MAY, 2023

THE VOL. 3

Roosevelt

REFLECTIONS ON
DECOLONIZATION
 Designed by Sarah Kim and Sasha
Mérigot

CONTRIBUTORS
Researchers - Adeline Kugler, Rhianna Cracknell, Chaaru Jain, Kuba Kudera Johnson, Lina
Pitz, Manju von Rospatt, Rhianna Cracknell, Sasha Mérigot, Terra Rolfe, Veronika
Blazkova. Editors - Alexandra Kolb, Clarisa Fernández de Guzmán, Erina Svinija, Hanna
Rodriguez Sundqvist, Lisa Place, Micah DenBraber. Board - Adeline Kugler, Grégory von
Boetticher, Kate Verhoeff, Sasha Mérigot, Lina Pitz, Manju von Rospatt. William
Goldiamond,
 THEME LETTER
Dear readers,

For the third edition of The Roosevelt, we came together as students from
different backgrounds and academic perspectives to reflect on one of the most
crucial struggles underlying the 21st century: decolonization. Though each of us
has followed a unique path in life, we’ve all felt the salience of the structural
consequences of colonialism and the importance of decolonization. We meant
for The Roosevelt to be a space where each of us can explore how
decolonization can be achieved, and what steps remain to be taken in the fields
we’ve come to study in our Global Challenges program. The Roosevelt Network
at LUC was born out of that very desire to provide students with a way to delve
into their own research interests, draw from their lived experiences, and find
their academic voice. As a progressive policy-oriented student think tank, we
strive to analyze global issues in depth, draw from a variety of sources, and
produce peer-reviewed articles up to academic standards. In the creation of this
edition, produced in a Western context, we aimed to confront our biases and
privilege by employing reflexivity in our writing, thinking, and discussions. We
celebrate the different ways that our students come to know, reflect, and study
topics that drive their desire to research and inquire about the world.
This year’s theme “Reflections on Decolonization” was inspired by growing
discourses at LUC about the need to decolonize higher education, research
practices, and the way we think about the world. As students situated in an
academic institution that has dedicated itself to solving “Global Challenges,”
and is located in the Netherlands, a Global North country and former colonial
power, we need to reflect on our own positionality in the global, (post?)colonial
power structures of academia, research, and governance. This edition of The
Roosevelt aimed to provide exactly this: an opportunity for students to reflect,
and make an attempt to apply a decolonial approach to topics of their interest.
This is why the magazine does not claim to be an authoritative voice on the
topic of decolonization, but rather offers some perspectives on decolonization
from passionate students seeking to challenge their thinking and critically
reflect on power dynamics in today’s world.

3
We brought together a team of students from different majors eager to
interrogate the topic of decolonization. With a focus on making evident the
links between global issues and colonialism, we present to you a wide range of
articles that touch upon colonial remnants in gender, health, and education,
but also upon fundamental concepts such as time. Other articles investigate
culture, identity and memory politics, conservation approaches, and digital
colonialism. They blend academic analyses, storytelling, accounts of lived
experiences, interviews, and personal opinions. The pieces collected in this
edition of The Roosevelt are the result of a year of dedication and commitment
to making this possible. Though the selection of topics is wide, it serves to show
the extent of decolonization as an interdisciplinary process. We hope you find
these pieces thought-provoking, and that they lead you to engage in (or
further) your own reflection on decolonization.

Thank you for joining us and enjoy!

Your Heads of Research

Sasha Mérigot Lina Pitz

4
Photo by Visual Karsa - Unsplash.com
 Table of Contents Page 7
Reflections on Gender-Based Global Health Programs:
Decolonial Approaches
Written by Manju von Rospatt

Page 17
Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
Written by Rhianna Cracknell

Page 25
Postcolonial Museums? Evaluating the Interplay
between National Identity, Politics, and Museum
Practices in France
Written by Sasha Mérigot

Page 34
The Earth is Ours: The Importance of Decoloniality in
Nature Conservation
Written by Lina Pitz

Page 41
Rethinking and Decolonizing Time: A Guide for
Members in the Higher Education Sector to Distance
Themselves from Dysphoria
Written by Chaaru Jain

Page 47
Dangers of Digital Domination: Exploring the Perils of
21st-Century Digital Colonialism
Written by Adeline Kugler and Terra Rolfe

Page 59
‘Ghost of Empire’: Is Australian Foreign Aid Neo-
Colonial?
Written by Kuba Kudera Johnson

Page 73
Decolonization from Theory to Practice: Museums
Must Show Us Our History
Written by Chaaru Jain

Page 79
Decolonizing the In-Between: Unmasking Colonial
Legacies in Central and Eastern Europe
Written by Veronika Blazkova

Photo by angeluisma 2021• Getty Images 6


Reflections on Gender-Based Global Health
Programs: Decolonial Approaches
Written by Manju von Rospatt
W
hat does decolonizing international
development mean? How should one
approach development studies or
practice with a decolonial mindset?
Rather than understanding development as an
ideal end-state that can be achieved through a
prescription of policies and programs, we must
strive for a more localized perspective of
development as complex political processes of
change in societies. Decolonizing development
also means we must examine our epistemological
approaches.[1] Pan-African feminist Jessica Horn
writes: “Decolonising development and
humanitarian work is predicated on a process of
decolonizing knowledge – interrogating power
dynamics.”[2]
7
01
Photo by Manju von Rospatt
This also means a tangible shift in power,
resources, and networks between partners in the
Global North and South.[3] Negotiating
relationships between civil society organizations
as well as increasing South-South cooperation
between states and organizations all fall into
decolonizing development. In other words, if one
is to reimagine the global development system,
one must examine structures of inequality and the
roots of power imbalances.[4] This topic presents
a vast array of questions, ideas, tensions, debates,
and innovations within decolonizing development
studies. This paper will focus on the sectors of
global health and gender-based advocacy.
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs
"I defend a decolonial
feminism whose objective is the
destruction of racism,
capitalism, and imperialism
[...]"
- Françoise Vergès
What colonial legacies are embedded in our
language in the global health, gender, and global
development nexus? Dr. Claire Somerville of the
Geneva Graduate Institute and Dr. Khatia
Munguambe of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
in Mozambique write that “global health and
gender [...] interventions are in need of critical
epistemological re-thinking that destabilizes the
entrenched relations of power and assumptions
derived from colonialisms of the global
North.”[5] This paper is not a comprehensive
review of the large issues of decolonizing gender
and global health interventions in the
development sector. Rather, I seek to explore
how decoloniality as a mindset can change the
ways in which these development programs
operate.
I aim to illustrate how implicit messages
embedded into aid and development programs
about gender and health privilege Western
‘universalist’ understandings of the body, health,
and gender. By doing so, development programs
obscure local understandings and knowledge
about well-being and gender, perpetuating
historical power dynamics and not accounting for
the lived realities of the people they work with. To
decolonize development programs, local
knowledge systems, and conceptualizations must
be taken seriously and integrated throughout the
policy and program design process. This can only
be done if program beneficiaries are seen as co-
creators and participants who set the agenda on
their needs and priorities. Increasing space in the
development sector for applied anthropology is
8
emerging as a method to assess Western
assumptions and dive deeper into the dynamics of
development interventions.[6] Such a decolonial
approach to the programming of these projects
may also help to create more lasting and
successful positive changes.
Decolonial Feminism
Decolonial feminist approaches must drive the
conversation and provide the conceptual framing
for decolonizing gender-based programming in
development initiatives. Decolonial feminism
raises critiques of feminists' ideas that do not take
into account the political context or structural
violence. French political scientist Françoise
Vergès, writes, “I defend a decolonial feminism
whose objective is the destruction of racism,
capitalism, and imperialism[…]”[7] In contrast to
decolonial feminism, she coined the term
“civilizational feminism,” which stems from an
imperial legacy and leverages the “ideology of
women’s rights” globally to undertake “civilizing
mission.”[8] These missions impose a “unique
perspective [about gender] that contributes to the
perpetuation of domination based on class,
gender, and race.”[9] In other words, Vergès
argues that the imposition of one approach to
gender and women’s rights perpetuates the
hegemony of Western epistemology, obscuring
local understandings of gender. In the same vein,
Nigerian scholar and decolonial feminist,
Oyérónke Oyěwùmí writes extensively about
decolonial feminism and African Epistemology as
a challenge to Eurocentric feminism. Through her
ethnography on gender relations and community
structure in the Nigerian Yoruba society, she
argues that European concepts of gender as social
categories did not exist prior to colonization.
Oyěwùmí’s work critiques and challenges the
supposed universality of certain concepts (such as
gender) as a Western idea.[10] Thus, a decolonial
feminist lens can aid us in our critical
interrogation of development interventions as
processes and practices.
Women’s Empowerment Interventions
“Women’s Empowerment,” a commonly used
term in development discourse, whether it comes
from civil society, national governments, or
intergovernmental agencies, plays an important
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs

role in development programming with specific

gender and health focuses. Many major
development organizations, such as Oxfam Novib,
USAID, CARE, and Mercy Corps use gender and
health as entry points to activate change. Research
in development studies has found that investing in
and working with girls and women through
targeted programs can activate these processes of
change at the household and communal levels.[11]
The term women’s empowerment also appears
frequently in advertisements for fair trade
certified and “ethically sourced” products from
the Global South, whether it be cacao from
Ghana, coffee from Columbia, or felt crafts from
Nepal.[12] But what does ‘empowerment’ actually
mean behind the shiny pages of a policy brief or
company website? Does this term, however well-
intentioned, obscure the reality of the wider
dynamics of structural oppression?
The language of empowerment can create a
moralizing discourse of self-responsibility for
‘fighting poverty’ which obscures the power
dynamics that keep people in such conditions. The
aforementioned scholar Vergès explores the
concept of women’s empowerment in
development discourse, arguing that non-
governmental organizations produce an apolitical
narrative of women’s empowerment in their
development programs, eliding any mention of
the political and structural barriers to prosperity
in their communities. That is, empowerment
implies that people need to raise their voices when
perhaps rather the channels through which their
voices are heard need to be expanded. We can
reframe this idea on the notion that people in
power need to listen more. This critique of
women’s empowerment is not intended to
discount the very real impacts that women’s
empowerment programs can have. Rather, this
critique can allow us to understand how women’s
empowerment initiatives can do more than help
women generate income by also challenging
structural conditions that hinder equity in the
long term.
I’ve been exploring the phrase “self-
empowerment” for my research project with a
development program in rural Nepal. The NGO
that designs and implements the program,
Practical Help Achieving Self Empowerment
Photo by Paddy Field - unsplash.com
(PHASE) Nepal, creates women’s groups to spread
information about best practices for health and

9
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs
hygiene related to maternity and child health.
This model involves a certain mutual
empowerment in which women come together
and learn more information about their bodies, at
least from a Western biomedical perspective.
PHASE also works with farmers to grow more
vegetables for food security as well as traditional
healers to refer patients to the local health post.
The organization maintains that through this
multi-pronged approach to development,
individuals (particularly women) and
communities will enter a ‘self-empowering’
process that will eventually lift them from a cycle
of generational poverty. In an interview I had with
the project coordinator, he mentioned that the
organization targets women as participants
specifically in order to maximize the benefits of
the program to indirect beneficiaries within the
women’s families. With this, the organization’s
theory of change asserts that community access to
basic services and knowledge will allow for
increased confidence and agency in individuals as
well as a greater capacity at a communal level for
self-advocacy initiatives.
One project site is in the district of
Sindhupalchok, northeast of Kathmandu, in a
rural mountain village by the name of Baruwa.
Almost all of the people there practice subsidence
farming and a stark majority of people are
classified as living under the global poverty line of
earning less than $2.15 a day. Besides vulnerability
to food insecurity, poverty, flooding, and
landslides exacerbated by global climate change,
this community also has been affected by the 7.6
scale 2015 earthquake. These factors combined
with a lack of job opportunities have led this
region of Nepal to have high levels of out-
migration and increased vulnerability. With this
understanding, PHASE Nepal began its
intervention in 2017 aiming to strengthen local
institutions and provide services to community
members in the pursuit of generating
empowering effects for individuals and
communities. When I arrived in Baruwa in
January 2023, I planned to interview women in the
program to discuss the topic of individual self-
empowerment. I arrived with expectations of how
a development intervention could mobilize and
empower individuals and communities. As I spoke
with the women in the community about the
impact of the gendered health and livelihood
10
interventions they are a part of, and they told me
about the complexity of such a process. Their
responses highlighted that there are many deep
structural barriers not only in their proximate
community but also within the global economy.
Most of the women had previously worked as
domestic workers in the Gulf states as part of the
“transnational care chain” with poor pay.[13]
Many ended up in even more debt than when they
left due to high payments to middlemen and
traffickers. Living in a context of harsh poverty,
most of the women could not identify with my
questions about empowerment in a Western sense
of increased individual agency. Instead, they used
different words and concepts, speaking more
about security, particularly in accessing health
care, a source of income, and food security. A few
women also mentioned the confidence they are
building by attending and participating in the
women’s groups. Most of the women told me
about financial difficulties within the context of
rural Nepal and many of our conversations ended
with stories of their time abroad as domestic care
workers. This experience led me to reflect more
deeply on how women’s empowerment programs
can operate effectively within a context of a global
economy that relies on women’s underpaid work
in informal sectors.
Drawing on these conversations, it is clear
that empowerment programs need to also take
into account structural issues that shape people’s
lives rather than just focus on individual capacity.
There is a certain tension with non-governmental
and governmental aid organizations from the
Global North arriving in communities with such
“empowerment programs,” when those same
organizations do not address the structural
inequalities within the development aid system.
Decolonizing development should begin with an
active recognition by policymakers and
development practitioners of such tensions. There
has been some change with the use of
“participatory rural appraisal” and community-
based research to assess the needs and understand
the context prior to designing
“interventions.”[14] Including the experiences,
perspectives, and lived realities of those whom the
intervention targets are paramount to decenter a
purely Western epistemology in the design of
empowerment programs and in the policymaking
process.
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs

Photo by Manju von Rospatt

Global Health Interventions behavior-changing, or health systems

strengthening, revived Enlightenment-era
Though definitions vary in the literature, global
conceptualizations of gender and illness. Such an
health, broadly speaking, aims to improve the
approach obscures valid, local knowledge and
health of individuals and communities across the
devalues it as “traditional” while global health
world through governance, advocacy, and
promises a “modern” approach. Regardless, if one
dispersal of biomedical, scientific, and
agrees with this point, it is clear that if
technological innovations.[15] With major global
interventions do not account for the local context,
health programs, predominately funded by
the lived realities, aspirations, and needs of a
foundations, governments, and organizations in
people in a specific place, then interventions will
the Global North, come certain Western
also be less sustainable and effective in their goals.
understandings of health and wellbeing.[16]
Decolonizing global health interventions,
Somerville and Munguambe write that “global
particularly those with a gendered focus on
health and its closely related gender activities are
behavior change, requires a genuine critique of
not just a matter of budgets and funding streams,
Western assumptions about homogenous
but also ways of knowing and doing that are
communities, gender as a binary, separate
typically drawn from epistemologies of the global
individuals, the body, health, and wellbeing.
North.”[17] In this way, global health
When taken together, decolonial and
interventions, whether they be disease-specific,
anthropological

11
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs

perspectives can provide a useful analytical hypertension symptoms. Citing the work of
framework to critique global health interventions. Oyèrónke Oyewumi, who writes about the
With the recognition that global health is entanglement of Western gender and biological
embedded in a Eurocentric system of concepts of the body, Somerville and Munguambe
development, decolonizing global health studies explore how biomedical approaches disregard
and interventions have become a major topic in non-bodily causes of diseases, such as
the literature.[18] Similarly, a burgeoning supernatural causes or cosmology. More
literature on medical anthropology examines specifically, the “Cartesian epistemology of the
local knowledge systems to de-center the biomedical formal health system fails to fit with
epistemologies of Western global health the experience and expectation of the
interventions, particularly focused on medical patient.”[21] In other words, global health
pluralism, that is the co-existence of multiple interventions can obscure and push aside local
epistemological approaches to healthcare.[19] epistemologies as the Western biomedical
The book Medicine in the Meantime: The Work approach takes precedence.[22] This has
of Care in Mozambique by Dr. Ramah McKay, a implications for building up the legitimacy of
medical anthropologist at the University of health interventions in the community as well as
Pennsylvania, explores transnational and non- the trust that people have in biomedical health
governmental global health interventions in practitioners. How can global health
Morrumbala and Maputo in Mozambique. McKay interventions maintain respect for local
finds that these short-term interventions are knowledge and trust systems with traditional
complicated and even disrupted the landscapes of healers while also providing important and life-
traditional healthcare and healing. McKay saving biomedical treatment and medication?
interrogates many taken-for-granted approaches Thus far, it has not necessarily been a clear
within global health, particularly analyzing the priority in the field of global health to do so.
power dynamics still embedded in data collection
practices, the use of unpaid health volunteers,
colonial practices in research, and donor-based
agenda-setting and funding streams. McKay’s
book highlights the tensions between global
health interventions and local processes of
development as highly complex and long-term.
Global health interventions, whether imposed by
foreign or local civil society organizations must be
aware of the subtle or blatant epistemological
impositions of the Western biomedical approach
and the harm this can do by sidelining local
epistemologies and understandings of illness and
health.
One key way to decolonize global health
programming would be to encourage a pluralistic
medical approach rather than having
interventions merely privilege biomedical,
allopathic approaches to medicine. The
ethnographies of Somerville and Munguambe in
rural Mozambique explore how medical pluralism
manifests in the lifeworlds of community
members as they negotiate visits to traditional
healers versus clinics.[20] They uncover how
community members refer to discourses of Photo from Pixabay
witchcraft to conceptualize stroke and

