd eva I
nihsiktam asmdt pdpakam iti nairuktdhl
sucih 'burning; glowing' is of/from socatih (Viwc) which denotes the activity of
burning; this other sucih ('pure') [is so called] for the very same reason; sin is
removed {nihsiktam: nilplsic) from it, according to the Nairuktas.
It is not quite clear whether the last part of this is intended as a further
explanation of etasmdd eva or whether it is intended as a separate analysis in
its own right. Durga believes in the latter alternative (D 1:575,15-18):
sucih socater jvalaty arthasya/ ayam apltarah sucir laukika etasmad ever/
vaiydkarand manyante nairuktdh punar nihpurvdt sihcater itarah sucir ity evam
manyante nih niskrsya asmat papakam asucitvam anyasmin siktam bhavatity evam I
'sucih is of socatih' which [denotes the activity of =] has the sense of 'burning; this
other sucih\ the ordinary one, '[is so called] for the very same reason', [is what] the
u. grammarians think; the Nairuktas, on the other hand, think that this other [word]
sucih is [a derivation] from [the root] sic ('pour out') preceded by [the preverb] nih,
thus: nih, that is, extracting 'sin from it', that is, impurity, it is poured (siktam) into
something else.
143
.144 The context is RV 10.101.7.
145
The word kosah is listed under meghandmdni 'names for cloud' at Nigh 1.10.
I am not convinced that Durga has got this right, but the passage does in any
case contain several interesting features. First of all, Durga makes it clear that
he takes socateh to be a genitive form. This excludes the possibility that
etasmdt refers back to it, but not that he does not take it to mean 'from the very
same root {^suc)\ It is, however, perfectly possible that it indicates a reason,
that is, that the reason for the word suci 'pure' is the same as the one for suci
'burning' and for that reason to be derived from the same ^suc. This analysis
he attributes to the grammarians. The following is then considered a separate
analysis which Durga makes formally clear by nihpurvdt sincateh, indisput-
ably ablative forms. But the very fact that this is a separate analysis excludes
the possibility that it picks up etasmdt which has already been linked to the
genitive form in -teh preceding it.
(6.17a) srprah146 sarpandtl idam apitarat srpram etasmdd eval sarpir vdl
tailam vdl
srprah 'slippery; oily; gliding' [is so called] on account of the gliding (sarpanam:
V-srp); this other srpram (nt., 'ghee; oil') too [is so called] for the very same reason;
ghee or oil.
This illustrates well how the etasmdd eva formula is parallel to an analysis
of the -andt type. Durga spells it all out (D 1:650,15-16):
srprah (71) iti anavagataml sarpa ity avagamahl sarpanad iti nirvacanaml idam
apTtarat srpram etasmad eva, sarpanad etat sarpir va tailam va, tad api hi sarpatil
srprah (Nigh 4.3.71) is not understood; sarpah ('which glides') would provide an
[immediate] understanding; sarpandt is the analysis; 'this other srpram too [is so
called] for the very same reason', [that is to say,] on account of the gliding - 'ghee
or oil' - for this too glides (sarpati). ^
Once more it is clear that we are dealing with a statement providing a causal
explanation.
(6.17b) skandho141 vrksasya samdskannam14* bhavatil ayamnpitarah
skandha etasmdd eva I dskannam kdye I i
skandhah (skandhas- nt.) 'branching crown' of a tree [is so called because it] is
attached {samdskannam: sam-d\skand) [to it]; this other skandhah (skandha- m.;
'shoulder') [is so called] for the very same reason: it is attached to the body.
Again etasmdd eva clearly offers a causal explanation. Durga does not quote^
this analysis, he only comments upon RV 1.32.5 which is quoted as a nigama
for the word kulisah which occurs at Nighantu 4.3. There is therefore every^
reason to assume that the present passage is a later interpolation. Skanda-l
146 147
148
Nigh 4.3. The context is skdndhamsi RV 1.32.5.
Samp (1927) reads samaskanno0. This cannot be right. As is clear from the nigama quoted'
(see preceding note), we are dealing with skandhas- (nt.); Skanda-Mahesvara too read:
samdskannam0 (SM 11:456,11).
Mahesvara comment upon it, however, and gloss (SM 11:456,12) etasmdd eva
by dskannatvdt, 'because it is attached [to the body]'. This leaves no room for
doubt: they assume that they are dealing with a causal explanation.
(7.29) mithunau149 kasmdtl minotih srayatikarmd I thu iti ndmakaranah I
thakdro vdl nayatih parah I vanir vdl samdsritdv anyonyam nayatahl
vanuto vdl manusyamithundv apy etasmdd eva I methantdv anyonyam
vanuta iti vdl
Why mithunau 'couple'? [Because it is of/from] minotih (Vm/ 'fix') which denotes
the activity of depending; thu is the suffix, or else it is the syllable tha, [with]
nayatih (Vwf 'lead') or vanih (^van 'win')150 [to account for] the last [part]: depend-
ing on each other, they lead [each other] or they win [each other]. A human couple
too [is so called] for the very same reason; or else [they are so called because] they
win each other when they are uniting (methantau: Amith 'unite').
The last statement here offers an alternative explanation which contains an
alternative verbal root to account for the first part of the word. This does not
mean that it is not perfectly sensible to take etasmdd eva as offering a causal
explanation. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 111:110,3) add dhdtupratyayasamuddydt
after etasmdd eva. If this is intended as a gloss, we are dealing with a case
where they take etasmdt to refer directly to the formal elements of the analy-
sis and not to the reason why something is called what it is called: 'from the
[same] combination of roots and suffixes'. This, however, would not be in
agreement with their own remarks at Nirukta 3.9 and 5.26 discussed above.
(9.8) islkesater151 gatikarmanahl iyam apitaresikaitasmdd eva I
isikd 'reed; rush' is of/from Tsatih (Vw) which denotes the activity of moving; this
other isikd ('arrow') [is so called] for the very same reason [that is, because it
moves].
This is a case where it would seem reasonable to interpret etasmdt as refer-
ring directly back to Tsateh, but the passage is almost certainly a later addition
since it is an analysis of a word that has been used to explain a word that has
been used to explain the form mdujavatasya which occurs RV 10.34.1, since it
is not commented upon by Durga, since Skanda-Mahesvara quote it in the form
iyam152 apTsikd apareslkd tasmdd eva (SM III: 149,5), and since the second
word is isikd, not isikd. I am therefore inclined to dismiss this passage as a later
interpolation.
(10.44) budhnam153 antariksaml baddhd asmin dhrtd dpa [iti vd]154 idam
apltarad budhnam etasmdd eva I baddhd asmin dhrtd prdnd iti I
149 15
151
The context is RV 10.88.11. ° Durga talks about sampmsarana here (D 1:833,8).
152
The analysis is given in passing while commenting on RV 10.34.1.
153
The editor notes: yam apisikdpa (pa C.) lesikd B. C.
The context is dhir budhnyah Nigh 5.4. As a nigama Yaska offers RV 7.34.16 which also con-
tains the word budhne. 154 Omitted by several MSS.
budhnam means the atmosphere, [so called because] waters are held bound
(baddhdh: ^bandh 'bind') in it; this other budhnam ('body') too [is so called] for
the very same reason: the breath is held bound in it.
This passage quite naturally lends itself to be interpreted as giving a causal
rather than a formal explanation. This is confirmed by Durga who adds very
little here (DII: 1026,10-11): idam apftarat sanram budhnam ity ucyate,' "also
this other one", that is, the body, is called "budhnam" \ This is simply followed
by the words of the Nirukta, a fact which indicates that Durga felt no further
explanation was needed; the Nirukta passage itself gives a causal explanation.
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM IV:49,8-9) repeat Durga.
(11.39) gaun155 rocateh I jvalatikarmanah I ayam apftaro gauro varna
etasmdd eval prasasyo bhavatil
gaun is of/from rocateh (Îruc) which denotes the activity of blazing; this other
gaurah too, that is, the colour, [is so called] for the very same reason: it is praise-
worthy.
This is not immediately clear. Durga remarks on it in the following manner
(D 11:1085,12-14):
gaurih156 rocateh ]\dldXyarthasyal mddhyamikd vdkl sd punah dlptimatil ayam
apltarah yo gauro varnah so 'pi etasmad eva rocateh I sa hi dfptirupatvdt krsnddin
apeksya prasasyo bhavati /
*gaurih is of rocatiK which has the sense 'of blazing' [and is] Speech [as a deity]
of the middle region: this, again, is bright; 'this other one too', the one which is 'the
colour gaurah\ that one too 'for the very same reason' is of rocatih: for it 'is praise-
worthy' with regard to such [colours] as black by fact of its being the colour of
brightness.
Durga's understanding of how the same causal explanation works is as good
a guess as anyone's. It is possible here that rocateh glosses etasmdd eva but it
is not very likely since Durga has already glossed rocateh with a form in the
genitive case. The way to take this passage, I believe, is that Durga understands
etasmdd eva to indicate a causal explanation and only secondarily a formal
analysis, and that when the commentators add dhdtoh, which Skanda-
Mahesvara do in this case (SM IV:86,10), or a form in -teh after etasmdd eva,
these forms have not been intended as glosses on etasmdt, but have been added
in order to clarify the formal analysis.
155 Nigh 5 5 As a nigama is offered RV 1164 41. The word gaun is listed under vanndmdni
'names for speech' Nigh 1.11. Geldner (RV 1164 41) takes gaurfas 'Buffel(-fell)', but see
Luders (1951*252) who sees in gaurf 'allerdings den Himmelsstrom, aber zwischen diesem
und der Vac bestehen die nachsten Beziehungen', and Renou EVP XVI 92; V S.
Agrawala (1962) argues that gaun 'she-buffalo' symbolises Varuna's waters as well as vdk
156
'speech'.
This is how the word occurs RV 1164 41, clearly as nom sg , whether Durga actually read it
like this in the Nighantu is hard to tell.
(11.47) ano157 vdyur anitehl api vopamdrthe sydtl anasa iva sakatdd iva I
anah sakataml dnaddham asmims civaraml aniter vd sydtl
jivanakarmanah / upajivanty enatl megho }py ana etasmdd eval
anah means wind [and] is of/from anitih (N'an 'breathe'); or else it may be [used in
RV 4.30.10] in the sense of a comparison: as if from the anah, that is, as if from the
carriage; anah means a carriage [and is so called because] rags are bound onto it;
or else it is of/from anitih which denotes the activity of living, people make a living
of it; a cloud too [is called] anah for the very same reason
This is not particularly informative, and I am inclined to dismiss it as a later
interpolation, first and foremost because anah sakatam and the rest of the
passage is not met with in the commentary of Durga, but also because of the
repetitive nature of the various analyses (aniter vd sydt jivanakarmanah) and
their general mindlessness. Durga does quote the first analysis, ano vdyur
aniteh, and makes it clear that he takes aniteh as a genitive form by glossing it
prdndrthasya 'which has the sense of breathing'.
This investigation leaves us with thirty-three instances of the etasmdd eva
formula. Out of these I would dismiss five as later interpolations.158 Eighteen
clearly indicate a cause.159 Five out of these eighteen are part of constructions
which involve causal analyses of the -andt type.160 An atypical instance is 7.29
where various verbal roots and suffixes are given in the nominative case to
indicate alternative derivations in reply to the question kasmdt 'why?' which
one could easily argue is picked up again by etasmdt. In the remaining ten
cases161 it is possible that etasmdt refers directly to forms in -teh or -eh, but all
of these cases can equally well be interpreted as causal explanations. This war-
rants only one conclusion: in the first instance the formula etasmdd eva indi-
cates a cause, not a grammatical derivation. All the occurrences met with in
the Nirukta lend themselves to such an interpretation, and in several cases no
other interpretation is possible.162 In no way, then, can the formula etasmdd eva
be taken as evidence that the forms in -teh and -eh are ablatives.
Turning to the commentaries, we find support for this conclusion. This
support is not entirely unambiguous, though in the vast majority of instances
it is clear that the commentators take etasmdd eva to mean 'for the very same
reason'. Durga, in fact, explicitly expands the set expression to etasmdd eva
kdrandt, 'for this very reason' in two instances.163 Several times164 the com-
mentators add the word dhdtoh or a form in -teh after etasmdt, but more than
once they themselves make it clear that they consider these additions to be gen-
itive and not ablative forms.165
157 158
159
The context is dnasah RV 4 30 10 2 6, 5 1, 6 17b, 9 8, and 11 47
1.20a, 1.20b, 2 168, 2.13, 2.17, 2.22, 4 13, 4.16, 4 18, 4 19, 4.21, 4.27, 5 2, 5.4, 5 14, 6.1, 6 17a,
161
and 10 44 ° 2.17, 4 16, 4 27, 5 2, and 6 17a
162
2.5, 3.9, 3.10, 4.5, 4.8, 5 163
7, 5 22, 5 26, 6.1, and 11.39
E g., 4 19,4.27, 5.2 Durga at 5 2, 5 14
164 2 17, 2 22, 3 9, 3 10, 4 5, 4.8, 4 13, 4 16, 5 7, 5 22, and 5 26
165
Durga at 3.10, 6.1, 11.39, Skanda-Mahesvara at 3.9, 5.7, 5.26.
More problematic are the following statements. At 2.5 Durga states (D

1:179,8-9): etasmad eva dhdtudvaydd gamer gdter vd which it is most natural
to interpret as ' etasmad eva, that is to say, from these two roots, namely from
Vgam or Vga'. Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 11:43,1) too add dhdtudvaydt after
etasmad eva. At 4.5 they remark (SM 11:208,17): tathd cdyam muso 'py
etasmad eva dhdtos tathoktah. It is perfectly reasonable to interpret this as:
'and thus also this [word] musah is in that way stated as from this very [same]
root'. At 7.29 (SM 111:110,3) they add dhdtupratyayasamuddydt after etasmad
eva. This could very well mean: '[that is to say,] from the [same] combination
of roots and suffixes'.
If etasmad eva does not mean 'for the very same reason' it would have to
refer to a verbal root and hence to a grammatical derivation. Apart from the
fact that such an interpretation does not work in many instances, there is also
the circumstance that etasmdt quite frequently is followed by an additional
explanation, clearly causal.166 Even if etasmdt were to refer to a verbal root, this
shows that the grammatical derivation would in any case be based on a causal
link between the name and an action considered the cause of the name.
Conversely, to conclude that etasmdt indicates a cause is not to say that in pro-
viding a causal explanation the etasmad eva formula does not also reveal a
grammatical analysis which ultimately involves a verbal root; on the contrary,
it does this in the same way as an analysis of the -andt type. This is "why bound-
aries are floating and why there are some instances in the commentaries where
etasmdt may refer to a verbal root. But it is the causal link which is primary;
that is to say, etasmdt does not refer to a form in -teh but states the reason why
there is a relation between a particular word and the activity expressed by a
verbal root.
Signification and the genitive case: ity apy asya bhavati j

I shall now turn to material of importance for the possible interpretation of
forms in -teh as genitives and for the usage of the genitive case in the Nirukta.
It is the genitive case which is used to mark the relation between a word and
that which it signifies, that is to say, the genitive is used to state that a word is
a word for a particular thing. This is the case both in the Nirukta and elsewhere.
I shall adduce a couple of examples: gaur itiprthivyd ndmadheyam, 'gauh is a
name for the Earth' (Nir 2.5). Patanjali, in his Mahdbhdsya, uses the same gen-
itive construction (Mbh 11:205,21): apradhdnasyopasarjanam iti samjnd
kriyate, 'the technical name upasarjana is made for apradhdna "subsidiary
word'".167
166
2 8, 2.22, 3.9, 3.10, 4 13, 4 16, 4.18, 4.27, 5 4, 5 26, 10.44, 11.39, and, for example, Durga at
167
45
The technical term upasarjana is defined A 1.2.43 prathamdnirdistam samdsa upasarjana
and A 1 2.44 ekavibhakti cdpurvanipdte, the problem of whether the two terms are really syn-
onymous need not concern us here.
Now, when it is said that 'gauh is a name for prthivV this seems to me to
mean both that gauh is a name for the Earth, that is to say, that it signifies the
Earth, and that the words gauh andp/t/i/vfare synonyms. In fact, the first three
chapters of the Nighantu rest on this assumption. Each section contains a group
of synonyms the meaning of which is indicated by the adhikara-word of that
particular section. In the statement gaur itiprthivyd ndmadheyam, then, we can
observe a certain confusion between a term and that which it signifies. We can
also observe that the genitive in this construction fulfils a double function. On
the one hand, it is used to mark a relation between a word and that which it sig-
nifies. On the other hand, it is used to mark a relation between one linguistic
element and another, that is to say, between two words. More specifically, the
latter relation implies that one can substitute 'gauh' for 'prthivV. Indicating a
word as a synonym of another is tantamount to saying that one word occurs in
the meaning of another word. Disregarding the confusion between a word and
the thing it signifies, one can argue that if a genitive case ending is used in this
manner, it is in effect a substitutional genitive, what the Indian grammarians
refer to as a sthdnasasthT.
Definitions of synonymy are hard to come by in works on theoretical lin-
guistics and philosophy of language, but the few we come by seem to pre-
suppose or involve substitution criteria. Addressing the question of synonymy
within one and the same language, Quine (1961:56) remarks:
So-called substitution criteria, or conditions of interchangeabihty, have in one form
or another played central roles in modern grammar. For the synonymy problem of
semantics such an approach seems more obvious still. However, the notion of the
interchangeability of two linguistic forms makes sense only in so far as answers are
provided to these two questions: (a) In just what sorts of contextual position, if not
in all, are the two forms to be interchangeable? (b) The forms are to be interchange-
able salvo quo) Supplanting one form by another in any context changes something,
namely, form at least; and (b) asks what feature the interchange is to leave invari-
ant. Alternative answers to (a) and (b) give alternative notions of interchangeabil-
ity, some suited to defining grammatical correspondences and others, conceivably,
to defining synonymy.
When it is stated in the Nighantu that two words are synonymous we do not
have to worry about the problem of context because they are clearly stated to
ibe synonyms in at least one context. The same holds good when Yaska states
\gaur itiprthivyd ndmadheyam. That 'gauh9 and 'prthivV are synonyms, that is
fto say, that they are substitutionable, entails that the name 'gauh' can occur in
pthe place of, that is to say, in the meaning of, the name 'prthivV.
\ With this background, I shall now turn to a set wording or formula, repeat-
edly employed by Yaska and the commentators alike, which is of considerable
interest when it comes to understanding the use of this genitive and how, at
lleast at one level, it relates to the genitive used in the analysis of the -teh type.
;fThe formula x ity apy asya bhavati is used when a nirvacana has just been
given and a following word is analysed in the same manner. Roughly, one may
translate this as 'x is also of it', but a more detailed investigation of the
instances occurring in the Nirukta itself seems called for.
(1.17) tvisitom jvalitahl tvisir ity apy asya diptindma bhavatil >
Sarup translates (1921:18): 'Tvisitah means shining. Of this word (the
part) tvisih is a synonym of light.' I do not think Sarup has understood this
correctly. In the first place he does not account for the particle apj, which is
rather crucial to this set expression. I suggest the construction be interpreted
as follows. First tvisitah is explained by the synonym jvalitah 'lighted;
blazing; burning'; then, since Yaska remembers there is also a similar word
tvisih, he adds that this too is a synonym of jvalitah, but because tvisih can
mean 'vehemence' as well as 'light, blaze', he specifies the condition that this
holds good only when it is a name for diptih 'light'. The passage could then
be translated: 'tvisih is also [a name/synonym] of this [when it is] a name for
light'.
Durga (D 1:138,10-11) quotes the text as above and adds: apathitam api
diptindmasu na kevalam ydny eva pathitdny anydny apy iti, 'even that which
is not listed [is included] among the names for light, [that is,] not exclusively
those which are listed, but also others'. This is a bit odd, since there is no
section in the Nighantu listing diptindmdni, names for light; nor does there
exist, as far as I am aware, any other lexicographical work with such a list.
Probably he is referring to the jvalitp ndmadheydni at Nighantu 1.17.
Skanda-Mahesvara (SM 1:109,6-7) quote the passage verbatim and add: iti
prdsangikam tvisisabdasya nirvacanam, 'thus an occasional nirvacana of the
word tvisiH\
(2.15) dinndmdny uttardny astaul. . . / tatra kdsthd ity etad anekasydpi
sattvasya [ndrna]169 bhavatil kdsthd diso bhavantil krdntvd sthitd
bhavantil kdsthd upadiso bhavantil itaretaram krdntvd sthitd bhavantil
ddityo 'pi kdsthocyatel krdntvd sthito bhavatil djyanto 'pi kdsthocyatel
krdntvd sthito bhavatil dpo ypi kdsthd ucyanteI krdntvd sthitd bhavantiti
sthdvardndm I
The following eight are names for the quarters . . . Among these kdsthd is [a name]
for several entities. [Thus,] kdsthdh are the quarters: striding across (V&ram), they
are set {^sthd)\ kdsthdh are the intermediate quarters: having crossed each other,
they are set; the sun too is called kdsthd: striding across, it has set; also the strip of
a shooting range170 is called kdsthd: striding out, it comes to an end; the waters too
are called kdsthd: striding out, they come to a halt, thus [it is a name/synonym] of
stationary waters.
Again, we have a genitive construction, in structure parallel to ity apy asya
bhavati, which states that a particular word is a synonym for several other
168 169
170
The context is RV 10 84 2 = AV 4 31 2 Omitted by several MSS
I follow Durga here, who (D I 312,16) glosses ajyantah by sarapathdntah 'the end of the
course of an arrow', pw, MW, and Apte identify it as the goal of a race-course
words, although the primary relationship here is that between a word and the
thing signified.
(6.21) rnjatih prasddhanakarmd I [. . .] 171 rjur ity apy asya bhavatil rjuniti
no vdrunahl ity api nigamo bhavatil
rnjatih denotes the activity of perfecting/embellishing;... rjuh 'straight' is also of
this: 'with straight guidance [let] Varuna [lead] us' (RV 1.90.1); this too is a quota-
tion from Veda.
Both rnjatih and rjuniti occur at Nighantu 4.3. In the present case, asya in
the set expression refers back to rnjatih; in other words, it is equivalent to
rnjateh which accordingly has to be understood as a genitive form. This is also
how Durga understands it (D 1:668,7): rjur ity apy asya/va rhjater bhavati.
Skanda-Mahesvara state the same (SM 11:466,8).
(6.22) kuruh krntateh I kruram ity apy asya bhavatil
kuruh 'Kuru' is of krntatih (Îkrt 'cut'); kruram 'cruel' is also of this.
Even Sarup has to deviate from his standard translation here (1921:106):
The word krura (cruel) belongs to the same root also.' Durga (D 1:675,14)
glosses asya by krntateh which is thus to be considered a genitive form. It is
also worthy of notice that after quoting the analysis kuruh krntateh, Durga
(ibid.,13) adds: sa hi satrun krntati, 'for he cuts to pieces enemies'. This makes
it clear that he thinks of the analysis krntateh as involving much more than a
mere reference to a verbal root.
(6.27) amhuro 'mhasvdn I amhuranam ity apy asya bhavatil krnvdnn
amhuranad uriil ity api nigamo bhavati/
amhurah means distressed;172 amhuranam is also [a name/synonym] of this:
'making free from the distressed' (RV 1.105.17); this too is a quotation from Veda.
The word amhurah occurs at Nighantu A3. This is a case parallel to Nirukta
1.17 tvisito jvalitahl tvisir ity apy asya diptindma bhavati, discussed above.
First a word from the Nighantu is explained, then another word is quoted as a
synonym of it, asya unambiguously a genitive form. Nevertheless, Sarup trans-
lates (1921:108): The word amhuranam is derived from the same root also.'
Similarly, Skold (1926:184) remarks in a note to the word asya: 'We should
expect etasmdd eva.' As we have seen, we should not expect etasmdd eva since
no reason is given here. We are dealing with a manner of indicating that
another word too is a name for the same thing, ultimately indicating synonymy
by means of a form in the genitive case. Durga supports the reading, adding
only that there is an occasion for offering an analysis also of amhuranam since
there is usage also of this word (D 1:687,12), a claim he justifies by quoting RV
171
Several MSS insert RV 10 76 1 as a nigama
m
here. Durga, however, says that Yaska does not
give a nigama here (D 1.667,15) That is, amhas-vat-, amhah is explained at Nir 4 25
1.105.17. This indicates that for Durga the formula ity apy asya bhavati is
common usage simply not worth commenting upon. The assumption that we
are dealing with synonymity is supported by the commentary pf Skanda-
Mahesvara (SM 11:482,14-15):
asyoddharane pradarsitavye I etatsqmdndrthasya sdrupyaprasangdd amhurana-
sabdasya tdvan nigamam darsayati krnvann amhurandd iti I
When an example of it [= amhura] is to be given, he simply gives the Vedic quota-
tion krnvann amhurandt for the word amhuranam which has the same meaning as
it, because there is occasion [for an analysis of that which is] of similar form.
(10.17) m seva iti sukhandma I sisyateh I vakdro ndmakaranahl
antasthdntaropalingi I vibhdsitagunahl sivam ity apy asya bhavati I
sevah is a name for happiness [and] is of sisyatih {^sis 'stir'); the syllable va is a
noun-maker; [and the word] has a substitute174 [v] for the penultimate [s\\ [and]
optionally it takes guna; sivam is also of this.
Here it is more difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether asya
refers back to sevah or to sisyateh. I am inclined to believe that it is to the latter.
Durga is not clear about his view on this, although he clearly considers sisyateh
to be a genitive form (D 11:981,13): sisir dhdtuh, vakdrah pratyayah sisa ity
asya, 'the root is sisih (Vizs), the syllable va is the suffix, [so it is] of this [root]
sisA (Dhp 1.718)'. Skanda-Mahesvara too consider sisyateh to be a genitive
form (SM IV:20,4). To the phrase sivam ity apy asya bhavati Durga just adds
(D 11:982,3) agunapakse, 'on the option that there is no guna strengthening',
and Skanda-Mahesvara comment similarly (SM IV:20,5): vibhdsitagunatvdc
ca sivo 'pi siddhah, 'and because guna strengthening is optional here, [the
word] sivah [sic] is also established'.
(11.5) candras175 candateh I kdntikarmanah I candanam ity apy asya
bhavati I
candrah 'bright' is of candatih (^cand 'shine') which denotes the activity of being
beautiful; candanam 'sandalwood' is also of this.
The context is the explanation of the word candramdh from Nighantu 5.5.
Sarup (1921:171), ignoring the genitive, translates: 'Candra "bright5' is derived
from (the verb) cand, meaning to shine. The word candanam (sandalwood) is
derived from the same root also.' Skold (1926:244), presupposing tliat we must
be dealing with an ablative, remarks in a note to asya: 'We should have
expected etasmdd eva?
There can be no doubt, however, that asya is a genitive form and that it refers
to candateh which therefore is a genitive form too. This is confirmed by Durga
who remarks (D II: 1039,17-18): .
173
174
Cf. the previous discussion p. 117 above.
The term upalingin
175
occurs only here in the Nirukta, and I am not confident abput my trans-
lation. v.l candram eight MSS, candrdm occurs as a name for gold at Nigh 1 2.
atha candrah kasmdtl candateh kantikarmanah/ nityakdnto hy asaul candanam lty

apy asya/va candater bhavati / tad apt hi kdntam I
Now, why candrahl 'It is of candatih (^cand "shine") which denotes the activity of
being beautiful.' For it is perpetually beautiful. [The word] 'candanam is also of
this' very same, [namely] of candatih, for that too is beautiful.
Skanda-Mahesvara, on the other hand, do not seem to support the reading
if the edition of the commentary is to be trusted here. First of all, they read
candram and accept that candateh is the analysis if it is a word for gold as in
Nighantu 1.2 (SM IV:57,5). They clearly consider candateh a genitive when
they state (ibid.): candater dhdtoh kdntarthasya, 'of the root candatih which
has the sense of being beautiful'. But they go on to remark (ibid.,6-7):
candanasabdo176 'py ata eva dhdtoh prasangdd111 uktvd prakrtg,syaiva cam
nirvacandntaram aha, 'having stated - because there is an occasion [for doing
so] - that also the word candanam is from that very root, he states another nir-
vacana of the very [word] under discussion [=candramdh]\ I do not find the
reading ata eva dhdtoh convincing because candateh has just been established
as a genitive. It may of course be that Skanda-Mahesvara alternate freely
between genitive and ablative interpretations. If the reading is genuine, then
they would simply refer to the grammatical derivation of candanam from the
root Acand, and their remark would no longer have any bearing upon the under-
standing of the expression ity apy asya bhavati.
The material presented above is not vast, but I consider it of the utmost
importance. It provides us with a set expression, a formula repeatedly used by
Yaska; the commentators are quite familiar with it as well. All of the seven
instances met with are illuminating. In two of the passages, tvisito jvalitah I
tvisir ity apy asya diptindma bhavati (Nir 1.17) and amhuro 'mhasvdn/
amhuranam ity apy asya bhavati (Nir 6.27), the genitive asya in the formula
ity apy asya bhavati is used to indicate that a word is used to signify the same
thing as another word, that is to say, ultimately speaking that the two words
involved are synonyms. So also in dinndmdny uttardny astau / . . . / tatra kdsthd
ity etad anekasydpi sattvasya [ndma] bhavati (Nir 2.15). That is to say, in as
much as one word is given in the sense of another word we are dealing with a
substitutional genitive. The genitive indicates 'of this thing' as well as 'in the
place of this word'.
In two other passages, kuruh krntatehl kruram ity apy asya bhavati (Nir
6.22) and candras candateh I kantikarmanah I candanam ity apy asya bhavati
(Nir 11.5), the genitive form asya refers to the preceding form in -teh. In the
case of rhjatih prasddhanakarmdI... rjur ity apy asya bhavati (Nir 6.21) the
genitive asya refers back to rhjatih which appears in the nominative case
because this is how it occurs at Nighantu 4.3, and asya here is glossed rnjateh
by Durga. In the remaining instance, seva iti sukhandmal sisyatehl. . . sivam
176
Corrected by Sarup (1934 623) from candasabdo0.
177
The editor remarks: 'pro1 nasti B C 178
The editor remarks 'ca' nasti B C
ity apy asya bhavati (Nir 10.17), it is even hard to determine whether asya refers
back to sisyateh or whether it indicates sivam as a synonym of sevah.
What this information tells us, then, is that the same genitive form asya in
the formula ity apy asya bhavati is used both to indicate that one word signi-
fies the same thing as another word, thus ultimately indicating that the two
words are synonyms, and to indicate a form in -teh, that is to say, a grammat-
ical derivation. In some instances it is even hard to determine which alterna-
tive we are facing.
Thus, the same formula ity apy asya bhavati refers both to a form in -teh and
to the thing signified by a word. This cannot be coincidence. Ultimately the
two alternatives work in the same way if we think in terms of substitution.
When the genitive indicates that one word signifies the same thing as another
word it means that one word is a synonym for the other. The words are thus
substitutionable. And I take this formula to be indicative of how even the gen-
itive in an analysis of the -teh type ultimately is to be understood, iâmely, as a
substitutional genitive tantamount to the one used in indicating a synonym. For
example, the analysis candras candateh (Nir 11.5) clearly indicates that
candrah 'bright' is to be derived grammatically from candatih {^cand 'shine')
but also that it is a synonym of the expression yo candati 'that which shines'.
I shall substantiate this claim by turning to the iti satah type of analysis.
The full version: analyses in -iti satah

The analysis megho mehatfti satah actually occurs at Nirukta 2.21. It represents
the most elaborate type of analysis met with in the Nirukta. In this case a finite
form of the verb (mehati 'it rains') is incorporated into a nominal construction
by means of the words iti satah. Here we have, I suggest, the clue to how the
mechanism of a nirvacana analysis ultimately operates. '
Not more than twenty-five words are analysed in this way in the whole
Nirukta, but they display some remarkable features: all of them Ire found in
the Nighantu, eight of them are adhikdra-words from Nighantu 1-3, and five
are names of deities. This indicates that we are dealing with an elaborate type
of analysis employed only in very important instances. Accordingly, what this
formulaic expression ultimately reveals will be of crucial importance for how
we are to understand nirvacanas in general. I have dealt with all the instances
of this type of analysis elsewhere179 and shall confine myself here to presenting
some highly interesting facts and conclusions disclosed by a complete^
investigation:
(1) At first sight an analysis of the iti satah type seems to present the same
ambiguity with regard to case form as the analyses in -teh and -eh, but th$
crucial instance grhdh kasmdtl grhnantiti satdm (Nir 3.13) admits of no doubt:!
the analysis is expressed in the genitive case. It is therefore evident that the sin-'
179
See Kahrs 1980 130-48, 233-50, see also 1984 150-2
gular forms satah and satydh are genitives as well. This instance also reveals
that sat-, the present participle of the root ^las 'to be', agrees in number with
the word which is analysed. It takes the unique instance of aplurale tantum to
reveal this important piece of information; a word is normally analysed in the
singular number.
(2) That sat- follows not only the number but also the gender of the noun
being explained is clear from the following instances: usdh kasmatl ucchatiti
satydh (Nir 2.18) and vdslti vdnndmal vdsyata iti satydh (Nir 4.16).
It is evident from this that the relation sustained between a term and its cor-
responding explanatory expression has to be conceived of as being far more
than just a reference to a verbal root. One immediate intention with an analy-
sis of this kind is obvious: it enables Yaska to delimit the number of possible
kdraka interpretations by embedding a kdraka analysis within the framework
of an analysis which is formulated in highly technical language also in every
other respect. The following examples may serve to illustrate this. In karma
kasmatl kriyata iti satah (Nir 3.1) the word karman 'action' is connected with
Vfer 'do; make', but in the passive, an analysis as karmasddhana. In mrtyur
mdrayatiti satah (Nir 11.6) the word mrtyu 'Death' is connected with Amr
'die', but causatively: mdrayati 'it causes to die', an analysis as hetusddhana.
Mere reference to the verbal roots and suffixes involved would not necessarily
bring to light the full semantic content of these words, although both of them
lend themselves to complete grammatical derivation as laid out in the
Unddisutras. 18° The Unddisutras seem to derive mrtyu in the sense of marana
'death; dying', that is, as bhdvasddhana.m Yaska, on the other hand, explains
mrtyu in the sense of 'Death', and only an interpretation as hetusddhana
(mdrayati) would disclose the function of the god of death: he causes beings
to die.
The commentators leave us in no doubt that they consider a restriction with
regard to kdraka interpretation the main intention behind an analysis of the iti
satah type. For example, commenting on the analysis dyur ity ahno ndma-
dheyamml dyotata iti satah (Nir 1.6), Durga remarks (D 1:77,10-11):
dyotata iti satah / dyotate tad iti dyur iti kartrkdrakamml sad iti yatra bruydt tatroc-
cdnta eva kdrakaniyamo drastavyah I anyatra yathestham yojyam I
'dyotata iti satah': in as much as one says 'it184 is bright', [it is called] dyuh 'day'
C [and] thus [to be interpreted as] kartr-kdraka. Wherever he (= Yaska) may add sat-,
there will be seen the kdraka restriction to have m fact been stated. Otherwise [i.e.
when satis missing] one must construe according to preference.
J80 p p u 4 144 a n d 3 2i5 DPU 6.73 and 1.135; cf A 3 3 1 unddayo bahulam, '[the suffixes] un etc
[occur] promiscuously'.
181
Yudhisthira Mimamsaka (1943 89, note 6) lists the v 1 mrlyante jand aneneti, 'people die by
182
means of it', which would give an interpretation as karanasddhana
dyuh is listed under aharndmdm at Nigh 1 9
?1843 With v 1. and Rajavade 1921 49,4 for dyotater dyur ml dyotata iti kartrkdrakam
tad - dyuh, attested also in the neuter according to MW.
Similarly, Skanda-Mahesvara have this to say about the same analysis (SM
1:67,7-10):
dyur lty ahno namadheyam, tad dhi rasmisambandhdd dyotate, sata ity updttam
kdrakapangrahdrtham, dyotata iti evam satah kartrkdrakel%s yuktasya satah
kartrkdrake na kdrakdntara ity arthahl evam yamo yacchatlti sata186 ity dddv api
sarvatra nirvacane^1 sata ity etad vydkhyeyaml
' "dyuh" is a name for day', for it is bright since it is related to the rays [of the sun].
[The element] satah is employed in order to include [in the analysis an interpreta-
tion with regard to] kdraka; [that is to say, it is a name] 'for something which is' in
such a way (evam) 'that one says (iti): it is bright', [that is to say,] for something
which is in such a way that it construes in the sense of the zgent-kdraka, that is to
say, in the sense of the agent-kdraka and no other kdraka. In the same way this
[element] satah is to be explained also in such instances as (Nir 10.19) yamo
yacchatlti satah [and so also] in all nirvacanas.
Thus, the commentators agree that the main purpose of an analysis of this
kind is to make a restriction with regard to possible kdraka interpretations.188
Now, if this is all Yaska wanted to say, he could have adhered to an analysis of
the type mehatiti meghah. I therefore doubt that the commentators have got the
whole story here.
One more thing which distinguishes this type of analysis from an analysis
of the -teh or -eh types is that the genitive of satah etc. operates in a different
way. In an analysis such as megho mehateh the genitive form mehateh estab-
lishes, at least in the first instance, a relation with the word-form meghah, not
with that which is signified by the word. In an analysis such as megho mehatiti
satah there is no such direct relation between the term and the explanatory
expression.
Let me now turn to the way in which Durga interprets an analysis of the iti
satah type (D 1:226,4-5):
aha - meghah kasmat/ ucyate - mehatiti sihcaty asaul evam kartari kdrake satah
asyaitad abhidhdnam bhavati megha iti I
He (Yaska) asks: 'why meghahV It is said: 'it rains', that is to say, it sheds water,
[and so] this name occurs for that 'which exists' in such a way, that is to say, in the
sense of agent as far as kdraka is concerned, [and hence] 'meghah'.
The syntax is a little cumbersome here due to the commentatorial style, but
the following points are clear. Durga too recognises that the relation here is not
directly between two word-forms. Nevertheless his interpretation is very
185
Corrected SM IV 608 from karakena. The dental n would imply kdrake na, a reading that
makes no sense. The na may have crept m under influence of the subsequent kdrake na in the
186
same passage.
Corrected SM IV 608 from the impossible evam 187
yamayos cid id iti sata ity°\ we are clearly
188
dealing with a quotation from Nir 10.19 Corrected SM IV: 608 from nirvacanena.
The commentators frequently repeat this view in a more abbreviated form, for example Durga
at Nir 2 13,2 18,2 21,3 1,3.9,3.10,4.16,10.34; Skanda-Mahesvara at 3.1,3.8,3 13,4.16,10.3.
similar to the way in which he interprets analyses m -teh and -eh, for example
(D 1:30,2-3): samdnpurvasya mndter abhydsdrthasya karmani kdrake
samdmndyah, 'in the sense of karman as far as kdraka is concerned, [the term]
samdmndya is of Amnd which has the sense of repetition189 and is preceded by
[the preverbs] sam and d\ In other words, the only difference Durga sees in the
two types of analysis is that in the iti satah case the kdraka interpretation has
been spelled out and the fact that the relation marked by the genitive case
ending is not directly between the verbal element and the term being explained
forces him to supply asyaitad abhidhdnam bhavati, 'this is a name of that' or
'this name is of that'. The discussion of the ity apy asya bhavati material
revealed that the distinction between a word and that which it signifies is
blurred in the Nirukta. Similarly, in the present instance, Durga does not seem
to distinguish sharply between word and signified thing.
It is evident, however, that in an analysis of the iti satah type the primary
relation is not between one word and another, but between a word and that
which it signifies. This is clear because mehatiti san is self-referring and thus
it would be difficult for it to serve as an ideal substitute for meghah. Another
feature which brings this out is the very fact that sat- agrees in gender and
number with the word that is being analysed. This makes sense only if the
reference is to the thing and not to the word which denotes it.
It is equally evident, though, that the distinction between word and denoted
thing is blurred in nirvacana analysis. This is the case even within the frame-
work of analyses of the -teh type; for example: vaydh sdkhd vetehl vdtdyand
bhavanti, 'vaydh, [meaning] branches, is of/from vetih (Vvf 'move'); they are
such as move in the wind' (Nir 1.4). Names are analysed but in relation to the
things they name.
It is worthy of notice that nowhere do Durga or Skanda-Mahesvara
comment on the fact that satah follows the term being explained in gender and
number, nor do they attach any other significance to sat- than its function of
determining which kdraka is involved. I think more is implied by sat- than just
this. I also believe that the genitive is to be understood in a different way.
Accordingly, I think it is possible to pursue matters further here. Let me first
of all suggest the following simple interpretation of megho mehatiti satah:
'meghah' is of that which really exists (satah) so that one says (iti) [of it]: it rains
(mehati).
According to this interpretation, the analysis determines the reference of
meghah by giving a definite description as in the nirvacanas of 'Bhairava', and
it provides a relation with a verb or a verbal root. A straightforward rendering
of the above interpretation would seem to be that the word meghah belongs to
something, namely a cloud, of which one can say that it rains. But if names are
introduced by a description, this would be either as a theory of the meaning of
189
Cf. Dhp 1 976 mna abhyase.
names or merely as a theory of their reference. Yaska has stated clearly that
his search is for the meaning of names. Let me therefore assume that we are
dealing with a theory of the meaning of names. It is possible, as Itshall later
argue,190 to interpret the genitive as marking the relation of 'being in the place
of and to conceive of this 'place' as the meaning of a word in the sense that
megho mehatlti satah could be interpreted:
'meghaJf is in the meaning of that which really exists {satah) so that one says (iti)
[of it]: it rains (mehati).
Under this interpretation the genitive is taken as a substitutional genitive, in
the same way as the genitive used to indicate that a word is used to signify the
same thing as another word, that is to say, ultimately speaking that the two
words involved are synonymous. As pointed out in the previous section, Yaska
is familiar with and indeed employs such a usage. This fits well with the fact
that a considerable number of the words analysed by an iti satah construction
are adhikdra-words in Nighantu 1-3. The adhikdra-word is semantically sub-
stitutionable for all the other words in the group indicating as it does the
meaning common to all of them.
Yaska also employs a substitutional genitive to let one linguistic item
replace another without a focus on semantics (Nir 12.7): nir ity esa sam ity
etasya sthdne, 'the [preverb] nih [occurs here] in the place of the [preverb]
sam\ Thieme (1958:46) remarks on this particular instance that 'he [= Yaska]
does not think of a technical substitution such as taught in Panini's grammar
and can be sure to be understood by any grammatical layman'. This is precisely
the point. The Nirukta is in no way a grammar processing language, but Yaska
takes the understanding of a substitutional genitive for granted. Other instances
where Yaska employs a substitutional genitive are: yat tu kihcid dgneyam taj
jdtavedasdndm sthdne yujyate, 'but anything addressed to Agni is-'acceptable
in the place of something addressed to Jatavedas' m (Nir 7.20); yat tu kihcid
bahudaivatam tad vaisvadevdndm sthdne yujyate, 'but anything addressed to
many deities is acceptable in the place of something addressed to the
Visvadevas' (Nir 12.40).
In the above nirvacana, then, mehatlti san would be grammatically and
semantically equivalent to meghah were it not for the self-reference problem.
But to the extent that the distinction between signifier and signified is blurred,
to the same extent it becomes less crucial whether we talk of the linguistic
expression mehatlti san or that which it signifies. The expression rfiehatiti san
must involve language for it to be a nirvacana. Moreover, when it is stated at
Nirukta 2.5 that 'gauh is a name for prthivV this implies both that 7gauh signi-
fies the Earth, and that the words gauh and prthivi are substitutionable lin-
guistic elements. I consider the iti satah construction to be a parallel case.
When you say x iti satah y, this means that y is a name for that which is so that
190 m
See pp. 248 ff. below. See BD 2.128.
one says 'he who x-es\ If we move from the ontological to the linguistic
domain, we have to replace the adjective satah by a relative pronoun: yo mehati
'he who rains'. The elements yo mehati and meghah are both grammatically
and semantically equivalent and hence entities which can replace each other.
What immediately requires further investigation, however, is the usage of the
element sat-.
Let me first of all turn to a usage of sat- met with in the Mahabhasya, for
example in the discussion of A 1.1.60 adarsanam lopah. This rule defines the
most general name for grammatical elision, lopa, as adarsana 'non-seeing'.192
Patanjali begins his discussion with the following observation (Mbh
1:158,2-8):
arthasya samjnd kartavyd sabdasya ma bhild itil itaretardsrayam ca bhavatil
ketaretardsrayatd I sato 'darsanasya samjnayd bhavitavyam samjnayd cddarsanam
bhdvyate tad etad itaretardsrayam bhavatil itaretardsrayam ca naprakalpyanteI
lopasamjhdydm arthasator uktamll 1 //
kim uktaml arthasya tdvad uktaml itikarano 'rthanirdesdrtha itil sato 'py uktaml
siddham tu nityasabdatvdd itilnitydh sabddh I nityesu ca sabdesu sato 'darsanasya
samjnd kriyate na samjnddarsanam bhdvyate II
It has been stated that a technical term should be made for the meaning and should
not be established for the linguistic form. Moreover, there is mutual dependence
involved. What mutual dependence? A name must be made for non-seeing that
exists, and non-seeing is established by means of the term. This is something which
involves mutual dependence, and something which involves mutual dependence is
not acceptable [in grammatical operations].
It has been stated that the term lopa applies to meaning and to something that
exists.' vt. 1
What has been stated? With regard to meaning this much has been stated: Hti has
been used to indicate the meaning'.193 It has also been stated with regard to some-
thing that exists: 'but it is effected because linguistic forms are eternally estab-
lished'.194 Linguistic forms are eternally established. And because linguistic forms
are eternally established, a technical term is made for non-seeing that exists; non-
seeing is not established by means of the term.
; The first issue to be raised here pertains to the claim that a technical term
in grammar should apply to the meaning of the linguistic form and not to that
linguistic form itself. That is to say, the term lopa refers to the meaning of
r
'non-seeing' and not to the linguistic form adarsana. Patanjali makes a point
'of this because of rule A 1.1.68 svam rupam sabdasydsabdasamjiid which
.teaches that a linguistic element (sabda) denotes its own form except in the
^case of a technical term in grammar. For a grammarian, who speaks about lan-
fguage, this is a distinction that simply has to be made in order to avoid the
^problem resembling the one which is solved by the modern use of quotation
492
Rule 1.1.60 and Patanjah's
m
remarks on itm have been discussed in detail by J.W. Benson
1990:124-40. A 1.1.44, vt. 3. A 1.1.1, vt. 9.
marks. The necessity of making a clear distinction between a* sign and its
meaning is not mere pedantry, as Gottlob Frege was careful to point out
(1893:4):
Man wird sich vielleicht uber den haufigen Gebrauch des Anfuhrungszeichens
wundern; ich unterschiede damit die Falle, wo ich vom Zeichen selbst spreche, von
denen, wo ich von seiner Bedeutung spreche. So pedantisch dies auch erscheinen
mag, ich halte es doch fiir notwendig. Es ist merkwurdig, wie eine ungenaue Rede-
oder Schreibweise, die urspriinglich vielleicht nur aus Bequemlichkeit und der
Kiirze halber, aber mit vollem Bewusstsein ihrer Ungenauigkeit gebraucht wurde,
zuletzt das Denken verwirren kann, nachdem jenes Bewusstsein geschwunden ist.
Hat man es doch fertig gebracht, die Zahlzeichen fiir die Zahlen, den Namen flir das
Benannte, das blosse Hilfsmittel fiir den eigentlichen Gegenstand der Arithmetik zu
halten.195
In nirvacana analysis there is, as we have seen, a certain scope for confu-
sion in this respect. Do we speak about a word or that which is signified by
a word? A nirvacana is an analysis of a word, but with regard to how it is
related to the thing signified. This is also where the wide semantic range of
the term artha enters the picture. If an analysis of the Hi satah type is inter-
preted as I have suggested, there is no room for such confusion. It is the
term which is analysed and it is analysed by a definite description, still lan-
guage, of that which it signifies. The relation between the term and its cor-
responding explanatory expression happens through that which the term
signifies.
The second issue raised by Patanjali pertains to the difficulty that arises if
a grammatical term were to provide a means of establishing a word, that is, if
the term lopa is applied to non-seeing which already exists and is simultane-
ously used to establish non-seeing. This creates a problem of mutual depen-
dence, itaretardsrayatd.
The first vdrttika on A 1.1.60 states that both of these issues have been dealt
with elsewhere. On the basis of arguments advanced in thosecontexts, it is
settled that the term lopa signifies the meaning of adarsana and that the term
is applied to something which exists. Patanjali quotes vt> 3 itikarano
'rthanirdesdrthah on A 1.1.44 nd veti vibhdsd. This vdrttika states that iti is
included in the rule to indicate that the term vibhdsd has the sense of 'or not'
and does not apply to the form of the linguistic elements na vd. Resorting to
the principle of anuvrtti, the recurrence of part of a rule in a subsequent rule,
195
'Perhaps one is perplexed by the frequent use of quotation marks; I use them to distinguish
between cases where I am talking about the sign itself and cases where I am talking about its
reference. This might seem pedantic but I think it is necessary. It is strange how an imprecise
way of speaking or writing, which originally might have been used due to laziness and for the
sake of brevity, but in full awareness of its imprecision, can ultimately confuse thought after
the awareness has gone. After all one has managed to take the number signs as numbers, the
name as the thing which is being named, that is to say, the mere auxiliary device as the subject
of arithmetic' "
Patanjali seems to argue that the word iti of A 1.1.44 is read into A 1.1.60,
having thus established that it is non-seeing, the meaning of adarsana, which
is termed lopa.
The problem of mutual dependence involves a fundamental debate on the
nature of language: while linguistic forms are eternally established (nitya),
they are also considered the product of grammar (kdrya, lit. 'to be produced').
Patanjali quotes vt. 9 on A 1.1.1 vrddhir ddaic, the rule that assigns the name
vrddhi to the sounds a, ai, and au. In the Mahdbhdsya discussion of this rule
the objection is raised that while the name vrddhi is applied to a, ai, and au
which exist, these vowels are to be established by the term vrddhi. The case is
an exact parallel to the one at A 1.1.60. Since there is room for confusion at this
point, I quote the passage in question (Mbh 1:40,20-1):
satdm ddaicdm samjhayd bhavitavyam samjhayd cddaico bhdvyante tad
itaretardsrayam bhavatil itaretardsraydni ca kdrydni na prakalpante I
A name must be made for a, ai, and au which exist, and a, ai, and au are established
by means of the term. This is something which involves mutual dependence, and
grammatical operations which involve mutual dependence are not acceptable.
The passage continues by adducing a couple of examples. The difficulty of
mutual dependence is then answered by vt. 9 which states that linguistic forms
are eternally established, nitya. Once again the passage is an exact parallel to
the one at A 1.1.60 (Mbh 1:40,26-8):
siddham tu nityasabdatvdtII 9II
siddham etatl kathaml nityasabdatvdt I nitydh sabddhl nityesu sabdesu satdm
ddaicdm sarnjhd kriyate na samjhayddaico bhdvyante I
'But it is effected because linguistic forms are eternally established.' vt. 9
It is effected. How? Because of the fact that linguistic forms are eternally estab-
lished. [For] linguistic forms are eternally established, [and] in as much as linguis-
tic forms are eternally established, a technical term is made for a, ai, and au which
exist; a, ai, and au are not established by means of the term.
On the basis of this argument, the technical name vrddhi cannot serve to
establish a, ai, and au which exist already since they, like other linguistic
forms, are eternally established. Likewise, the name lopa in A 1.1.60 is
assigned to non-seeing which already exists, and does not serve to establish
non-seeing. One may argue that a slight difficulty arises concerning whether
it is the word-form adarsana that exists already or its meaning non-seeing, but
in the case of a, ai, and au this problem does not arise since here we deal
.with phonological terms implying that ia> signifies a etc. That is to say, they
are signified by their own form according to A 1.1.68 svam rupam
sabdasydsabdasamjhd cited above. This is because a etc. on a phonological
level do not carry meanings of their own, but in the context of the claim that a
technical term should be made with regard to the meaning of a linguistic
element that is eternally established, the problem seems to vanish since the
relation between word and meaning is said to be eternally established as

well.196
It is thus ascertained that the name lopa applies to the meaning of the term
by which it is defined and thus is something that exists. The word-form
adarsana is not at question at all; the name lopa is given to real non-seeing and
not to the word-form adarsana.
Similarly, I suggest, it would be possible to argue that in an analysis of the
iti satah type, we face the analysis of terms which signify something which
actually already exists such that it lends itself to a particular definite descrip-
tion. Certainly, the term does not establish that which it signifies. The thing
signified really exists so that it can be described in a certain way, and so that
the definite description of it is true.
It remains to explain why some words and not all words are analysed in this
manner, particularly with regard to the element sat-. I have already given a
brief rundown of the frequency of the iti satah type of analysis, arid the mere
importance of the words analysed in this manner would to some extent explain
why they are eligible for this more elaborate analysis. I have also tried to inves-
tigate the possibility of tracing a connection here to the ritual spHere.197 It is
evident that several of the terms analysed by an iti satah construction, for
example karman (Nir 3.1), megha (2.21), mrtyu (11.6), vaifas vdnndma (4.16),
and certainly the deities, all have a relation to the sacrifice, that is to say, to a
sacred, instantly efficacious ritual action. It is also difficult not to think of the
innumerable satahlsatdm people who, through their life in truth, "are able to
turn words into reality. It is on that basis tempting to paraphrase sat- as 'which
exists in a way that is a true /real /efficacious existence' and conclude that it is
used, for example, for karman as a name for 'ritual action' which is a truly real
action as opposed to other actions which are not efficacious in the same way.
I have tried to investigate this further in order to see whether it would be
possible to track down an underlying system whereby terms specifically per-
taining to ritual are analysed in this way, but I have failed to find anything con-
clusive. Indeed, it seems to me that such a system does not exist Moreover,
several terms which pertain to the ritual sphere (e.g., chanddmsi and mantrdh
Nir 7.12) are not analysed by means of an iti satah construction. Still, the ritual
connection and the usage of sat- in connection with truth and making truth is
worth keeping in mind since Yaska undoubtedly lived in a world of Vedic
ritual, although perhaps no longer in that world of Vedic ritual which we come
to know through the Brahmanas.
196
In the phrase siddhe sabddrthasambandhe, traditionally considered the first £art of the first
varttika of the Mahdbhdsya. Patanjali (Mbh I 6,17) analyses the compound as* siddhe sabde
'rthe sambandhe ca, 'when [it is assumed] that the word-form, [its] meaning, and the relation
[between them] are permanently established', it could alternatively be interpreted* 'when [it
is assumed that] the relation between a word-form and [its] meaning is permanently estab-
lished' Under both alternatives the relation between word-form and meaning is considered
permanent
197
This was first suggested to me by Harry Falk (private communication 29 6 1987).
On the basis of this discussion, I suggest the usages of sat- in the

Mahdbhdsya and in the ritual sphere be taken into account with extreme
caution, and that in an analysis of the iti satah type sat- be interpreted in a way
whereby it simply serves to sanction the definite description as true. In other
words, the analysis megho mehatlti satah may be paraphrased: 'meghah is in
the meaning of that which really exists (satah) such that it is true to say (iti)
[of it]: it rains (mehati)\
With regard to an analysis of the type megho mehatlti satah, then, it has
been established that satah is a genitive form and that sat- agrees in gender and
number with the noun that is explained. This is because an expression such as
mehatlti san refers to a real existent thing and not to a linguistic form. First of
all, this makes it clear that the genitive here cannot be derivational, in the sense
that 'x is a form of y\ Durga too recognises that the construction leaves no
room for a direct relation between two linguistic elements. Supplying asyaitad
abhidhdnam bhavati, 'this is a name of that' or 'this name is of that', he takes
the genitive to mark a relation between a term and that which it signifies so
that megho mehatlti satah is to be interpreted as 'meghah is a name for that
which is such that one says: it rains'. Neither Durga nor Skanda-Mahesvara
comment upon the fact that sat- agrees in gender and number with the noun
that is being analysed, nor do they have much to say about sat-. The only thing
they are eager to point out is that an iti satah analysis serves to indicate a spe-
cific kdraka interpretation, excluding any other kdraka interpretation. This
nevertheless does not prevent them from offering a different one should cir-
cumstances so require (cf. SM IV: 102,1). Now, kdraka interpretation would
easily have been taken care of also by a more simple analysis of the mehatlti
meghah type. If kdraka were all Yaska wanted to specify, why would he bother
to add sat- in the genitive case and have it agree in number and gender with the
noun he explains?
Whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent
properties depends on the way it is described. In a nirvacana of the iti satah
type, the element sat- serves to indicate a definite description which deter-
mines the reference of the term being analysed. Having also considered the
usage of sat- in the ritual context and in the Mahdbhdsya, one may argue that
it simply serves to sanction a definite description as true. An analysis of the iti
satah type would then convey the following information: there is (sat-) an x
such that it is true (sat-) to say of it 'it is Jt-ing' or 'it is being x-ed' etc., and
therefore it is called V . To conclude, under this interpretation an analysis such
as megho mehatlti satah may be paraphrased: 'meghah' occurs in the meaning
of that which really exists such that it is true to say of it: it rains. In this way
nothing has to be supplied; the interpretation simply rests on the way the gen-
itive is to be understood, an issue to which I shall return in much detail below.
In vydkarana you talk not of things but of how they are spoken about, and
the approach is primarily derivational. Still, there is an overlap between
meaning and form. For example, you would not add a suffix unless there is
meaning involved. The nirukta analysis is also concerned with words, but
words in relation to things. This is why one finds causal and derivational
explanations side by side. An analysis of the iti satah type provides a vast
amount of information: it sanctions a definite description as true and presents
sufficient linguistic material to yield the semantically and linguistically ideal
expression for the word that is being explained. Note that the interpretation I
have suggested for an analysis of the iti satah type is of a semantic nature. It
brings out the artha of the word analysed, and this is exactly what the nirva-
cana method tries to achieve. This is also what the various types vof analysis
have in common.
The relationship between the various types of analysis

It is now possible to see how the various types of analysis relate to each other.
It is evident that the complexities of Yaska's technical language presuppose a
long development. If we are to gain as full a picture as possible, we have to
remember that we are dealing with elliptical ways of expression which have
to be cautiously treated not only in relation to the metalanguage of Yaska
which has its own historical presuppositions, but also in relation to the
possibilities of interpretation and subtle conceptual distinctions developed by
the later tradition. There is nothing which says that the commentators inter-
preted Yaska in an infallible manner. On the other hand, they themselves put
their mark on a tradition which throughout employed and modified the
methods exhibited by Yaska. As far as I know, there is only one significant
exception: the iti satah type of analysis seems to be uniquely characteristic of
the Nirukta.
The analysis exemplified as megho mehandt was clearly well established
before Yaska's time and frequently employed in later literature:'A further
development of usages met with in Vedic literature, it is primarily a causal
explanation indicating the action or event which is considered the cause of a
name. Although it therefore establishes a relation between a name and a verbal
noun and hence ultimately with a verb or a verbal root, it is evident that
constructions of the -andt type can refer exclusively to the semantic content of
a word. This explains why such constructions occur as additional semantic
elucidations to analyses of the -teh type, while the reverse never is the case.
Nowhere is an analysis of the -andt type seen to replace any of the other types.
This holds good also for the formulaic expression etasmdd eva 'for the very
same reason' which also indicates the cause for a name.
A causal explanation is also provided by an analysis such as mehatiti
meghah which in addition provides a kdraka interpretation which, as in the
preceding instance, can be seen as a further development of usages met with
in Vedic literature. Such kdraka analysis certainly establishes a relation to a
finite verb and thus to a verbal root. Still, the primary relationship between a
term and its corresponding explanatory expression is also in this case of a
causal nature: x is called V because of the jt-ing or because it is jc-ing, is being

