RULE 88 – PAYMENT oF THE DEBTS oF THE ESTATE
the death of his debtor is interested in collecting his credit as
Digest by Erika
#1. G.R. No. L-47971 June 27, 1941
Intestate estate of the deceased Julio Magbanua. MARIANo
MAGBANUA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL A. AкoL and zACARIAS B. DoRoMAL, ET
AL., defendants-appellees. LAUREL,
L.:
FACTS: On August 24, 1917, Julio Magbanua died intestate.
On July 20, 1935, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo issued an
order appointing Manuel Akol as administrator and Zacarias B. Doromal
as co-administrator.
Upon motion of Priscila and Paz Magbanua, the court appointed Telesforo
Gedang and Pedro Flores as commissioners on claims and appraisal.
These commissioners published a notice filed within 6 months from said
date.
On November 11, 1935, Mariano Magbanua and his wife, Priscila
Magbanua, filed with the committee a claim against the deceased Julio
Magbanua in the total amount of P2,251.86.
After hearing, the committee disallowed this claim, on the ground that, in
accordance with section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it had
prescribed.
By way of appeal, they filed the corresponding complaint against Manuel
Akol and Zacarias B. Doromal, as administrator of the estate of Julio
Magbanua, seeking judgment for the sum of P2,251.86.
CFI= issued an order affirming the resolution of the committee on claims
disallowing the claim of the spouses Mariano Magbanua and Priscila
Magbanua, on the ground of laches.
Petitioner's contention: The appellants maintain that the death of
Julio Magbanua ipso facto suspended the running of the prescriptive
period fixed in Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: whether or not the claim of spouses Magbuana had
already lapsed.
RULING: YES
It is here admitted that at the time of the death of Julio Magbanua on
August 24, 1917, the appellant's right of action upon the claim in
question had not yet prescribed, but that at the time said claim was filed
before the committee on claims on November 11, 1935, more than 18
years had already elapsed.
In Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva (57 Phil., 486), we observed:
It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the
persons entitled to be appointed administrators or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in
that direction, and since no administrator or committee on
claims and appraisal has been appointed to fix the time for
filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of
Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, to present the latter's claim
against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribed.
If, as we have stated, the object of the law in fixing short special
periods for the presentation of claims against the estate of a
deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible in order to pay off the debts
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
and distribute the residue; and if a creditor having knowledge of
soon as possible; and if according to law the persons entitled to
the administration or to propose another person for
administrator have thirty days from the death within which
to claim that right, after which time the court, may appoint any
creditor of the intestate debtor: then the plaintiff as
administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of
laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro
Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after
the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the
intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of
Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent
had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18, 1925.
If the claimant in Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva was held guilty of laches
for failing to institute the proper intestate proceedings within the period
of three years, there is more justification for ruling that the herein
appellants cannot recover upon their claim, it appearing that more than
eighteen years had elapse after the death of their debtor, Julio
Magbanua, and before the institution of the latter's intestate proceedings.
As is conspicuous in Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva, "according to law
the persons entitled to the administration or to propose another person for
administrator have thirty days from the death within which to claim that
right, after which time the court may appoint any creditor of the intestate
debtor," and to within which
to
theclaim that debtor,"
intestate right, after
andwhich timeotherwise
to "hold the court would
may appoint
be any creditor of
to permit a creditor having knowledge edge of his debtor's death to keep
the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either
testate or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the
prejudice of the heirs and delegatees." In
In the instant case there can be no dispute that the appellants were
aware of the death of Julie Magbanua, because the latter was a brother of
the appellant Priscila Magbanua who alleges to have taken care of him
during his last days and to have paid his funeral expenses, the latter being
one item of her claim. We cannot too often repeat that the speedy
settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of
our probate law. (Sikat vs. Viuda de Villanueva, supra.)
After debts and expenses of administration paid, residue given to heirs an
Digest by Erika
#2. G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984
LUzoN SURETY CoMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASToR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCo кILAYкo, defendants-
appellants.
MAкASIAR, J.:
FACTS: Luzon Surety Company issued two administrator's bond in
the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant- appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special
Proceedings Nos. 3075 and 3076 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
RULE 88-90 Page 1 of 18
The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily
after executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed
to pay the premiums every year.
In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the
documnetary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the project of partition
and accounts of defendant-appellant.
In 1962, Luzon Surety demanded from defendants the payment of
premiums and documentary stamp taxes from Aug. 1955.
On the same year, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for
cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the
heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares".
The said motion was granted and the CFI ordered the bonds cancelled.
Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a
total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962.
Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI.
CFI= allowed the plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and
effect from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to
the Supreme Court on questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bonds still in force and effect from 1955
to 1962?
RULING: YES
Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the administrator
is required to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying
creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned
upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust.
Hence, the surety is then liable under the administrator's
bond.
Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and presents to
the Court, within three months from the date of his appointment, a correct
inventory of all the property of the deceased which may have come into
his possession or into the possession of any other person representing him
according to law, if he administers all the property of the deceased
which at any time comes into his possession or into the possession of
any other
person representing him; faithfully pays all the debts, legacies, and
bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends
which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true
account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any other
date that he may be required so to do, and faithfully executes all orders and
decrees of said Court, then in this case this obligation shall be void,
otherwise it shall remain full force and effect (p. 9, 18, ROA p. 9, rec.).
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then
liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has
duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the
sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the
performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of
administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to
respect the indemnity
agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had
something to do as an administrator/executor even after the
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DIGESTS
approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6,
1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond
ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project
of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit.
The defendant-appellant Pastor
T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for
administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of
the estate and pnygkmt ba nee t`k jkfts nmj kxpkmsks (Flores
vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts
and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it will terminate at
the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does
not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter bond
in the absence of an express stipulation to this effect. As such, as long as
the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held
liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the
administrator.
Purpose of administration distribution of residue among heirs and legatee
Digest by Angelli
#3 GR No. 50526, Dec 04, 1991
CASIMIRo V. ARкoNCEL v. ALFREDo J.
LAGAMoN
FACTS: The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate on July 20, 1976
at Davao City (his residence at the time of his death), leaving behind an
estate with a probable value of about P241,020.00. On November 24,
1976, a petition for letters of administration seeking, among others, for
the appointment of the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel as administrator
over the intestate estate of the deceased, was filed by one of the heirs,
Nenita C. Valdez, and docketed as Special Case No. 2079 in the Court of
First Instance of Davao City, Branch I. All the other heirs manifested
their conformity to the appointment of the surviving spouse, Maria V. Vda.
de Arkoncel.
In the order dated April 1, 1977, the intestate Court* identified the heirs of
the deceased Casimiro F. Arkoncel as Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, widow;
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., son; Florencio V. Arkoncel, son; Maria V.
Arkoncel, daughter; and Nenita Carpio Valdez, daughter, but appointed
Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., the eldest son, as the judicial administrator
without bond instead of Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, the widow and
ordered the issuance to him of letters of administration. In the same order,
the Court of First Instance allowed him one year within which to dispose
of the estate and to pay the debts of the deceased. The letters of admi-
nistration issued on April 11, 1977 gives Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr.,
petitioner herein, full authority as Administrator of the estate of Casimiro
F. Arkoncel, to take possession of all the property of said deceased and to
perform all other acts necessary for the pre- servation of said property.
On July 5, 1977, the intestate court issued an order giving notice to all
persons having money claims against the decedent Casimiro F. Arkoncel.
In compliance with the order of the intestate court, FNCB
RULE 88-90 Page 2 of 18
Finance, respondent herein, filed on October 7, 1977 with the court a
quo its claim against the estate for the payment of certain debts incurred
by the decedent during his lifetime, in the following amounts:
Principal sum --------------------- P44,438.00
Interests ---------------------------- (to be computed later at
14% p.a.)
Attorney's fees-------------------- 11,109.50
Liquidated damages------------ 4,443.38
On January 9, 1978, petitioner herein, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel and the
claimant FNCB Finance, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered into an amicable settlement, under the following terms and
conditions:
"1. That the Judicial Administrator admits the claim of herein claimant
against the estate, as follows:
a) P44,438.00 - representing the outstanding principal balance of the
Torana car purchased for the use and benefit of the decedent Casimiro F.
Arkoncel and financed by herein claimant;
b) Interest on the outstanding principal balance from the date of default in
the payment of the latter on April 12, 1977 until fully paid at the rate of
14% per annum;
c) P11,109.50 or 25% of the outstanding principal balance as and for
attorney's fees;
d) Costs of and expenses in this suit in the amount of P200.00;
2. That the claimant, with the conformity of its counsel, is willing to
reduce, as it hereby reduces, its claims for attorney's fees to 15% of
the principal balance or to P6,665.70." (Rollo, p. 35)
The intestate Court approved the amicable settlement in an order dated
May 17, 1978, directing the parties to strictly comply with the terms
thereof and the Judicial Administrator, "to pay the amounts agreed upon
out of the estate funds and/or properties within 30 days from receipt"
of the said order Respondent judge issued the questioned order of
December 13, 1978 granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a
writ of execution. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on
December 28, 1978 was denied by respondent judge for lack of merit in an
order dated January 12, 1979 holding that "the order of
tvhoilsuCntoaurirltydeantetedreMdayin1to7, b1y97t9heapparrotiveins gx
thx exaiims iacappbelerfsectllyemvaelnidt
order which was a decision in itself based on the compromise
agreement" (Rollo, p. 57). Hence, this petition for certiorari with
preliminary injuction filed with the Court by petitioner on May 15, 1979.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE PAYMENT
OF A DEBT IN AN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. ‘ NO.
HELD: The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an ami-
cable settlement with the claimant FNCB Finance. He was not only
assisted by counsel but the agreement itself was confirmed by the
other heirs, the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, Florencio V.
VAarkldoenzc,el wanasd MreapriraesVe.nAterkdonbceyl (MhersiaAst)t.
oTrhneyo-tinh-eFrahcet ir,DNaeevindita OC. Montano who is at the same
time counsel for the other heirs and the judicial administrator. The
agreement was submitted to the intestate court for approval and it was
duly approved by the court
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
a quo in an order dated May 17, 1978 which incorporated the conditions
therein. The court approves a compromise agreement when
not contrary to law, morals or public policy and renders
judgment in accordance therewith (Jose v. Chem Samco and Sons,
Inc., 125 SCRA 142 [1983]; Alejandro v. Philippine Airlines, 127 SCRA
660 [1984]). In the instant case, judgment was rendered in consonance
with the compromise agreement and the parties were enjoined to comply
with and abide by its terms and conditions (Gravador v. Elbinias, 126
SCRA 205 [1983]; G & S Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA
212 [1983]; National Housing Authority v. Abaya, 129 SCRA 412
[1984]).
There is no merit to the petition.
The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is immediately executory unless a
motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be
taken against the order denying the motion (De Guzman v. Court