12
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs
One proposal that follows the notion of medical
pluralism is a system of mutual referrals between
traditional healers and health workers.
Development initiatives have worked with
traditional healers to educate and encourage them
to refer patients to a doctor. Yet, these same
programs could also bridge systems of traditional
and biomedical healthcare by having healthcare
workers collaborate more actively with traditional
healers and perhaps even refer people to the
traditional healer if certain symptoms cannot be
addressed. One female community member in
Sindhupalcohk, Nepal summarized this idea
during an interview I conducted for the
aforementioned project:
“Some issues can only be treated at the hospital and
others only by traditional healers. And, you know, if the
medicine from the hospital doesn’t work then we will go
to the monks at the monastery and the traditional
healers in our town. If you ask others, everyone would
say this to you! And of course, if you look at our culture,
the local healers and monks have been around for much
longer than doctors. They are very important. Really, if
you look at the situation, it is only my generation that
has had access to doctors. Our mothers didn’t go see the
doctors back then. And so, because of that, our culture
here still respects the local healers… I don’t mean to say
that the doctors are not good; I know they are doing
good. But what I mean to say, is that we need both the
local healers and the doctors; we need both in our
community. Nowadays, people say that the doctor is
more important than the healers, but if I have a small
issue like a headache, fever, or body aches, then I would
rather first go to the local healer. And if there is a bigger
issue like a big cut or an injury then, of course, I will
immediately go to the doctor. There is no question of
that.” - Interview with Community Member in Baruwa,
Sindhuplachok, Nepal (January 2023).
Gender mainstreaming and health:
Development organizations and gender
equality
A key aspect of decolonizing the gender and
global health nexus that requires careful attention
is the topic of ‘gender mainstreaming. Written
extensively by African feminist scholars, gender
mainstreaming refers to the reinforcement of the
gender binary, which implicitly takes a traditional
13
Western understanding of gender as universal.
[23] Somerville and Munguambe write that
“gender mainstreaming in the work of global
health” is supported through funding streams and
programming dominance.[24] Gender and
development programs aim to address unequal
power relations between genders, moving away
from a sole focus on women-centered
programming. An increasing amount of
development programs focus on working with
men to sensitize them to issues of gender-based
violence and gender equality. Yet, in such a
process, supposedly universal gender norms are
further perpetuated and imposed by global health
and development interventions, particularly if
they employ an explicit gendered approach.[25]
The history of imposing Western conceptions
of gender and sexuality roots back to the colonial
era in what Diana Heath describes as a part of the
‘imperial hygiene’ project within obscenity
regulations.[26] In this way, colonialism has long
been concerned with and relied upon organizing
colonized subjects according to the colonizer’s
visions and values. Similarly, drawing on the work
of Maria Lugones, an Argentinian philosopher
who wrote about the “coloniality of gender,”
Lucas Ballestin characterizes gender as a “colonial
object.” Ballestin analyzes how gender as an
institution has been exported vis a vis European
colonialism to the rest of the world through
informal institutions such as social pressures and
norms as well as formal institutions such as
policies.[27] Decolonial development scholars
have found similar dynamics in contemporary
gendered interventions. How can programs be
designed in such a way that they minimize
Western normative ideas about how people
should behave in relation to their gender? The
literature of applied anthropological research
into gender mainstreaming raises important
discussion points and questions about the
decolonization of gender equality and global
health programs.
For example, Jeroen Lorist and Eileen Moyer,
researchers at the University of Amsterdam, and
Mercy T. Mbabazi, independent researchers based
in Kampala, Uganda, examined how the
collaboration between Dutch, South African, and
Ugandan NGOs in an anti-gender-based violence
intervention in Uganda failed to address the
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs
normative ideas about patriarchy, masculinity,
and gendered violence embedded in the program.
[28] By analyzing the language of program
documents and conducting interviews and
ethnographic practice, they further found,
counter to the Western expectations of patriarchy
as a fixed structure, that local patriarchal power
structures managed to adapt flexibly and
hindered people from reporting gender-based
violence at home.[29] Citing the work of James
Ferguson who described the development as an
“anti-politics machine,” the authors examine how
the public health and NGO perspective obscured
the more complex realities and intricacies of the
context.[30] In other words, the awareness-raising
and sensitisation intervention to challenge
patriarchy in the project site did not take into
account the complexities of how patriarchy
outside of Europe may reassert itself.
Related to this topic of gender mainstreaming,
is the work of Dutch anthropologist Dr. Willemijn
Krebbekx, who analyzes how development
programming about sex education with certain
Western ideas about gender and sexuality are
exported to countries in the Global South. In an
interview with Dr. Krebbekx, we discussed her
upcoming research project, which focuses
specifically on how sex education programs
developed in Dutch knowledge institutions are
translated to local contexts in classrooms in
Uganda and Bangladesh. Working with an
organizational partner, she will trace the process
and interrogate the power dynamics behind the
crafting of the curriculum of such sex education
programs as well as the effects of the
implementation on the ground. What is of
particular interest is how a decolonial angle and
perspective to approach such global health
interventions has opened new research questions
and possibilities, which organizations themselves
are perhaps increasingly supporting.
Closing reflections
Having examined the value of a decolonial
feminist lens in global health as well as gender-
based programming through women’s
empowerment and gender-based programs, what
conclusions can we reach? It is clear that
decolonizing development aid needs to be a key
priority moving forward and that decolonizing
14
gender and global health programs are a major
aspect of this. Applied anthropological research
can support this effort by gathering rich
information and insight into how people’s lived
realities and contexts may not align with the
development discourses and Western
epistemologies of development interventions.
Moving forward, decolonizing development will
also require that the structure of the development
industry changes, i.e. that power dynamics are
challenged, grassroots initiatives are supported,
and the system of donor funding, deliverable
results, and the short timespans of development
projects are re-evaluated. We must creatively
imagine what alternatives exist to our current
global development system. Decolonizing
development is a process of critical inquiry about
epistemology, power, and funding. Writing about
grassroots, indigenous-led health systems, Dr.
MD. Ijeoma Nnodim Opara believes that “Global
health will not survive its true decolonization. It is
not supposed to. Instead, a better, transformed
ecocentric world health system should emerge
from the ashes of the deconstruction and
dismantling of the global health industrial
machine.”[31] By supporting more small-scale and
locally-led initiatives in the fields of gender and
global health, we can resist the universalization of
Western norms and epistemologies and deliver
epistemic justice on the journey toward the true
decolonization of development. The key to this
approach is to always center the voices of people
whom development interventions aim to
empower.
Endnotes
[1]As someone interested in development studies, I ask
myself what my motivations are. I have long wanted to
work in the field of global health or gender advocacy. My
motivation lies in solidarity with and for minority women
who have been and continue to be disadvantaged by
gendered, economic, cultural, and political systems. Raised
in the US by a Nepalese mother and German father,
though I have benefitted from a cross-cultural upbringing,
I am undoubtedly a product of Western schooling and
education, which have shaped me with Western
perspectives and approaches to the world. I aim to diversify
my understanding of knowledge more generally, and more
specifically within the field of development. I have serious
doubts about the development field and feel dubious at
times about the programs being promoted. I still believe
that international advocacy can play an important role in
supporting processes of change, but fundamental shifts in
how funding processes function and programming content
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs
are designed are needed. This paper is an attempt to work
through some of these ideas, by applying a decolonial lens.
[2] Somerville and Munguambe, “The Rise of NCDs in
Mozambique: Decolonizing Global Health and Gender.”
[3] Horn, “Decolonizing Emotional Well-being and Mental
Health in Development: African Feminist Innovations.”
[4] van Wessel, Kontinen, and Justice Nyigmah Bawole,
Reimagining Civil Society Collaborations in the Global South.
[5] Somerville and Munguambe, “NCDs in Mozambique:
Decolonizing Global Health and Gender,” 202.
[6] Bi and London School of Economics, “The Cycle of
Decolonisation: A tool for applying anthropology to policy
and practice and achieving social justice.”
[7] Ibid., 5.
[8] Vergès, A Decolonial Feminism.
[9] Ibid., 4.
[10] Oyěwùmí, “Conceptualizing Gender: The Eurocentric
Foundations of Feminist Concepts and the Challenge of
African Epistemologies.”
[11] Remme et al., “Investing in the Health of Girls and
Women: A Best Buy for Sustainable Development.”
[12] Fair Trade USA, “Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment in the Fair Trade Model.”
[13] Helma, “Care Migration: The Connectivity between
Care Chains, Care Circulation and Transnational Social
Inequality.”
[14] Chambers, “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA):
Challenges, Potentials, and Paradigm.”
[15] Salm et al., “Defining Global Health: Findings from a
Systematic Review and Thematic Analysis of the
Literature.”
[16] Kwete,et al., “Decolonizing Global Health: What
Should Be the Target of This Movement and Where Does
It Lead Us?”.
[17] Somerville and Munguambe, “NCDs in Mozambique:
Decolonizing Global Health and Gender,” 191.
[18] Kwete, et al., “Decolonizing Global Health: What
Should Be the Target of This Movement and Where Does
It Lead Us?”.
[19] Khalikova, “Medical Pluralism.”
[20] Somerville and Munguambe, “NCDs in Mozambique:
Decolonizing Global Health and Gender,” 191.
[21] Ibid., 198.
[22] Somerville and Munguambe, “NCDs in Mozambique:
Decolonizing Global Health and Gender,” 198.
[23] Oyewumi, “Conceptualizing Gender: Feminist
Concepts and African Epistemologies.”
[24] Somerville and Munguambe, “NCDs in Mozambique:
Decolonizing Global Health and Gender,” 200.
[25] Shio and Moyer, “Navigating Norms of Masculinity:
Tactical Gender Performances among Gay Men in Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania.”
[26] Heath, “Sanitizing Modernity: Imperial Hygiene,
Obscenity, and Moral Regulation in Colonial India.”
[27] Ballestín, Gender as Colonial Object, Public Seminar;
Lugones, “Toward a Decolonial Feminism.”
[28] Lorist, Mbabazi, and Moyer, “The Fluidity of
Patriarchy: Kinship, Tradition and the Prevention of
Gendered Violence in Lugbaraland, Uganda.”
15
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,”
Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho.
[31] Nnodim Opara, “It’s Time to Decolonize the
Decolonization Movement - Speaking of Medicine and
Health.”
References
Ballestín, Lucas. “Gender as Colonial Object - Public
Seminar.” Public Seminar, February 12,
2021. https://publicseminar.org/2018/07/gen
der-as-colonial-object/.
Bi, Suriyah and London School of Economics. “The Cycle
of Decolonisation: A tool for
applying anthropology to policy and practice and
achieving social justice.” Impact of Social
Sciences, November 17, 2022.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/
2021/04/12/the-cycle-of-decolonisation-a-tool-
for-applying-anthropology-to-policy-and-practice-
and-achieving-social-justice/.
Chambers, Robert. “Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA):
Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm.”
World Development 22, no. 10 (October 1, 1994):
1437–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-
750x(94)90030-2.
Fair Trade USA. “Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment in the Fair Trade Model,” Fair
Trade Certified, December 5, 2022,
https://www.fairtradecertified.org/blog/gende
r-equality-and-womens-empowerment-in-fair-
trade-model/.
Ferguson, James. The Anti-Politics Machine:
“Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic
Power in Lesotho (U of Minnesota Press, 1994).
Françoise Vergès. A Decolonial Feminism (Pluto Press
UK), 2021).
Heath, Diana. “Sanitizing Modernity: Imperial Hygiene,
Obscenity, and Moral Regulation in Colonial
India.” In Enchantments of Modernity, edited by
Saurabh Dube, Routledge India, 2011. DOI:
10.4324/9781003071020
Horn, Jessica. “Decolonizing Emotional Well-being and
Mental Health in Development: African Feminist
Innovations.” Gender and Development. 28:1. (2020)
85-98, DOI: 10.1080/13552074.2020.1717177
Khalikova, Venera. “Medical Pluralism,” Open
Encyclopedia of Anthropology, March 6, 2022,
https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/m
edical-pluralism.
Kwete, Xiaoxiao, Kun Tang, Lucy Chen, Ran Ren, Qi
Chen, Zhenru Wu, Yi Cai, and Hao Li.
“Decolonizing Global Health: What Should Be
the Target of This Movement and Where Does It
Lead Us?” Global Health Research and Policy 7, no. 1
(January 24, 2022).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41256-022-00237-3.
 Gender-Based Global Health Programs

Lorist, Jeroen, Mercy T. Mbabazi, and Eileen Moyer. “The

Fluidity of Patriarchy: Kinship, Tradition and the
Prevention of Gendered Violence in
Lugbaraland, Uganda,” African Studies 81, no. 2
(April 3, 2022): 229–46,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2022.210379
Lugones, María. “Toward a Decolonial Feminism.”
Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 25, no. 4
(October 1, 2010): 742–59.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01137.x.
Lutz, Helma. “Care Migration: The Connectivity between
Care Chains, Care Circulation and Transnational
Social Inequality.” Current Sociology 66, no. 4
(April 23, 2018): 577–89.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392118765213.
Opara, Ijeoma Nnodim. “It’s Time to Decolonize the
Decolonization Movement - Speaking of Medicine
and Health,” Speaking of Medicine and Health,
July 27, 2021,
https://speakingofmedicine.plos.org/2021/07/
29/its-time-to-decolonize-the-decolonization-
movement/.
Oyewumi, Oyeronke. “Conceptualizing Gender: The
Eurocentric Foundations of Feminist
Concepts and the Challenge of African
Epistemologies.” Jenda: A Journal of Culture and
African Women Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1, 2002).
http://awdflibrary.org/handle/123456789/582.
Remme, Michelle, Anna Vassall, Gabriela Fernando, and
David E. Bloom. “Investing in the
Health of Girls and Women: A Best Buy for
Sustainable Development.” British Medical Journal,
June 2, 2020, m1175.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1175.
Salm, Melissa, Mahima Ali, Mairead Minihane, and Patricia
A. Conrad. “Defining Global
Health: Findings from a Systematic Review and
Thematic Analysis of the Literature.” BMJ Global
Health 6, no. 6 (June 1, 2021): e005292.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2021-005292.
Shio, Jasmine and Eileen Moyer. “Navigating Norms of
Masculinity: Tactical Gender
Performances among Gay Men in Dar Es Salaam,
Tanzania,” Gender, Place & Culture 28, no. 6 (June
3, 2021): 853–69,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2020.175951
3.1.
Somerville, Claire and Khatia Munguambe. “The Rise of
NCDs in Mozambique: Decolonizing
Global Health and Gender,” Gender and
Development, 29:1(2021)189-206, DOI:
10.1080/13552074.2021.1885220
van Wessel, Margit, Tiina Kontinen, Justice Nyigmah
Bawole. Reimagining Civil Society
Collaborations in the Global South (London and New
York: Routledge, 2023).