*-ed, etc. As is well known, kdraka analysis permeates Sanskrit literature.
While the two previous methods have a clear basis in Vedic texts, the
remaining three are, as far as I know, confined to the Nirukta and later litera-
ture. They are technically more specialised and complex, and have one feature
in common: they all exhibit a case form which is not immediately clear. In the
case of the analyses in -teh and -eh it is evident from the previous investigation
that it is not possible to rule out either a genitive or an ablative interpretation
on the basis of possible attributes in the Nirukta itself. Although the com-
mentators to an overwhelming extent treat them as genitive forms, the material
from the Nirukta forces us to consider and indeed accept that the forms in -teh
and -eh can be genitives as well as ablatives. In fact, both interpretations may
be simultaneously possible.
Let me first turn to the ablative interpretation. Under this alternative an
analysis exemplified as megho mehateh or megho miheh could be seen as a
purely derivational analysis, simply informing us that the word meghah is
derived grammatically - and not etymologically or historically - from the
verbal root mih. This more or less rules out a causal explanation, except as indi-
cating a verbal root so to speak as a causa materialis, and could explain why
analyses in -teh sometimes are followed by a verbal noun in -andt which clearly
adds a causal explanation.
It is clear that Yaska understood and indeed employed analysis into verbal
roots and suffixes as well as secondary formation with taddhita suffixes.198 He
does not employ the vaiydkarana term pratyaya 'suffix' but the term
ndmakarana, literally 'noun-maker', implying that a suffix makes a noun, that
is to say, derives a nominal from a verbal idea.
Turning to the genitive interpretation of forms in -teh and -eh the picture
gets more complex. It is quite clear that the commentators frequently take the
genitive to establish a relation with a verb or a verbal root. First of all this fits
well with their frequent addition of °arthasya, also added as glosses of Yaska's
°karmanah. For example, commenting upon daksind daksateh samardhaya-
tikarmanah, 'daksind is of daksatih (ydaks) which denotes the activity of ren-
dering complete' (Nir 1.7), Durga adds the gloss samardhayatyarthasya,
clearly a bahuvnhi compound in the sense of '[of daksatih] which has the
sense of rendering complete'. There are also instances where the commenta-
tors are quite explicitly linking a form to a verbal root by the formula asyedam
rupam, 'this form is of this . . . ' or similar. I shall adduce a few examples. On
usiram (the name of a particularly fragrant root) Skanda-Mahesvara remark
198
For example, Nir 4 2 pdsyd pasasamuhah; cf. A 4.2.37 tasya samuhah which teaches that the
taddhita suffix aN is added in the sense of 'collection of it' and A 4.2.29 pdsddibhyo yah
which teaches that the suffix ya is added after the stems pdsa- etc. (gana 141: pdsddayah).
This is no reliable argument for settling the question of chronology - Panini and Yaska may
have based themselves on traditions commonly available to both of them - but it serves to
show that Yaska was familiar with taddhita analysis according to the same linguistic princi-
ples that Panini employed.
170 Indian semantic analysis \
(SM 11:45,5-6): vaseh Iraki krtasamprasdranasyedam rupaml kdmyate hi tat,

sugandhitatvdt, 'this form is of vasih (Vvai 'desire; like') which has been
subject to vocalisation of the semivowel when the suffix TraK (-Tra) is added;
for it is desired because of its fragrance'. The genitive establishes a relation to
a verbal root and the semantic reason for this choice of root is added separately.
Similarly (SM 1:104,14—15): evam atrdvasdyeti na syater avapurvasya lyab-
antasya rupam, dhdtupasargayor lyapas cdtrdrthdsambhavdt, 'so, in this case
avasdya is not a form of syatih preceded by the preverb ova and ending in [the
absolutive suffix] LyaP (-yd), since the sense of root and preverb and LyaP is
impossible here'. Likewise (SM 111:89,1-2): [dasyur] dasyateh 'tasu upaksaye
dasu co* ity asya ksaydrthe vartamdnasyeti sesah, '[dasyur is of] dasyateh, i.e.
of this [about which it is stated Dhp 4.106-7:] "[the root] tas [occurs] when
wasting [is to be denoted], so also [the root] das"', it is of this \yhich occurs
when there is the sense of destruction, thus the statement is to be completed'.
Under these interpretations there would not be much of a difference
between the genitive and the ablative alternatives. The genitive would estab-
lish a certain noun as a form (rupa) of a certain verbal root, and the ablative
would similarly indicate a grammatical derivation from a verbal root.
Determining what suffix is involved and which kdraka is left to the judgment
of the reader. In fact, interpreted in this manner, the -teh and -eh forms of analy-
sis would not convey more information than an analysis in -andt and less than
the mehatiti meghah type. My hypothesis is that they are compressed ways of
expression, eventually lending themselves to more elaborate interpretation.
Mere indication of a verbal root is not what characterises the semantic quest
of nirvacana analysis, and although this as an argument would be far from
compelling, it is reasonable to assume, with the commentators, that we would
be entitled to read considerably more into an analysis which simply indicates
the verbal root by which a grammatical derivation would take place.
The texts support such an assumption. In the Nirukta itself Several of the
analyses in -teh and -eh are introduced by the word kasmdt 'why?' just like
other types of analyses, including the less technical ones.199 This is also the
case with the commentators, for example Durga (D 11:981,12-13): seva iti
sukhandmal tat kasmdt I sisyateh, 'sevah is a name for happiness; why is
that? sisyateK. Similarly, with a form in -eh (D 11:994, 16-17): atha garbhah
kasmdt/ grbheh dhdtoh grndtyarthe vartamdnasya, 'now, why garbhah
"womb"? It is of the verbal root grbhih (^grbh) which occurs in the sense of
praising.' This not only allows for, but indeed necessitates reading a causal
explanation into analyses in -teh and -eh even though, strictly speaking, all they
do is indicate a verb or a verbal root. One could, of course, argue that in these
instances kasmdt is not to be interpreted as 'why?' but as 'from what [verbal
root]?', 200 but if this were the case it would show how one and the same
199
For example
200
Nir 2 10 (hiranyam), 2 15 (disah), 2 18 (ratnh), 2 23 (vak), 3.9 (annam, balam)
etc. But see Kahrs 1983.
formulaic expression can be interpreted in different ways according to the

angle one may wish to approach a nirvacana from - semantic or derivational.
In other words, if the Nirukta itself and the commentaries not only allow for
but actually do read more information into analyses in -teh and -eh than what
is actually stated, it is possible to argue that these analyses lend themselves to
a fuller interpretation than what they formally allow for. This may include the
genitive form itself.
Although it is not possible to rule out the ablative interpretation of forms in
-teh and -eh, it is an indisputable fact that the genitive interpretation gets fuller
support from the Nirukta itself, and overwhelming support from the com-
mentaries. This may be no coincidence. The same genitive form asya in the
formula ity apy asya bhavati is used to indicate two different things. In some
instances it informs us that one word signifies the same thing as another word,
thus ultimately indicating that the two words are synonyms. In other instances
it serves to indicate a form in -teh, that is to say, a grammatical derivation.
Considering that in some instances it can even be hard to determine which
alternative we are facing, it would certainly be possible to encode the notion
of a substitutional genitive into the forms in -teh and -eh as well. Even in the
technical language of the AstddhydyT, one and the same genitive is to be inter-
preted in different ways. For example, the genitive of A 6.4.1 angasya is to be
interpreted as a sthdnasasthT, a substitutional genitive, in A 7.2.102 tyadddindm
ah, but as an avayavasasthi, a partitive genitive, when it recurs by anuvrtti in
A 7.2.106 tadoh sah sdv anantyayoh.
Let me now finally turn to the way in which the interpretation of an iti satah
type of analysis outlined above relates to an analysis in -teh and thus ultimately
to one in -eh. In Nirukta 12.5 Yaska deals with the name Usas as the name of
a goddess belonging to the heavenly sphere (dyusthdnd devatd), analysing it by
usd vasteh kdntikarmanah. This pertains to the word usah listed at Nighantu
5.6. The same passage then gives an analysis of her name as a goddess belong-
ing to the middle region: ucchater Hard mddhyamikd. This pertains to the word
usah listed at Nighantu 5.5. In the context of Nighantu 5.5 Yaska's only remark
on the name is (Nir 11.46): usd vydkhydtd, 'usdh has [already] been explained'.
Now, this must necessarily refer to the one and only previous analysis, namely
(Nir 2.18): usah kasmdtl ucchatiti satydh, 'why [the name] usdhl [Because] it
occurs in the meaning of she who really exists such that it is true to say [of her]:
she shines (ucchati)\ This analysis pertains to usah as the adhikdra-word of
Nighantu 1.8 (sodasosondmdni).
This warrants the following conclusion. Since Yaska at Nirukta 12.5 en
passant gives the analysis ucchateh of the same usah that he said at Nirukta
11.46 had been explained earlier and which was analysed at Nirukta 2.18 by an
iti satah construction, it is evident that he can substitute an analysis of the iti
satah type with an analysis formulated by means of the artificial verb-noun in
-teh. It is then possible to argue that ultimately the two kinds of analysis are to
be understood in the same manner. We are dealing here with elliptical ways of
expression which lend themselves to more than one interpretation according to

the different layers of Yaska's technical language, all of them interpretations
which are simultaneously valid.
The question also arises as to how the later tradition looks at the relation-
ship between the iti satah and -teh types of analysis. Let me first turn to the
commentaries on the analysis of usdh given at Nirukta 12.5. Since Durga and
Skanda-Mahesvara are in close agreement here, suffice it to cite the remarks
of Skanda-Mahesvara (SMIV: 101,14-102,1):
usah kasmatl vasteh kantyarthasya I kdntd hy asaul ucchater vdl yathoktam 'usah
kasmat ucchatlti satyah' iti dyusthdndyd201 vikalpahl madhyamasthdnd ucchater
eva202/ tad aha ucchater itareftV sd hy udakdni vivdsayati vivdsyate vd meghdn ma-
dhyamenal
Why 'usdh9? [Because it is] of vastih (Îvas) which has the sense of being beauti-
ful/splendid (Dhp 2.70); for she is beautiful/splendid. Or else \fusdh9 is] 'of
ucchatih (^vas/uch203) "shine; expel"'; [that is to say,] just as it has been stated [Nir
2.18]: 'why usdh? [Because it occurs] in the meaning of she who really exists such
that it is true to say [of her]: she shines/expels', it is [also here at Nir 12.5] an alter-
native for [usdh considered as] belonging to the heavenly sphere. [When, on the
other hand, usdh is considered as] belonging to the middle sphere, it is only of
ucchatih; therefore he says 'this other [usdh] is of ucchatih\ for she expels (vivdsay-
ati) water or is [herself] expelled (vivdsyate)204 from the cloud by him who resides
in the middle sphere.205
It is clear from this that the commentators too are happy to replace or refer
to the analysis ucchatlti satyah with the analysis ucchatek Another example is
the analysis of vratam 'action; vow' 206 (Nir 2.13).207 Durga comments on idam
apitarad vratam etasmdd eva nivrttikarma as follows (D 1:207,15-208,3):
vratam iti karmanama vrnotlti/ evam kartari kdrake satah vrnotehl tad dhi karma
subham ca krtam sadd vrnoti kartdraml idam apitarad vratam etasmad eva
nivrttikarma yamaniyamdkhyam bahirvedikam dntarvedikam vd yad agnisanni-
dhdv upeyate, tat punah varayatlti evam satah tad visayesu pravartamdnam
purusam stryddisu20* vdrayati tad anusrtya sa puruso nivartate 'vaklrnT
bhavisydmity etasmdd bhaydtl
201 202
203
v.l. °sthdnd vd vi° MSS B and C. Durga adds vivdsandrthasya, genitive.
There is a lot of confusion in lexica with regard to various roots vas/uch/us; cf. Dhp 1.231,
204
1.727, 6.14; see Kahrs 1980:237-41. ,
This analysis as karmasddhana comes as a surprise since Yaska specified kartr by the
ucchatlti satyah analysis at Nirukta 2.18. But as a nigama for usdh (mddhyamikd) oiNighan
5.5 Yaska offers RV 4.30.10 aposa dnasah sarat sdmpistdd aha bibhyusT. Geldner translates
'Die Usas lief von dem zerschlagenen Karren aus Furcht weg.' The commentators take
ucchatih in the sense of 'expel; drive away' as the causative of virtvas, e.g. Durga 1:220,8
where Usas clearly expels darkness, or 1:368,3 where vivdsayati is glossed'ndsayati 'drives
away; expels'. This makes the interpretation as karmasddhana completely straightforward.
205
206
That is to say, by Indra who conquers Usas in RV2074.30.10.
208
Nigh 2.1 lists vratam under karmandmdni. ' See p. 134 above, and Kahrs 1980:234-6.
So read with Rajavade (1921) for purusastryddisu.
'vratam is a name for action: it envelops'; [thus vratam] is [a name] 'of that [action]
which really exists' in such a manner; that is, in the sense of agent as far as kdraka
is concerned; that is to say, it is of vrnotih (Vvr 'cover; envelop'); for that action
which has been done, even if it is good, always envelops the agent; this other vratam
too, [i.e. vratam in the sense of] action of abstention [is so called] for the very same
reason, that is to say, [action] known as yama and niyama (roughly: 'restraints and
restrictions'), inside the sacrificial ground or outside it, that is, that [vratam] which
takes place in the vicinity of the sacrificial fire, also that [vratam] 'causes to be
enveloped'; that is to say, [it is a name] 'of that which really exists' in such a manner,
in as much as it makes a man engaged in his activities cover himself up in front of
women etc., and as he adheres to this [vratam] that man abstains out of fear from
[having to make the statement:] 'I shall be one who has ejaculated.'
Once more it is clear that an analysis of the iti satah type can be replaced
by an analysis in -teh, which again is picked up by the expression etasmdd eva
'for the very same reason'. It is worthy of notice that Durga pays no heed to his
earlier interpretation of the genitive satah as marking a relation with the thing
signified, as the relation specified by vrnoteh clearly holds between the lin-
guistic forms vratam and vrnotih.
This little investigation makes it evident that we can construct a line from
the analysis in -andt which gives a causal explanation, to the mehatiti meghah
type which in addition offers a fully formulated kdraka analysis, to the iti satah
type of analysis which, eventually, may be referred to by an analysis in -teh or
-eh.
There can be no doubt that the iti satah type of analysis is superior to any
of the others. It incorporates all the information conveyed by each and every
one of them, and, in fact, gives you more. By way of a definite description it
gives a causal explanation of why a word is the right word for something, it
offers a kdraka interpretation, it establishes a relation to a verb and hence to a
verbal root, and it sanctions the definite description determining the reference
as true.
On the basis that Yaska employs a genitive to indicate a substitution pro-
cedure as well as to indicate that which is signified by a word and thus ulti-
mately its synonym, that this same substitution principle underlies three of the
five chapters of the Nighantu where words are arranged in groups of syn-
onyms, I have argued above for an interpretation of the genitive in an iti satah
type of analysis as a substitutional genitive or what the Sanskrit grammarians
call a sthdnasasthu Under this interpretation of the genitive nothing has to be
supplied. Now, derivatives of sat- are common words for truth in Sanskrit.
What an iti satah analysis offers at the end of the day, then, is nothing less than
a theory of truth as a theory of meaning all set up according to a substitutional
model. Either one considers meghah the substitute for the ideal linguistic
expression mehatiti son, disregarding in that case the problem of self-reference
and the fact that the relation marked by the genitive strictly speaking is with
the thing signified, or one considers the relation to be to the meaning of the
thing signified, the latter alternative requiring the construction of an ideal

linguistic expression that involves a relative pronoun: yo mehatu The term
meghah can replace the ideal expressions mehatiti son or yo mehati because
they mean the same thing, one replacing the other at the relevant location in
semantic space just like in the Paninian system some linguistic item may
replace another in some specific context at the relevant location itt grammat-
ical space.
Now, as demonstrated above, it is evident that Yaska can replace an analy-
sis of the iti satah type with an analysis formulated by means of the artificial
verb-noun in -teh. It has also been established that the same genitive form asya
in the formula ity apy asya bhavati is used to indicate that which is signified
by a word, ultimately its synonym, as well as a form in -teh, and that in some
instances it can even be hard to determine which alternative we are facing. This
overlap illustrates that even a formulaic expression works in more than one
way. It is then possible to argue that ultimately the two kinds of analysis are to
be understood in the same manner, and that we are entitled to read more into
an analysis in -teh or -eh than a mere reference to a verb or a verbal root. Note
that I am not saying that the latter types of construction actually exhibit the
same information as an iti satah construction, but that an investigation of the
relationship between the various forms of analysis warrants the conclusion that
they can be decoded to reveal the same information.
Indeed, it is possible to argue that ultimately all nirvacanas are to be under-
stood according to a substitutional model. An understanding of nirvacana
analysis according to a model of substitution works well also for those analy-
ses which are expressed in a less technical language, as for example the nirvac-
anas of 'Bhairava' discussed earlier. It also explains how one and the same
word can be analysed in more than one way, and how seemingly exclusive
explanations can be simultaneously valid. They are simply alternative place-
holders in semantic space.
It now remains to investigate the model of substitution and its standing in
other parts of Sastric Sanskrit literature, and to see how the results of such an
investigation fit in with the substitutional interpretation of nirvacana analysis.
5
Substitution
Whether or not it may licitly be considered a general pattern in Indian thought,

the model of substitution is certainly a well-developed methodological pro-
cedure in Paninian grammar and in the ritual Sutras. And the science of
grammar was certainly influential. Louis Renou went as far as to claim that
'adherer a la pensee indienne, c'est d' abord penser en grammairien'.l In simple
words, the Indian grammarians adopted a model whereby stages in the lin-
guistic derivational process are accounted for by saying CY occurs in the place
of X' as opposed to 'X becomes Y \ The latter procedure was certainly known
to the Indians and is met with in the Pratisakhya texts where changes of sounds
are accounted for by letting one item change into another according to a
morphophonemic technique where the items X and Y are denoted by a nomi-
native and an accusative form respectively. Here the item Y is termed the
vikdra 'modification; difference', while X is termed the vikann, literally 'pos-
sessing modification'. This procedure is clearly older than Panini2 although
available evidence fails to ascertain that all Pratisakhya texts are earlier.
The primary concern of the Pratisakhya texts was the relation between the
Samhita or continuous text of the Vedas and the Padapatha, the analysed or
word-for-word text. That is to say, they sought to describe those modifications
or differences, vikdms, which distinguish the Samhitapatha from the Pada-
patha. Accordingly, the bulk of Pratisakhya rules pertains to changes of single
sounds.
The Paninian substitution procedure, on the other hand, involves not only
single sounds but also larger units such as bases and suffixes. These units may
even be theoretical terms such as the lakdras, the ten abstract verbal tense and
mood suffixes which at the level of abstract syntax mediate between seman-
tics and morphology.3 It is then no longer convenient or, indeed, possible to
1
'Being true to
2
Indian thought is first of all to think as a grammarian'; Renou and Filliozat 1953,
3
§ 1519 Cf Thieme 1958 45, Cardona 1969 32 f, 1976 274 f
Rule A 3.4.69 lah karmani ca bhdve cdkarmakebhyah teaches that an L-suffix is added to a
verbal root (A 3 1 91 dhatoh) to denote - in addition to the agent {kartan A 3 4.67) - the object
or, m the case of intransitive verbs, the mere activity expressed by the verbal root Moreover,
these L-suffixes serve to mark tenses. Other rules define what specific tense and mood are
denoted by each particular L-suffix when they are introduced at particular stages of a grammat-
ical derivation. For example, A 3 2.110 lun teaches that the aonst L-suffix luN is added after a
176 Indian semantic analysis - .
talk about a vikara or modification, the substitution method being adopted and
fully developed instead. The element which is to undergo substitution is indi-
cated by the genitive case suffix, while the substitute is given in the nomina-
tive.
A linguistic element has a possible domain of applicability which in
Paninian terminology is referred to as the sthana, literally 'place; activity of
standing', a term I shall return to in much detail further on. The substituend,
the element which is to undergo the substitution operation, is called the
sthanin, literally 'place-holder; placing-possessor', and the substitute, the
element which replaces the sthanin, is called the ddesa, literally 'instruction;
specification'. I shall discuss these two terms in turn.
The sthanin
The term sthanin has been studied in detail by A. Wezler (1972) who, with
regard to Panini, renders it as (ibid.: 12): 'das, was durch eine ihm eigentiimliche /
zukommende Stelle (d.h. eine Stelle, an der es erwartet wird (prasakta)4)
charakterisiert ist'.5 He adds (ibid., note 30): 'Das ist die etymologische
Bedeutung von sthanin- und nicht "ce qui [etait] a telle place [et n'y est plus]" ',6
thus condemning the rendering of Renou (1941-2:130). Wezler'slendering of
sthanin is based on a conception of the secondary suffix -in advocated by
Thieme (1955:191): 'Mit einer Formation auf -in- wird jemand oder etwas als
der Besitzer (im weitesten Sinne) von einer ihm eigentumlichen Sache (die
durch den dem Formans vorausgehenden Nominalstamm genannt oder be-
zeichnet ist) charakterisiert.'7 Although Thieme cautiously adds 'in the widest
sense', I do not find this rendering very helpful, nor do I, consequently, accept
Wezler's rendering of sthanin. I simply do not think it is possible to come up
with such an exact and detailed mdaning for any secondary suffix in Sanskrit,
be it on the basis of the observations of the indigenous grammarians or on the
basis of Indo-European linguistics. Taking -in as a general possessive suffix, I
prefer at this stage to render sihana as 'place' and sthanin as 'place-holder'.
verbal root when the action refers to the general past (A 3 2 84 bhute). These abstract L-suffixes
are subsequently replaced by finite verbal endings or by participial suffixes which may them-
selves be subject to substitution. The advantage of introducing the abstract level of L-suffixes
m the grammatical process is that at this level all verbal endings can be said to signify agents,
objects, or mere activity in relation to the action expressed and can thus be treated according
4
to what they have in common at this level.
This is Wezler's way of incorporating the indigenous interpretation ofsthdna asprasanga 'pos-
sible appearance, chance' and sthanin accordingly as prasakta, I shall return to the possible
5
interpretations of sthdna further on.
That which is characterised by its own peculiar/ due place (i.e. a place at which it is expected
6
{prasakta))'
'That is the etymological meaning of sthanin- and not "that which [was] in such a place [and
7
is no longer there]"'
'With a formation in -in someone or something is being characterised as the possessor (in the
widest sense) of a thing which is peculiar to the possessor, (the thing is named or designated
by the nominal stem which precedes the forming element).'
Substitution 177
As noted by Wezler (1972:13), Renou (1941-2:131) observed that Vedic

ritual did not know the term sthdnin in any other sense than 'qui est a sa place'
('which is in its place') and adduced text-places to buttress his claim. Adding
further evidence for this, Wezler (ibid.) finds it works also for the opposite
concept asthdnin 'not in its place'. From this he moves on to asthdna which,
as the basis for the derivation asthdnin, can be rendered 'unrechter Ort'
('improper place'), and sthdna accordingly as 'ein rechter, passender Ort' ('a
proper, fitting place') although there do not seem to be any text-places in Vedic
literature with this meaning. In other words, Wezler moves from asthdnin
'nicht am rechten Ort befindlich' ('not in the proper place'), to asthdna
'unrechter Ort' ('improper place') and, via sthdnin 'am rechten Ort befindlich'
('in the proper place'), to establish a sthdna 'ein rechter Ort' ('a proper place')
and a locative sthdne 'am rechten Ort' ('in the proper place').
Wezler (ibid.: 14) then turns to instances where sthdne, 'einer Postposition
vergleichbar' ('comparable to a postposition') is used in the sense of 'anstatt;
anstelle' ('instead of; in place of). The text-places adduced for this claim are
all reducible to the formula tasya sthdne. We have already encountered such a
usage in the Nirukta (Nir 12.7): nir ity esa sam ity etasya sthdne, 'the [preverb]
nih [occurs here] in the place of the [preverb] sam\ Indeed, this is normal
Sanskrit usage at all stages of the language in the sense of 'in the place of it',
and I see no reason why sthdne is to be considered a quasi-postposition. This
conclusion is supported by the observations made by Wezler concerning the
parallel instances where loke 'im Sinne von "an der richtigen, passenden
Stelle" verwendet ist - so wie es fiir das semantisch sehr nahestehende sthdne
in der Tat zu erschliefien ist' 8 (ibid.: 16), an interpretation which, notably, does
not work with loke in a genitive construction parallel to tasya sthdne. Wezler
admits that 'ein loke mit genitivischem Attribut = "an der/die Stelle, an die
[eigentlich] x paBt/gehort" jedoch erweckt zumindest starke Zweifel'9
(ibid.: 17). He concludes, however, that sthdne preceded by a genitive attribute
is equivalent to German '[an]statt, anstelle' in numerous text-places in the
Kalpasutras, and as such is to be conceived of as a quasi-postpositional expres-
sion of pre-classical Sanskrit.
Wezler (ibid.) transfers his interpretation of sthdne with a genitive attribute
to the Astddhydyl, and interprets A 1.1.49 sasthi sthdneyogd, a rule to be dis-
cussed in much detail further on, as 'eine Sechste [Kasusendung] (d.h. ein
Wort, das auf eine Genitivendung auslautet) ist [innerhalb der Astadhyayl] mit
sthdne ("anstatt, anstelle") zu konstruiren',10 claiming that Panini's usage pre-
supposes the usage of sthdne and that Panini resorts to ordinary Sanskrit usage.
8
. where loke 'is used in the sense of "at the right or fitting place" - as it is in fact to be inferred
9
for the semantically close sthane\
'A loke with a genitive attribute = "at the place at which x [actually] fits / belongs" evokes at
10
least strong doubts'
'A sixth [case ending] (l e , a word that ends in a genitive ending) is [within the AstahyayT] to
be constructed with sthdne ("instead of, in place of").'
Accordingly, not only rule A 1.1.49 but also the term sthanin has to be under-
stood against the linguistic usage of the time as demonstrated by the
Kalpasutras. But Wezler relies on his previous arguments and interpretations
for his final conclusion (ibid.: 19-20):
Denn wie aus sthanin-, 'am rechten Ort befindlich' - zusammen mit asthdnin-,
seiner Kontradiktion, und asthdna-, 'unrechter Ort' - ein sthdne, 'am rechten Ort'
zu erschlieBen ist, so darf man andererseits folgern, daB neben sthane, '[an]statt,
anstelle', auch ein sthanin-, 'was durch eine ihm eigentumliche Stelle [namlich eine
solche, an der es erwartet wird] charakterisiert ist', als allgemeine Bezeichnung fur
die verschiedenen speziellen Begriffe, die jeweils als genitivisclie Attribute zu
sthdne fungieren, bereits vor Panini existiert hat, daB also nicht erst Panini das in
den Ritual-texten nur im Sinne von 'am rechten Ort befindlich' belegte sthanin-
auch in dem technischen Sinne von 'urspriingliches, durch ein Substitut zu erset-
zendes Element' verwendet hat. Und wer die Zulassigkeit dieses Schlusses
verneinen sollte, muB immerhin zugeben, daB der dann zuerst von Panini im Sinne
von 'Substituendum' gebrauchte Terminus sthanin- nicht vorf dem sthdne,
'anstelle', der Kalpasutras getrennt werden kann.11
Indeed, I agree that it would be difficult to separate Panini';s usage of the
term sthanin from the usage of sthdne with a genitive as met with for example
in the Kalpasutras. But Wezler's aim is to take us to this contusion through
the stages of his derivation - sthanin > asthdnin > asthdna > sthdna > sthdne -
a derivation proceeding in a rather unexpected order. Rich as his article is in
observations, its interpretations and conclusions come across as unnecessarily
cumbersome. To me it seems perfectly sufficient that we resort to the ordinary
Sanskrit usage tasya sthdne interpreted simply as 'in the place of it' and
sthanin as 'place-holder' to make the terminology and practice of the substitu-
tion procedure of the Astddhydyi emerge as a completely naturaPproduct of the
J
linguistic usage of its time. *A
The Mesa
The substitute, the element which is to replace the sthanin, is termed the ddesa.
According to Thieme (1968), the term also refers to the substitution itself.12
11
'On the one hand one can make an inference from sthanin- "being in the proper place" -
together with its contradiction asthdnin-, and asthdna- "improper place" - to a sthdne "in the
proper place". One may on the other hand infer that together with sthdne "instead of; in place
of" also a sthanin- "that which is characterised by its own peculiar place [i.e,, a place at which
it is expected]" has existed, even before Panini, as a general designation for the particular
notions which act as genitive attributes to sthdne. That means that Panini Was not the first to
use sthanin- which in the ritual texts had only been used in the sense of "being in the proper
place", also in the technical sense of "original element which is to be replaced by a substitute".
Those who want to deny that this conclusion is permissible have at least to admit that the term
sthanin- which Panini uses in the sense of "substituend" cannot be separated from the sthdne
"instead of" of the Kalpasutras.'
12
G. Gren-Eklund (1984:118, note 53) suggests, in my view correctly, that Thieme's distinction
between 'Substitut' and 'Substitution' may be due to our own languages and logic.
Substitution 179
Indeed, Thieme argues that adesa had the sense of 'Substitut; Substitution'
already in the Brahmanas and oldest Upanisads (ibid.:262; my emphasis):
Nun ist adesa nicht nur als 'Anweisung, Vorschrift', sondern auch als wis-
senschaftlicher Terminus mit einer Spezialbedeutung bei den Grammatikern belegt.
Panini braucht adesa im Sinn von 'Substitution' (1.1.48, 7.2.86) und 'Substitut'
(l.i.56,8.3.59,6.4.120,8.2.5). Patanjali hat auch das Verb a+dis 'substituieren', 'als
Substitut lehren'. Es liegt nahe zu fragen, ob wir in der vedischen Prosa ebenfalls
mit einem adesa 'Substitution, Substitut' rechnen dtirfen. Wir hatten damit, was wir
suchen: die Benennung eines vom Lehrer gelehrten Verfahrens ('Substitution',
'Ersetzung') anstelle einer Bennung [sic] einer vom Lehrer gebrauchten
Lehrmethode ('Vorschrift'). Zu untersuchen ware, ob das in den (alteren) Upanisads
gelehrte Verfahren adaquat als 'Substitution', 'Ersetzung' benannt werden kann.
Wir selbst wiirden wohl 'Identifizierung' sagen. 'Substitution' meint jedoch im
Grund dasselbe, wenn auch in einer klein wenig anderen Beleuchtung. Wenn a-b
ist, heisst das ja, daB man im Prinzip b fur a und a fur b 'substituieren', a und b
gegenseitig 'ersetzen' kann. Vielleicht darf man sogar meinen, der Ausdruck
'Substitution' sei angemessener als 'Identifizierung'. Denn in den meisten Fallen
handelt es sich gar nicht um eine gegenseitige 'Austauschbarkeit' - also eine voll-
standige Identitat -, sondern nur darum, zu erkennen, daB fur den Wissenden a
durch b zu ersetzen ist, wenn man es in seinem Wesen, seiner Essenz richtig fassen
will, wahrend nichts damn liegt b durch a zu ersetzen.13
This passage is problematic. Although his reasoning is clearly circular,
there can be no doubt that Thieme takes 'Identifizierung' to mean 'identity'
since he introduces the equation mark. This is simply incorrect. Moreover,
'Identifizierung' ('identification') and 'Substitution' ('substitution') does not
'im Grund' ('in reality; really') mean the same thing. First of all, a and b are
not names but variables. Once they are replaced by names it is clear that they
are not so readily substitutionable even if they surround an equation mark.
Secondly, only singular terms can stand on each side of an equation mark. If
V and 'fc' are singular terms, 'a = V is true if and only if V and '&' have the
same extension, that is, are co-referential. For example, 'the Earth = the third
13
'For the grammarians adesa does not denote just "order, rule" but it is also a scientific term
with a special meaning. Panini uses adesa in the sense of "substitution" (1.1.48, 7.2.86) and
"substitute" (1.1.56, 8.3.59, 6.4.120, 8.2.5). Patanjali has also the verb a+dis "to substitute",
"to teach something as a substitute". This raises the question whether we can also expect an
adesa "substitution, substitute" in Vedic prose. If so, we would have found what we were
looking for: the naming of a procedure ("substitution", "replacement") which is taught by a
teacher instead of a teaching method (rule) which is used by a teacher. It is to be examined
,-. whether the procedure which is being taught in the (older) Upanisads can be adequately named
"substitution" or "replacement". We ourselves would probably say "identification''. In reality
"substitution" means the same thing although it shows the phenomenon in a slightly different
light. If a = b that means that in principle b can be "substituted" for a and a can be "substi-
tuted" for b, that is to say, a and b can be "replaced" mutually. Perhaps one can even say that
the expression "substitution" is more adequate than "identification". For in most cases there
is no mutual "replaceability" - that is to say, complete identity. What is important is to recog-
nise that for one who knows a is replaceable by b if one wants to understand it correctly in its
being or essence. It is not important to actually replace b by a.'
180 Indian semantic analysis,
planet from the Sun' is true. But this means that 'the Earth' and 'the third
planet from the Sun' refer to one and the same thing, which would make
identification easy but substitution very difficult except on a linguistic level.
You cannot substitute something with itself. Nor is it correct, as Thieme
himself recognises, to maintain that when a is identified as b then a can replace
b and vice versa in all contexts. In an extensional language any two predicates
which are true of the same objects are interchangeable salva veritate. Identity
is a relation which relates a thing to itself and not to any other thing. If we have
two classes which are to be filled it is a relation x=x or x=y. The statement 'x
=x' is necessarily true. However, if we turn to the question of substitutionality
we may get problems with the statement 'x=y\
Leibniz's law, the indiscernability of identicals, claims that if there is iden-
tity, then the objects have all predicates in common. That is to say, if there is a
true statement of identity, the two terms are substitutionable in any true state-
ment and the resulting statement will be true. This is not the case]. It resembles
identity, but it is not identity. There may be differences in the objects at a given
time in a given place. Thus contingent identity is different from necessary
identity. It is necessary that a given object is identical with itself, For example,
if we say: 'the Morning Star = the Evening Star', the object pointed out satis-
fies Leibniz's law. We cannot imagine that the one exists without the other. But
in the statement: 'the statue = the piece of bronze' there is a relation which is
not quite like the previous one, even if we call it a contingent identity.
That identity does not necessarily allow for linguistic substitution will be
clear from the following example. The statements 'Giorgione = Barbarelli' and
'Giorgione was so called because of his size' are both true, but replacement of
the name 'Giorgione' by the name 'Barbarelli' turns the second statement into
a falsehood: 'Barbarelli was so called because of his size'.14 Sitoilarly, if we
hold as true the statements: 'the'Morning Star=Venus', 'the Evening Star=
Venus', and 'the Morning Star=the Evening Star' it seems reasonable that we
can substitute 'Venus' and 'the Morning Star' in some contexts. E&ut if we intro-
duce second order predicates we get into trouble. Whereas it may be true to
say: 'John believes that the Morning Star is Venus', it may not necessarily be
true to say 'John believes the Evening Star is Venus'.
Now, what Thieme has in mind here is a particular type of identification or
bandhu 'tie; nexus' well known from the Brahmanas and Upanisads. Examples
are: samvatsaroyajhah, 'the sacrifice is the year' (SatBr 11.2.7.1); adityo 'gnih,
'the [sacrificial] fire is the sun' (SatBr 10.5.4.1); atmaivedam sarvam, 'this
entire universe is nothing but the Self (ChUp 7.25.1); akaso brahma,
'brahman is Space' (ChUp 3.18.1). The task of the Brahmanas, is to explain
ritual and its implements, including formulas, acts, and material substances,
by discovering their real nature and establishing their internal relations. To
account for these items, their purpose and meaning in ritual, these identifica-
14
Example from Qmne 1969:139.
Substitution 181
tions were made. Later Vedic literature found itself facing a fundamental ques-
tion: if the Veda is a body of injunctions, how can it be meaningful? First and
foremost this question pertained to the problem of meaning in ritual. How can
the Upanisadic statement that 'all this is brahman' be true when it is against a
lot of Vedic injunctions? The first aim of the Upanisads was accordingly to
give these ritual injunctions a meaning, and in doing so they employed the
familiar type of identifications within a metaphysical frame.
It seems clear to me that in thi? context the 'is' of these identifications lends
itself to the meaning 'stands for; represents' rather than '='. It may well be the
case that it was these very same identifications which laid the foundation for
the model of substitution as met with for example in the technical literature of
grammar. It is clear that they are referred to by the term ddesa (hence Thieme's
claim that ddesa means 'Substitution' as well as 'Substitut'?), but, as far as I
can see, there is no textual evidence which warrants the conclusion that ddesa
means 'substitute' or 'substitution' rather than 'specification; teaching;
instruction' or 'Anweisung; Vorschrift' in the Brahmanas and oldest
Upanisads. Indeed, some of the examples adduced by Thieme seem rather to
speak against his own case. The phrase athdta ddesah: neti neti (BAUp [M]
2.3.11 [K] 2.3.6) Thieme (ibid.:264) interprets as follows: 'Nunmehr seine (des
makrokosmischen und mikrokosmischen Seelenwesens: purusa) Ersetzung
(die seine mystische Wahrheit enthullt). Sie lautet immer wieder: "nicht'V15
This seems to me rather forced, and ddesa would make perfect sense as
'specification; teaching': 'now hence the teaching: neti neti". In other words, I
think Thieme's conclusion is wrong. This is supported also by the following
observation expressed by Wezler (1972:7):
Nachdem P. Thieme und - unabhangig von ihm - Y. Ikari16 gezeigt haben, daB
ddesa- m. auch in den Brahmanas und alteren Upanischaden die dem Paniniya aus
der Astadhyayi gelaufige Bedeutung 'Substitution, Substitut' hat, wtirde man
erwarten, bei Uberpriifung der Belege in den Kalpasutras zu dem gleichen Ergebnis
zu kommen, zumal in diesen Werken im Zusammenhang detaillierter Angaben iiber
den Vollzug bestimmter Opferhandlungen zahlreiche, und zwar konkrete
'Ersetzungen' gelehrt werden. Diese Erwartung wird freilich enttauscht.
Tatsachlich namlich scheint adesa- in den Kalpasutras, wie bereits L. Renou fest-
gestellt hat,17 nur im Sinne von a) 'Anzeige, Angabe' und von b) Anweisung,
Vorschrift' vorzukommen.18
15
'Now his (of the macrocosmic and microcosmic soul-being:16purusa) replacement (which dis-
17
closes his mystical truth). It is again and again: "not".' Y. ikari 1969.
18
Renou 1941/42:130.
'After P. Thieme and - independently of him - Y. Ikari have shown that ddesa- m. has the
meaning "substitution, substitute", which is known to the Paninlya from the Astadhyayi, also
in the Brahmanas and the older Upanisads, one would expect to reach the same result if one
were to check the references in the Kalpasutras because m these works concrete "replace-
ments" are taught in connection with detailed accounts of the execution of particular sacrifi-
cial acts. This expectation is not met. In fact ddesa- seems to appear in the Kalpasutras only
in the sense of (a) "declaration, information" and (b) "order, rule".'
It would be highly curious if ddesa were to mean 'substitute'"or 'substitu-

tion' in the Brahmanas and oldest Upanisads, but not have such a meaning in
the ritual Sutras which do operate with the notion of substitution in a techni-
cal sense. The surprising fact that we do not meet with this meaning in the
Kalpasutras once again warrants the conclusion that Thieme was wrong or at
least that he was reading too much into his textual evidence.
In fact, I believe that it is perfectly possible to go directly fromlthe meaning
and usage of the term ddesa in ritual texts to understand its use in the sense of
'substitute; substitution'. In ritual works ddesa means 'instruction; specifica-
tion'. It is a specific injunction, a special application, which overrules what is
already there, what is 'in place', sthdne. In other words, something automat-
ically applies (prdpnoti) unless there is some specific instruction, ddesa, to
overrule it. In practice this comes down to 'substitute', and the usage of the
term ddesa in grammar is accordingly nothing more than a special application
of its liturgical use. Let the following passage from the Baudhdyana
Srautasutra suffice to buttress this claim (BSS 24.8):
athdta ddesakdritdni vydkhydsydmo '19 'nddisto 'gmr ' api tu yathaitad bhavaty
adhidevane juhoti rathamukhe juhoti... gdrhapatye juhotity ' anddista ahavanlya
eva hotavyam ' anddisto 'dhvaryur ' api tu yathaitad bhavaty unnetd juhoti
pratiprasthdtd juhotity ' anddiste 'dhvaryunaiva hotavyam ' anddistam pdtram' api
tu yathaitad bhavaty ahjalind juhoti surpena juhoti krsndjinaputena . . . ayas-
mayena kamandalund juhotity ' anddiste srucaiva hotavyam ' anddista samid '
ddesdd eva samidham jdniydd' vijhdyate ndsamitke juhuydd yad asamitke juhuydd
yathdjihve 'nnam dadydt tddrk tat tasmdt samidvaty eva hotavyam ' anddista
upasamddhdyaiva hotavyam '// 8//
Next, therefore, we shall explain the operations of specific instruction (ddesa). The
[Ahavanlya] fire has not been specified. But it is the case that it is [specifically
stated] as follows [in Brahmana]: 'he sacrifices [ghee] on the gambling ground';20
'he sacrifices on [the fire above] the front of the chariot';... 'he sacrifices on the
Garhapatya fire'. [Yes, but] when there is no specific instruction {anddiste) [as to
what it is], the sacrifice must be made on the Ahavanlya fire only.
The Adhvaryu21 has not been specified. But it is the case that it is [stated] as
follows: 'the Unnetr22 sacrifices'; 'the Pratiprasthatr23 sacrifices'. [Yes, but] when
there is no specific instruction (anddiste), the sacrifice must be made by the
Adhvaryu priest only.
The sacrificial vessel has not been specified. But it is the case that it is [stated]
19
Caland, sensibly, has retained the sandhi of the manuscripts and only separated the sentences
by placing a little stroke above the line, cautiously adding (BSS, vol. l:xm) 'without being
20
sure, however, to have given always the right interpunction'. I retain his punctuation here.
SatBr 5.4.4.22. The subsequent instances should, at least in principle, be similarly traceable
quotations. I take the form of the passage to be a dialogue, a feature characteristic of early
Sastnc prose.
21
The Yajurveda priest (rtvij) in charge of all the manual actions of the sacrifice such as cooking
22
the oblations, offering the oblations into the fire, etc. *
23
One of the assistants of the Adhvaryu, in charge of extracting and pouring the Soma.
The primary assistant of the Adhvaryu. '
Substitution 183
as follows: 'he sacrifices by means of the cupped hands'; 'he sacrifices by means
of the Surpa (wickerwork basket for winnowing grain)'; 'he sacrifices by means of
the vessel of black antelope skin' . . . 'he sacrifices by means of the bronze water-
vessel'. [Yes, but] when there is no specific instruction (anddiste), the sacrifice must
be made by means of a Sruc24 ladle only.
The kindling has not been specified. One should understand the kindling from
the specific instruction (adesa) [to perform a sacrifice] itself. One should under-
stand that one cannot make a sacrifice on a fire which has not already received kin-
dling. To sacrifice on [a fire] without kindling is just like giving food to a person
without a tongue; therefore one must sacrifice only on [a fire] which has kindling.
When there is no specific instruction (anddiste), the sacrifice must be made only
after the kindling has been provided.
To sum up, unless there is a specific instruction, the default case is that one
sacrifices on the Ahavanlya fire; unless there is a specific instruction, the sac-
rifice must be made by the Adhvaryu priest; unless there is a specific instruc-
tion, the sacrifice must be made by means of a Sruc ladle; unless there is a
specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made only after the fire has received
kindling. Otherwise a specific instruction (adesa) would tell you to substitute
that for the general instruction.
The Baudhayana Srautasutra is generally considered the oldest among the
Srautasutras.25 The section from which the above passage stems, the karmdnta
section, is a set of paribhdsa-like instructions, that is to say, a section that con-
tains general rules of interpretation applicable to the science of ritual. The very
methodology employed in this section is a methodology which requires the
substitutional model. In fact, that the usage of adesa in the sense of 'substitute'
is no more than a special application of its liturgical use in the sense of 'spe-
cific instruction', is thus brought out by the general methodology employed in
the technical literatures of ritual and grammar, to which I shall now turn.
The method of description in the literatures of ritual and grammar

The notion of something automatically applying unless there is a specific
instruction to overrule it reflects the general methodological division in Sastra
between the general (samdnya) and the special (visesa). This division is crucial
to the method of description met with in the literatures of grammar and ritual
from Baudhayana onwards. To get a clear picture of how this methodology
works, let me first of all turn to a familiar relation, namely, the relation between
24
25
The generic name for the three sacrificial ladles, the juhii, the upabhrt, and the dhruvd
On this assumption W Caland (1903:11), following the general concensus of his time that
Apastamba belonged to the fifth or fourth century BCE, gave the sixth century BCE as termi-
nus post quern for Baudhayana. However, the dates of the Srautasutras are to be treated with a
lot of caution, as noted by J. Gonda (1977.476-7): 'Whereas some authors wisely confine
themselves to statements such as "the general period of the sutras extends from the sixth or
seventh century before Christ to about the second century", others, overlooking the necessity
to study the complex of this literature as a whole, could not resist the temptation to settle the
age of a definite work within narrow limits.'
map and territory. If we have a map - and I think it is justified to call the ritual
and linguistic descriptions of the ancient Indians a map - it will tell us a great
deal about those who made the map. Reminding ourselves that the map is not
the territory, we may then ask what features of the territory are represented on
the map. If the territory is absolutely uniform, nothing would be represented
on the map except the borders of the territory. Otherwise, what will be repre-
sented on a map is really differences of various kinds - differences in height,
vegetation, surface, population structures, etc.
Let the following passages from the ritual Sutras serve to illustrate how the
basic framework of this methodology works:
ASS 1.1.2—3: darsapurnamdsau tu purvarn vydkhydsydmas tantrasya tatrdmnd-
tatvdt, 'but we shall explain the new and full moon sacrifices first since the basic
model itantrd) has been handed down in that context'.
ASS 2.1.1: paurnamdsenestipasusomd upadistdh, '[the rules for] the isti26 animal,
and Soma sacrifices have been taught by [the rules for] the full moon sacrifice
[which has been described already]'.
AGS 1.7.1-2: atha khalilccdvacd janapadadharmd grdmadharmds ca tan vivdhe
pratiydtl yat tu samdnam tad vaksydmah, 'now, the rules of different regions and
towns are indeed varied, [and] those one must observe at the wedding; what is
common [to them], however, we shall [now] describe'.
SSS 1.16.1: vydkhydtau darsapurnamdsau prakrtir istipasubandhdndm, 'the new
and full moon sacrifices which have been explained are the prototype for the isti and
animal sacrifices'.
BhSS 5.17.1-3: punarddheyam vydkhydsydmah I tasydgnyddheyena kalpo
vydkhydtahl vikdrdn anukramisydmah, 'we shall [now] explain the renewal of the
sacrificial fires; its ritual procedure has been explained by the [ritual of] setting up
the sacrificial fires; we shall outline [only] the differences'.
BhSS 6.15.4—5: dmdvdsyam tantram bhavatil tatraiso 'tyantapradesahI sarvesv
istipasubandhesu ddrsapaurnamdsikd dharmd anuyanti, 'the new moon sacrifice
is the basic model; in this respect the general rule is this: in all istis and animal sac-
rifices, the rules follow those prescribed for the new and full moon sacrifices'.
BhSS 14.1.1-3: madhyamdinam savanam vydkhydsydmah I tasya pratahsavanena
kalpo vydkhydtahl vikdrdn anukramisydmah, 'we shall [now] explain the midday
pressing [of Soma]; its ritual procedure has been explained by the morning press-
ing; we shall outline [only] the differences'.
Thus, the methodology employed revolves around such concepts as prakrti
'prototype' and vikrti 'modification'. This is also referred to in terms of an
image from the art of weaving as tantra 'warp' and dvdpa 'wqof denoting
respectively the basic model which is the constant part of a ritual and the
26
An isti is a type of Srauta sacrifice which requires vegetable offerings in contrast to the bloody
animal sacrifices.
Substitution 185
special features which differ from one ritual to another. The pattern is clear:
the general situation or the shared features are described first, and the mod-
ifications or changes or differences are later introduced as specific instruc-
tions, adesas. Indeed, this is a procedure which is commonly resorted to in any
science.
Turning to Panini and his grammar, we shall first of all have to ask a funda-
mental question: what language did he make a map of? The answer to this
question is well known, but absolutely essential. At one and the same time he
deals with all linguistic facts known to him as Sanskrit. These linguistic facts
were, on the basis of stylistics, divided into two main areas: chandas, the lan-
guage met with in the corpus of Vedic texts, and bhdsa, the standard colloquial
Sanskrit of his time and clearly a spoken language. The rules of the AstddhydyT
apply simultaneously to both these domains in as much as the rules applicable
only to the Vedic domain are stated by explicitly mentioning the Vedic domain
as a particular domain within the total domain, the totality of linguistic facts.27
Moreover, differences within this total domain are accounted for in various
ways, notably, regional, social, and pragmatic usages - for instance, there are
rules which specify which forms to use when contempt is to be expressed.
Panini also refers to easterners and northerners, probably to account for dialec-
tal usages. By way of example, rule A 6.3.32 mdtarapitardv udicdm teaches
that according to the northerners mdtarapitarau is a valid form (as against
mdtdpitarau), and A 8.2.83 pratyabhivdde 'sudre teaches that in returning a
greeting, but not to a Sudra, the last vowel of a sentence becomes pluta and
gets the acute accent. Variation is also accounted for by rules stating options.
It was thus quite natural for Panini in his description of language to adopt
the same methodology that we meet with in the ritual Sutras. One starts out
with what is common to all domains of language and gives a description by
means of rules which apply to it entirely. Differences of various kinds are then
accounted for by rules giving exceptions or options. Accordingly, Panini for-
mulated general rules (utsarga) to account for features shared by all domains,
and exceptional rules (apavdda) to account for deviating features pertaining
only to a particular domain. This is what gives us patterns such as: generally
item X occurs, but in chandas item Y (or: item X or Y); generally form X
occurs, but to express contempt one may use form Y; preferably form X occurs,
marginally form Y may be used instead; generally the suffix X is added but
27
As noted already (p. 32 above), Yaska seems to treat chandas and bhdsa m much the same
manner (Nir 2.2): athapi bhdsikebhyo dhdtubhyo naigamdh krto bhdsyantel damundh
ksetrasddhd ml athapi naigamebhyo bhdsikdhl usnaml ghrtam iti, 'moreover, Vedic prima
nouns are analysed on the basis of verbal roots belonging to classical Sanskrit, such as
damundh, ksetrasddhdh, but also classical [primary nouns] on the basis of Vedic [roots], such
as usnam, ghrtam\ But although chandas and bhdsa were not conceived of as different stages
of language ordered in time, it is still clear that they were considered different linguistic
domains. So, for example, the fifth-century grammarian Bhartrhan in his MahdbhdsyadTpikd
(MbhD 288,17-18). asya tu chdndasatvdd bhdsdydmprayogo duhsampddah, 'but because th
is a chandas form, it is difficult to use it in bhdsd\
186 Indian semantic analysis '
under certain circumstances suffix Y occurs instead. The picture is that of a

linguistic universe where different elements in given contexts or at given points
in the process of derivation may become manifest or actualised at some loca-
tion in grammatical space. And the idea of where something is and where
something could be also leads naturally to the notion of substitution.
Returning to the image of map and territory, I may quote M, Deshpande
(1985:124; emphasis in the original):
Theoretically speaking, Panini's conception of Sanskrit is that of a panchronistic
flatland. It is neither purely diachronic nor purely synchronic. It includes all known
diachronic and synchronic facts of Sanskrit.
From the point of view of comparative linguistics this might be considered
an apt description, but it is nevertheless imposing one important notion onto
Panini's model, namely the notion of time. Panini's description of Sanskrit
comprises all linguistic facts known to him but nowhere does he.say anything
like 'earlier one said X, but today one says Y' or anything that cpuld be inter-
preted in that direction. In other words, his flatland is not panchronic to him.
Panini's model has nothing to do with chronos at all. This also means that
nothing like language development or linguistic change through time is
accounted for. The language he describes is timeless, later to be .termed nitya
'eternal' or siddha 'established'.
In the tradition of Indian grammatical thought we meet with a fundamental
debate on the nature of grammar and hence on the nature of words or speech
elements. One view holds that they are eternally established, constant {nitya),
while according to the alternative view they are produced (kdrya), as if pro-
cessed by grammar. The discussion comes up at several places in the
Mahdbhdsya. It is first met with in the Paspasdhnika in the context of
Pataiijali's remarks on Rgveda 4.58.3 (Mbh 1:3,15-16):
catvdn srngd trayo 'sya pddd dve sirse sapta hastdso asya I
tndhd baddho vrsabho roravlti maho devo martydm a vivesa II
Four horns, three feet are his, two heads, seven hands are his.
Bound in three ways the bull roars repeatedly: a great god has entered mortals.
As one might expect, the verse in question has been subject to widely dif-
fering interpretations which need not concern us here. The hymn itself praises
the sacrificial ghee, which is first identified with Soma which has the form of
a bull. According to Patarijali, the great god is sabda, Speech, the four horns
are the four classes of words (nouns, verbs, preverbs, and particles), the three
feet are the three tenses, etc. What is of immediate interest here, however, is
that the two heads are seen as the two aspects of the nature of words or speech
units: eternal (nitya) and produced (kdrya). It is the nitya view which gets the
attention in Vyakarana, the kdrya view is to my knowledge never really devel-
oped at all.
When it comes to the model of substitution, the Sanskrit grammarians who
Substitution 187
believed in the doctrine of nityatva were forced to adopt a model of substitu-

tion where substitutes are considered substitutes of whole words. This is first
stated in a verse quoted in the Mahdbhdsya (Mbh 1:75,13-14):
sarve sarvapadddesd ddksiputrasya pdninehl
ekadesavikdre hi mtyatvam nopapadyate II
All [the substitutes taught] by Panini,28 the son of Daksl, are substitutes of whole
words. For eternality {nityatva) is incongruent with change in a part.
Of course, the Sanskrit language, like all languages, developed and changed
through time. The interesting question is whether the Indian grammarians were
aware of such changes and, if they were, how they dealt with the phenomenon.
Indeed, how is it possible to account for what we would call historical change
within a non-historical model? It is clear that the grammarians after Panini
were aware of differences and variations within different domains of Sanskrit
usage, but they never adopted any idea of historical change. The question has
been elegantly answered by Deshpande (1985), and I shall not go into details
here. Briefly, the idea is that the Vedas are eternal and infinite, and that we con-
sequently do not know everything that is in them. This makes it possible to
claim that new forms or new linguistic usages do not exist. Patanjali does
indeed encourage the inclusion of previously unattested forms. Since the lan-
guage is eternal, such usage can only be rediscovered old usage. This princi-
ple was adopted also in other Sastras, such as Dharmasastra. A good example
is the practice of burning a sati or virtuous widow, a practice which is nowhere
prescribed or even mentioned in authoritative literature. But since the practice
exists, it must have been dealt with in a lost or inaccessible part of the Veda.
With respect to grammar, the situation has been described by Deshpande
(1985:137):
From the theoretical point of view of this eternal Sanskrit, no new facts of language
can come to light because there can be no new facts. Only previously unknown facts
can become newly known. Thus, the theory of eternality of Sanskrit separates the
existence of language from its attestation in history.
The question is then who has the power to determine a newly discovered fact
as correct usage. This is the cultural elite known as the Sistas, the model speak-
ers of Sanskrit. In the words of Deshpande (1985:143—4):
Each new generation of these linguistic elites may provide previously unknown
facts about this eternal language. Thus the grammar of this eternal language is in
theory, quite paradoxically, not eternal. It has to be a continually changing entity ...
It is a living organism which, in theory as well as in practice to some extent, con-
tinues to grow with the language and ever remains aware of and inclusive of newly
discovered facts about this language.
28
The genitive form pdnineh could also indicate that it is Panini's point of view that is stated
here* 'In the opinion of Panini, the son of DaksT, all [substitutes] are substitutes of whole
words.'
The Indian grammarians' model of language, then, is a map of where some-

thing is and where something could be. The task of grammar isto structure the
linguistic material and suppress the occurrence of incorrect forms. Regional or
other usages, which were accepted as correct, would not appear as more than
acceptable substitutes which occur in the place of other forms under given cir-
cumstances.29 At the level of grammatical operations the substitution pro-
cedure implies that in the process of a given derivation, a linguistic item X is
replaced by another item Y in some specific context. Such an operation
accounts for the fact that X does not occur in its possible domain of applicabil-
ity, Y occurring there instead.
One more feature of the substitutional model requires mention. In the
AstddhydyT, rule A 1.1.56 sthdnivad ddeso 'nalvidhau lays down the important
principle, known as the sthdnivadbhdva principle, that the substitute is treated
like the substituend except in a rule teaching an operation that depends on
sounds.30 The same principle applies in the ritual Sutras, as stated in the
Bhdradvdja Srautasutra (BhSS 6.15.7):
tad yatra prdkrtasya yajndngasya sthdne vaikrtam dmanet tat tasya dharmdn
labhetl yathd saramayam barhir barhisah sydmdkd vnhTndm sthdlT kapdlasya
caruh puroddsasyeti II
When someone teaches a modification to occur in the place of a sacrificial requi-
site pertaining to the prototype, it takes on the characteristics of the latter. For
example, grass of the sara type that of barhis, sydmdka grains that of paddy, a vessel
that of potsherds, and boiled rice that of a cake.
Similarly, the Apastamba Srautasutra clarifies the situation arising when
some sacrificial substance is lacking in full or in part (ApSS 24.3.52-4):
sistdbhdve sdmdnydt pratimdhihl taddharmd ca sydtl mdtrdpacdre tacchesena
samdpnuydtl
29
P Kiparsky (1979) argues that the three different words used by Panim to indicate optionality,
vd, vibhdsd and anyatarasydm, did m fact serve to distinguish between preferred usage, mar-
ginally acceptable usage and equally acceptable options respectively The^ later grammarians
treat them all as synonyms indicating mere optionality If Kiparsky is right, this requires an
explanation If the grammarians have to account for the total, timeless domain of eternal
Sanskrit, it is clear that they could no longer easily view options as graded possibilities.
Grammar has to account for all correct usage pertaining to this eternal language A form is
thus either valid or not - it cannot be more or less valid It seems to me very unlikely that
Pamnlyas after Pamni did not notice, for example, that vd 'or' could be interpreted differently
from vibhdsd which Pamni defines ( A l l 44) as 'na vd' On the one hand, if the na here is
taken to negate vd, one would simply have to accept that something negated is different from
itself unless it is zero, as for example a feature of height in a complete flatland. On the other
hand, it is perfectly possible that it means 'or not' rather than 'not or', in which case matters
would no longer be so straightforward However, the possibility remains that the Pamnlyas
after Pamni let the idea of nityatva weigh so heavily that they preferred to disregard any dis-
tinction between the three terms If, again, Kiparsky is right, this would also indicate that the
doctrine of nityatva was not firmly rooted in the grammatical climate of Pamni
30
The rule and Patanjah's remarks on it have been studied in detail by S D Joshi and J A F
Roodbergen 1985 and 1990
Substitution 189
When the prescribed [sacrificial requisite] is lacking, a substitute (pratmidhi) [must

be used] on the basis of similarity. And [this substitute] would possess the character-
istics of that [which it replaces]. If there is partial lack [of the sacrificial requisite],
one should finish [the ritual] by means of what is left of it.
So the sthdnivadbhdva principle applies also in the ritual domain, either to
the substitute which has become necessary because of the method of descrip-
tion, that is to say, when the prototype specifies some sacrificial implement
which is to be replaced by another in the modification sacrifice, or it applies
because a certain substance prescribed for a certain ritual is not available and
another substance has to be used in its place. Ritual implements can be
replaced by other implements, and again we are not talking about identity
between them but about semantic equivalence.
The sthdnasasthi: Panini's rule A 1.1.49 and its indigenous inter-

pretations
It is the genitive case ending which marks the specific relation of 'being in the
place of. As mentioned already, the grammarians refer to this genitive as the
sthdnasasthi. By way of example, rule A 2.4.52 aster bhuh [drdhadhdtuke A
2.4.35] teaches that bhu replaces as in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes.31
This could be written: asteh sthdne bhuh, 'bhu [occurs] in the place of as [in
the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes]'.
We have seen that the expression tasya sthdne 'm the place of it' is normal
Sanskrit usage, and the use of the genitive to indicate a substituend in the
AstddhydyTis accordingly nothing more than employing established linguistic
usage for a technical purpose. In the Astddhydyi the, sthdnasasthi is defined by
rule A 1.1.49 sasthi sthdneyogd, and an inquiry into the notion of grammatical
I substitution and the use of the genitive case to indicate it would thus reason-
\ ably begin with an investigation of this rule and its indigenous interpretations.
But in the same way as the investigation of the relation sustained between a
term and its corresponding explanatory expression in the Nirukta had to
proceed through nirvacanas formulated in a highly technical manner since
they alone could be expected to yield sufficiently systematic information, an
investigation into the sthdnasasthi and the relation sustained between the terms
involved in a substitution operation has to begin by investigating the rule which
teaches the technicalities of substitution. Accordingly, only an investigation of
A 1.1.49 and the literature pertaining to it can in the first instance be trusted to
^provide us with reliable constants in the investigation of the sthdnasasthi and
the model of substitution.
An investigation of Panini's notion of substitution through internal analysis
31
A 3 4 113 tinsit sdrvadhdtukam assigns the name sdrvadhdtuka to the finite verbal suffixes
(tiN) and those marked with an anubandha, diacritic marker, S A 3 4 114 drdhadhdtukam
sesah then assigns the name drdhadhdtuka to the rest, that is, to all other suffixes added to a
verbal root
of the AstddhydyT alone is hardly likely to be very fruitful, and it is not only
Panini's model of substitution ^hich is of interest here. As iriiportant for the
present study is the way the subsequent Paninlya tradition conceived of it.
Accordingly, I shall take as my basic text the Mahdbhdsya discussion of A
1.1.49, together with its commentaries. This provides the mostjsubstantial dis-
cussion not only of the rule itself but also of more wide-ranging issues per-
taining to the notion of substitution in general.
Patanjali's remarks on A 1.1.49 have been summarised briefly by Ojihara
and Renou (1962), although these authors are primarily concerned with the
Kdsikdvrtti of Jayaditya and Vamana and with its commentaries, Haradatta's
PadamanjarT and Jinendrabuddhi's Nydsa. P.-S. Filliozat (1976) has done a
French translation of the Mahdbhdsya on A 1.1.49, together with Kaiyata's
PradTpa and its subcommentary, the Uddyota, by Nagesabliatta. Filliozat's
work is part of a large project aiming at a complete translation of Patanjali's
work with the two commentaries, and as such is not too much concerned with
details pertaining to the issues I wish to discuss. The present study requires a
detailed study of Patanjali's remarks on A 1.1.49 together with a thorough dis-
cussion of issues raised in the commentaries and other relevant Paninlya liter-
ature. Only by considering in detail the issues raised therein, the arguments
advanced and the implications they entail, can we hope to get the full picture
of the Paninlya model of substitution, and to find out whether Paninlyas differ
among themselves and, eventually, why they prefer one possible solution to
another. Only by such a procedure would it be possible to understand the full
import of the simple phrase 'X in the place of Y' in the Paninlya context, to <
determine what this 'place' is and the relationship between the three terms,
involved in a substitution operation. And only by thoroughly investigating s
these questions would it be possible to find out whether the notion of grammat-
ical substitution is compatible with the semantics of nirvacan'a analysis as laid >
down by Yaska and employed in the discourse of subsequent Sanskrit litera-;
ture.
Survey of Patanjali's remarks on rule A 1.1.49