of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 [1985]; Zagala v. Jimenez, 152 SCRA 148
[1987]). It then becomes ministerial for the lower court to
order the execution of its final executory judgment (Service
Specialists Incorporated v. Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139 [1986];
Landicho v. Tensuan, 151 SCRA 410 [1987]).
Even more than a contract which may be enforced by
ordinary action for specific performance, the compromise
agreement is part and parcel of the judgment, and may
therefore be
e12n0fo7r[c1e9d61a]s; Osusmchenbay v a. Cworuitrtooff
eAxgercauritainonRe(Tlartiiaonvs. ,L1ir7agS,C1RASC8R2A8 [1966];
Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984]).
Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated, as in
the case at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to move for its
execution (Valdez v. Octaviano, 1 SCRA 744 [1961]; Paredes
v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984]).
Petitioners claim that properties in custodia legis may not be
the proper subject of a writ of execution to satisfy a claim;
that what private respondent could have done was to ask the
Court a quo for an order requiring the administrator to pay
the debt and only if there are no sufficient funds on hand to
pay the debt may the court order the sale of the properties
and out of the proceeds, to pay the debt. This argument is
ouonrdt enr itchaeblde i speottslietmivenpt
abpleproinvainsmg odritrieocnts otfhethjeudviceirayl
utche ams
administrator to pay the claim of FNCB Finance out of the
funds and/or properties of the estate, to wit:
"Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is hereby directed to
pay out of the estate funds and/or properties the amounts
agreed upon within 30 days from receipt hereof."
Nevertheless, petitioner Judicial Administrator chose not to
comply with said order. Inasmuch as the compromise
agreement is part and parcel of the judgment and may,
therefore, be enforced as such by a writ of execution, the
respondent judge committed no reversible error in issuing the
questioned writ of execution.
wHEREFoRE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
RULE 89 – SALES, MoRTGAGES, AND oTHER
RULE ENCUMBRANCES
88-90 oF PRoPERTY oF DECEDENT
Page 3 of 18
Digest by Angelli Guingue
#1 G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDo C. SILVERIo, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDo S. SILVERIo, JR., CITRINE HoLDINGS, INC., MoNICA
P. oCAMPo and ZEE2 RESoURCES, INC., Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., L.<
FACTS: The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on October
7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son),
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S. Silverio-Dee (daughter), and
Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding
(SP PROC. NO. M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by
SILVERIO, SR.
The administrator first appointed by the court was Edgardo Silverio,
but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated Nov. 3, 1999 filed by the heirs
of Beatriz Silverio, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by
Edgardo was approved by the intestate court and in his stead, Silverio Sr
was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of
pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between
Silverio Sr. and Silverio Jr.
Tthe
eisntaetsetaptetictoiounret rflaipn-dflroepspeodndinedanptp.
Ioninatninogrdaees raidnm20in0i5st, rSaiitlover roiof Sr was removed as
administrator and in his stead, Silverio Jr was designated as the new
administrator. By virtue of the aforesaid order, Silverio Jr executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. over the No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City property. Citrine became the
registered owner thereof. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor
of Monica Ocampo who later sold to ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC. the at No.
82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City property. The No. 19
Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City property was partially settled in
favor of the heirs of Beatriz. Silverio Sr., then filed a Urgent Application
for the issuance of TRO restraining and/or preventing Silverio, Jr.,
Monica, Citrine, and their successors-in-interest from committing any act
that would affect the titles to the three properties.
On February 2011, Silverio Sr., filed an urgent omnibus motion (a)
to declare as null and void the deed of absolute sale dated Sept 2010
(Instsia Road property), (b) to cancel the TCT in favor of
Ocampo (Cambridge property), and (c) to reinstate the TCT in the name of
Ricardo Silverio Sr and the intestate estate of late Beatriz Silverio (Intsia
property). The intestate court rendered the now assailed orders granting
preliminary injunction against Silverio Jr and declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale, TCT and all its derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsia properties null and void.
The CA overturned the intestate court's decision.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the Intestate Estate by the administrator was
valid.
RULING: YES
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having
jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance,
but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 856
6:
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate,
without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. In the early
case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the
property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of
Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: x x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of
the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As
early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid
down the rule that a sale by an administrator of property of the
deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null
and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void
the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a
fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been
pclroosbeadteocrotuerrtmciannantoedt .a n nul t h e un a u th
TT o p h o ld p e ti
io n e r 's c o n te n t io n th a t th
o ri z e d s a le , w o u ld r e nd er meaningless the
power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (italics
ours) our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being
no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed
by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate
court under its omnibus order dated october 31, 2006.
Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said court on motion
by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the
subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored on the
fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in
effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to
the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of
authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the
time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011 Order
of the intestate court annulling the sale of the subject properties grounded
solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents
Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping
appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good
faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate
court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006 which remained
valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.
RULE 88-90 Page 4 of 18
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the intestate court when it ordered the sale of the Cambridge
Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing as justification the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No.
97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made permanent by
the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to
the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of
administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR.
as administrator and nothing else.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 8,
2C0A1G3.Ra.nSdP RNeosso. l 1u2ti1o1n7d3aatne d
1Ju2l2y042,42a0r1e3AoFfFtIRheMCEDou. rt of Appeals in
With costs against the petitioner.
Digest by Angelli Guingue
#2 G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
JULITA Go oNG, FoR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN
oF STEVEN Go oNG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HoN. CoURT oF APPEALS, ALLIED BANкING
CoRPoRATIoN and the CITY SHERIFF oF QUEzoN CITY,
respondents.
PARAS, L.<
FACTS: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12,
Block 407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd
15021, with an area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to
Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975
and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate
in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was registered on
TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot
No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled
and TCT No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot
No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-
in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking
Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by
JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705 on
the same date with the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent
necessary in case of subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of the property other conditions set forth in Doc. No.
340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of Felixberto
Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied
Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E).
Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial
approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court.
In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong
who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong
informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00
by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the
loan.
RTC: Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the capital
of the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said
property should be presumed as acquired during the marriage and,
therefore, conjugal property; After the dissolution of the marriage with
the death of plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
acquired, by law, her conjugal share, together with the hereditary rights
thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963). Consequently,
the mortgage constituted on said property, upon express authority of
plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with
respect to her conjugal share thereon, together with her hereditary rights.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision with modification.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED
OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S
ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL
APPROVAL.
RULING: No
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled
to great respect, carries even more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in the case at bar.
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the
administration of petitioner ‚ the wife of the deceased, is a
community property and not the separate property of the latter;
(2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and
not in her capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects the
wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in the estate of
her husband.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the
estate of her husband is concerned the same is not true as regards her
conjugal share and her hereditary rights in the estate. The records show
that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the property in
question because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of
P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the time she
executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the
mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by
law and the evidence, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the
mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in
her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Sicardal, et al. vs. Eladas
(21 SCRA 1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs. Garavilla (10 SCRA 589),
further argues that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the
deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage
is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone
is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily
entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an
injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of
Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each
have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co- owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
RULE 88-90 Page 5 of 18
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals On September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the
cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage
constituted on the property under administration, by or sell so much of the properties of the estate for the purpose of paying off
authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack the obligations" referred to in the petition.
of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to
Come 1965, the newly appointed administratrix contested said sale,
her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged saying that no sale can be valid with the absence of notice to the heirs,
was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal who did not even have a guardian ad litem to begin with.
share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for
after all, she was the ABSoLUTE owNER thereof. This The RTC ruled for the annulment of the sale. CA reversed the decision of
ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there any claim that the lower court. Hence, this petition.
the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the Issue: whether or not the sale was valid, considering no notice of
rights of any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for
assailed sale was made to the heirs.
impaired.
Held: Without notice and hearing, the sale, mortgage or encumbrance is
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court void. Notice is mandatory. Noncompliance therewith under the sale is null
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to and void.
dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with
her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of
the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship
It does not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement o
and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners
(See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code
applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in
connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of
property under administration for the payment, say of a
conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary
shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial
approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove,
provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including
the government.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was
notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by
An estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though without counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no
consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously
and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied.
virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other
injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).
The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Digest by Yanee