16

Decolonising UK Compulsory History
Education
Written by Rhianna Cracknell
“The more insidious act, though less sensational, proved to have the greatest impact: a deliberate exclusion and
obfuscation within the country’s national curriculum. Through this, more than records were destroyed. The
erasure itself was erased.” — Assembly, by Natasha Brown.
C
ompulsory history education in the UK
remains inadequate in addressing the
legacy of British colonialism and teaching
students to engage with it critically and
with nuance. In part due to the lack of attention
and time attributed to it by the national
curriculum, Britain’s history of imperialism and
the way it has shaped global systems continues to
go under-studied and be under-examined by
British students. This is underpinned by the
persistent erasure of Black British history. This
paper argues that this education could be
improved by a more extended engagement with
slavery and imperialism, in tandem with the
17
02
Photo of Hammerton College from Pixabay
inclusion of more contemporary events in both
British history and worldwide. Instead of aiming
to create patriotic narratives, history education
best serves students and society by aiming to
impart critical thinking for a nuanced
engagement with national identity.
This essay begins with a consideration of the
relevance and wider implications of history
education and decolonisation within it. It goes on
to evaluate the extent to which slavery, migration,
wider Black British history, and the decolonisation
period are covered within the British curriculum.
Throughout, it draws upon the accounts of
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
educators, historians and former students, as well
as referring to government officials and reports.
Decolonisation is often characterized as a
contentious buzzword. Indeed, the controversy
and discordance it evokes can be seen across the
political landscape worldwide, from political
backlash to removals of statues of imperial figures
in South Africa and the UK to Republican
mobilization against critical race theory in the US.
[1] The stakes are high across the debate, as both
advocates for decolonisation within education and
its skeptics agree that any moves in its direction
are not merely about how historical details are
discussed. The underlying tension within
decolonisation debates concerns what it is to
inhabit the current political moment in light of
the role of colonialism in creating it. It is also
often posited as a crossroads for the future: to
Photo from Khan Academy
18
renounce structures and ways of thinking which
originated under and remain underpinned by
colonial beliefs, or to preserve a (tarnished)
legacy and narrative. Philosopher Nigel Biggar
gained prominence in public debate surrounding
decolonisation through his argument that the
British empire should be a source of “pride as well
as shame” and characterized the decolonisation as
“about the present, not the past”.[2] The
sentiment that decolonisation is about shaping
the future is echoed by those in favor of
expanding the decolonisation of education. For
example, Pryah Mahabeer describes
decolonisation in education as a necessary
component of being “critically conscious in
understanding the present, in order to be able to
imagine future possibilities”.[3] The weight
attributed to this then underpins the charge this
debate carries across political spectrums.
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
History education as a whole is also used
internationally to create national identity and
narratives for populations to relate to and
coalesce around.[4] History then becomes central
to an idea of national self, to which every
individual has a relationship to some extent –
hence the evocative nature of the topic. Overall,
the assumption that decolonisation represents a
crossroads for the future of national identity and
life adds weight to the concept, shifting the
conversation away from simply historical
interpretations, to as yet undetermined future
social realities.[5]
Questions as to the details and methods of
history education are thus caught up in wider,
emotive and complex debates – to what extent
can modern moral standards be applied to
individuals from centuries past?[6] To what
extent should ‘positive’ effects of empire be
condemned, or celebrated with caveats? [7] How
much emphasis should be attributed to the
empire within Britain’s ‘national story’? Such
questions require the attention and rigor of
focused political debate – and perspectives
beyond that of one white British student. While
inherently linked to the political nature of history
education and the current context, this essay does
not address them head-on. Instead, it posits that
these considerations can be better held between
informed people with practiced critical thinking
abilities, and whose reactions to decolonising
conversations go beyond defensiveness. These
skills can be intentionally cultivated through a
history education that values nuance and critical
evaluation.
History education is widely associated – by
both teachers and policymakers – with
developing critical thinking skills in students. It
offers information for students to engage with
about the past, inviting them to draw and
evaluate connections within the present.[8] As a
result of this, the contents of history curricula
have also been considered, beyond the UK, as a
political tool in forming a coherent national
narrative to be imparted to a country’s young.[9]
This echoes the explicit intentions given by the
then education secretary, Michael Gove, in 2011:
to tell a chronological, coherent ‘island story’ of
Britain’s "distinguished role … in the history of
the world"
19
as "a beacon of liberty for others to emulate."[10]
This goal is clearly reflected by the sparse
attention given to the many aspects of British
history where these values were not in display,
namely the domination inflicted across the world
through British imperialism.
England is the only country in Europe for
which history is a compulsory subject only until
the age of 13.[11] It remains compulsory until 14
for Wales and Northern Ireland and until 15 in
Scotland, but only 45% of students continued with
it to GCSE examinations (exams taken at 16) in
2017.[12] While any curriculum necessitates
simplification and omission to some extent, this
limited time frame makes this pressure more
acute for England in the current education system
it employs. A national curriculum dictates the
content of classes until this point and a list of
modules for GCSEs and A Levels is offered by the
Department of Education for schools to select
between.[13] This curriculum mandates that in-
depth study of the British empire is optional. In
addition, it has received criticism for the lack of
GCSE modules that discuss it in further detail.
The History of Migration module covers it the most
but has been characterized as “whitewashing”
history, as migration of non-European groups is
framed as separate from the “nation-building”
immigration of earlier European groups such as
the Vikings.[14] Even topics portrayed as
alternate options for a more diverse education are
shaped by the assumption of a national narrative
to which people of color are outsiders.
Furthermore, this module is taken by nearly
200,000 students less than the module on Nazi
Germany.[15]
The content – and, in places, lack thereof –
of the British history curriculum is the topic of
considerable debate. Above all, there is a mixed
consensus on the decision to emphasize slavery in
the mandatory curriculum as of 2007: it is now
required to discuss the empire at some point
before the mandatory period of history education
ends, although there are no stipulations on the
length of time this must be for. To some
interpreters, this indicated a step forward in
exploring the legacy of the British empire more in
classrooms.[16] On the other hand, it has been
dismissed as tokenistic, insufficient, and framed
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
intentionally to be more palatable with a coherent
national narrative of progress and liberty.[17] It is
inarguable that a curriculum that mandates
coverage of the transatlantic slave trade, in which
Britain played a leading role over centuries, comes
closer to unpacking Britain’s colonial legacy than
one which does not. Transatlantic slavery was a
humanitarian violation that fundamentally
restructured trade, industrialisation, and racial
inequity across continents over hundreds of years.
At best, not including it would be remiss in
understanding both the global and national
history of the time. At worst, excluding slavery
from the curriculum would ignore the profound
violence and exploitation that was actively
promoted and instigated by the UK. Its inclusion
in the curriculum is undoubtedly a positive
development, yet its delivery and accompanying
facets of the curriculum leave much to be desired.
For example, Hannah Cusworth quotes Eric
Williams to describe the delivery of classes on
slavery as appearing “as if Britain had been
involved in transatlantic slavery ‘solely for the
satisfaction of abolishing it’”, in line with the focus
on uplifting the aspects of British history which
reveal a drive towards liberty.[18] The slave trade
is then framed around abolition as the
culmination of a social movement for progress,
which – while worth discussing and to some
extent celebrating as a victory for social progress
and equity – highlights the heroism and virtue of
the white British middle class as the final point.
This neglects the systemic exploitation enacted by
the British state in this period, in addition to the
ripple effects slavery maintained over the
socioeconomic situation of Britain and the world
for centuries. Furthermore, it emphasizes Black
history as one of subjugation and lack of self-
determination, creating alienation and
discordance within classrooms. For example,
writer Angie Emordi described the impact of this
emphasis on slavery in classes on her educational
experience: “the only time I saw historic Black
faces was when they were suffering –
downtrodden, beaten and bruised”.[19] Coupled
with an absence of Black British history from the
compulsory curriculum, similar sentiments are
echoed throughout the accounts of teachers and
students: “it seemed to [a student] as though
Black people in the past could only be one of two
things: either slaves or saviors and not
British.”[20] Slavery is an essential facet of British
history to cover; the focus on white British
abolitionists and the lack of Black British history
beyond this point prevents the expression of an
alternate narrative of Black people’s agency.
Indeed, following the abolition of the slave
trade, Black British history all but disappears from
the national curriculum. This creates a subliminal
separation between the concept of Britishness and
Black identity, to the detriment of the quality of
education and the experiences of Black pupils
within schools. It fails to provide
Photo from Getty Images
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
Photo by Daniel Julio • unsplash.com
a baseline for discussions of racial categorisation,
oppression and liberation within the British-
specific context, as much of the information and
language used for these then stems solely from a
distinct and only partially comparable American
context. Instead, literature on decolonising
British history education consistently points to an
emphasis placed on Black history in other places,
separate from the ‘island story’ told of the UK
throughout the curriculum. While the American
civil rights movement is undoubtedly of
international significance, learning about it
without links to comparable movements and
events within the UK context (such as the Bristol
Bus Boycotts in parallel to those in Montgomery
and across the US) has been attributed with a
disconnect between British history and racial
discrimination.[21] In practice, this can be seen as
a result of limited teaching time, created by the
short length of compulsory history education
which leads to prioritizing significant world
events. However, it still constitutes a pattern
where racial discrimination and oppression can be
separated from British history and actions. For
either interpretation, this disconnect could be
lessened by a more diverse portfolio of
perspectives and stories within the curriculum,
explicitly bringing Black British history to the
foreground.
This is a prominent suggestion for radically
improving the contents of the UK compulsory
history curriculum. Expanding the stories and
perspectives included, especially those of Black
21
people within the UK after the abolition of the
slave trade and other distinct ethnic minority
groups has been suggested by the 2021
Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, in
addition to various decolonisation scholars and
history teachers.[22] There are numerous
advantages to this. For one, it adds a complexity
and new approach to studies of the empire, which
may reduce the possibility of reproducing colonial
power dynamics by only communicating the
actions of colonizers, just with a few more
criticisms. It fills a gap within the curriculum by
providing more detailed and up-to-date
information about the creation of the modern
British state and continues to explore the legacy
of the slave trade in its foundation. Furthermore,
the Commission encourages that “all children can
learn about the UK and the evolution of our
society”.[23] Not only is it important to show
Black British students other, richer narratives for
themselves beyond enslaved Africans and
embattled Americans, but such stories can also be
impactful and necessary for other students’
education as well. Britain is a deeply multicultural
country. In order to truly ‘tell these island’s
stories’, it is crucial to explore how this came to
be, while a journey deeply entrenched in Britain's
colonial history, within British history education.
In addition to the lack of stories revolving
around the Black British community, former
colonies gaining independence from European
empires is also largely omitted. South Asian
history specialist
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
Elizabeth Leake referred to the period of
decolonisation as “conspicuously absent” from
both history curricula and discussions of
decolonising education within the UK.[24] This is
resonant with the compulsory history curriculum
in particular, where previously British colonies
gaining their independence is largely glossed over
– with the exception of the ‘non-statutory’ and
uncommonly selected option to cover Indian
independence – in favor of the Second World
War and other 20th century events. Another
stated goal of the curriculum established in 2016
is to instill an understanding of important global
events and modern international, historical and
political contexts. While a worthwhile goal, this is
unaligned with the current flawed program.
Indeed, any global history of the 20th century
dismisses a huge amount of the world’s countries
and populations by skimming over the period in
which they gained independence from European
colonial powers, most commonly that of the
British Empire. This is yet another example of the
empire’s diminished presence in history
education. Additionally, it lowers the quality of
educational provision: not addressing this time
period leaves huge gaps in the understanding of
recent national and global history. It also allows
for the empire to fade into the background and
appear absent from the context of modern
history, rather than giving specific and accurate
attention to its conclusion. It undermines the
recentness of the empire by positioning the
empire as separate from more contemporary eras
of history. Furthermore, the UK education system
is decried beyond history for its inward-looking
focus and lack of robust consistent information on
global affairs, politics and other countries and
cultures.[25] Including more global histories of
the 20th century, intrinsically linked as it is to the
decolonisation period, would also be a necessary
step in improving that deficit of knowledge. The
UK’s historical and social landscape has also been
shaped profoundly by different ethnic groups,
such as the Windrush generation and South Asian
migrants, whose effects on British history will be
recognisable to all students within classes,
especially those of those groups. Teaching these
aspects of global and national modern history
expands the space for students from these
22
backgrounds within the classroom, in addition to
demonstrating the links between the rest of the
world and the UK – a relationship which British
education as a whole neglects.
In conclusion, UK history education is
inadequate in various ways, failing to prepare
students to engage critically with the legacy of the
British empire, both in their classrooms and in
wider ongoing political discourse. This is a
problem rooted in the content of the curriculum,
where a consistent theme is the prioritization of a
simple, uplifting ‘island story’ over approaching
historical complexity. While the inclusion of the
transatlantic slave trade within the mandatory
topics of the national curriculum was a positive
step forward to addressing the British empire and
its consequences, it remains one of the only topics
to do so and reasserts the association of Black
history as separate from the UK. This is also
hindered by the short length of time in which
history is a compulsory subject within the UK,
especially in England. This time pressure and
undervaluing of history education within the
education system amplifies the necessity of any
curriculum to omit some events and simplify to
some extent for their younger audience. That
said, there are perspectives and events which
when absent from the curriculum (such as Black
British history following the abolition of slavery
and countries gaining independence from Britain
in the 20th century) fail their students in
understanding the richness of British history –
and in preparing them to ‘imagine future
possibilities’.[26]
Endnotes
[1] Wall, “Bristol Dumped Slave Trader in the Docks”;
Meckler and Natanson, “As Schools Expand Race Equity
Work.”
[2] Biggar, “Empire Is Never Black and White.”
[3] Mahabeer, “Curriculum Decision-Makers on
Decolonising,”
[4] Mycock, “The Politics of History Education in a Post-
colonial World”, 398.
[5] Mahabeer, “Curriculum Decision-Makers on
Decolonising,”
[6] Yoon, “Moral Judgement in History Education,” 532.
[7] Biggar, “Empire Is Never Black and White.”
[8] Department of Education, “National Curriculum”.
Dennis, “Educational Grief,” 33.
[9] Mycock, “The Politics of History Education in a Post-
colonial World,” 392; Moncrieffe, Decolonising the History
Curriculum, 13.
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education
[10] Higgins, “Michael Gove Risks Propaganda Classes.”
[11] Garner, “A Nation Alone.”
[12] Carroll and Gill, “Uptake of GCSE Subjects 2017.”
[13] Department of Education, “National Curriculum in
England.”
[14] Moncrieffe, “Decolonising Narratives of Mass
Migration,” 18.
[15] Department of Education, “National Curriculum in
England”; Dennis, “Educational Grief,” 37.
[16] Cusworth, “Diversifying or Decolonising,” 43.
[17] Higgins, “Michael Gove Risks Propaganda Classes.”
[18] Cusworth, “Diversifying or Decolonising,” 44.
[21] Behm et al., “Decolonising History, Enquiry and
Practice”, 172.
[22] Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, The
Report; Moncrieffe, “Euro-centrism and Primary
Schooling,” 13; Stevens, 40 Ways to Diversify History
Curriculum, ; Begum & Saini “Decolonising the
Curriculum”, 196; Glowach et al., “Making Space for
Collaborative Action,” 100.
[23] Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, The
Report.
[24] Behm et al., “Decolonising History, Enquiry and
Practice”, 170.
[25] Nutbeam, “English Education is Just Too Narrow” ;
Swain, “Lack of Languages Stifles Brits.”
[26] Mahabeer, “Curriculum Decision-Makers on
Decolonising,” 3.
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lessons: Inequality, Diversity and the
National Curriculum.” Race, Ethnicity and
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Anil, Pratinav. “Colonialism by Nigel Biggar review — why
both sides of the empire debate are
wrong.” The Times. January 26,
2023.https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/colon
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Begum, Neema., & Saini, Rima. “Decolonising the
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Biggar, Nigel. “Empire is never black and white but
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Glowach, Terra, et al. “Making spaces for collaborative
action and learning: Reflections on
teacher‐led decolonising initiatives from a
professional learning network in England.” The
Curriculum Journal 34 (2022): 100– 117.
Higgins, Charlotte. “Historians say Michael Gove risks
turning history lessons into propaganda
classes.” The Guardian. August 17, 2001.
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/a
ug/17/academics-reject-gove-history-lessons
Mahabeer, Pryah. 2018. “Curriculum Decision-Makers on
Decolonising the Teacher Education
Curriculum.” South African Journal of Education 38
(4).
Matasci, Damiano. “Decolonising Education: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary
Challenges.” African Studies Review 65, no.3
(2022): 761–70.
 Decolonising UK Compulsory History Education

Meckler, Laura, and Hannah Natanson.. “As Schools

Expand Racial Equity Work, Conservatives
See a New Threat in Critical Race Theory.” The
Washington Post. May 3, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2
021/05/03/critical-race-theory-backlash/.
Moncrieffe, Marlon Lee. “Decolonising the History
Curriculum: Euro-centrism and primary
schooling”. Springer Nature, 2020.
Moncrieffe, Marlon Lee. “Decolonising Narratives of Mass
Migration in the National
Curriculum for Key Stage 2 History.” Decolonising
the Curriculum – Transnational Perspectives 1 no. 142
(2020): 18-19.
Mycock, Andy. “After Empire: The Politics of History
Education in a Post-colonial World.” In
Palgrave handbook of research in historical culture and
education, 391-410. London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2017.