The series of arguments advanced by Patafijali in his remarks on rule 1.1.49,
frequently involve other rules and examples which require explanation.]
Moreover, in what follows I shall consider several issues at length in the light;
of what the commentators have to say. To some extent this makes the presenta-^
tion wind back upon itself, and a brief survey of Patanjali's discussion may!
{
therefore be useful. * \
As noted already, a genitive case suffix is defined in rule A 1.1.49 by the
expression sthdneyogd. Patanjali's first task is to question this expression, the|
mere form of which creates problems. He justifies its interpretation as a com-^
pound, more precisely as a bahuvnhi compound whose members are not in|
syntactic agreement. The irregular occurrence of the locative case suffix,
Substitution 191
which may even be considered short for the instrumental case suffix, is
accounted for on the grounds that we are dealing with a ready-made form, a
nipdtana. Under this interpretation rule 1.1.49 states that a genitive case suffix
marks a relation (yoga) which is in some way defined by the sthdna, a term to
which the tradition has attributed different senses.
The next issue in Patanjali's discussion is the purpose served in formulat-
ing the rule. In his first vdrttika Katyayana suggests that the rule is stated in
order to restrict the number of possible interpretations of a genitive case suffix.
According to Patanjali, a hundred meanings may be expressed by means of a
genitive case suffix, and all of these would apply when a genitive case suffix
is pronounced. Hence, a restriction is to be made that in the science of grammar
> one should consider a genitive case suffix to be a sthdnasasthi and nothing
else. The second vdrttika rejects this idea, arguing that if every genitive were
to be interpreted as a sthdnasasthi, then other usages of the genitive, such as
the avayavasasthT, the genitive which marks a part, would no longer be
[ accounted for. As examples are adduced the genitive forms sdsah and gohah
of A 6.4.34 sdsa id anhaloh and A 6.4.89 ud upadhdyd gohah. Only when
; these forms are interpreted as partitive genitives do the rules mentioned take
\ effect properly.
The third vdrttika tries to meet the objection raised by the second in claim-
ling that the restriction would apply only when there is doubt about the relation
învolved and that there is no doubt in the case of genitives such as the parti-
jtive. Patanjali declares that even this need not be stated, and illustrates the
^situation with an example from everyday life. When someone asks the way
[from one place to another, only that information is given to him that would
remove doubt. Similarly, in grammar, a restriction applies only when there is
idoubt. At this point in his discussion Patanjali mentions two other interpreta-
tions of the expression sthdneyogd, namely sthdne 'yoga and sthdne yogavatl
Sender the first alternative a genitive case suffix would be identified as a
sthdnasasthi when no particular relation is specified by context. Under the
i second alternative a genitive case suffix would be identified as a sthdnasasthi
pWhen there is a possibility that it denotes a variety of relations.
?
Leaving these proposals aside with no further remarks, Patanjali then turns
: to the fourth vdrttika which suggests that it is rather a specially distinguished
Igenitive case suffix which is defined as sthdneyogd. That is, the problem of
•Identifying a sthdnasasthias such could be solved by adding to it some partic-
ular mark by which it would be easily recognised. Such a procedure would
|iowever create other problems. Patanjali quotes A 6.4.34 sdsa id anhaloh and
| a 6.4.35 sd hau to illustrate the difficulties entailed by such a marking device.
Jlp rule 6.4.34 the item sdsah is understood to exhibit a partitive genitive. Now,
the same item sdsah is considered to recur in the subsequent rule 6.4.35 sd hau
Jwhere it no longer exhibits a partitive genitive. Instead the required results can
pe obtained only if the genitive is interpreted as a sthdnasasthi. But in rule
"6,4.35 the item sdsah is merely understood, it is not mentioned. Its only
mention is in rule 6.4.34 where it exhibits a partitive genitive. So, Patanjali

objects, the recurrence of the item sdsah in rule 6.4.35 gives us a mere under-
standing of the word form sdsah, and to mere understanding a mark cannot be
added. To get around this difficulty he suggests that the mark be added to the
ddesa, the substitute, instead.
Challenging the whole claim that rule 1.1.49 states a restriction, Patanjali at
this point shifts the argument to cases where one single genitive case suffix
serves to mark several different relations. This, of course, creates problems. As
a possible way out Patanjali proposes that if no restriction is made at all, a gen-
itive case suffix may mark various relations according to context. In that case,
however, an earlier problem arises at one remove, namely that there are a
hundred meanings expressed by a genitive case ending, and all of these would
apply when a genitive is pronounced. This, says Patanjali, i!s no problem. We
are dealing here not with relations in general, only with those that could pos-
sibly obtain between one linguistic item and another. But even then, he has to
admit, such relations as adjacency, dnantarya, and nearness, sdnupya, may
obtain in addition to the one denoted by the sthdnasasthT. Doubt will thus arise
anyway. Condemning this as 'mere doubt', Patanjali invokes a paribhdsd,
general principle of interpretation, which states that in all cases of doubt, one
particular conclusion should be ascertained by reasoned explanation. By force
of this paribhdsd Patanjali concludes that when interpreting a genitive case we
should supply the locative word form sthdne.
But if this is the core of the matter, then why should rule 1.1.49 be stated?
It needs to be stated, Patanjali claims, in order to ensure that whatever ends in
a genitive case suffix, specifically any form after which the suffix is actually
pronounced, should be linked with the sthdna. Interpreted in this way, says
Patanjali, rule 1.1.49 serves to provide another paribhdsd according to which
substitutes occur in the place of what has been expressly enunciated.
Various conclusions may be drawn from Patanjali's remarks on rule 1.1.49,
but no purpose would be served in considering these before tatanjali's discus-
sion has been examined in more detail.
The expression 'sthaneyoga'"

Patanjali begins his discussion of rule 1.1.49 with an explanation of the expres-
sion sthdneyogd, the mere form of which raises certain difficulties. Judging
from the feminine suffix -a it would have to be a compound, qualifying sasthl
But the locative case ending of the element sthdne would generally preclude
an interpretation as a compound. Patanjali proposes tîe following analysis of
the expression (Mbh 1:118,6-7):
kirn idatn sthdneyogeti I sthdne yogo 'sydh seyam sthdneyogd I saptamyalopo nipa-
tandtll trtiydyd vaitvaml sthdnena yogo 'sydh seyam sthdneyogd II
What is this 'sthdneyogd' ? [As a bahuvnhi compound qualifying sasthi it can be
analysed as:] that of which there is a relation (yoga-) in the sthdna (sthdne), that is
Substitution 193
sthdneyogd. Since this is a legitimate form (nipdtana), there is no elision of the loca-
tive case suffix. Or there is e instead of the instrumental case suffix (-end), that of
which there is a relation with the sthdna (sthdnena) is sthdneyogd.
Patanjali interprets sthdneyogd as a bahuvnhi compound which qualifies
sasthT, and accounts for the non-elision of the locative case suffix on the
grounds that we are dealing with a legitimate form, a nipdtana, a specially
listed, ready-made form.32 A 2.2.24 anekam anyapaddrthe accounts for the
bahuvnhi compounding of more than one word in order to denote something
different, that is, different from what is directly referred to by any of the indi-
vidual words which appear in the compound. In the present instance the com-
pound qualifies the sasthT, the sixth case suffix. Now, a compound is
considered a nominal stem according to A 1.2.46 krttaddhitasamdsds ca which
teaches that also a derived linguistic unit which ends in a krt or a taddhita
suffix or is a compound is called a nominal stem, prdtipadika.33 According to
A 2.4.71 supo dhdtuprdtipadikayoh, which teaches elision by the element luk34
of a case suffix that occurs in a root or in a nominal stem, the locative case
ending should be elided in the compound sthdneyogd.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. A 6.3.1 alug uttarapade states
that in the forms listed in the subsequent rules there is no elision by luk of a
case suffix before the last member of a compound. A 6.3.9 haladantdt sap-
tamydh samjndydm, for example, teaches that a locative case ending is not
elided before the last member of a compound when the prior member is a stem
ending in a consonant or in a, provided the whole compound is a name. Rules
A 6,3.10-20 teach similar specific conditions for the construction of an aluk-
samdsa where, in particular words, the locative case suffix is retained. There
does not seem to be any specific rule to prevent elision of the locative case
suffix in a compound such as sthdneyogd. So Patanjali relies on Panini's
authority and states that there is non-elision of the locative case suffix 'since
this is a legitimate form', nipdtandt.
As for the alternative interpretation, sthdnena yogo 'sydh seyam sthdne-
yogd, which introduces the instrumental case suffix instead of the locative with
the statement that the item -e has replaced -ena, the same nipdtana argument
would hold.35 The reason for introducing an alternative analysis which involves
32
33
See Renou 1955.
The previous rule, A 1 2 45 arthavad adhdtur apratyayah prdtipadikam, states that a nomina
stem, prdtipadika, is a meaningful linguistic unit which is neither a verbal root, nor a suffix,
nor a form which ends m a suffix However, we are not really dealing with a proper nominal
34
stem here because of the feminine
By A 11 60 adarsanam lopah, elision (lopa, lit 'loss') is defined as 'non-seemg' A 11 61
pratyayasya lukslulupah then lists luk, slu and lup as three specific names of elision which
35
apply only to the non-seemg of suffixes.
Or rather, there is elision of the third case suffix, but the -a of the stem is replaced by -e as it
is before the dative and ablative plural ending -bhyah according to A 7,3 103 bahuvacane jhaly
et which teaches that e replaces the final a of a stem before a plural ending beginning with a
consonant. Clearly this rule is not applicable here, and hence, it is argued, we are dealing with
a nipdtana
the instrumental case may quite simply be that the word yoga is equated with
sambandha 'relation', and that these terms are normally construed with the
instrumental case so that the meaning of the compound sthdneyogd could be
expressed as: 'that of which there is a relation with the sthdna\ On this view
the sthdna itself is one of the two terms of the relation. But thp instrumental
case could also imply that a relation obtains which is caused by tfiie sthdna. The
locative, on the other hand, could express that the relation is 'in the sthdna\ in
the sense that one term is related to another term with the sthdna as a neces-
sary condition for the relation. Thus the alternatives have quite different
implications for the interpretation of the relation involved. *
It seems to me likely that the locative word form sthdne is retained on the
basis of this form's use in ordinary language, while the instrumental would
more properly account for the needs of the present context. As we have seen,
the expression tasya sthdne 'in the place of it', where the locative form sthdne
is construed with a genitive form, is normal Sanskrit usage.
P.-S. Filhozat (1976:364) translates sthdneyogd as 'qui exprime une relation
par 1'occurrence'36 regardless of whether it is the locative or the instrumental
case which is involved, claiming that 'dans les deux cas le sens de compose est
le meme, la troisieme et la septieme desinence pouvant avoir le sens de
cause'.37 It is certainly true that in Sanskrit both the instrumental and the loca-
tive can express the sense of cause, but one may ask why Patanjali should
bother to introduce an alternative explanation if it did not add any new dimen-
sion at all. By the expression 'par 1'occurrence' Filliozat has interpreted the
word sthdna as prasanga 'possible appearance; chance' or 'occurrence'.
According to the grammatical tradition this is a fully legitimate interpretation,
although it is not the only one possible. A detailed examination of the complex-
ities pertaining to the interpretation of the relation in question and the tradi-
tionally accepted meanings of the word sthdna will be carried but below.
Concerning the interpretation of the compound sthdneyogd itself, a look at
the commentaries is illuminating. Kaiyata remarks as follows (MbhP I:408a):
kim idam itil samdse vibhaktisravandprasangahI asamdse 'pi 'yuktih' itiprdpnoh,
na tu yogeti prasnahll
'What is this [sthdneyogaP* The issue is this, if [sthdneyogd is] acompound, then
the hearing of a case suffix should not take place38 But if it is not a compound, [the
form] 'yuktih'' would occur [in the feminine] and not 'yogd\
I take this to mean that the form yoga is acceptable when it appears as the
final member of a compound, but when there isâo^compound, yuktih would
be the acceptable feminine form. The stem yoga- is formed by addition of the
36
37
'Which expresses a relation by occurrence '
In both instances the meaning of the compound is the same, in as much as*both the third and
38
the seventh case endings can have the sense of cause'
That is, there should be elision of the locative case suffix according to A 2 4 71 supo dhd-
tupratipadikayoh
Substitution 195
suffix GHaN {-a with initial accent and guna or vrddhi). This suffix is added
to a verbal root to express bhdva 'being; mere activity' in the form of an action
noun according to A 3.3.18 bhdve or to express a kdraka other than the agent
in lexicahsed derivatives39 according to A 3.3.19 akartan ca kdrake
samjhdydm. The corresponding feminine would be formed according to A
3.3.94 striydm ktin which introduces the feminine suffix KtiN (-ti with initial
accent and weak grade) for any root in the senses taught by rules 3.3.18 and
3.3.19. The resulting stem would thus be yukti,40 Nagesa accordingly remarks
on Kaiyata's statement (MbhU I:408a): yuktir in I sasthiti stnlingavisesanat-
vdd iti bhdvah, '"yuktih [would apply]": since it qualifies the feminine gender
of [the word] sasthT; that is the idea'.
And Bhartrhari, in the same context, remarks as follows m his DTpikd
(MbhD 288,10-12):
kim idam sthaneyogeft / samdsdsamdsayor yugapadasambhavdt saptamisravandd
asamdso 'yarn41 sydtl yoge 'pi42 tdpa updddndt samdsah sydtl itarathd hi yuktir iti
prdpnotity aha kim idam sthaneyogefr /
'What is this sthdneyogd"?' Because it is impossible for something to be a compound
and a non-compound at the same time, this would be a non-compound since we hear
the locative case ending. But from the use of the feminine suffix TdP m the word
yoga-, [that is, in yoga,] it would be a compound. For otherwise the word yuktih
would apply [as the correct feminine form]. So he says: 'what is this sthdneyogdr
Later in the same passage (MbhD 288,15 f.) Bhartrhari comments on
Patanjah's alternative analysis by means of the instrumental case. He seems
to refer, through the word dcche, to Panmi's rule A 7.1.39 supdm
sulukpurvasavarndccheyddddydydjdlah which accounts for various case
endings in Vedic (chandas), thinking the -e (se) mentioned in this rule to be
the one which has replaced -ena. Provided I have understood his reference cor-
rectly, this seems rather awkward. Bhartrhari himself realises the difficulty of
such a formation since the rule is taught for Vedic language.43
Nagesa too remarks on the nipdtana issue and the instrumental case alter-
native (MbhU 1:408), but I do not consider it worthwhile to enter into details
here. In brief, he states that in a compound with a word ending m the instru-
mental case there is e for a when a third triplet ending, that is, an instrumental
39
That is, words whose meanings are not transparent from the application of grammar alone but
ascertained through the lexicon of the Sanskrit language On the sense of samjfid, see G B
Palsule 1966
40
The derivation of a feminine form from rules A 3 3 18 and A 3 3 19 is blocked by A 3 3 94,
see Vaidyanatha's Chdyd (Bhargavasastrl JosT 1951 408, note 4) tathd cdkartanti prdpta-
ghafiah striydm ktind bddha iti bhdvah, 'and thus, by the rule striydm ktin, there is blockin
41
of GHaN which would apply according to the rule akartan etc , that is the idea'
42
So read with Palsule and Bhagavat (1991 18) and MbhDms fol 200b for MbhD asamdso sydt
MbhDms fol 200b clearly reads pi but adds what seems to be a superfluous va, Palsule and
43
Bhagavat (ibid) read iti ca
MbhD 288,17-18 asya tu chdndasatvdd bhdsdydm prayogo duhsampddah, 'but because th
is a chandas form, it is difficult to use it in bhdsd'
case ending, is elided by luk. This is recognised as a nipdtana rather than

taught as a substitution 'in the place of the third' because the -ina substitute
would occur first, because there is no authority for blocking it as an antaranga
operation,44 because there is no authority for blocking the elision by Ink, and
also because vrddhi would occur.45 Nagesa makes it clear that if the substitu-
tion in question were of the case suffix, then Patanjali should have said i-tvam
instead of e-tvam. So Nagesa tells us how he thinks this nipdtana works and
why Patanjali calls it e-tvam rather than i-tvam, and explains why the e itself
is the nipdtana.
But just like the other commentators, Nagesa does not give us a clue as to
why an interpretation of the compound involving the instrumental case is
brought up at all. Some commentators give only the trttydvigraha, the analy-
sis by means of the instrumental case; thus, notably, two prominent commen-
tators on the Siddhdntakaumudi, Bhattoji Diksita46 in his autocommentary
Praudhamanoramd,41 and Jnanendrasarasvatl48 in his TattvabodhinT.49 The
evidence available makes me stick to my previous suggestion: an analysis by
the instrumental is quite simply prompted by the fact that one would expect the
word yoga, which is considered equivalent to sambandha 'relation' by the
commentators, to be used with an instrumental sthdnena in the present
context.50 i
Commentators thus follow Patanjali in regarding the expression sthdneyogd
as a compound. The retention of the locative case suffix precludes an inter-
pretation of it as a samdnddhikaranabahuvnhi, a bahuvrihi compound whose
members are in syntactic agreement. If it were such a compound, rule 1.1.49
would teach that a sixth triplet ending, that is, a genitive case ending, is used
when the relation is the sthdna. Rather, the compound has to be interpreted as
a vyadhikaranabahuvnhi, a bahuvrihi whose members are not in syntactic
agreement.51 The basic meaning of rule 1.1.49 would thus be: 'a genitive case
ending is used to mark a relation which is in some way defined bf the sthdna".
In the course of his remarks oh rule 1.1.49, Patanjali mentions two other
interpretations of the expression sthdneyogd. Since these to a certain extent rest
44
X
That is, the operation which gives e for a +1. This operation is considered to be antaranga, an
operation whose conditions or causes of application are internal or proximate with regard to
those of another operation which accordingly is termed bahiranga, whose conditions are exter-
nal. In the process of formation an antaranga rule is present in the mind prior to a bahiranga
45
rule, and is thus considered stronger than it. See p. 215 below.
46
By rule A 6.1.88 vrddhir eci, -a and e in sthdna e would be replaced by ai.
Bhattoji probably flourished in the last
47
half of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth
48
century; see Cardona 1976:284. Ed. V.L. Joshi 1966:70L^
Jnanendrasarasvatl was a contemporary of Bhattoji according to Yudhisthira Mlmamsaka
(1973:412). Other scholars have assigned him to the early eighteenth century; see Cardona
50
1976, note 475. 49 SKI:44.
The assumption is supported by Patanjali's 0
final remarks on A 1.1.49 (Mbh 1:119,26):
51
sasthyantam sthdnena yathd yujyeta ; see p. 218 below.
This is the view also of Nagesa (MbhU I:408b), further, by way of example, the Kdsikdvrtti
(Kas 1:170); the Bdlamanoramd and TattvabodhinT commentaries on the Siddhdntakaumu
(SK 1:44); Praudhamanoramd (ed. V.L: Joshi 1966:70).
Substitution 197
upon arguments brought up during his discussion, they will be dealt with as
they appear.
The purpose of rule A 1.1.49

Having thus analysed sthdneyogd as a bahuvrlhi compound, Patanjali contin-
ues his discussion of rule 1.1.49 by questioning the purpose of the rule. This
serves to introduce the first vdrttika (Mbh 1:118,8—13):
kimartham punar idam ucyate I
sasthydh sthdneyogavacanam niyamdrthamll 1 //
niyamdrtho 'yam drambhahl ekasatam sasthyarthd ydvanto vd te sarve sasthydm
uccdritdydm prdpnuvantil isyate ca vydkarane yd sasthisd sthdneyogaiva sydd iti
tac cdntarena yatnam na sidhyatlti sasthydh sthdneyogavacanam niyamdrthaml
evamartham idam ucyate I I
Now, for what sake is this [rule] stated?
The statement of a relation defined by the sthdna for the genitive has as its purpose
the making of a restriction/ vt. 1
This undertaking is to make a restriction. One hundred52 are the meanings for the
genitive case suffix53 - or as many as there are - and all of them would apply when
a genitive case ending is uttered. But we want the genitive case ending in the science
of grammar to be the one which marks a relation defined by the sthdna only, and
that does not happen without effort. Therefore [the vdrttika is made]: 'the statement
of a relation defined by the sthdna for the genitive has as its purpose the making of
a restriction'. So for such a purpose it is stated.
Thus the first vdrttika claims that the rule is stated in order to establish a
niyama, a restriction with regard to the possible interpretations of a genitive
case suffix in the rules of grammar.
Kaiyata remarks on this in the following way (MbhP I:409a):
ekasatam iti I sasthTdandakapdthdsrayenaitad uktam II ydvanto veti I sabde ydvatdm
sambhava ity arthahll
'One hundred': this is stated by relying on the SasthTdandakapdtha. 'Or as many as
there are': that is to say, as many of which there is a possibility in a word.
Nagesa's commentary here is quite important for the interpretation of the
compound sasthyarthdh (MbhU I:409a):
sasthldandakapathah - granthavisesahll bhdsye - sasthyartha iti I sasthiprayoj-
anakds tadarthdnvayinah sabddh satam ity arthahllyad vd sasthyarthdndm satatve
tesdm satatvam arthasiddham bodhyamll ekasatam iti nirnayendbfiidhdya punah
samdigdhdbhidhdnam ay uktam ata aha — sabda iti I
52
Normally ekasatam means 'hundred and one', e.g. ekasatam adhvaryusakhah, 'hundred and
one Adhvaryu (= Yajurveda) branches' (Mbh 1:9,21). Nagesa takes it in the sense of satam 'one
53
hundred'; see below.
For a detailed discussion of the compound sasthyarthdh m the light of Nagesa's commentary,
see below.
'SasthXdandakapathd' - [namely] a particular text.54 In the Bhdsya [Patanjah states]

'sasthyarthdh'. That is to say, those words whose purpose [for use] (prayojana) is
[the expression of] the genitive case ending and which are invariably accompanied
by its meaning, are a hundred. Or else, if the property of being a hundred pertains
to the meanings [expressed] by the genitive case suffix, then one should recognise
that the condition of being a hundred for those words is established through their
meanings. Moreover, when it has been stated with decision 'one hundred', an
ambiguous expression is inappropriate. Therefore he [=Kaiyata] says: 'in a word'.
Thus Nagesa suggests two interpretations of the compound sasthyarthdh in
accordance with two senses attributed to the term artha, namely 'purpose;
motive (prayojana)9 and 'meaning'. Under the first alternative, sasthyarthdh
is considered a bahuvnhi compound which qualifies sabddh 'words'. It seems
reasonable to assume that this is a straightforward samdnddhikaranabahu-
vrlhi, a bahuvnhi compound whose members are in syntactic agreement. The
sense would thus be that there are a hundred words whose 'purpose' (pra-
yojana) is the genitive case ending. The words alluded to injhis way are
svasvdmin 'possessed-possessor', avayavdvayavin 'part-whole', etc. These
are further said to be tadarthdnvayin 'accompanied by the meaning of it', that
is, by the general meaning of the genitive case suffix, namely 'relation'. To get
the full idea of this it is necessary to investigate more closely the sense of pra-
yojana in the present context. Since Nagesa's remarks have implications of
considerable importance, it seems worthwhile to go into details here.
In grammatical literature the word prayojana generally means 'purpose;
motive; object'. It is quite commonly the term used to refer to the necessary
purpose of a rule. Grammatically, the word is formed as a derivation from the
verb praAyuj 'use; employ', from which the equally common term prayoga
'use; employment' is derived as well. \
Nydyasutra 1.1.24 defines the term prayojana in the following way: yam
artham adhikrtya pravartate tat prayojanam, 'that goal (artha) with regard to
which one is active, that is prayojana' (NS 45). Vatsyayana, in his commentary
on Nydyasutra 1.1.1, interprets prayojana as karanasddhana, that is, as a noun
expressing the instrument of the activity denoted by the verb to \yhich the word
is related: yena prayuktah pravartate tat prayojanam, 'that because of which
the intent one is active, that is prayojana' (NS 5). According to this analysis,
the word is formed with the suffix LyuT (-ana55 with guna and presuffixal
accent) in the sense of karana 'instrument' by A 3.3.117 karanadhikaranayos
ca.
An analysis as karanasddhana would make it easy to distinguish the basic
meanings of prayoga and prayojana. While the formeFcould be rendered 'use;
employment', the latter would lend itself to an interpretation a& 'that through
54
Such a work is unknown to me It seems reasonable to assume that it woufd have to be a list
giving the different words or meanings which determine the relations marked by a genitive
55
case suffix, words like svasvdmin 'possessed-possessor', etc
The element -yu is replaced by -ana according to A 71.1 yuvor andkau.
Substitution 199
which there is an employment of something', and hence be rendered 'purpose;

motive', etc. The encyclopaedic Sanskrit lexicon Vdcaspatyam, an orthodox
pandita work, does indeed give karanasddhana as the basic interpretation of
prayojana:56 prayujyate 'nena, '[something] is employed etc. by means of if.
The lexicon continues by quoting the Nydyasutra definition which, as seen,
uses the term artha to define prayojana.
Now, with regard to the compound sasthiprayojanakdh which qualifies
sabddh 'words', one should note that it is common practice in grammatical lit-
erature to say that a rule X is the prayojana of a rule Y when rule Y is intro-
duced first and one asks why it exists. This is also normal Sanskrit usage. So,
just as one can say that rule X is the prayojana of rule Y when rule Y is intro-
duced first, in the same way one can say here that the genitive case ending is
the prayojana of certain words which come up prior to the utterance of the gen-
itive case ending. Employing the samdsdnta kaP (-ka), one may thus construct
a bahuvnhi compound and say that rule Y is X-prayojanaka, or that certain
words are sasthiprayojanaka. The prayojana is that a genitive case ending is
enunciated. If we apply a karanasddhana analysis of the word prayojana, then
Nagesa's interpretation of sasthyarthdh as a samdnddhikaranabahuvnhi
would be: 'a hundred words have as their purpose [for use the expression of]
the genitive case ending'.
It should be mentioned, however, that Nagesa in a different context inter-
prets the word prayojana as karmasddhana, that is, as a noun denoting the
object of the activity expressed by the verbal root *4yuj with the preverb pra.
The context is the discussion of the compound dharmaniyamah which occurs
in the very first vdrttika in the Paspasdhnika of the Mahdbhdsya. Among the
various interpretations Patanjali suggests there (Mbh 1:8,4-6) is dharmapra-
yojano niyamah on which Nagesa remarks (MbhU 1:65b):
sa eva dharmah, tena prayujyate - dksipyate iti karmalyudantahprayojanasabdahl
sa cdsddhunivrttirupo niyamah/
This very [niyoga 'injunction'] is Dharma. Through it something is used, that is,
implicated, and the word prayojana is accordingly formed by adding the suffix LyuT
{-ana) in the sense of karman (object). And this, m the form of suspending incor-
rect [speech], is the restriction.
The expression tena prayujyate would at first sight indicate an interpreta-
tion as karanasddhana, but tena 'through if refers rather to the preceding word
dharmah here. The compound dharmaniyamah, understood as dharmapra-
jojano niyamah, would then mean that the restriction is something which is
implicated through injunction (dharma = niyoga), and dharma would thus be
the cause of the restriction.
Applying this to the compound sasthiprayojanakdh, one would also have to
take into consideration that this could be a vyadhikaranabahuvnhi, a
56
Taranatha Tarkavacaspati 1873-84.
bahuvnhi whose members are not in syntactic agreement. According to such

an interpretation and an analysis of the word prayojana as karmasddhana, one
would get the meaning: 'there are a hundred words which have something
accomplished through the genitive case suffix'.
Under the first of the alternative interpretations suggested by Nagesa, then, it
is possible to conclude that ekasatam sasthyarthah means that there are a hundred
words which have the genitive case suffix as their purpose for use and which are
invariably connected with its general meaning 'relation'. Any one of these words
would bring about a genitive case ending. But their meanings too would bring
about the genitive. So Nagesa suggests another interpretation of sasthyarthah,
now taking artha in the sense of 'meaning'. The compound would then have to
be a tatpurusa, but taking it as a straightforward sasthitatpurusa in the sense of
'the meanings of the genitive case' is precluded by Nagesa's interpretation of the
compound sthdneyogd as a vyadhikaranabahuvnhi and also by ,what Nagesa
states elsewhere (MbhU I:408b): sthdnasdmipyddayah sasthyarthasambandha-
nirupakdh, na tu sasthyarthah, 'sthdna, sdrnipya, etc., these condition the rela-
tion which is the meaning of the genitive case, but they are not the meanings of
the genitive case'.
Under the second alternative suggested by Nagesa it is thus reasonable to
interpret sasthyarthah as 'meanings for the genitive case' in the sense that
there are one hundred words whose meanings serve to bring about the genitive
case suffix. One could also get this by reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka,
that is, from the continued presence and absence of units.57 The anvaya mode
of reasoning is an analytic procedure which, formally expressed, states that
when A occurs, B occurs; and when A is absent, B is absent. Thus, if these
meanings occur, a genitive case ending invariably occurs.
Nagesa's point here is that just as sthdna is not the meaning of the genitive
case suffix, one cannot talk of a hundred meanings of the genitive. Rather,
those words or meanings are a hundred which determine the relation denoted
when a genitive case suffix is uttered and for which the genitive accordingly is
a purpose for use. On the second alternative, Nagesa remarks, thfe property of
being a hundred is arthasiddha, effected through meaning, as opposed to the
first alternative where it would be sabdasiddha, effected through the forms
themselves.
To sum up, a hundred words, or their meanings, may serve to bring about a
genitive case suffix. The words thus alluded to are 'possessed-possessor',
'part-whole', etc. These words or meanings determine the relation marked by
a genitive case suffix. The problem, then, is that if any of these woMs or mean-
ings occur, then a genitive case ending is brought aboutT Conversely, if a lin-
guistic item is uttered with a genitive case ending, then all of these words or
meanings would possibly apply if nothing is undertaken to prevent this from
happening. The first vdrttika accordingly suggests that the purpose of rule
57
On anvaya and vyatireka, see Cardona 1967-8; 1981; 1983:37-116; 1988:499-503.
Substitution 201
1.1.49 is to establish a restriction in this respect so that in the science of

grammar a genitive case suffix marks only that relation which is in some way
defined by the word sthdna.
Having thus suggested the purpose of the rule, Patanjali introduces the
second vdrttika which points out that such a restriction is too rigorous, since it
would exclude genitives such as the partitive etc. (Mbh 1:118,13-17):
asti prayojanam etatl kirn tarhitil
avayavasasthyddisv atiprasangah sdso goha itill 211
avayavasasthyddayas tu na sidhyantil tatra ko dosahl sdsa id anhaloh [6.4.34] iti
sdses cdntyasya sydd upadhdmdtrasya cal ud upadhdyd gohah [6.4.89] iti gohes
cantyasya sydd upadhdmdtrasya ca//5S
This is the purpose. What then?
There would be over-application with regard to the genitives which mark a part etc.,
such as sdsah and gohah.' vt. 2
But then the genitives which mark a part etc. are not accounted for. What fault is
there? [A 6.4.34] sdsa id anhaloh would then [teach a substitution] in the place of
the final sound of [the root] sds [when it is a presuffixal base] as well as in the place
of any penultimate sound. [A 6.4.89] ud upadhdyd gohah would [teach a substitu-
tion] in the place of the final sound of [the presuffixal base] goh as well as in the
place of any penultimate sound.
The point brought up here is that if the purpose of rule 1.1.49 were to state
a complete restriction with regard to the interpretation of a genitive case suffix
met with in the rules of grammar, then other usages of the genitive, such as the
partitive, would not be properly accounted for. In order to show how such an
interpretation of 1.1.49 would affect operations taught by certain rules,
Patanjali quotes as examples A 6.4.34 sdsa id anhaloh and A 6.4.89 ud upad-
hdyd gohah.
Rule 6.4.34 provides for the substitution of the vowel / for the upadhd, the
penultimate sound,59 of the root Îsds ' order; instruct' when the latter is an
anga, a presuffixal base,60 followed by aN or by any suffix beginning with a
58
59
See the Bhasya discussion at A 6.4.1, vt. 2 (Mbh 111:178,19-21).
Although the term 'sound' may be considered to imply an idea of sequence, I have chosen it
to render Sanskrit varna, and hence 'penultimate sound' to render upadhd, wishing to avoid
the complicated concept of the phoneme. (See in this respect e.g. R. Harris 1981:57 f.) From
v a practical point of view one may conveniently use the term 'letter', as done, for example, by
Kielhorn (1874), but this refers to writing rather than to speech. By the term 'sound' I refer to
\4 the basic individual sound-units listed in the Sivasutras, the sets of sounds preceding the actual
body of rules in the AstadhyayT, others which are denoted by them, and the sounds termed ayo-
gavdha (see below, p. 223, note 114).
f° The not quite accurate but still preferable rendering 'presuffixal base' for the technical term
anga I have taken from Cardona (e.g. 1976:187, et passim). The term is defined by A 1.4.13
- yasmdtpratyayavidhis tadddipratyaye 'ngam as that which begins with that linguistic element
P to which a suffix is added when the suffix follows. The term vidhi generally means 'rule' as
well as 'that which is taught in a rule'. The commentators interpret pratyayavidhih in A 1.4.13
as 'addition of a suffix'. This sense is easily established by rules A 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 2.3.29. J.W.
* Benson (1990) has carried out a thorough investigation of the term anga and its usage, based
primarily on Patafljali's remarks on the term.
consonant and marked with a diacritic K or N.61 The words upadhdydh khiti
recur from A 6.4.24 aniditdm hala upadhdydh khiti which provides for the
elision of a penultimate n in a verbal root which ends in a consonant and is fol-
lowed by a suffix marked with a diacritic K or N provided the addition of n is
not signalled by a diacritic marker /.
Rule 6.4.89 ud upadhdyd gohah provides for the substitution of the vowel u
for the penultimate sound of the presuffixal base goh (^guh 'hide'), provided a
suffix follows which begins with a vowel, act The latter requirement is taught
by A 6.4.77 aci snudhdtubhruvdm yvor iyahuvahau from which aci recurs.
If rules 6.4.34 and 6.4.89 are to work properly, the words sdsah and gohah
have to be interpreted so as to exhibit partitive genitives, contextually bound to
upadhdydh which exhibits a genitive to be interpreted according to rule 1.1.49.
Thus sdsa upadhdydh teaches a substitution for the penultimate of sds, that is,
a, and goha upadhdydh teaches a substitution for the penultimate of goh, that
is, o. If, however, the genitive exhibited in sdsah and gohah were to be inter-
preted according to rule 1.1.49, they would no longer be contextually bound to
upadhdydh and this term would thus erroneously effect the substitution of any
penultimate sound. Likewise, sdsah and gohah would effect the substitution of
the final sounds of sds and goh according to A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya which
teaches that substitution takes effect on the final sound of the form indicated
as a substituend by the genitive case. The words sdsah and gohah of rules
6.4.34 and 6.4.89 would thus signal the replacement of s and h by i and u, while
the word upadhdydh would signal the occurrence of these replacements in the
place of the penultimate sound of any item which is followed by the suffixes
specified by the respective rules.
This interpretation of the Bhdsya passage in question is in agreement with
the remarks of the commentators. Kaiyata states the following (MbhP I:409b):
avayaveftV niyamena sambandhdntardndm nivartandd iti bhdvahlj upadhama-
trasyefrV sdsind sambandhdbhdvdtpacddisambandhino 'pity arthahl tatra hy ani-
ditdm ity ata upadhdyd iti vartatell
[He brings up the question of] 'part': because the restriction cancels the other rela-
tions [marked by a genitive case suffix]; that is the point. 'Of any penultimate': there
being no relation with sds, the sense is [that substitution would occur] even for [the
penultimate which is] the relatum in pac etc. For there [in A 6.4.34] there is recur-
rence of upadhdydh 'of the penultimate' from [A 6.4.24] aniditdm etc.
The niyama, restriction, would follow from rule 6.4.24 into the present rule
which contains the genitive sdsah: Nagesa adds to this (MbhU I:409b):
tasya sthdnasasthitvenopadhdvisesane sdmartydbhdvddmbhdvah II
Because this [= sdsah] ends in a sthdnasasthi, there is no capability for it to be a
qualifier of the penultimate; that is the idea.
61
For example, the past participle sis-td 'ordered; instructed' is formed by adding the suffix Kta
(-td) to the presuffixal base sds.
Substitution 203
That is to say, sdsah, and likewise gohah, would no longer be contextually

bound to the genitive upadhdydh. Due to the niyama expressed as the purpose
of rule 1.1.49 by the first vdrttika, they would instead have to be interpreted
according to this rule. The result of this would eventually be that the substitu-
tions taught by rules 6.4.34 and 6.4.89 would be directed to the penultimate
sound of any item, such as pac etc., to which the suffixes stipulated by these two
rules are added. Clearly, this is not Panini's intention. Accordingly, the claim of
the first vdrttika that the purpose of rule 1.1.49 is to make a restriction cannot
imply that any genitive encountered in the rules of grammar is to be interpreted
tas denoting one relation only. So the second vdrttika objects to such an inter-
pretation by pointing out that the rules of grammar also contain genitives such
as the partitive and that these have to be accounted for as well, a fact which is
amply illustrated by the two examples sdsah and gohah quoted by Patanjali.
The third vdrttika tries to meet the objection raised by the second in claim-
ing that the restriction is valid only when there is doubt about the relation (Mbh
1:118,18-25):
avayavasasthyddindm cdprdptir yogasydsamdigdhatvdt II3 //
avayavasasthyddindm ca niyamasydprdptih I kim kdranam I yogasydsamdigdhatvdt I
samdehe niyamo na cdvayavasasthyddisu samdehahl kim vaktavyam etatl na hi I
katham anucyamdnam gamsyate621 laukiko 'yam drstdntah I tad yathd I loke kamcit
kascit prcchati grdmdntaram gamisydmi panthdnam me bhavdn upadisatv itil sa
tasmd dcaste I amusminn avakdse hastadaksino grahitavyo 'musminn avakdse has-
tavdma itil yas tatra tiryakpatho bhavati na tasmin samdeha iti krtvd ndsdv
upadisyate I evam ihdpi samdehe niyamo na cdvayavasasthyddisu samdehahlI
* 'But [the restriction] would not apply to the genitives which mark a part etc.,
because there is no doubt with regard to the relation [in these cases].' vt. 3.
But the restriction would not apply to the genitives which mark a part etc. Why?
Because there is no doubt with regard to the relation. A restriction applies when
there is doubt, but there is no doubt with regard to the genitives which mark a part
etc. Is this to be stated? Definitely not. How can it be understood when it is not
stated? From daily life there is the following illustration. Just as, in the world, when
someone asks somebody: 'I am going to another village, could you point out the
way to me?' This other one tells him: 'at that point you turn right, at that point you
turn left.'63 Making out that there is no doubt with regard to a path going trans-
versely there, he does not point that one out. And so here as well a restriction applies
where there is doubt, but there is no doubt with regard to the genitives which mark
a part etc.
?? On the future form gamsyate, see B. van Nooten 1970.

&* The expressions hastadaksinah and hastavdmah are considered bahuvrihi compounds by th
commentators. Thus Kaiyata states (MbhP I.410a). hasto daksino yasya, 'that of which the
hand is right'. Since a path does not have parts or hands (cf. the Chdyd, quoted Bhargavasastrl
JosT 1951:410, note 1: mdrgdnavayavatvdi), this is slightly expanded by Nagesa (MbhU
I:410a): daksino hasto yasya sannihita ity arthah, 'that is to say, that [path] to which the right
hand is near'. Puzzled by the unusual order of the members of these compounds, Bhartrhari
(MbhD 290,14-17) explains them as being basically tatpurusa compounds and refers to
Panini's rule A 2.1.30 trtiyd tatkrtdrthena gunavacanena, for which see S.D. Joshi 1969:168 ff.
The argument of the second vdrttika, that the restriction which was postu-
lated as the purpose of rule 1.1.49 by the first vdrttika would be too rigorous
in that it would affect the interpretation even of such genitives as the partitive,
is here challenged by the claim that a restriction works only where there is
doubt, and that such genitives as the partitive are beyond doubt as to their inter-
pretation. As Kaiyata remarks (MbhP I:409b):
aniyamaprasange niyamah kriyate, na tuprdg evdvasthite niyamell
When there is a possibility that there would not be a restriction, a restriction is made,
but not when a restriction has indeed been established already.
Or, in the words of Nagesa (MbhU I:409b): avayavasasthyddindm istdndm
nivrttaye niyamdprdptir iti vdrtikdrthah, 'the point of the [third] vdrttika is that
a restriction would not come about to cancel such genitives as the partitive
which are desired'.
Patanjali claims that even this need not be stated, and compares the situa-
tion to one where a man wanting to know his way to some other village is told
only of those points on his path where doubt may arise. The idea is, as I under-
stand it, that one makes a restriction only with regard to such places as where
there is a fork-shaped division of the path, not with regard to totally oblique
paths. There is no doubt that a crossing path is not the path one is instructed to
follow, and so nothing is said about it. Such a path is, according to Nagesa
(MbhU I:410a), purvapascimdnyataradisi gacchato daksinottaramdrga iti
ydvat, 'as much as a road going south-north for one who moves in the direc-
tion of either east or west'.64
Similarly, in grammar a restriction applies only when there is doubt, but
there is no doubt with regard to genitives such as the one that marks a part,
since these are established beyond doubt already.
At this point in his discussion of rule 1.1.49 Patanjali mentions two alterna-
tive interpretations of the expression sthdneyogd. According to the first oii
these it is to be read as sthdne 'yoga (Mbh 1:119,1):
atha vd sthdne 'yoga sthdneyogd/ kim idam ayogetil avyakt^yogdyogdll
Since the word yoga so far ha$ been taken in the sense of 'relation', the fol-
lowing translation seems reasonable:
64
In their edition of Bhartrhari's Dipikd Abhyankar and Limaye read as follows (MbhD
290,13-14): yau hi panthdnav bhavatas tatra na jndyate kasmin pqthibhdge grdmafy
samnivista iti. In the Dipikd manuscript, however, the first part of this reads (MbhDms foL
202b): yau hi yamthdndm ekadikkau0. It is understandable that Abhyankar and Limaye take
°dikkau as a bahuvrThi compound and, lacking a reference for this, emend the impossible
yamthdndm to panthdnav0. Their emendation anekadikkau is possible, giving the sense of
'two paths going in a plurality of directions (not in two)' or, suiting my picture of the situa-
tion, 'two paths going in [slightly] different directions', however I fail to see why it is neces,n
sary. I propose to read ekadikkau with the manuscript, a reading retained also by Palsule and
Bhagavat (1991:20,26). Accepting the other emendations suggested by; Abhyankar and
Limaye, one could then translate the passage as follows: 'For, when you hav6 two paths going
in one direction, it is not known along which division of paths the town is located.'
Substitution 205
Or else sthaneyogd is [to be analysed as] sthane 'yoga. What is this ayogd! That
[genitive case ending] which denotes a relation that is not clear.
The remarks of Kaiyata seem to support the interpretation of yoga as 'rela-
tion' (MbhP I:410a):
ayogeri/ yogam antarena sasthyd evdbhdvdd visisto yogo yasyd ndstiti sdmarthydt
pratvyatel
1
ayogd': since there is no genitive case ending without some relation, we must
understand that [what is marked by the genitive defined by rule 1.1.49] is something
for which there is no specified relation [established already].
Under this alternative sthaneyogd is no longer considered a compound.
Instead it is taken as a phrase which is to be divided sthane 'yoga, where ayogd,
in the sense of avyaktayogd 'which identifies a relation that is not clear', is con-
sidered a nansamdsa65 qualifying sasthT, while the word sthdna, in the locative,
defines the relation marked by the genitive case suffix. This solution logically
presents itself on the basis of the foregoing discussion in the Bhdsya. If the
purpose of A 1.1.49 is to express some sort of restriction with regard to a geni-
tive case ending met with in the rules of grammar, and if it is argued that this
restriction must not affect genitives such as the partitive because these are estab-
lished already and thus beyond doubt, it becomes possible to say, with Kaiyata,
that no genitive case suffix occurs unless some relation is to be denoted, and
that A 1.1.49 supplies the interpretation for a genitive form which, unlike sdsah
and gohdh discussed above, is not contextually bound. In other words, where
no particular relation is specified, the restrictive rule 1.1.49 applies to mark the
relation in question as defined by the locative word form sthane.
This solution is the only one presented in the Bhdsdvrtti of Purusotta-
madeva,66 a simple commentary on the AstddhydyT, where, incidentally, the
'word ayogd is glossed avyaktasambandhd,61 the word yoga thus specifically
identified as synonymous with sambandha 'relation'.
, In Nagesa's Uddyota we meet with a considerably more sophisticated inter-
pretation of the sthane 'yoga alternative and of the word yoga in particular.
This seems worthy of mention regardless of whether it represents tenets valid
for Patanjali. Nagesa makes the following remarks on Kaiyata's interpretation
of the issue (MbhU I:410a):
visista itil nirnayavisista ity arthahl ayam eva bhdsye vyaktasabdasydrthah I atra
pakse yogasabdah karmavyutpattyd sambandhiparahl
'visistaK: that is to say, specified through ascertainment. This alone is the sense of
vyakta in the Bhdsya. On this view, by its analysis as object, the word yoga means
relatum.
$ That is, a compound with the negative particle as its first member. In the sense of avyaktayogd,
the expression ayogd is taken as a compound of the sakapdrthiva type by Sivaramendrasaras-
vatlin his Ratnaprakdsa commentary on the PradTpa (ed. M.S. Narasimhacharya 1975:302).
| 6 Generally placed in the early twelfth century; see Cardona 1976:282.
? Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri 1971:9.
This means that when the word yoga is analysed as karmasddhana, it

denotes 'something which is related' and not 'relation'. Thus, when sthdneyogd
is interpreted as sthdne 'yoga, rule 1.1.49 teaches, according to Nagesa, that a
genitive case ending which, in contrast with genitives such as the partitive, has
an unspecified relatum marks a relation defined by the word sthdne.
Patanjali goes on to present still another possible interpretation of the
expression sthdneyogd (Mbh 1:119,2-3):
atha vd yogavatT yoga I kd punar yogavatT/ yasya bahavo yogdhl kuta etatl bhumni
hi matub bhavatill
Or rather yoga is [to be interpreted as] yogavatT. What, then, is [the sense of]
yogavatil That for which relations are many. How does this come about? Because
the suffix matUP applies in the sense of abundance.
Under this alternative sthdneyogd is to be read as two separate words, sthdne
and yoga, the latter formed by adding the secondary suffix aC {-a) to the stem
yoga- according to A 5.2.127 arsaddibhyo }c which teaches that the suffix aC
is added to the words arsas etc. in the sense of matUP, and by then adding the
feminine -a (TdP). According to A 5.2.94 tad asydsty asminn iti matup, the
possessive suffix matUP (unaccented -mat, under certain conditions to be
replaced by -vat) is added to form derivatives in the sense of 'that is pertaining
to it' or 'that is located in it'. A vdrttika quoted by Patanjali under this rule
states that the suffix can only be added when certain meanings, such as censure
or abundance, are to be expressed.68 The gana, list of words, starting with arsas
is an dkrtigana, an open-ended gana. Under this alternative, then, yoga means
'abundant in relations' and rule 1.1.49 would thus teach that a genitive case
suffix which may denote many relations marks the relation defined by the word
sthdne.
I am not fully confident of the text at this point, but Bhartrhari seems to take
the following stand in his Dipikd (MbhD 291,1-3):
atha va yogavati yogeft / sarvasydh sasthyd yogo69 'stiti10 bhummti vyapadisyate111
yaivdnekdrthasambandhini saiva yoga12 yogavatil yd tu nirjhdtayogd sd tu ndyogd
ndpf3 yogavatiti sthdne na bhavisyatil
'Or rather yoga is [to be interpreted as] yogavati' All genitives mark [some] rela-
tion, [and] therefore it is pointed out that [matUP applies] 'in the sense of abun-
dance'. But only that [genitive] which marks a relation with multiple meanings is
yoga, that is, yogavatT. But [a genitive] which marks a relation that is fully known,
68
See the Bhdsya discussion under the first vdrttika on A 5.2.94 and the verse cited there (Mbh
69
I 393,15-16)
70
With MbhDms (fol 202b), against the emendation yoge of Abhyankar and Limaye (MbhD)
71
MS (ibid.) reads stiff.
72
Emended, also by Palsule and Bhagavat (1991 21,12), from MS (ibid ) reading \yadisyate.
73
MS (ibid.) reads yoge.
So read with Palsule and Bhagavat (1991.21,13), MS (ibid.) reads sd tu ndyogd ndmapi0,
Abhyankar and Limaye (MbhD 291,2-3) lead* °sd tu nal yogdndm api°.
Substitution 207
[that genitive] is neither ayogd 'marking a relation which is not clear' nor yogavatT
'abundant in relations', and hence does not apply to mark a relation defined by the
sthdna.
Nagesa, who sticks to his interpretation of yoga as 'relatum', offers an
important remark here which however bids some difficulty as to its interpreta-
tion (MbhU I:410a):
yogavatlft' pakse 'py evam eva, sthdnarupasambandhiniyamdrthatvddasya//
'yogavatf: even on this view things are just the same, since [the rule] has as its
purpose a restriction on the relatum in the form of the sthdna.
Now, this is ambiguous. The compound sthdnarupasambandhiniyama0 can
either be understood so that sthdnarupa qualifies the word saynbandhin, the
sthdna thus becoming a relatum of the relation in question, or it can be under-
stood so that sthdnarupa qualifies sambandhiniyama, the restriction thus
appearing in the form of the sthdna. It makes sense to refer to the sthdna as a
relatum, directly, less so to refer to it as a niyama, directly. The first alternative
therefore seems to me the most plausible one, although the second cannot be
excluded completely. Under the first alternative the statement would mean that
when there is a possibility of many relata, rule 1.1.49 serves to restrict a geni-
tive to mark a relation with a specific relatum only, namely the sthdna. Under
the second alternative there is a restriction on the relatum, the restriction being
the sthdna itself. Taking into consideration that the word sthdna appears in the
locative in the phrase sthdne yoga, this could be taken to imply that rule 1.1.49
comes into play to mark a relation which has one relatum or, possibly, both
relata restricted to appear in the sthdna.
The two possible interpretations may thus be seen to represent two differ-
ent views of how the relation marked by a sthdnasasthT is to be considered. On
the first view we would be dealing with a relation where there is a restriction
that one of the relata has to be the sthdna. On the second view the sthdna would
not be a relatum but something which restricts the one relatum or both relata
of the relation in question. A full discussion of the problems connected with
the exact determination of the relation marked by a sthdnasasthT will be carried
4
out below. Suffice it here to say that these two views come up in that context,
as does the problem that the sthdna, strictly speaking, is not a relation. This
may be the reason for Nagesa's choosing to interpret yoga as 'relatum' and not
as 'relation' when sthdneyogd is not considered a compound.
To sum up, when the wording sthdneyogd is split, Paninlyas leave us with
two options. The phrase can be read either as sthdne 'yoga or as sthdne yoga.
Generally speaking, both of these interpretations specify certain conditions for
interpreting a genitive as a sthdnasasthT. According to the first, when there is
an uncertain relation or, following Nagesa, an uncertain relatum, the relation
marked by the genitive is defined by the word sthdne. According to the second,
when there is an abundance of relations or, following Nagesa, an abundance of
relata, one is similarly to supply the word sthdne. None of these alternatives is
considered by Katyayana, and Patanjali seems to present them only in passing,
leaving them as mere possibilities arising through the claim that the purpose
of the rule is to make a restriction.
Patanjali now turns to the statement of the fourth vdrttika which brings up
an entirely new solution to the problem raised by the second vdrttika of how
to identify a sthdnasasthi when also genitives such as the partitive are to be
taken into consideration as possible interpretations when a genitive case suffix
is met with (Mbh 1:119,4-15):
visistd vd sasthi sthdneyogd II All
atha vd kimcil litigant dsajya vaksydmTtthamlingd sasthi sthdneyogd bhavatltil na
ca tal lingam avayavasasthyddisu karisyatell yady evam sdsa id ahhaloh sd hau
sdsigrahanam kartavyam sthdneyogdrtham lingam dsanksydmiti I na kartavyaml
yad evddah purastdd avayavasasthyartham prakrtam etad uttdratrdnuvrttam
sat sthdneyogdrtham bhavisyatil kathaml adhikdro ndma triprakdrahl kascid
ekadesasthah sarvam sdstram abhijvalayati yathd pradipah suprajvalitah sarvam
vesmdbhijvalayati I aparo 'dhikdro yathd rajjvdyasd vd baddham kdstham
anukrsyate tadvad anukrsyate cakdrenal aparo 'dhikdrah pratiyogam tasydnir-
desdrtha iti yoge yoga upatisthatel tad yadaisa pakso 'dhikdrah pratiyogam
tasydnirdesdrtha iti tadd hi yad evddah purastdd avayavasasthyartham etad uttara-
trdnuvrttam sat sthdneyogdrtham bhavisyati I sampratyayamdtram etad bhavati I na
hy anuccdrya sabdam lingam sakyam dsanktuml evam tarhy ddese tal lingam
karisyate tat prakrtim dskantsyati II
4
Or rather, a distinguished genitive case suffix [signifies] sthdneyogd.' vt. 4
Or else, having added some mark, I shall state that a genitive case suffix with such
a mark is established as sthdneyogd. And this mark will not be made for such gen-
itives as the partitive. 4>
If so, mention must be made of; sdsl, [the root Îsds, the genitive^form of which
recurs] in [A 6.4.35] sd hau [from A 6.4.34] sdsa id anhaloh, so I may add a mark
to signify the sthdneyogd. [Such a mention] need not be made. That very [mention
of sdsl] which is put forward in the context of the earlierjrule [A 6.4.34] to signify
a partitive genitive, that [mention of sdsl] is recurrent in the subsequent rule [A
6.4.35] for the purpose of signifying the sthdneyogd. How? Becausean adhikdra74
is of three kinds. A certain kind, standing at its one place, illumines the whole
corpus of rules as a bright-shining lamp fully illumines a house. Another [kind of]
adhikdra is dragged along by means of the particle ca 'and', just like a log is dragged
along which has been tied to a rope or an iron chain. Another [kind of] adhikdra
makes its presence in rule after rule so that it need not be stated in each subsequent
rule. Therefore, when the view is that a governing rule need not be stated in each
subsequent rule, then, in fact, that very [mention of a genitive form], which in an
earlier rule signifies a partitive genitive, is recurrent in a subsequent rule where it
appears to signify the sthdneyogd.
74
Strictly speaking, an adhikdra is a governing rule, but Patanjali seems to usp the term in the
wider sense of any statement that can be read into a rule and thus govern its interpretation; see
below.
Substitution 209
[But] this brings about mere knowledge. For it is not possible to add a mark if the
linguistic item is not pronounced.
If it is like that, then the mark will be made on the substitute, and it will then leap
over to the substituend75 [which is indicated by the genitive form recurrent from the
earlier rule].
The fourth vdrttika suggests that the problem of identifying a genitive as a
sthdnasasthlcould be solved by adding to those genitives some particular mark
by which they would easily be recognised. But such a procedure creates certain
difficulties. Patanjali quotes two rules to make this clear. The first is rule 6.4.34
sdsa id anhaloh, discussed earlier. In brief, this rule signals the replacement
by i for the penultimate sound, upadhd, of the root Îsds 'order; instruct' when
the latter is a presuffixal base, anga, followed by aN or by any suffix begin-
ning with a consonant and marked with a diacritic K or N. Now, the genitive
form sdsah is understood to exhibit a partitive genitive, since the word is con-
textually bound to upadhdydh which recurs from A 6.4.24 aniditdm hala upa-
dhdydh kniti where upadhdydh exhibits a sthdnasasthl. The second rule quoted
by Patanjali is A 6.4.35 sd hau which teaches that the presuffixal base sds is
replaced by sd before the imperative ending hi to give sd-dhi. The genitive form
sdsah of rule 6.4.34 is understood to recur in rule 6.4.35 where it no longer sig-
nifies a partitive genitive contextually bound to upadhdydh, but a sthdnasasthl.
In rule 6.4.35, then, the genitive sdsah is considered to recur. But it is not men-
tioned. Its only mention is in rule 6.4.34, but there it signifies a partitive gen-
itive.
In order to argue against the necessity of repeating sdsah in rule 6.4.35,
^Patanjali refers to three ways in which an adhikdra works. Strictly speaking,
an adhikdra rule is a heading rule which governs subsequent rules in a partic-
ular section of the grammar. The adhikdra is thus an item which recurs {anu-
yartate) in each rule belonging to this section. But parts of rules are also
considered to recur in subsequent rules, and these recurring items evidently fall
fcnder the scope of an adhikdra as well, if one is to judge from Pataiijali's dis-
gussion here. Moreover, the first kind of adhikdra mentioned by Patanjali in
|his passage actually refers to that type of rule which is technically termed
paribhdsd, general principle of interpretation, not restricted in its application
|o the domain of a certain section but valid throughout the grammar. Rule
11.49, for example, is considered a paribhdsd rule.76 The second kind of
$S The exact sense of the term prakrti is a point of ambiguity here. Generally it means 'norm;
original' or, in grammar, 'base; stem'. Panini does not employ prakrti as a technical term in
such a sense, only prakrtyd which denotes a form that has not yet undergone any change (yrtti).
In the present context prakrti could refer to the base sds, or to an earlier mention, prdkrta, that
is, to what has come down from an earlier rule which in this case would imply that prakrti
refers to the form sdsah as it has come down from rule 6.4.34, or it could refer to the sthdnin,
the substituend. Kaiyata takes it in the latter sense; see below.
$ Kaiyata remarks (Mbhp 1:41 la): pdrdrthyasdmydt paribhdsd ypy adhikdra ucyate, 'even
paribhdsd is called an adhikdra because it is equivalent in serving the purpose of other [rules]'.
In his commentary here Nagesa objects to the claim that a paribhdsd illuminates the whole
adhikdra mentioned here works by means of the particle ca 'and; also' which
signals the recurrence of the item in question.
The first and second kind of adhikdra may be excluded in the present
context simply because they do not apply. It is the third kind of adhikdra which
is relevant here. This is said to work in such a way that it 'makes its presence
in rule after rule so that it need not be stated in each subsequent rule'. Both
major governing rules and parts of rules which are to recur in subsequent rules
were probably marked with a svarita vowel to be heard in the recitation of the
AstddhydyT. This feature was lost early in the tradition.77 This marking device
is accounted for by A 1.3.11 svaritenddhikdrah which states that an item
characterised by a svarita vowel is to be considered an adhikdra. Patanjali's
way of telling how the third type of adhikdra works is an echo of the first vdrt-
tika on this very rule: adhikdrah pratiyogam tasydnirdesdrthah, 'the point oft
an adhikdra is that it need not be stated in subsequent rules'. As Cardona
(1968:448, note 4) has pointed out; the term adhikdra is here best interpreted
as karmasddhana, that is, as denoting the item which is made to recur.78
Thus, in the present context, the item sdsah which is considered to recur in
rule 6.4.35 from rule 6.4.34 seems to be regarded as an adhikdra of this third
kind. Accordingly, it is only necessary to mention the genitive form sdsah
once, so that by its mention in rule 6.4.34, although it there signifies a.partH
tive genitive, it makes its presence in rule 6.4.35 where it signifies af
sthdnasasthi.19
To this the objection is raised that the recurrence of sdsah in rule 6.4.3§
gives a mere understanding of the word form sdsah from rule 6.4.34, and to,
mere understanding no mark can be added. How could one add a mark to aj
Footnote 76 (cont.)
grammar, pointing out that there are two views concerning how a paribhdsd works (MbhU|
1:411 a). He discusses the issue at length m the context of panbhdsds 2 and 3 in hij
Panbhdsendusekhara (Kielhorn 1871-4:6-26; ed. Abhyankar 1962:1-6). Concerning thS
difference between a paribhdsd and an adhikdra, the Bhdsya discussion at A 2.1.1 samarthaM
padavidhih betrays a certain confusion in this respect and tcrsome extent an overlapping
between the two concepts. Discussing whether this rule is a panbhasa or an adhikdrM
Patanjali here postulates a difference between the two in claiming that a paribhdsd is of tl||
first kind referred to above, whereas an adhikdra is stated to make its presence in rule aftei
rule so that it need not be stated again in each subsequent rule, and thus equal to the third kiag
referred to above. See Mbh 1:359,4-7 with Kaiyata's commentary. See also Mbh 1:70,20-11
where the concept of paribhdsd seems to include that of adhikdra.
77
Cardona (1968) has discussed Panini's use of svarita; references to other discussions perl
78
taming to this topic are given by Cardona 1976:192.
The Kdsikd at A 1.3.11 glosses adhikdra by the word viniyoga (roughly, 'assignment; conn
mitment'), an interpretation as bhdvasddhana, that is, as a noun expressing the mere activip
of assigning, according to the PadamanjarT (KasP 1:408). Commenting on the Bhdsya a A
1.3.11, Kaiyata remarks that the word adhikdra
l
may be interpreted either as bhdvasddhana§i
as karmasddhana (MbhP II: 145a).
79
Nagesa (MbhU 1:41 la) claims that we are dealing here with a sabdddhikdra, an adhikafM
where one item of a rule goes into a subsequent rule in the sense that only the form goes dowi|p
not the meaning. It should however be kept in mind that the major adhikdpa rule A 6.411
angasya exhibits a genitive to be interpreted by context, in rule 6.4.34 as a partitive geiutiv|f|
in rule 6.4.35 as a sthdnasasthi. The genitive angasya is coreferential with sdsah in both rul$i
Substitution 211
word form that is not pronounced? Kaiyata articulates the problem clearly
(MbhPI:411a):
svaritatvapratijndndd uttaresu yogesu tasya sabdasydnumdnam bhavatu, lingd-
sangas tv anuccdritasya katham sydd ity arthahll
That is to say, by the convention of recognising the existence of svarita vowels, this
item [sdsah] should be inferred in subsequent rules80; but how is a [phonetic] mark
added to something which is not pronounced?
In order to meet this difficulty, Patanjali suggests the mark be added to the
^substitute, adesa. Through the relation that obtains between substitute and sub-
"stituend, sthdnin, the sense conveyed by the mark will be transferred to the sub-
Istituend, marking it thereby as exhibiting a sthdnasasthl Kaiyata explains this
in the following manner (MbhP I:411a):
ddesalingdsangdt tasya ca sasthyabhdvdt tatsambaddhasthdnino lingakdryam
phalisyatity arthahll
That is to say, by adding the mark to the substitute, and by the fact that this does not
exhibit a genitive case suffix, the operation [signalled] by the mark will take effect
on the substituend which is related to the substitute.
Thus, if a mark were added to the substitute sd in A 6.4.35 sd hau, this mark
gvould direct the operation to take effect on the related substituend expressed
jjby the recurring genitive form sdsah which is thus identified as exhibiting a
hthdnasasthiIn the context of A 6.4.35. The mark would not direct the opera-
Eon to the substitute sd itself, since this item does not exhibit a genitive case
Sending.
I Challenging the whole claim that the purpose of rule 1.1.49 is to state a
flpstriction, Patanjali next points out the difficulties of cases where there is only
p e genitive case suffix but several things to be qualified through it (Mbh
Sfil9,16-19):
yadi niyamah kriyate yatraikd sasthy anekam ca visesyam tatra na sidhyatil
angasya halah anah samprasdranasyeti I hal api visesyo 'n api visesyah
samprasdranam api visesyam I asatipunar niyame kdmacdra ekayd sasthyanekam
l
visesayitum I tad yathdl devadattasya putrah pdnih kambala itil tasmdn ndrtho
Hiyamenal
*If the restriction is made, then it would not work properly in cases where there is
l?
6ne single genitive case suffix but several things to be qualified. [In the string of
rules and recurring items] angasya (A 6.4.1) halah (A 6.4.2) anah (A 6.3.111)
samprasdranasya (A 6.3.139), hal is to be qualified, an is to be qualified, and
samprasdrana is to be qualified [by the single genitive angasya]. But if there is no
Restriction, then do as you please in order to qualify several things by means of one
single genitive case suffix. As for example: Devadatta's son, hand, blanket.
Therefore there is no point in the restriction.
^®The use of the plural here is a bit odd because it only goes to one rule
Patanjali's argument here is that there are cases where one single genitive
case suffix serves to denote several relations that may differ according to cir-
cumstances. A restriction which limits a genitive case suffix to denote just one
particular relation would accordingly create problems. Or, as Kaiyata puts it,
one can no longer have the relation between qualifier and qualificand.
To illustrate his point, Patanjali adduces the example of A 6.4.1 angasya
which contains a genitive to be 'interpreted according to context. The word
angasya is considered to recur in A 6.4.2 halah. Recurring there are also the '
items dirghah and anah from A 6.3.111 dhralope purvasya dirgho 'nah,;
together with A 6.3.139 samprasdranasya. Rule 6.4.2 halah is thus to be inter-1
preted in accordance with the string angasya halo ynah samprasdranasya ,
dirghah, 'when preceded by a consonant which is part of a presuffixal base, a j
vowel aN {a, i, u) that is samprasdrana (7, w, r, / as replacements of the corre-1
sponding semivowels y, v, r, /) is replaced by a long vowel [when the former fj
is the final]81 of a presuffixal base'. For example, rule 6.4.2 halah serves t o |
derive the past participle huta from hvd Qive) 'call; invoke', but prevents thef
lengthening of u in uta and niruta derived from ve 'weave', in uta because there |
is no preceding consonant that is part of the presuffixal base, in niruta because!
the r is not a part of the presuffixal base but belongs to the preverb. f
Kaiyata clarifies the point in the following manner (MbhP I:411b): |
yadlr// 'angasya' iti sthdnasasthitvdd visesanavisesyabhdvo nd prakalpata ityi
arthahll |
\
'If [a restriction is made]': that is to say, if [the genitive met with in A 6.4.1] angasyg^
is accepted as a sthdnasasthT, then a relation between qualifier and qualificand is|
rendered impossible.
This interpretation is supported by Nagesa (MbhU 1:41 lb):
tattvdd dhala ity ddind 'vayavavdcakena visesanavisesyabhdvo na sydd ity arthaH/M
That is to say, in reality there can be no qualifier-qualificand relatiorj with halah etc|
since these refer to a part. ""
To get rid of this difficulty, Patanjali simply suggests that if no restriction i]
made, one single genitive case suffix may serve to qualify different things i
desired, thus denoting various specific relations as in the example 'Devadatta'^
son, hand, blanket' where relations like father-son, part-whole, owner-ownec;
are involved. Therefore, even though a genitive case suffix strictly speakin|
merely denotes relation in general, the restriction is rendered unnecessary. T|
this Patanjali raises the following objection (Mbh 1:119,19-20):
nanu coktam ekasatam sasthyarthd ydvanto vd te sarve sasthyam uccdritaya^
prdpnuvantil \
81
A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya directs the substitution to the final sound of the form given in the \
tive case; cf. Nagesa's remarks on the Bhasya passage under discussion (MbhU 1:41 lb) <
the Kasikd on rule A 6.4.2.
Substitution 213
Well, but it has already been stated that there are one hundred meanings [or, pur-
poses of use] for the genitive case suffix82 - or as many as there are - [and] all of
them would apply when a genitive case ending is pronounced.
This objection is immediately met with a counter-objection (Mbh
1:119,20-5):
naisa dosah I yady api loke bahavo 'bhisambandha drthd yaund maukhdh srauvds
ca sabdasya tu sabdena ko 'nyo 'bhisambandho bhavitum arhaty anyad atah
sthdndtl sabdasydpi sabdendnantarddayo 'bhisambandhdhf aster bhur bhavatiti
samdehah sthdne 'nantare samipa itil samdehamdtram etad bhavati sarva-
samdehesu cedam upatisthate vydkhydnato visesapratipattir na hi samdehdd
alaksanam itil sthdna iti vydkhydsydmah II
There is no fault here. Although there are numerous relations83 in the world - [such
as] possessive,84 genetic, oral,85 ritual86 - still, between one linguistic unit and
another linguistic unit, what relation is allowed to obtain other than this [one
defined by the] sthdnal Even between one linguistic unit and another linguistic unit
there are relations such as 'adjacent' etc. So there is doubt when it is stated [in rule
2.4.52 aster bhiih] that bhu occurs 'of as': in the sthdna [of as], in the adjacency, in
the nearness? - This is mere doubt, and in all cases of doubt this [paribhdsd] pre-
sents itself: 'the understanding of something particular [among two or more
possibilities is ascertained] by reasoned explanation, for [a grammatical rule
should] not [be considered] a non-rule as a result of [mere] doubt [as to its inter-
pretation].' So we shall interpret [the genitive to denote a relation defined by the
locative word form] sthdne.
Pataiijali's first point here is that although several different relations can be
observed in the world, relations which in language would be expressed by
means of a genitive case suffix, only such relations as may possibly obtain
between one linguistic unit and another are of interest here. And what partic-
ular relation is allowed to obtain between two such terms other than the one
defined by the sthdnal In replying to this rhetorical question, Patanjali is
forced to admit that even between one linguistic unit and another linguistic unit
relations such as dnantarya 'adjacency' may also obtain. From the rest of the
passage it is evident that Patanjali, in addition to dnantarya, alludes to the par-
ticular relation of sdmipya 'nearness' here. Whether he has even other relations
f2 For the compound sasthyarthdh, see pp. 197 ff. above.