The Civil Code provides that the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child
#3 G.R. No. L-27876 (208 SCRA 270)April 22, 1992
It is explicitly provided that notice must be in be writing, must be given to the
MANECLANG vs.BAUN
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was noti
DAVIDE, JR., L.<

Gist: The Core issue of this case is the validity of a sale of a

parcel of land by the administrator of an intestate estate
made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell and an order
granting it which were filed and entered, respectively,
without notice to the heirs of the decedents.

Facts: Margarita died intestate, leaving nine children. One of them, Oscar
Maneclang, petitioned for the settlement of the estate. No guardian ad
litem was appointed for any of the minor heirs.

SPECPRO RULE 88-90 Page 6 of 18

DIGESTS
seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed
authorization to represent
given them.
by the court forObviously
the sale ofthen, the requirement
the properties, of
the docu

Digest by Yanee
Digest by Yanee
#5 G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998
#4 G.R. No. L-6306. May 26, 1954
OPULENCIA vs. CA
HALILI VS. LLORET
PANGANIBAN, L.<
Bautista Angelo Facts: Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performanc
Opulencia admitted the foregoing facts but claims that the subject property was formed
Facts: Petitioner, Fortunato Halili filed an action against the defendants, The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which allows the sa
Maria Lloret and Ricardo Gonzales Lloret (administrator of the intestate
The CA reversed the Trial court's decision. Hence, the appeal.
estate of Francisco Gonzales ) to compel the latter to execute a deed of
sale of certain parcels of land. Issue: Whether or not a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceedin
Accordingly, Halili through Atty. Teofilo Sauco negotiated the sale of the
6 parcels of land with Ricardo for P200,000. Hence, he gave two checks,
one for the sum of P100,000 drawn against the Philippine National Bank
in favor of Maria Lloret and another for the same amount drawn against
the Philippine Trust Co. in favor of Ricardo Gonzales Lloret.
Later on, Ricardo refused to sign the deed of sale. That he could not
carry out the agreement in view of the fact that he had received
other better offers of the purchase of the lands. He denied that a
definite understanding had ever been reached between him and the
plaintiff or his representative relative to the sale of the lands in question.
In fact, Halili suspended the payment of the two checks. And that the
understanding he had with Teofilo Sauco regarding the sale did not pass
the stage of mere negotiation, and, as such it did not produce any legal
relation by which the defendants could be compelled to carry out the sale
as now pretended by plaintiff in his complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of lands can be compelled by specific
performance.
Held: The court ruled in the negative.
The parties knew well that the properties were subject to judicial
administration and that the sale could have no valid effect until it merits Held: Yes. Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in th
the approval of the court, so much so that before the lands evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate whe
were opened for negotiation, the judicial administrator, with the The Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heir
conformity of the heirs, secured from the court an authorization to
that effect, and yet, as will be stated elsewhere, the terms that were
made to appear in the document (Exhibit D) differ substantially from the
conditions prescribed in the authorization given by the court, which
indicates that said document cannot have any binding effect upon the
parties nor serve as basis for an action for specific performance, as now
pretended by the plaintiff, in the absence of such judicial approval.
And the court finally found that the authorization calls for the sale of six
parcels of land belonging to the estate, but in the document as drawn up by
Sauco it appears that only five parcels would be sold to the plaintiff, and
the other parcel to Ricardo Gonzales Lloret. Undoubtedly, this cannot
legally be done for, as we know, the law prohibits that a land subject of
administration be sold to its judicial administrator.

The sale of properties subject to judicial administration cannot have any valid effect until it is approved by the court. where the terms that w

Digest by Dan

#6: GR No. 158566 September 20, 2005

Josephine Orola vs. The Rural Bank of Pontevedra (CAPIZ), Inc.

Josephine Orola and her siblings, Mryna, Angeline,

FACT
Manuel, Antonio and Althea filed a complaint against the R
bank of Pontevedra, their father Emilio Orola (the administrator of his
wife's estate, Trinidad Laserna) and the Ex-officio Provincial sheriff
for the nullification of the promissory notes and real estate