Photo by Dorothea Oldani • unsplash.com

24

Postcolonial Museums? Evaluating the
Interplay between National Identity, Politics,
and Museum Practices in France
Written by Sasha Mérigot
T
wentieth-century France saw the
proliferation of museums and
monuments, together with a state-
sponsored glorification of the past which placed
an emphasis upon the duty of remembrance.[1]
While the past has always been essential to
nation-building, its representations became
extremely diffuse throughout the French
territory, both spatially and culturally, after the
French Revolution.[2] The foundational myth of
the Republic is one which claims to have created
the idea of patrimoine.[3] The propagation of
museums, statues, and heritage sites in general,
attests to the growing importance placed on
displaying, preserving, and communicating
national history. The construction of the notion of
patrimoine through various political initiatives
serves the function of fabricating a master
25
03
Photo by Jean-Pierre Dalbéra • flickr.com
narrative about French national identity.[4] It
would be even more accurate to speak of a
‘romancing’ of the past - after all, do we not speak
of the roman national as the nation narrating its
own mythicized history?[5] It was Pierre Nora who
argued that museums are the guardians and
tellers of French history and identity as “lieux de
mémoire” which are sites wherein the “memory
crystallizes and secretes itself.” These sites are the
strongholds of history and memory, they hold
“material, symbolic, and functional” roles and are
born out of a “will to remember.” Maurice
Halbwachs further stated that the act of collective
rememberance described in Nora’s account
depends on a memory that is socially constructed
and reconstructed to serve a social group’s
present reality.[6] We should not be surprised
then to see that these sites also serve
 Postcolonial Museums?
as a way through which the nation and national
identity are demarcated, and through which the
Self and the Other are defined and contrasted. In
today’s society, museums have become sites where
identities are contested and re-negotiated. The
tensions between the French reality and its
colonial past have become central to how we think
about cultural spaces and heritage. As such, this
essay aims to shed light on the importance of
museums for the production of past narratives
that silence or reinforce ideas of ‘French-ness,’
what some of the consequences might be for
French society, and how decolonization might or
might not be taking place in French museums and
restitution practices. It will answer the question:
What do recent museum practices and art
restitutions tell us about French national identity
and decolonization in the cultural space?
First, this essay will give a brief overview of
colonial culture and postcolonial studies in France
and their relation to museums. Then, it will
discuss the links between national identity and
museums in recent French history, more
specifically what to make of leading theories in
memory and nationalism studies from a
decolonial lens. Next, three museums will be
analyzed in the context of postcolonial France.
Curatorial practices will be put under scrutiny,
along with the challenges of decolonization for
museums. Finally, this essay will expand on
restitution as a decolonial practice.
While French society is riddled with colonial
monuments, both tangible and intangible, what is
remarkable is its inability to reflect on colonial
legacies. In recent years, scholars have sought to
understand the “memory war” and “identity
crisis” that the French ‘nation,’ in all its
heterogeneity, faces.[7] It must be highlighted
that postcolonial studies in France faced
considerable resistance and only became a more
salient field of academia in the early 2000s.[8]
Alice Bennington explores the reasons for which
postcolonial studies have been labeled as
“politically dangerous,” examining the
intellectual, institutional, political, and socio-
cultural context in which they emerged.[9] She
concludes that the premises of postcolonial
studies challenge “the model of the French state”
and the idea of “national identity.”[10]
26
Scholars who examine the tension between
colonial memory and French society emphasize
the importance of Republicanism in the denial
that has accompanied how we remember our
history. To explore the continuity between the
French colonial empire and the pervasiveness of
the colonial mindset today, one must delve into
the specificities of colonial rule and its lasting
effects. French colonial rule is a vast subject, that
this essay cannot discuss at length. However,
there is an important body of literature on the
subject, which Pascal Blanchard, Sandrine
Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel, and Dominic Thomas
examine in-depth in “Colonial Culture in France
Since the Revolution.”[11] Along with other
scholars, they analyze how the “colonial culture”
was formed during the Third Republic, through
which institutions and discourses, and what it
means for French national identity. A key aspect
of colonial culture that Blanchard and Bancel
flesh out is the creation of museums, which
Robert Aldrich argues were used to “stimulate
scientific knowledge, economic interest, and
territorial expansion.”[12] Collecting became a
way to display the ‘primitive’ and contrasted the
Other against the backdrop of a glorified past of
successful conquest. In the postcolonial context,
debates have arisen around curatorship and
exhibition practices. Questions around the
framing of the “vestiges of colonialism,” the
nature of certain artifacts, reconciling demands of
various stakeholders, the acquisition of colonial-
era artifacts, and engagement with the audience
are now central to whether museums can and
should be decolonized.
Museums have been instruments and
mediators of the (re)construction of memory and
national identity. Broadly defined, national
identity is a sense of belonging to a ‘nation.’
French national identity is usually described
according to specific values of “secularism,
patriotism, and republicanism.”[13] Additionzlly,
authors note that “exceptionalism” and
“universalism” as traditional republican ideals
often enter in conflict with “France’s problematic
relationship with its colonial past.”[14] Jack
Hayward traces the notions of exceptionalism and
universalism as emerging in early medieval times
through France’s relationship with the Roman
Catholic Church.[15]
 Postcolonial Museums?
Since then, “the deeply rooted conviction in
French culture that France's actions are relevant
to all humanity” has been intertwined with the
idea of the nation.[16] Throughout the 19th and
20th centuries, French governments placed great
emphasis on glorifying the past.[17] In this
regard, Hayward argues that “what is specific
about French museums is ‘their close link with the
central government and their pedagogical
aims’.”[18] Additionally, Ernest Renan states that
‘forgetting’ and ‘historical errors’ were essential
to the making of the nation, further supporting
the idea of the creation of myths and master
narratives displayed, among other sites, in
museums.[19] Other scholars argue that museums
take on a political function and do ‘identity work’
which contributes to the inclusion and exclusion
of who is French, and who is not.[20] These
authors contribute to a broader understanding of
museums as sites where memory and history are
displayed and selectively reinterpreted to fit a
dominant narrative. Benedict Anderson enriches
this idea with his theory of “imagined
communities,” where he describes a form of
“political museumizing” through which the power
of the state is projected.[21] As such, there is a
form of consensus in nationalism studies that
museums are important sites for the production
of national identity, especially in France.
However, some of these widely disseminated
theories around national identity reveal in
themselves the failure of historians and
intellectuals to incorporate colonial memory into
national memory. Since its conception, Nora’s
concept of lieux de mémoire has been a pioneer for
museum studies, though it is not without its
criticism.[22] Through Nora’s work, it becomes
apparent that references to colonialism, the
empire, and postcolonialism are widely absent.
Several scholars have made attempts to explore
alternatives to Nora’s concept, such as the “nœuds
de mémoire,” “lieux d’oubli,” “lieux de
traumatisme,” or even “lieux de mémoire de
l’immigration.”[23] Nora himself referred to the
idea of “Africa’s perceived ahistoricity,” and has
been criticized for his “colonial aphasia.”[24]
While useful for the analysis of national memory
and identity, Nora’s position raises concerns
about epistemic decolonization. The use of the
aforementioned theories must also be put under
27
scrutiny before they can be used, to contextualize
knowledge production, and reveal the lacunas
and silences to which Euro-centric knowledge
contributes.
A recent museum that has been the topic of
scholarly discussion over the years is the Musée du
Quai Branly (MQB), which exhibits the
contradictions of French national identity in a
postcolonial context. The specificity of the MQB
is that it was a presidential project, with the
“French state as its client.”[25] Looking at
President Jacques Chirac’s vision, which he
expressed in public appearances and speeches,
the MQB appears to be a project which is about
justice, peace, and respect. Dominic Thomas
outlines four key themes within his inauguration
speech: reparations, globalization, cultural
diversity, and aesthetic experience.[26] However,
he correctly remarks that Chirac carefully chooses
his words to eclipse the role of France in the
history of violence which he mentions. Further, in
his speech, he fails to articulate and contextualize
the colonial project, which Thomas states results
in a “postcolonial mission civilisatrice,” or the lack
of engagement with the question of the
provenance of the artifacts in the museum.[27]
The aesthetic vision imbued in the MQB is one
that “obscures a political project” towards
postcoloniality.[28] The content of the collections
and the way they are displayed suggests that, as
Herman Lebovics states:
We are invited to believe that
the societies from which they
came were more artistic, in a
primitive way, than ours; that,
when not carving masks or
weaving textiles, all they did
was dress up, sing, and dance.
 Postcolonial Museums?
Sometimes they hunted and
killed enemies with
handsomely-made weapons.
We learn that they worshiped
strange gods. By that which is
non-vu we are led to believe
that they had no modern
technology nor did they seem to
think about either the natural
or the supernatural world
rationally, or indeed
historically.[29]
Despite Chirac’s commitment to celebrate
and show respect to other cultures, the statement
above translates to the lack of reflection upon
collection and representation. The fallacy lies in
what the museum attempts to display, which is no
less than “a snapshot of the past cultures of dead
people.”[30] Looking into the overall
architectural project, led by Jean Nouvel, the
museum building and its garden have been
described as jungle-like, with its dense foliage,
twisted paths, and boxes of red, yellow, orange,
and brown which stick out of the glass and metal
structure or the museum. Inside, a dark corridor
takes the visitor to the permanent collections,
which run along the “river”: a path lined with
brown, clay-like walls throughout which screens
with barely any descriptions play videos - a feature
which is also present in each collection (grouped
by broad geographical region: Oceania, Africa,
the Americas, and Asia).[31] A feeling that stays
with the visitor throughout the collections is one
where the art displayed seems enigmatic, which
the widespread focus on rituals and divinations in
the textual descriptions contribute to. After
having walked through the museum
28
and paying attention to the choices made in
displaying the collections, Lebovics’ analysis comes
to mind:
The MQB represents the
colonial Other primarily
within the framework of
contemporary Western
aesthetic culture.[32]
The MQB may not have been the museum to
guide France towards postcoloniality, and much
work could be done to further engage with
French history and identity. However, an analysis
of the context in which the museum was
inaugurated, its contents, architecture, and visitor
experience reveal the tensions between French
ideals, values, identity, and the continuation of
the colonial as the national, and reflecting,
revising, and engaging with the histories of
French society. But before we can proceed with
the postcolonial project, a question arises about
whether it is possible to undertake this work
despite the colonial legacies which permeate state
institutions and society. As Sarah Amato puts it, to
what extent can “an institution of state power that
has represented European colonial superiority”
bring about a redefinition of national
consciousness?[33]
While the MQB seemed to indicate if not a
shift towards a postcolonial reality, at least a
desire and some form of spoken postcolonial
regret, the Musée National de l’Histoire de
l’Immigration (MNHI, previously Cité National de
l’Histoire de l’Immigration - CNHI) and the
planned Musée de l’Histoire Nationale show little
progress has been made to decolonize French
history and museums. In part, the reasons for this
are similar to the reasons for which the MQB did
not provide meaningful engagement with
France’s colonial history: the politics around the
MNHI and the Musée de l’Histoire Nationale
favored a reconstruction of national identity (and
national unity) over the postcolonial project. The
CNHI was inaugurated in 2007, a year after the
 Postcolonial Museums?
MQB, in the Palais de la Porte Dorée which had
previously hosted the 1931 Exposition Coloniale.
[34] Some scholars opposed the project on
account of the building’s history: placing the
CNHI in a building that celebrates colonial
history would contribute to the “elision of
colonial history” and lead to “serious confusion”
of colonial history and the history of immigration.
[35] The building itself displays frescoes and
sculptures which spell out France’s ‘positive role’
in the colonies, bringing knowledge and science
to “‘good savages’, close to nature and in need of
civilisation.”[36] Little has been done to
effectively contextualize the building and its
architecture, and deconstruct the narratives of
colonization. Additionally, the museum was not
solely destined to shine a positive light on
immigration, but also to reinforce national
cohesion.[37] However, the CNHI still
represented a space that “reconsidered and
reframed French official historical and heritage
narratives within a context of cultural diversity,
hybridity, postmodernism and postcolonialism.”
[38] In reality, the inauguration was boycotted by
then-President Nicolas Sarkozy, and upon the
announcement of new immigration policies, most
of the CNHI’s steering committee resigned.[39]
During his term, Sarkozy wanted to build a
museum of French national history (Musée de
l’Histoire Nationale) in an attempt to capture an
official narrative about history and identity in one
museum. The museum was planned to give
visitors an “old-fashioned narrative history of
male achievements.”[40] With space for critical
reflection, Sarkozy’s museum was a political
project which would only have further silenced
and obscured the variety of experiences and
voices in French history and identity. On the
contrary, the MNHI had the potential to delve
into the relationship between colonization and
immigration, and to highlight the “stigmatisation
of colonial descendants living in France
today.”[41] Despite the name change in 2013, and
the official inauguration by President François
Hollande in 2014, the MNHI is seen as a
postcolonial shortcoming due to the enduring
silence on its location, the relationship between
immigration and colonization, and colonial
legacies.[42]
While presidential museums as political
projects have fallen short of engaging with a
29
postcolonial revision of French history and
identities, museum staff and historians can still
play an important role in the decolonization of
the cultural space. Curatorship strategies and
museum practices can contribute to the
deconstruction of state-sponsored narratives. In
fact, during the conception of the MQB,
anthropologist Maurice Godelier pushed for a
museum “with a cultural pluralist relationship to
the peoples whose arts would be on display.”[43]
Though his vision was restricted, he is one of the
scholars who bring a critical reflection to the role
of museums in French society. Practitioners
imagine what decolonization could mean for
museums, which can take the form of: "[...] the
proactive identification, interrogation,
deconstruction and replacement of hierarchies of
power that replicate colonial structures. In this
way, museum decolonisation is active, radical and
potentially all-encompassing, having the scope to
include almost any aspect of museum work, from
recruitment to representation, audience
engagement to repatriation, acquisitions to
architecture, design to labelling, conservation to
storage, and so on."[44] Museum staffs are
powerful in their decisions to display and exhibit
artifacts. To the credit of the MQB, various
engaging temporary exhibitions have been
carefully crafted to include the violence of
colonization, the role of European powers in
colonization, and the slave trade.[45]
Additionally, the MQB regularly holds
international and interdisciplinary conferences,
and frequently engages with researchers whose
work goes “well beyond the limits of the
museum’s permanent exhibits.”[46] The
disconnect between the permanent collections
and temporary exhibits is striking, the former
seeming to have become a forgotten part of the
museum. Scholars tend to agree that museums
need to rethink their methodology in
approaching the past. Particularly, museums
should reconsider who their audience is and go
beyond the “usual white urban visitor.”[47]
Further, there is an imperative to engage with
contemporary diaspora artists and communities,
and broader societal actors such as groups and
organizations rooted in decolonial and anti-racist
activism. This way, the question of aesthetics and
context can be revisited in ways that help liberate
the space for debate and critical perspectives.
 Postcolonial Museums?
Practitioners imagine what
decolonization could mean for
museums, which can take the form
of: [...] the proactive identification,
interrogation, deconstruction and
replacement of hierarchies of power
that replicate colonial structures. In
this way, museum decolonisation is
active, radical and potentially all-
encompassing, having the scope to
include almost any aspect of museum
work, from recruitment to
representation, audience engagement
to repatriation, acquisitions to
architecture, design to labelling,
conservation to storage, and so on.
30
Photo by Ninara • flickr.com
As such, while government stakeholders may
infuse museums with political agendas, museum
staffs can make choices that challenge state
narratives and reveal the continuities between
colonialism and discrimination, marginalization,
oppression, and racism in contemporary France.
Alongside the question of decolonization in
museums, the topic of restitution has come to the
forefront of debates in France as a practice for the
decolonization of historical narratives. In 2018,
President Emmanuel Macron commissioned a
report by Felwine Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy(“the
Sarr-Savoy report”) on the restitution of African
cultural heritage as a starting point for
subsequent policies.[48] The commission of this
report is unlike France’s approach to restitutions
since the 1954 Hague Convention, which
consisted of treating them as exceptions or
dismissing the requests. In this regard, the
content of the report challenges the ways France
has engaged with questions of restitution by
addressing questions of consent and colonialism.
Following the report, Macron has created and
used political momentum to enact a legal
framework for the restitution of 26 artifacts to
Benin.[49]
While museums are meaningful sites for the
negotiation of identities, they also influence and
communicate on cultural policy-making. In the
case of the Sarr-Savoy report, it
 Postcolonial Museums?
was written in consultation with museum staff.
[50] Additionally, historians and curators are
often solicited to establish museum projects and
advise on restitution processes. Several authors
note the strategic ways through which artifacts
may be returned. For instance, Rowan Light
examines how restitution might be performative,
which in turn allows a country to redefine its
postcolonial identity.[51] Light argues that the
ceremonies through which artifacts are restituted
are a state performance that is geared toward
“postcolonial legitimation and identity
formation.”[52] Similarly, Jeremiah J. Garsha
regards the return of stolen colonial-era artifacts
as an opportunity for engagement and reflection
on Germany’s colonial past. He examines how
actions taken in Germany and France, including
the opening of the controversial Humboldt
Forum in Berlin, have prompted debates around
restitution and advanced restitution through
public pressure.[53] Doris Duhennois has made
political strategy central to her study of France’s
restitution policies. She is critical of Macron’s
declarations on restitution, as she questions the
political and deceitful motivations of the
President.[54] In her view, France
instrumentalizes restitution to redefine its
“postcolonial identity” while superficially
engaging with its colonial past.[55] She describes
this as a political strategy that entails
acknowledging the legitimacy of “postcolonial
criticisms” but not seeking a deeper
understanding of colonial legacies nor enacting
any structural reforms.[56] Through a short
introduction of the debates around restitution, it
seems that the practice is gaining momentum but
remains likely to be instrumentalized or co-opted
by political agendas. Nonetheless, museum staff is
powerful in engaging with restitution, they can
serve as mediators and translators of cultural
policy-making in France. Additionally, debates on
the provenance of artifacts are also useful to
disrupt colonial narratives, though they depend
on museums’ willingness to initiate thorough
research into their collections.
In conclusion, museums have been and remain
important sites for the construction of ‘national
identity’ in France. While national identity is a
mythicized rendering of the past through
collective remembrance, it is a helpful lens to
examine identity conflicts in French society.
31
In this regard, museums are sites where identities
are renegotiated, and narratives created and
reinforced, while others are silenced or obscured.
The creation of two museums related to the topic
of colonialism, the Musée du Quai Branly and the
Musée National de l’Histoire de l’Immigration,
seemed promising at first. However, they fall
short of engaging with the French postcolonial
context in a way that is critical and self-reflexive.
As political projects, the absence of
contextualization of France’s role during
colonization and the continuity of the past as
colonial legacies reveals the tensions between
state-sponsored agendas/narratives and colonial
memories. However, museum staffs are powerful
in choosing an appropriate methodology to
display, collect, interrogate, engage with its
audience, translate policies, mediate, and advise
on restitution. They can act across multiple fields
within their capabilities which can further
deconstruct the cultural space from within. A
prominent example is the political momentum
garnered by the Sarr-Savoy report, which could be
a guide for a meaningful restitution regime as a
decolonial practice.
Endnotes
[1] Hayward, “French Identity.”
[2] Swenson, The Rise of Heritage.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Thiesse, “L’Histoire de France en musée.”
[5] The term roman national is commonly used to mean
national myth or narrative.
[6] Halbwachs, “On Collective Memory.”
[7] See Blanchard, Pascal, Lemaire, Bancel, Thomas, and
Pernsteiner, “Colonial Culture in France Since the
Revolution” and Pernsteiner, Dominic, Blanchard, and
Bancel, “The Colonial Legacy in France.”
[8] Bancel and Blanchard, “From Colonial to
Postcolonial.”
[9] Bennington, “(RE)WRITING EMPIRE?”, 1163.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Pascal et al., “Colonial Culture in France Since the
Revolution.”
[12] Aldrich, “Memorials and Museums,” 49.
[13] Hayward, “French Identity,” 53.
[14] Looseley, “THE RETURN OF THE SOCIAL,” 145.
[15] Hayward, “French Identity.”
[16] Rémond, “La Fille Ainée de l'Eglise,” quoted in:
Hayward, “French Identity,” 56-57.
[17] Hayward, "French identity.”
[18] Ibid, 54.
[19] Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation ?”
 Postcolonial Museums?
[20] See Macdonald, “Museums, National, Postnational
and Transcultural Identities”; Hayward, “French Identity”;
Thiesse, “L’Histoire de France en musée.”
[21] Anderson, Imagined Communities, 125.
[22]Achille, Forsdick, and Moudileno, "Introduction," 4.
[23] Ibid, 5.
[24] Ibid, 7.
[25] Vogel, “Des ombres sur la Seine,” quoted in: Thomas,
“The Quai Branly Museum.”(author's unofficial
translation)
[26] Thomas, “The Quai Branly Museum.”
[27] Ibid, 147.
[28] Ibid, 148.
[29] Lebovics, “Will the Musée du Quai Branly Show
France the Way to Postcoloniality?” 3.
[30] Ibid, 5.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid,6.
[33] Amato, "Quai Branly Museum," 62.
[34] Labadi, “The National Museum of Immigration
History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist Representations,
Silencing, and Re-Appropriation,” 313.
[35] Crowley, “Musée National de l’Histoire de
l’Immigration,” 207.
[36] Labadi, “The National Museum of Immigration
History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist Representations,
Silencing, and Re-Appropriation,” 314.
[37] Crowley, “Musée National de l’Histoire de
l’Immigration.”
[38] Ibid, 311.
[39] Labadi, “The National Museum of Immigration
History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist Representations,
Silencing, and Re-Appropriation,” 208.
[40] Bancel and Lebovics, “Building the History Museum
to Stop History,” 271.
[41] Labadi, “The National Museum of Immigration
History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist Representations,
Silencing, and Re-Appropriation,” 312.
[42] Labadi, “The National Museum of Immigration
History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist Representations,
Silencing, and Re-Appropriation.”
[43] Lebovics, “The Dance of the Museums,” 175.
[44] Giblin, Ramos, and Grout, “Dismantling the Master’s
House,” 472.
[45] See for example the recent exhibition on Black
Indians de la Nouvelle Orléans.
https://m.quaibranly.fr/fr/expositions-evenements/au-
musee/expositions/details-de-levenement/e/black-
indians-de-la-nouvelle-orleans
[46] Gosson, “‘Tous Ceux sans Qui La France Ne Serait Pas
La France’,” 126.
[47] Thomas, “The Quai Branly Museum,” 150.
[48] Sarr and Savoy. “Rapport sur la restitution du
patrimoine culturel africain.”
[49] See for instance LOI n° 2020-1673 du 24 décembre
2020.
[50] Paquette, “France and the Restitution of Cultural
Goods,” 305.
[51] Light, “Unknown Anzacs.”
[52] Ibid, 253.
[53] Garsha, “Expanding Vergangenheitsbewältigung?”
32
[54] Duhennois, “Restitution of African Colonial
Artefacts.”
[55] Ibid, 137.
[56] Ibid, 130.
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eds. Postcolonial Realms of Memory Sites and Symbols
in Modern France - Contemporary French and
Francophone Cultures 68. Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 2020
Aldrich, Robert. “Memorials and Museums.” In
Postcolonial Realms of Memory, 159. Liverpool
University Press, 2020.
Amato, Sarah. “Quai Branly Museum: Representing France
after Empire.” Race & Class 47, no. 4 (April
2006): 46–65.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd
edition. London: Verso, 1991.
Bancel, Nicolas, and Pascal Blanchard. “From Colonial to
Postcolonial: Reflections on the Colonial Debate
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Bennington, Alice. “(RE)WRITING EMPIRE? THE
RECEPTION OF POST-COLONIAL STUDIES IN
FRANCE.” The Historical Journal 59, no. 4
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Blanchard, Pascal, Sandrine Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel,
Dominic Thomas, and Alexis Pernsteiner. Colonial
Culture in France Since the Revolution.
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Crowley, Patrick. “Musée National de l’Histoire de
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Garsha, Jeremiah J. “Expanding
Vergangenheitsbewältigung? German Repatriation
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33, no. 4–5 (September 3, 2019): 471–86.
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History (Paris, France), Neo-Colonialist
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Representations, Silencing, and Re-
l’obscurité et le musée du quai Branly,” in
Appropriation.” Journal of Social Archaeology 13, no.
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3 (October 2013): 310–30.
débat, no. 147 (November–December 2007): 178–
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Bringing the Empire Back Home France in
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57.
France the Way to Postcoloniality?”
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Routledge (2010).
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Thinking Postcolonially about French Cultural
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Macdonald, Sharon. “Museums, National, Postnational and
Transcultural Identities.” Museum and Society 1,
no. 1 (2003): 1–16.
Paquette, Jonathan. “France and the Restitution of
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2020): 302–16.
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and Nicolas Bancel. The Colonial Legacy in France.
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1882.