& The terms sambandha and abhisambandha have been discussed by A. Aklujkar who con-
cludes that 'no technical or grammatical distinction of any kind exists between sambandha and
abhisambandha? (1989:303). He goes on: The appearance of, and to some extent the prefer-
1
ence for, abhisambandha when its equally non-technical colleague sambandha can convey its
meaning seems to be due to the sensitivity which early Sanskrit authors had for the shades of
meaning expressed by the upasargas or prefixes. As the situation was probably perceived as
one in which word "X" turned to thing "x" or word "Y" for effecting a connection, it was
^perhaps felt that an addition of the prefix
84
abhi, which indicates "facing" or "looking in the
direction of", was appropriate.' That is, the relation between owner and owned.
P6 That is, the relation between teacher and pupil.
^ That is, the relations between priests in a sacrifice, between the yajamdna and the priests,
between mortals and immortals, etc. See Malamoud 1976:155 f.
in mind is hard to tell. The tradition does not mention other reldtions in this
context. The early eighteenth-century author Vasudeva Diksita categorically
limits them to three in his Bdlamanoramd (SK 1:44,4-5): sabdasya sabdena
traya eva sambandhdh - dnantaryam sdmipyam prasangas ca, 'only three
relations [may obtain] between a linguistic unit and [another] linguistic unit:
adjacency, nearness and possible appearance'.87 Anyhow, it is evident that at
least the dnantarya and sdmipya relations may obtain in addition to the one
defined by the sthdna. Hence, Patanjali argues, doubt will arise as to the spe-
cific sense of a rule such as A 2.4.52 aster bhuh, the purpose of which is to
teach that bhu replaces as in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes. The word
asteh in this rule exhibits a sthdnasasthi, but how can we be certain about that
when also such relations as dnantarya, adjacency, and sdmipya, nearness, may
obtain? Because, says Patanjali, this is mere doubt, and in all cases of doubt
the following paribhdsd, general principle of interpretation, presents itself:
vydkhydnato visesapratipattir na hi samdehdd alaksanam**
In a case of doubt, this paribhdsd tells us, we have to ascertain a particular
conclusion by reasoned explanation, vydkhydna}9 For a rule in grammar
(laksana), which is a means of understanding, does not cease to be so out of
mere doubt. Whereas the word alaksana in the present context may be taken
in the narrow sense of 'non-rule', the seventh century author Nllakantha
glosses it abodhaka 'something which does not give understanding', resorting
to the familiar nirvacana of the word laksana: laksyate yneneti laksanamjfid-
nasddhanam,90 'laksana [is so called according to the analysis] "something is
recognised/characterised by means of it", that is, it is a means of knowledge'.
This brings us closer to the coiiimon meaning of laksana, namely 'sign;*
characteristic mark' or, more precisely, 'that through which something is char-
acterised', thus comprising both definiens and definitio of Western terminol-
ogy.91 As in my translation of the Bhdsya passage above, the paribhdsd could]
thus be interpreted so as to have a wider scope than just the^rules of the;
AstddhydyT.
Invoking this paribhdsd, Patanjali explicitly says that we are fbrced to inter-j
pret. And, he continues, the specific relation which the genitive9 marks in thg
87
Note that dnantarya, sdmipya and prasanga are called relations here. The word sthdna is takenl
88
in the sense of prasanga 'possible appearance'. ^
This way of arguing (samdehamdtram etc.) is met with in the form of a fixed expression af
several places in the Bhdsya, for example Mbh 1:42,11 (A 1.2.2); 266,15 (A 1.3.9); 271,15 (Ai
1.3.10); II: 106,3 (A 3.2.57); 106,18 (A 3.2.57). The paribhdsd is also invoked on its own, fol
example Mbh 1:6,26; 7,5 (Paspasd); 111:246,3 (A 7.1.13), and is widely accepted by Paninlya|
from Patanjali onwards. Nagesa presents it as the very first paribhdsd in hi|
Paribhdsendusekhara and it is listed in the majority of grammatical paribhdsd works (cf|
89
Abhyankar 1967, index).
According to Nagesa: vydkhydndc chistakrtdt, 'from the interpretation done by the sistas, thgf
90
learned' (Paribhdsendusekhara, ed. Abhyankar 1962:1); cf. Thieme 1957:53 ff.
Nllakantha's Paribhdsdvrtti, ed. Abhyankar 1967:293. Patanjali resorts to the .same nirvacan^.
in his Mahdbhdsya on A 2.3.37,91stating that a laksana is that by which something is recojil
msed (Mbh 1:459,2-3; 7-10). See G. Gren-Eklund 1984:118, note 53.\ i
Substitution 215
present context we shall interpret by supplying the locative word form sthdne.
The commentators take us considerably further here, providing reasons for the
choice of this particular interpretation. Kaiyata remarks (MbhP I:412a):
sthana itil antarangatvdd laksydpeksandd veti bhdvahl
[Why would we understand] 'sthdne' [?] The idea is: either from the fact that it is
present first in the mind {antaranga), or from considering the laksya, the final result
of an operation.
Kaiyata identifies two reasons why we should interpret a genitive by sup-
plying the locative word form sthdne. On the one hand, such an interpreta-
tion is ascertained through the principle of antarangatva. In brief, an
operation92 is considered antaranga when its conditions or causes of applica-
tion are internal or proximate with regard to those of another operation,
accordingly termed bahiranga, whose conditions are external.93 Moreover,
what depends on a meaning that presents itself prior to another meaning is
also termed antaranga. In the process of formation an antaranga operation
is present in the mind prior to a bahiranga operation, and is thus considered
stronger than it.94 In other words, that which presents itself earlier takes effect
earlier. This idea is reflected in the widely accepted paribhdsd: asiddham
bahirangam antarange, 'a bahiranga [operation] is not effected when [there
4S a possibility of] an antaranga [operation taking effect]'.95 Patanjali himself
accepts the principle of antarangatva and quotes this paribhdsd at several
places in the Mahdbhdsya though he is occasionally forced to make excep-
tions to it.96;
On the force of this antara/iga-principle, then, it is possible for Kaiyata to
claim that the relation marked by a genitive should be interpreted by supply-
ing the locative woroNform sthdne. This is what comes to mind first.97
On the other hand\]jCaiyata says, this interpretation is arrived at also by
igksydpeksana, that is, by paying attention to the final forms which are the
output of grammatical operations. The interpretation whereby one supplies the
word form sthdne is the only one which would give the forms desired, the
forms met with in actual Sanskrit usage.
92
I take 'operation' here to include a rule as well as what is taught in a rule.
^91 See p. 196, note 44 above.
Note here the following remark of Joshi and Roodbergen (1980:ii). With regard to the view
that the whole sentence, and not only the single words of which it is composed, is at the basis
of formation, they state that 'a distinction must be introduced between antaranga-m\es which
are word-integrative rules, and bahiranga-rules which are non-word-integrative rules.
Moreover, as regards the order of application, priority must be given to the antaranga-mles.'
^Kagesa presents this as paribhdsd 50 in his Paribhdsendusekhara. It is listed in all extant
works on grammatical paribhdsds. For recent critical work on this paribhdsd, see Kiparsky
1982:87 ff. and Bronkhorst 1986. Even though the antaranga-paribhdsd may turn out to be
irrelevant as Kiparsky (1982) has tried to demonstrate, it was certainly at work in the minds of
m
Sanskrit authors at least from the times of Patanjali.
m
For example, Mbh 1:26,14 (Sivasutra 4); 111:93,3 (A 6.1.135); 347,22 (A 7.4.10).
This will be explained below.
Bhattoji Dlksita retains the arguments based on laksydpeksana and

antarangatva, but adds a third one in his Sabdakaustubha (SK 244,10-12):
aster bhur itydddv anekasambamdhaprasamge 'pi laksydnurodhdd antaramgatvdt
sthdnivad ddesa itijndpakdc ca sthdneyogataiva vydkhydsyate I
Even though several relations are possible with regard to [a rule] such as [A 2.4.52]
aster bhuh, only the interpretation 'sthdneyogd' should be offered, because it com-
plies with the final result of an operation, because it is antarahga [with regard to
any other relation], and, moreover, because [rule A 1.1.56] sthdnivad ddeso ['nal-
vidhau] serves as an indicator98 [in this respect].
Bhattoji says the relation defined by the expression sthdneyogd comes to
mind first, and it is the only one that fulfils the demands of the forms actually
met with in the real language. Moreover, he argues, rule 1.1.56 sthdnivad ddeso
'nalvidhau serves as an indication for this interpretation of rule 1.1.49 as
applied to a rule such as A 2.4.52 aster bhuh. As mentioned already, rule 1.1.56
sthdnivad ddeso 'nalvidhau teaches that, with specific exceptions, a substitute,
ddesa, is considered like the sthdnin, the element which undergoes the sub-
stitution in an operation.
Nagesa, commenting on Kaiyata's statement, pays attention^ only to the
argument based on antarangatva but retains Bhattoji's argument that A 1.1.56
is a jndpaka here. Nagesa's remarks are important since he "claims that
antarangatva is established regardless of whether we interpret the term sthdna
as artha 'meaning' or prasanga 'possible appearance' 99 (MbhU I:412a):
antarangatvad itil sthdnasabdo 'rthavdci prasangavdcT vd, ubhayathd ypy
antarangatvam I sthdnivad ddesa itijndpakam apy atra bodhyamll
'From the fact that it is present first in the mind {antarangd)? The word sthdna sig-
nifies artha 'meaning', or prasanga 'possible appearance', but! either way
antarangatva [is established]. Moreover, [A 1.1.56] sthdnivad ddeso 'nalvidhau
should be recognised as an indicator here.
Kaiyata's claim that we would supply the locative word form sthane simply
on the basis of antarangatva is thus clearly supported by Nagesa wiio adds that
however we interpret the word sthdna, we have antarangatva.
Vaidyanatha Payagunda, Nagesa's pupil, justifies how antarangatva is
established regardless of which of the two senses we ascribe to the word
sthdna. In his Chdyd (Bhargavasastrl JosI 1951:412, note 4) he comments on
Nagesa's statement as follows:
98
The technical term jndpaka may best be rendered 'something which serves to indicate'. Based
on supposed implications which result from internal analysis of the rules ^f grammar, a
jndpaka is a structural argument through which a valid interpretation can be inferred and jus-
tified. In other words, when seemingly conflicting features occur in the grammar, one should
look for some other feature which indicates the valid interpretation on the basis of consistency
and a unified system. i
99
These are the two senses most commonly attributed to the term sthdna by the tradition. They
will be discussed in detail below.
Substitution 217
ddye 'bhidheyasya sabdaprayogahetutvenddau buddhisamnidhdndt, antye prasak-

tasyaivdnantaryddisambhavena tasyddau taddrudhattvam [sic] ity arthah//
anyathd sutravaiyarthyam apity aha - sthdnill
On the first view, [that sthdna signifies artha,] because that which is to be denoted
is present in the mind first since it is the reason for using words; on the second view,
[that sthdna signifies prasanga,] since the possibility of [relations] such as adja-
cency exists only for what would possibly appear (prasaktasya), the latter reaches
it (=the mind) at the very beginning; that is the sense [of Nagesa's remark].
Moreover, since otherwise the rule [A 1.1.49] is meaningless, he says: sthdnivat etc.
Vaidyanatha's argument is as follows. On the view that the term sthdna sig-
nifies artha, meaning, the antarangatva of the srtena-relation is justified
through the fact that what is to be denoted or expressed is the cause for the use
of a word, and accordingly that is established first in the mind/That is to say,
meaning comes first when we use words and therefore one can claim that there
is antarangatva. But if it is assumed that sthdna signifies artha, then one does
not need Panini's rule, since words are used to denote or express artha and that
is in the mind already.
On the view that sthdna signifies prasanga, the possible appearance of a lin-
guistic unit, we can also interpret the genitive with the supplement of the loca-
tive word form sthdne even without rule 1.1.49. The objection would be that
there are also relations such as adjacency and nearness. The answer to this is
that sthdna here signifies prasanga 'possible appearance'. The possibility of
these other relations applying exists only for what is prasakta, for what would
possibly appear. In other words, there exist relations such as adjacency and
nearness, but these can obtain only for something which is about to appear. By
way of example, A 2.4.52 aster bhuh would then be interpreted to mean that
since the possible appearance of as is antaranga, bhu is used when there is a
u
possible appearance of as. To state that 'bhu is used next to as' would not be
possible, since adjacency or nearness is possible only for something which will
;
appear. These relations presuppose whatjs-going to be there. Hence the
! sthdna-vtl&iion, which applies to^what is prasakta, to what would appear, is
1
what one arrives at first, and the st/iana-relation is thus antaranga with regard
to any other relation.
Only something which is prasakta can be a relatum in the dnantarya and
sdmipya relations. These hold only between word and word, not between word
I and meaning. This is of significance with regard to the two senses of sthdna,
I namely artha and prasanga, referred to by Nagesa. Either way antarangatva is
; established. The alternative senses of artha and prasanga are just choices with
regard to the weight being laid on meaning or on word form.
£ Returning to the Bhdsya discussion, it is now possible to see the full signif-
icance of Patanjali's conclusion: sthdna Hi vydkhydsydmah, 'so we shall inter-
pret [the genitive to denote a relation defined by the locative word form]
osthdne', which in fact is his last statement on A 1.1.49 itself. From the justifica-
:tion of this interpretation by the principle of antarangatva resorted to by the
commentators, one may actually conclude that rule 1.1.49 is superfluous. And
the necessity of the rule is indeed what Patanjali rhetorically questions in his
final remarks on A 1.1.49 (Mbh 1:119,25-8):
na tarhiddnim ayam yogo vaktavyah I vaktavyas ca I kim prayojanaml sasthyantam
sthdnena yathd yujyeta yatah sasthy uccdntdl kim krtam bhavdtil nirdisya-
mdnasyddesd bhavantity esd paribhdsd na kartavyd bhavatill
In that case, then, this rule need not be stated. It must be stated. For what purpose?
In order that what ends in a genitive case suffix, provided the genitive is actually
pronounced after it, should be linked with the sthdna. What is accomplished by this?
The paribhdsd which states that 'substitutes occur in the place of what is expressly
enunciated' need not be made.
Rejecting at first any reason for stating the rule, Patanjali then says it
should be stated. What is taught by the rule may be fully provided for by the
principle of antarahgatva. But the rule serves another purpose, namely that
what ends in a genitive, provided the genitive case suffix is actually pro-
nounced after it, should be linked with or, possibly through the sthdna.
Interpreted in this way, the rule is made to render the paribhdsd that states:
nirdisyamdnasyddesd bhavanti, 'substitutes occur in the place f of what is
expressly enunciated'.
Bhattoji Dlksita sums the situation up as follows in his Sabdakaustubha (SK
244,12-15):
tasmdn ndyam etasya sutrasya sutrdrthahl kim tu sasthyamtam ucbdryamdnam
eva sthdnena yujyate na tu pratvyamdnam iti sutrdrthahl tad etad ucyate
nirdisyamdnasyddesd bhavamtiti I
Therefore this is not the way to understand this rule.100 No, the meaning of the rule
is: 'only that which is expressly enunciated with a genitive case ending is linked
with the sthdna, not that which is [merely] understood'. So what is [really] stated is
[the paribhdsd]: 'substitutes occur in the place of what is expressly enunciated'.
The paribhdsd is not rejected, it simply does not require special statement.
In fact, there are numerous instances where Patanjali resorts to it when dis-
cussing operations that could be misapplied. The paribhdsd is thus cited at
several places in the Mahdbhdsya, most notably at A 6AA30pddahpat where
Patanjali deals with it at some length.101 In his third vdrttika on this rule
Katyayana refers to it in order to meet a difficulty raised by the second vdrt-
tika.102 At this point Patanjali proclaims the necessity of the paribhdsd, telling
100
That is, to identify the genitive in a rule such as 2.4.52 aster bhilh as a sthdnasdsthTsince this
would come about anyway, either because such an interpretation is antaranga, or because
101
laksydpeksana would bring it about, or because A 1.1.56 would serve to indicate it.
Other instances are: Mbh 1:29,23 (Sivasutra 5); 116,19 (A 1.1.47); 129,16 (A 1.1.51), 111:20,26
(A 6.1.13); 22,10 (A 6.1.13); 50,18 (A 6.1.71); 186,1 (A 6.4.19); 214,1 (A 6.4.101); 225,11 (A
102
6.4.142); 236,4 (A 7.1.1); 252,20 (A 7.1.33); 258,5 (A 7.1.50); 398,6 (A 8 2.16)'.
A 6.4.130, vt. 3: na vd nirdisyamdnasyddesatvdt, 'or rather not, because substitutes [occur] in
the place of what is expressly enunciated'.
Substitution 219
us that there are numerous purposes served by it.103 These are listed in the
remaining vdrttikas and thoroughly discussed by Patanjali who demonstrates
how errors would come about if one does not accept Xhe paribhdsd. His conclu-
sions here are however consistent with his final remarks on A 1.1.49. The func-
tions served by the paribhdsd are in fact taken care of by rule 1.1.49 sasthT
sthdneyogd (Mbh III:222,16-17):104
sd tarhy esd paribhdsd kartavydl na kartavydl uktam sasthT sthdneyogety etasya
yogasya vacane prayojanam sasthyantam sthdnena yathd yujyeta yatah sasthy
uccdritetill
So then this paribhdsd needs to be stated. It need not be. It has been stated that the
purpose in formulating rule [A 1.1.49] sasthT sthdneyogd is that whatever ends in a
genitive case suffix, provided the genitive is actually pronounced after it, should be
linked with the sthdna.
If rule 1.1.49 is interpreted so as to render the paribhdsd, then the scope of the
rule and the scope of the paribhdsd are logically interconnected. Since Panini
does not himself explicitly state the paribhdsd, it seems in the first place exigent
to consider the reasons given by the tradition for introducing the paribhdsd and
see whether these harmonise with the rules and principles formulated in the
Astddhydyl In doing so it is necessary to look at the arguments adduced by
Paninlyas in the context of this nirdisyamdna-principle. What Paninlyas remark
on the paribhdsd may thus also contribute to a better understanding of how rule
1.1.49 and the operations governed by it have been viewed by the tradition.
/
The nirdisyamana-paribhasa /
Invoked by Paninlyas from Katyayana onwards, the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd
is listed in the majority of extant grammatical paribhdsd collections.105 Nagesa
presents it as paribhdsd 12 in his Paribhdsendusekhara. Aiming at consistency
in the body of rules and the principles which govern their interpretation,
Nagesa is first and foremost concerned with the question of how the paribhdsd
interacts with other rules of grammar. Hence, his discussion provides us with
a valuable structural frame for presenting the problems which according to the
tradition pertain to the present paribhdsd. With this in mind, it seems more
rewarding to review the discussion in the Paribhdsendusekhara than to inves-
tigate Patanjali's remarks on the paribhdsd at rule 6.4.130 directly since most
of the issues raised in the Mahdbhdsya are also dealt with in the course of
Nagesa's exposition. So are the issues brought up by Kaiyata and by Nagesa
himself in the context of Patanjali's final remarks at rule 1.1.49. These are also
103
Mbh 111:221,11: avasyam esd paribhdsd kartavydl bahuny etasydh panbhdsdydh pra-
104
yojandm I
The same view is put forward also in the paribhdsd works of Purusottamadeva, Slradeva,
105
Nllakantha and Haribhaskara (ed. Abhyankar 1967:127, 167, 294, 320).
See Abhyankar 1967, index.
more easily understood in the light of Nagesa's exposition in the

Paribhdsendusekhara and will accordingly be considered only after an
examination of the paribhdsd has been carried out. Nagesa's exposition is,
however, extremely dense. To present a paraphrase and an explanation of his
arguments seems therefore a more favourable way to proceed here than to give
a literal translation of the whole discussion.106
The trick here in the first place is getting the relations right between the
paribhdsd and certain rules with which it seems to be in conflict.. Basically,
these are the rules A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya, A 1.1.54 ddeh parasya, A 1.1.55
anekdlsit sarvasya and A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya, and, moreover,
another paribhdsd not listed as a separate rule in the Astddhydyi: yaddgamds
tadgumbhutds tadgrahanena grhyante. Rule 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya states that in
replacements of sounds, the substitution applies to the final sound of the
element which undergoes substitution, that is, to the final sound of the form
cited in the genitive case in a rule. As an exception to this, rule 1.1.54 ddeh
parasya states that when an operation is taught for a following form, the sub-
stitution is directed to the initial sound of that form. Another exception is
taught by rule 1.1.55 anekdlsit sarvasya which teaches that a substitute marked
with a diacritic S or one consisting of more than one sound replaces the entire
element which undergoes substitution, instead of replacing only its final
sound. Rule 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya stipulates that when an operation is
taught by means of some linguistic unit, that unit denotes, apart from itself,
also whatever ends with it. Finally, there is the general principle of interpreta-
tion yaddgamds tadgumbhutds tadgrahanena grhyante which states that aug-
ments which are added to some element, thus forming an integrated part of it,
are understood when this element is mentioned.107 Nagesa presents the latter
paribhdsd, referred to in what follows as theyadagama-principle, zsparibhdsd
11 in his Paribhdsendusekhara, that is, immediately before the' paribhdsd
which is the present object of investigation.
Nagesa introduces the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsdâs he usually does any
paribhdsd included in his work, by pointing to a difficulty which has to be met.
In the present case the difficulty is caused right away by the preceding
paribhdsd, the yaddgama-princvple. The problem is that the property of being
a substituend, sthdnitva, does not apply correctly to linguistic units recognised
by the yaddgama-phnciple.
With regard to an aorist formation such as udasthdt, we have to consider the
following situation. Rule A 8.4.61 udah sthdstambhoh purvasya teaches the
replacement by a sound which is homogeneous with the preceding for sthd and
stambh when these follow the preverb ud.m Since here a replacement is taught
106
107
A full translation has been made by Kielhorn (1871-^.67 ff.).
108
Katyayana refers to this paribhdsd in vdrttika 5 on rule A 11 20 dddhd ghv addp.
This rule accounts for forms such as the infinitive utthdtum. By rule 8.4.65 jharo jhan
savarne, a t which is preceded by a consonant and followed by a homogeneous sound such as
th is elided
Substitution 221
for a following form, rule 1.1.54 ddehparasya applies and directs the substitu-
tion to the initial sounds of sthd and stambh.109 Now, the yaddgama-princiiple
states that an element to which an augment is added denotes not only itself, but
also that which results from its combination with that augment. In the forma-
tion of the aorist form udasthdt, the augment aT, acutely accented a, is added
to sthd. Accordingly, sthd denotes also asthd which in the formation of
udasthdt is preceded by ud. In the sound-replacement taught by rule A 8.4.61,
then, the augment a would be identified as the sthdnin, the element which is
to undergo the substitution operation.
In order to avoid such an erroneous occurrence of homogeneity with the
preceding sound, paribhdsd 12 is introduced: nirdisyamdnasyddesd bhavanti,
'substitutes occur in the place of what is expressly enunciated'. The paribhdsd
thus excludes the possibility of ascribing sthdnitva, the property of being a sub-
stituend, to elements which are recognised by application of the yaddgama-
principle.
Having thus given a reason for introducing the paribhdsd, Nagesa goes on
to remark on its relationship with rule 1.1.49 sasthT sthdneyogd. Since the
general sense of this rule, that the genitive marks the particular relation in some
way defined by the locative word form sthdne, is evident from antarangatva or
laksydpeksana, Nagesa claims that the rule is read twice. And the paribhdsd
conveys the sense of the second reading: only something which is expressly
enunciated with a genitive case ending, or, more precisely, only that which in
the real language is like that which is enunciated or forms part of110 what is
enunciated, becomes a term in the relation defined by the sthdna, not that
which is merely understood to be so. In other words, this paribhdsd prevents a
linguistic unit which is merely inferred and not expressly enunciated with a
genitive case ending from being recognised as a sthdnin, an element which is
to undergo a substitution operation. Such a recognition could, as noted, errone-
ously result from the application of the yaddgama-principle formulated by
paribhdsd 11. Therefore, Nagesa says, the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd is estab-
lished.
The validity of this paribhdsd is then challenged by a series of objections
which have to be met. The first of these concerns operations taught in a rule
such as A 7.4.32 asya cvau. This rule teaches that a final a or d of a presuffixal
base is replaced by f when the suffix Cvlm follows. Only short a is expressly
enunciated in the rule. On the view that a linguistic unit denotes the generic
character which is inherent in every individual unit, Nagesa argues that there
109
Concentrating on the problem raised by the yaddgama-pnnciple, Nagesa leaves rule 11 54
ddehparasya out of his discussion here, probably on purpose, since the rule later on is shown
to apply together with the nirdisyamdna-panbhdsd, thus directing the substitution to the
110
initial sound of what is actually enunciated in a rule with a genitive case ending.
111
Seep 228below
The adverbial suffix Cvl (A 5 4.50 krbhvastiyoge sampadyakartan cvih) is deleted by A
6 1.67 ver aprktasya. Rule A 7 4.32 accounts for forms such as suklfkrta 'made white' where
the final a of sukla 'white' is replaced by F.
• * »
i s n o f a u l t h e r e , s i n c e a - n e s s i n h e r e s a l s o i n l o n g a s o t h a t w h e n s h o r t a i s m e n -
1 1 2
t i o n e d i n a r u l e , l o n g a i s a l s o d e n o t e d . T o b u t t r e s s h i s a r g u m e n t , N a g e s a a l s o
r e f e r s t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n t a u g h t b y A 6 . 4 . 8 5 n a b h u s u d h i y o h . A n o p e r a t i o n o n
a s o u n d e x p r e s s l y e n u n c i a t e d i n a r u l e a p p l i e s t o a l l v a r i e t i e s d e n o t e d b y t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r s o u n d a c c o r d i n g t o r u l e A 1 . 1 . 6 9 a n u d i t s a v a r n a s y a c d p r a t y a y a h
w h i c h s t i p u l a t e s t h a t a s h o r t v o w e l a l s o d e n o t e s a n y v a r i e t y o f t h a t V o w e l , t h u s
a l s o i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g l o n g , p r o v i d e d t h e v o w e l i n q u e s t i o n i s n o t a s u f f i x . R u l e
6 . 4 . 8 5 p r o h i b i t s p r e v o c a l i c s e m i v o w e l s u b s t i t u t i o n i n t h e c a s e o f a p r e s u f f i x a l
b a s e e n d i n g i n b h u o r s u d h l B o t h o f t h e s e e n d i n a l o n g v o w e l . N o v y - , i f t h e p r e -
v o c a l i c s e m i v o w e l s u b s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e d f o r b y t h e p r e c e d i n g r u j e s A 6 . 4 . 8 2 e r
a n e k d c o ' s a m y o g a p u r v a s y a a n d A 6 . 4 . 8 3 o h s u p i d i d n o t a p p l y a l s o t o t h e l o n g
v o w e l s f a n d w , t h e n t h e p r o h i b i t i o n t a u g h t b y r u l e 6 . 4 . 8 5 w e f u l d b e o u t o f p l a c e .
T h e s e c o n d p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p a r i b h d s d c o n c e r n s t h e a n u b a n d h a ,
d i a c r i t i c m a r k e r , N w h i c h s e r v e s , a m o n g o t h e r f u n c t i o n s , t o m a r k s u b s t i t u t e s
a s a p p l y i n g o n l y t o t h e f i n a l s o u n d o f t h e e l e m e n t w h i c h u n d e r g o e s s u b s t i t u -
t i o n . I t m a y b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e n i r d i s y a m d n a - p a r i b h d s d m a k e s t h i s m a r k e r N
s u p e r f l u o u s i n r u l e A 6 . 4 . 7 7 a c i s n u d h d t u b h r u v d m y v o r i y a n u v a n a u . T h i s r u l e
t e a c h e s t h a t w h e n a v o w e l f o l l o w s , t h e i a n d w , b o t h s h o r t a n d l o n g , w h i c h a r e
f i n a l i n a p r e s u f f i x a l b a s e w h i c h e n d s i n t h e c o n j u g a t i o n a l c l a s s s u f f i x S n u , o r
i n a r o o t , o r b h r u ' b r o w ' a r e r e p l a c e d r e s p e c t i v e l y b y i y A N a n d u v A N . T h e d i a -
c r i t i c m a r k e r N s i g n a l s t h a t t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n a f f e c t s o n l y t h e f i n a l s o u n d o f t h e
e l e m e n t s l i s t e d . B u t / a n d u h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s l y e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e r u l e b y y v o h .
H e n c e , i f t h e p a r i b h d s d i s v a l i d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n w o u l d a f f e c t o n l y t h e s o u n d s
i a n d u e v e n i f t h e s u b s t i t u t e s i y a n d u v a r e n o t m a r k e d w i t h a d i a c r i t i c N w h i c h
t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e s s u p e r f l u o u s . H o w e v e r , N a g e s a a r g u e s , t h i s c l a i m l o s e s i t s
f o r c e b e c a u s e ' r o o t s ' e t c . h a v e a l s o b e e n e x p r e s s l y e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e r u l e , a n d
s o w e d o h a v e t o a t t a c h t h e a n u b a n d h a N t o i y a n d u v t o m a r k t h e m a s s u b -
s t i t u t e s o f a f i n a l s o u n d o n l y . \
N a g e s a t h e n p u s h e s t h e a r g u n i e n t f u r t h e r , q u e s t i o n i n g t h e " U s e o f t h e
a n u b a n d h a N i n r T N a n d r i N . T h e s e a r e s u b s t i t u t e s J S g r t h e s h o r t v d w e l r i n t h e
m
o p e r a t i o n s t a u g h t b y r u l e s A 7 . 4 . 2 7 r i n r t a h a n d A 7 . 4 . 2 8 r i n s a y f a g l i n k s u .
1 1 2
T h i s v i e w i s k n o w n a s t h e j d t i p a k s a , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g t h e v i e w t h a t a n o u n r e f e r s t o a g e n u s ,
a s o p p o s e d t o t h e v y a k t i p a k s a a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a n o u n r e f e r s t o a n i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t y .
A p p l i e d t o P a n i n i ' s r u l e s , t h e f o r m e r v i e w h o l d s t h a t o n e r u l e c o v e r s a l l p o s s i b l e i n s t a n c e s ,
w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r v i e w h o l d s t h a t a r u l e h a s t o b e r e p e a t e d f o r e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l i n s t a n c e . T h i s
i s s u e i s c e n t r a l t o t h e M l m a m s a k a s i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f V e d i c i n j u n c t i o n s . D o e s a n
i n j u n c t i o n s u c h a s b r d h m a n o n a h a n t a v y a h , ' a B r a h m a n s h o u l d n o t b e k i l l e d * , r e f e r t o e v e r y
B r a h m a n o r t o o n e i n d i v i d u a l ? N a g e s a d i s c u s s e s t h e t w o v i e w s a t p a r i b h d s d 4 0 i n h i s
P a r i b h d s e n d u s e k h a r a ( e d . A b h y a n k a r 1 9 6 2 : 6 6 f f . ; K i e l h o r n 1 8 7 1 - 4 : 1 9 0 f f . ) .
1 1 3
R u l e A 7 . 4 . 2 7 t e a c h e s t h a t t h e f i n a l o f a p r e s u f f i x a l b a s e i s r e p l a c e d b y r i w h e n ' t h e a d v e r b i a l
s u f f i x C v l o r a s u f f i x b e g i n n i n g w i t h y a w h i c h i s n o t a k r t o r a s d r v a d h d t u k a s u f f i x f o l l o w s .
T h i s a c c o u n t s f o r f o r m s s u c h a s m d t n y a t i ' " m o t h e r s " ; c o n s i d e r s a m o t h e r ' ( d e n o m i n a t i v e
f r o m m d t r - ' m o t h e r ' ) a n d m d t n b h u t a ' b e c o m e a m o t h e r ' . R u l e A 7 . 4 . 2 8 t e a c h e s . t h a t r i i s s u b -
s t i t u t e d f o r t h e f i n a l r o f a r o o t w h i c h i s a p r e s u f f i x a l b a s e b e f o r e t h e c o n j u g a t i o n a l c l a s s s u f f i x
S a , t h e p a s s i v e s u f f i x y a K , a n d t h e o p t a t i v e a n d p r e c a t i v e a u g m e n t y d s U T . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e ,
t h e r o f V & r ' d o ; m a k e ' i s r e p l a c e d b y r i b e f o r e y a K , g i v i n g t h e 3 . s g . p a s s i v e f o r m k r i y a t e ' i s
m a d e ' , a n d b e f o r e y d s U T , g i v i n g t h e 2 . p i . a c t i v e p r e c a t i v e f o r m k r i y d s t a ' y o u s h o u l d m a k e ' .

Substitution 223
Here the vowel r alone is expressly enunciated. On the one hand, then, if the
nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd is valid, the anubandha N seems to have no function
whatsoever, except that it might have been added solely for the sake of clarity.
On the other hand, a claim that the anubandha N serves to indicate the
paribhdsd is useless with regard to rules where a sound is expressly enunci-
ated conflicts with the Bhdsya on the fifth Sivasutra, hayavarat. One of the
problems discussed there is why the ayogavdha sounds114 are not included in
the Sivasutras. This prevents them from being referred to by the pratydhdra115
term al which comprises all the other sounds of the Sanskrit language.
Discussing possible purposes of including the ayogavdha sounds, Katyayana
suggests in vdrttika 8 that they ought to be included, one of the advantages
being operations that are prescribed for a final sound. The rule referred to here
is A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya, 'in the place of the final aV, which directs the sub-
stitution to the final sound, referred to by the term al, of the linguistic element
which is the target of the substitution operation. Since the ayogavdha sounds
are not covered by the term al, they do not fall under the scope of this rule.
Hence, one might claim, rule 1.1.52 would be a purpose for teaching them at
the stage of the Sivasutras. For example, s replaces the visarjaniya (h) of
vrksah when t follows, as in vrksas tatra 'the tree, there', according to A 8.3.34
visarjanvyasya sah, and so rule 1.1.52 would correctly direct the substitution to
the final sound of vrksah, namely to h. But this, Patanjali argues, cannot be
called a purpose. The replacement of only the visarjaniya is already taken care
of by the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd, the visarjaniya being expressly enunciated
in rule 8.3.34.116 Patanjali thus explicitly says that it is untenable to suggest that
rule 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya is a purpose for reading the ayogavdha sounds in the
Sivasutras, for the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd provides for the correct applica-
tion of the operations in question.
At this stage of his exposition Nagesa leaves objections aside, turning
instead to the functions served by the, paribhdsd and its relationship with other
rules. He begins by pointing to an issue brought up also in the introductory part
114
The ayogavdha sounds are visarjaniya (visarga), jihvdmuliya (the sound replacing visarg
before k and kh), upadhmdniya (the sound replacing visarga before p and ph), anusvdra
115
(nasal), anundsika (nasalised sound) and yama (doubled consonant before a nasal consonant).
A pratydhdra is a technical abbreviation term which serves to denote a set of sounds. For
116
example, iK denotes long or short i u r I.
Mbh 1:29,21-4:
alo 'ntyavidhihprayojanaml vrksas tarati I plaksas taratil alo 'ntyasya vidhayo bhava
alo 'ntyasya satvam siddham bhavatil etad api ndsti prayojanaml nirdisyamdnasyd
bhavantiti visarjaniyasyaiva bhavisyatill
[A 1.1.52] alo 'ntyasya is a purpose [for teaching the ayogavdha sounds in the Sivasutras
so that they can be referred to by the term al]. For example, [s replaces the visarjaniya (h)
of vrksah and plaksah according to A 8.3.34 visarjaniyasya sah] in vrksas tarati and
plaksas tarati. Since [substitution] operations [by rule 1.1.52] apply to the final al, it is cor-
rectly established that s is [the replacement] for the final al. - Even this is no purpose. [In
the operation taught by rule 8.3.34, s] will apply only for the visarjaniya by virtue of [the
paribhdsd] 'substitutes occur in the place of what is expressly enunciated'.
of his discussion, namely that the paribhdsd prevents units identified by the
tadantavidhi and the yaddgama-pnnciple from being recognised as elements
which are to undergo a substitution operation. The problems caused by the
yaddgama-principlo have already been mentioned. The tadantavidhi is rule
1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya which states that when an operation is taught by
means of some element, that element denotes, apart from itself, also that which
ends with it. For example, the element pad would denote also supdd.
To illustrate his point, Nagesa adduces as examples the formation of
udasthdt and supadah. The problems related to the correct application of rules
in deriving the aorist form udasthdt have been discussed above. The other
example, supadah, refers to the operation taught by rule 6.4.130 pddah pat in
the context of which Katyayana and Patanjali discuss the paribhdsd.
According to this rule, the element pad which is final in ajpresaffbcal base
termed bhanl is replaced by pad. Thus, in the masculine, the accusative plural
of the presuffixal base supdd 'having beautiful feet' is formed by adding the
suffix Sas (-as). The base would then fulfil the conditions for being termed
bha, and pad is accordingly replaced by pad, giving at this stage the form
supadas. By the tadantavidhi, however, the unit pad would also denote units
such as supdd and dvipdd, yielding in the above example just padas and not
supadas in the accusative plural. But on the condition that a valid substituend,
sthdnin, has to be expressly enunciated, such a problem does not arise. So we
need the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd to give us the knowledge of the lack of
sthdnitva, the property of being a substituend, for elements which are sug-
gested solely by the tadantavidhi or the yaddgama-principle. This is recog-
nised already by Katyayana when he introduces the paribhdsd in his third
vdrttika on A 6.4.130.118 Once the paribhdsd is accepted, forms such as
supadah and udasthdt are properly accomplished.
Having thus established the paribhdsd in relation to the tadantavidhi and the
yaddgama-pnnciple, Nagesa goes on to remark on its relation to th£ three rules
A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya, A 1.1.54 ddehparasya, and A 1.1.55 anekdlsit sarvasya.
He claims that when each and every condition for thelfpplication of these rules
is fulfilled, then they co-exist jointly with the paribhdsd. There is no relation
of blocked and blocker since there is no contradiction involved here. Moreover,
says Nagesa, they are not subservient to each other, since both th6 paribhdsd
and these rules are introduced in grammar for the sake of other rules.119
117
According to A 1.4 18 yaci bham, a unit gets the name bha when it is followed by a suffix
beginning with a vowel or y, provided the suffix in question fulfils the conditions required by
A 1 4.17 svddisv asarvandmasthdne, namely that it should be one of the suffixes introduced
by rules A 4 1.2 through A 5.4.151 with the exception of suffixes that are sarvandmasthdna.
The latter are the suffixes of the so-called1 strong cases. In Pamnian terms they are (A 1.1.42)
Si, that is, the replacement of Jas and to (the nominative and accusative plural suffixes) after
a neuter presuffixal base (A 7.1 20), and (A 1.1.43) suT, that is, su, au, Jas, am, auT- the suf-
fixes of the nominative singular, dual, plural,118and accusative singular and dual when they
occur after a non-neuter presuffixal base. See p 218, note 102 above. ,
119
See p. 209, note 76 above.
Substitution 225
Now, one may object that there is a possible conflict here with rule 1.1.55
anekdlsit sarvasya. This rule teaches that a substitute marked with a diacritic
S or one consisting of more than one sound replaces the entire element which
is to undergo substitution, instead of only its final sound as stipulated by rule
1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya. In the formation of supadah, then, the element pad ought
to replace the entire base supdd. Nagesa refutes this by claiming that the word
sarvasya 'of the entire' in rule A 1.1.55 should be understood so as to denote
all of that which is identified as a sthdnin through the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd
only, but not all of that which is suggested by the tadantavidhi or the
yaddgama-principle.
Moreover, Nagesa continues, to suggest that A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya and A
1.1.54 ddeh parasya should block the paribhdsd by reason of their being taught
later than A 1.1.49 in the AstddhydyT, is contradicted by a statement in the
Mahdbhdsya. Under vdrttika 7 on A 6AA30pddahpat Patafijali comes up with
the paribhdsd to solve the difficulties connected with the formation of
udasthdt mentioned earlier. A 8.4.61 udah sthdstambhoh purvasya states that
after ud, in the place of the initial sound of sthd and stambh, we have a sound
which is homogeneous with the earlier. That the substitution takes effect on the
initial sound is provided for by rule 1.1.54 ddeh parasya which teaches that
when an operation is taught for a following form, such as sthd and stambh
which follow ud, then the substitution is directed to the initial sound of that
form. Rule 1.1.54 teaches an exception to the stipulation of rule 1.1.52 alo
'ntyasya, that the substitution is directed to the final sound. Since rule 1.1.54
and, accordingly, rule 1.1.52 are involved in the process here, Patafijali would
not have brought up the paribhdsd if these rules were to block it. Nagesa is thus
relying on the authority of Patanjali in this case.
With regard to the opposite idea, that the paribhdsd should block rules A
1.1.52 and A 1.1.54 by force of its being antaranga, Nagesa refers to Kaiyata's
statement at A 6.4.142 ti vimsater diti that those two rules would have no scope
if this were true.120
Hence, the paribhdsd applies simultaneously with rules A 1.1.52, A 1.1.54
and A 1.1.55. The paribhdsd limits a substitution operation to take effect only
on that element which in a rule is expressly enunciated as ending in the geni-
tive case suffix, while the rules mentioned direct the substitution to a specific
part of that element. The precise relationship of the paribhdsd to these seem-
ingly conflicting rules is thus clarified.
Nagesa next considers a circumstance which precludes the application of
the paribhdsd. This concerns the suffix akAC (-ak- with stem-final accent).
According to A 5.3.71 avyayasarvandmndm akacprdkteh this suffix is added
120
Kaiyata states (MbhP V354a)# na hi nirdisyamdnapanbhdsd 'alo 'ntyasya' 'ddehparasya'
ity etayor bddhikd, etayor mrvisayatvaprasangdt, 'for the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd do
block the two [rules] alo 'ntyasya and ddeh parasya since these two then by consequence
would be without any scope' Whether Nagesa agrees with Kaiyata in this respect is hard to
tell; cf Kielhorn 1871-4 73, note 5
to an indeclinable word and to a pronoun before the vowel of the final syllable.
Thus, for example, the pronominal stem yusmakad- is derived by adding akAC
to yusmad-. Defined as a pratyaya 'suffix', and not as an dgama 'augment',
akAC is one of the two 'suffixes' which are added inside a form.121 In the
domain of akAC, Nagesa claims, the paribhdsd does not apply. The reason is
that a substitution operation takes effect only when we have a knowledge of the
sthdnin involved, as does sthdnivadbhdva, the principle whereby a substitute
is treated like the element it replaces. Similarly, in the case of akAC we get a
knowledge of the sthdnin by another paribhdsd, presented as paribhdsd 89 in
the Paribhdsendusekhara: tanmadhyapatitas tadgrahanena grhyate. This
paribhdsd states that something which is inserted in the middle of a form is
understood when this form is mentioned. This applies to akAC, and a substitu-
tion operation takes effect only when we have a knowledge\tf the form to
which akAC is added. Thus, what is taught for yusmad- apples also to
yusmakad-. As long as akAC is inserted in a form the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd
does not apply. The form to which akAC is added is recognised as the sthdnin,
the element which is to undergo some future substitution operation, by
paribhdsd 89.122
The final issue brought up by Nagesa concerns cases where a genitive form
has been expressly enunciated in a rule where it thus exhibits a sthdnasasthT
and then recurs by anuvrtti in a subsequent rule where it has to be, interpreted
as exhibiting an avayavasasthi, a partitive genitive. Nagesa claims that the
nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd does apply even in the domain of such partitive gen-
itives. The examples Nagesa cites are the derivations of atisyah^ nominative
singular masculine of the stem atityad- 'surpassing that', and atiyuyam, nom-
inative plural of the stem atiyusmad- 'surpassing you'.
As for atisyah, A 7.2.106 tadoh sah sdv anantayoh states that t and d which
are non-final in a presuffixal base are replaced by s in the nominative singu-
lar. More specifically, this applies to the non-final t and d of the pronominal
stems tyad- etc. as stipulated by A 7.2.102 tyadddindm ah which teaches that a
replaces the final (A 1.1.52) of the presuffixal bases (A 6.4.1) tyad etc.123 In
rule 7.2.102 the genitive tyadddindm is to be interpreted as a sthdnasasthT,
whereas it is to be interpreted as an avayavasasthi, a partitive genitive, in the
context of rule 7.2.106. Now, in the formation of the nominative atisyah from
the stem atityad-, the substitute s prescribed by rule 7.2.106 replaces the t of
121
The other one is SnaM, the nasal affix of the seventh present class (A 3 1 78 rudhddibhyah
122
snam)
For the view of Raghavendracarya, see Kielhorn 1871-4 74, note 2. See also the discussion
123
in the Mahabhasya at varttika 1 on rule A 1.1.72 (Mbh 1.184,13-25).
The nominative of tyad- is derived as follows
:
tyad+sU (A 412)
tya + a + sU (A 7.2.102)
sya + a + sU (A 7 2 106)
sya + sU (A 6 197)
syas
Substitution 227
tyad only, not the t of ati although tyad would denote also atityad by rule 1.1.72
yena vidhis tadantasya. The reason is that only tyad etc. have been expressly
enunciated in tyadddindm, which in the context of rule 7.2.106 is a partitive
genitive. It should however be stressed that the paribhdsd applies only with
regard to the expressly enunciated genitive tyadddindm of rule 7.2.102, not to
any genitive.
The second example offered by Nagesa is the formation of atiyuyam. We
are here dealing with rules that teach substitution operations in the domain of
pronouns. According to A 7.2.86 yusmadasmador anddese, the finals of the
two presuffixal bases yusmad and asmad are replaced by a before a case suffix
which begins with a consonant and is not a substitute. A 7.2.91 maparyanta-
sya states that the substitutes taught in the subsequent rules up to A 7.2.98
replace that part of yusmad and asmad which is bounded by mf that is to say,
yusm and asm. By A 7.2.93 yuyavayau jasi, then, yuya and vaya are taught as
substitutes for yusm and asm in the nominative plural, yuyam and vayam. Now,
the compound yusmadasmadoh exhibits a sthdnasasthiin A 7.2.86, but when
it recurs by anuvrtti in rules A 7.2.91 and A 7.2.93 it has to be interpreted as a
partitive genitive. If the paribhdsd did not apply in the case of such a partitive
genitive, then, in the formation of atiyuyam, the unit yuya would replace even
atiyusm by rules A 7.2.91 and A 7.2.93 since here yusmad would denote also
atiyusmad according to the tadantavidhi, rule A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya.
On this evidence Nagesa concludes that the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd is to
be considered applicable also in cases where substitutes replace only part of
that which is expressly enunciated in a rule with a genitive case ending, that is,
the paribhdsd applies also to what is expressly enunciated when this recurs by
anuvrtti in a subsequent rule even though the genitive in the latter context is to
be interpreted as a partitive genitive.
Nagesa ends his exposition by pointing out that the paribhdsd is found in
the Mahdbhdsya on A 6.4.130 pddah pat and A 1.1.49 sasthT sthdneyogd.
The major points of Nagesa's discussion may be reviewed briefly as follows.
He introduces the paribhdsd by referring to a difficulty caused by the
yaddgama-prmciple presented in the preceding paribhdsd 11, namely that a
linguistic unit recognised according to this principle may erroneously be iden-
tified as a unit which is to undergo a substitution operation. This problem is
solved if the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd is established. Nagesa goes on to claim
that rule 1.1.49 is read twice and that the paribhdsd is established by the second
reading.
Having thus tentatively established the paribhdsd, Nagesa states various
objections against it which have to be met. The first of these concerns substitu-
tion operations which take effect even on long vowels while only the corre-
sponding short vowel has been expressly enunciated in the rule which teaches
the operation. The second objection concerns the possible redundancy of the
anubandha N which, among other functions, serves to signal that a substitu-
tion operation is to take effect only on the final sound of the element identified
as the substituend. Both of these objections are successfully met by Nagesa