SPECPRO RULE 88-90 Page 7 of 18

DIGESTS
mortgages executed by Josephine Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the sale
of the property subject of the said deed at public auction.
They alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void
because the same were never submitted to and approved by the RTC in a
special proceeding. Moreover, they were hoodwinked by their father-
administrator Emilio Orola into signing the contracts of lease and
amended contracts of lease, promissory notes and deeds of real estate
mortgages as security for the P600,000 loan on the assurance that they
would benefit therefrom but did not receive the proceeds of the said
loan. As such, the extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages
and the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null and void.
The petitioners reiterate their argument that respondent Emilio Orola, then
administrator of the estate, failed to comply with Section 7, Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. They aver that this provision is mandatory in nature,
including the fixing of a time and place for hearing of the motion for the
approval of the amended contracts of lease. They point out that respondent
Orola failed to file a motion for the approval of the real estate mortgages.
The petitioners insist that even if it is assumed that the December 17, 1982
Order of the intestate estate court approving the amended contracts of
lease authorized the constitution of real estate mortgages over the real
property of the estate, such order is void, as it authorized petitioners
Manuel, Antonio and Josephine Orola, and not the respondent Emilio
Orola, to mortgage the said property. They insist that they are not
estopped from assailing a void order issued by the intestate estate court.
Respondent Rural Bank insists that the petitioners had been benefited by
the loans granted to them; hence, are estopped from assailing the real
estate mortgage contracts. Respondent Orola, for his part, avers that the
one-half undivided portion of the property subject of the real estate
mortgages was the exclusive property of the deceased, and partly the
conjugal property of the respondent and the deceased. Moreover,
respondent Orola's share in the conjugal property was not the subject
of the intestate case, as it was not included as part of the property given as
security for the loans of the petitioners-mortgagees.
The RTC of Roxas City gave their favor on the petitioner. But the CA
reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortagages
of petitioners-appellees are void?constituted over the real estate properties
HELD: Yes. The petition is meritorious.
Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon
application of the administrator and on written notice to the
heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage
so much as may be necessary of the real estate for the
expenses of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that
such mortgage would be beneficial to the persons interested:
Sec. 7 of Rule 89 provides the rules to obtain court approval
for such mortgage.
Any mortgage of the realty of the estate without the appropriate authority
of the estate court has no legal support and is void. The
purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real
estate mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial
foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described therein at public
auction, can thus be attacked directly and collaterally.
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that respondent
Emilio Orola failed to secure an order from the intestate estate court
authorizing him to mortgage the subject lots and execute a real estate
mortgage contract in favor of respondent bank.
What the intestate estate court approved was the authority incorporated in
the amended contracts of lease respondent Orola gave to petitoners
Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that the said lots could be
mortgaged to the respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000
loan under their respective names. In fine, intestate estate court
authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to mortgage the said lots
to respondent Rural Bank. Lastly, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court,
only the executor or administrator of the estate may be
authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage real
estate belonging to the estate; hence the order of the estate
court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty of
the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.
Orola had no right or authority to mortgage the realty belonging to the
estate. He derived his authority from the order of the estate court w/c had
jurisdiction to authorize the REM thereof under such terms and conditions
& upon proper application. Any mortgage of realty of the estate
w/o the appropriate authority of the estate court has no legal
support and is void. The purchaser at public auction acquires
no title over the realty. The REM contracts, as well as the
judicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property
described therein at public auction, can thus be attacked
directly and collaterally.
RULE 90 – DISTRIBUTIoN AND PARTITIoN oF THE ESTATE
Digest by Dan
#1: GR No. 209651 November 26, 2014
MARCELo INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CoRP., and THE
HEIRS oF EDwARD T. MARCELo, NAMELY, кATHERINE J.
MARCELo, ET AL vs.
JoSE T. MARCELo, JR.
FACTS: Decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four
compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4)
respondent Jose, Jr. In an Order dated 13 December 1991, the RTC
appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate.
The intestate court approved the Liquidation of the Inventory of the
Estate of Jose Sr which bears the conformity of all the heirs and
considering that the period for filing of money claims against the subject
estate has already lapsed.
The RTC archived the intestate proceedings, pending Edward's
submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. On 3 July 2009, Edward
died, and Jose Jr. moved for his appointment as new regular administrator
which was opposed by petitioners. On 6 January 2010, the RTC issued the
assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. as regular administrator of
Jose, Sr.'s estate.
PJaentiutiaorny e2r0s 1f0ileOdrdanerOammndninbouws Mmootvioedn for
tRhecoanpspiodienrtamtioent oinf stthead6 of George as administrator
of Jose, Sr.'s estate which was denied by the RTC and and denied on
appeal by the CA.
RULE 88-90 Page 8 of 18
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a regular administrator is still
necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution stage of the
intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.'s estate. YES
Petitioners contention: The appointment of a regular administrator is
unnecessary where there remains no pending matter in the settlement of
Jose, Sr.'s estate requiring attention and administration. There is no
existing or unliquidated debt against the estate of Jose, Sr, the settlement
thereof being already at the liquidation, partition and distribution stage.
Further on that, the liquidation and proposed partition had long been
approved by the probate court.
HELD: The settlement of Jose, Sr.'s estate is not yet through and
complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and distribution
stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and
Partition of the Estate. The rule provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. – x x x No
distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum tobe fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. x x x
x finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the
SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. –
If at the time of the distribution the executor or administrator has retained
sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the
expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of
partition may be paid by such executor or administrator when it appears
equitable to the court and not inconsistent with the intention of the testator;
otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective
shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall be
settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested in the
partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an
execution in the name of the executor or administrator against the party not
paying for the sum assessed.
In this case, we observe that the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate,
approved by the RTC in its Order dated 16 February 2001, is not yet in
effect and complete. We further note that there has been no
manifestation forthcoming from any of the heirs, or the parties in this case,
regarding the completion of the proposed liquidation and partition of the
estate. In fact, as all parties are
definitely
payment ofaware,
estate the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the
taxes.
For clarity, we refer to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate,
which was divided into two (2) parts: (1) Settlement of the Claims against
the Estate, and (2) After Settlement of the Claims, distribution of the
remaining assets of the estate to the four (4) compulsory heirs. The same
document listed payables and receivables of the estate dependent on a
number of factors and contingencies:
There has been no showing from either of the parties that the receivables
of, and claims against, Jose, Sr.'s estate has been actually liquidated,
much less, if an offsetting occurred with the companies listed in the
inventory on one hand, and Jose, Sr.'s estate, on the other. Although
the Marcelo family, in particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr.,
hold equity in the corporations
mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations are
family owned by the Marcelos', these corporations are different
juridical persons with separate and distinct personalities from the Marcelo
patriarch, the decedent, Jose, Sr.18
SPECPRO
DIGESTS
More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, the
actual partition of the estate, where each heir separately holds his share in
the estate as that which already belongs to him, remains intangible and the
ultimate distribution to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of
estate taxes.19
Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.'s
estate states that the valuation amount of the shares of stock as listed
therein is based on par value, which may have varied given the passage of
time. The same document delivers a very important notation that the
equal distribution of the listed assets of the estate will depend on the
actual selling price of these assets less taxes and other deductions:
Above assets will be distributed equally by the four (4) [compulsory
heirs] depending if these will be sold or not. It is very important to note
that equal distribution will be based on actual selling price minus taxes and
other deduction if any, on the above inventories of estate properties.20
To date, more than a decade has passed since the intestate proceedings
were archived, thus, affecting the value of the estate's assets.
From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate proceedings
involving Jose, Sr.'s estate still requires a regular administrator to
decedent.
Digest by Dan
#2: G.R. No. 169454 December 27, 2007
THE HEIRS oF MARCELINo DoRoNIo vs. HEIRS oF
FoRTUNATo DoRoNIo
FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased,
were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Asingan,
Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.
Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were
among their children and herein represented by their heirs, petitioners and
respondents respectively. In 1919, a private deed of donation propter
nuptias was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in
favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter's wife on the subject
property which was occupied by both parties for several decades.
Petitioners now claim ownership of the land in view of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino
Doronio
d w if e. R e s p o n d en ts ,
acq ui re d o n e - h a lf o f th
on th e o th e r h a n d, c on t e nd s t ha t th e
e pro p er ty c o v er e d b y O C T N o . 3 52 b y
tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation was null
and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half
of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of
the property by acquisitive prescription and that the subject land is
different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under
OCT No. 352 and under the private deed of donation were different..
Petitioners filed before RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For
the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation". Petition was granted and
TCT 4481 issued to petitioners. Respondent's MR denied.
Respondents, in turn, filed an action for reconveyance and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. CA
reversed RTC. Hence, this petition with petitioners contending that the
RTC no jurisdiction to hear the case since issues on Impairment
of Legitime Should Be Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in
Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages.
RULE 88-90 Page 9 of 18
ISSUES: WON the issue on Impairment of Legitime Should properly be
threshed out in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages thus within
the jurisdiction of RTC.?
HELD: No. Issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato
Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in
an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise
of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving
the settlement of estate.
An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action.
xxxx
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed
by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In
special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application
or motion.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,
questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the
dcoeucertasheadvitnog ajnuyrishdeicirtiomnayofbteheh
easrtdataenpdrodcetedrminignse,danbdy the final order of the
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
SPECPRO
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings."
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting
in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh
out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass
upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
We likewise find merit in petitioners' contention that before
any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value
of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added
to it. with the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of
the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes. (DE LEoN)
Desetcaltaerasthi onuldofbehediristrtiobudtedte.rSmeipnaeratoe wach
The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdictio
The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all pay
the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be
prejudiced the legitimes. (De Leon and Festin p. 179)
Digest by Ivy
#3 G.R. No. L-15445, April 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER oF THE INTESTATE ESTATE oF THE DECEASED
MERCEDES CANo, FLoRANTE C. TIMBoL, administrator-
appellee,
Vs.
JoSE CANo, oppositor-appellant.
LABRADoR, L.:
FACTS The intestate Mercedes Cano died leaving as her only heir her son
Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. Jose Cano, brother of the
intestate, was appointed administrator. Jose Cano filed a petition
proposing that the agricultural lands of the
RULE 88- Page 10 of
intestate be leased to him for P4,000 annually, such rental will be used for
the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to
the government. The petition was approved.
The court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the
minor heir, approved the reduction of the rental to P2,400 and the
conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a subdivision.
Upon motion of Jose, a project of partition was approved, designating
Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the
intestate.
Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano. He
presented a motion alleging among other things (a) that the area destined
for the projected subdivision be increased from
30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be
approved. Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision
would reduce the land leased to him and would deprive his tenants of
their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express authority
of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his
leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the
objections of Jose Cano.
Jose Cano argues that since the project of partition had already been
approved and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to
appoint a new administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to
be converted into a subdivision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the finality of approval of project of partition by
itself terminate the probate proceeding and consequently, the lower court
has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator or to authorize the
enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. NO
RULING: The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid,
and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such
heir.
As long as the order of distribution of the estate has not been
caoonmd ptleierdmwiniathte, p ro ce e d in g s c a n n o t b e
a ju d ic ia l p a r t it io n i s
dth, ebpercoabuaste dneoetmfeindaclloasned
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs form bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed.
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share,
is to demand his share through proper motion in the same probate or
administrative proceedings, or for the reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
Finality of approval of project of partition by itself does NoT TERMINATE probate
A judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the he
Digest by Ivy
#4 G.R. No. L-852 March 19, 1949
LEoNIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA Vs. ISAAC
BoNILLA and SILVINA oRDANEz,
SPECPRO
TUASoN, J.:
FACTS: Casimiro Evangelista is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
who was married to Leonida Mari plaintiff herein. They begot two
children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista all surnamed Evangelista.
Casimiro died intestate.lOn January 10, 1944 Deogracias Evangelista
alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro executed a declaration of heirship
and sold the property in question to the defendants spouses, Isaac Bonilla
and Silvina Ordañez. Consequently, the TCT was issued to them.
This action was brought to recover Leonida Mari and Caridad
Evangelista's combined 3/4, share in the parcel of land sold by
Deogracias. The defendants did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother
of Deogracias Evangelista at the time when he bought the land as
Deogracias Evangelista was living with his grandfather, Matias
Evangelista; and that Caridad Evangelista was living with her mother,
Leonida Mari;
ISSUE:
W/N the judicial partition in favor of Deogracias bound Leonida Mari and
Caridad Evangelista. NO
RULING:
If, as is probably the case, defendants relied on the court's order
adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate in the distribution
held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, their innocence avails them less
as against the true owners of the land. That was a summary settlement
made on the faith and strength of the distributee's self-serving affidavit;
and section 4 of the above- mentioned rule provides that, "If it shall appear
at anytime within two years after the settlement and distribution of an
estate that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or other person may compel the
settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for the
purpose of satisfying such participation." Far from shielding defendants
against loss, the adjudication and the rule under which it was made gave
them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. " judicial
partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not
parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota
or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint
possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership, and
certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more
than his own true right.
A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and
conclusive, and not being of such definitive character as to
stop all means of redress for a coheir who has been deprived
of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the
prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindicacion in the
province where any of the real property of the deceased may
be situated. Broad perspectives of public policy are set out in
the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing
a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a
partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had.
proceeding.
Digest by Ivy
#5 GR No. 165744, August 11, 2008
RULE 88- Page 11 of
 OSCAR C. REYES versus Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or ow
MAкATI, Branch 142, zENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
and RODRIGO C. REYES