33

Photo by Alenka Skvarc • unsplash.com
The Earth is Ours: The Importance of
Decoloniality in Nature Conservation
Written by Lina Pitz
T
he conservation of Earth’s remaining
biodiversity is high on policymakers’
agenda when it comes to mitigating
and minimizing the effects of climate change. The
diversity of species and ecosystems is crucial to
ensure the continued provision of ecosystem
services that humanity depends on. Food, water,
pollination, clean air, flood protection, nutrient
cycling and cultural services are just some
examples of the services that Earth’s biodiversity
makes possible.[1]
Protecting and conserving this biodiversity
across the world is the proclaimed goal of the
conservation science discipline. Most biodiversity
hotspots, and therefore areas of interest for
conservation scientists, such as the Amazon Basin,
Central Africa, and Melanesia, are situated in the
Global South.[2] However, conservation science
remains a field dominated by scholarship,
practitioners and literature from the Global
North.[3] There is visible inequality within the
discipline, with nature conservation having
endured criticism by decolonial scholars, activists
and Indigenous rights groups for deep-seated
systemic racism and the continuation of colonial
power structures.[4]
34
04
To give an accessible introduction to the topic,
that highlights the importance of decolonization
in a discipline seemingly not related to the
humanities, I want to ask: How do colonial history
and neocolonial structures affect the discipline of
biodiversity conservation in Global South
countries? countries?
In this article, I will argue that biodiversity
conservation is a scientific discipline historically
rooted in colonialism, a fact that continues to
negatively affect modern conservation and
indicates a need for decolonial advancement
within the discipline.
To begin with, I will provide a literature review
of influential works on the topics of coloniality in
conservation and decolonial scholarship that have
had a personal influence on me as the author of
this article. The literature review will furthermore
function as an integrated positionality statement.
Following this, I will first argue that conservation
science is historically rooted in colonialism and
colonial thinking patterns. Secondly, I will outline
the institutional structures that persistently
reproduce colonial power relations in nature
conservation education and practice. Lastly, I will
contend that the position of local and
 The Earth is Ours
Indigenous communities in conservation issues
can be compared to what Frantz Fanon labels as
the “damnés,” and that reclaiming power over
their lands enables them as producers of
knowledge, rather than subjects.[5]
Where to situate this essay
This article is embedded not only in literature
about nature conservation but also in anti-
colonial/decolonial scholarship. I will shortly list
various influential scholars here that have shaped
decolonial thought as well as had a crucial
influence on me as the author of this article.
However, I will not attempt a complete literature
review of the field as it does not fall within the
scope of this article.
As a white woman brought up in Western
Europe and solely educated in Western
institutions, my knowledge about the importance
of decoloniality comes from PoC scholars of the
discipline who were introduced to me within my
university education, or student working groups
focusing on the topic of decoloniality. Two
authors whose theories I have extensively studied
in university classes are Anibal Quijano, who
discussed the inextricable connection between
modernity, rationality and coloniality, and
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and his works on
epistemologies of the South. Due to my interest in
environmentalism, Vandana Shiva and her works
on ecofeminism, as well as Queer critiques of her
works, have shaped my understanding of the
connection between minority groups and the
environment. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o and his book
Decolonising the Mind (1986), have driven me to
consider the aspect of European languages as a
colonizer’s language and why their continued
hegemony is problematic. As a Queer woman, I
have felt a personal connection to the works of
female Queer decolonial writers like Audre
Lorde. Furthermore, as a white person that
engages with decolonisation, I also think it is
important to be aware of the inherent
ambivalence between my whiteness and
contributions to decolonisation efforts. The
article “Decolonizing While White” by white
South-African professor Sally Matthews has
guided me in this and in understanding that
without recognising the influence my whiteness
35
has on my attempts to contribute to decolonial
scholarship, “white participation in decolonial
struggles may ultimately do more to alleviate the
guilt of white academics than it does to dismantle
the hierarchies that decolonial struggles
ostensibly oppose.”[6]
Lastly, in this article, I rely on psychoanalyst
Frantz Fanon’s term “damnés” from his book, The
Wretched of the Earth (1961). Fanon has been
extremely influential in decolonial scholarship,
outlining the intimate connection between
colonialism and the mind of the colonized.
There exists a diverse body of literature on
colonialism in conservation, informed by a
multidisciplinary range of authors. Most recent
articles have focused on the impact that the
colonial structures upon which conservation
science was built have on current conservation
practices and give recommendations on how this
can be changed; Rudd et. al. with their article
“Overcoming racism in the twin spheres of
conservation science and practice,” (2021) and
Naira Gracia with “Decolonizing Conservation
Science: Response to Jucker Et al. 2018,” (2021)
are both relevant examples published in the past
two years. In their article, “Decolonising
Conservation Policy: How Colonial Land and
Conservation Ideologies Persist and Perpetuate
Indigenous Injustices at the Expense of the
Environment,” (2020) Lara Domínguez and Colin
Luoma give an overview of the colonial history of
conservation science and identify how human
rights breaches through the use of fortress
conservation methods. The two authors approach
the topic from a rights-based perspective.
Another interesting interdisciplinary addition to
the literature comes from linguist Jessica
Pouchet, in her article “Participation, inequality,
and conversations about conservation,” (2020)
which addressed the persistently remaining
inequalities in participatory conservation projects.
The scholars Millhauser and Earle contribute to
the topic of conservation from an archeological
background with their article, “Biodiversity and
the Human Past: Lessons for Conservation
Biology,” (2022).
Lastly, some examples of scholars who have
suggested alternative frameworks and practices
for decolonial conservation are Rosemary-Claire
Collard, Jessica Dempsey, and Juanita Sundberg
 The Earth is Ours
in “A Manifesto for Abundant Futures,” (2015) as
well as Madhav et. al. in their article “Indigenous
Knowledge for Biodiversity Conservation,” from
1993. These authors underline the importance of
investigating the motivations of conservationists
for saving nature and highlight alternative
Indigenous conceptions of nature that could be
transferred to conservationist approaches.
I hope to contribute to the existing literature
by providing an overview of contemporary
persistent and historical colonial structures within
biodiversity conservation and by explicitly linking
Indigenous conservation projects with Frantz
Fanon’s concept of the “damnés.”[7]
The Colonial History of Conservation
First and foremost, biodiversity conservation as a
discipline is historically rooted in colonialism and
the Western perception of nature. The earliest
form of biodiversity conservation is the so-called
“fortress conservation.”[8] Fortress conservation
is based on the idea that nature can best be
protected by establishing strictly protected areas
of pristine nature, where any human presence or
influence is completely banned. The idea that
nature as “wilderness” exists in its ideal form in
separation from humans originated from early
romantic writers and is not a framework that
exists in Indigenous philosophy.[9] Moreover, the
practice of fencing off certain areas of land for
the protection of nature only became possible,
and necessary through certain principles central
to colonialism. As highlighted by Dominguez et.
al.: “the introduction of individualised property
regimes and the emphasis placed on cultivation as
the only “productive” form of land use worthy of
legal protection […].”[10] European colonizers in
Africa, Asia and the Americas sought to separate
Indigenous people from their lands and asserted a
capitalist, agricultural mode of production on
these lands. European conservation scientists
sought to repair the ecological damage caused by
colonizer’s overexploitation “through
conservation models premised on removing
indigenous peoples from their ancestral
lands.”[11] These conservation models relied on
the notion of private land ownership, a concept
first introduced following the arrival of European
colonizers in most parts of the world. Through
36
labelling Indigenous territories as private
properties, colonizers caused local communities
to lose access to their ancestral land and with it
their ability to safeguard it. Traditional communal
land management was no longer possible. In its
original forms, fortress conservation was framed
as a universally “good” practice that benefitted
the whole of humanity. However, in reality, these
protected areas in the Global South mostly
benefited the colonising states through tourists,
trophy hunters and scientific researchers coming
from the Global North where lands had already
been developed for economic purposes.[12] In the
past, protected areas have been enforced through
violent policing against their former human
inhabitants, leading to evictions, death, injury,
trauma and poverty of local communities.[13]
There also exists no concrete evidence that strictly
enforced protected areas result in better
biodiversity protection. A 2013 review by Ferraro
et. al. even suggested that protected areas that
allow sustainable use of the resource base by local
and Indigenous communities are correlated with
better biodiversity conservation outcomes.[14]
In the 1990s, biodiversity conservation as a
discipline began responding to criticism about
fortress conservation and turned toward
participatory conservation practices that formally
include local communities in environmental
governance. As highlighted by the British
Ecological Society, “the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Global Assessment
(GA) is the first global scale assessment to
systematically engage with ILK [Indigenous and
local knowledge] and issues of concern to
Indigenous peoples and local communities
(IPLC).”[15] However, local communities’
participation in these projects has often been
found to be superficial, with deep-seated colonial
power relations and racist dynamics continuing to
influence conservation in the field and the
classroom.[16] In the next section, I will outline
how these dynamics play out in current
biodiversity conservation teaching and practice.
Institutionalised Colonialism in Nature
Conservation and Practice
Despite an increasing turn away from fortress
conservation and toward the involvement of local
 Photo of West Kalimantan (Indonesia), oil palms have replaced all but small patches of forest. (Science, 2019)

Diagram depicting the structure of Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)
secretariat. IPBES have close to 145 members including NGOs, organisations, conventions, cand local
communities/civili society groups. IPBES assess specific issues, support policy making, build capacity and knowledge
as well as communicating and reaching out to ensure widesst impact of its work. (IPBES)