who, significantly, relies on the authority of Patanjah in this endeavour.
At this stage Nagesa goes on to remark on the relationship between the
paribhdsd and certain other rules of grammar with which there may be a
possible conflict. His first point here is that the paribhdsd is necessary to
prevent elements suggested solely by A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadaniasya or the
yaddgama-prmciple from being recognised as elements which are to undergo
substitution operations. Nagesa's second point here concerns the precise rela-
tion between the paribhdsd and the three rules A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya, A 1.1.54
ddehparasya and A 1.1.55 anekdlsit sarvasya. He argues that neither do these
rules and the paribhdsd block each other, nor are they subservient to each
other. Provided each and every condition for their application is fulfilled, the
rules and the paribhdsd apply together. The paribhdsd limits a substitution to
take effect only on that which is expressly enunciated with a genitive pase
ending, while the rules mentioned direct the substitution to a specific part of
that which is expressly enunciated.
Nagesa then points out an exception to the applicability of the paribhdsd,
namely forms to which the suffix akAC has been added. The property of being
a substituend, sthdnitva, is ascribed to such forms by another paribhdsd, pre-
sented as paribhdsd 89 in the Paribhdsendusekhara: tanmadhyapatitas tad-
grahanend grhyate.
The final issue raised by Nagesa concerns the applicability ofthe paribhdsd
in the domain of partitive genitives. Given a rule where a form is expressly
enunciated with a genitive case ending which in that context is to be interpreted
as a sthdnasasthi, the same form may recur by anuvrtti in a subsequent rule
where it has to be considered a partitive genitive. Nagesa argues that the
paribhdsd does apply in the domain of such partitive genitives, that is, it
applies even in cases where the substitute replaces only part of that which is
?
expressly enunciated in a rule.
In this way the interpretation which Nagesa offered at the beginning of his
discussion has been accounted for. The passage in question runs as follows (ed.
Abhyankar 1962:28,11-12):
sasthyantam nirdisyamdnam uccdryamdnam uccaryamanasajatiyam $va nirdisya-
mdndvayavarupam eva vd sthdnena sthdnamrupitasambandhenq yujyate na
pratiyamdnam iti tenedam siddhamll
What is expressly enunciated - that is, actually pronounced, [or rather, what m the
real language] is of the same kind as, that which is actually pronounced - with a gen-
itive case ending, only [that] or only that which forms part of what is expressly enun-
ciated, is linked with124 the sthdna, that is, through the relation which i£ determined
by the sthdna, not that which is [merely] understood [by the tadantavidhi or the
yadagama-ynncvplz]. Hence this [rule A 1.1.49] is established.
124
The sense of the instrumental here is ambiguous, but the whole issue of the relation defined
by the sthdna will be discussed below
Substitution 229
In this way the panbhdsd does not only convey the sense of rule 1.1.49. It
also serves to reconcile rule 1.1.49 thus interpreted with certain other features
of the system set up m the AstddhydyT. It may be noted in passing that Nagesa
considers the two terms of the ^/zana-relation to be related through the sthdna
in the sense that the relation is determined by the sthdna or, as will become
evident later on, by what the word sthdna signifies. This issue as well as the
conclusions that may be drawn from Nagesa's discussion of the nirdisyamdna-
paribhdsd will be considered again below.
Commentators' remarks on the final section of the Mahdbhdsya at A 1.1.49

and their implications
With this background it is possible to turn to the concluding remarks of the
commentators on the final passage of the Bhdsya at A 1.1.49. Patanjali, it may
be recalled, stated that the purpose of rule 1.1.49 is to render the nirdisyamdna-
paribhdsd.125 Bhartrhari remarks as follows in the DTpikd:126
sasthyantam sthanena yatha yujyeta/ yat tat sasthyantam srutyanupdti I yat
pratiyamdnam tan nam sthanena yujyeta ml yatah sasthy uccarita/ tasya kdrya-
yogitvamm ity eso 'rthah sutrdrambhdt labhyate itil lyam ca sd panbhdsd
'nirdisyamdnasyddesd bhavanti' itil tena 'pddahpaf iti pdcchabdah sasthyantah
srutyanupdti, tadantah pratlyamdna iti na tadantah sthanena yujyatel nanu ca
pdda ity etat sambhutam129 tadantam pratydyayatiti tadantasyddesaprasangahl
tatra kecid varnayantil tadantapanbhdsd bddhyate 'nenetil etac cdsatl iha dosah
sydtl pddayater apratyaydntasya padbhdvah sydt130/ iha hi tat sydn na
vydghrapdda itim I tasmdt prdptasya132 tadantavidher anena vyavacchedah knyatel
yathaiva sdstrdt pdda iti pddantam pratipadyase, evam asmdc chdstrdd133 idam
125
126
Seep 218 above
Text established on the basis of MbhDms fol 204b-5a, MbhD 293,10-23, and the improved
127
edition of Palsule and Bhagavat 1991 23,18-24,5
So read with MbhDms and Palsule and Bhagavat, against the reading ° srutyanupdti yat
pratiyamdnam tat taf of MbhD Why Abhyankar and Limaye introduced this emendation
remains obscure in as much as one would have to translate 'whatever reaches the ear with a
genitive case ending and is so understood, that should be joined with the sthdna'' This goes
against the very idea of preventing what is understood by the tadantavidhi or the yaddgama
principle from being recognised as elements which are to undergo a substitution operation It
would probably be possible to regard the statement as too wide an application (atiprasanga)
which is later to be rejected, though the MbhDms is completely clear at this point and makes
128
perfect sense, so there is no need to emend here
129
So read with Palsule and Bhagavat against kdryayogitve 0of MbhD and MbhDms
Palsule and Bhagavat
13
suggest the emendation samsrutam , but this does not make very good
131
sense either ° MbhDms padbhdva syd
The MbhDms seems to read iha hi tasyd iha hi tasydnna vydghrapdda iti This is so garbled
;„ that it is tempting to follow Palsule and Bhagavat who simply suggest iha hi na sydt -
'.j vydghrapdd iti
132
Emendation suggested by Palsule and Bhagavat, MbhDms reads tasmdn prdtastha, MbhD
133
emends to tasmdd pddasya
MbhDms seems to read evam ayam vdcchdstrdd, Palsule and Bhagavat suggest evam eva
vdsmdc chdstrdd (reading, however, cdsmdc°, ibid 195), MbhD reads evam ayam vd sdstrdd
which is closer to the manuscript reading but makes no sense
230 Indian semantic analysis ^
vdkyam evambhutam pratipadyasva I pdda iti pddantasya yah pdcchabdas134 tasya

padbhdvo bhavatltil atha vd samuddyd135 eva kdryasattve pdcchdstrdd136 avayava-
dvdrakam kdryabhdktvam pratipadyante na sdksdd iti I katham 'yivarnayor
didhivevyoK iti I tatrdpi didhivevyor nirdisyamdnatvdt sarvddeso Ippah prdpnotil
satyam evam etadl upasamhdrena ca 'alo 'ntyasycC ity antyasya131 bhavisyatill
'In order that what ends in a genitive case suffix should be linked with the sthdnd*:
that is to say, whatever ends in a genitive case suffix as a result of hearing [the
genitive suffix]; but what is [merely] understood [from that which is actually
heard with a genitive case ending], that should not be linked with the sthdna.
'Provided a genitive is actually pronounced after it': that is the recipient of the
operation. This sense is obtained from the formulation of the rule [A 1.1.49]. And
this is [as much as ] that [familiar] paribhdsd: 'substitutes occur in the place of
what is expressly enunciated'. Therefore, in [A 6.4.130] pddah pat it is the lin-
guistic item pad which ends in a genitive case suffix as a result of hearing [it];
what ends in it (= in pad) [and would thus fall under the scope of the tadantavidhi
(A 1.1.72)] is [merely] understood, and hence that which ends in it is ncjt linked
with the sthdna.
Well, but this [element] pddah has come about, [and that] causes a knowledge
[also] of what ends in it [according to A 1.1.72], and so there is a possibility that the
substitute occurs in the place of whatever ends in it (= in pad). »
As far as this is concerned, some explain: the tadanta-paribhdsd is blocked by
this [rule 1.1.49]. But that is not correct; there would be a fault here: pad would
occur in the place of [the causative presuffixal base] pddayatih {-pad) ending in a
zero suffix {-pad). But there would not be [a fault] here: [pad would not occur] in
the place of vydghrapdd. Therefore this [rule 1.1.49] accomplishes a delimitation of
the tadantavidhi which applies [here]. Just as, on the basis of the rule (=A 1.1.72),
you understand [also] whatever ends in pad when you hear [the word] pddah [of A
6.4.130], in the same way, on the basis of this rule (= A 1.1.49), you must understand
this sentence [pddah pat] in this manner: pad occurs in the place 6f the linguistic
element pad of that which ends in pad [when you consider] pddah'in the place of
pad' [in rule 6.4.130]. Or rather, on the basis of the pad-rule [i.eh, A 6.4.130138],
when a grammatical operation takes place, entire groups of [linguistic] elements
themselves are capable of participating in a grammatical operation, [but only]
through [their] parts, [and] not directly. ?,
134
So read with Palsule and Bhagavat; MbhDms seems to read pddacchabdas°, emended to pad
135
sabdas MbhD.
MbhDms reads yamuyd; Palsule and Bhagavat accept the emendation samuddyd[h] 'wholes'
of MbhD. The emendation is substantiated by the subsequent avayavadvdmkam E
'occasioned
136
by the parts'.
With MbhD. MbhDms seems to read yd[c?]chdsdstrdd (according to Mbht), pdchasdstrdd;
according to Palsule and Bhagavat, ydchdstrdd). Palsule and Bhagavat suggest the emenda-
137
tion {kdryasattve) 'smdc chdstrdd; see below.
After upasamhdrena MbhDms seems to read valomtyasyetyamsya; MbhD gives the text as
upasamhdrena ca 'alo 'ntyasyd1 ity antasya; Palsule and Bhagavat as above* except that they
138
read tu for ca. \
But it would probably be neater to have A 1.1.49 as the basis here. This, I presume, is what
makes Palsule and Bhagavat prefer the more drastic emendation {kdryasattve) 'smdc
chdstrdd0. *'
Substitution 231
What about [A 7.4.53] yivarnayor didhfvevyohl139 There too, because didhi and
vevf have been expressly enunciated, elision applies as the substitute of the entire
[forms didhTand vevT]. That is correct, but by invoking [A 1.1.52] alo 'ntyasya, [the
substitute] will appear [only] in the place of the final sound.
Once again, the task is to get the relationship right between A 1.1.49, or the
nirdisyarnana-paribhdsd, and certain other rules in the AstddhydyT. Bhartrhari
limits himself to the seemingly conflicting tadantavidhi and rule 1.1.52 alo
'ntyasya. Because didhi and vevT have been expressly enunciated - as stipu-
lated in the paribhdsd - A 1.1.52 directs the substitution to the final sound, and
the tadantavidhi which would bring about substitution of the entire forms is
set aside.
Kaiyata, who is considerably clearer here, comes up with a slightly differ-
ent solution while moving within the same scenery (MbhP I:41?2b):
yatah sasthlft'/ tena pddah pad ity asydyam arthah -pddantasydngasya yo 'vayavah
pdcchabdah sutre sasthyd nirdistas tasya pacchabda ddeso bhavati, na tu
pratiyamdnasya pddantasyal asyaiva sutrasya nirdisyamdnasyddesd bhavantlty
ayam arthah I sasthiti sasthyantam grhyate I tena sasthyantam eva nirdisyamdnam
sthdnena yujyate, na tu pratlyamdnam ity arthah I alo 'ntyasyddeh parasyety etat tu
vacanasdmarthydn na bddhyate II
That after which the genitive case suffix [is actually pronounced]'; hence, the
meaning of [rule 6.4.130] pddah pat is the following. It is as a replacement of that
particular unit pad, which forms part of a presuffixal base ending in pad and is
expressly enunciated in the rule by the genitive case suffix, that the unit pad applies,
but not of that which is [merely] understood to end in pad. The purpose of this very
rule [A 1.1.49] is the statement that 'substitutes occur in the place of what is
expressly enunciated'. In saying 'a genitive case suffix', what is denoted is 'that
which ends in a genitive case suffix'. Therefore, only when it ends in a genitive case
suffix is something expressly enunciated linked with the sthdna, not when it is
[merely] understood [by the tadantavidhi or the yaddgama-pnnciple]; that is the
meaning. But [rules A 1.1.52] alo 'ntyasya and [A 1.1.54] ddeh parasya, by force of
[the very fact that they] have been stated, are not blocked140 [by A 1.1.49].
Adducing A 6.4.130 pddah pat as his example, Kaiyata states that only
when something is expressly enunciated with a genitive case ending is it recog-
nised as a valid sthdnin, not when it is merely understood to be so. He also
notes that when rule 1.1.49 is interpreted in this way it does not block rules A
1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya and A 1.1.54 ddehparasya. By now this is familiar ground.
Nagesa's commentary contains remarks of considerable importance here
(MbhU I:412b):
139
A 7.4.53 teaches elision in the form of lopa as the replacement of the final sound (A 1.1.52
alo 'ntyasya) of the roots didhiN and veviN when they occur as presuffixal bases before suf-
fixes beginning with y or i. Under the solutionI4presently discussed, lopa would be the sub-
stitute of the entire forms didhi and vevu ° See p. 225, note 120 above.
nirdisyamdnam itil uccdryamdnam ity arthahl nirdisyamdnam sasthyantam evety

anvayahl nirdisyamdnapadasya cddhydhdra iti bhdvahll na bddhyate itil kim tu
svavyavasthdpakatvendsnyata ity arthahl evam anekdlsutre sarvo 'py etat-
paribhdsdbodhita eva grhyate I paddanna itydddv api ddesaih pdninikrtasthdnyuc-
cdrandnumdndd vyavasthdrthatvdd vd na dosah II yat tv alo 'ntyasyddeh parasyety
amu etadbddhakdv iti, tat tu udasthd iti141 pddahpad iti sutrasthabhdsyaviruddham I
vyavasthdpakatve sambhavati bddhakatvakalpand'naucityagrastamlA^call
'What is expressly enunciated'; that is to say, what is actually pronounced. The
construction of the sentence [in the Pradipa] is: 'only what is expressly enunciated
with a genitive case ending',143 the idea being that we have the supplement of the
word nirdisyamdna 'being expressly enunciated'. '[Rules A 1.1.52 and A 1.1.54] are
not blocked', however these [two rules] are relied upon as limitors of the
paribhdsd,144 that is the sense. Likewise in rule [A 1.1.55] anekdl[sit sarvasyai 'the
entire' [unit identified as the sthdnin by this rule] is also understood to be only/what
is recognised by this paribhdsd.145 Even in the case of [A 6.1.63] paddannqs etc.
there is no fault, either because the pronunciation of the substituends actually/ made
by Panini is inferred through the substitutes, or because the purpose [of the fule] is
a fixed distribution [of usage]. But the proposition that the two [rules A 1.1.52] alo
'ntyasya and [A 1.1.54] ddeh parasya block the paribhdsd is contradicted by the
Bhdsya at rule [A 6.4.130] pddah pat with regard to [the formation of an aorist form
such as] udasthdtdm.146 Moreover, this [proposition] is tormented due to the impro-
priety in imagining that [these rules] serve as blockers [of the paribhdsd] when the
possibility exists that [they] serve to determine a fixed distribution of scope.
Nagesa here points out that even in the case of A 6.1.63 paddannomdshrn-
nisasanyusandosanyakanchakanudandsanchasprabhrtisu there is no fault.
This rule teaches that before one of the suffixes beginning with Sas, that is,
before the accusative plural suffix and the other suffixes of the so-called weak
cases, the substitutes listed should replace the stem, so that pad replaces pdda,
dat replaces danta, etc. This rule is an anomaly in that substitutes are taught,
but substituends are not listed. And when no sthdnin has been expressly enun-
141
142
The edition of Vedavrata (1962-3) reads udasthdd iti.' ~~
The edition of Vedavrata (1962-3) reads bddhakatvakalpandnaucityagrastam which I take to
143
be a compound.
Kaiyata states 'sasthyantam eva nirdisyamdnam'. This syntax is determined by the logic of
Kaiyata's explanation. Nagesa, on the other hand, prefers the syntax 'nirdisyamdnam
sasthyantam eva\ I suspect that Nagesa's concern here is to make it clear that the particle eva
in the sense of restriction, avadhdrana, should apply to both of the other words of the
construction. This is confirmed by his own word order m the Paribhdsendusekhara (ed.
144
Abhyankar 1962:28,11); sasthyantam nirdisyamdnam ... eva.
sva- may refer to rule 1.1.49 itself, which at this stage of the discussion amounts to the same.
It is the scope of rule 1.1.49, interpreted as conveying the sense of the paribhdsd, that is
145
limited by the two rules; that is, the two rules determine a fixed distribution of scope.
Just as rules A 11 52 and A 1.1.54 serve to direct the substitution to a specific part of the unit
which has been identified by the paribhdsd, so does rule 1.1.55 state that the substitute under
certain conditions is to replace the entire substituend, but only what has been identified by
the paribhdsd, not that which has been recognised by the tadantavidhi or the yaddgama-
146
prmciple.
This variant of the example is the one adduced by Patanjah in his discussion of A 6.4.130
(Mbh 111:222,12).
Substitution 233
ciated with a genitive case ending, the paribhasa does not apply. Nagesa gets
around this problem in two ways. Either, he says, the pronunciation of the sub-
stituends made by Panini can be inferred through the substitutes, or the rule
serves to establish a fixed distribution or limitation (yyavastha) in usage.
Similarly, when dealing with the possibility that the rules A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyasya
etc. were to block the paribhasa, he concludes that such a view is untenable as
long as the possibility exists that these rules serve as limitors of the paribhasa,
determining a fixed distribution of scope.
Vaidyanatha Payagunda comments on the Uddyota passage in the following
way (Bhargavasastrl JosT 1951:412, note 10):
nanv ayam paddanna ityddau dosah, atra sthdnyabhdvenaitadapravrttyd tesdm

sarvapadendgrahanendntyddesatvdpatter ata aha — paddanna itydddv itill atra
gauravam, tathd sati tathaiva vaded vd yta aha - vyavetil prayogetyddihll dvayor
api loke sattvdd iti bhdvahll
Well, there is this fault in the case of [A 6.1.63] paddannas etc.: since no elements
which are to undergo substitution are mentioned here, the paribhasa does not apply.
Hence the word sarva [of A 1.1.55] is not denotative, and so you would have the
substitution directed to the finals of these [by rule 1.1.52]. Therefore [Nagesa] says
'in the case of [rule 6.1.63] paddannas etc.'. There is prolixity involved here, or, that
being so, that is indeed how he would say [it], [and] therefore he states: '[or because
the purpose is] a fixed distribution'; that is, in usage etc. The idea is: because both
exist in the world.
Units occur in complementary distribution. Substituends would already

exist in the world, but we use substitutes before certain case suffixes. Rule
6.1.63 serves to establish a fixed distribution in this respect. This is possible
because sthdnins and ddesas both exist in the world, a fact which implies that
one has to consider usage. And Paninlyas do indeed acknowledge that
grammar serves to explain the linguistic elements of eternal Sanskrit usage.
Concluding remarks on the discussion of A 1.1.49

Since a survey of Patanjali's remarks on A 1.1.49 was given prior to their dis-
cussion, I shall turn directly to the conclusions I think we can draw from this
discussion. What is immediately striking is that the series of arguments con-
cerning this rule do not primarily concern the genitive being used to mark the
relation of being in the place of. Such a usage of the genitive is in accordance
with established Sanskrit usage. Another important conclusion is really a
simple observation: in the grammar one and the same genitive form can be
interpreted in different ways according to context. In the words of Cardona
(1974a:326): Tanini's rules 1.1.49, 66, 67 are properly interpreted only as
restrictive metarules. As such they presuppose no radical departure in Panini's
metalanguage from the syntax of normal Sanskrit for which the rules of the
grammar account.'
Patanjali concludes that rule 1.1.49 is necessary only to teach the content of
the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd. He argues in a similar manner also with regard
to A 1.1.72 yena vidhis tadantasya (the tadantavidhi) and A 1.4.13 yasmdt
pratyayavidhis tadddipratyaye 'ngam.141 Patanjali is forced to admit that there
is some doubt as to the relation marked by the genitive, since between one lin-
guistic unit and another such relations as dnantarya 'adjacency' and sdmipya
'nearness' may also obtain. This he dismisses as mere doubt, and invokes the
paribhdsd which tells us that in a case of doubt, we have to ascertain a partic-
ular conclusion by reasoned explanation, vydkhydna. So we are forced to inter-
pret and in cases of doubt one can rely on tradition. Rhetorically, then, he says
we do not need rule 1.1.49. Then he says we do need it, but only to render the
nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd. In other words, the rule teaches specific needs of
grammar and not a particular usage of the genitive. This argument wou|d not
work were not the use of the sthdnasasthT firmly rooted in the usage of ordi-
nary Sanskrit. It seems therefore safe to conclude that the usage of the
sthdnasasthT is an established feature of ordinary language and that Patanjali's
discussion of rule 1.1.49 supports this fact. This leads to the question of
whether Patanjali's conclusion is in agreement with Panini's intentions or
whether it is a trick of the commentators.
That it was Panini's intention that rule 1.1.49 teach what the paribhdsd
states is more than doubtful. It is evident that you could get the usage of the
sthdnasasthTfrom the Sanskrit language itself, but other interpretations of the
genitive also apply in the AstddhydyT, so it is perfectly possible that Panini for-
mulated the rule to clarify this situation. Otherwise one would have to assume
that he introduced rule 1.1.49 to clear the ground for rules A 1.1.52, 1.1.54,
1.1.55 and 1.1.56 which all pertain to substitution. Commentators suggest that
A 1.1.56 is ajfidpaka for A 1.1.49, but so would A 1.1.52 alo 'ntyaysa be. It
may not technically be zjiidpaka, but could it be that rule 1.1.49 w&s stated to
account for the genitive in that rule and the ones in A 1.1.54 and A 1.1.55 which
teach exceptions to rule 1.1.52?
Katyayana gives no hint that the purpose of A 1.1.49 is to teach the content
of the paribhdsd. On the contrary, he is concerned with the genitive and its
usage in the AstddhydyT. The four vdrttikas on this rule state: (1) that the
purpose is to make a restriction with regard to the interpretation of a genitive
in the grammar (2) that this does not work, since it would exclude such geni-
tives as the partitive (3) that this is no problem, because in those cases there is
no doubt about the relation (4) or, that the genitive used to denote the relation
defined by a sthdnasasthT should receive some distinguishing mark.
The Paninlya tradition from Patanjali to Vaidyanatha Payagunda, on the
other hand, tells us that A 1.1.49 is introduced to convey the sense of the
nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd, that substitutes take the place of what is expressly
enunciated with a genitive case ending. Simple commentaries, such as the
147
For the latter rule, see Benson 1990.70-1.
Substitution 235
Kdsikdvrtti and the Bhdsdvrtti, do not bring in the paribhdsd in their discus-
sions of rule 1.1.49. The need of grammar, however, is that in the process of a
grammatical derivation a rule such as A 6.4.130 pddah pat teaches that pat
replaces pad but not anything ending in pad which has not been stated with a
genitive case ending. This may be achieved by letting A 1.1.49 render the
paribhdsd, but that could only happen if rule 1.1.49 were dispensable in its
function of introducing the sthdnasasthT.
In his long discussion oftheparibhdsd in the Paribhdsendusekhara, Nagesa
is not really concerned with substitution, only with the technical complications
caused by the paribhdsd in the system of grammar. Consequently, he discusses
problems internal to the AstddhydyT, primarily the relation of the paribhdsd to
other rules, in particular rules teaching or relating to substitution operations.
The paribhdsd limits a substitution operation to take effect only on that
element which in a rule is expressly enunciated as ending in a genitive case
suffix, while the rules in question direct the substitution to a specific part of
that element. The precise relationship of the paribhdsd to seemingly conflict-
ing rules is thus clarified.
This raises the important question of whether the paribhdsd is necessary for
non-grammarians. Although this is hard to argue, I am inclined to answer
maybe not, and say that it is only required within the theoretical framework of
Paninlya grammar. Strictly speaking the paribhdsd speaks of 'what has been
enunciated', but not of the genitive. It is the choice of the grammarians to let
it render A 1.1.49. If the paribhdsd has any general validity, it does not neces-
sarily state anything more than that a substitute takes the place of an expressly
enunciated substituend.
As for the sthdnasambandha, the relation defined by supplying the locative
word form sthdne, Kaiyata tells us that it is antaranga, that it is what would
come to mind anyway as the relation obtaining between one linguistic element
and another regardless of other relations that may possibly obtain. This view
is endorsed by Bhattoji DIksita, Nagesa, and Vaidyanatha. Nagesa comments
that antarangatva is established regardless of whether we interpret the term
sthdna as artha 'meaning' or prasanga 'possible appearance', the two mean-
ings most commonly ascribed to this term by the tradition. If it signifies artha
'meaning', Vaidyanatha remarks, then the antarangatva of the sthdnasam-
bandha holds because meaning comes first when we use words. But if it is
assumed that sthdna signifies artha, then one does not need Panini's rule, since
words are used to denote or express artha and that is in the mind already. If,
on the other hand, sthdna signifies prasanga 'possible appearance' it is also
possible to interpret the genitive as a sthdnasasthl'even without rule 1.1.49. The
possibility of other relations, Vaidyanatha argues, exists only for what is
prasakta, for what would possibly appear. Other relations, such as adjacency
and nearness, can obtain only when something appears. These relations hold
only between word and word, not between word and meaning. But either way
antarangatva is established. The alternative senses of artha and prasanga are
just choices with regard to the weight being laid on meaning or on word form,
though prasanga elsewhere involves meaning.
If, then, the sthanasambandha is considered to be present in the mind before
any other relation when we meet with a genitive form in the grammar, there is
every reason to conclude that to interpret a genitive as a substitutional genitive
is nothing remarkable in Sanskrit grammatical literature. Nor is there anything
in the discussions of A 1.1.49 and the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd which restricts
such a usage of the genitive to grammatical texts. With regard to the relation
sustained between the two terms of a nirvacana analysis, this is significant. So
is Vaidyanatha's remark that on the view that the term sthdna signifies artha
'meaning', the sthanasambandha is what comes to mind before any other rela-
tion because meaning comes first when we use words. It may be recalled that
nirvacana analysis first and foremost is concerned with meaning, not with
grammatical form. It remains to investigate more precisely the nature of the
sthanasambandha, the relation marked by a sthdnasastlu.
The relation marked by a sthanasasthi

The logical possibilities are that there may exist in the substitution model three
relations: (a) between the sthdnin and the ddesa (b) between the sthdnin and
the sthdna (c) between the sthdna and the ddesa. It may also be the case that
sthdna is a relational term, that is, that it is expressive of the relation 'being the
sthdna of.
In the Mahdbhdsya discussion of A 1.1.49 we meet with some conflicting
statements as to the relation marked by a sthanasasthiand its interpretation. To
begin with, Patanjali gives two alternative interpretations when he discusses
the vyadhikaranabahuvnhi compound sthdneyogd (Mbh 1:118,6-7): sthdne
yogo 'sydh, literally 'that of which there is a relation in the sthdna", and sthd-
nena yogo 'sydh, 'that of which there is a relation with the sthdna9. The loca-
tive interpretation I take to mean that the sthdna is a necessary condition for
the relation, while the instrumental would imply that the sthdna itself is one of
the terms of the relation. This ambiguity reflects itself in Patanjali's final
remarks on A 1.1.49: sthdna iti vydkhydsydmah, 'so we shall interpret [the gen-
itive to denote a relation defined by the locative word form] sthdne' (Mbh
1:119,25), and sasthyantam sthdnena yathd yujyeta, 'so that what ends in a gen-
itive case suffix should be linked with the sthdna' (Mbh 1:119,26). In works
such as the Praudhamanoramd and the Tattvabodhinlonly the trtiydvigraha is
resorted to.148 As I have already suggested,149 this could simply be prompted
by the fact that one would expect the word yoga in the sense of sambandha
'relation' to be used with the instrumental form sthdnena in the present
context. The most natural way to translate sthdnena yujyeta is 'should be joined
with the sthdna9. This is normal Sanskrit usage. Patanjali resorts to it also else-
148 149
See p 196 above. See p. 196 with note 50 above.
Substitution 237
where, for example at A 2.2.19 when referring to two views concerning the
priority of relations between preverbs, roots, and suffixes (Mbh 1:217,22-3):
purvam dhdtur upasargena yujyate pascdt sddhanena, 'a root is first joined
with a preverb and subsequently with a finite verb suffix [expressing the
kdraka]\ Under this alternative, then, the relation obtains between the sthdna
and the sthdnin. There is nothing in the Bhdsya discussion itself which pre-
cludes such an interpretation. But the mere fact that the usage of the instru-
mental is normal Sanskrit usage may allow for the possibility that it is actually
resorted to for that very reason, for we did indeed face a locative in the first
place. The possibility therefore also presents itself that the expression sthdnena
yujyeta is to be interpreted as 'should be joined through/by means of the
sthdna\
But there are further conflicting remarks. For example, Kaiyata says at one
point in the discussion that the sthdnin is related to the ddesa.150 At another
point Nagesa comes up with an ambiguous remark that either the sthdna is one
of the terms of the relation in question or it is something which restricts one or
both terms of the relation in question.151
A 2.3.50 sasthi sese teaches that a genitive case ending is introduced to
denote 'the rest' (sesa). According to the Kdsikdvrtti this rest is any relation,
sambandha, which is not a kdraka-relation and different from the meaning of
the nominal stem. In other words, a genitive case suffix is introduced to denote
any relation sustained between entities, that is to say, any non-verbal relation
in general, such as father-son, master-servant, part-whole, etc.152 The fact that
two entities are mutually related by their appearance in a given context is
expressed by the genitive case. But the particular type of relation is not speci-
fied.
The problem of determining the relation marked by a sthdnasasthT may best
be illustrated by adducing as an example a rule for the interpretation of which
rule 1.1.49 comes into play. Such a rule is A 2.4.52 aster bhuh. This rule,
together with A 1.1.49, teaches that the verbal root as is replaced by bhu in the
domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes. To the class of drdhadhdtuka suffixes
belong, for example, the suffix Ktvd by which the absolutive bhutvd is formed,
150
MbhP I 411a. ddesahngdsangdt tasya ca sasthyabhdvdt tatsambaddhasthdnino lingakd
phahsyatity arthah\ 'that is to say, by adding the mark to the substitute, and by the fact that
this does not exhibit a genitive case suffix, the operation [signalled] by the mark will take
151
effect on the substituend which is related to the substitute', see p 211 above.
MbhU
iU
I:410a. yogavatlfr pakse 'py evam eva, sthdnarupasambandhiniyamdrthatvdd asy
yogavatT"' even on this view things are just the same, since [the rule] has as its purpose a
152
restriction with regard to the relatum having the form of the sthdna\ see p 207 above
The Kdsikd states (Kas II 209-11) karmddibhyo yo 'nyah prdtipadikdrthavyatinktah
svasvdmisambandhddih sesas tatra sasthi vibhaktir bhavati, 'the rest is such relations
owner-owned which is other than [fozrafoz-relations] such as karman "object" [and] different
from the meaning of the nominal stem [indicated in the nominative case], in this context the
sixth case ending applies'. More sophisticated commentaries, from the Mahdbhdsya onwards,
see the need to continue also kdraka-vzlditions from the previous rules, but this need not
concern us here.
and the suffix tumUN by which the infinitive bhavitum is formed. In the rule
aster bhuh, it is obvious that the statement involves a relation between two
relata, the verbal roots as and bhu. Just what the relation is, however, cannot
be known from the statement aster bhuh alone, anymore than one knows from
the statement devadattasya yajnadattah just what relation obtains between
Devadatta and Yajnadatta. But if yajnadattah is replaced by an obvious rela-
tional term such zsputrah 'son', the relation in question is immediately under-
stood: Devadatta's son.
Now, in the case of aster bhuh, where bhu itself is no obvious relational
term, the relation marked by the genitive is determined by the expression
sthdne which defines the genitive according to A 1.1.49. A 2.4.52, then, teaches
that bhu occurs in the sthdna of as in certain contexts, the elements bhu and as
technically termed the ddesa 'substitute' and the sthdnin 'substituend', respec-
tively. But the exact nature of this relation depends on what sense is attributed
to the term sthdna. A full investigation of the differenUnterpretations of sthdna
considered by the commentators will be carried out sepaJatelyJêlow. Suffice
it here to say that Paninlyas interpret the term sthdna either as an action noun,
equivalent to sthiti 'a standing', or as a term referring to a locus. Under the first
alternative various contextual meanings are considered, the one most com-
monly accepted being prasanga 'possible appearance; chance'. Under the
second alternative one particular locus that is considered is the artha
'meaning' of a linguistic element or speech unit.
If sthdna is interpreted as a term referring to a locus and sthdnin as some-
thing occurring in that locus, it seems reasonable to assume that a similar rela-
tion obtains between the substitute, ddesa, and the sthdna. The sthdnin and the
ddesa are thus inseparably related, but only through the sthdna. Thus, if
the sthdna denotes some sort of locus in grammatical space, for example the
meaning {artha) in which a linguistic unit is said to occur, then the rules of
the AstddhydyT which contain genitives to be interpreted by A 1.1.49 may be
assumed to teach linguistic elements that should occur in loci held by other lin-
guistic elements that are to be replaced.
If the term sthdna is interpreted as an action noun with the sense of
prasanga 'possible appearance' and the term sthdnin is interpreted as 'that
which is characterised by possible appearance', then the direction of the rela-
tion between the sthdnin and the sthdna is reversed, and the genitive as
defined by A 1.1.49 may be said to identify the sthdnin as that linguistic
element which would possibly appear if a certain rule did not introduce the
ddesa. This presupposes that the sthdnin and the ddesa are in complementary
distribution. In the case of A 2.4.52 aster bhuh, then, the genitive serves to
identify as which is the element that would possibly appear if the rule did not
specify the element bhu as its replacement in the domain of drdhadhdtuka
suffixes.
With the above background it is possible to investigate more closely the
relation marked by the genitive as defined by A 1.1.49 in the light of how
Substitution 239
Paninlyas themselves have considered the issue. Kaiyata, in his commentary

on rule 1.1.49, remarks on the relation in question as follows (MbhP P.408b):
sthane yogo 'sya iti I sthdnammittasambandhety arthahll trtlyaya vefi/ 'nipdtandf
iti yojyaml yathd devadattasya yajnadatta iti putratvddidvdrakah sambandho
'vagamyate, evam aster bhur ity atrdpy asydm paribhdsdydm satydm sthdna-
nimittah sambandho 'vasiyate II
'That of which there is a relation in the sthdna': that is to say, [the genitive identi-
fies] a relation which is caused by the sthdna. [On] 'trtiydyd va? [one should add
that this statement too] is to be constructed with nipdtandt 'because it is a legiti-
mate form'. When you say 'Devadatta's Yajnadatta' a relation that becomes appar-
ent through such properties as 'being a son' etc. is understood. Likewise with regard
to the statement 'aster bhuh\ given this principle of interpretation,153 a relation
which is caused by the sthdna is ascertained too.
Kaiyata here identifies yoga as sambandha 'relation', and the way in which
Patanjali analysed the compound sthdneyogd makes him say that the relation
in question is one which has the sthdna as its cause (nimitta). To tell us how
relations are perceived, he offers the by now familiar example of devadattasya
yajnadattah, where the property of putratva 'being a son' or some similar
abstract relational property has to be supplied if the relation between
Yajnadatta and Devadatta is to be understood. If the paribhdsd, the principle
of interpretation expressed by rule 1.1.49, is recognised, the relation expressed
in rule A 2.4.52 aster bhuh is understood through sthdnatva in the same way
that the relation marked by the genitive in devadattasya yajnadattah is estab-
lished through putratva, the property of being a son, or any similar abstract
relational property. Given the paribhdsd rule A 1.1.49, rule 2.4.52 aster bhuh
becomes understood as well. On the available evidence so much seems to be
Kaiyata's view.
Now, it is well known that Kaiyata built heavily on Bhartrhari. Consider
then the following passage from Bhartrhari's DTpikd on rule 1.1.49 (MbhD
288,17-289,2):
darsanadvayam ca sasthinirdesesu I 'aster bhuh' iti I eke manyante154 aster iti yd
sasthi sd naiva bhuvah sambandhinil kim tarhi sthdnaprayuktd I ddheyatvena tu
bhavatir upddiyate iti I ke cid dhi sabdd na svarupdd vyatirekam upajanayitum
saknuvantil tad yathd I devadattasya yajnadatta iti na yajhadatto yajhadattarUpdd
devadatte155 vyatirekam janayati I evam hi kalpyamdne samuccayapratipattih sydt
- devadatto yajhadattas ceti1561 tasmdd ye ynye yrthd devadattasya yajnadattah pita
putrah svdmT bhrtyah samipa ity etebhyo vyatirekah1511 ke cit tu svarupdd eva
153
That is, rule 1.1.49 itself.
154
So phrase with Palsule and Bhagavat (1991:19,7-8) for darsanadvayam sasthinirdesesu 'aster
155
bhuh? ity eke manyante I.
So MbhDms fol. 201a, a reading retained by Palsule and Bhagavat (1991:19,11), for MbhD
156
devadatteti. I am not fully confident of the text or my translation here.
157
So also Palsule and Bhagavat (1991:19,12). The MbhDms fol. 201a reads yajnadattasyeti.
So also Palsule and Bhagavat (1991:19,13). The MbhDms fol. 201a reads vyatirekecittu0.
vyatirekam dhur itil yathd ddsahputrah karmakara itil anye manyante Ibhusabda
evaparigrhya svasamavdyino dharmdn sdmipyddin vyatirekahetur15* itil
Now there exist two views concerning statements where genitives are given, such
as aster bhuh. Some hold that the genitive in asteh is not a relatum of bhuh at all,
but rather it is linked directly to the sthdna. [The verb] bhavatih (^bhu), however,
is employed as something to be placed [in the sthdna]. For some linguistic units are
not able to produce additional relational difference on the basis of their own form,
just as in the statement 'Devadatta's Yajnadatta' where [the term] Yajnadatta does
not produce any relational difference on the basis of the form 'Yajnadatta' with
regard to Devadatta. For when it is considered like this, we get a mere understanding
of aggregation, namely, 'Devadatta and Yajnadatta'. Therefore it is from those other
senses, such as Yajnadatta [who is] father, son, master, servant, [or] near to
Devadatta, that a relational difference [is produced]. Some [linguistic units] do,
however, express a relational difference on the basis of their own form alone, such
as 'slave', 'son', 'employee'.
Others hold that the linguistic element bhu itself, once it has taken on properties
such as nearness which are inherent in it, is theûse_with-i:egard to [producing]
relational difference.
On the authority of Bhartrhari, then, there exist two positions concerning
statements which contain genitives to be interpreted according to A 1.1.49.
Such a statement is A 2.4.52 aster bhuh, which, taken by itself, clearly con-
tains a relational genitive and involves a relation between two relata, the ele-
ments as and bhu, however it is impossible to know from this statement alone
just what exactly the relation in question is. In this respect the statement aster
bhuh is similar to devadattasya yajnadattah, where the term yajnadatta, just
like the term bhu, is incapable of producing any relational difference on the
basis of its own form since it does not belong to the class of inherently rela-
tional terms such as pitr 'father', puira 'son', svdmin 'master', etc. Thus, all
that is achieved by a statement like devadattasya yajnadattah is an under-
standing of mere aggregation, that is, one entity and another entity. If, on the
other hand, one of the two terms is a relational term like pitr and such, the rela-
tion in question is immediately understood; for example, devadattasya pita
'Devadatta's father'.
Now, if one adds the locative grhe 'in a house' to form a sentence like deva-
dattasya grhe yajnadattah, one immediately understands that Yajnadatta is in
a house that belongs to Devadatta. The genitive devadattasya is directly bound
to grhe. Similarly, if one supplies sthdne to the statement aster bhuh to give
asteh sthdne bhuh, one immediately understands as to be related directly to
what sthdne signifies. The term bhu, on the other hand, since it is not a rela-
tional term such as pitr 'father' or anything similar, simply refers to the verb.
In context, this is referred to as something which is to be put in a place. This
indicates that Bhartrhari considers sthdna as a term referring to a locus.
158
So read with MbhDms fol. 201a, a reading retained by Palsule and Bhagavat (1991:19,16), for
MbhD vyatireke hetur in.
Substitution 241
The other position alluded to in the DTpikd passage under discussion is that
even such terms as bhu or yajnadatta, although they are not inherently rela-
tional terms such as pitr 'father', nevertheless can serve to show additional
properties. In this case bhu is directly related to as and able to produce rela-
tional difference by itself once it is qualified by a relational property.
Now, given the paribhdsd rule sasthi sthdneyogd which states that a geni-
tive which is not already contextually bound is to be understood as involving a
relation with the sthdna, once the locative word form sthdne is supplied in
accordance with this provision, a genitive such as asteh is indeed linked
directly to sthdne: asteh sthdne bhur bhavati, 'bhu applies in the sthdna of as\
Let me now turn to Nagesa's commentary on A 1.1.49 and the way in which
he remarks on the relation denoted by the genitive as defined by this rule
(MbhU I:408b):
atra sthdnasdmipyddayah sasthyarthasambandhanirupakdh, na tu sasthyarthd iti
na matupsutrasthabhdsyavirodhah I ata evdtra bhagavatd saptamyantena trtiydnt-
ena vd samdso darsitah, na tu samdnddhikaranabahuvnhih I tad dhvanayatoktam
- sthdnanimittasambandhety artha itiII nanv ddesavidhau sthdnasabddbhdvena
katham sthdnanimittah sambandho 'ta dha-yatheti I tathd ca 'devadattasya yajha-
dattaK ity ukte kim ity dkdnksdvasdt putra ity adhydhdro yathd, tathd pradesesu
sthdnapadddhydhdrena vdkyaikadesanydyena vd bodha iti bhdvahll
There is no disagreement here with what is stated by the Bhdsya in the context of
the matUP rule since [terms] such as sthdna and sdmipya condition the relation
which is the meaning of the genitive case, but they are not the meanings of the gen-
itive case. For this very reason Patanjali presents this as a compound with a word
ending in the locative or the instrumental case, not as a bahuvnhi compound whose
members are in syntactic agreement. So to bring this out [Kaiyata] has stated: 'that
is to say, it is a relation which is caused by the sthdna\
But since the word sthdna is absent in rules which teach substitutes, how [do we
know] that the relation is one which is caused by the sthdna? For this reason he
[= Kaiyata] makes the statement 'just like'. So in this way, when it is stated
'Devadatta's Yajnadatta', by force of the expectancy [which is reasonably expressed
by the question] 'what?', just like you supply putra 'son', in the same way you get
an understanding by supplying the word sthdna in the rules [which constitute the
range of its application] (pradesesu), or by the principle whereby part of a sentence
[brings out the meaning of the whole sentence], that is the idea.
Nagesa here agrees to the interpretation of the compound sthdneyogd as a
vyadhikaranabahuvnhi, a bahuvnhi compound whose members are not in syn-
tactic agreement. The reason for this interpretation is, according to Nagesa, that
sthdna, sdmipya 'nearness', and dnantarya 'adjacency' are not meanings of the
genitive case. Rather they exhibit various relational properties which are nec-
essary conditions for the relation marked by the genitive case, like Kaiyata also
said. As mentioned already,159 Vasudeva Dlksita fixes the number of such terms
159
See p. 214 above.
at three in his Bdlamanoramd (SK 1:44,4-5): sabdasya sabdena traya eva

sambandhdh - dnantaryam sdmipyam prasangas ca, 'only three relations [may
obtain] between a linguistic unit and [another] linguistic unit: adjacency, near-
ness and possible appearance'. He, however, refers to these three terms simply
as relations and takes sthdna in the sense of prasanga 'possible appearance'.
Nagesa spots a difficulty in his own interpretation and is careful to note that
it is not in conflict with views stated by Patanjali in the context of the matUP
rule. It may be clarifying to examine this briefly. The rule referred to is A
5.2.94 tad asydsty asminn iti matup, which introduces the possessive suffix
matUP (unaccented -mat) to form derivatives in the senses of 'that is per-
taining to it' or 'that is located in it'. This rule comes under the domain of the
heading rule A 4.1.82 samarthdndm prathamdd vd which states that rules
introducing derivative suffixes called taddhita apply optionally and that the
suffix introduced by each rule is added after the first of the semantically and
syntactically related (samartha) elements referred to in each rule. In a rule such
as A 5.2.94, then, the suffix matUP is introduced after the variable tat 'that',
which refers to a nominative form denoting aijjobject, in the senses of 'asydstV
or 'asminn asti\ Or, speaking with the Kdsikd,160 asmin 'in it' and asya 'per-
taining to it' are the senses of the suffix, while asti 'is' is a qualifier of the stem.
An example of such a derivative is gomat 'possessing cows; rich in cows'.
According to rule 5.2.94 this is semantically equivalent to gdvo 'sya santi,
'cows are his'. In his discussion of A 5.2.94 Patanjali brings up the following
interpretation of the relation denoted by a genitive case suffix (Mbh
11:391,17-23):
idam tarhi prayojanam astiyuktdd yathd sydd anantarddiyuktdn md bhud iti I gdvo
'sydnantardh gdvo 'sya samipa iti I atha kriyamdne }py astigrahana iha kasmdn na
bhavati gdvo 'sya santy anantardh gdvo 'sya santi samipa iti I asdmarihydt I katham
asdmarthyam I sdpeksam asamartham bhavatitil yathaiva tarhi kriyamdne 'sti-
grahane 'sdmarthydd anantarddisu na bhavaty evam akriyamdne 'pi tia bhavisyatil
asty atra visesahl kriyamdne 'stigrahangjtdntarena trtlyasya padasya prayogam
anantarddayo 'rthd gamyante I akriyamdne punar astigrahane 'ntarendpi trtiyasya
padasya prayogam anantarddayo 'rthd gamyante II
This, then, is the purpose [of rule 5.2.94], namely that it (= the suffix matUP) should
be added after that which is connected with asti, and that it should not be added after
that which is connected with anantara etc. such as gdvo 'sydnantardh, 'cows adja-
cent to him', or gdvo 'sya samipe, 'cows in the nearness of him'. Now, even when
asti is mentioned, why does it not apply here: gdvo 'sya santi samipe, 'there exist
cows adjacent to him', gdvo 'sya santi samipe, 'there exist cows in tlie nearness of
him' ? The reason is that there is absence of semantic connection. How [can you say
that there is] absence of semantic connection? [Because of the principle saying:]
'that which requires [qualification by a co-occurrent word] is [regarded as] seman-
tically unconnected.' But this amounts to saying that when mention of asti is made,
it does not apply with regard to anantara etc., and that likewise it will not apply
160
asyasminn iti pratyayarthau I astiti prakrtivisesanam I
Substitution 243
when [mention of asti] is not made? There is a difference here. When mention of
asti is made, the senses of anantara etc. are not understood unless some third word
is employed [in which case there would be lack of semantic connection]. But when
mention of asti is not made, the senses of anantara etc. are understood even without
employment of some third word.
The statement sdpeksam asamartham bhavati, referring to the principle that
an element of a formation which requires some outside element as its own
qualifier is regarded as semantically unconnected and therefore unsuited for
the formation in question, is commented upon by Kaiyata in the context of A
2.1.1 samarthah padavidhih. This rule stipulates that any operation concern-
ing finished words (pada) applies only to linguistic elements which are seman-
tically connected. Although the context here is the formation of words into
compounds, the basic principle is the same in the formation of words by
taddhita suffixes. In either case semantic connection has to hold. Kaiyata
explains the principle in question as follows (MbhP II:318b):
nydyo 'yam I vrttau hy upasarjanapadena pradhdndrthdbhidhdyind bhdvyaml
svavisesandpeksdydm ca tasya prddhdnyam iti katham ekasyaikadd prddhdnyam
ekdrthibhdvas ca sydtll
This is a maxim. For, in formation [of compound words], the subordinate word
should denote the meaning of the principal word [of the formation]. But when [the
subordinate word] requires [some third co-occurring word as] its own qualifier, then
principality pertains to it.161 How, then, can one [word] at any one time be principal
and how can there be a meaning-unification?162
Returning to rule 5.2.94, we meet with the following statement in Nagesa's
commentary on the Bhdsya discussion quoted above (MbhU IV:343b): 'astind
yuktdd evcC iti vaktum ucitam, 'atha kriyamdne 'pi' ity uttarabhdsyasvarasdt,
'it is proper to state "after that which is connected with asti alone" because of
the inclination later in the Bhdsya [to state]: "now even when [mention of asti]
is made'".
Consider now the following passage from Kaiyata's remarks on the Bhdsya
discussion of A 5.2.94, keeping in mind the view presented in the Kdsikd that
the word asti in rule 5.2.94 is a qualifier of the base (MbhP IV:343b-344a):
kriyamana iti I prakrtyarthavisayapaddpeksam trtiyatvam - gdvah santy anantara
asyetil tatrdstigrahane kriyamdne kevala evdstyartha upddhibhdvena pratyaydnte
'ntarbhavati/ asati tu astigrahane dharmdntardvacchinnasydpy astyarthasydn-
tarbhdva dsankyetety arthahl tatra kriyamdne 'stigrahane 'styarthasyaivdntar-
bhdvdvagamdd vdkye yat trtiyam padam - 'anantardK iti tad vrttau svdrthaprati-
pddandydvasyam prayoktavyam I tatprayoge cdsdmarthyaml akriyamdne tv asti-
grahane 'nekasydpy upddher antarbhdvasambhdvanayd vrttdv anantarapada-
prayogam antarendpy dnantarydvagamdd asdmarthyam na sydd ity arthahlI
161
162
That is, to the subordinate word with regard to its own qualifier.
That is to say, the original pradhdna and the original upasarjana cannot both be the pra-
dhdna at one and the same time.
'When [mention of asti] is made': being a third [word] involves a relation of depen-
dence with regard to a word that is within the range of the stem's meaning, such as
in gavah santy anantara asya, 'there exist cows adjacent to him'. As lar as this is
concerned, when asti is mentioned, the meaning of asti by itself is included in that
which ends with the suffix as an extraneous [meaning-]condition [of the stem]. But
when there is no mention of asti, one may suspect the inclusion even of the sense
of asti specified by these other features; that is the sense. In this respect, when
mention of asti is made, that which is the third word, namely anantardh, must nec-
essarily be used in order to convey its own meaning in the formation, since in the
sentence we understand inclusion of the sense of asti only. And when it is used,
there is absence of semantic connection.
But when mention of asti is not made, through the possibility of including even
diverse extraneous [meaning-]conditions in the formation, no lack of semantic
connection would obtain, because there is understanding of dnantarya 'adjacency',
even without the employment of the word anantara 'adjacent'; that is the sense.
Without entering into a detailed discussion of theintricacies involved in the
interpretation of A 5.2.94, it is clear from tlje-abbve remarks that if a suffix A
is applied to a stem B, semantic connection has to hold between A and B. That
B is qualified by some third word C, such as anantara, means that B is dis-
connected from A, so that meaning-unification, ekdrthibhdva, dobs not obtain.
In the example here, the word gavah 'cows' is qualified by the word anantardh
'adjacent' which is related to gavah alone. Such a dependence on an additional
word precludes the formation of gomat-, since anantardh is a qualifier of the
meaning of gavah, that is, of the stem's meaning, which does not extend to the
meaning of the suffix conveying the sense of the genitive case suffix.
Thus, when Nagesa in his remarks on A 1.1.49 claims that there is no dis-
agreement between what Patanjali says in the context of A 1.1.49 and what he
says in the context of A 5.2.94, this provides us with further evidence that
sthdna, sdmipya or dnantarya are not meanings of the relation marked by the
genitive case suffix. When Patanjali at A 5.2.94 talks about lack of semantic
connection, asdmarthya, this is because he regards anantara 'adjacent' as a
qualifier of the stem's meaning, while the genitive variable asya is the sense
of the suffix that is introduced.
The term sthdna, then, is not the meaning of the genitive case, and it is
accordingly not included among relational terms, that is, it is not a member
of the class of all possible relations. On the contrary, the term*sthdna itself
determines the relation marked by the genitive case suffix so that the particu-
lars of the relation are understood. This is the view presented by Nagesa also
in his Laghusabdendusekhara (LSI:58,l-2): sthdnapaddrthanirupitasam-
bandhdrthikety arthah, 'that is to say, [sthdneyogd signifies] something which
has as its meaning a relation determined by the sense of the word sthdna\ Rule
1.1.49, then, basically teaches that a genitive is used when the relation marked
by it is determined by the locative word form sthdne.
There remains the problem that the word sthdne is absent in rules which
teach substitution operations. Kaiyata, in the passage quoted above, states that
Substitution 245
there is the understanding of dnantarya 'adjacency' even when the word anan-
tara 'adjacent' is not used. Similarly, Nagesa, in the passage quoted above from
his commentary on A 1.1.49, states as a preliminary solution that just like one
applies, by expectancy, some further qualification like putra 'son' on hearing
a statement such as 'Devadatta's Yajnadatta', in the same way one gets meaning
by supplying the necessary element, that is, by supplying the word form sthdne
in rules which are within the range of application of A 1.1.49. Nagesa also pre-
sents an alternative solution. Since the definition in the rule is sasthl
sthdneyogd, then, whenever you hear a sasthl, that is, whenever you hear a gen-
itive case suffix in rules for the interpretation of which A 1.1.49 must come into
play, you supply the rest of the rule, namely sthdneyogd, on the principle of
vdkyaikadesa,163 the principle that part of a sentence brings out the meaning
of the whole sentence. The problem then is to decide the domain of A 1.1.49,
that is to say, to decide when a genitive case suffix in a rule is to be interpreted
according to rule 1.1.49 and when it is not.
Concerning the interpretation of the relation marked by a sthdnasasthT,
some important remarks are also given by the commentators in the context of
A 6.4.1 angasya. This is a heading rule, adhikdra, recognised by the tradition
as valid throughout the seventh adhydya. Basically, rule 6.4.1 states the condi-
tion that the name anga 'presuffixal base' must apply if the operations sig-
nalled by the rules within this section are to take place. The interpretation of
the genitive angasya thus affects several hundred rules. Now the interpretation
of this genitive raises certain difficulties, details of which need not concern us
here.164 But a brief summary of what Katyayana and Patanjali say seems nec-
essary. The discussion of the genitive at A 6.4.1 begins by assuming that
angasya is a sthdnasasthT, that is, a genitive as defined by A 1.1.49. To this the
objections are raised that one must also have a heading with an ablative form,
arigdt, and that such forms as partitive genitives in the angddhikdra are not
properly accounted for.165 These objections are answered by saying that the
class names pratyaya 'suffix' and anga determine each other - that is, that an
anga requires a suffix and a suffix an anga - and that angasya contains a gen-
itive signifying a relation.166 Thus, for example, the relational genitive angasya
is understood in a rule such as A 7.1.9 ato bhisa ais, which teaches that ais is
163
164
On this nydya see Mbh 1:111,22 f.
165
For a full discussion of this rule, see Benson 1990:72-123.
A 6.4.1, vt. 1: angasyeti sthdnasasthT cet paficamyantasya cddhikdrah, 'if the genitive
angasya is a sthdnasasthT, then another heading of the word ending m the ablative [has to be
stated]', and vt. 2: avayavasasthyddindm cdprasiddhih, 'moreover, the genitives which mark
166
a part etc. are not properly accounted for'. See Benson 1990:87 ff.
A 6.4.1, vt. 3: siddham tu parasparam pratyangapratyayasamjndbhdvdt, 'but it is prope
accounted for because the technical names anga and pratyaya are mutually dependent', and
vt. 4: sambandhasasthTnirdesas ca, 'and [this is] a statement of a genitive which denotes a
relation [in general]'. See Benson ibid. The term anga itself is defined by rule 1.4.13 yasmdt
pratyayavidhis tadddi pratyaye 'ngam as 'that which begins with that [linguistic item] to
which a suffix is added and is followed by the suffix'. See Benson 1990:13-71 and p. 201,
note 60 above.
substituted in the place of the instrumental plural suffix bhis when it follows a
short a, so that this rule does not wrongly allow ais to replace bhis of an item
like bhissd 'cooked rice' in brdhmanabhissd 'Brahman's rice'. The substitu-
tion is stated for bhis related to an anga, that is, which follows a short a of an
element to which the name anga applies, so that the bhis in question must be
a suffix (pratyaya). As Kaiyata remarks in this context, an interlocutor who
does not understand the full impact of this assumes that only one relation is
intended, the one involving a determining condition and a conditioned element
(nimittanimittibhdvasambandhah) instead of any possible relation, depending
on the context in which the heading angasya is allowed to recur. At this point,
then, Patanjali brings up the objection that genitives such as partitive genitives
are not included, and that the sthdna too is not included when the heading
s
angasya recurs in subsequent rules (Mbh III: 179,7-8):
evam apy avayavasasthyddayo 'visesita bhavantil avayavasasthyddayo 'pi sam-
bandha evall evam api sthdnam 'visesitam bhavati Ijthdnam api sambandha evall
Even so the genitives which mark a part-^fcTremain unqualified [by the word
angasya]. Also the genitives which mark a part etc. exist only when there is a rela-
tion. Even so the sthdna remains unqualified. The sthdna too is precisely a relation.
This passage raises a problem created by the ambiguous sandhi of sam-
bandha eva, that is, whether the case form intended is the locative, sambandhe,
or the nominative, sambandhah. Taking into consideration the parallelism of
the two statements, avayavasasthyddayo }pi sambandha eva and sthdnam api
sambandha eva, one would immediately feel inclined to interpret them in the
same way. Were this justified the latter statement would translate: /the sthdna
too exists only when there is a relation'. However, I do not think this is the case.
When Patanjali considers the avayavasasthT and such, saying of these sam-
bandha eva, commentators do indeed accept the form to be sambandhe, loca-
tive. If we take avayava quite literally as 'part', then we have to accept one
interpretation, suggested by Nagesa {MbhU V:270b): avayavasasthyddayo 'pi
sambandhe eva -jdyanta ity arthah, 'that is to say, even the genitives which
mark a part etc. arise when a relation is to be signified'.
If, on the other hand, one considers avayava to be a metaphorical usage of
a relational property, that is to say avayavatva 'part-ness', then one can say,
with Nagesa, that in the end these abstract relational properties are included
among relations in general (MbhU V:270b): yad vd tadvdcyd avayavatvd-
dayo167 'pi sambandhe 'ntarbhutd ity arthah, 'or else, even part-ness {avaya-
vatva) and such are to be expressed by it, that is to say, these are included in
[the notion of] relation'. Thus, according to Nagesa, such genitives as the
avayavasasthT can either be conditioned by a relation or be included among
abstract relational properties, that is, among relations in general. '
Now, given that what is considered to recur in rules headed by A 6.4.1
167
Vedavrata (1962-3.IV 665) reads tadvdcydvayavatvddayo0'.
Substitution 247
angasya is merely this term which is to be interpreted contextually, one has

only a relational genitive. The particular relation in question is either given
contextually or, if this is not the case, provided for by A 1.1.49 sasthT
sthdneyogd. Thus, for example, sdsah of A 6.4.34 sdsa id anhaloh is under-
stood to contain a partitive genitive, since the word is contextually bound to
upadhdydh which recurs from A 6.4.24 aniditdm hala upadhdydh kniti. And
the genitive angasya, which recurs from A 6.4.1 and is co-referential with
sdsah, is also thus bound and accordingly to be interpreted as a partitive gen-
itive. Now sdsah is understood to recur in A 6.4.35 sd hau where it is not a
bound genitive, and so the co-referential genitive angasya recurring from rule
6.4.1 is likewise not bound, so that in this case one understands sdsah angasya
sthdne . . . 'in the sthdna of sds that is an aftga . . .' by rule 1.1.49 sasthT
sthaneyogd}^
In the light of the above, consider again Patanjali's statement sthdnam api
sambandha eva, the answer to the objection brought up in the Bhdsya that the
sthdna would remain unqualified by the term angasya in rules where the latter
recurs if angasya merely contains a relational genitive.
Now, the partitive genitives and such could be conditioned by or included
among relations. But the term sthdna, if it means prasanga 'possible appear-
ance; chance' or artha 'meaning', cannot be included among relations because
it is not itself a relation, nor can it be conditioned by a relation since it itself
determines a relation. Still I think it pretty certain that sthdnam api sambandha
eva is indeed to be understood, with commentators, as sambandhah eva, not
as sambandhe eva. Kaiyata comments on the statement in question as follows
(MbhP V:270a): sambandhanimittatvdt sambandha ity arthah, 'the meaning is
that by fact of its being a necessary condition for a relation, it is a relation'.
Referring to the two interpretations of the term sthdna just mentioned,
prasanga and artha, Nagesa adds the following explanation to Kaiyata's
remarks (MbhU V:270b):
nanu prasango 'rtho vd sthdnam tanmrupito hi sambandho na tu tad eva
sambandho 'ta aha - sambandhanimittatvad in / sambandhinau hi sambandhasya
nimittaml nimittanimittinor abhedopacardd evam uktir ity arthah//
Now sthdna signifies either possible appearance or meaning. However the relation
is determined by it, the relation is not it alone, and therefore he says: 'because it
is a necessary condition for a relation'. For its two relata are the necessary condi-
tion for a relation. The sense is that since there is metaphorically no difference
between a condition and that which is conditioned [by it], such a statement [can
be made].
168
For the example, cf Cardona 1974a 310 Rule 6.4.34 sdsa id anhaloh provides for substitu-
tion of the vowel i for the penultimate sound (upadhdydh, recurring from A 6 4.24) of the
verbal root Vms1 'order; instruct' when the latter is followed by aN or by any suffix beginning
with a consonant marked by a diacritic KoiN {kniti, recurring from A 6 4.24) Rule 6 4 35
sd hau signals that the presuffixal base sds is replaced by sd before the second singular imper-
ative ending hi to give sddhi (cf Cardona 1970a.49, with note 36)
Similarly, the seventeenth-century commentator Annambhattajstates in his

Uddyotana on Kaiyata's Pradipa (ed. Narasimhacharya 1982:269):
sthdnyddesabhdve sthdnam nimittam ity upacdrdt 'sthdnam sarribandhaK ity
uktam, na tu sthdnam eva sambandha ity aha - sambandhanimittatvad itil
When there is a substituend-substitute relation, the sthdna is a necessary condition,
and so, by transfer of denotation,169 it has been stated that the sthdna is a relation.
But the relation is not the sthdna alone, and so he says: 'by fact of its being a nec-
essary condition for a relation'.
So, just as the relation expressed by the statement devadattasya yajna-
dattah, 'Devadatta's Yajfiadatta', is conditioned by some other term such as
putra 'son', in the same way a relation expressed by the words aster bhuh is
conditioned by the locative word form sthdne, although the situation of the
sthdnasasthT is slightly different from that of the avayavasasthyddayah, the
genitives which mark a part, etc. The latter could, as Nagesa points out, be
conditioned by a relation or be included among relations, that is, be members
of the class of all possible relations. On the other hand, the sthdna, when the
term signifies prasanga 'possible appearance; chance' or artha 'meaning', is
not included in the class of all possible relations, because it is not itself a rela-
tion, nor is it conditioned by a relation. On the contrary, the sthdna itself deter-
mines a relation. Hence I think it proper to accept what Kaiyata and Nagesa
say, which also Annambhatta says: the sthdna is called a sambandha 'relation'
metaphorically, because it is a necessary condition for the relation in question.
Note that I have accepted what most Paninlyas say, namely that the sthdna is
not itself a sambandha and thus not something directly conveyed by a genitive
ending, but it is a necessary condition for the relation between the sthdnin and
the ddesa and hence metaphorically considered a relation.
The meaning of the term sthdna

It is now possible to investigate more closely the meaning of the term sthdna.
As mentioned already, this is basically analysed in two ways by the commen-
tators. Firstly, it may be interpreted as bhdvasddhana, that is to say* as an action
noun formed with the suffix LyuT (-ana with presuffixal accent) by A 3.3.115
lyut ca. Under this alternative it denotes mere activity, state of being, equiva-
lent to sthiti 'a standing'. So, for example, Jinendrabuddhi's Nydsa on the
Kdsikd at A 1.1.49 (KasN 1:168): sthdnasabdo bhdvasddhanah sthitih sthdnam,
'the word sthdna [is a noun] realising mere activity, sthdna [thus] being equiv-
alent to sthiti "a standing'", or Nagesa's Laghusabdendusekhara (LSI 58,6):
169
Strictly speaking, upacdra does not imply exactly the same as the Western*notion of meta-
phor. Rather, upacdra means that a primary concept A is denoted not by the usual a but by an
accidental or secondary b, that is to say, it involves a change of denotation. See in this respect
G. Gren-Eklund 1986. Thus, in the present case, the word sambandha is substituted for sam-
bandhanimitta.
Substitution 249
bhdve lyut sthdnasabde, 'LyuT in the sense of mere being in the case of the
word sthancC. Alternatively, it is interpreted as adhikaranasddhana, that is to
say, as a noun denoting a locus, in this case formed with LyuT by A 3.3.117
karanddhikaranayos ca. So, for example, Kaiyata on the Mahdbhdsya at A
1.1.1 and A 1.1.49 (MbhP 1:162a, 408b): tisthanty asmin sabddh, 'speech ele-
ments stand in it'.170
Under the first alternative commentators remark that three particular con-
textual meanings can be considered for the word sthdna: apakarsa 'drawing
away', nivrtti 'ceasing; cancellation', and prasanga 'possible appearance;
chance'. Thus, for example, the Nydsa on the Kdsikd at A 1.1.49 (KasN 1:168;
similarly PadamahjarT, ibid.):
gosthdne 'svo badhyatdm ity apakarsah sthdnasabdasydstheyah I slesmanah sthdne
kadukam ausadham ity atra nivrttihl darbhdndm sthdne sarair dstaritavyam iti
prasangahl
When one says 'Let a horse be tied up in the sthdna of the cow', apakarsa 'drawing
away' is to be recognised for the word sthdna. When one says 'Bitter herb medicine
in the sthdna of phlegm', here nivrtti 'ceasing; cancellation' [is to be recognised].
When one says 'One should strew with sara in the sthdna of darbha grass',
prasanga 'possible appearance; chance' [is to be recognised].
This amounts to the following. When one says 'A horse should be tied up
in the place of the cow', one means that the cow in question is to be taken away
and a horse tied up in its place; when one says 'Bitter herb medicine in the
case of phlegm', one means that the phlegm is removed when the medicine is
taken; and when one says 'One should strew with sara in the place of darbha
grass', one means that if the occasion arises that darbha grass is not available,
then one uses sara instead. That is to say, the particular senses in question are
contextual varieties of a single general meaning of the word sthdna. In the
context of A 1.1.49 sasthi sthdneyogd Paninlyas generally take sthdna in
sthdneyogd to be an action noun in the sense of prasanga 'possible appear-
ance; chance'. For instance, A 1.1.51, vt. 3: siddham tuprasange raparatvdt,
'but it is properly accomplished because a following r is taught when there is
the possible appearance [of aN in the sthdna of r]', 171 with Bhdsya (Mbh
1:126,15-17):m
uh sthdne 'nprasajyamdna eva raparo bhavatitiIkim vaktavyam etatlna hi!katham
anucyamdnam gamsyatel sthdna iti vartate sthdnasabdas ca prasangavdcTI
170
So also Bhartrhari in his DTpikd (MbhD 289,2-9); a full discussion of the relevant passage
will be given below. Note that this analysis is a nirvacana analysis. The question arises as to
whether the commentators apply A 3.3.115 and 117 on purpose or mechanically. In other
words, do they apply these rules because they consider them to involve an important distinc-
tion or because there exist two rules by which the term may be analysed? According to A
3.3.117 they could also have applied an analysis as karana, an option they do not avail them-
171
selves of.
172
Rule 1.1.51 ur an raparah teaches that a sound denoted by aN replacing r is followed by r.
Cf. also A 1.1.52 with Mbh 1:130,14.
r applies only when aN is possibly appearing in the sthdna of r. Is this to be stated?