BRION, J.:
FACTS: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo are two of the four children
of the sps Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and
Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation, a
domestic corporation established by their family. Pedro and Anastacia
subsequently died. The former had his estate judicially partitioned among
his heirs, but the latter had not made the same including her shareholding
in Zenith.
Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint, with the SEC against Oscar, as a
derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo
C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH
INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control,
custody, and/or possession of Oscar and to determine the shares of stock
of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and
fraudulently appropriated by Oscar for himself and which were not
collated and taken into account in the partition, distribution, and/or
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he should be
ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these shares
of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and
respective shares.
Whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC sitting as special
commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigos complaint since
what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional
rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper
remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that
is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
Digest by Elaine
#6. G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008
QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAw OFFICE FOR
ITS OwN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF
RAYMOND TRIVIERE, petitioners,
vs.
LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The case was subsequently transferred to RTC designated as a special
commercial court (in accordance with RA 8799). RTC took cognizance of
the derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation
Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia
Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he purchased the subject shares with
his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a
bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the
settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the
jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
Oscar prayed that the trial court be prohibited from continuing with the
proceedings.
CA denied Oscar's motion.
fI asscut ein: Wth/eNntahteurceomofpalapinetitsionnotfoar
bsoenttalefmidendt eorfiveasttivaeetes; uhiet nbcuet, iist iins outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court. YES
FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away and a proceeding for the
settlement of his intestate estate was instituted by his widow, Amy
Consuelo Triviere and its counsel. The LCN Construction, as the only
remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond
Triviere filed its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion of payment filed
by counsel of petitioner, and argued that RTC had already resolved the
issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion
for Payment filed by the counsel for petitioner for failure of the
administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the
estate as required by the court. It also averred that claims are still
outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been
paid. The RTC issued its Order taking note that "the widow and the heirs
of the deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received their
respective share in the Estate." The RTC declared that there was no more
need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate. LCN sought
recourse from the Court of Appeals and promulgated a Decision ruling in
favor of LCN.
ISSUE: WON the award in favor of the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere
is already a distribution of the residue of the estate - YES

RULING: RULING: While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow
made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of
The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against
jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of
relevant provision Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court that the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already
contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares: being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had
been paid or provided for.
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of theor not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
court thereon shall be binding on the person raising discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate
that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the
the questions and on the heir. subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the
distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the
A probate court has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary meansoftooutstanding
payment its authority to determine
obligations the properties
of the estate included
(second paragraph of in the in
Section 1, Rule 90).There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the
petitioner