37
 The Earth is Ours
communities in biodiversity conservation projects,
there are still institutional structures that prevail
and reproduce colonial power relations in nature
conservation education and practice. In their
article “Overcoming racism in the twin spheres of
conservation science and practice” Rudd et. al.
(2021) explains how these power relations remain
embedded in both the science aspect of the
discipline, in other words, academic teaching of
biodiversity conservation, and in the practical
aspect of the discipline, referring to in the field,
managing conservation projects. In regard to the
academic teaching of biodiversity conservation,
Rudd et. al. state that “BIPOC students are
disproportionately underrepresented in degree
subjects that lead to conservation careers […].”
This is due to financial burden, visa procedures
for students from the Global South, lack of
scholarships, difficulty for BIPOC communities in
accessing nature and the lack of inclusivity in the
design of field trips to the Global South, which
are still an integral part of Western conservation
degrees.[17] This bias is also represented
considering the lack of diversity in conservation
scholarship: editorial positions of academic
journals, authorship of academic articles and
article citation rates are all dominated by Global
North scholars.[18]
Looking at the sphere of conservation
practice, the numbers are very similar: a study in
2014 showed that 88% of senior positions in US
environmental organisations were held by white
people.[19] High-level decision-making in
conservation projects in the Global South is often
made by NGOs alongside governments, with local
people only involved in the process once it is well
underway.[20] Even when locals are involved in
fieldwork, language barriers and a lack of formal
qualifications prevent them from moving higher
up in the hierarchy of the conservation project.
Therefore, it becomes clear that “conservation
narratives remain dominated by western and/or
privileged biologists and elite international and
local NGOs.”[21]
The “damnés” and Empowerment
Subsequently, I argue that using Fanon’s term the
“damné” and their empowerment as creators of
knowledge can be a helpful framework
considering the decolonization of biodiversity
conservation.
38
In his book The Wretched of the Earth [Les damnés de
la terre] (1961), Fanon uses the term “damné”
[condemned] to describe the position of
marginalized bodies “at the crux of the
coloniality. of power, the coloniality of
knowledge, and the coloniality of being.”[22] The
coloniality of power/knowledge/being is what,
according to Fanon, creates the line between
human and non-human. Human is considered
modern and rational, a denomination inextricably
bound to the colonizer through the use of
coloniality in defining modernity, a theory
postulated by Anibal Quijano in “Coloniality and
Modernity/Rationality” (2007). The non-human,
on the other hand, is irrational, lacks objectivity
and is condemned to remaining inferior.
Fanon was not acquainted with the term
BIPOC, however, that is who his theory of the
“damnés” refers to: “subjects that are located out
of human space and time, which means, for
instance, that they are discovered along with their
land rather than having the potential to discover
anything or even to represent an impediment to
take over their territory.”[23] This analysis of the
position BIPOC hold in the eyes of the colonizer
is crucial when it comes to understanding the
position BIPOC communities have in biodiversity
conservation. The deeply colonial idea that
BIPOC, with their land, were by the European
leads to the ongoing assumption, whether
subconscious or not, that BIPOC lack objectivity
and can never assume the position of producers of
knowledge. The only way they can hope to move
up the hierarchy is by assimilating to the colonial
idea of what being a rational, modern human is.
[24] In nature conservation this is reflected
through the continued domination by Global
North scholars, organisations, and frameworks
over conservation projects located in the Global
South. Indigenous and Local Knowledge (ILK) is
assumed to be non-scientific, or in other words
not trustworthy knowledge that can be used to
conserve biodiversity. Therefore, instead of
BIPOC communities managing their ancestral
lands according to their knowledge, the white
scientist feels called to intervene.
Fanon argued that true decolonization is not
about marginalised bodies obtaining validation
from the colonizer, yet instead about “challenging
the terms in which humanity is defined and
 The Earth is Ours
recognition takes place.”[25] In the case of
biodiversity conservation, that means
decolonizing the discipline is not about admitting
more BIPOC students into Westernised academic
programmes on conservation or involving local
communities more in conservation projects.
Rather, there is a need to fundamentally
challenge what is accepted as valid conservation
methods and practices and who are accepted as
creators and stewards of these practices.
An example of this fundamental challenge
coming into reality is the so-called “territories of
life,” otherwise known as “territories and areas
conserved by indigenous peoples and local
communities (ICCAs).”[26] These are biodiverse
areas where there is a close connection between
the land and its local/Indigenous community,
where this community makes up the governance
body over the land and where the management
efforts of the community contribute to
biodiversity conservation and community well-
being.[27] In the case of territories of life,
biodiversity governance is in the hands of BIPOC
local communities, recognising them as creators
of conservation knowledge and practices. An
emblematic, functioning territory of life can for
example be found in the Philippines, where the
Tanabag Batak tribe manages a significant
portion of their ancestral land in the province of
Palawan, declared a UNESCO biosphere reserve.
[28] There is also an increased focus and support,
especially in North America, for research done by
Indigenous researchers into Indigenous
conservation methods. An example of this is the
article “Decolonial Model of Environmental
Management and Conservation: Insights from
Indigenous-led Grizzly Bear Stewardship in the
Great Bear Rainforest” (2021) by Artelle et. al.
The research was conducted by Indigenous
scholars within their own communities in British
Columbia (on the territories of Haíɫzaqv,
Kitasoo/Xai’xais, Nuxalk, and Wuikinuxv First
Nations) and highlights Indigenous salmon
conservation methods. Their research findings
have been picked up by major international
conservation organisations, like Conservation
International.
Conclusion
In the words of Frantz Fanon, “decolonization sets
39
out to change the order of the world.” In that
way, decolonization of nature conservation sets
out to change the order of the discipline in
fundamental ways.
The science of nature conservation originated
from the colonial exploitation of Indigenous
lands and the subsequent privatizing and fencing
off of areas assigned to be pristine natural places
with no human impact. Despite an increased
awareness of the racist and neo-colonial power
relations this fortress conservation entails, BIPOC
local communities are still often reduced to
performative team members when it comes to the
management of conservation projects in the
Global South. I have argued that Frantz Fanon’s
term “damné” and the empowerment of BIPOC
as creators of knowledge, rather than subjects of
it, is representative of the shift that needs to
happen in conservation science and the
acknowledgment of BIPOC local communities as
creators and practitioners of valid biodiversity
conservation knowledge and methods.
Biodiversity conservation is vital in the fight
against the climate crisis. However, effective
nature conservation can only happen on a global
scale if remaining colonial power relations are
examined, acknowledged, and challenged within
the teaching and practice of how best to conserve
nature.
Endnotes
[1] Cefic. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.
[2] Gracia, “Decolonizing Conservation Science,” 1321.
[3] Rudd et al., “Overcoming Racism,” 6.
[4] Ibid., 1.
[5] Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of ten theses,” 20.
[6] Matthews, “Decolonising while white,” Abstract.
[7] Maldonado-Torres, “Outline of ten theses,” 20.
[8] Pouchet, “Participation, Inequality, and
Conversations,” 475.
[9] Cronon, “The Trouble With Wilderness,” 12.
[10] Dominguez, “Decolonising Conservation Policy,” 3.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 5.
[13]Pouchet, “Participation, Inequality, and
Conversations,” 475.
[14]Ferraro et al, “More strictly protected areas.”
[15]McElwee et al, “Working with Indigenous and local
knowledge,” Abstract.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Rudd et al, “Overcoming Racism,” 6.
[18] Gracia, Decolonizing Conservation Science, 1322.
[19] Rudd et al, “Overcoming Racism,” 6.
[20Pouchet, “Participation, Inequality, and
Conversations,” 475.
 The Earth is Ours

[21] Rudd et al, “Overcoming Racism,” 7. McElwee, P, Fernández-Llamazares, Á, Aumeeruddy-

[22] Ibid., 20. Thomas, Y, et al. Working with Indigenous and
[23] Ibid., 21. local knowledge (ILK) in large-scale ecological
[24] Rudd et al, “Overcoming Racism,” 21. assessments: Reviewing the experience of the
[25] Ibid., 22. IPBES Global Assessment. J Appl Ecol. 2020; 57:
[26] ICCA, “Territories and Areas Conserved.” 1666– 1676. https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-
[27] Ibid. 2664.13705
[28] ICCA, “The Tanabag Batak ICCA.” Pouchet, Jessica. “Participation, Inequality, and
Conversations About Conservation.” Journal of
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40
 05

Photo by Susan Q Yin • unsplash.com

Rethinking and Decolonizing Time: A Guide

for Members in the Higher Education Sector
to Distance Themselves from Dysphoria
Written by Chaaru Jain

P
I worried a lot. Will the garden grow, will the rivers re-colonial societies had rigid expectations
flow in the right direction, will the earth turn for the very basic unit of our existence, the
as it was taught, and if not, how shall conditionality of "being human”
I correct it? depended on whether or not we could use our

‘minds and intellect’, or “imagine things, create
Was I right, was I wrong, will I be forgiven, institutions or history, use land and resources,
can I do better? practice the arts”.[1] While it may seem that we

have grown and moved away from this conception
Will I ever be able to sing, even the sparrows of time imposed by colonial powers, the idea
can do it and I am, well, persists under the guise of ‘humanism and
hopeless. liberalism’ which are used as shields for

colonialism and imperialism.[2] According to
Is my eyesight fading or am I just imagining it, Raewyn Connell, this shift arrived in the 1970s
am I going to get rheumatism, and 1980s with the onset of neoliberal ideology
lockjaw, dementia? after the failure of postcolonial institutions which

meant a turn “from balanced, locally driven
Finally I saw that worrying had come to nothing. development, to a search for export advantage in
And gave it up. And took my old body deregulated international markets and heavy
and went out into the morning, corporatization.[3] This phenomenon has been
and sang. carried onto university systems globally which

have moved away from being institutions where
-Mary Oliver, I Worried “supply (truth) creates demand (student interest)

to ones in which demands (student aspiration)
create supply (student places)”.[4] The university,
which was once an academic institution with both