Indeed not. [But if] it is not to be stated, how is it to be understood? [The word form]
sthane is still current, and the word sthdna signifies prasanga 'possible appear-
ance'.173
Under the second alternative, the interpretation as adhikaranasddhana, one
particular locus that is considered is the artha 'meaning' of a linguistic
element or speech unit, sabda. Thus, for example, Kaiyata on the Mahdbhdsya
at A 1.1.1 (MbhP 1:162a): sthdnasabdo 'rthavdcT tisthanty asmih sabdd iti
sthdnam, 'the word sthdna signifies artha "meaning" [according to the analy-
sis]: "something occurs [tisthanti, lit. 'stands'] in it, namely linguistic ele-
ments", thus [it is called] sthdna\
These two interpretations of the term sthdna will now be investigated in the
light of what the commentators remark in the cornet of A 1.1.49.
Bhartrhari on sthana ,"

There is an important passage in the DTpikd which deals with the interpreta-
tion of sthdna as artha where Bhartrhari brings forward the argument that sub-
stitutions are of whole units. Moreover, Bhartrhari mentions here still another
possibility, based on the position that all linguistic elements are first self-
referring (svarupapaddrthaka), a position alluded to already by K^tyayana.174
Thus, let us assume that the sthdnins referred to by as in A 2.4.52 aster bhuh
are instances of as actually used to signify meaning. The meaning of these,
then, is signified by bhu. Now, the pratydhdra115 terms iK, yaN, and so on are
technical terms (sabdasamjhd) which signify i and so on, and the vowels ulti-
mately signified also have meanings, namely their own forms (svarupa). Even
these sounds, then, can be considered to have meanings, the sounds that occur
in actual terms such as dadhi, dadhy. '*.
The DTpikd passage in question is indeed not simple, but then so much of
this text is badly transmitted and difficult. Since this is a passage of consider-
able importance, revealing as it does the views of Bhartrhari, one of the most
173
Further textual evidence is easily adduced. In addition to the Kdsikd, Nydsa, and Padamanjan
on A 1.1.49, see for example the Sabdakaustubha (SK 191) and Siddhdntakaumudl (SK 1:44)
of Bhattoji Diksita {sthdnam ca prasangah), and also two commentaries on tfre latter work,
the Bdiamanoramd of Vasudeva Diksita and the Tattvabodhim of Jnanendra SarasvatI (SK
1:44-5). See also the Jainendramahdvrtti (JV) of the Jain author Abhayanandin on the cor-
responding rule 1.1.46 td sthane of Devanandin's Jainendravydkarana. (Instead of referring
to a case ending, vibhakti, in the customary way of numbering them with the ordinals first
through seventh, Devanandin uses the device of adding a to each letter of the Word v-i-bh-a-
174
k-t-i. A sixth triplet ending, sasthi, is thus referred to as td.)
A 1.1.68 vt. 2. Rule 1.1.68 svam rupam sabdasydsabdasamjhd states that a linguistic element
denotes its own form except in the case of a technical term, sabdasamjfid, given in the
grammar. Vt. 2 states: na vd sabdapurvako hy arthe sampratyayas tasmdd arthanivrttih,
not, for the conceptualisation of meaning is preceded by the knowledge of linguistic elements,
175
and therefore there is cancellation of meaning'.
A pratydhdra term is a technical abbreviation denoting a set of sounds, iK thus denoting long
or short iurl.
Substitution 251
prominent among all the Indian grammarians and philosophers of language, I

shall deal with it in considerable detail. As is well known, Bhartrhari's Dipika
is extant in a single fragmentary manuscript which, moreover, is written by
various hands and is full of corruptions. To begin with I quote the text as it was
adopted by the editors of the first printed edition of the manuscript, K.V.
Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (MbhD 289,2-9):
sthdnam cdrthahl tisthaty asmin sabda iti asmin aster arthe bhavati I bhdvini vrttis
ca itarasya yasmdd bhavati tadartham dhetil atha varnddesesu kah sthdndrtho
ydvatd 'rtha eva varndndm ndstil tatrdpi 'sarve sarvapadddesdK ity asmin pakse
dadhisabdasya dadhy ddeso ruher api rupih iti yuktaml atha vd kdlah
sthdnasabdenocyate I ikah kale yano 'dhitisthanti iti/ yathd vd 'asteK ity etad
anukaranam arthaprayuktdndm asirupdndml te ca sthdninahl tesdm artho
vidhvyate bhavatindl evam iko yan acity atrdpi iko yani krte dadhy ddih sydt, ikah
tesdm yat svarupam so 'rthah sthdnam iti II
G.B. Palsule and V.B. Bhagavat (1991:19,17-26) suggest the passage be
read in the following way:
sthdnam vdrthah, tisthaty asmin sabda iti I asmin \pakse] aster arthe bhavatir
bhavati I nivrttis cetarasya yasmdt bhavatis tadartham dheti I atha varnddesesu kah
sthdndrtho, ydvatd artha eva varndndm ndstil tatrdpi 'sarve sarvapadddesdK ity
asmin pakse dadhisabdasya dadhy ddeso, ruher api rupir iti yuktaml atha vd, kdlah
sthdnasabdenocyate - ikah kdlam yano 'dhitisthantiti I yathd vd 'aster' ity etad
anukaranam arthaprayuktdndm asirupdndm, te ca sthdninah tesdm artho
'bhidhiyate bhavatind, evam Hko yan acV ity atrdpi iko ye 'nukrtd dadhyddisthd
ikas tesdm yat svarupam so 'rthah sthdnam iti II
At several points here I differ from all the editors in the text adopted. On the
basis of the actual readings found in the DTpika manuscript (MS =
MbhDms),1761 propose the passage be read as follows:
sthdnam cdrthahl tisthaty asmin111 drsta iti I asminn aster arthe bhavatihl
bhdvinivrttis cetarasya yasmdd bhavatism tadartham dhetil atha varnddesesu kah
sthdndrtho ydvatdrtha eva varndndm ndstil tatrdpi sarve sarvapadddesd119 ity
asmin pakse dadhisabdasya dadhyddeso ruher api rupirm iti yuktaml atha vd
kdlah sthdnasabdenocyate I ikahm kdlam yano 'dhitisthantiti I yathd vaster ity etad
anukaranam arthaprayuktdndm1*2 asirupdndmml te ca sthdninahl tesdm artho
vidhiyate bhavatindl evam iko yan acity atrdpy iko ye na krtd dadhyddisthdm ikas
tesdm yat svarupam so 'rthah1*5 sthdnam iti I
On the basis of this reading I offer the following translation:
176
In 1986 George Cardona kindly made the pertinent passage of the MS available to me in the
form of a very readable xerographic copy from a microfilm in his possession. The facsimile
177
reproduction of the MbhDms published by BORI (Poona 1980) is legible but not very clear.
179
MS tisthatityasmin. m So MS.
MS sarvapadddeso
18
but this is a well-known
181
verse, e.g.
m
Mbh 1:75,13-14, see p. 187 with note
183
28 above. ° MS msamir (?). MS ekah. 185 MS arthapratyuktanam.
MS avirupdndm. MS dadhyddisyd ikas. MS so rtha sthdnam.
And sthdna is artha 'meaning' [according to the analysis]: [something] occurs

(tisthati, lit.: 'stands') in it, that is, it is seen [there].186 [Thus, for example, A 2.4.52
aster bhuh can be paraphrased:] in it, that is, in the meaning of as, bhu (bhavatih)1*7
[occurs]. There is to be188 a cancellation of the other [element, namely as, in the
context of an ardhadhdtuka suffix], since (yasmdt) bhu (bhavatih)m [in that
context] expresses the meaning of it (=as).m
Now, concerning substitution of single sounds, what is the sense of sthdna [then],
in as much as meaning does indeed not exist for single sounds?
Even in this case [the interpretation as artha] is acceptable, on the view that 'all
[substitutes] are substitutes of complete words',191 so that for the [whole] element
dadhi there is the substitute dadhy, likewise rup for ruh.191
Alternatively, kdla 'time' is expressed by the word sthdna, so that [a rule such as
A 6.1.77 iko yan aci teaches that sounds denoted by] yaN occupy the time of [pro-
nunciation of sounds denoted by] iK.
Or, it is so that this as (asteh) [of A 2.4.52] is an imitation [in grammar] of all the
units as [of the real language] which are used to signify the meaning [which is to
be conveyed] (arthaprayuktdndm). These [units as] are the substituends, and their
meaning is provided for193 by bhu (bhavatind). Similarly also in the^ case of [A
6.1.77] iko yan act [the sounds denoted by] iK, those which are not accomplished,
[that is, the sounds denoted by] iK which occur in dadhi and such, that which is their
own form (svarupam), that meaning (artha) is the sthdna.
186
This would be the translation if the reading drsta of the MS is retained. It is, however, tempt-
ing to emend drsta to sabda as was first suggested by Abhyankar and Limaye and retained by
Palsule and Bhagavat. Such a wording of the analysis is known from Kaiyata's PradTpa (MbhP
I:408b): tisthanty asmin sabdd iti sthdnam, arthe ca sabdas tisthati', cf. p. 256 below.
187
Kaiyata's reliance on the Dlpika and on Bhartrhari in general is well known.
188
The MS has bhavati, but cf.0below.
The reading bhdvinivrttis of the MS is thus accepted and considered a compound.
Compounds with bhdvin- as their first member are not numerous according to standard
Sanskrit lexica; MW gives only bhdvicakravartin 'a future king'. However, the" word bhdvin-
'future; which is to be' is used several times by Bhartrhari in his VdkyapadTya (e.g. VP 3.9 40,
95, 114). It is noteworthy that Punyaraja, in the context of VP 2.184ab: dhdtoh sddhanayo-
gasya bhdvinah prakramdd yathd, expresses himself by such compounds as bhdvisddh-
189
anasambandhasamdsrayanena and bhdvisarfftiandhdt (ed. Subramania Iyer 1983:78).
Note that the MS actually reads bhavatih (bhavatis tasartham) here, so that at this point it was
Abhyankar and Limaye who emended to bhavati. Palsule and Bhagavat suggest the reading
190
°bhavatih bhavati I nivrttis0.
Imagining that Abhyankar and Limaye were right in emending bhavatih to bhavati, one may,
according to a rather peculiar syntax which is avoided if the reading of the MS is accepted,
translate: 'when there is to be a formation [with a linguistic element] different from the other
[element], it signifies the meaning of the latter'. In that case it would be reasonable to accept
also the emendation ofbhdvinivrttis0 to bhdvinivrttis0 suggested by Abhyankar and Limaye.
Accepting this emendation but retaining the reading bhavatih of the MS, one may also trans-
late: 'there is to be an occurrence of another [element, namely bhu (bhavatih)], since bhu
191
expresses the meaning of it (as)'.
192
This alludes to a verse quoted Mbh 1:73,13-14; see p. 187 with note 28 above/
A 6.1.77 iko yan aci provides for semivowel substitution, in this case y for i, so that dadhi is
replaced by dadhy when a vowel follows. A 7.3.43 ruhah po 'nyatarasydjn teaches the
193
optional replacement of rup for ruh when forming the causative stem.
The MS reading vidhiyate 'is taught; is provided for' is retained also by Abhyankar and
Limaye. The slightly better sense 'and their meaning is denoted by bhu9 may be obtained by
emending vidhiyate to (a)bhidhiyate as suggested by Palsule and Bhagavat. -
Substitution 253
This is what Bhartrhari tells us concerning the interpretation of the word

sthdna. The ideas put forward in the passage may be paraphrased as follows.
First his major thesis is propounded, namely that sthdna refers to the meaning
of a linguistic element, as shown by his analysis as adhikaranasddhana and the
paraphrase of rule A 2.4.52 aster bhuh. According to this interpretation, the
sthdna is the location in grammatical space occupied by a linguistic element.
This location is identified as the meaning {artha) in which an element occurs.
Since perennial linguistic elements, such as as and bhu, are proper to particular
different contexts, one element may be said to occur in the location of another
element, that is to say, in the meaning of another element, according to a seman-
tic topography where the two elements are in complementary distribution.
Next follows the major objection concerning substitution of single sounds,
in which case no meaning is involved. This objection is overcome in three
different manners:
First, by the principle that a grammatical substitution operation applies only
to whole linguistic items, not to single sounds, so that a rule such as A 6.1.77
iko yan aci, which provides for prevocalic semivowel substitution, actually pro-
vides for whole elements such as dadhy to occur in domains different from
those of other whole elements such as dadhi. Under these conditions substitu-
tion involves whole elements which are used for each other in certain locations
so that they are in complementary distribution in one meaning within the lin-
guistic practice Paninlyas set out to describe.
Alternatively, and in this case giving up the position that sthdna refers to
artha 'meaning', Bhartrhari suggests that sthdna is considered as referring to
kdla 'time', so that a rule such as A 6.1.77 iko yan aci would provide that a
semivowel occupies (adhitisthati) the time of a vowel when another vowel
follows. That is to say, at the time for pronouncing a vowel, a semivowel resides
there instead. This kdla alternative I shall return to below.
Finally, Bhartrhari proposes another possibility, reverting to the view that
sthdna signifies artha 'meaning', but now allowing the own form (svarupa) of
a linguistic element to be one of the meanings involved. This alternative is
introduced in the text by yathd vd, correlated with evam which follows. As I
take it, the parallel is this: as (asteh) of A 2.4.52 aster bhuh is a self-referring
term whose meaning is all the elements as (asirupdndm) that occur in actual
forms, so that they are prompted by a meaning that is to be conveyed
(arthaprayuktdndm). And these are the sthdnins, the substituends. In other
words, the substituends referred to by as in A 2.4.52 are instances of as actu-
ally used to signify meaning. And their meaning is provided for by bhu. The
situation is similar in the case of a rule such as A 6.1.77 iko yan.aci: just like
as of the rule aster bhuh refers to as as actually used in meaningful forms, in
which as has meaning, so the pratydhdra term iK refers ultimately to the
vowels / etc. which do have meaning by referring to the actually used sounds i
etc. of dadhi and such. And this meaning is the sthdna, the meaning which is
the own form of the vowels i etc. ultimately signified.
K
254 Indian semantic analysis -
Concerning this last line of the DTpikd passage, I am not completely confi-
dent of the text or my translation, although I think it is pretty Clear what
Bhartrhari has in mind. The MbhDms here reads iko ye na krtd dadhyadisya0.
Abhyankar and Limaye have emended this to iko yani krte dadh^ddih sydf
which, although not without a certain effort, could be interpreted: 'when yaN
has been substituted for iK, dadhi etc. should come about'. Palsule and
Bhagavat (1991:19,25-6) suggest iko ye 'nukrtd dadhyddisthd ikas tesdm yat
svarupam so 'rthah sthdnam iti which they translate (ibid., trans, p. 71): 'the
ik-s in (the real) words dadhi etc. which are named imitatively, - their meaning,
viz. the form, is denoted by sthdna (in this rule)'. However, the reading I have
proposed above would be more faithful to the actual manuscript reading,
emending only dadhyadisya to dadhyddisthd(h) 'which occur in dadhi and
such'. I have not been able to make anything out of the possibility of reading
yena and not ye na. *\
It is, at least, quite clear from this passage that Bhartrhari propoUpds as his
major thesis that sthdna refers to artha 'meaning'. The objections to such a
view are carefully considered, and the position is ultimately retained.
The alternative interpretation of sthdna as kdla 'time' which is resorted to
in order to overcome the difficulty created by substitution of single sounds, I
shall return to briefly. At first sight the interpretation as kdla seems to refer to
another locus according to an interpretation of sthdna as adhikaranasddhana.
But note that the interpretation of sthdna as prasanga 'possible appearance',
or any other familiar alternative based upon an interpretation of sthdna as bhd-
vasddhana, is not discussed in the DTpikd passage at all. Elsewhere in the
DTpikd194 Bhartrhari seems to bring up the idea of kdla as an alternative to
prasanga.
Basic to Bhartrhari's ideas is the notion of sabdabrahman, ultimately
speaking the sole reality of undifferentiated being qua Speebh.195 This
brahman is one, but it appears as many196 through the power ofJkdla 'time'
which is an aspect of brahman.197 Duejxi this kdlasakti 'Power of Time' the
world appears through the six modifications of being, sad bhdvavikdrdh,
referred to already in the Nirukta (Nir 1.2) and attributed by Yaska to a certain
Varsyayani. A detailed analysis of kdla 'time' is offered by Bhartrhari in kdnda
3.9 of his VdkyapadTya.m
Although it is ultimately one, Speech appears in sequences due to the Power
of Time. Thus it is not surprising that Bhartrhari in his DTpikd identifies sthdna
as kdla, that is to say, as that portion of time which is occupied by a linguistic
unit at the time of its pronunciation. The idea of Time and Speech is addressed
briefly in the VdkyapadTya (VP 1.49-50):
nddasya kramajdtatvdn na purvo na paras ca sah I
akramah kramarupena bhedavdn ivajdyatell
194
For example, MbhD 302,21 f., when discussing vt. 3 siddham tu prasange raparatvdt on A
198
1.1.51 ur an raparah. 195 VP 1.1. m
VP 1.2. 197
VP 1.3.
Translated with Heiaraja's commentary by P. Sarveswara Sharma 1972.
Substitution 255
pratibimbam yathdnyatra sthitam toyakriydvasdt I

tatpravrttim ivdnveti sa dharmah sphotanddayoh 11
Since sound is produced in [time-]sequence, this [sphota 'indivisible unit of
Speech'], which [can be characterised] neither as earlier nor as later, [and as such
is] without sequence, appears as if possessing parts through [sound which has] the
form of sequence.199
Just as a reflection [of the moon etc.] which resides elsewhere [than in itself,
namely in water,] seems, as a result of movement in water, to follow the activity of
this [water] - [such] is that which characterises [the relation between] the indivis-
ible Unit of Speech {sphota) and sound.
The Vrtti states in this context (ed. Subramania Iyer 1966:106): °nddah
sapratibandhdbhyanujnayd vrttyd sphotam avadyotayati, '. . . through its
function which comprises prevention and permission, sound suggests the
sphota, the indivisible Unit of Speech'. While bhedavat 'possessing parts'
pertains to dravya 'substance', krama 'sequence' pertains to time. The notion
of pratibandha 'prevention' and abhyanujfid 'permission' is a function
through which time regulates the world.200 With regard to language, this
works in such a way that the eternal and indivisible Speech, although one,
appears as if it had parts through sound which is manifest in time and space.
And through these functions of time, the manifested sounds appear in
sequence in such a way that when one is permitted to appear, all others are
prevented. In this way the notion of time could be said to fill the function of
prasanga 'possible appearance'. An analysis of sthdna as bhdvasddhana
would still hold, since time is one and in principle a continuum which is ulti-
mately without sequence, like Speech itself.
Kaiyata on sthana
Kaiyata deals with both of the common interpretations of the term sthdna, as
a noun denoting a locus in the sense of artha 'meaning' and as an action noun
in the sense of prasanga 'possible appearance'. He proceeds to show how each
of them would affect the analysis of A 2.4.52 aster bhuh (MbhP I:408b):
199
This is the interpretation I suggest if the text is read as above. The Benares edition (Patavar-
dhana et al. 1884-1937) and the edition of Sltaramacarl (1926/7) read grhyate for jayate, listed
as v.l. in the edition of Abhyankar and Limaye (1965) but surprisingly not in the edition of
Rau (1977). The commentary of the Benares edition gives the v.l. sakramah for akramah. Rau
(1977) offers the v.l. sakramam kra°. Reading sakramah and grhyate one may translate:
This [sphota], which [can be characterised] neither as earlier nor as later, is linked to [the
notion of time-]sequence, because sound arises in [time-]sequence. Through [this] form of
[time-]sequence [that pertains to sound,] [sphota] is perceived as if possessing parts.
By way of comparison, J.F. Staal (1967:vii) translates:
Though sound is produced in a fixed order
Speech itself has no earlier or later
Itself without order, it is produced
As if divided by the appearance of order.
200
Cf. VP 3.9.4.
sthdnam artha iti ke cid dhuh tisthanty asmin sabdd iti sthdnam, arthe ca sabdas
tisthati I tendster arthe bhur ity arthah II anye tv dhuh bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anya-
tarasydm ityddau ropadhddindm dnarthakydd bhdvasddhanah prasahgavdcT
sthdnasabda dsnyatel tendsteh prasange - asteh prdptau bhuh prayujyate ity
arthah sampadyate II svdbhdviko 'ster aprayoga drdhadhdtuke bhusabdasya ca
prayogo 'nena prakdrendnvdkhydyate II
Some say that sthdna [signifies] artha 'meaning' [according to the analysis]: 'some-
thing occurs in it, namely linguistic elements, thus [it is called] sthdna\ and a lin-
guistic element occurs in [its] meaning. Hence the sense [with reference to rule
2.4.52 aster bhuh] is that 'bhu [occurs] in the meaning of as\ But others say that,
since in [rules] such as [A 6.4.47] bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anyatarasydm the sound
r and the penultimate etc. are meaningless, the word sthdna is formed with the sense
of the mere activity [of standing] and signifies prasanga 'possible appearance'.
Therefore the sense brought forward is that when there is a possible appearance of
as, that is, when as would [otherwise] obtain, bhu is used. The non-use of as which
already exists (svdbhdvika) in the domain of an dr\dhadhdtuka suffix and also the
use of the element bhu are explained in this way.
Kaiyata first notes the interpretation of sthdna as a derivative signifying a
locus, in particular the meaning (artha) in which a linguistic element occurs.
In this connection, recall that expressions like ayam sabdo }sminn arthe
vartate, comparable to English This word occurs in this meaning', are normal
Sanskrit and that Paninlyas refer to the locative in such usages as a visayasap-
tamT, a locative which denotes a domain.201 Thus, for example, rule 2.4.52 aster
bhuh together with rule 1.1.49 would, under this interpretation, provide that
bhu occurs in the meaning of as (aster arthe) in the domain of drdhadhdtuka
suffixes. That is to say, bhu is used in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes
to signify the meaning which as signifies in the domain of sdrvadhdtuka
suffixes. This implies that linguistic elements 'stand' in their location in
semantic space.
201
For example, Mbh 11:199,21 (Bhdsya on A 4rtt stnydm, vt 5): stnydm yafprdtipadikam
vartate tasmdt tdbddayo bhavanti, 'when a nominal stem occurs in the domain of the femi-
nine, [the suffixes] TaP etc. apply'; similarly Mbh 11:31,10 (on A 3.1.26): bhavantiha hi
visayasaptamyo 'pi I tad yathdl pramdne yat prdtipadikam vartate stnydm yat prdtipad
vartata iti, 'for here also locatives which denote a domain apply: for example, "when a
nominal stem occurs in the domain of a measure; when a nominal stem occurs in the domain
of the feminine"'. See also Cardona 1983:44, note 80. Another instance, which involves rule
2.4.52 aster bhuh, is A 2.4.35 drdhadhdtuke. The Kdsikd remarks (Kas 11:284): visayasap
tami ceyam na parasaptamil tendrdhadhdtukavivaksdydm ddesesu krtesu pascdd ya
prdptam pratyayd bhavanh, 'and this is a locative which denotes a domain, hot a locative
which denotes that which follows; therefore, when one intends to use an drdhadhdtuka suffix,
then, after the ddesas have been made, the suffixes are added accordingly'. The problem here
is that there are two rules which introduce two different gerundive ikrtya) suffices, A 3.1.97
aco yat and A 3.1.124 rhalor nyat. A 3.1,97 teaches that after a root which ends in a vowel,
you add yat, which, applied to ybhu as the ddesa of âs in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suf-
fixes, correctly yields bhu-ya —»bho-ya -«-> bhav-ya. A 3.1.124 teaches that nyat is added to a
root which ends in r or a consonant. Now âs ends in a consonant. If we interpret drdhadhd-
tuke as a parasaptami one would add nyat to as and eventually end up with the erroneous form
bhdvya; so it is considered a visayasaptami. See also Mbh 1:484,5-8.
Substitution 257
Under the interpretation as bhdvasddhana, on the other hand, the term

sthana signifies prasanga 'possible appearance' and the same rule 2.4.52
would provide that bhu occurs in the domain of ardhadhdtuka suffixes where
as would otherwise obtain. As Kaiyata notes, some insist that only this inter-
pretation is justified, since in some rules for the interpretation of which A
1.1.49 must come into play the sthdnin is not a meaningful element. Single
sounds, to which meaning is not normally ascribed by the grammarians,202 are
also signalled to undergo substitution operations by rule 1.1.49, and in such
instances it is difficult to give the sense of 'meaning' to the word sthana. For
example, A 6.4.47 bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anyatarasydm should provide for
optionally not using the r of bhr- and the penultimate s of -sj in ^bhrasj 'fry'
in the domain of an ardhadhdtuka suffix, adding instead the augment rAM (r)
after the vowel. In short, the rule provides for using bharj instead of bhrasj.
But r and s are not meaningful elements. This rule presents us with interpreta-
tional difficulties on its own.203 Specifically, rAM applies in the place of the r
and the penultimate, that is, s, while A 1.1.47 mid aco yntydt parah teaches that
an element marked with an anubandha M, such as rAM, is added after the final
vowel of the form to which it applies. So the M directs the augment to one
place, that is, after the a of bhrasj, but the sthana is stated to be in the place of
the r and the s. Accordingly, one is left with a sthana that is at another place.
This could be said to be held by lopa 'elision' or zero, since aprayoga 'non-
use' is adarsana 'non-seeing', and adarsana is lopa.204 This is merely a line of
reasoning; the texts talk only of nivrtti 'cancellation' by the sthdnasasthT. The
Kdsikd considers the case of A 6.4.47 bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anyatarasydm
as follows (Kas V:398):
ropadhayoh iti sthdnasasthlnirdesdd upadhd rep has ca nivarttete / mittvdc cayam

aco 'ntydt paro bhavatil
Because a genitive which marks the sthana is exhibited in the word ropadhayoh, the
penultimate and the r are cancelled. But since it is marked with the diacritic marker
M, this [r] appears after the final of the vowels [according to A 1.1.47 mid aco 'ntydt
parah].
On this view, the disappearance of r and s is signalled by the genitive case
suffix, while the position of r in forms affected by rule 6.4.47 bhrasjo ropa-
dhayo ram anyatarasydm is said to be signalled by the anubandha M of rAM
as stipulated by rule 1.1.47 mid aco yntydt parah. According to the Kdsikd,
then, it is the disappearance of s and r in words formed by the addition of
ardhadhdtuka suffixes, such as the infinitive bharstum 'to fry', which is due
to the genitive case, while the position of r in such forms is effected through
the anubandha M of rAM.
202
The locus classicus for the discussion of non-meaningful elements is the Mahabhdsya at
203
sivasMra 5, vt. 9 ff. (Mbh 1:30 ff.).
204
Cf. Patanjali's discussion at A 6.4.1 (Mbh 111:199,17 f.); cf. Benson 1990:95-7.
By A 1.1.60 adarsanam lopah.
Be this as it may, an infinitive form bharstum will optionally obtain by

adding the drdhadhdtuka suffix tumUN {-turn) and by replacing thej of bhrasj
by s by A 8.2.36 vrascabhrasjasrjamrjayajardjabhrdjacchasam sah. Other-
wise one will get bhrastum.
What is important here is that neither the r nor the s possess,meaning on
their own. Still their replacement is signalled by a sthdnasasthi. This makes it
difficult to say that rule 6.4.47 bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anyatarasydm teaches
forms which are used in the meaning of r and s. Kaiyata attributes this view to
others. This may indicate that it is not his own position, but it is perfectly pos-
sible that he merely presents two poitats of view without any particular prefer-
ence for one or the other. But he musi have been familiar with arguments that
rAM in A 6.4.47 is not an irrefutable objection against the position that sthdna
means artha since Bhartrhari, as became evident earlier on, defends this posi-
tion in his DTpikd, a work with which Kdiyata was not only familiar, but which
he draws upon extensively in his own Prddtpa. The matter is also discussed by
Nagesa in a passage that will be dealt with shortly.
The meaning of the term sthdna is in this case identified as prasanga 'pos-
sible appearance', so that A 6.4.47 could be said to teach forms where, under
given conditions, rAM applies when the possible appearance of ir and s would
otherwise obtain. Kaiyata argues that this is possible on the view that grammar
only deals with words that already exist, that are svdbhdvika 'naturally exis-
tent'. The non-use of as and the use of bhu as taught by A 2.4.52 aster bhuh
are explained in this way as well, the two linguistic elements thus having
complementary domains. That sthdna signifies prasanga means that techni-
cally, in grammar, one would hear as if it were not cancelled by the body of
rules. Similarly, with regard to A 6.4.47, one would hear the r arid the s if they
were not cancelled. I do not think Kaiyata is right here, for prasqkta forms are
just those which the rules have led you to so far, not forms which are svd-
bhdvika 'naturally existent'.
Nagesa on sthana <

In his Uddyota Nagesa comments on the last-cited PradTpa passage in a way
that sheds considerable light on the interpretation of sthdna as artha
'meaning'. He remarks on the two interpretations of sthdna as follows (MbhU
I:408b-9a): *
arthe cetil vdcakatvasambandheneti bhdvahll asteh prasanga ity asya vydkhyd -
asteh prdptdv itill prayoga hi I svdbhdvika ity anusajyatel sabdan\tyatvabhanga-
pattyd sthdnasabdo nivrttivdcT nopapadyata iti bhdvahl ramvidhau ropadhagha-
titasyarthe ramghatita ity arthe na ksatir ity atrarucihll
'And [a linguistic element occurs] in [its] meaning.' Through the relation of being
[its] signifier, that is the idea. The explanation of 'when there is possible appear-
ance of as' is 'when as would [otherwise] obtain'. [On] 'use': [The word] svd-
Substitution 259
bhdvika 'naturally existent' adheres [to this as well, and not only to aprayoga 'non-
use'].205 The idea is that it is not acceptable that the word sthdna has the sense of
nivrtti 'cancellation; ceasing' since this would incur destruction of [the view that]
linguistic elements are eternally established. [But in fact] there is no harm [to the
view that sthdna means artha] if the sense conveyed is that when rAM is taught [in
rule 6.4.47], an item which has rAM as a constituent [occurs] in the meamng of one
that has r and the penultimate [s] as constituents - and therefore all of this is unsat-
isfactory.206
Here Nagesa makes it clear that a word - or, more precisely, a linguistic
element - may be said to 'occur in' its meaning through the relation of being
its signifier.
The prasanga alternative is then discussed. With regard to this he brings in
the notion of sabdanityatva, the position that speech forms are eternal, that lin-
guistic elements are permanently established. This, according to Nagesa, is
what Kaiyata has alluded to by the word svabhavika 'naturally existent'. All
that is explained by grammar is the use of bhu and the non-use of as in the
domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes. The elements bhu and as have of their
nature complementary domains. One has not established the use of bhu and
the non-use of as. Words exist already. Taking sthdna in the sense of nivrtti
'cancellation; ceasing' is thus in principle incompatible with the view that
speech forms are eternal, which is also incompatible with interpreting sthdna
in the sense of apakarsa 'drawing away'.
This view is expressed also in the PadamanjarT on the Kdsikd at A 1.1.49
(KasP 1:169; similarly the Nyasa, KasN 1:168):
mvrttivdcT na grhyate, aster upadesasdmarthydt I na hy drdhadhdtuke nivarttitasya
sdrvadhdtuke sravanam upapadyate, na hi mathurdydm vydpdditah srughne jfvati I
ndpy apakarsavacanah, na hy arthena nityasambaddhasya tato 'pakarsah sam-
bhavatil ndpy drdhadhdtukdd apakarsah, na hi nitye prakrtipratyayasamuddye
prakrter apakarsah sambhavati I svabhavika eva hy aster aprayoga drdhadhdtuke
bhusabdasya ca prayogo 'nena prakdrendnvdkhydyate, atah prasangah eva
sthdnaml
[That sthdna] is expressive of nivrtti 'ceasing' is not understood by force of the
teaching of as [in the grammar]. For it is not appropriate that something which has
ceased [to exist] before an drdhadhdtuka suffix should be heard before a sdrvadhd-
tuka suffix. Someone who has been killed in Mathura is not alive in Srughna! Also
205
The term svabhavika qualifies both prayoga 'use' and aprayoga 'non-use' in the PradTpa
206
passage Nagesa comments upon
That is to say, that A 6 4 47 should make one prefer the prasanga alternative is not a com-
pelling argument Although I do not think so, it is theoretically possible that the word arucih
'dislike' in this passage refers to Kaiyata's dislike. If so, the last sentence must be translated
'[Kaiyata has expressed] dislike here because there is no harm [to the position that sthdna
should be interpreted as artha] if the sense conveyed is that when rAM is taught [in rule
6 4.47], an item which has rAM as a constituent [occurs] in the meaning of one that has r and
the penultimate [s] as constituents'. Under this interpretation, Kaiyata too would defend the
position that sthdna means artha
i
[it does] not [obtain that sthand] expresses apakarsa 'drawing away'. For neither is
drawing away of something which is eternally related to [its] meaning possible, nor
is drawing away from an ardhadhdtuka suffix, since, in as much as the aggregate of
stem and suffix is eternally established, drawing away of the stem is not possible.
For the naturally existent non-use of as in the domain of an ardhadhdtuka suffix
and also the use of bhu are explained in this way. Accordingly, only prasanga 'pos-
sible appearance' is [the sense of] sthdna.
Haradatta thus rejects the idea that sthdna should mean nivrtti 'ceasing;
cancellation'. Something which has completely ceased to exist in one place
does not appear at another. In other words, if an element such as as were can-
celled, if it were cancelled forever, there would be no point in mentioning as
again at all since it would have been destroyed for good. Still, a substitution
process involving nivrtti could be justified by saying that what changes is actu-
ally a cognition onaJmowledge^(fewJJ/z/, sampratyaya), that is to say, perennial
elements proper to different contexts are conceptualised. One cognition is
replaced by another cognition in the mind. By saying that the replacements
actually take place in the mind, the doctrine of nityatva is secured even on the
view that sthdna has the sense of nivrtti.
This view is discussed at various places in vydkarana literature, for
example, in the Mahdbhdsya on A 1.1.56, vt. 14 kdryaviparindmdd vd
siddham, 'or [the doctrine of nityatva is accomplished] because there is a
transformation of what is going to be produced'. Patanjali takes the word
kdrya- here as a feminine adjective denoting buddhi 'mind; cognition',
arguing that only buddhi undergoes a viparindma 'transformation' (Mbh
1:137,13-18):
atha vd kdryaviparindmdt siddham etatl kim idam kdryaviparindmdd itil kdryd
buddhih sd viparinamyate I nanu ca kdryaviparindmdd iti bhavitavyarf^ I santi caiva
hy auttarapadikdni hrasvatvdnil api ca buddhih sampratyaya ity anarthdntaram/
kdryd buddhih kdryah sampratyayah kdryasya sampratyayasya Viparindmah
kdryaviparindmdd itil parihdrdntaram evedam matvd pathitam katham cedam
parihdrdntaram sydtl yadi bhutapurve sthdnasabdo vartatel
Or else this [position of nityatva] 'is accomplished because of a kdryaviparindma\
What is this kdryaviparindmdtl A cognition to be produced, that is what undergoes
transformation. Well, then [the wording] should have been kdrydvipdrindmdt. But
there are instances of shortening which are dependent upon a following word [cf. A
6.3.63]; moreover, buddhi and sampratyaya 'knowledge' do not differ in meaning,
[and so you can talk of] a cognition to be produced [as equivalent to] a knowledge
to be produced, [and accordingly of] a change in a knowledge to be produced as a
transformation-to-be-produced, and accordingly [defend the nityatva position by
arguing:] 'because there is a transformation of what is to be produced7. This [vdrt-
tika] is read on the assumption that it in fact presents an alternative solution [to the
problem], but how could this be an alternative solution? If the word sthdna is used
for something which was there previously.
Nagesa remarks on the last statement (MbhU I:454a):
Substitution 261
bhutapiirve sthdnasabdaprayogam abhyupetyedam parihdrdntaram I anyathdn-

arthakyaprasangdt II na ca tatra sthdnasabdo drsyate, somasthdne itydddv
abhutapiirve eva prayogadarsandd iti yadi bhutapiirve ityddi bhdsyatdtparyam I
This is an alternative solution when it is admitted that the word sthdna is used for
something previously existing, because it would not make sense otherwise; but the
word sthdna is not seen to possess that sense (tatra - bhutapurva), that is the sense
of the Bhdsya on yadi bhutapiirve, because one sees its use only for something
which is not previously existing in phrases such as 'in the place of Soma'.
That is to say, Nagesa makes it clear that the word sthdna is not used for
bhutapurva 'previously existent'. Patanjali continues (ibid., 18-26):
bhutapiirve cdpi sthdnasabdo vartate I katham I buddhydl tadyathdl kas cit kasmai
cid upadisati prdcinam grdmdd dmrd iti I tasya sarvatrdmrabuddhih prasaktdl
tatah pascdd aha ye ksirino 'varohavantah prthuparnds te nyagrodhd iti I sa tatrdm-
rabuddhyd nyagrodhabuddhim pratipadyate I sa tatah pasyati buddhydmrdms
cdpakrsyamdndn nyagrodhdms cddhvyamdndn I nityd eva ca svasmin visaya dmrd
nityds ca nyagrodhd buddhis tv asya viparinamyate I evam ihdpy astir asmd
avisesenopadistah I tasya sarvatrdstibuddhih prasaktdl so 'ster bhur bhavatity
astibuddhyd bhavatibuddhim pratipadyate/ sa tatah pasyati buddhydstim
cdpakrsyamdnam bhavatim cddhfyamdnam I nitya eva ca svasmin visaye 'stir nityo
bhavatir buddhis tv asya viparinamyate II
And the word sthdna does occur with regard to [something] which was there previ-
ously as well. How? By [referring to] a cognition. Just as someone points out to
someone else: 'there are mango trees east of the village'. That [person] will have the
cognition of mango trees everywhere [east of the village]. Then later he (the
speaker) says: 'those [trees] with a milky juice, which grow downward, with broad
leaves, they are banyan trees'. Then he (the listener) obtains a cognition of banyan
trees through the cognition of mango trees. Then he sees that the mango trees are
removed and the banyan trees are established in his mind, but the mango trees are
in fact permanently established in their own domain, and the banyan trees are per-
manently established [in theirs]. Only his cognition is transformed. Similarly also
in this case: [the verbal root] as has been taught to him without specification, so he
will have a cognition of as everywhere, [that is, in the domain of sdrvadhdtuka as
well as that of drdhadhdtuka suffixes]. He then obtains the cognition of [the verbal
root] bhu through the cognition of as by [A 2.4.52 which teaches that] bhu appears
in the place of as [in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes]. Then he sees that as is
removed and bhu is established in his mind, but as is in fact permanently established
in its own domain, and bhu is permanently established [in its]. Only his cognition
is transformed.
Kaiyata remarks (MbhP I:454a): na ca nityatvavirodhah I buddhidharmdh
kevalam arthesu pratipattrvasdd dropyante, na tu tadvasdd arthdndm tathd-
vasthdnam, 'and so there is no violation of the nityatva view: it is only the prop-
erties of cognitions that are imposed upon things by force of the cogniser; but
it is not by such power that the condition of things is [established] as such'.
Nagesa comments on this as follows (MbhU I:454b): na ceri/ bhutapiirve hi
sthdnasabdo nivrttivacanah sydd iti bhdvahll tatpakse nityatvam katham id

prcchati bhdsye katham iti, '"and so there is no": for if the word sthdna were
used for something which was previously, it would express cessation {nivrtti),
that is the idea; and on that view, how could there be nityatva, and so he asks,
in the Bhasya, "how?"'. The sense of nivrtti is thus retained on the view that
what is replaced in a substitution process is actually a cognition* while the lin-
guistic elements themselves are perennially established in their respective
domains.207
Haradatta also rejects the sense of apakarsa 'drawing away', on the basic
premise of Paninlyas that the relation between a linguistic element and its
meaning is eternally established, not arbitrary or invented by someone. This is
a position held also by the Jain grammarian Abhayanandin, .author of the
Jainendramahdvrtti on Devanandin's Jainendravydkarana (JV 1.1.46):
nityasabddrthasajnbandh'avivaksdydm sthdnasabdah prasangavdcTI prasahgas ca
prdptdrhatvam svdrthapratydyakdvasaro vdl yathd guroh sthdne sisya upacaryate
iti guroh prasahga iti gamyate I evam asteh sthdne prasange bhuhl bhavitdl bhav-
ituml bhavitavyam I brunah prasange vacir bhavatil vaktdl vaktuml vaktavyaml
anityasabddrthasambandhavivaksdydm apakarsavdcT sthdnasabdah I yathd goh
sthdne asvam badhndtil evam asteh sthdne 'pakarse bhur bhavatil
When one intends to express [the position] that the relation between linguistic ele-
ments and their meanings is eternally established, [then] the word sthdna expresses
prasahga 'possible appearance'. And prasanga [is either] the condition that entitle-
ment obtains208 or [it is] an occasion which expresses the sense of the thing [in ques-
tion]. For example, The pupil is served in the place of the teacher' means 'when
there is entitlement for the teacher'. Similarly, in the place of as, that is, when the
occasion arises [for as], bhu [applies]. As in [the following formations with drdha-
dhdtuka suffixes]: bhavitd, bhavitum, bhavitavyam. When the occasion arises for
bru, vac applies. When one intends to express [the position] that the relation
between linguistic elements and their meanings is not eternally established, [then]
the word sthdna expresses apakarsa 'drawing away'. Just as [when one says] 'He
ties up a horse in the place of theTcow.' Similarly, in the place of as, that is, when
there is drawing away [of as], bhu applies.
Thus, the sense of apakarsa is rejected on the premise that the sense of
prasanga obtains because the relation between a linguistic element and its
meaning is eternally established. Logically, this is of course not the only cir-
cumstance under which prasanga may obtain. The implication of the view
expressed by Abhayanandin is that the two alternatives, prasanga and artha,
overlap. Panini's grammar is a system where derivations start from semantics.
When prasanga obtains it is because the relation between a linguistic unit and
the meaning in which it occurs is considered to be eternally established.
207
The term buddhivipanndma 'transformation of cognition' and the problem of illusory change
208
have been discussed by D.S. Ruegg 1958.
Or, possibly: 'the condition of deserving [to receive or undergo] what has arrived [i.e., is at
hand]'.
Substitution 263
Similarly a stem and a suffix are semantically connected within a system of

mutually excluding domains.
What then about linguistic items which are not considered meaningful ele-
ments but which are nevertheless affected by substitution operations?
The Nagesa passage, to which I shall now return, could be interpreted so as
to offer a possible solution to this problem. Rule A 6.4.47 bhrasjo wpadhayo
ram anyatarasydm teaches an option whereby the r and s of the verbal root
Abhrasj are not used but the augment rAM (r) is inserted after the vowel of the
root. But single sounds such as r and s are not considered meaningful elements,
and so sthdna cannot mean ariha.
Nagesa dismisses this view and claims that there is no harm to the position
Kaiyata originally presents - namely that sthdne is interpreted as arthe - on
the assumption that A 6.4.47 provides for using an item that has rAM as a
constituent in the meaning of one that has r and penultimate s as constituents
(ropadhaghatitasyd). I think that this is what Nagesa has intended with the
claim that 'there is no harm' (aksatih). Another possibility would be that
aksatih refers to the absence of harm to the nityatva position. But this is hardly
tenable, since it would be true also under the interpretation that sthdna means
prasanga. Rather, once one interprets the rule as shown, there is no harm done
to the view that sthdna has reference to meaning.
Such an interpretation is supported also by what Nagesa has stated else-
where, a circumstance that weakens the possibility that the word aruci 'dislike'
expresses Kaiyata's view. Rather, the dislike is Nagesa's own, something
which is supported by what he says in his Laghusabdendusekhara. There he
takes the term sthdna of A 1.1.49 in the sense of prasanga 'possible appear-
ance' but remarks that, insofar as possible, the prasanga in question is of a
meaningful item. To illustrate this point he uses A 6.1.77 iko yan aci which thus
provides for the use of an item with a prevocalic constituent y to convey the
meaning of an item with a prevocalic constituent / which would otherwise pos-
sibly appear to convey the meaning (LSI 58,6-9,2):
prasahgas ca sati sambhave 'rthavata eva, arthapratydyandrtham sabdaprayogdtI
iko yan itydder acparekdraghatitasabdasydrthabodhandya prasange tatparaya-
kdraghatitah prayoktavya ity arthahl
And possible appearance, insofar as possible, is only of something that is meaning-
ful, since the purpose of linguistic elements is to bring about understanding of
meaning. That is to say, according to [A 6.1.77] iko yan etc., when the occasion
arises {prasange) for communicating the sense of a linguistic element which has /
as a prevocalic constituent, [an element] with a prevocalic constituent y is to be used
[instead].
The possibility Nagesa has brought up is, of course, compatible with the
position that one considers whole items such as dadhy to appear in certain
domains instead of items such as dadhi, which of their nature have comple-
mentary domains. The Sanskrit grammarians who believed in the doctrine of
nityatva were forced to adopt a model of substitution where substitutes are con-
sidered substitutes of whole words. This position is mentioned already in a
verse quoted in the Mahdbhdsya (Mbh 1:75,13—14).209 Nagesa's position is also
compatible with the idea that what actually changes is a cognitiorif210 Thus the
Laghusabdendusekhara passage continues (LSI 59,2-6):
er uh ityades ca tes tuh iti; ato na sabdanityatdhdnih I kim ca ikdrabuddhiprasange
yakdrabuddhir ity arthahl ata eva acah parasmin ityddi sangacchatel spastas
cedam dddhd ghu iti sutrasthdnivatsutrayor bhdsyel
And according to [rules] such as [A 3.4.86] er uh}xx there is -tu for -ti,m and so the
position that linguistic elements are eternally established is not forsaken. Moreover,
there is a cognition of y when there is the possible appearance of a cognition of i,
that is the meaning. For this very reason [A 1.1.57] acah parasmin etc.213 suits. And
this is clear from the Bhdsyam on rjules [A 1.1.20] dddhd ghv [addp] and [A 1.1.56
which teaches that the ddesa is considered] like the sthdnin.
On the view that linguistic elements are naturally existent (svdbhdvika), as
is eternally established but does not appear before an drdhadhdtuka suffix
where the eternally established unit bhu appears. So sthdna cannot mean
nivrtti: there is no cancellation, no ceasing. The situation is simply that one
element does not appear, since another element appears to convey the meaning
according to a system where the two elements have complementary domains.
In the same way one can consider a rule such as A 6.1.77 iko yan aci. Once
whole units such as dadhy are considered to appear in certain donjains instead
of units such as dadhi, it becomes possible to claim that the rule teaches the
use of a unit that has y as a constituent in the meaning of one that has i as a
constituent, provided a vowel follows.
Nagesa is in agreement with Bhartrhari, then, when he brings forward the
argument that substitutions are of whole units. Looked upon in this way, it is
whole units such as dadhy and dadhi, having of their nature complementary
domains, which are the elements mvolved in a substitution process. One whole
unit appears in the meaning of another whole unit which would possibly
appear to convey the meaning. Therefore you cannot base an argument that
sthdna means prasanga and not artha on the view that individual sounds are
meaningless. Accordingly, rAM in A 6.4.47 bhrasjo ropadhayo ram anya-
tarasydm does not provide a critical argument against taking sthdna in the
sense of artha 'meaning'.
209 210
211
See p 187 with note 28 above Mbh 1:137,13 f, discussed above
Rule 3 4 86 teaches the replacement of i by u in the imperative ending
2213
12 p o r mstance, bhavatu for bhavati.
Rule 11 57 acah parasmin purvavidhau teaches that the replacement for a vowel is consid-
ered like the vowel when there is application of a rule which would affect that which precedes
the vowel, and when the replacement is conditioned by what follows the voweL Here the prin-
ciple of sthdnivadbhdva taught by A 1.1 56 is at work, that is, the principle that the ddesa is
considered like the sthdnin. m Mbh 175,8 f, 137,13 f.
Substitution 265
Concluding remarks
The results of this inquiry into the meaning of the term sthdna can be summar-
ised as follows. Basically, sthdna is analysed in two different ways, either as
bhdvasddhana, with LyuT (-ana with presuffixal accent) by A 3.3.115 lyut ca,
that is, as an action noun denoting mere activity, state of being, equivalent to
sthiti 4a standing', or as adhikaranasddhana, with LyuT by A 3.3.117 kar-
anddhikaranayos ca, that is, as a noun denoting a locus for the activity denoted
by the verbal root Îsthd.
Under the first alternative commentators consider three particular contex-
tual interpretations of sthdna, namely apakarsa 'drawing away', nivrtti
'cancellation; ceasing', and prasanga 'possible appearance; chance'. The par-
ticular senses in question are considered contextual varieties of one single
general meaning of sthdna.
Paninlyas generally take sthdna in sthdneyogd of rule A 1.1.49 in the sense
of prasanga 'possible appearance'. In principle, taking sthdna in the sense of
nivrtti 'cancellation' or in the sense of apakarsa 'drawing away' is incompat-
ible with the view that speech forms, as well as the relation between a linguis-
tic element and its meaning, are perennial, eternally established (nitya). Still,
a substitution process involving the senses of nivrtti or apakarsa could be jus-
tified by saying that what changes is actually a cognition. Perennial elements
proper to different contexts are conceptualised.
The interpretation of sthdna as prasanga 'possible appearance' is clearly
applicable in any context where grammatical form alone is considered. This
requires a grammatical universe as the range of application, within which one
can talk of prasanga or possible appearance of linguistic elements. This uni-
verse is provided by the body of rules, on the view that grammar is concerned
with linguistic elements that already exist. Grammar does not establish these
elements. Thus, with regard to a rule such as A 2.4.52 aster bhuh, all that is
explained by grammar is the use of bhu and the non-use of as. The units as and
bhu have of their nature complementary domains. Under the interpretation of
sthdna as prasanga, a rule such as A 2.4.52 aster bhuh would, together with A
1.1.49, provide that bhu occurs in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes, where
there would otherwise be the possible appearance of as.
Now, in Panini's grammar derivations start from semantics. The interpreta-
tion of sthdna as prasanga obtains because speech units are eternally estab-
lished, as is the relation between a linguistic unit and the meaning in which it
occurs. Thus it is not surprising that commentators also consider an alterna-
tive interpretation of sthdna, namely as a derivative signifying a locus, in par-
ticular the meaning, artha, in which a linguistic element or speech unit, sabda,
occurs. A linguistic unit may be said to 'occur in' its meaning through the rela-
tion of being its signifier, as Nagesa notes. One should in this connection keep
in mind that an expression such as ayarn sabdo 'sminn arthe vartate, compar-
able to English This word occurs in this meaning', is normal Sanskrit and that
Paninlyas refer to the loqative in such usages as a visayasaptami, a locative

denoting a domain.
Thus, under the interpretation of sthdna as artha, rule A 2.4.52 aster bhuh
together with rule A 1.1.49 sasthisthdneyogd would provide that bhu occurs in
the meaning of as {aster arthe) in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes. That
is to say, bhu is used with drdhadhdtuka suffixes to signify the meaning which
as signifies in the domain of sdrvadhdtuka suffixes. This implies that linguis-
tic units occur in their respective domains in semantic space, all units and
meanings thus embedded in a system where meaning is the locus in which a
linguistic unit occurs.
One major objection to this interpretation of sthdna as artha 'meaning' con-
cerns rules which seemingly provide for substitution of single sounds, in which
case there is no meaning involved. Thus, as Kaiyata notes, some insist that only
the interpretation of sthdna as prasanga 'possible appearance' is justified,
since there exist rules which are affected by rule A 1.1.49 where the linguistic
items stipulated as sthdnin and ddesa are not directly meaningful. However,
according to Nagesa, there is no harm to the position that sthdna is interpreted
as artha since a rule which provides for substitution of single sounds actually
provides for the use of a whole item that has one sound as a constituent in the
meaning of a whole item that has another sound as a constituent.
The same point is brought forward by Nagesa elsewhere. Thus, in his
Laghusabdendusekhara he takes sthdna in the sense of prasanga 'possible
appearance' but remarks that, insofar as possible, the prasanga in question
should be of a meaningful unit.215 This is compatible with the position referred
to already by Patanjali, that in a substitution process one should consider whole
items such as dadhy to occur in certain domains instead of other whole items
such as dadhi, not only y instead of i. Tn this way the difficulty concerning sub-
stitution of single sounds is overcome. Linguistic elements such as dadhi and
dadhy are in complementary distribution, or, according to the Sanskrit termi-
nology, such elements are naturally existent (svdbhdvika), having of their
nature complementary domains. '
Bhartrhari too alludes to this in his DTpikd, where his major thesis clearly is
that sthdna refers to artha, the meaning of a linguistic element. Alternatively,
and giving up the position that sthdna refers to artha, Bhartrhari also suggests
another possible interpretation of sthdna, namely kdla 'time'. That is to say,
sthdna denotes that portion of time which a linguistic item occupies at the
moment of its pronunciation. In this way the objection concerning substitution
of single sounds is overcome as well. But Bhartrhari mentions lstill another
possibility, reverting to the view that sthdna signifies artha, basedon the posi-
tion that all linguistic items are first self-referring, a position already alluded
to by Katyayana (vt. 2 on rule A 1.1.68). Thus, say that the substitudnds referred
to by as in rule A 2.4.52 aster bhuh are instances of as actually used to signify
215
When, may one ask, is this not possible7
Substitution 267
meaning, their meaning, then, is expressed by bhil. The situation is similar in