SPECPRO RULE 88- Page 12 of

children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all
its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed
least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes
completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet
received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005.
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private
respondent
The 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allowsfiled
theadistribution
motion for reconsideration
of the estate of the to
prior Order which wasof obliga
the payment
denied by RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was
received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6,
where, however, the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable2006,
distribution of the inheritance
private respondent in accordance
filed her Notice with law
of Appeal while and her
she filed the final jud
Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. RTC denied the appeal on two
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations
grounds: (1) that of theDee's
Nelia Silverio- estate of thewas
appeal lateagainst
Raymong Triviere was m
an order
denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec.
Partial distribution of the estate should not have been allowed. There was
1(a), no41
Rule determination
of the Rules ofonCourt;
sufficiency
and (2)ofthat
assets
NeliaorSilverio-Dee's
absence of any outs
Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an
appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Hence, private respondent filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with the CA which issued a TRO
and ruled that Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated
by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order
dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to
appeal? [Yes, they are interlocutory orders.]

RULING: SC first cited the CA decision which ruled that the

OO m n ib u s O r d er d at e d M a y 3 1 ,
tth e a l le g e d a u t h o r it y g iv e n b y
2 0 0 5 w a s a f in a l o r d r . C A s a i d t h a t
S IL V E R IO , S R . f o r N e li a S . S i l ve r io - Dee to
occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated
as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of
estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an
Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84,
Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall
have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as
the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84,
Revised Rules of Court). CA also reiterated that a final order is one that
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
Digest by Elaine proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, while an
#7. G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009 interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely
but leaves something to be decided upon.

RICARDo S. SILVERIo, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
CoURT oF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIo-
DEE, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr.,
filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. In Nov
2004, during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
the administrator of the estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed an
opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of
the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. RTC granted the
petition and removed Silverio Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Silverio Jr. as the new administrator. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. In 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real
Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, without Authority from this Honorable Court. On May 31, 2005,
the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3,
2005 and denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration.
In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to,
upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
The SC added that it is only after a judgment has been rendered
in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be
included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order
generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of
the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their
rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the
estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,

SPECPRO RULE 88- Page 13 of

together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. The Court
in Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals said that although the right of an heir
over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise
rights of ownership over such inchoate right as provided in Art 493 of the
Civil Code.
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context
that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate
proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties
of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90,
Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be
distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other
expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed
with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the
intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any
property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which
she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by
the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
property located in Forbes Park. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the
RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to
an appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode
of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such
improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. The private respondent has now lost her
remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Doctrine: Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the
court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate
2. In the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21938- 39,
court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property
May 29, 1970, this Court, thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that
that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. The
there are two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his
administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon
order of the Court. status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its
reopeningasif long
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate
Digest by Elaine
#8. G.R. No. L-23915 September 28, 1970
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ.
SATURNINA M. VDA. DE LOPEZ, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ, minors, represented by their
mother and natural guardian LOLITA B. BACHAR,movants-
appellants.
SPECPRO
MAKALINTAL, J.:
FACTS: On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, filed with the lower court a
project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate
children with the deceased. The lower court approved the project of
partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for
all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy,
both surnamed Lopez, represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar,
filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming
that they were illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born
out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that
their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to
them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the
ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and
closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and
that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy,
which should be an independent action against the individual distributees..
ISSUES: (1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding
was filed too late; and
(2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
RULING: 1. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's
ofinrdael r imdemcleadr inaggteltyheupinotnestiatste ispsruoacneced. inIgt
wclaossendodidifnfeortenbtecforomme judgments or orders in ordinary
actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders
in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the
party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only
seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was
therefore invoked on time.
it has as
already been closed.
the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, t
Demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a
testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same
special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the judge who has
jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who, when the
time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the
interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
Digest by: Albert
#9 G.R. No. L-42615 August 10, 1976
SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, et al, Petitioners, vs. JUDGE VALERIO V.
ROVIRA in his capacity as Presiding Judge, et al, Respondents.
Aquino, J:
Facts: Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1,
1964. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their four daughters
RULE 88- Page 14 of
named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. Two days after his death, a
petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement
of his estate. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22,
1964. She administered the estate for seven years. Judge Castrense C.
Veloso in his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and
project of partition and declared the proceeding "closed and terminated.
The partition was duly registered. On June 8, 1971 or after the order
closing the intestate proceeding had become final, Camilo Divinagracia
filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged
that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent.
. as one of her heirs.
Respondent Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned
order dated October 18, 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding.
ISSUE: whether an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed,
can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on
his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's estate.
HELD: No. We hold that the probate court erred in reopening the intestate
proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed
to have had constructive notice (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248). The
order closing it was already final and executory. The motion to reopen it
was not filed within the thirty- day reglementary period counted from the
date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure
order could not be disturbed anymore (Imperial vs. Muñoz, L-30787,
August
29, 1974, 58 SCRA 678. Compare with Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil.
730, 741; Jerez vs. Nietes, L-26876, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA
904, 909; Vda. de Lopez vs. Lopez, L-23195, September 28, 1970,
35 SCRA 80, 83, where the motion to reopen the intestate proceeding was
filed within the reglementary period).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr
In the book of FESTIN:
However, where the order closing the intestate proceeding
was already final and executory, the same cannot be
reopened on a motion therefore filed after the lapsed of the
reglementary period.
Lopez (35 SCRA 81) compared to Divinagracia (72 SCRA 307):
Both involved the issue of the reglementary period within which
or anyhtheeir,cadsev.
NinOteNre-sPtAedRTinIEtShetoesttahte, cpaaanrtrietoiopne,n person
Conclusion: if proceeding already closed, motion to reopen may
be filed by a nonparty deprived of his lawful participation, as long as it is withinand
Digest by: Albert
#10 G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972
JUANITA LoPEz GUILAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE oF THE CoURT oF FIRST INSTANCE oF PAMPANGA
AND ALEJANDRo LoPEz respondents .
MAкASIAR, L.<
SPECPRO
FACTS: Jacinta was married to Alejandro. They had no children. Jacinta
executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and
executor.
Petitioner Juanita, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was
declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta
and Alejandro.
After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña
Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita
The will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro,
was appointed executor without bond.
In a project of partition executed by both Alejandro and Juanita, the right
of Juanita to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and
3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), were adjudicated
to Juanita as her share
.
The lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that the
records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes.
Petitioner Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the
project of partition.
Juanita filed a petition praying that Alejandro be directed to
deliver to her the actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well
as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the 10
tenants or
lessees of the said two lots.
Alejandro claims that, by virtue of the order which approved the project of
partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita and directed that the
records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and inheritance
taxes, and the order which "ordered closed and terminated the present
case", the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated.
.
Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary
shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and
terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the probate
proceedings.
.
ISSUE: W/N the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated.
isee
HELD: No.The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts
30 days
the (now 15 days) estate
remaining or beforedelivered
order closing
to the
theproceedings becomestofinal. (de Le
heirs entitled
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the
estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated, because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate on intestate court
RULE 88- Page 15 of
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741- 742; Timbol vs. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order
Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs
Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing
460-461).. theadministrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and
decreeing the proceedings closed.
Remedy of heir entitled to residue but not given his share To demand his share through
a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings,Private
ORrespondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the probate judgment of and the Order of partition,
motion to reopen if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action which would be tried by
in said motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and
aonrdoethr eorf ctohuertprorbjautdegceouwrht icahlremadigyhtfinraelvearnsde eaxedceuctiseidonanodr
admit their opposition to the allowance of the reshuffle
will. One properties
of the groundslong ago di
raised for the re-opening of the proceedings was the non-distribution of the
when does a probate court lose jurisdiction of an estate under administration? (UP) and legatees.
estate to the devisees