41
 Rethinking and Decolonizing Time
delivery and discovery components, today faces
limitations on the discovery aspect and extensive
pressure on the delivery due to their allegiances
to being “service leviathans”, alongside the “the
multiplication of legal-rational procedures” that
tend to create an illusion of efficiency.[5]
Another aspect of this neoliberal knowledge
economy, according to Richard Budd, is the
“marketized student experience” in which
students find themselves pushed to be the
“primary agents of their own pedagogical
destinies”, but the motivation can be lost once the
realization of the university’s dependence on their
fee-payment sets in, providing leverage.[6] This
experience is also pushed using the employability
narrative revolving around the “extra-curricular
activities, work placements, and even
recommending domestic students to interact
more with international students to improve their
career chances”.[7] According to Dan Barbezat
and Mirabai Bush, we as a society, “have lost our
way in higher education” by abandoning the
mission to create “lives of purpose and strong
ethical and creative minds”, visible in the mission
statements of universities that follow this syntax.
[8] However, do these claims/principles actually
take place in higher education? Often, they do
not. Consequently, the problem emerges from
both sides of the institution, where one party
feeds onto the mistakes of the other and
continues the feedback loop. In this essay, I will
argue that this neoliberal wave that has spread
around the world has had a negative impact on
the conceptions of time within which academics
exist and have subsequently, worsened the mental
health of those interacting with these distorted
temporalities over time.
First, I will explore the existing scholarship
to understand the different lines of thought
revolving around the temporal constrictions in
higher education and the impact these may have
on the mental well-being of those who are
involved in this system (staff and students).
Second, I will then move on to provide some
recommendations for students to continue and
move away from these structures that hamper
their well-being. These can be tools that could
help them make it through the semester when
they have to work within these time constraints
and be able to recognize patterns of burnout and
stress.
42
The shift in the mass mindset of universities and
educational institutions in the post-industrial age
when evidence of scholarly work become crucial,
embodying the mechanism of a treadmill. [9]
Globalization in higher education is visible as
“partly an illusion, partly a cultural hangover
from the old empires, and partly an economic
strategy”.[10] Shahjahan argues that the
neoliberal logic colonizes our bodies (the
interconnected body-mind-spirit notion) but
“does not preclude important tactics of
resistance”.[11] According to Nicholson, there are
various practices that can be considered contested
sites within higher education where ‘authority
and power’ will find themselves opposing
‘individual resistance and creativity’.[12]
Together, space and time construct identities and
practices, holding the potential to perform
political work and enact power. As long as the
leading ideology assigning human development
to profit enhancement is neoliberalism, there will
be violence.[13] Time has been delineated as
expendable by powers of religion, capitalism and
morality: Anderson points out that time is used as
an ‘epistemic tool’ in order to deem indigenous
and other subaltern people ‘behind in
development,’, ‘anachronistic’ and ‘resistant to
progress’.[14] As a part of the decolonization
discourse of time and knowledge, Eurocentric,
linear notions are critiqued for being sources and
bases of neoliberal logic used to extend ‘colonial
time’ by allowing the undermining of traditional
practices and capitalizing on fear (of survival of
one’s country, of the other, one’s own economic
survival, etc.).[15] For example, for academic staff
Together, space and time construct
identities and practices, holding
potential to perform political work
and enact power. As long as the
leading ideology assigning human
development to profit
enhancement is neoliberalism,
there will be violence.
 Rethinking and Decolonizing Time
Photo by Mikael Kristenson• unsplash.com
and researchers, the tenure clock and the
biological clock can lead to anxiety and stress
because, in this linear time, there is a lack of space
for both lives to co-exist.[16] Hans Rämö claims
that “like Saint Augustine and Alice’s white
rabbit, we do not know what time is, but nowadays
we are always aware of what time it is”.[17] The
bureaucratic, neoliberal influences on academia
have made it difficult to negotiate what a valid
ideology of time might be, taking the
chronological understanding of time as the
default: “measurable and quantifiable one of
performativity-invested Chronos, synchronization
of global educational cultures and universities,
and linear, chronological arrangement of the
past, the present and the future of learning
experiences” which leads to an economy that only
values money and high-achieving students,
considered “time-managers”.[18] However, this
clashes with the way of life that, historically, has
been measured in different co-existing times,
both lived and imagined as we today see the print
43
and the digital academic space functioning on
different times.[19] Another modality of time that
is recognized is Nietzsche’s “Aionic” where there
is an element of eternity experienced by those
employed who are in an unexplored realm that
manages to hold on to the “subversive of
managerial and performative priorities” of
chronological time in a playful manner.[20]
Papastephanou also mentions Kairos which is
“time that gives value” as opposed to the Chronos
which dates time, concluding that the Kairos,
Chronos and Aion should be in sync in the
academic space instead of finding a discordance.
[21] It is this incongruity which affects students
and staff adversely by depriving them of playful
time or the time of completion and fulfillment, an
integral to the good performance of humankind.
The “faster and efficient” working system fails to
see the externalities like “associated policies and
procedures, together with pressure on funding,
increases in student numbers, and an ethic of
accountability” which affect scholars’ outputs due
 Rethinking and Decolonizing Time
to conspicuous time pressure. The balance
between measured and unmeasured time has
become far too disproportionate.[22] The
blurring of work and personal time and
multitasking leads to a disarray of how the
different modalities of time interact in the realm
of the global business of Higher education. It is
also important to remember that all time is not
equal just as all working time is not always
renumerated despite how hegemonic powers
define work relations on the basis of clock time.
[23]
These institutions still hope to cling onto their
humanist institutions, producing what is
characterized by Sharma as ‘transit spaces’:
“switch points for global capital […] and local
relations, […] govern and institutionalize the
temporal order and replete with the
contradictions of that order’s contents, the
multiple temporalities or itineraries, as they
intersect and cross”.[24] This is further
emphasized by Leathwood and his colleagues who
claim that deadline-motivated modalities of time
affect “teaching preparation and pedagogical
relationships, raising questions about innovation
and criticality, power and in/security, continuity
and care”.[25] The fast pace of university
education today is commonplace and it is clearly
illustrated in the block system, the increased
pressure to produce essays and publish research
work, assessment of students to gauge ‘customer
satisfaction’, etc. This casualization in higher
education, when seen through a chronopolitical
lens, displays a disposability of academics along
with their experiences of “academic
marginalization and of financial and other
insecurities”.[26]
It could therefore be advantageous to consider
Barbara Adam’s concept of ‘timescapes’ which is
‘‘a cluster of temporal features, each implicated in
all the others, but not necessarily of equal
importance in each instance […] and can be
divided into: time-frame, temporality, timing,
tempo, duration, sequence and temporal
modalities (past, present, future)”.[27] Similarly,
Murphy’s concept of time also uses the
heterogenous frames of time and multiple
temporalities to juxtapose with bureaucratic time,
the norm of post-modern life, inclusive of
university time syntaxes instead of quasi-seasonal
44
time schemes that were employed in the past.[28]
This shift comes with the expectation of increased
productivity and efficiency set by managerialism
to which time and resources of organizations are
devoted first, and then, subjected to “cost-
control, quality-control, standardization and
planning”.[29]
However, the organizational inefficiency that
has followed is nothing short of ironical because
“time efficiency has transformed into time
dysfunction instead” due to the feeling of never
having enough time makes individuals who feel
this way seem morally responsible for this loss.
This social acceleration is embedded in capitalism
where “monthly, weekly, daily output schemes
have replaced what we might call a natural
rhythm determined by work motivation, pleasure
in getting things done, and the expectation of
rest after a hard day’s work”.[30] It also echoes in
the Marxist rationalization of work, where “time
is everything, man [sic] is nothing […] and quality
no longer matters whereas quantity has the power
to decide everything: hour for hour, day for day”.
[31] When considered in a neoliberal context
which remains woven into our “mind and soul”,
care for the very same mind, body and soul is
externalized.[32] Therefore, it is crucial to reflect
on how students and staff alike do not get
swallowed into a rabbit hole of time that requires
productivity and efficiency at the maximum,
inescapable rabbit hole of time.
In this section, I will outline some of the best
practices that have been carved out for
undergraduate students but also non-traditional
students, researchers and Ph.D. students, as they
all face similar dilemmas in the same higher
education system. One of the major takeaways
from Connell’s book, The Good University, is to
challenge the dominant knowledge formation
processes that are monitored by the neoliberal
“intellectual property” regime and work as neo-
colonial strategies by powerful countries. In the
same vein, the concept of successful navigation of
time should be problematized in order to allow
individuals to reflect on what indeed would be
successful navigation, keeping in mind that:
“Speed can be dangerous. At a certain point of
acceleration, it jeopardizes freedom’ and shortens
the time of engagement with ethical issues”. [33]
Additionally, there are some actions that the
 Rethinking and Decolonizing Time
literature suggests can be helpful to nurture and
care for the academic. Shahjahan recommends a
‘less is more approach’ in the learning
environment and a ‘not do’ approach to
accumulating tasks that could allow for slowing
down to create relationships, accepting and
allowing for uncertainty.[34] This preparation
would also build resilience by training the mind
“to cope with and bounce back after encountering
negative events, and to return to almost the same
level of emotional well-being”.[35] In fact,
adopting a source of attachment in the academic
setting, whether it be “a supportive adult,
prosocial peers, adults (role models), or positive
school and other community networks”.[36] In my
personal experience and observations, the student
body also makes efforts to ‘romanticize’ education
by reconnecting with the body. Similarly,
Shahajahan considers “[t]he use of food, music,
drama, and other sensory experiences connected
to course readings” tools to foster positivity
brought by the recognition of the body as a source
of knowledge.[37] The ways in which students
have been doing it is through adapting styles
according to books about their subjects (fashion),
engaging with the music that comes from the
issues they learn about and by creating study
playlists (culture), creating a good environment to
study in, going outdoors to work and listening to
others in their field of study.[38] These still allow
them to function within the neoliberal institutions
and yet resist and maintain a degree of agency
over their use time.[39] Merely accepting the
value of one’s work is said to help reduce stress
and cultivate confidence in the individual’s own
abilities in research.[40] Erga pushes for his post-
critical perspective of “know thyself” to regain the
educational ethos through self-inquiry and
embark on an internal journey “to delve into the
geography of one’s body and mind, the history
and evolution of one’s mental states” through the
individual’s preferred way of doing so and to
name a few: yoga, meditation, tai-chi, non-
judgmental mindfulness, and so on.[41] Connell’s
inclusion of alternative universities which have
tried, failed and succeeded “to run technoscience
and religious courses at the same time” is an
inspiration for institutions at large. [42] Future
pathways as globalization and resistance bind
together in a quest for truly diverse voices and
spaces.
45
Merely accepting the value of
one’s work is said to help
reduce stress and cultivate
confidence in the individual’s
own abilities in research.
In a nutshell, as members of the neoliberal
institution, we have the opportunity to reflect and
encourage universities to fulfill their duty towards
students but also to “find love in the student
experience” because it has not disappeared in the
time-space axes just yet.[43] As Murphy
emphasizes: “Chocking on time’s fluster, we are
left to wonder whether thought has been expelled
unceremoniously from its own house”.[44] We
have the time to pause and sit, create
relationships and regain some control over our
minds, which might take time and training but as
a collective group, is possible.
Endnotes
[1] Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous
Peoples, 25-26.
[2] Ibid., 26.
[3] Connell, The Good University, 83.
[4] Murphy, “Discovery and Delivery: Time Schemas and
the Bureaucratic University,” 140-144.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Budd, “Looking for Love in the Student Experience”.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ergas, “Reclaiming the Educational Through Embodied
Narratives of “Know Thyself”, ” 98.
[9] Brew, “Academic Time and the Time of Academics,”
187.
[10] Connell, 85.
[11] Shahjahan, “Being ‘Lazy’ and Slowing Down,”490.
[12] Nicholson, “On the Space/Time of Information
Literacy, Higher Education, and the Global Knowledge
Economy,” 135.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Shahjahan, 490.
[15] Ibid., 491.
[16] Ibid., 492.
[17] Papastephanou, “Higher Education and an Ethic of
Time,” 168.
[18] Ibid., 170-174.
 Rethinking and Decolonizing Time
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Brew, 189.
[23] Leathwood and Read, “Short-Term, Short-Changed?,”
18.
[24] Nicholson. “On the Space/Time of Information
Literacy,” 12.
[25] Leathwood and Read, 1.
[26] Ibid., 9.
[27] Ibid., 4.
[28] Murphy, 139.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Leathwood and Read, 4-6.
[31] Marx, “A Scientific Discovery”.
[32] Ibid., 5-9.
[33] Papastephanou,176.
[34] Shahjahan, 496.
[35] McCalman and Bainbridge, “Indigenous Education,
Well-Being, and Resilience— A Systemic Approach”.
[36] Ibid., 213.
[37] Shahjahan, 497.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Preedy, “From Hopeless to Romantic”.
[40] Guthrie et al., “Understanding Mental Health in the
Research Environment”.
[41] Ergas, 106.
[42] Connell, 150-154.
[43] Budd, 124.
[44] Murphy, 152.
References
Brew, Angela. “Academic Time and the Time of
Academics”. In Universities in the Flux of Time,
edited by Paul Gibbs, Oili-Helena Ylijoki, Ronald
Barnett, and Carolina Guzmán-Valenzuela, 182–
96, n.d.
Budd, Richard. “Looking for Love in the Student
Experience”. In Post-Critical Perspectives on
Higher Education: Reclaiming the Educational in
the University, edited by Naomi Hodgson, Joris
Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, 3:111–26. Debating
Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020.
Connell, Raewyn. The Good University. p.241.
Ergas, Oren. “Reclaiming the Educational Through
Ergas, Oren. “Reclaiming the Educational
Through Embodied Narratives of ‘Know
Thyself”’. In Post-Critical Perspectives on Higher
Education: Reclaiming the Educational in the
University, edited by Naomi Hodgson, Joris
Vlieghe, and Piotr Zamojski, 3:97–110. Debating
Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020.
Guthrie, Susan, Catherine A. Lichten, Janna Van Belle,
Sarah Ball, Anna Knack, and Joanna Hofman.
“Understanding Mental Health in the Research
Environment”. Rand Health Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1
April 2018): 2.
46
Leathwood, Carole, and Barbara Read. “Short-Term,
Short-Changed? A Temporal Perspective on the
Implications of Academic Casualisation for
Teaching in Higher Education”. Teaching in
Higher Education, 23 March 2020, 1–16.
Marx, Karl. “A Scientific Discovery”. In The Poverty of
Philosophy. Artefacts: A Reassessment of
France’s Post-Colonial Identity.” International
Journal of Francophone Studies 23, no. 1–2 (July
1, 2020): 119–42.
McCalman, Janya, and Roxanne Bainbridge. “Indigenous
Education, Well-Being, and Resilience— A
Systemic Approach”. In Multisystemic Resilience,
by Janya McCalman and Roxanne Bainbridge,
199–219. Oxford University Press, 2021.
Vergangenheitsbewältigung? German
Repatriation of Colonial Artefacts and Human
Remains.” Journal of Genocide Research 22, no. 1
(January 2, 2020): 46–61.
Murphy,. Peter. “Discovery and Delivery: Time Schemas
and the Bureaucratic University”. In Universities
in the Flux of Time, edited by Paul Gibbs, Oili-
Helena Ylijoki, Ronald Barnett, and Carolina
Guzmán-Valenzuela, 223, n.d..
Nicholson, Karen. “On the Space/Time of Information
and the Bureaucratic University”. In Universities
in the Flux of Time, edited by Paul Gibbs, Oili-
Helena Ylijoki, Ronald Barnett, and Carolina
Guzmán-Valenzuela, 223, n.d..
Oliver, Mary. “I Worried”. In Devotions: The Selected
Poems of Mary Oliver, 71. New York: Penguin
Press, 2017.
Papastephanou, Marianna. “Higher Education and an
Ethic of Time”. In Universities in the Flux of
Time, edited by Paul Gibbs, Oili-Helena Ylijoki,
Ronald Barnett, and Carolina Guzmán-
Valenzuela, 168–81, 2015.
Preedy, Rebecca. “From Hopeless to Romantic: How to
Romanticise Your Degree”. The Study Blog
(blog), 18 March 2021.
Shahjahan, Riyad A. “Being ‘Lazy’ and Slowing Down:
Toward Decolonizing Time, Our Body, and
Pedagogy”. Educational Philosophy and Theory
47, no. 5 (16 April 2015): 488–501.
Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. Decolonizing Methodologies:
Research and Indigenous Peoples. 12th ed.
London & New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2008.

Dangers of Digital Domination: Exploring
the Perils of 21st-Century Digital
Colonialism
Written by Adeline Kugler and Terra Rolfe
D
igital technologies and platforms have
sprouted like mushrooms since the end
of the 20th century. Facebook, Google,
PayPal, Tiktok and Amazon are tools that many
people of the 21st-century use every day to
facilitate their lives, communicate with friends,
tell us today’s weather, share the latest music, and
facilitate digital payments. These platforms and
technologies are embedded in our daily routines
with ease and subtlety; on the surface, they
present as amazing innovations which inspire
efficiency and productivity. Yet, against their
innocent facades, the big tech companies
responsible for these technologies and platforms
possess considerable influence in shaping the
planet. These impacts range from environmental
concerns to privacy issues which often replicate
47
06
Photo by John Schnobrich • unsplash.com
colonial dynamics. How and where do these
dynamics take form? This article reviews the
primary arenas in which colonial technology
dynamics have and may emerge. Ranging from
resource extraction processes to migration policy
1
and employment patterns, these dynamics
represent a worrying trend in the evolution of
global economics, politics, and power.
Several concepts including digital colonialism,
2
data colonialism, and technocolonialism have
emerged to denote the unfair and racialized
practices of big tech companies.[1] Conceptual
variations remain between these three terms, but
they overlap in their approach to coloniality
within the digital sphere. Digital colonialism is
defined by Michael Kwet as “the use of digital
technology for political, economic and social
 Dangers of Digital Domination
domination of another nation or territory",[2] yet
has also been used broadly by others to
characterise the colonial implications of digital
technologies and platforms.[3] The term data
colonialism focuses on the ways in which data
extraction, analysis and relations can exert forms
of colonial pressures.[4] Finally, the term
technocolonialism introduced by Mirca Madianou
concentrates on colonial dynamics of dependence
that digital technologies instil within a
humanitarian context.[5] These concepts have
emerged to explain the relationships between
colonialism and capitalism.[6] That is, core
features of colonialism in the 18th century such as
slavery and resource appropriations are mirrored
in today’s digital technologies and data-driven
3
economies.[7] These include the outsourcing of
minerals by big tech companies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), or the desire to
increasingly absorb personal data in Africa.[8]
Capitalism is still shaped by the legacy of the neo-
colonial era. Consequently, the rising awareness
of tech colonialism increases calls for
decolonisation practices to alleviate both future
and current injustices. Subsequent elements of
tech colonialism will be explored in the following
subsections.
Big tech’s global power
The first colonial impression imparted by tech
colonialism is that a majority of big tech
companies are American or Chinese with a global
influence reaching monopolistic degrees.[9] This
is particularly controversial regarding the
projects, processes and products developed by
these companies and their dominance within the
market. In the same ways that the British Empire
developed a network with its colonies to maximise
natural and human resources, US multinationals
“exercise imperial control at the architecture level
of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware and
network connectivity, which then gives rise to
related forms of domination”.[10] In other words,
many Big Tech companies have control over large
portions of the supply chain for all components of
digital technologies. This control means there is
little interoperability between technologies and
allows these multinationals to dominate the
market. Additionally, many of these corporations
48
have a business model based on data as a
commodity.[11] Google, Meta and Twitter are
good examples. One main source of profit comes
from the advertisement industry, which is fuelled
by selling user data to marketing companies and
offering a digital space for targeted brand
advertisement.[12] Thus, the primary economic
interest for these companies is to gain more access
to user data, disregarding privacy and
transparency concerns, in order to sell more of it
and create targeted advertisements.[13] Countries
in the Global South represent great unused data
resources (i.e., large populations that do not yet
have as wide access to digital technologies) for
these multinationals.[14] However, citizens in
these countries are also the most vulnerable due
to little or no data protection regulations. In fact,
only 50% of African countries present forms of
data protection regulations compared to 96% in
Europe.[15] Hence, technology multinationals
have gained global dominance in the digital
technology market and created a digital
ecosystem where they are the central players,
striving for unexploited data resources in the
global south; mimicking colonial powers from the
past.
The Digital divide
As technologies develop across wealthy nations
including China and the US, they risk furthering
developmental inequities between rich and poor
countries. The undermining of poorer countries’
abilities to develop their own technological tools
or adapt existing tools to the needs of their
language, culture, and practices, allows for
inequities of power and development to persist.
[16] Countries are left dependent on technologies
created for populations entirely unlike their own.
This development of dependencies in many ways
mirrors the economic processes of colonialism,
where resources were extracted from local lands
and populations, overwhelmingly for the benefit
of a foreign country, and subpar goods were sold
back to local populations.[17] As Chinese and
American technologies dominate the technology
landscape of many countries, especially in Africa,
they extract hugely profitable data from local
populations at no cost. For example, Google
controls 70% of the South African online
 Dangers of Digital Domination
advertising market, and Facebook an additional
12%.[18] As a result, South African companies and
political parties are largely dependent on two
American companies for advertising. Online
platforms also have significant influence on local
social, economic, and political processes; their
scale and influence in turn fosters dependency on
their products.[19] However, the products sold
back to users in Global South countries are not
necessarily as effective or appropriate in those
contexts as they are in the United States or China.
These companies resultantly extract significant
amounts of data and money for their own profit
and use, little of which remains in or returns to
the South African economy.
Alongside the extraction of data and financial
assets, there is also the question as to whether
these technologies benefit other countries.
Adapting technology designed for Western or
Global North political and social environments
can come with serious consequences. In Myanmar,
which has limited media freedom, the use of
Facebook –– a platform developed within and for
the United States, a country with a (relatively)
healthy media ecosystem –– contributed to the
genocide against the Rohingya.[20] Meta,
Facebook’s parent company, aggressively
marketed Facebook to people in Myanmar as part
of its Free Basics program, which provided access
to only select websites. This selective internet
access, combined with near-entire government
ownership of media, meant that there were few
ways to verify information in Myanmar.
[...] there is also the question as
to whether these technologies
benefit other countries. Adapting
technology designed for Western
or Global North political and
social environments can come
with serious consequences.
49
As a result, misinformation spread across Burmese
Facebook pages without effective mechanisms for
users to check whether it was true.[21] pages
without effective mechanisms for users to check
whether it was true.[22] In addition, Meta’s
content moderation support in Burmese was at
one point limited to a single person for 1.2 million
users; even after hiring an additional 99 content
moderators, internal documents report that only
2% of Burmese hate speech on Facebook was
removed.[23] In short, Meta appears to have given
little thought to these differences in media
ecosystems, or the differences between content
moderation in English and Burmese, before
aggressively marketing the Free Basics package in
Myanmar.
While a situation in which local competitors
are able to adapt their products to local needs and
context may then seem preferable, this is difficult.
The monopolies of big tech companies on data
and market shares currently limit competitors’
ability to adapt products to local contexts.[24]
Economies of scale make it easier for pre-
established companies to continue investing in
infrastructure and mean that they already have
access to the largest amounts of data. Economies
of scale explain why Google provides more
personalised and ‘effective’ search results than
“Yahoo!” –– Google is the market leader, has
more data and technical capabilities, and
therefore is able to provide an easier-to-use
consumer product. In addition, network effects
mean that users are more likely to join a social
media platform that their social network already
uses, which makes Facebook or WeChat much
more alluring than a homegrown alternative
where users interact with few of their friends.[25]
Monopolization keeps imported technological
products as market leaders and the primary
preference for many, despite their dangers and
inefficiencies.
Artificial intelligence
Data is the fuel behind not just advertising, but
also the artificial intelligence (AI) systems used by
big tech companies and governments. AI systems,
in turn, risk exacerbating technological
colonialism through their opacity and
discrimination. AI can be a rather nebulous term,
 Dangers of Digital Domination
Photo of Rohingya refugee camp • unsplash.com
and is defined here as automated decision-
making, including “technologies that automate
the mining of vast stores of data as well as
processes that mimic human cognition and come
up with novel decisions about outcomes.”[26]
This includes predicting outcomes based on
historical data and patterns. In this sense,
‘intelligence,’ may be a bit of a reach; the quality
of an AI system’s output is only as good as the
data it is fed. The data that feeds AI systems is no
different and includes the biases which permeate
society.[27] As a result of this, the algorithms
which power many technological processes –
ranging from the ordering of posts in social
media feeds to the issuing of electronic travel
authorisations –– reflect the biases and
discrimination of the real world. These biases
disproportionately affect non-white, non-Western
people.[28] As AI becomes increasingly
integrated into business and government, this
risks exacerbating discrimination
50
and racialised power dynamics across many
elements of our lives. The opacity of many AI
systems creates additional challenges, as it is often
impossible to know – even as an expert – how a
system reached a decision.[29] Non-technically
trained decision-makers relying on AI face an
additional layer of opacity, as they have even less
knowledge of how AI works in the first place and
may be more prone to trust automated processes.
[29] For example, the childcare benefits scandal
(toeslagenaffaire) in the Netherlands, where many
families were baselessly accused of benefits fraud,
resulted partially from improper use of
algorithms. People with a second nationality,
many of whom were lower-income and/or people
of colour, were assessed as being ‘higher risk’
than those with only Dutch nationality; these
scores were then passed on to human decision-
makers, who could not see what contributed to
the higher risk scores.[30] While this situation
 Dangers of Digital Domination