the case of a rule such as A 6.1.77 iko yan aci which signals prevocalic semi-
vowel substitution. Now, the pratydhdra terms iK, yaN, and so on are techni-
cal terms which signify i and so on, and the vowels ultimately signified also
have meanings, namely their own forms (svarupa). Even these forms, then, can
be considered to have meanings, namely the sounds i and y that occur in actual
terms such as dadhi and dadhy.
It is thus clear that the interpretation of sthdna as prasanga 'possible
appearance' first and foremost applies at the level of grammatical form. It is
equally clear that the alternative interpretation of sthdna as artha 'meaning' is
seriously considered or even preferred by three major Paninlyas in the tradi-
tion, namely by Bhartrhari in the fifth century, by Kaiyata in the early eleventh
century, and by Nagesa in the late seventeenth to eighteenth century. The main
objection to the interpretation of sthdna as artha concerns substitution of
single sounds where there is seemingly no meaning involved. This objection is
overcome in different ways. Both interpretations of sthdna, as prasanga and as
artha, presuppose a view of grammar where linguistic units occur in their
respective domains according to a system of complementary distribution. This
domain may be regarded as basically determined by the possible appearance
of a unit or by its meaning. There is a certain choice, then, as to whether one
wishes to concentrate on linguistic form or on semantic content, and the two
alternatives thus overlap.
On the view that speech units are perennial and that the relation between a
speech unit and its meaning is eternally established as well, one unit does not
cease to exist when a complementary unit appears in its place. The unit which
is replaced disappears from the scene, but it does not cease to exist. When the
meaning conveyed by as in the domain of sdrvadhdtuka suffixes is conveyed
by bhu in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes, as does not cease to exist, it is
simply not the placeholder in that particular context.
6
Epilogue
The nirvacana material from the Nirukta makes it clear that in the technical
language of Yaska a genitive is used to mark the relation between a term and
its explanatory expression. In other words, although an ablative also occurs,
there is indisputably a genitive construction to be accounted for. J.S. Speijer
(1886:81-2) introduces his description of the syntactic usage of the genitive in
the following way: T h e fundamental notion of the genitive or sixth case is to
mark the belonging to, partaking of. In Sanskrit, it is employed in, so manifold
and so different ways as to make it very difficult to give a satisfactory account
of all of them.' This was a fact alsQ to the Sanskrit grammarians. In the words
of Patanjali (Mbh 1:118,10-11): ekasatam sasthyarthd ydvanto vd te sarve
sasthydm uccdritdydm prdpnuvantj, 'there are one hundred meanings for the
genitive case suffix - or as many as there are - and all of them would apply
when a genitive case ending is uttered'.1
Now, anyone engaged in nirvacana analysis would be well versed in
vydkarana and hence familiar with the use of the sthdnasasthT in the
AstddhydyT. Indeed, in Yaska's outline of nirvacanasdstra he explicitly states
that the analysis of single words should not be taught to anyone who is not
trained in vydkarana.2 On the basis of the previous discussion, however, I think
it is possible to put forward a stronger argument here. If, as Kaiyata and others
claim, the sthdnasambandha or relation marked by a substitutional genitive is
considered antaranga, that is to say, that it comes to mind before any other rela-
tion when we encounter a genitive form in the grammar, then there is nothing
remarkable in interpreting a genitive as a substitutional genitive in the context
of relations between linguistic elements. This is also buttressed by the use of
the genitive to indicate synonyms and the usage of the genitive in the formula
ity apy asya bhavati met with in the Nirukta. Nor is there anything in the dis-
cussions of A 1.1.49 sasthi sthdneypgd and the nirdisyamdna-paribhdsd which
prohibits such an interpretation within or without the boundaries of vydkarana.
As noted by Cardona (1976:201):
It is noteworthy that Panmlyas, from Katyayana on, do not view rules 1.1.49,
1.1.66-67 as stating any syntactic uses different from the object language Sanskrit.
1 2
See pp. 197 ff above. Nir 2.3, see p. 38 above.
Epilogue 269
Instead, according to them, the metarules in question apply to provide single

unambiguous interpretations of rules which, otherwise, the user of the grammar, a
speaker of Sanskrit, could not interpret uniquely.
Note that I am not claiming that the genitive used to mark the relation
between a term and its explanatory expression was intended exclusively as a
sthdnasasthi in the technical sense of the Astddhydyl All I am arguing is
simply that all genitives are complex and that the substitutional use of the gen-
itive is part of the Sanskrit language so that any genitive in a suitable context
could be interpreted in such a way.
With regard to the relation sustained between the two terms of a nirvacana
analysis, suffice it to repeat Vaidyanatha's remark that on the view that the term
sthdna signifies artha 'meaning', the sthdnasambandha is what comes to mind
before any other relation because meaning comes first whenvwe use words.
Viewed according to a substitutional model, a nirvacana analysis provides two
terms, a sthdnin or substituend and an ddesa or substitute, which are related
through the sthdna or location in grammatical space which is the necessary
condition for the relation in question. When the sthdna is identified as artha
'meaning', the two elements are simply alternative placeholders in semantic
space, and artha 'meaning' is the necessary condition for the relation between
a word and its explanatory expression. Meaning, it may be recalled, is the
primary quest of nirvacana analysis.
According to A 1.1.56 sthdnivad ddeso 'nalvidhau the ddesa is treated like
the sthdnin except in a rule teaching an operation that depends on sounds. In
other words, the characteristics of the substituend are transferred to the sub-
stitute. This principle is valid also in the ritual Sutras where ritual elements are
substituted for each other or for cosmological entities.3 This principle, known
as the sthdnivadbhdva, is of considerable importance for the understanding of
nirvacana analysis according to a substitutional model.
On the assumption that a nirvacana offers the etymology of a given word,
and that there can only be one correct etymology of any one given word, schol-
ars have striven to ascertain which is the correct or preferred alternative when
more than one have been suggested. Such an approach is simply a red herring,
to which the nirvacanas of 'Bhairava' convincingly testify. To my mind, there
can be no doubt that Yaska too states equally valid alternatives when he offers
more than one nirvacana for any given word.
Most recently this issue has been discussed by Mehendale (1986) when crit-
icising the view expressed by Bronkhorst (1981:6-7): 'On many occasions the
Nirukta gives several etymologies of one single word in one single meaning.
There is reason to believe that all such etymologies were considered simultane-
ously correct.' Mehendale is of a different opinion (1986:119): 'His (= Yaska's)
use of such expressions as vd, api vd, yad vd while giving alternative ety-
mologies for a given word - and this is also true in the case of the word
3
See p. 188 above.
nighantu - clearly shows that in his opinion these are possible alternatives and
it is presumed that a new suggestion cancels the ones made previously.' In my
view this presents no tenable argument at all: it is perfectly possible to argue
that vd, api vd, and yad vd simply suggest alternatives with no preference for
any particular one of them. And, understandably, Mehendale admits to some
puzzlement as to why Yaska gives an additional derivation of anna from
dAnam when its derivation from A ad 'is clear' (ibid.):
It is true that it is not easy to say why Yaska does this. It is possible that he did this
under the influence of the Brahmanas and the Upanisads where, occasionally, words
of known derivation, have been derived in an 'unorthodox' way, witness, for
example, the derivation of yajna in the Sat. Br. 3.9.4.23, Ch. Up. 4.16.1; 8.5.1, or of
yajus in the Br. Up. 5.13.2. Or one may say that Yaska did it because to him the
derivation of anna from ad- was not that obvious since not all the roots which end
in -d yield similar formations, and even in the case of roots like bhid-, nud- etc. alter-
native forms are available. Be that as it may, a case like this cannot be an argument
to infer that Yaska believed in the simultaneous correctness of alternative deriva-
tions.
There seems to be only one way of understanding the simultaneous correctness
of multiple derivations of nighantu. We have to suppose that at one time the samd-
mndya was called nigantu, samdhantu and samdhartu and that in course of time all
these designations assumed one identical form nighantu. Only this way the three
derivations become simultaneously correct.4
Mehendale goes on (ibid.): 'Bronkhorst rightly discards this assumption,
and yet says that Yaska believed in the simultaneous correctness of the alter-
native derivations.' In my view Bronkhorst is absolutely right, and the explana-
tion suggested by Mehendale, although he discards it, is indeed not the only
way one could explain how numerous derivations of a single word all can be
considered valid. I am, however, slightly reluctant to use the* expression
'simultaneously correct' and would rather describe them as equally correct in
that one can only invoke one alternative at any given moment. Withki the time-
less framework of a substitutionafmodel alternative nirvacanas are equally
valid. They are simply alternative placeholders in semantic space.
In vdrttika 12 on A 1.1.56 the question is raised whether the sthdnivadbhdva
principle is incompatible with the doctrine that speech elements are eternal
(nitya): anupapannam sthdnyddesqtvam nityatvdt, 'the condition of being
sthdnin and ddesa does not come about because [of the doctrine that speech
elements] are eternal'. Pataiijali remarks on this as follows (Mbh 1:137,4-6):
sthdnyddesa ity etan nityesu sabdesu, nopapadyate I kim kdranam I nityatvdtl sthdnT
hi ndma yo bhiltvd na bhavatil ddeso hi ndma yo 'bhutvd bhavatil etac ca nityesu
sabdesu nopapadyate yat sato ndma vindsah sydd asato vd prddurbhava itill
4
The reference is to Nirukta 1.1: nighantavah kasmatl. . .1 te nigantava eva santo nigamand
nighantava ucyanta ity aupamanyavah I api vd hanandd eva syuh I samdhatd bhavanti I
samdhrtd bhavanti I
Epilogue 271
This [condition of being] sthdnin and ddesa does not come about when speech ele-
ments are eternal. Why? Because of [the doctrine of] eternality. For what we call a
sthdnin is something which, having been, is no longer, and what we call an ddesa
is something which, not having been [previously], comes to be. And this does not
come about when speech elements are eternal, namely that something existent
should be destroyed, or something [previously] non-existent become manifest.
Kaiyata comments (MbhP I:453a): ekadesavikdre ypi yatra nityatvahanis
tatra sarvavikdre kuto nityatvam, 'even when you have change in just a part the
principle of eternality is violated, so how can you have eternality when there
is change of the whole?'. He adds: yatrdnvayo 'pi kasya cin ndstity arthah,
'that is to say, when there is not even the continued presence of anything'.
When, for example, the verbal suffix -ti is replaced by -tu there is at least the
continued presence of t. This is not the case when there is a change of the
whole, so, it is argued, in that case the eternality principle is definitely vio-
lated. Nagesa makes this clear (MbhU I:453b):
sarvavikara itil aster bhur ityddaull yo bhutva ityddi bhdsyasya prdgabhdvdprati-
yogitve sati dhvamsdpratiyogitvam nityatvam iti tdtparyamll
'When there is change of the whole': [that is to say,] in cases such as [A 2.4.52]
aster bhuh. The intention of the Bhdsya beginning 'that which having been' is that
[for something] to be eternal is [for it] to have an existence which, given that it is
not the counterpart of prior non-existence, is not the counterpart of [posterior]
destruction [either].
Thus, to be eternal is to have a kind of existence which is qualified neither by
prior non-existence nor by posterior destruction. The argument that this is
incompatible with the condition of being sthdnin and ddesa is refuted by vdrttika
13: siddham tu yathd laukikavaidikesv abhutapurve 'pi sthdnasabdaprayogdt,
'but [the doctrine of nityatva] is properly managed because the word sthdna is
used with reference to [something] which was not [there] previously5 as well, just
as in everyday speech and in Vedic'. Patanjali remarks (Mbh 1:137,8-11):
siddham etatl kathaml yathd laukikesu vaidikesu ca krtdntesv abhutapurve 'pi
sthdnasabdo vartatel loke tdvad upddhydyasya sthdne sisya ity ucyate na ca
tatropadhydyo bhutapurvo bhavatil vede 'pi somasya sthdne putikatrndny
abhisunuydd ity ucyate na ca tatra somo bhutapurvo bhavatilI
This is properly managed. How? The word sthdna occurs also with regard to [some-
thing] which was not there previously, just as in mundane and Vedic precepts.6 For
example, in everyday speech it is said The pupil instead of the teacher.' But here
the teacher is not [someone] who was [there] previously. In the Veda also. It is said
'The Putlka plant should be pressed instead of Soma.' But here Soma is not [some-
thing] which was [there] previously.
5
Patanjali will later (Mbh 1:137,15) say that the word sthdna occurs with regard to that which
6
has been (Jbhutapurve) as well {bhutapurve cdpi sthdnasabdo vartate); see below.
This translation of krtanta follows Joshi and Roodbergen 1986:121, note 492.
Within a substitutional model the teacher and the pupil, the Soma and the
Putlka plants are simply alternative placeholders without any notion of earlier
or later. The teacher does not cease to exist, although the pupil appears in his
place. Similarly, within grammatical space, there is no violation of the doctrine
of nityatva. The non-temporal substitution is proved by referring to the
meaning of the word sthdna in everyday and ritual contexts where the sthdnin
is not former. i
A further argument is brought forward by vdrttika 14: kdryaviparindmdd vd
siddham, 'or it is properly managed because of a transformation of that which
is to be formed'. This understanding of kdryaviparindmdt is based on Patanjali
who explains (Mbh 1:137,13-14): kdryd buddhih sd viparinamyate, 'a cogni-
tion which is to be formed, that is what undergoes a transformation'. Kaiyata
comments (MbhP I:453b): anyasydtra viparindmdsambhavdt sdmarthydt
kdryatvena buddhir grhyate na tu kdryasabdo buddhiparydyah, 'because it is
impossible for anything else to undergo the transformation here, cognition
(buddhi) is understood on the strength that it is what is to be formed (kdrya),
but the word kdrya is not a synonym of buddhi". Patanjali explains the purpose
of the vdrttika (Mbh 1:137,17-26):
parihdrdntaram evedam matvd pathitam katham cedam parihardntatam sydtl yadi
bhutapurve sthdnasabdo vartatel bhutapurve cdpi sthdnasabdo vartatel katham I
buddhydl tadyathdl kas cit kasmai cid upadisati prdcinam grdmdd dmrd itil tasya
sarvatrdmrabuddhih prasaktdl tatah pascdd aha ye kslrino "'varohavantah
prthuparnds te nyagrodhd itil sa tatrdmrabuddhyd nyagrodhabuddhim pratipad-
yatel sa tatah pasyati buddhydmrdms cdpakrsyamdndn nyagrodhdms cddhiya-
mdndnl nityd eva ca svasmin visaya dmrd nityds ca nyagrodhd buddhis tv asya
viparinamyate I evam ihdpy astir asmd avisesenopadistah I tasya sarvatrdstibud-
dhih prasaktdl so yster bhur bhavatity astibuddhyd bhavatibuddhirripratipadyate I
sa tatah pasyati buddhydstim cdpakrsyamdnam bhavatim cddhtyamdnam I nitya
eva ca svasmin visaye 'stir nityo bfiavatir buddhis tv asya viparinamyate II
This [vdrttika] has been read on the-assumption that it presents a totally different
solution to the problem, but how would it be a totally different solution? [It would]
if the word sthdna occurs with regard to [something] which was there previously,
and the word sthdna does occur with regard to [something] which was there previ-
ously as well. How? By [referring to] a cognition. Just as someone points out to
someone else: 'there are mango trees east of the village'. That [person] will have the
cognition of mango trees everywhere [east of the village]. Then later he (the
speaker) says: 'those [trees] with a milky juice, which grow downward, with broad
leaves, they are banyan trees'. Then he (the listener) obtains a cognition of banyan
trees through the cognition of mango trees. Then he sees that the mango trees are
removed and the banyan trees are established in his mind,7 but the mango trees are
in fact permanently established in their own domain, and the banyan trees are
permanently established [in theirs]. Only his cognition is transformed. Similarly
7
There is no clear distinction between kartr, karana, and adhikarana here: it happens m the
mind by force of the mind.
Epilogue 273
also in this case: [the verbal root] as has been taught to him without specification,
so he will have a cognition of as everywhere.8 He then obtains the cognition of [the
verbal root] bhu through the cognition of as by [A 2.4.52 which teaches that] bhu
appears in the place of as [in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes]. Then he sees
that as is removed and bhu is established in his mind, but as is in fact permanently
established in its own domain, and bhu is permanently established [in its]. Only his
cognition is transformed.
So there is no violation of the doctrine of nityatva in this case either. Once
the speech elements of the Sanskrit language are considered eternal, one
element does not cease to exist when a complementary element appears in its
place. The idea of succession, the temporal priority of the sthdnin, is denied.
There is no earlier or later, except in the mind. Or, in the words of Kaiyata
(MbhP I:454a): na ca nityatvavirodhahl buddhidharmdh kevalam arthesu
pratipattrvasdd dropyante na tu tadvasdd arthdndm tathd 'vasthdnam, 'and so
there is no violation of [the doctrine of] eternality; it is only the properties of
cognitions that are imposed upon things by force of the cogniser, but it is not
by such power that the condition of things is [established] as such'.
This leaves us with a model of substitution which does not involve any
notion of time. If the ddesa is considered like the sthdnin in accordance with
the sthdnivadbhdva principle, and there is no notion of temporality involved in
the substitutional model, it becomes easy to explain how alternative nirvac-
anas of a given word in a single meaning can be equally valid. They are simply
alternative placeholders in semantic space. There is no prior or posterior, there
is no one alternative which has to be preferred. Since the relation between
word and meaning is eternally established too, the various alternatives are
permanently invokable ideal expressions which the actual forms we meet with
in language replace.
The temporality problem may even hint at a possible solution as to why a
substitutional model could have been adopted in the first place. As noted, in
the Atharvaveda and in the Satapathabrdhmana the mythical activity given as
the ground for using a name is expressed in a past tense, thus referring to a spe-
cific event.9 If a Nirukta formula of the -tehl-eh or iti satah type is interpreted
according to a substitutional model, no temporality is expressed at all. This
could be the result of an exegesis which suppresses time in order to secure the
eternality of the Vedas. This idea of eternality conflicts with the Aitihasikas,
the legendarians, who refer to real events and persons in the past. The
Nairuktas, however, prefer allegorical interpretations, and, in general, dissolve
historicity.10
The temporality and personality problem became really serious for the
8
9
That is to say, in the domain of drdhadhdtuka suffixes as well as that of sdrvadhdtuka suffixes.
10
See p. 27 above.
Cf. p. 27 above; an example was adduced from Nirukta 2.16 concerning the identity of Vrtra:
tat ko vrtrahl megha iti nairuktdhl tvdstro 'sura ity aitihdsikdh, 'but who is Vrtra7 a cloud
according to the Nairuktas; an Asura, son of Tvastr, according to the Aitihasikas'.
Mlmamsakas* the extreme Vedic ritualists. For them even myth was arthavdda,
a non-injunctive 'explanation of the meaning', an elaboration of the topic-
matter coming up in ritual, designed to encourage or dissuade. The purpose of
myth was no longer to narrate events of the past but to promote a rite. Already
Jaimini argued that the Veda is not composed by anyone and so is eternal.11 If
the Veda did not exist before the persons referred to in myths, then it would not
be eternal. In fact, any narrative at all would prove that the Veda is not eternal.
With an allegorical interpretation and within a substitutional model the per-
sonality and temporality problems disappear.
One further issue arises as a result of the sthdnivadbhdva principle. If the
ddesa is to be considered like the sthdnin, then how do we consider a case
where no sthdnin is mentioned? In the context of vydkarana, Vaidyanatha
pointed out that since linguistic units occur in complementary distribution,
the rules of grammar serve to establish a fixed distribution in this respect. This
is possible, Vaidyanatha says, because sthdnins and ddesas both exist in
the world, a fact which implies that one has to consider usage.12 In
nirvacanasdstra we have to infer the sthdnin which, although not the form met
with in actual linguistic usage, has its characteristics transferred onto the
ddesa, the form we meet with in actual usage. Still, the sthdnin too is part of
the Sanskrit language. It is just a more composite linguistic unit, in its fullest
form simply a sentence.
In vydkarana substitutes are considered substitutes of "whole words
(padas)13 as opposed to the earlier framework of the Pratisakhyas, for example,
TaittirTya Prdtisdkhya 1.56: varnasya vikdralopau, 'change and elision are of
a speech sound'.14 W. Whitney (1871:40) remarks on the latter: *That is to say,
not of a whole word. Where, as by v.19, more than one letter is omitted, each
is specified.' In the terminology of vydkarana a pada or word is defined by A
1.4.14 suptinantam padam, 'that which ends in a nominal ending or a verbal
ending is &pada\ Panini does not define the notion of a sentenced or vdkya, but
various definitions have been suggested by subsequent Paninlyas. The briefest
one is offered by Katyayana at A 2.1.1, vdrttika 10: ekatin, 'that which contains
a finite verb'.15 Other traditions, most notably Buddhism and the Tantric tradi-
tions concerned with the use of mantras consider a pada a larger unit not
delimited by word boundaries.
The Mantrasastric use of the term pada has been well put by Abhinavagupta
in the Tantrdloka discussing the embodiment of the divine consciousness in
>
11 12 13
14
Cf Mlmamsasutra 11 27-32 See p 233 above See p 187 above.
15
See p 175 above
This involves the assumption that a finite verb such as asti underlies nominal sentences, a view
accepted by Patanjah and the later tradition Patafijall's own view is, roughly, that there must
be a verb in a sentence, but that there can be more than one verb Most recently the question
of Paniman syntax and the changing notion of sentence has been discussed by Deshpande
1987, 1991 As Deshpande points out (1987.71, 1991 34), Panini held the view that there can
be purely nominal sentences and that their derivation does not require the assumption of an
underlying finite verb
Epilogue 275
the pan-Saiva Vyomavyapimantra of eighty-one padas {ekdsitipada devi)16

(TA 6.228c-30b):
tathd tathd pardmarsasakticakresvarah prabhuh II
sthulaikdsitipadajapardmarsair vibhdvyate I
tata eva pardmarso ydvaty ekah samdpyate II
tdvat tatpadam uktam na suptinniyamayantntam I
The omnipotent governor of the totality of Powers [constituted by] the sum of all
ideas of whatever form is realised through [the contemplation of] the ideas which
arise [one by one] m these eighty-one padas, finite though they are Therefore we
define the pada as that unit [of speech] which accommodates the complete idea, not
[as m vydkarana] as that which is bounded by a sup or a tin.
Thus, as Jayaratha points out by way of illustration on these verses (TAV
4[6] 187,13—16), the six syllables om narnah sivdya are not three padas but one.
The use of the term pa da in this sense does not stem from Abhinavagupta but
goes back to the Saivagamas.17
A similar use of the term pada is met with in Buddhist texts. Vasubandhu
states in his Abhidharmakosabhdsya (AKBh 270,5-6) :18
vdkyam padam, ydvatd 'rthapansamdptih, tad yathd — anityd bata samskdrdh ity-
evamddi, yena knydgunakdlasambandhavisesd gamyante I
[The term] vdkya [of AK 2.47] means pada, insofar as it allows for the complete
expression of a meaning, for example, 'impermanent are the samskdras\ etc , [and
pada is defined as that] by which the specific relations of action, quality, and time
are understood.
A syntactic unit is a pada, not necessarily a word which for the grammar-
ian was the natural unit when describing language. In nirvacanasdstra these
units may vary. A unit may be a word or contain several words, but the impor-
tant thing is that the substitution affects the totality. It seems the situation may
be viewed as follows. Every noun analysed by a nirvacana is linked to an
action, referred to by means of a verbal root or a finite verb. Ultimately this
entails that a noun is to be interpreted with regard to kdraka, which involves a
finite verb. If it is interpreted in terms of bhdva, one may argue that a finite
verb such as asti underlies the analysis. This implies that a noun may be the
replacement met with in the real language of a semantically eqiiivalent expres-
sion which formally is a sentence. It follows that in nirvacana analysis a noun
ultimately embeds a sentence. The stdnivadbhdva principle secures that the
characteristics of the sentence are transferred to the noun.
It is possible to pursue this line of thinking a bit further. A 1.1.62 pratyaya-
lope pratyayalaksanam teaches that when a suffix is elided and replaced by
16
17
For this mantra see Brunner-Lachaux 1977 240, note 192
By way of example, Matangaparamesvardgama 131 ab (ed Bhatt 1977 241) ekdsitipada dev
18
yd sd saknh sivdtmikd, describing the same Vyomavyapimantra
See Simonsson 1982 540-1
zero, the mark of the elided suffix remains to take effect in a subsequent opera-
tion caused by the suffix.19 Considering the nature of natural ellipsis in Panini,
Deshpande (1985a:36) suggests that in view of A 1.1.62 and the situation of
word-ellipsis and its /connection with semantics and syntax, one may formu-
late a theory that Panini does have a general rule padalope padalaksanam. In
the words of Deshpinde (ibid.): 'When a word is zeroed (by natural ellipsis),
the zero may still be treated like the original word it replaces.' The existence
of such a rule woujd allow us to explain all sorts of elliptical sentences in
Sanskrit in accordance with Panini's system. Deshpande concludes (ibid.):
However, this principle is restricted to semantics and syntax, and does not extend
into the realm of phonological and accentual rules.20 One can justify such a conclu-
sion based on Panini's rules. Panini clearly says that the lost word is the sthdnin
'substituendum' for the deletion or zero (lopa), cf. P. 1.4.105 and P. 2.3.14. Thus, the
general rule P. 1.1.56 (sthdnivad adeso ynal-vidhau) should apply to a word and its
replacement by a zero.
A 1.4.51 akathitam ca teaches that the name karman is assigned also to that
kdraka which is unspecified, that is, which has not otherwise been assigned to
any specific kdraka category. According to the tradition it is this rule which
accounts for ditransitive constructions of the type mdnavakam panthdnam
prcchati, 'he asks the boy the way'.21 Kiparsky (1982:39 ff.) has suggested that
A 1.4.51 akathitam ca in fact accounts for elliptical constructions where the
object is omitted from the sentence and therefore identified as akathita 'not
expressed'. He concludes (ibid.:44): 'It seems, then, that Panini assumed a
general deletion rule, operating freely in the grammatical derivations of sen-
tences, which drops words which are obvious from the meaning or context.'
Let these observations serve to indicate that it is perfectly possible to view
the mechanics of nirvacana analysis within a similar framework, yhe word that
is explained embeds a sentence with most of its elements elided and replaced
by zero. It is still possible to treat the word like the original sentence it ulti-
mately replaces. Indeed, this may suggest a way of thinking not confined to
vydkarana alone. It may even provide a clue to the understanding of the prac-
tice of assigning metaphysical meaning to all the sounds of the Sanskrit lan-
guage resorted to by certain Tantrlc traditions.
To conclude, I have argued that an analysis of the Hi satah type conveys the
following information: there is (sat-) an x suehmat it is true (sat-) to say of it
19
20
This rule and Patanjah's remarks on it have been discussed by Benson 1990,141-68.
As far as I can see, this is not entirely correct. There are some accent rules where lopa is used
to indicate that a whole word is elided. A 8.1.62 cdhalopa evety avadhdrane teaches that when
there is elision of the words ca or aha and the word eva is used in their place to denote a restric-
tion, the first of the finite verbs retains its accent. A 8.1.63 cddilope vibhdsdlea,ches that when
there is elision of the words ca, vd, ha, aha, or eva the first of the finite verbs optionally retains
its accent See Benson 1990 134 for a discussion of these rules in the cdntext of A 1.1 60
21
adarsanam lopah
S.D Joshi (1976) has argued that it is the preceding rule A 1 4.50 tathdyuktam cdnlpsitam and
not A 1.4 51 which accounts for double accusative constructions of this type.
Epilogue 277
'it is x-ing' or 'it is being x-ed' etc., and therefore it is called 'x\ The fact that
the sthdna, the location in grammatical space, is identified as artha opens new
perspectives for the interpretation of an Hi satah type of analysis in the light of
a substitutional model. Since the term artha frequently refers to that which is
designated by a name as well as to the meaning of that name, it is less crucial
whether we take artha in the sense of linguistic meaning or we take it in the
sense of the thing meant. Once the genitive of satah is interpreted as a
sthdnasasthi and sthdna is identified as artha, then an analysis such as megho
mehatiti satah can be interpreted: 'meghah' occurs in the meaning of that
which really exists such that it is true to say of it: it rains. Such an interpreta-
tion provides no difficulties and is supported by an investigation of the sub-
stitutional model in the literatures of grammar and ritual. Basically, then, a
nirvacana analysis works so that it establishes the truth-value of a sentence in
the sense that if a true sentence can be established as an ideal version of a
prevalent term, then that term is infused with the meaning of the true sentence.
As such, nirvacana analysis is an empirical theory of what expressions mean
by force of its appearance as a theory of truth.
The meaning of a sentence is intimately connected with whether it is true
or false. The sentence 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. While
discussing the nirvacanas of 'Bhairava' I pointed out that one can give exactly
the same truth conditions in a language by making systematic shifts in what
the singular terms refer to and what satisfies the predicates.22 One gets a differ-
ent thought if one gets a different sentence to represent it. And whether we can
say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties depends
simply on the way it is described. The important feature of nirvacana analysis
is that the attribution of properties happens through the name itself, for
example 'Bhairava'. The analysis establishes an ideal expression which has the
semantic power to identify the nature of that which a name signifies. This, I
suggest, is how it came to be a powerful tool in cultural discourse. If someone
has the power to determine the reference of the words of a shared language,
then that person has the capacity to interpret and determine the contents of
thoughts. If knowledge is justified true belief, then it would seem that all the
true beliefs of a consistent believer constitute knowledge. A nirvacana analy-
sis justifies a certain belief, and this justification implies that the belief is true
(sat-). A nirvacana analysis is thus an epistemological device.
The notion of reference in modern semantics is a theoretical concept we
introduce in order to have a satisfactory theory of what sentences do, and a
theory of truth is a theory about semantic relations between sentences in a lan-
guage. Obviously, I am not claiming that nirvacanas work 6r are to be inter-
preted within such a framework. There is a big difference between the question
of what makes sentences true in a philosophically acceptable way, and the way
sentences are made true by consent in the community. This alone makes it clear
22
See pp. 3 and 97 above
that the nirvacana device is very different from modern semantic theories of
truth or truth-based theories of semantics in that it lacks explanatory power in
the philosophical sense.
In the light of the technical framework of the Nirukta it is of course also
possible to adopt a different model for the interpretation of nirvacanas. On the
view that the -teh and -eh forms are ablatives one would simply face statements
that single out the verbal element which underlies the grammatical formation
and identify the action or event considered the reason for a particular name.
This is a possibility also if they are considered genitive forms, and it is no
longer crucial to determine which case ending we are dealing with. But this
does not exclude an interpretation according to a substitutional model either.
Even within the AstadhyayT one and the same genitive form is to be interpreted
in different ways in different contexts.23 As far as the material from the Nirukta
is concerned, we are dealing with elliptical ways of expression*which lend
themselves to various interpretations according to the different levels and his-
torical presuppositions of Yaska's technical language. There is no reason why
these interpretations cannot be simultaneously operative. Indeed, the situation
reflects rather strikingly the fundamental debate on the nature of words or
speech elements. One view holds that they are eternally established (nitya),
while the alternative view holds that they are produced (kdrya), as if processed
by grammar.24
It seems worth considering once again the Brahmana equations mentioned
earlier, equations of the type samvatsaro yajftah, 'the sacrifice is the year'
(SatBr 11.2.7.1), or ddityo 'gnih,{ 'the [sacrificial] fire is the sun' (SatBr
10.5.4.1).25\Here 'the sacrifice' or 'the fire' would be termed ddesa. They are
ritual elements which replace cosmological entities. It is in these identification
formulas that we can see a move towards technical nirvacanas. In the context
of ritual sthdna could be the levels of interpretation known as'adhidevatd,
adhydtman and adhiyajna, levels which establish a relation between macro-
cosm, microcosm and ritual. This way of interpreting is very common in the
l
Brahmanas and Upanisads.
With the sthdna identified as artha 'meaning' a nirvacana is to be inter-
preted not only as 'X in the place of Y' but as 'X in the meaning of Y \ This
implies that we have an ideal expression Y which is the placeholder in seman-
tic space. This place, that is to say, this meaning, is instead occupied by the
item X which replaces Y. Knowledge of tharsecret place or meaning and that
secret entity Y is provided by experts who are in command of theôols of the
tradition. In this way change is achieved through substitution in that new
meaning may be encoded into old terms by means of a substitutional model. I
have stated already that this is not the only way to look at nirvacana analysis,
23
By way of example, the genitive of A 6,4.1 angasya is to be interpreted as a sthdnasasthT, a
substitutional genitive, in A 7 2 102 tyadpdinam ah, but as an avayavasasthT, a partitive geni-
24
tive, when it recurs by25anuvrtti in A 7 2 106 tadoh sah sdv anantyayoh, see p 226 above
See p 186 above. See p 180 above. ' '
Epilogue 279
but it has the advantage of showing the flexibility of the various types of analy-
sis while providing a superstructure that encompasses them all within a model
known from other areas of Sastric Sanskrit, notably the literatures of grammar
and ritual. The model arises out of the wealth of material provided by the
Indian tradition itself, and it has the advantage of directly involving the artha
of a given term, the very goal nirvacanasdstra strove to achieve.
ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary sources which are arranged in volumes, chapters, or verses are referred to by
means of these. Otherwise references are to page and line.
A Astddhydyi of Panini. Ref. to ed. O. Bohtlingk 1887.

A ASS Ananddsrama Sanskrit Series, Poona.
Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev (tr.): 1960, The Paribhdsendusekhara ofNdgojfbhatta,
edited and explained by F. Kielhorn; part 2: translation and notesy Poona: BORI.
(New edition, with preface by K.V. Abhyankar, of Kielhorn 1871-4.)
(ed.): 1962 The Paribhdsendusekhara ofNdgojibhatta, edited critically with the com-
mentary Tattvddarsa of MM. Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar; part 1 Srimadupddhyd-
yopandmakasivabhattasutasatlgarbhajandgojibhattakrtah srimanmahdmahopd-
dhydydbhyamkaropdhvavdsudevasdstrTviracitaydtattvddarsdbhidhayd vydkhya-
yd samavetah paribhdsendusekharah, prathamo bhdgah), Poona: BORI. (New
edition, with new Sanskrit commentary, of Kielhorn 1868.)
(ed.): 1967, Paribhdsasamgraha {a collection of original works on vydkarana
paribhdsds) (Paribhdsdsamgrahah (Vyddisdkatdyanddiproktaparibhdsdpdthdndm
tatpranitavrttindm ca samgrahah)) {BORI Post-graduate and Research Department
Series 7), Poona: BORI.
Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev and Vishnu Prabhakar Limaye (eds.): 1965,
VdkyapadTya ofBhartrhari (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 2),
University of Poona.
ABS Ahirbudhnyasamhitd, ed. by M.D. Ramanujacarya under the supervision of F. Otto
Schrader, 2 vols., Madras: Adyar Library, 1916. (Revised edn by V Krishnamacharya
(Adyar Library Series 4), Madras: Adyar Library, 2nd edn 1966.) '
Agrawala, VS.: 1962, 'GawT, in Indological studies in honor of W.N. Brown
(American Oriental Series 47), ed. by E. Bender, New Haven: American Oriental
Society, pp. 1-7. , .
AGS Asvaldyana Grhyasutra, ed. with the commentary of Gargya Narayana by
Ramanarayana Vidyaratna and Anandacandra Vedantavaglsa (Bibliotheca Indica
57), Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1866-9.
AK(Bh) Abhidharmakosa(-bhdsya) of Vasubandhu, ed. with the Sphutdrthd com-
mentary of Yasomitra by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, vol. 1 (Bauddha Bharati
Series 5), Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970.
Aklujkar, Ashok: 1989, 'Sambandha and abhisambandha', Journal of Indian
Philosophy 17: 299-307.
ApSS Apastamba Srautasutra, ed. with the commentary of Rudradatta by Richard
Garbe, 3 vols. (Bibhotheca Indica 92), Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal,

1882-1902.
Apte Revised and enlarged edition of V.S. Apte's The practical Sanskrit-English dic-
tionary, eds.-in-chief RK. Gode and C.G. Karve, 3 vols., Poona: Prasad
Prakashan, 1957-9.
ASS Asvaldyana Srautasutra, ed. with the commentary of Gargya Narayana by
Ramanarayana Vidyaratna (Bibhotheca Indica 49), Calcutta: Asiatic Society of
Bengal, 1864-74. (Repr. 1989.)
Aufrecht, Theodor (ed.): 1859, Ujjvaladatta's commentary on the Unddisutras, Bonn:
Marcus.
AV Atharvavedasamhitd, ed. by R. Roth and W.D. Whitney, 2nd edn, revised by M.
Lindenau, Berlin: Ferd. Dummler, 1924.
BAUp Brhaddranyakopanisad, ed. by KasTnatha Sastrl Agase (AASS 15), Poona:
Anandasrama, 4th edn 1939.
BD Brhaddevatd of Saunaka, ed. by Arthur Anthony Macdonell (HOS 5), Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1904.
Benson, James William: 1990, PatanjaWs remarks on ariga (Oxford University South
Asian Studies Series), Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Bhagavaddatta: 1931, Vaidika vdnmaya kd itihdsa, dusrd bhdga, vedom ke bhdsyakdra
(vol. 2: the commentators of theVedas), Lahore. (English trans, by Satyashrava: A
comprehensive history ofVedic literature, New Delhi: Pranava Prakashan, 1977.)
Bhaglratha Prasada TripathI: 1965, PdninTya-dhdtupdtha-samTksd (Sarasvati Bhavana
Studies (SarasvatTbhavana-adhyayanamdld) 14), Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit
Vishvavidyalaya (Varanaseyasamskrtavisvavidyalayah). (In Sanskrit.)
Bhate, Saroja: 1968, 'Some primary and secondary suffixes known to Yaska', Journal
of the University of Poona 27: 121-32. (Repr. PCASS, Class A, 15.)
Bhatt, N.R. (ed.): 1977, Matangaparamesvardgama (Vidydpdda) avec le commentaire
de Bhatta Rdmakantha (PIFI56), Pondichery: PIFI.
Bhattacharya, Bishnupada: 1950, 'Niruktavdrttika - a lost treatise', Indian Historical
Quarterly 26: 159-65. (Repr. Bhattacharya 1958: 96-109.)
1958, Ydska's Nirukta and the science of etymology, Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay.
BHSD Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1953. (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.)
BhSS Bhdradvdja Srautasutra, ed. with the Paitrmedhika and Parisesa Sutras by C.G.
Kashikar, Poona: Vaidika Samsodhana Mandala, 1964.
Biardeau, Madeleine and Charles Malamoud: 1976, Le sacrifice dans Vlnde ancienne
(Bibliotheque de VEcole des Hautes Etudes, Section des Sciences Religieuses 79),
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Bohtlingk, Otto (ed.): 1887, PdninVs Grammatik, herausgegeben, ubersetzt, erldutert
und mit verschiedenen Indices versehen, Leipzig: Haessel. (Repr. Hildesheim:
01ms, 1964,1971.)
BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune.
BPD Bodhapancadasikd by Abhinavagupta with commentary (-vivarana) by Pt.
Harabhatta (KSTS 76), ed. by Pt. Jagaddhara Zadoo, Srinagar, 1947.
Bronkhorst, Johannes: 1981, 'Nirukta and Astadhyayl: their shared presuppositions',
7/7 23:1-14.
1984, 'Nirukta, Unadi Sutra, and Astadhyayl: a review article', //J27: 1-15. (Review
article of Mehendale 1978.)
282 Abbreviations and bibliography
1985, 'A possible quotation from the Niruktavarttika known to Durga in the
Yuktidlpika', in Proceedings of the Fifth World Sanskrit Conference, ed. by R.N.
Dandekar and RD. Navathe, New Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, pp. 90-100.
1986, Tradition and argument in classical Indian linguistics: the bahiranga-
paribhdsd in the Paribhdsendusekhara (Studies of Classical India 6), Dordrecht:
Reidel.
1987, Three problems pertaining to the Mahdbhdsya (BORI Post-graduate and
Research Department Series 30, 'Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial
Lectures' (third series)), Poona: BORI.
1990, lvdrttika\ Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 34: 123-46.
Brunner-Lachaux, Helene (ed., trans., annot.): 1963, Somasambhupaddhati, premiere
partie: le rituel quotidien dans la tradition sival'te de VInde du Sud selon
Somasambhu (PIFI 25.1), Pondichery: Institut Francais d'Indologie.
1977, Somasambhupaddhati, troisieme partie: rituels occasionnels dans la tradition
sivalte de VInde du Sud selon Somasambhu, II: diksd, abhiseka, vratoddhdra,
antyesti, srdddha (PIFI 25.Ill), Pondichery: Institut Frangais d'Indologie.
BSPS Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series.
BSS Bombay Sanskrit Series.
BSS Baudhdyana Srautasutra, ed. Willem Caland, 3 vols. (Bibliotheca Indica 163),
Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1904-23.
Buddruss, Georg (ed.): 1971, Paul Thieme; Kleine Schriften (Glasenapp-Stiftung
5,1-2), 2 vols. (with continuous pagination), Wiesbaden: Steiner. (2., unveran-
derte Auflage mit einem Nachtrag 1984 zur Bibliographic, 1984.)
Caland, Willem: 1903: Uberdas rituelle Sutra des Baudhdyana (Abhandlungenfur die
Kunde des Morgenlandes 12,1), Leipzig: Brockhaus.
Cardona, George: 1967, 'Panini's syntactic categories', Journal of the Oriental
Institute, Baroda 16: 201-15.
1967-8, 'Anvaya and vyatireka in Indian grammar', Adyar Library Bulletin 31-2
(V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume): 313-52.
1968, 'Panini's definition, description, and use of svarita\ in Pratiddnam: Indian,
Iranian and Indo-European studies presented to Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus
Kuiper on his sixtieth birthday, ed. by J.C. Heesterman, G.H. Schokker, and V.I.
Subramoniam, The Hague-Paris: Mouton, pp. 448-61. *
1969, Studies in the Indian grammarians I: the method reflected in the sivasutras
(Transactions of the American Philosophical Society,* new series 59. 1),
Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
1970, Review of Staal 1967, /// 12: 232-9.
1970a, 'Some principles of Panini's grammar', Journal of Indian Philosophy 1:
40-74. ' \
1974, Tanini's karakas: agency, animation and identity', Journal of Indian
Philosophy 2: 231-306.
1974a, 'On Panini's metalinguistic use of cases', in Charudeva Shastri felicitation
volume, ed. committee S.K. Chatterji, V. Raghavan, R.N. Dandekar, Vishva
Bandhu, A.D. Pusalkar; K.A.S. Iyer, and Satya Vrat Shastri, Delhi: Charudeva
Shastri Felicitation Committee, pp. 305-26.
1976, Pdnini: a survey of research (Trends in Linguistics, State-of-the-Art Reports
6), The Hague-Paris: Mouton. (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.)
1977, Review of PatahjalVs Vydkarana-Mahdbhdsya Bahuvnhidvandvdhnika
(P. 2.2.23-2.2.38), text, translation and notes by J.A.R Roodbergen, ed. by S.D.
Joshi, Poona: University of Poona, 1974, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
26, 3: 328-42.
1978, 'Still again on the history of the Mahabhasya', Annals of the Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute 58-9 (Diamond Jubilee Volume): 79-99.
1980, 'On the paribhasa upapadavibhakteh kdrakavibhaktir ballyasV, Studien zur
Indologie und Iranistik 5/6: 27-48.
1981, 'On reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka in early Advaita', in Studies in Indian
philosophy (A memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi), ed. by
Dalsukh Malvania and Nagin J. Shah, Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology,
pp.79-104.
1983, Linguistic analysis and some Indian traditions {Post-graduate and Research
Department Series 20, 'Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures' (first
series)), Poona: BORI.
1988, Pdnini: his work and its traditions. Volume one: background and introduction,
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Second edn, revised and enlarged, 1997.)
Carrithers, Michael, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes (eds.): 1985, The category of the
person, Cambridge University Press.
ChUp Chdndogyopanisad, ed. by Kaslnatha Sastrl Agase (AASS 14), Poona:
Anandasrama, 1913.
CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France.
D Durga's commentary (Rjvartha) on the Nirukta: The Nirukta of Ydska (with
Nighantu) edited with Durga's commentary, vol. I (BSS 73) ed. by H.M.
Bhadkamkar assisted by R.G. Bhadkamkar, Bombay 1918, vol. II (BSS 85) ed. by
R.G. Bhadkamkar, Bombay 1942. (Ref. to vol., page and line.)
Davidson, Donald: 1974, 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme', Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (1973-4): 5-20. (Repr.
Davidson 1984: 183-98.)
1975, Thought and talk', in Mind and language (Wolfson College Lectures 1974),
ed. by Samuel Guttenplan, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 7-23. (Repr. Davidson
1984: 155-70.)
1979, 'The inscrutability of reference', The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10:
7-19. (Repr. Davidson 1984: 227-41.)
1984, Inquiries into truth and interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1986, 'A nice derangement of epitaphs', in Ernest LePore (ed.): Truth and interpreta-
tion: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, pp.
433-46.
Deeg, Max: 1995, Die altindische Etymologie nach dem Verstdndnis Ydskas und seine
Vorgdnger: eine Untersuchung u'ber ihre Praktiken, ihre literarische Verbreitung
und ihr Verhdltnis zur dichterischen Gestaltung und Sprachmagie, Dettelbach:
Joseph H. Roll.
Des Desopadesa of Ksemendra (KSTS 40), ed. by Madhusudana Kaul Sastrl, Poona,
1923.
Deshpande, Madhav M.: 1985, 'Historical change and the theology of eternal Sanskrit',
KZ 99: 122-49.
1985a, Ellipsis and syntactic overlapping: current issues in Pdninian syntactic
theory (Post-graduate and Research Department Series 24, 'Pandit Shripad
Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures' (second series)), Poona: BORI.
1987, Taninian syntax and the changing notion of sentence', Annals of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 68: 55-98.
1991, Taninian syntax and the changing notion of sentence', in Hans Henrich Hock
(ed.): Studies in Sanskrit syntax: a volume in honor of the centennial ofSpeijer's
Sanskrit Syntax (1886-1986), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 30-43. (Earlier and
briefer version of Deshpande 1987.)
Dhp the Paniniya dhatupdtha. Ref. to ed. O. Bohtlingk 1887.
DIksa, Saroja: 1989, Aitareya evam taittinya brdhmanom ke nirvacana, Delhi: Nag
Publishers.
DPU Unddisutras in the dasapddi recension. Ref. to ed. Yudhisthira Mlmamsaka
1943. .
Dwarikadas Shastri (Dvarikadasah Sastrl) (ed.): 1964, The MddhavTyd Dhdtuvrtti (a
treatise on Sanskrit roots based on the Dhatupdtha of Pdnini by Sdyandcdrya)
(Prachya Bharati Series 1), Varanasi: Prachya Bharati Prakashan.
1971, Bhdsdvrtti (a commentary on Pdnini's grammar) by Purusottamadeva
(Snmatpurusottamadevaviracitd bhdsdvrttih (PdniniydstddhydyTvydkhyd))
(Prachya Bharati Series 9), Varanasi: Tara Publications.
Evans, Gareth: 1982, The varieties of reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
EVP Louis Renou: Etudes Vediques et Pdnineennes, 17 vols. (Publications de
VInstitutde Civilisation Indienne, serie in-8° 1,2,4,6,9,10,12,14,16,17,18,20,
22, 23, 26, 27, 30), Paris: Boccard, 1955-69.
Filliozat, Pierre^Sylvain (tr.): 1976, Le Mahdbhdsya de Patahjali avec le Pradipa de
KcziyatcTet VUddyota de Ndgesa: adhydya 1, pdda 7, dhnika 5^7 (PIFI 54,2),
Pondichery: Institut Francais d'Indologie.
Frege, Gottlob: 1893, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. 1, 2nd edh, Jena. (Repr.
Hildesheim: Georg Olm, 1962.)
Geldner Karl Friedrich Geldner: Der Rig-Veda aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche iiber-
setzt und mit einem laufenden Kommentar versehen, 4 vols. (HOS 33-6),
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951-7.
Gellner, Ernest: 1993, 'What do we need now? Social anthropology and its new global
context', in The Times Literary Supplement, 16 July 1993 (No 4711), pp. 3-4.
Gombrich, Richard: 1992, 'The Buddha's Book of Genesis?', IIJ 35: 159-78.
1992a, 'Why is a khattiya called a khattiyal The Agganna Sutta revisited', Journal
of the Pali Text Society 17: 213-14.
Gonda, Jan: 1955, 'The etymologies in the ancient Indian Brdhmanas\ Lingua
5:61-86. (Repr. in J. Gonda: Selected Studies 2, Leiden: Brill, 1975, pp. 32-57.)
1975, Vedic literature (HIL 1,1), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
1977, The ritual Sutras (HJlL 1,2), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Grassmann Hermann Grassmann: Worterbuch zum Rig-Veda, Leipzig: Brockhaus,
1873.
Gren-Eklund, Gunilla: 1984, 'Causality and the method of connecting concepts in the
Upanisads', Indologica Taurinensia Yl\ 107-18.
1986, 'The cots are crying', in Kalydnamitrdrdganam: essays inxhonour of Nils
Simonsson, ed. by E. Kahrs, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, pp. 79-97.
Grierson, George Abraham: 1932, A dictionary of the Kashmiri language, Calcutta:
Asiatic Society of Bengal.
Harris, Roy: 1981, The language myth, London: Duckworth.
Heesterman, Jan: 1979, review of M. Biardeau and C. Malamoud 1976, IIJ 21: 47-9.
Hel Helaraja's commentary on VP, kdnda 3, part 1, ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer (Deccan
College Monograph Series 21), Poona: Deccan College, 1963.
HIL A history of Indian literature, ed. by Jan Gonda, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1975-.
Hirakawa, Akira et al.: 1973, Index to the Abhidharmakosabhdsya; part one: Sanskrit-
Tibetan-Chinese, Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Kabushikikaisha.
HOS Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, Mass.
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal.
Ikari, Yasuke: 1969, 'A study on the Upanisadic term ddesa\ Indogaku Bukkyogaku
Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 17,2: 684-9. (In Japanese.)
JA Journal Asiatique, Paris.
JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JosI, Bhargavasastrl Bhikajl (ed.): 1951, Snmadbhagavatpatanjalimaharsipranite
vydkaranamahdbhdsye navdhnikam, AstddhydyTprathamddhydyaprathamapdda-
vydkhydnam, srTmadupddhydyakaiyatanirmitapradipaprakdsitam, sarvatantra-
svatantrasnmanndgesabhattaviracitoddyotodbhdsitam; (asya vaidyandthakrta-
cchdydsitaldni catvdry dvartandni m.m. sivadattaraghunathapanditdbhydm
sampdditdni) tad etad iddnim kdsivisvavidydlayddhTtasdstrena mumbdpunyavil-
sanmahdvidydlayddhydpakena parasurdmaksetrdbhijanena josikulabhusana-
snbhikdjTsarmaputrena bhdrgavasdstrind sdstrdcdryena vydkarandnubandhi-
granthddisdhdyyam samavalambyatippanapdthabhedddipradarsanapuraskarena
pariskrtam\ pahcamam samskaranam (Patanjali's Vydkaranamahdbhdsya with
Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nagesa's Uddyota; vol. 1: adhydya l,pdda 1, dhnika 1-9,
edited with footnotes including extracts from Vaidyanatha's Chdyd compiled by
pandits Sivadatta (Kudala) and Raghunatha (Sarma), etc., 5th printing), Bombay:
Nirnaya Sagar Press.
Joshi, Shivaram Dattatray: 1969, Patanjali's Vydkarana-mahdbhdsya avyayibhdvatat-
purusdhnika (P. 2.1.2—2.1.49); edited with translation and explanatory notes by
S.D. Joshi in collaboration with J.A.F. Roodbergen (PCASS, Class C, 5), Poona:
University of Poona.
1976, Tanini's rules 1.4.49, 1.4.50 and 1.4.51', in Centre of Advanced Study in
Sanskrit Studies 3 (PCASS, Class E, 4), Poona: University of Poona, pp. 59-70.
Joshi, Shivaram Dattatray and J.A.F. Roodbergen (trs.): 1975, Patanjali's Vydkarana-
mahdbhdsya: kdrakdhnika (P. 1.4.23-1.4.55); introduction, translation and notes
(PCASS, Class C, 10), Poona: University of Poona.
1980, Patanjali's Vydkarana-mahdbhdsya: vibhaktydhnika (P. 2.3.18-2.3.45); intro-
duction, text, translation and notes (PCASS, Class C, 12), Pune: University of
Poona.
1985, 'On P. 1.1.56', JAOS 105: 469-77.
1986, Patanjali's Vydkarana-mahdbhdsya: paspasdhnika; introduction, text, trans-
lation and notes (PCASS, Class C, 15), Pune: University of Poona.
1990, Patanjali's Vydkarana-mahdbhdsya sthdnivadbhdvdhnika: part I (P.
1.1.56-1.1.57): introduction, text, translation and notes (BORI Research Unit
Publications 11), Poona: BORI.
Joshi, Venkatesh Laxman (ed.): 1966, Praudha Manoramd with commentary
Sabdaratna ofHari DTksita, vol. 1 (Deccan College Monograph Series 31), Poona:
Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.
JV Jainendramahdvrtti of Abhayanandin (Jainendravydkaranam tasya tikd
dcdrya-abhayanandipranita jainehdramahdvrttih (JndnapTtha MiirtidevT Jaina-

granthamdld, samskrta granthdnka 17)), ed. Shambu Nath Tripathi and Mahadeo
Chaturvedi, Varanasi: Bharatiya Jnanapltha KasI, 1956. (Ref. to vrtt{ under sutra
number.)
Kahrs, Eivind G.: 1980, Bidrag til interpretasjonen av Nirukta (Studier i Ydskas
tekniske metoder for analyse av ord, med spesiell vektpa analyser av type -anat
og iti satah), University of Oslo. (Diss.) (In Norwegian.)
1983, 'Yaska's use of kasmdf, IIJ 25: 231-7.
1984, 'Yaska's Nirukta: the quest for a new interpretation', Indologica Taurinensia
12: 139-54.
1986, 'Durga on bhdva\ in E. Kahrs (ed.): Kalydnamitrdrdganam: essays in honour
of Nils Simonsson, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, pp. 115-44.
1992, 'Exploring the SaddanTtV, Journal of the Pali Text Society 17: 1-112.
1996, Substitution and change: foundations of traditional Indian hermeneutics,
University of Oslo. (Diss.)
Kas Kdsikdvrtti of Vamana and Jayaditya, ed. with the Nydsa of Jinendrabuddhi and
the Padamanjan of Haradatta by Dwarikadas Shastri and Kalikaprasad Shukla, 6
vols., Varanasi, 1965-7.
KasN Jinendrabuddhi's Nydsa on the Kdsikd, in Kas.
KasP Haradatta's Padamanjan on the Kdsikd, in Kas.
Katre, Sadashiva L.: 1948, 'Harisvamin the commentator of the Satapatha-Brahmana:
a protege of Vikramaditya the great of tradition, his date - c. 54 B.C.', Bharatiya
Vidyd 9 (ShriJ&rM. Munshi Diamond Jubilee Volume, part 1) (Bharatiya Vidya
BhavajvBombay): 325-40.
Kielhorn, Lorenz Franz (ed.): 1868, The Paribhdsendusekhara of Ndgojibhatta; part
I: the Sanskrit text and various readings (BSS 2), Bombay: The Indu Prakash
Press. (References to the revised edition by K.V. Abhyankar 1962.)
(tr.): 1871-4, The Paribhdsendusekhara of Ndgojibhatta, edited and explained by F.
Kielhorn; part II: translation and notes (BSS 7, 9,12), Bombay: The Indu Prakash
Press (7, 9) / Government Central Book Depot (12). (References to the revised
edition by K.V. Abhyankar 1960.)
Kiparsky, Paul: 1979, Pdnini as a variationist (PCASS, Class B, 6/Current Studies in
Linguistics Series 7), ed. by S.D. Joshi, Poona-Cambridge, Mass.-London: Poona
University Press and M.I.T. Press,
1982, Some theoretical problems in Pdnini's grammar (BORI Post-graduate and
Research Department Series 16, 'Professor K.V. Abhyankar Memorial Lectures'
(second series)), Poona: BORI.
Kirste, Johann (ed.): 1859, The Unddiganasutra ofHemacandra with the author's own
commentary, Wien/Bombay.
KSS Kdsi Sanskrit Series, vfaranasi.
KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, published under the authority of the
Government of His Highness Major (later Lieut.) General Maharaja Sir Pratap
Singh Sahib Bahadur, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir State, by the Research
Department, Jammu and Kashmir State.
Kunhan Raja, C: 1936, 'The chronology of the Vedabhasyakaras', Journal of Oriental
Research (Madras) 10: 256-68.
1940-1, 'Niruktavartika: a rare work till now undiscovered', Annals of Oriental
Research 5: 5-16.
1944, The author of the Niruktavartika', Adyar Library Bulletin 8: 191.