ISSUE
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only afterthe
: W/N theallegation
payment of of all the debtsofand
non-distribution the the remaining
estate estate deli
is sufficient
ground to warrant the re-opening of the testate proceedings.

HELD: No. The non-distribution of the estate, which is

vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the
re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion
for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza,
theCourt ruled that if the executor or administrator has
possession of the share to be delivered, the probate court
would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to
order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled
thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court.
Digest by: Albert
However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary
#11 G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992 period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order.

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA Guilas (43 SCRA 111) compared to Fran (210 SCRA 303):
RODRIGUEz, petitioners,
Both involved PARTIES who have not received their shares.
vs.
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA Conclusion: Parties to partition agreement who have not received their shares can file a m
and
MARIA MEJIA GANDIONGCO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., L.<

FACTS: Remedios, a widow, died with neither descendants nor

ascendants; she left real and personal properties, she executed a last will
and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario or,
upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Fran
filed a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The Digest by: Jill
petition alleged
that Rosario
assuming is not physically
the position well and,
of administratrix. The therefore, will issued
probate court not be #12. G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
an order setting the petition for hearing. Meanwhile, the court appointed CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator. vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA
The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
the testatrix, Remedios, and appointing petitioner Fran as executor thereof. Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
the period therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.
Petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; copies thereof were
MEDIALDEA, L.<
furnished each of the private respondents.

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in
the will and signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of
Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was
submitted by the executor for the court's approval. Said legatees and
devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of
the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing, and state that
they had no objection to its approval.
Facts: This case involves the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. He
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers,
sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are his two aunts
namely; Petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the sister of his mother
Salustia Solivio and Private respondent Concordia Javellana- Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father. Salustia Solivio brought to her marriage
paraphernal properties which she had inherited from

SPECPRO RULE 88- Page 16 of

her mother but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the e
marriage to Esteban Sr. On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her
properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his aunt
Celedonia his plan to place his estate in a foundation in honor of his
mother. Unfortunately, he died sooner without having set up the
foundation. Two weeks after his funeral, Celedonia told Concordia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his
mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan
of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of
the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia
then filed a special proceeding for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Thereafter, she was declared sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Four months later after the court's
pronouncement, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision because she too was an heir of the
deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The trial court ruled in
favour of Concordia and ordered the execution of its judgment pending
appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. Celedonia filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this instant petition. Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia's action for partition and recovery of share (MO)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the
Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set
aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have
herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No.
2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the
denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead
of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate
action
for the was
action sameimproperly
purpose infiled
Branch
for it26isofthetheprobate
court. court
We hold
that that the separate
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing
and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court
should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a
co-equal court.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to
proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, setting aside the probate proceedings were
matters be within the exclusive competence of the probate court.

2. Whether or not there is extrinsic fraud (NO)

3. whether or not the property is subject to reserve troncal (NO) 2. As to the question of extrinsic fraud

4. whether or not Concordia is entitled to her one-half share (NO)

The charge of extrinsic fraud is unwarranted:
Ruling: 1. As to jurisdiction
1.Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended
to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had ag
No. After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisd

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Concordia

was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as wel
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as require

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the inte

3. On the question of reserve troncal

No. Based from the foregoing provision, the rkskrvn trbmhne

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring descendant
applies tofrom his ascendant,
properties the reverse
inherited by anof ascendant
the situation from
covered
a by
Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll Article 891.
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
Inbrother
the case or sister.
at bar, It does not
the property of apply to property
the deceased inherited
is not by a
a reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the

SPECPRO RULE 88- Page 17 of

descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject
to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, Articles 1003 and 1009 of the NCC should
apply in the distribution of his estate.
4. As to the question of Concordia's one-half share
No. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "
The petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE . Concordia J. Villanueva is de
REMEDY oF PRETERITED HEIR
The intestate proceedings, although closed and terminated, can still be opened within the prescriptive period upon petition by the preterited heir (de Leon. Festin p. 186
A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate whichWhether
Digest by: Jill
#13. G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.
LUISA LYoN NUÑAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUÑAL,
and ANITA NUÑAL HoRMIGoS, petitioners,
vs.
THE CoURT oF APPEALS and EMMA LYoN DE LEoN in her
behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN
SABARRE and кENNY SABARRE, EDUARDo GUzMAN,
MERCEDEz LYoN TAUPAN, wILFREDo GUzMAN, MALLY
LYoN ENCARNACIoN and DoRA LYoN DELAS PEÑAS,
respondents.
FACTS: Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment
in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property
of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded
to the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by
the latter.
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon
and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a
motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In
her motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled
Moreover, where the judgment has become final, the remedy of a party-heir would be to
case her rights, interests, ownership and
SPECPRO
participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the
said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar as her
share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said share not
having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further
invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing
the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the
partition of the property
The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the
lower court whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary
L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property
considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in
Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property
and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
the courtormay
notaccept
the proper remedy
or reject. (UP) to enforce a right of an
excluded heir to a final and executory judgment of partition is a motion to
quash said judgment?
HELD: NO. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void.
Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has
become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost
his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he
would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be
in excess of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent
suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other
heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all
the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
RULE 88- Page 18 of