Kunjunni Raja, K.: 1964, The Niruktavdrttika of Nllakantha', Adyar Library Bulletin
28: 250-62.
1979, 'Etymology and interpretation in ancient India', in Dr. V. Raghavan
Shashtyabdapurti Felicitation Volume, Madras: Kuppuswami Sastri Research
Institute, pp. 180-2.
KZ (Kuhns) Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der
indogermanischen Sprachen, Gottingen.
Laddu, Sureshachandra Dnyaneshwar: 1967, 4A possible light on the relative age of
Yaska and Patanjali', Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal 5: 58-62.
Lamotte, Etienne: 1974, 'Passions and impregnations of the passions in Buddhism', in
Buddhist studies in honour ofl.B. Homer, ed. by L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K.R.
Norman, Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, pp. 91-104.
Larson, Gerald James and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (eds.): 1987, Samkhya: a dualist
tradition in Indian philosophy {Encyclopedia of Indian philosophy IV), Princeton
University Press.
Liebich, Bruno: 1922, Materialien zum Dhdtupdtha (Sitzungsberichte der
Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse
1921: 7), Heidelberg: Winter.
LSI Laghusabdendusekhara (avyayibhdvdnto bhdgah) of Sri Ndgesa Bhatta, with the
Sekhara Dipaka commentary by M.M.Pt. Sri Nitydnanda Panta ParvatTya with an
introduction by Pt. Gopdla Sastri Nene (KSS 27), Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1925.
7th edn 1984.
LUders, Heinrich: 1951, Varuna I: Varuna und die Wasser, aus dem NachlaB heraus-
gegeben von Ludwig Alsdorf, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
1959, Varuna II: Varuna und das Rta, aus dem NachlaB herausgegeben von Ludwig
Alsdorf, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Macdonell, Arthur Anthony (ed.): 1886, Kdtydyana's SarvdnukramanT of the Rgveda
with extracts from Sadgurusisya's commentary entitled VeddrthadTpikd, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
1904, BD.
Malamoud, Charles: 1976, Terminer le sacrifice', in Madeleine Biardeau and Charles
Malamoud: Le sacrifice dansVInde ancienne (Bibliotheque de VEcole des Hautes
Etudes, Section des Sciences Religieuses 79), Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, pp. 155-204.
Mayrhofer Manfred Mayrhofer: Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Worterbuch des
Altindischen, 4 vols., Heidelberg: Winter, 1956-80.
Mbh Vydkarana-mahdbhdsya of Patanjali, ed. Franz Kielhorn, 3 vols., Bombay,
1880-5. 3rd edn, revised etc. by K.V. Abhyankar, Poona: BORI, 1962-72.
MbhD MahdbhdsyadTpikd of Bhartrhari, ed. by K.V Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye
(BORI Post-graduate and Research Department Series 8), Poona: BORI, 1970.
MbhDms MahdbhdsyadTpikd of Bhartrhari (BORI Post-graduate"and Research
Department Series), Poona: BORI, 1980. (Facsimile edn of the Mahdbhdsya-
dTpikd manuscript.)
MbhP MahdbhdsyapradTpa of Kaiyata, 5 vols., ed. by Bhargavasastrl Bhikajl JosT
1951 (vol. I,*5th edn), 1942 (vol. IV), 1945 (vol. V), Sivadatta Kudala 1912 (vol.
II), and Raghunath Sarma - Sivadatta Kudala 1937 (vol. III).
MbhU MahdbhdsyapradTpoddyota of Nagesabhatta, ed. as MbhP.
Mehendale, Madhukar Anant: 1965, 'Nirukta Notes, X: Anupa', in Dr. V.V. Mirashi
Felicitation Volume, Nagpur, pp. 104-7. (Repr. in Mehendale 1978: 1-4.)
1968, Some aspects of Indo-Aryan linguistics (the Wilson Philological Lectures,
1963^-), University of Bombay.
1968a, 'Nirukta Notes, XV: Aikapadika in the Nirukta 1.14', Indian Linguistics 29:
90-6. (Repr. in Mehendale 1978: 22-30.)
1978, Nirukta notes, Series //, Pune: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research
Institute.
1978a, 'Yaska's second rule of derivation', in Mehendale 1978: 57-62.
1978b, The science of etymology (niruktasastra)', in Mehendale 1978: 63-80.
1986, 'On the Brhaddevatd 2.102-103', /// 29: 117-20.
Mette, Adelheid: 1973, Indische Kulturstiftungsberichte und ihr Verhaltnis zur
Zeitaltersage (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der
geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 1973: 1), Mainz-Wiesbaden: Verlag
der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur/Steiner.
MM(P) MahdrthamahjarT of Mahesvarananda with autocommentary t (-parimala)
(Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 66), ed. T. Ganapati Sastrl, Trivandrum, 1919.
MNP Mahdnayaprakdsa of Rajanaka Sitikantha (in Old Kashmiri) with autocom-
mentary (in Sanskrit) (KSTS 21), ed. Mukunda Rama Sastrl, Bombay, 1918.
Mor, Mansukh Raj, (Manasukharaya Mora) (ed.): 1952, Niruktam (Nighantuh) sriman-
maharsiydskdcdryyapranltam, prathamo bhdgah, sri devardjayajvakrta 'nir-
vacana'/ndma tikd sahitam (Nighantu with commentary by Devarajayajvan)
(Gurumandala Granthamdldydh 10), Calcutta.
MVUT JMdlinTvijayottaratantra (KSTS 37), ed. Madhusudana Kaul Sastrl, Srinagar,
1922.
MW Monier Monier-Williams: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (New edn, greatly
enlarged and improved), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.
Narasimhacharya, M.S. (ed.): 1982, Mahdbhdsya PradTpa vydkhydndni: commentaires
sur le Mahdbhdsya de Patanjali et le PradTpa de Kaiyata, vol. 9 (adhydya 6, pdda
1-4) (P/F/51,9), Pondichery: Institut Francais d'Indologie.
NeT(U) Netratantra, with the commentary (-uddyota) of Rajanaka Ksemaraja (KSTS
46, 61), 2 vols., ed. Madhusudana Kaul Sastrl, Bombay, 1926, 1939.
Nigh Nighantu. Ref. to ed. L. Sarup 1927.
Nir Nirukta o$ Yaska. Ref. to ed. L. Sarup 1927.
NS Nydyasutra of Gautama, ed. with Vatsyayana's Bhdsya and Visvanatha's Vrtti by
Digambara Sastrl Josi (AASS 91), Poona: Anandasrama, 1922. (Ref. to Sutra or
page.)
NSV Niruktaslokavdrttika of Nllakantha Gargya, ed. by Vijayapalah, Calcutta:
Srlmatl SavitrldevI Bagriya Trust, 1982.
Ojihara, Yutaka and Louis Reitou (trs.): 1962, La Kdsikd-vrtti (adhydya I, pdda 1)
traduite et commentee, 2e partie (Publications de VEcole Frangaise d'Extreme-
Orient 48), Paris: Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient.
Padoux, Andre: 1963, Recherches sur la symbolique et Venergie de la parole dans cer-
tains textes tantriques (Publications de VInstitut de Civilisation Indienne de
rUniversite de Paris 21), Paris: de Boccard. (Revised, 2nd edn 1975.)
1990, Vac: the concept of the word in selected Hindu Tantras, Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York Press. (English translation by Jacques Gontier of revised
and enlarged version of Padoux 1963.)
Palsule, Gajanan Balakrishna: 1955, A concordance of Sanskrit dhdtupdthas (with

index of meanings) (Deccan College Dissertation Series 14), Poona: Deccan
College Post-graduate and Research Institute.
1966,' "Samjnayam" in Panini', Journal of the University of Poona 25: 31-75. (Repr.
as PCASS, Class A, 10, i966.)
Palsule, Gajanan Balakrishna and Vamana Balakrishna Bhagavat: 1991,
MahdbhdsyadTpikd of Bhartrhari; fascicule VIII: dhnika VII (BORIPost-graduate
and Research Department Series 37), Poona: BORI.
Pandey, Kanti Chandra: 1963, Abhinavagupta: an historical and philosophical study,
2nd edn (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies 1), Varanasi: Chowkhamba.
Parkin, David (ed.): 1982, Semantic anthropology (Association of Social
Anthropologists monographs 22), London: Academic Press.
Patavardhana, Ramakrishna SastrT (Tatya SastrT), Gangadhara SastrT ManavallT,
Ramacandra SastrT Kotibhaskara and GosvamI Damodara Sastrl (eds.): 1884-1937,
Vdkyapadiya, a treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar by Bhartrhari, with
a commentary by Punyardja (kdndas 1-2); . . . with a commentary by Heldrdja
(kdnda 3) (VdkyapadTyam sdngavaiydkaranasiddhdntanirupanam sribhartrhari-
mahdvaiydkaranaviracitam srTpunyardjakrtaprakdsdkhyatikdyutam; . . . srtheld-
rdjakrtaprakdsdkhyatTkdyutam) (Benares Sanskrit Series 6), 2 vols. in 11 fascicles,
Benares: Braj B. Das.
PCASS Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Poona.
PH Pratyabhijndhrdaya of Rajanaka Ksemaraja with autocommentary (KSTS 3), ed.
J.C. Chatterji, Srinagar, 1911.
PIFI Publications de Vlnstitut Frangais d'Indologie, Pondichery.
PPU Unddisutras in the pahcapddT recension. Ref. to ed. T. Aufrecht 1859.
PT(V) Pardtrimsikd with the commentary (-vivarana) of Abhinavagupta (KSTS 18),
ed. Pt. Mukunda Rama SastrT, Bombay, 1918.
pw Sanskrit-Wdrterbuch in kurzerer Fassung, bearbeitet von Otto Bohtlingk, 7 parts,
St. Petersburg: Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1879-89.
Quine, Willard Van Orman: 1951, Two dogmas of empiricism', Philosophical Review
60: 20-43. (Repr. in W.V. Quine 1961:20-46.)
1960, Word and object, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
1961, From a logical point of view, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2nd
edn, revised. (1st edn 1953.)
1969, 'Ontological relativity', in W.V. Quine: Ontological relativity and other
essays, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 26-68.
1990, Pursuit of truth, Cambridge, Mass, and London: Harvard University Press.
(2nd revised edition 1992.)
Rajavade, Vaijanatha KasTnatha (ed.): 1921, Durgdcdryakrtavrttisametam niruktam,
purvasatkdtmakah prathamo bhdgah (Yaska's Nirukta with the commentary of
Durga, part 1) (AASS 88:1), Poona: Anandasrama.
(ed.): 1926, SrimadydskdcdryapranTtam durgacdryakrtavrttisametam niruktam,
uttarasatkdtmako dvitiyo bhdgah (Yaska's Nirukta with the commentary of
Durga, part 2) (AASS 88:2), Poona: Anandasrama.
1940, Yaska's Nirukta; Volume I: Introduction. Full texts ofNighantu and Nirukta.
Cursory examination ofNighantu. Notes on chapters I-III of Nirukta. 25 Indexes
(Government Oriental Series, Class A, 7), Poona: BORI.
Rau, Wilhelm (ed.): 1977, Bhartrharis Vdkyapadiya: die Mulakdrikds nach den
290 Abbreviations and bibliography «»
Handschnften herausgegeben und mit einem Pdda-Index versehen

{Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII,4), Wiesbaden: Steiner.
Renou, Louis: 1941-2, 'Les connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en Sanskrit', JA
233: 105-65. (Repr. in J.F. Staal (ed.): A reader on the Sanskrit grammarians
{Studies in Linguistics 1), Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972, pp. 435-69.)
1942, Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit, 3 vols. {Bibliotheque de VEcole des
Hautes Etudes, fascs. 280-2), Paris: Champion. (Repr. in one vol., Paris:
Champion, 1957.)
1955, 'Les nipdtana-sutra de Panini et questions diverses', EVP I: 103-30.
Renou, Louis and Jean Filliozat: 1953, Ulnde classique; manuel des etudes indiennes;
tome II, Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient.
Rocher, Rosane: 1968, La theorie des voix du verbe dans Vecole pdnineenne (le I4e
dhnika) (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Travaux de la Faculte de Philosophie et
Lettres 35), Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles.
Roth, Rudolph (ed.): 1852, Jdska's Nirukta sammt den Nighantavas, herausgegeben
und erldutert von Rudolph Roth, Gottingen: Dieterichschen Buchhandlung.
Ruegg, David Seyfort: 1958, 'On the term buddhivipanndma and the problem of illu-
sory change', /// 2: 271-83.
RV Rgveda. Ref. to Rgveda-samhitd srTmatsdyandcdrya-viracita-bhdsyasametd
{Rgveda-samhitd with the commentary of Sayana), ed. N.S. Sontakke et al., 5
vols., Poona: Vaidika Samsodhana Mandala, 1933-51. (Vol. 1 repr. 1972.)
Sanderson, Alexis: 1985, 'Purity and power among the Brahmans of Kashmir', in
Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (eds.): The category of the
person, Cambridge University Press, pp. 190-216.
1986, 'Mandala and Agamic identity in the Trika of Kashmir', in Mantras et dia-
grammes rituels dans Vhindouisme (Table ronde: CNRS, Equipe n° 249
'L'hindouisme: textes, • doctrines, pratiques'), Paris: Editions du CNRS, pp.
169-214.
1988, 'Saivism and the Tantric traditions', in Stewart Sutherland et al. (eds.): The
world's religions, London: Routledge, pp. 660-704. (Repr. in Friedhelm Hardy
(ed.): The world's religions: the religions of Asia, London: Routledge, 1990, pp.
128-72. All references are to this edition.)
1990, 'The visualization of the deities of the Trika', in Andre Padoux (ed.): Limage
divine: culte et meditation dans Vhindouisme (CNRS, UPR 249 'L'hindouisme.
textes, doctrines, pratiques'), Paris: Editions du CNRS, pp. 31-88.
1992, 'The doctrine of the Malinlvijayottaratantra', in Teun Goudriaan (ed.): Ritual
and speculation in early Tantrism: studies in honor of Andre Padoux, Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, pp. 281-312.
1995, 'Meaning in Tantric ritual', in Anne-Marie Blondeau and Kristofer Schipper
(eds.): Essais sur le rituHJII (Colloque du centenaire de la Section des Sciences
Religieuses de VEcole Pratique des Hautes Etudes) {Bibliotheque de VEcole des
Hautes Etudes: Section des Sciences Religieuses CII), Lou vain-Paris: Peeters, pp.
15-95.
Samp, Lakshman (ed., tr.): 1920-7, The Nighantu and the Nirukta, the oldest Indian
treatise on etymology, philology, and semantics. (Repr. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1967.)
1920, {id.) Introduction, Oxford University Press.
1921, {id.) English translation, Oxford University Press.
1927, (id.) Sanskrit text, with an appendix showing the relation of the Nirukta with
other Sanskrit works, Lahore: University of the Panjab.
(ed.): 1928, Fragments of the commentaries of Skandasvdmin and Mahesvara on the
Nirukta, Lahore: University of the Panjab. (Contains the text of chapter one.)
1929, Indices and appendices to the Nirukta with an introduction, Lahore:
University of the Panjab.
(ed.): 1931, Commentary of Skandasvdmin and Mahesvara on the Nirukta: chapters
II-VI, Lahore: University of the Panjab.
(ed.): 1934, Commentary of Skandasvdmin and Mahesvara on the Nirukta: vols. Ill
& IV, chapters VII-XIII, Lahore: University of the Panjab.
1937, 'Date of Skandasvamin', in Gangdndtha Jhd commemoration volume, ed. by
K. Chattopadhyaya et al (Poona Oriental Series 39), Poona: Oriental Book
Agency.
Sarveswara Sharma, Peri: 1972, The Kdlasamuddesa of BhartrharVs VdkyapadTya
(together with Heldrdja's commentary translated from the Sanskrit for the first
time), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
SatBr Satapathabrdhmana in the Madhyandina recension, ed. A. Weber, Berlin,
1849-55. (2nd repr. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 96), Varanasi: Chowkhamba,
1964.)
Say Sayana's introduction to his commentary on the Rgveda. Ref. to page in N.S.
Sontakke et al. (eds.): Rgveda-samhitd srfmatsdyandcdrya-viracita-bhdsya-
sametd (Rgveda-samhitd with the commentary of Sayana), vol. 1, Poona: Vaidika
Samsodhana Mandala, 1933. (Repr. 1972.)
Scharfe, Hartmut: 1977, Grammatical literature (HIL V,2), Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Schneider, Ulrich: 1954, Acht Etymologien aus dem Aggaiina-Sutta', in Asiatica:
Festschrift Fnedrich Wellerzum 65. Geburtstag, ed. J. Schubert and U. Schneider,
Harrassowitz: Leipzig, pp. 575-83.
Simonsson, Nils: 1957, Indo-tibetische Studien: die Methoden der tibetischen Uber-
setzer, untersucht im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung ihrer Ubersetzungen fur die
Sanskritphilologie, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
1982, 'Reflections on the grammatical tradition in Tibet', in Indological and
Buddhist studies: volume in honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his sixtieth birth-
day, ed. by L.A. Hercus et al., Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, pp. 531-44.
Simson, Georg von: 1988, 'Etymologie als Mittel ideologischer Auseinandersetzung:
Bemerkungen zum Aggafinasutta des Dighanikaya', in Studia Indogermanica et
Slavica: Festgabefur Werner Thomas zum 65. Geburtstag (Specimina Philologiae
Slavicae, Supplementband 26), ed. by P. Kosta et al., Munich: Otto Sagner, pp.
87-98.
Singh, Fatah: 1962, The Vedic etymology: a critical evaluation of the science of ety-
mology as found in Vedic literature, Kota: The Sanskriti-Sadan.
Singh, Maan: 1994, The Upanisadic etymologies, Delhi: Nirmal Publications.
Sltaramacari Sastri (ed.): 1926/7 (Samvat 1983), VdkyapadTyabrahmakdndah yogi-
rdjamahdvaiydkaranasnbhartrhariviracitah . . . srldravyesajhdsdstripraty-
ekdrthaprakdsikdfikdparigumphitah . . . snsitdrdmdcdrisdstrind samsodhitah
(VdkyapadTya, brahmakdnda, with the commentary Pratyekdrthaprakdsikd of
Dravyesa Jha Sarma), Vrindavan: Brajendra Press.
Sivanarayana Sastri: 1969, Nirukta-mTmdmsd, Delhi-Varanasi: Indological Book
House.
1972, Nirukta ke pamca adhydya (1-4 tathd 7 adhydya) rju-vivrti ndmaka vydkhyd
sameta, Delhi-Varanasi: Indological Book House.
SK Sabdakaustubha of Bhattoji Dlksita, (Sabdakaustubhah snmadbhattojidTksita-
viracitah, prathamddhydyasya prathamapddo navdhnikaparyantah), vol. 1, fasc.
\-A, ed. Gopala Sastri Nene and Mukunda Sastrl Puntamkar, Benares:
Chowkhamba, 1933.
SK Siddhdntakaumudi of Bhattoji Dlksita, ed. with the Bdlamanoramd of Yasudeva
Dlksita and the TattvabodhinT of JnanendrasarasvatI by Giridhara Sarma and
Paramesvarananda Sarma , 4 vols., Varanasi, 1958-61.
Skold, Hannes: 1926, The Nirukta, its place in old Indian literature, its etymologies
(Acta Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis 8), Lund: Gleerup.
SM The commentary of Skandasvamin and Mahesvara on the Nirukta', 4 vols.: vol. I
Sarup 1928, vol. II Sarup 1931, vols. Ill & IV Sarup 1934. (Ref. to vol., page and
line.)
Smith, Helmer (ed.): 1928-30, SaddanTti: la grammaire palie dAggavamsa: I
Padamdld, II Dhdtumdld, III Suttamdld, Lund: Gleerup.
1949-66, id.: IV-V,2 Tables, Lund: Gleerup.
SN Spandanirnaya, in: The Spandakdrikds of Vasugupta with the Nirnaya by
Ksemardja, edited with preface, introduction and English translation by
Madhusudan Kaul Sastrl (KSTS 42), Srinagar, 1925.
Snellgrove, David: 1959, The Hevajratantra: a critical study, part 1: introduction and
translation {London Oriental Series 6), London: Oxford University Press.
Speijer, J.S.: 1886, Sanskrit syntax, Leyden: Brill. (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1973.)
SSS Sdnkhdyana Srautasutra, ed. with the commentary of Varadattasuta Anartlya by
Alfred Hillebrandt, 4 vols. (Bibliotheca Indica 99), Calcutta: Asiatic Society of
Bengal, 1885-99.
SS(V) Sivasutra with the commentary (-vimarsini) of Rajanaka Ksemaraja (KSTS 1),
ed. J.C. Chatterji, Srinagar, 1911.
Staal, Johan Frederik (Frits): 1967, Word order in Sanskrit and universal grammar
(Foundations of Language, Supplementary Series 5), Dordrecht: Reidel.
Stein, Marc Aurel: 1900, Kalhana's RdjataranginT, a chronicle of the kings ofKasmir.
Translated with an introduction, commentary and appendices, 2 vols.,
Westminster: Archibald Constable.
Subramania Iyer, K.A. (ed.): 1966, Vdkyapadiya of Bhartrhari with the Vrtti and the
Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva, kdnda I (Deccan College Monograph Series 32),
Poona: Deccan College.
1983, Vdkyapadiya of Bhartrhari (an ancient treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit
grammar) containing the Tikd ofPunyardja and the ancient Vrtti, kdnda 2, Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass. v
SvT(U) Svacchandatantra with the commentary (-uddyota) of Rajanaka Ksemaraja
(KSTS 31, 38, 44, 48, 51, 53, 56), 6 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul SastrT, Bombay,
1921-35.
TA(V) Tantrdloka of Abhinavagupta with the commentary (-viveka) of Rajanaka
Jayaratha (KSTS 23, 28, 30, 36, 35, 29, 41, 47, 59, 52, 57, 58), 12 vols., ed.
Mukunda Rama Sastrl (vol. 1) and Madhusudan Kaul Sastrl (vols. 2-12), Bombay
and Srinagar, 1918-38.
Taranatha Tarkavacaspati: 1873-84, Vdcaspatyam (brhat samskrtdbhidhdnam)... sri

tdrdndthatarkavdcaspatibhattdcdryena sankalitam (Vachaspatyam (a compre-
hensive Sanskrit dictionary) compiled by Sri Taranatha Tarkavacaspati), 6 vols.,
Calcutta. (Repr. in 6 vols. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 94), Varanasi:
Chowkhamba, 1962.)
Tarski, Alfred: 1935, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen', Studia
Philosophica 1: 261-405. (German translation of a book in Polish, 1933.)
1956, 'The concept of truth in formalized languages', in Logic, semantics, meta-
mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 152-278. (Collected papers 1923-38.)
Thieme, Paul: 1935, 'Zur Datierung des Panini', Zeitschrift der deutschen
Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 89: 21-4. (Repr. Buddruss 1971:528-31.)
1955, review of Jacob Wackernagel, Altindische Grammatik II2: Albert Delbrunner:
Die Nominalsuffixe, Gottingen, 1954, in Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 209:
182-216. (Repr. Buddruss 1971:661-95.)
1957, 'The interpretation of the learned', in Felicitation volume presented to
Professor Sripad Krishna Belvalkar, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan, V.V. Mirashi, R.N.
Dandekar, S.K. De, V. Raghavan, and A.S. Altekar, Varanasi: Motilal
Banarsidass, pp. 47-62. (Repr. Buddruss 1971:596-611.)
1958, review of 1957 repr. of Renou 1942, in Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 212:
19-49. (Repr. Buddruss 1971:727-57.)
1961, Introduction to Betty Shefts: Grammatical method in Panini: his treatment of
Sanskrit present stems (American Oriental Series Essay 1), New Haven:
American Oriental Society, pp. ix-x.
1968, 'Adesd1 in Melanges d'indianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou (Publications
de Vlnstitutde Civilisation Indienne, serie in-8° 28), Paris: Boccard, pp. 715-23.
(Repr. Buddruss 1971:259-67.)
Turner, Ralph L.: 1979, review of M.A. Mehendale 1978, Indian Linguistics 40: 212.
van Nooten, Barend A.: 1970, 'Sanskrit gamsyate, an anit future', JAOS 90: 159.
Varma, Siddheshwar: 1953, The etymologies ofYdska, with the assistance of Bhim Dev
Sastrl (Vishveshvaranand Indological Series 5), Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand
Vedic Research Institute.
VB Vedic Bibliography by R.N. Dandekar, vol. 1: 1946 (repr. 1986), vol. 2: 1961 (repr.
1978), vol. 3: 1973, vol. 4: 1985 (Government Oriental Series, Class B, 10,11, 13,
14), Poona: BORI.
VBh Vijndnabhairavatantra with the commentary (Uddyota) of Sivopadhyaya on vv.
24 to the end incorporating the surviving fragment of the commentary (Vivrti) of
Rajanaka Ksemaraja on vv. 1 to 23 (KSTS 8), ed. Mukunda Rama Sastrl, Bombay,
1918.
VBhK Vijndnabhairavatantra with the commentary (-kaumudt) of Ananda Bhatta
(KSTS 9), ed. Mukunda Rama Sastri, Bombay, 1918.
VBhU Vijndnabhairavoddyota of Rajanaka Ksemaraja; in VBh.
VBhV Vijndnabhairavavivrti of Sivopadhyaya; in VBh.
Vedavrata (ed.): 1962-3, SrTbhagavatpatahjaliviracitam vydkarana-mahdbhdsyam
(srTkaiyyatakrtapradipena ndgojibhattakrtena bhdsyapradipoddyotena ca
vibhusitam) (Patanjali's Mahdbhdsya with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nagesa's
Uddyota), 5 vols., Gurukula Jhajjar (Rohatak): Haryana Sahitya Samsthana.
Verma, Nargis: 1991, The etymologies in the Satapatha Brdhmana, Delhi: Nag Publishers.
Vijayapala (ed.) {sampddakah vijayapdlah): 1982, Nirukta-slokavarttikam, Calcutta:

Srlmatl SavitrldevI Bagriya Trust (distributed and printed by the Ram Lai Kapur
Trust, Bahalgarh, Sonlpat), {upodghdtah pp. 1-52, text pp. 1-588).
VP VdkyapadTya of Bhartrhari, ed. Wilhelm Rau, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977.
vt. vdrttika.
Wezler, Albrecht: 1972, 'Marginalien zu Paninis Astadhyayl I: sthdnin\ KZ 86: 7-20.
1994, 'Once again on Patanjali's definition of a word (Studies inPatanjali's
Mahabhasya V)', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 38: 173T89.
Whitney, William Dwight: 1871, The Tdittiriya-Prdtigdkhya, with its commentary, the
Tribhdshyaratna: text, translation, and notes, New Haven: for the American
Oriental Society. (From the Journal of the American Oriental Society 9, 1871.)
YD YuktidTpikd, ed. by Ram Chandra Pandeya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.
Yudhisthira Mlmamsaka (ed.): 1943, Dasapddyunddivrtti {Princess of Wales Sarasvati
Bhavana Texts Series 81), Benares: Government Sanskrit College.
1965/6 (Samvat 2022), Niruktasamuccayah dcdryavararucipramtah (Vararuci's
Niruktasamuccaya), Ajmer: Bharatiya Pracyavidya Pratisthana (2nd edn).
1965/6a (Samvat 2022), Kdsakrtsna-dhdtuvydkhydnam, sricannavtrakavikrta-
karndtakatlkdydh samskrtarupdntaram {Kdsakrtsna-dhdtuvydkhydnam with San-
skrit translation of the Kannada commentary by Cannavlrakavi), Ajmer:
Bharatiya Pracyavidya Pratisthana.
1973, Samskrta vydkarana-sdstra kd itihdsa (tin bhdgom mem puma), prathama
bhdga, Sonipat: Ram Lai Kapur Trust, 3rd edn Samvat 2030.
I N D E X OF T E X T - P L A C E S
Atharvaveda 3.13.2 26, 53, 103 Rgveda (RV) 1.164.33 143; 4.58.3 186; 7.75.5
Abhidharmakosabhdsya (AKBh) 270,5-6 275 25-6 ' \
AstddhyayT(A) 1.1.1 165; 1.1.47 257; 1.1.49
' 177, 189-219, 229-36, 236, 237, 238, 239, Kdsikdvrtti (Kas) 11:209-11 237 n 152; 11:284
240, 241, 244, 245, 247, 249, 256, 257, 265, 256n.201;V:398 257
266; 1.1.52 202, 220, 223, 231, 234; 1.1.54
220, 221, 225, 231, 234; 1.1.55 220, 225, 234; Chdyd of Vaidyanatha Payagunda (ed.
1.1.56 188, 216, 269; 1.1.57 264 n.213; 1.1.60 BhargavasastrT JosI 1951) 412, note 4 216;
163, 193 n.34; 1.1.61 193 n.34; 1.1.62 275; 412, note 10 233
1.1.68 163; 1.1.69 222; 1.1.72 220, 224, 227,
230, 234; 1.2.45 193 n.33; 1.2.46 193; 1.3.11 Jainendramahdvrtti (JV) 1.1.46 262
210; 1.4.13 201 n.60, 234; 1.4.14 274; 1.4.17
224 n.117; 1.4.18 224 n.117; 1.4.51 276; 2.1.1 Tantrdloka (TA) 1.95 63-6; 1.96 72-4; 1.97
243; 2.2 24 193; 2.3.50 237; 2.4.52 189, 75-6; 1.98 77; 1.99-100ab 78; lOOcd 83;
237, 238, 240, 252, 253, 256, 257, 258, 261, 1.235-6 85; 1.237-40 93-4, 3.65 73 n.48,
265, 266; 2.4.71 193; 3.1.97 256n.201; 5.135d-6ab 71; 6.30-lab 67; 6.31cd-33
3.1.124 256 n.201; 3.2.110 51, 175 n.3; 68-9; 6.228c-30b 275
3.2.174 74; 3.3.18 195; 3.3.19 195, 3.3.94 Tantrdlokaviveka (TAV) 1[1] 139,7-8 63;
195; 3.3.115 53, 248; 3.3.117 53, 249; 1[1]139,13-14 65; 1[1] 141,1-4 72;
3.3.122 50; 3.4.69 51, 175 n.3; 3.4.113 189 l[l]141,4-5 73; 1[1] 141,5-7 74;
n.31; 3.4.114 189 n.31; 4.1.82 242; 4.1.83 75; 1[1]141,8~14 76; 1[1] 141,14-142,4 77-8;
4.3.120 75; 5.2.94 206, 242, 243, 244; l[l]142,4-10 78-9; l[l]142,10-ll 81;
5.2 127 206; 5.3.71 225; 6.1.63 232; 6.1.77 1[1]143,1-11 83-4; 2[3]74,12 79 n.59;
252 n.192, 253, 263, 264, 266; 6.3.1 193; 4[6]30,ll-31,8 67; 4[6]31,9-32,2 67-8;
6.3.9 193; 6.3.32 185; 6.4.1 212,245,246, 4[6]32,3-33,8 68-9
247; 6.4.2 212; 6.4.24 202, 247; 6.4.34 201, Taittinya Prdtisdkhya 1.56 274
202, 203, 209, 247; 6.4.35 209, 247; 6.4.47
257, 258, 263; 6.4.77 222; 6.4.85 222; 6.4.89 Durga's commentary on the Nirukta (D)
201, 202, 203; 6.4.130 224, 225, 230, 231, 1:30,1-4 29 n.42; 1:30,2-3 161;
235; 7.1.9 245; 7.2.86 227; 7.2.91 227; 1:30,3-4 46; 1:77,10-11 159; 1:88,4-6 110;
7.2.93 227; 7.2.102 226; 7.2.106 226; 7.3.43 1:154,18-19 35; 1:169,8-10 114; 1:179,7 115;
252 n.192; 7.3.103 193; 7.4.27 222n.ll3; 1:180,8-11 116; 1:191,1-2 134;
7.4.28 222 n.113; 7.4.32 221; 7.4.53 231 1:207,15-208,3 172; 1:226,4-5 160; 1:229,1-2
n.139; 8.1.62 276; 8.1.63 276; 8.2.83 185; 136; 1:281,14-17 137; 1:292.6-7 124;
8.4.61 220, 225; 8.4.65 220 n.108 1:318,5-6 119; 1:318,13 1J9; 1:364,2-4 139;
1:417,1 142; 1:445,9-10 143; 1:479,17-18
Apastamba Srautasutra (ASS) 24.3.52-4 188 145; 1-527,8-10 146; 1:566,12 127,
Asvaldyana Grhyasutra (AGS) 1.7.1-2 184 1:566,13-14 128; 1:575,15-18 147;
Asvaldyana Srautasutra (ASS) 1.1.2-3 184; 1:581,17-582,2 128; 1:650,15-16 148;
2.1.1 184 1:812,5-6 130; 11:924,3 99; 11:931,11-13 99
n.7; 11:970,9-10 121; 11:981,12-13 117;
Uddyotana (ed. Narasimhacharya 1982) 269 11:103947-18 156; 11-1085,12-14 150
248 Desopadesa (Des) S3 94-5
Index of text-places
Nirukta (Nir) 1.4 105, 106, 161; 1.6 106, 159; 256 n.201; 11:391,17-23 242; 111:179,7-8
1.7 106, 107, 108, 169; 1.8 108, 109; 1.9 109, 246; 111:222,16-17 219
110, 111; 1.12 35; 1.15 31, 32; 1.17 112, 154; MahdbhdsyadTpikd (MbhD) 288,10-12 195;
1.18 46; 1.19 46; 1.20 28, 46, 132; 2.1 36, 288,17-289,2 239^0; 289,2-9 251; 291,1-3
37, 38, 91, 92; 2.2 32, 100, 114; 2.3 38; 2.5 206; 293,10-23 229-30
115, 116, 132, 152; 2.6 133; 2.7 38; 2.8 134; Mahdbhdsyapradipa (MbhP) I:46a 120; I:56b
2.13 134; 2.15 101, 154; 2.16 27; 2.17 135; 42; I:62a 250; I:62b 43; I:64b 45; I:408a
2.18 26, 159, 171; 2.20 54, 104; 2.21 158; 194; I:408b 239, 255-6; I:409a 197; I:409b
2.22 136; 3.1 159; 3.9 137; 3.10 137; 3.11 202, 204; I:410a 205;I:411a 211, 237 n.150;
118; 3.13 123, 158; 3.18 118; 3.19 103; 3.20 I:411b 212;I:412a 215; I:412b 231;I:453a
125; 4.1 32; 4.5 138; 4.8 139; 4.10 120; 4.13 271;I:453b 272; I:454a 261, 273; II:318b
140; 4.16 141, 159; 4.18 142; 4.19 142; 4.21 243; IV:343b-344a 243; V:270a 247; V:354a
142; 4.25 126; 4.27 54, 104, 143; 5.1 143; 225
5.2 144; 5.4 144; 5.5 54,103; 5.7 145; 5.14 Mahdbhdsyapradipoddyota (MbhU) 1:64b 45;
145; 5.22 146; 5.26 127, 147; 6.1 147; 6.17 I:65b 199;I:408a 195; I:408b 200,241;
148; 6.21 155; 6.22 117, 155; 6.27 155; 6.30 I:408b-9a 258; I:409a 197; I:409b 202, 204;
120; 7.9 129; 7.13 29 n.40; 7.15 100; 7.20 I:410a 205, 207, 237 n.151; I:411b 212,
162; 7.23 130; 7.29 117, 149; 9.8 149; 9.11 I:412a 216; I:412b 231-2; I:453b 271;I:454a
121; 9.14 130; 9.22 100; 9.26 27,53,98; 260-1; I:454b 261-2; IV:343b 243; V:270b
10.10 121; 10.17 117, 156; 10.22 98; 10.31 246, 247
122; 10.44 149; 11.5 122, 156, 158; 11.6 Mahdrthamanjariparimala (MMP) 4,10 94;
159; 11.24 131; 11.39 150; 11.46 171; 11.47 179,25-6 88
151; 12.5 171; 12.7 162, 177; 12.26 122;
12.40 162 Laghusabdendusekhara (LSI) 58,1-2 244; 58,6
Niruktaslokavdrttika (NSV) 1.6.28 114; 1.6.151 248-9; 58,6-9,2 263; 59,2-6 264
132
Nydyasutra (NS) 1.1.1 198; 1.1.24 198 VdkyapadTya (VP) 2.482 10; 1.49-50 254-5
Nydsa(K2isN) 1:168 248,249 Vijndnabhairavatantra (VBh) 130 71, 90
Vijndnabhairavavivrti (VBhV) 114,7-9 89;
PadamanjarT (Kas?) 1:169 259 114,9-10 90; 114,14 90; 115,10-13 90
Pardtnmsikdvivarana (PTV) 99,9 92 Vijhdnabhairavoddyota (VBhU) 1,2-5 61-2,
Paribhdsendusekhara (ed. Abhyankar 1962) 86-7
28,11-12 228
Pratyabhijfidhrdaya (PH) 28,12-29,4 80 Satapathabrdhmana 6.1.1.9 27, 53
n.63 Sabdakaustubha (SK) 244,10-12 216;
^ 244,12-15 218
Bdlamanoramd (SK) 1:44,4-5 214, 242 Sdnkhdyana Srautasutra (SSS) 1.16.1 184
Brhaddranyaka Upamsad (BAUp) 2.3.11 [M]Sivasutra 3.29 92
' 2.3.6 [K] 181 SivasutravimarsinT (SSV) 116,7-118,4 92-3
Bodhapancadasikd (BPD) 4 73; lied 83
Baudhdyana Srautasutra (BSS) 24.8 182 Sayana's introduction to his commentary on the
Rgveda (Say) p. 28 29, 30, 31, 47; p. 29 33,
Bhdradvdja Srautasutra (BhSS) 5.17.1-3 184; 46, 47, 49
6.15.4-5 184; 6.15.7 188; 14.1.1-3 184 Skanda-Mahesvara's commentary on the
Nirukta (SM) 1:46,6-8 50; 1:51,11 105;
Mahdbhdsya (Mbh) 1:4,12 120; 1:6,8-11 41-2; 1:67,7-10 160; 1:75,8 110; 1:75,11 110;
1:7,8-10 43; 1:7,11-12 44; 1:7,23-5 44; 1:104,14 113; 1:104,14-15 170; 11:42,12 115;
1:29,21-4 223; 1:40,20-1 165; 1:40,26-8 11:45,3 117; 11:45,5-6 170; 11:63,5 134;
165; 1:75,13-14 187; 1:118,6=^192, 236; 11:90,3-4 101; 11:90,4-6 102; II: 149,7-9
1:118,8-13 197; 1:118,13-17 201; 1:118,18-25 138; 11:152,17 118; 11:156,11-13 124;
203; 1:119,1 204; 1:119,2-3 206; 1:119,4-15 11:183,10 118; 11:183,14 119; 11:270,18-20
208; 1:119,16-19 211; 1:119,19-20 212; 127; 11:281,18-19 143; II:322,12T13 145;
1:119,20-5 213; 1:119,25-8 218; 1:126,15-17 11:425,14 130; 11:482,14-15 156; 111:89,1-2
249; 1:137,4-6 270; 1:137,8-11 271; 170; 111:156,1 130; IV: 101,14-201,1 172
1-137,13-14 272; 1:137,13-18 260; Spandanirnaya (SN) 38,9 80
1:137,17-26 272; 1:137,18-26 261; 1:158,2-8 Svacchandatantwddyota (SvTU) l[l]:3,12-4,7
163; 1:217,22-3 237; 1:324,7-10 49; 87-8; 3[5]:76,17-18 94; 6[15]: 146,11-16
1:363,24-8 47; 11:31,10 256 n.201; H: 199,21 60-1
I N D E X OF WORDS ANALYSED BY THE
NIRVACANA METHOD
amhatih 126-7 krstayah 98

amhah 126-7 toia/i 147
amhurah 155 kruram 155
amhuh 121 ksTram 116
amhuranam 155
akupdrah 142 137
aksi 33, 109
agham 129 gdyatram 108
anuh 117 132
adhvd 67-9
158
anupah 136 gaurah 150
anupdh 136 gauri 150
andhah 143 gau/t 115, 132, 152, 162
«n/i 145 grismah 54, 104
ardham 125-6
104 candrah 156, 158
135 122
106
131
6, 53, 100, 103 142
dsyam 111 talam 127
o/w/wz/i 144 ftz/u 127
dhutih25 154
indrah 25 daksinah 107
wzA:a 149 daksind 107
isikd 149 ' 100
130
116, 169 difafi 93-4, 95
usdh 26, 159, 171, 172 devah 70 n.43, 100
dyuh 159
rjuh 155
(i/zanva 54, 103
kaksah 114 dhuh 137
kacchapah 142
kacchah 142 142
fcarraz/z'llO ndma 143
159 «f/?«M/i 49-50
154 niruktam 47
154
155 parjanyah 121
z 118 puskaram 145
krttih 146 prthivT 25
298 Index of words analysed by the nirvacana methoc
bandhuh 142 vikatah 120

budhnam 149 vwfyitf'99
vivaksase 123
bhagah 107 visam 122
bhimah 132 v*/z 133
bhismah 132 vrra/i 108
bhairavah 61-93, 95-7, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, vrsabhah 100
78, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89 vratam 134
magham 106 sakvaryah 109
madhu 122, 139 j/ra/i 140'
mithunau 117, 149 ^MCI/I 147
musah 138 sundhyuh 141
musikdh 138 seva/i 117, 156
mrtyuh 159 iva 118
meg/ia/i 158, 161, 162, 277
safcta/i 120
yora'/z 134 5anî/2 130
sararukam 128
rathah 121 salalukam 128
simhah 118
laksanam 214 sindhuh 98-9
toj 127 suvidatram 129
srprah 148
vaksah 141 skandhah 148
vaykfe 105, 162 sthdnam 250
vardhah 144
vavaksitha 123 /ian/* 142
v<zsf 159 /wwtaft 107
GENERAL INDEX
A 1.1.49 177, 189-219, 229-36, 236, 237, 238, artha 39-47, 164, 198, 253, 279; as meaning of
239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 247, 249, 256, 257, sthdna 217, 235, 238, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255,
265, 266; basic meaning of 196, 221, 256, 258, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, 277,
concluding remarks on discussion of 233-6, 278, indigenous discussions of 41-7, Louis
nirdisyamdna-panbhdsd and 218, 219-29, Renou on 40, Paul Thieme on 40, semantic
231, 234, purpose of 197-219, relation to A range of 164
1.1.52, 54, 55 and 56 234, survey of arthavdda 7, 274
Patanjali's remarks on 190-2, vdrttikas on Astddhydyl 10, 13, passim; the rules of 185
191, 197, 200, 201, 203, 208, 209, 234 atiparoksavrtti 35, 37
Abhayanandin 262 avyutpanna 32
Abhinavagupta 58, passim; on nirvacana ayogavdha sounds 223
analysis and reliance on tradition 66-71, task
in exegesis 59 bahiranga 215
abhydsa 124 bandhu 25, 180
ablative case: attributes to -tehl-eh forms beliefs 3, 4, 5, 7, 62, 63, 93, 95, 277
123-31, -tehl-eh forms and'105, 169-74, 278 Bhairava 57-61; autonomous agent 63, cause of
adesa 176, 178-83, 233, 238, 269, 270, 271, 274, the fear-cry 75-6, descriptive name 48,
278; in Brahmana equations 278, m ritual desiccator of time 77-8, favouring those
texts 182-3, mark added to 211, Paul Thieme terrified by samsdra 74-5, goddesses of
on 178-82 cognition and 78-81, &ara£a-analysis of 82-3,
adhikdra 208, 209-10 Lord of the Wheel of Powers 81, master of the
adhikdra-words 31, 101, 102, 103; rasmindmdniBhlravas 79, most terrible 81-2, nirvacanas
101-2, stotrnamani 102-3 of 61-93, 95-7, rava 'the roar' 73-4, 75-6,
adhvan 67-9 78-9, subjective awareness ipardmarsa) 75-6,
adjacency, see dnantarya supporter of the universe 72-4, supported by
ddyantaviparyaya 115 the universe 72-4, unconditioned self-
Aghoresvarl58 representation 75, 85, vaiydkarana derivation
Agnihotram Ramanuja Tatachariar 32 of 74-5
Ahirbudhnyasamhitd 57 Bhairavatantras 58, 59
aikapadika 38 n.57 Bhairavl 58
Aitihasikas 27, 273 Bhartrhari 254; on sthdna 250-5
akAC 225-6, 228 bhdsd 185
dnantarya 192, 213, 214, 217, 235, 241, 244 bhdsyakdra 131
-andt 98-103,168, 173; causal explanation 99, Bhattoji Dlksita 196 n.46
103, 168 Bhucarl 78-81
Annambhatta 248 Bhutatantras 58
antaranga 215, 217, 218, 221, 235, 268 Brahmanas 25, 180, 181, 278
anvartha 47-50, 63-6, 67, 68, 70, 83, 84, 85, 96 Brhaddevatd 18, 19, 20, 21
anvarthasamjnd 48-50 Brhaspati 70, 71, 88
anvaya 200
apakarsa 249, 259, 262, 265 chandas 185
Apara 59 change 278
apavdda 185 commentaries, the role of 10-11
300 General index
Daivatakanda 29 jdtipaksa 222 n.U2

Davidson, Donald 3 n.6, 5 Jayaratha 63 n.23, passim
definite descriptions 26, 161, 164, 166, 167, JnanendrasarasvatI 196 n.48
173 jndpaka 216 n.98, 234
Dikcarl 78-81
diksd 93-5 Kaiyata 41, passim
discourse 5-6, 95, 277; consistency of 6, myth KalasamkarsinI 60, 72
as part of 7, nirvacana analysis and 277, ' Kali 58^59, 60,78, 80
universe of 5, 6 Kapalika 58, 78
Durga 14, 23, passim; date of 14 kdraka 49, 50-4, 103, 159-60, 168-9; analysis
of bhairava 82-3
ekapada 38 n.57 kdrya 165, 186, 278
ellipsis 276 Kashmir 55, 56, 57
equations 25, 278 kasmdt 99, 131, 151, 170
etasmddeva 99, 131-52, 173; causal explanation Katyayana 13
151, 152, picking up kasmdt 151 Kaula 59, 78
eternality, see nityatva KhecarT 78-81
etymology 24, 269; popular 56 Krama 58, 59, 78; goddesses of cognition 78-81,
exegesis: tradition in 57, 88, Abhinavagupta and permeating the Trika 78
59, potential for 91 Ksemaraja 60, 61; mangalasloka by 61-3, 86-89
Ksemendra 93, 94
Frege, Gottlob 26, 164
lakdras 51-2, 175
genitive 197, 198, 268, 269, 277, 278; attributes laksydpeksana 215, 221
to -tehl-eh forms 112-23, defined by rule A language, Indian grammarians' model of 188
1.1.49 190-219, 229-236, 236, 238, 240, 241, lopa 163
indicating element to undergo substitution
176, interpreted contextually 192, 202, 226, Mahdbhdsya 10, 13, passim
227, 228, 233, 247, 278, marks relation mdhdtmya texts 55-6
between word and that which it signifies 152, Mahdvyutpatti 1
153, meanings of 197-200, nirdisyamdna- Mahesvara, see Skanda-Mahesvara
\ paribhdsd and 219-29, of satah 160, 162, 167,Mahesvarananda 88
277, partitive etc. 201, 202, 203, -204, 226, Mdliriivijayottaratantra 59; Abhinavagupta's
227, 246, 248, relation marked by 200, 201, exegesis of 59, ritual and metaphysics of 60
205, 213, 214, 215, 268, 269, substitutionai, mantras 57, 58, 73, 74; varnasdrupya and 92
see sthdnasasthT, synonymy and 153, 157, matUP 242
158, 268, syntactic use of 268, -tehl-eh and meaning 2, 4, 27, 39^7, 62, 91, 93, 96, 101, 163,
105, 158,169-74, 278 167, 236, 253, 266, 267, 269, 277, 278;
Gocarl 78-81 adhikdra-wovds and, beliefs and 4, 62, 277,
guru 93-5 determined by the community 5, 56,
indeterminacy of 2-4, intersubjectivity and
Harisvamin, date of 15-16 27, 72, 93, naming and 40, of sentences 277,
hermeneutics 6 patterns of 1, 2, reference and 40, 47, single
hetunirdesa 99 sounds and 252, 253, 257, 263, 26,4, social
holism 3 anthropology and 2 n.2, theory of truth as
theory of 173
ideal expressions 96, 168, 173-4, 273, 277 mehatiti 103-4, 168-9, 173; causal explanation
identification 179, 180, 181, 278 104,168-9
identity 180 method 9-11
interpretation 5, 7; Indian tradition and 7, Mlmamsakas 7, 274
methods of 7-8, models underlying 8
in satah 158-68; adhikdra-v/ords and 158, 162, Nagesa 45, passim
interpretation of analyses in 162, 167, 276-7, naimittiki 69, 70
restriction on Mra&tf-interpretation 159-60, Nairuktas 27, 273; allegorical interpretations
167, ritual context of 166, sanctions definite and 27, 273, historicity and 27, 273
descriptions as true 167, 168, 173, self- Naigamakdnda 29
reference and 161, semantic nature of 168 Naighantukakdnda 28
ity apy asya bhavati 152-8, 171, 174, 268 ndmakarana 11*2-18, 169
General index 301
names 72; attribution of properties through 96, Para 59

descriptive 48, of Tantric deities 57, theory of Paramartha 34 n.48
meaning of 161 Parapara 59
nearness, see sdmlpya pdribhdsiki 69, 70
Nighantu 28-9, 31, 173; substitution principle paroksavrtti 35, 37
and'i73 Patanjali 10,13, passim] and the Nirukta 14
Nllakantha22-3 power 6, 86, 277; to determine correct usage
nirdisyamdna-panbhasa 218, 219-29, 234-5, 187
268; necessity for non-grammarians 235, Powers (sakti) 58, 59, 60, 63, 78, 79, 80, 81, 89;
partitive genitives recurring by anuvrtti and female 60, 78
226, 227, 228, relation to A 1.1.49 221, 231, prakdsa 79
234, relation to A 1.1.52, 54 and 55 211, 223, prasanga 176 n.4, 194, 217, 235, 238, 249, 255,
225, 228, 230-1, 235, tadantavidhi and 257, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267
220-4, 227, 228, 231, yaddgama-paribhdsd prasiddhd 69, 70
and 220-4, 227, 228 Pratisakhya texts 175, 274
nirukta 27, 31; purpose of 29-30, relationship to pratyaksavrtti 36
vydkarana 32 prayojana 198-200
Nirukta 13, 27, 27-34; commentators on 14-23, properties: attribution of 96, 277, necessary or
editio pnnceps of 24, Indo-European contingent 96, 167, relational 246
philology and 24-5, semantic analysis and 27,
study of 23-5 Quine, Willard Van Orman 2, 3,4 n.8, 26;
Niruktabhdsyatikd, date of 14-18 reform of language 26
Niruktaslokavdrttika 19, 20, 22-3
Niruktavdrttika 18-22 rasmir yamandt 101-2
nirvacana, definition of 27, 35 reference 3, 72, 86, 96, 161, 162, 167, 277;
nirvacana analysis 8, 26, 27, 268, 269, 276, 277, inscrutability of 3, meaning and 40,47, power
278-9; alternative analyses valid 269-70, to determine 6, 277, truth and 3 n.6
background of 25-7, beliefs and 277, relation 237, 238, 240-1, 246, 247; dnantarya
epistemological device 277, establishes truth- 192, 213, 214, 217, 235, 241, 244, 'being in the
value of sentence 277, general principles of place of 97, 162, 189, 'belonging to' 105,
35-9, grammarians' use of 32, in between linguistic elements 167, 173, 192,
Ahirbudhnyasamhitd 57, in exegesis and 213, 234, between name and action or event
metaphysics 57, model underlying it 8, 9, 98, between substitute and ideal expression
268-9, 276, purpose served by 33, 97, between term and explanatory expression
relationship between various types of 168-74, 97, 98, 104, 159, 164, 168, 189, 236, 268, 269,
semantic analysis 48, substitutional between terms in substitution operation 189,
interpretation of 174, 268-9, theories of truth 190, between word and meaning 166 n.195,
and 277, 278, through syllables and single 265, defined by sthdne 201, 213, 215, 221,
sounds 89-93 238, m susbtitution model 236, marked by a
nirvacanasdstra 13, 27, 279; Chinese Buddhist sthdnasasthi736-48, 268, rule A 2.3.50 and
texts and 34-5, complement to grammar 32, 237, sdmTpya 192, 213, 214, 217, 235, 241, 244
considered a veddnga 27-8, continuous restriction, see niyama
tradition of 23, imprints of in Kashmir 56, use Rjvartha, date of 14
in religious discourse 56, vydkarana and 25,
32, 75, Yaska's exposition of 35-9 sabdabrahman 254
Nisdtanatantra 68 n.35 sdbhydsa 124
nitya 165, 186, 270, 278 Sadasiva 58 n. 12
nityatva 259, 260, 264, 271, 272, 273 Saddanlti 32
nivrtti 249, 257, 259, 260, 262, 264, 265 Saiva Siddhanta 58-9,78
myama 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 207, 211, 212 Saivism 57; Kapalika 58, Kashmirian 57, Kaula
non-dualism 57, 58, 59, 60-1 59, 78, Krama 58, Tantric 57, Trika 59
Sakti, see Powers
optionality 188 n.29 sdmTpya 192, 213, 214, 217, 235, 241, 244
Sanskrit 185; linguistic change and 187, model
Pancaratra 57 speakers of 187
Panini 10, 13, passim sasthyarthdh, Nagesa's interpretation of
pada 274-5; Mantrasastnc use of 274, 197-200'
Vasubandhu's definition of 275 sdstra, Chinese translation of 34-5
302 General index
Sastra, methodological division in 183 tadantavidhi 220, 224, 225, 227, 228, 231,
sat-159, 161, 163,166,167,173, 276, 277 nirdisyamdna-panbhdsd and 220-4, 227, 228,
satT 187 231
Sayana 18 n 14, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 47 tantra 57
scripture 7, 57 Tantnc deities, names of 57
self-reference 250, 253, 266 tdntnka 57
semantics 3 n 6, 25, 97, 101, 265 Tarski, Alfred 3 n 6
sentences 50, 276, elliptical 276, meaning of tattva 25
277, semantic relations between 277, truth -teh and eh 104-31, 169, ablative attributes to
conditions of 3, 50, truth-value of 277 123-31, ablative interpretation of 169-74,
single sounds meaning of 252, 253, 257, 263, 278, genitive attributes to 112-23, genitive
264, substitution of 252, 253, 266, 267 interpretation of 169-74, 278, relation to other
Sistas 187 types of analysis 168-74
Sivatanusdstra 70, 88 temporality 272, 273
Sivopadhyaya 89 text passages, presentation and citation of 11-12
Skanda-Mahesvara 14-18, 23, passim texts 1, exegesis of 1
Skandasvamin, see Skanda-Mahesvara time, notion of 186, 273
sphota 255 tirtha 55, 56 n 2
sthana 176, 194, 196, 197, 201, 205, 207, 236, tradition 57, 84, 88, 95, 278, authorities of 95
238, 241, 248, 269, 271, 277, Bhartrhari on translation 2, indeterminacy of 4
250-5, in ritual context 278, Kaiyata on Tnka Saivism 59, 60, 78, incorporation of
255-8, kdla 'time' and 252, 253, 254, Krama elements in 78, ritual and 60
meaning of 217, 235, 238, 247, 248, 248-67, truth 3, 50, 95, 97, 173, 277, 278, mtersubjective
269, 277, 278, metaphorically considered a 5, mrvacana analysis and 277, presumption of
relation 247, 248, Nagesa on 258-64, 95, theory of truth as theory of meaning 3
necessary condition for relation 194, 236, 241, n 6, 173, theories of 3 n 6, 277
244, 247, 248, 269, relational term 236, 244, truth conditions 97
247, 248
sthdnasasthT 153, 157, 158, 162, 173, 189-267, upacdra 248 n 169
268, 269, 277, identified by a mark 208-11, Upamsads 180, 181, 278
ordinary Sanskrit usage and 234, relation Usas 26, 171
marked by 207, 235, 236-48, 268, synonymy utsarga 185
and 153, 157, 158
sthdneyogd, interpretations of 192-7, 204-8 vdcaka 79
sthdmn 176-8, 225, 226, 233, 238, 269, 270, vdcya 79
271, 272, 273, 274, Albrecht Wezler on 176-8, vaidika 57
identified by nirdisyamdna-panbhdsd 225, Vaidyanatha Payagunda 216
226 varnasdrupya 92
sthdnivadbhdva principle 188-9, 226, 269, 270, vdrttika 21
273, 274, 275, in the ritual Sutras 188-9 vdrttikakdra 18-22, Saunaka as 21
stotd stavandt 102 Vasudeva Dlksita 214
substitutes 178, 187, whole words 187, 264, 266, Veda 7, 274, inaccessible parts of 69, 187,
274 meaning of 33, 46, understanding of 28, 31
substitution 158, 178, 179, 180, change and 278, vimarsa 73, 79
in Paniman grammar 175, m ritual Sutras 175, visayasaptamT 256
188-9, of single sounds 252, 253, 266, 267 voidness 81
substitutional model 96, 97, 173, 174, 175, 181, vydkarana 10, 13, passim
186-7, 188, 264, 269, 270, 277, 278, non- vyaktipaksa 222 n 112
temporality and 272, 273 vyatireka 200
Svacchandabhairava 58 Vyomavamesvarl 80
Svacchandatantra 60-1, Ksemaraja's exegesis ofVyomavyapimantra 275
60-1, non-dualism and 60-1
svanta vowel 210 yaddgama-panbhdsd 220, 220, 221, 224, 225,
synonyms 153,157, 158, 171, 173 227, 228, nirdisyamdna-panbhdsd and 220-4,
synonymy 153, 157, 158, genitive case and 157, 227, 228
158, substitution criteria and 153 Yaska 13-14, passim, concerned with semantics
syntactic units 275 31, 101, date of 13-14
University of Cambridge
Oriental publications published for the
Faculty of Oriental Studies
1 Averroes' commentary on Plato's Republic, edited and translated by E I J
Rosenthal
2 FitzGerald's 'Salomon and Absal\ edited by A J Arberry
3 Ihara Saikaku the Japanese family storehouse, translated and edited by G W
Sargent
4 The Avestan Hymn to Mithra, edited and translated by Ilya Gershevitch
5 The Fusul al-Madam of al-FdrdbT, edited by D M Dunlop (out of print)
6 Dun Karm, poet of Malta, texts chosen and translated by A J Arberry, introduc-
tion, notes and glossary by P Grech
7 The political writings of Ogyu Sorai, by J R McEwan
8 Financial administration under the Tang dynasty, by D C Twitchett
9 Neolithic cattle-keepers of south India a study of the Deccan Ashmounds, by F R
Allchin
10 The Japanese enlightenment a study of the writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi, by
Carmen Blacker
11 Records of Han administration Vol I Historical assessment, by M Loewe
12 Records of Han administration Vol II Documents, by M Loewe
13 The language of Indrajit of Orcha a study of early Braj Bhdsd prose, by R S
McGregor
14 Japan s first general election, 1890, by K H P Mason
15 A collection of tales from Uji a study and translation of 'Uji Shui Monogatari', by
D E Mills
16 Studia semitica Vol I Jewish themes, by E I J Rosenthal
17 Studia semitica Vol II Islamic themes, by E I J Rosenthal
18 A Nestonan collection of Chnstological texts Vol I Synac text, by Luise
Abramowski and Alan E Goodman
19 A Nestonan collection of Chnstological texts Vol II Introduction, translation
indexes, by Luise Abramowski and Alan E Goodman
20 The Synac version of the Pseudo-Nonnos mythological scholia, by Sebastian
Brock
21 Water rights and irrigation practices in Lajh, by A M A Maktan
22 The commentary of Rabbi David Kimhi on Psalms cxx-cl, edited and translated
by Joshua Baker and Ernest W Nicholson
23 Jaldl al-din al-Suyuti Vol I Biography and background, by E M Sartam
24 Jaldl al-din al-Suyuti Vol II'Al-Tahadduth binimat alldh\ Arabic text, by E M
Sartam
25 Ongen and the Jews studies in Jewish-Christian relations in third-century
Palestine, by N R M de Lange

Kahrs - Indian Semantic Analysis The Nirvacana Tradition - Kashmir - Saivism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Kahrs - Indian Semantic Analysis The Nirvacana Tradition - Kashmir - Saivism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE ORIENTAL PUBLICATIONS 55

INDIAN SEMANTIC ANALYSIS

A series list is shown at the back of the book

The Indian tradition of semantic elucidation known as nirvacana analysis repre-

Preface page xiii-

Abbreviations and bibliography 280

From an early concern with Buddhism, in particular with Madhyamaka and

for so many centuries as a highly potent tool in negotiating that intersubjective

vided invaluable criticism and support. The material of that dissertation is

Traditional societies exploit flexibility while pretending permanence. This is

A note concerning method

The role of indigenous commentaries

A note on the presentation and citation of text passages

The vyakarana tradition of the Paniniyas is well known to us through a

The commentators on the Nirukta

Cardona (1976:298) states that 'Skandasvamin is probably to be placed

Bhattacharya (1958:96-105) also attributes fourteen quotations in Durga's

existence of a Niruktavdrttika as an independent, lost commentary on the

has been a matter of dispute.27 Vijayapala (ibid.) therefore considers what he

The study of the Nirukta

but important contribution of Kunjunni Raja (1979). Further studies per-

approaches that field with the ideas of Indo-European comparative philology

The background of nirvacana analysis

The second kdnda, consisting of one adhydya, is known as the Naigamakdnda

'samdmndyah samdmndtaK and ending 'tasyds tasyds tddbhdvyam anubhavaty

not have a clear understanding of the meaning' (idam antarena mantresv

is concerned. He is quite clear about the relationship between vyakarana and

Yaska's exposition of nirvacanasastra: a brief outline

resorted to by the commentators. In addition to these they operate with a third

and proceed by analysing on the basis of similarities in syllables and single

Three basic terms: artha, anvartha, and kdraka

Kaiyata remarks on this in the following, illuminating manner (MbhP

context is the meaningfulness of upasargas - preverbs or prepositions. This

direct participants in actions.77 Such a participant is a means of realising the

(2) Abstract syntactic level; participants assigned to karaka categories:

appear in the form of corresponding nominal expressions. With an agent noun

Praxis: Saiva Kashmir

In the Appendices to his translation of Kalhana's Rajatarangini, Marc Aurel

As 'another potent cause' that seems to have co-operated in this vitiation of

The case of Bhairava: preliminaries

of these Tantric cults is mainly concerned with their evocation by means of

words: could a nirvacana be suggested if it were not resting on beliefs already

The Tantrdloka and Tantrdlokaviveka: anvartha revisited

devo hy anvarthasastroktaih sabdaih samupadisyate I

sdstrokta with anvartha or is he not? I am inclined to think that he means to say

Abhinavagupta on nirvacana analysis and reliance on tradition

analysis. At Tantrdloka 6.30 he offers two interpretations, dualist and non-

atraiva yathd katham cid antarbhdvaniyam yena sarvatraivdnvarthacdrcd pdram

Sivatanusdstra, an early work of the Saiva Siddhanta in Kashmir. Along with

Deriving the substance of his arguments from fundamental tenets of Saiva

sabdanasvdbhdvydt as 'because it is his nature to produce sound'. The distinc-

A 4.3.120 tasyedam bhiru aN

bhih56 samsdratrdsah, tayd janito yo 'sau ravah bhagavadvisaya dkrandah

tion from initial to final voidness, according to the Mahdnayaprakdsa (MNP

| 5 See also the Mahdrthamahjanpanmala of Mahesvarananda (MMP 89,4-90,6) Khecari and

of all phenomena, we nevertheless meet with the persistence of a theistic

Gurus. And Abhinavagupta is quite explicit on how he understands the term

as reality itself. Similarly, nirvacana analysis is for Abhinavagupta an effec-

Ksemaraja's mangalasloka revisited

Turning to later Saiva authors, it has already been demonstrated that

Towards the boggling point: analysis through single sounds

able as would be in accordance with a nirvacana that by some grammatically,

be interpreted according to meaning'. This attitude is reflected in the concept