took place within the Global North, it is iris scanners constitute a form of
nevertheless an example of what decolonial ‘technocolonialism’ that extracts data from
scholars refer to as ‘the coloniality of power’, refugees for the profit of private companies.[32]
which identifies the legacies of colonialism in This exacerbates unequal power relations
systems of social hierarchy still very much present between refugees and aid organisations within
today.[31] In this expansive form, the cultural humanitarian settings and creates ‘colonial
and economic discrimination of the toeslagenaffaire relationships of dependency’ on big tech
arguably is an additional example of coloniality in companies.[33] Outside of refugee camps and
practice today. other humanitarian settings, migration systems
As AI becomes increasingly integrated into present general risks of discrimination which are
the processes of big tech platforms and particularly acute against populations that are
government decision-making, the risks of non-white and from countries in the Global
discrimination continue. The saturation of South.
American and Chinese tech companies, that have Discrimination risks
the data and financial being particularly acute
capacity to develop when AI is used within
especially powerful AI, risks
People with a second migration systems such as
the development of systems the electronic travel
that are biased and nationality, many of whom
authorisation programs in
ineffective outside their were lower-income and/or the United States, Canada,
training contexts.
people of colour, were assessed and the European Union;
Subsequent differences in by determining risk profiles
AI capabilities risks as being ‘higher risk’ than those of travellers based on
exacerbating development with only Dutch nationality; historical data, these
inequities between systems have the potential
countries. Finally, the use
these scores were then passed
to exacerbate biases and
of AI in migration policy on to human decision-makers, discrimination, such as
also risks exacerbating who could not see what higher rates of passport
existing discrimination at flagging for travellers with
borders.
contributed to the higher risk
Arab-sounding names.[34]
scores. The potential impacts of
Migration and technology
States increasingly use technology to help control this experimentation and discrimination are
the flow of migration, and technology companies immense, and offer another example of the
also influence the manner in which (im)migration coloniality of power at play in technology use.
happens. The colonial flavour of these practices
Rare minerals
stems from their intersections with colonial
histories –– for example, through the movement Less obvious instances of colonial practices by Big
of people from former colonies to former colonial Tech companies lie in the strong ties between the
powers –– and their entrenchment of racialised, rare minerals industry and the big tech industry.
primarily Western-centric power dynamics. We Rare minerals are crucial components of almost
see four areas where these patterns appear all technological devices (e.g., computers,
particularly clear: in humanitarian crises, for risk headphones, or batteries).[35] Yet, the extraction
profiling foreign nationals, and through testing of these minerals and metals is often pervasive
new technologies on populations with little legal and unethical. This industry has many
protection. In humanitarian settings, including environmental impacts including air, soil and
refugee camps, the use of privately-developed water pollution, and radioactive waste.[36]
technologies such as biometric fingerprinting and Additionally, dangerous working conditions
connected with extremely low wages are often
present in many mining sites in the global south.
[37]

51
Photo by Sara Kurfeß • unsplash.com
 Dangers of Digital Domination
Stark wage inequalities exist between Argentinian
miners, earning between 300$ and 1800$ USD a
month, and Australian miners, earning 9000$
USD a month, illustrating forms of cheap labour
exploitation.[38] In parallel, corruption in the
mining industry of poor countries also creates
opportunities for intense political and economic
lobbying of mining contracts and the expense of
local interests making accountability towards
mining companies employment schemes and
forage practices difficult.[39] For example, the
DRC holds ~ 34% of cobalt and 65% of Colombo-
Tantalite world reserves. Both minerals are
important to electronic devices components.
However, the DRC is known for corruption ––
especially rent extraction and patronage –– in
mining contracts between the government,
mining companies, and clients fueling the local
civil war.[40] Finally, the mining industry is
plagued by cases of human rights abuses such as
child labour and inhuman work conditions.[41]
These human rights infringements are often
disregarded by tech companies' business models
and market interests.
The main issue is that Big Tech companies
depend on these minerals to create their product
and are intentionally turning a blind eye to the
illegal and abusive practices in the mining
industry presented above. By failing to regulate
their supply chains to avoid causing harm to the
environment and populations living near the
mines, some have argued that Big Tech
companies are complicit to these abuses (e.g.,
child labour, corruption, pollution) and
benefiting from the exploitative context to buy
rare minerals for low prices. This has been
highlighted by the 2019 lawsuit against Apple,
Google, Tesla, and Microsoft accused of taking
advantage of this cheap labour in colonialist ways
by being complicit in the death and injuries of
child workers in cobalt mines of the DRC.[42]
Ultimately, the reality behind the mineral
industry so needed by Big Tech exacerbates the
image of a ruthless Western colonial power taking
advantage of cheap labour and resources in the
Global South.
Content moderation
Miners are not the only victims of colonial
patterns of labour. Social media platform content
53
moderators face similar exploitative working
conditions that present a two-sided form of
coloniality: market favouritism for the global
north and exploitation of the global south. The
expansion of the internet birthed a utopian idea
that online platforms would be a haven for
freedom of expression and free of regulation and
charges.[43] Despite initial hopes, social media
platforms have become hotbeds for
pornographic, violent, and discriminatory
content.[44] In order to prevent such content
from becoming widespread and protect human
rights online, cheap, human content moderators
were outsourced from the Global South.[45] This
created an “invisible chain of workers in the
Global South who are subjected to excruciatingly
violent, pornographic, and other disturbing
content while being paid a fraction of U.S.
wages.”.[46] Additionally, instead of using H1-B
visas, many multinational technology companies
transfer foreign workers to American positions on
L-1 visas that do not require salaries at market
wages.[47] The coloniality of this practice is
exacerbated by the fact that much of the content
moderation labour force comes from former
Western colonies such as India or the Philippines,
who possess Western cultural fluency and literacy
that resulted from the first period of colonisation
in these countries.[48] Big tech companies
perpetrate colonialism by utilising this familiarity
for Western content moderation, despite having a
lack of proper content moderators for non-
Western content. This was the case during
Facebook’s involvement in Myanmar.[49]
Facebook was accused of letting hate speech
spread on the platform, fuelling the genocide
against the Rohingya because of a lack of proper
content moderation.[50] Thus, the sphere of
content moderation highlights the two-sided form
of coloniality. On the one hand, there is an
exploitation of the Global South workforce for
Western content moderation. On the other hand,
there is a lack of proper content moderation for
non-Western content. The duality highlights the
marginalisation of workers and cultures in the
global south to promote Western cultural
interests.
Solutions
The outlined patterns of coloniality and digital
 Dangers of Digital Domination
technology require decolonial movements to
protect vulnerable populations exploited by Big
Tech companies and states. Increasing digital
policies and regulations in the Global South is a
first solution to the problem. Such regulations
could be developed on a national scale within
separate countries but could also include
transnational regulation projects (e.g., within the
African Union or under the African Continental
Free Trade Agreement) and incentivising
countries to view data as a commodity that needs
to be protected on various scales. However, this
approach assumes that regulations properly
protect individuals and local interests and remains
strongly inspired by the European Union; this
would involve transplanting quite sound data
protection laws. However, such processes draw
similarities to the colonial legal transplants of the
past and risk not accounting for local contexts.
While this solution is framed on a policy level, the
unstable institutional landscape of many countries
in the Global South may take some time for these
54
policies and regulations to be drafted and
properly implemented. Going back to the
example of the DRC, regulations hindering the
profits of the minerals industry to fuel local
resource conflicts and protect human rights have
been developed.[51] These policies have changed
the behaviours of some actors but have not
managed to change the mechanism linking
conflicts to resource exploitation because of a lack
of enforcement.[52] This scenario, highlighting
structural flaws in states’ capacity to enforce
policies, could repeat itself for digital policy
development in the DRC and other countries with
weak enforcement institutions. Hence, it
questions the immediate effectiveness of this
solution in institutionally-unstable countries in
the global south. Ultimately, even if effective
implementations came gradually, establishing
such regulations would still set the first stone for
the development of global south digital
governance through mechanisms of policy
feedback and path dependency. An alternative
Photo by Camilo Jimenez • unsplash.com
 Dangers of Digital Domination
solution presented by Michael Kwet is known as
ecosocialism and seeks to address the imperialistic
patterns of the industry.[53] This movement
adheres to core elements from political socialism
based on “principles of anti-imperialism, class
abolition, reparations and degrowth”.[54] The
aim of this movement is to revolutionise the
current capitalist US/EU-centric model of the
tech industry taking into account social, cultural
and environmental perspectives and ending the
digital divide. Practical implications of this
movement include the respect for planetary and
social boundaries, the socialisation of physical
infrastructures (e.g., data centres), intellectual
property, platforms, and data, a decentralisation
and increased interoperability of the internet,
bans on advertisements, as well as developing
community-driven instead of private-owned
security services. Kwet’s ecosocialism is a slight
expansion of the digital socialism movement. For
the purpose of limiting tech companies' power
and enhancing users' control of digital services,
digital socialism promotes “the social (or
common) ownership of organisations and
productive assets in the digital economy”.[55]
Digital socialism translates to tax reforms for tech
companies and stricter data protection
regulations. However, some have also openly
criticised this digital (eco)socialist model for
being too utopian and deceitful, especially when
Tech Companies use it themselves to market their
products as empowering. Morozov highlights that
a “nominal increase in equality of consumption
does not always entail a corresponding increase in
individual autonomy”, a point often stressed by
digital socialist proponents.[56] While the
premises of this project rely on values of
community and security, the feasibility remains
questionable regarding some of the questionable
interpretations as well as (extreme) applications
unfitting to the capitalist market economy.
Incremental changes in a socialist approach may,
however, provide more realistic ways to assess the
feasibility of digital (eco)socialism, perhaps
leading to more radical reforms in the future.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the digital technology industry is not
as neutral as it may seem. Indeed, many colonial
patterns can be found in the activities and
55
developments of Big Tech companies that must be
understood to prevent a modern version of
colonialism. We have highlighted in this article
many aspects of this industry that favours the
economic growth of Big Tech companies against
the local interests of the Global South and
questioned the ethical underpinnings of these
practices. Such problems include the Global
South's dependencies on Western technologies,
the development of biased and discriminatory
artificial intelligence, and the testing of digital
technologies on vulnerable populations such as
migrants and refugees. Other activities
encompass labour exploitation for mineral
extractions and content moderation, as well as the
exploitation of comparative wages and Western
fluency resulting from previous colonial periods.
Solutions to these problems have been
formulated but remain disputable. It is, thus,
imperative that a global conversation is held
regarding the role digital technologies play in our
everyday lives. It seems like the Big Tech industry
has grown in a relatively unregulated institutional
environment leading to questionable practices
and development that increase forms of global
inequality. We should, therefore, question the
place that Big Tech companies hold on the
market and how their power and knowledge are
used for public goods. This may also entail
rethinking which interests (i.e., consumer,
economic, political) are currently being favoured
in this ecosystem and which we want to prioritise
in the future. In a world where innovation never
seems to stop, there must be an ongoing
conversation that does not just include business
and political elites, but also social, philosophical,
and ethical insights to spur a sustainable
environment of growth for the future.
Endnotes
[1] Couldry and Mejias, “The Decolonial Turn in Data and
Technology Research: What Is at Stake and Where Is It
Heading?,” 3–6.
2] Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: The Evolution of US
Empire.”
[3] See Tait, dos Reis Peron, and Suárez, “Terrestrial
Politics and Body-Territory: Two Concepts to Make Sense
of Digital Colonialism in Latin America”; Young, “The
New Knowledge Politics of Digital Colonialism.”
[4] Couldry and Mejias, “Data Colonialism: Rethinking Big
Data’s Relation to the Contemporary Subject,” 336.
[5] Madianou, “Technocolonialism: Digital Innovation and
Data Practices in the Humanitarian Response to Refugee
Crises,” 10–11.
 Dangers of Digital Domination
[6] Couldry and Mejias, “The Decolonial Turn in Data and
Technology Research: What Is at Stake and Where Is It
Heading?,” 2.
[7] Couldry and Mejias, 2–3.
[8] Elmi, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?”
[9] Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New
Imperialism in the Global South,” 4.
[10] Kwet, “Digital Colonialism: US Empire and the New
Imperialism in the Global South,” 3.
[11] Elvy, “Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data
Economy,” 1383-96.
[12] Goldfarb, “What Is Different About Online
Advertising?,” 115.
[13] Goldfarb, 123–25.
[14] Elmi, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?”
[15] Elmi, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?”.
[16] Arun, ‘AI and the Global South,’ 591.
[17] Kwet, ‘Digital Colonialism,’ 6.
[18] Kwet, ‘Digital Colonialism,’ 7.
[19] Pinto, ‘Digital Sovereignty or Digital Colonialism?’, 19.
[20] Arun, ‘AI and the Global South,’ 596.
[21] Arun, ‘AI and the Global South,’ 597.
[22] Guzman, ‘Meta’s Facebook Algorithms.’
[23] Kwet, ‘Digital Colonialism,’ 14.
[24] Kwet, ‘Digital Colonialism,’ 13-14.
[25] Molnar, ‘Technology on the Margins’, 309.
[26] Derave, Genicot, and Hetmanska, ‘Risks of
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence,’ 412.
[27] Hajian, Bonchi, and Castillo, ‘Algorithmic Bias’.
[28] Molnar, ‘Technology on the Margins’, 310.
[29] Parasuraman and Riley, ‘Humans and Automation,’
239.
[30] Heikkilä, ‘AI: Decoded.’
[31] Grosfoguel and Georas, ‘Coloniality of Power’, 146.
[32] Madianou, ‘Technocolonialism’, 2.
[33] Madianou, ‘Technocolonialism’, 10.
34] Derave, Genicot, and Hetmanska, ‘Risks of
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence,’ 412.
[35] Stone, “The Big Tech Quest to Find the Metals
Needed for the Energy Overhaul.”
[36] Nayar, “Not So ‘Green’ Technology: The Complicated
Legacy of Rare Earth Mining.”
[37] Penke, “The Toxic Damage from Mining Rare
Elements.”
[38] Kwet, “Digital Ecosocialism: Breaking the Power of
Big Tech”
[39] Chêne, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),” 3–6.
[40] Geenen, “Local Livelihoods, Global Interests and the
State in the Congolese Mining Sector,” 7.
[41] Kelly, “Children as Young as Seven Mining Cobalt
Used in Smartphones, Says Amnesty.”
[42] Kelly, “Apple and Google Named in US Lawsuit over
Congolese Child Cobalt Mining Deaths.”
[43] Bellon, “Qu’est Devenue l’utopie d’Internet ?,” 6.
[44] Banko, MacKeen, and Ray, “A Unified Typology of
Harmful Content,” 128–37.
[45] Zhang, “Colonialism Is Alive in the Exploited Tech
Work Force.”
[46] Zhang.
[47] Simmons, “Technology Colonialism.”
56
[48] Zhang, “Colonialism Is Alive in the Exploited Tech
Work Force.”
[49] Fink, “Dangerous Speech, Anti-Nuslim Violence, And
Facebook in Myanmar,” 48.
[50] Koenig, “Q&A on Court Ordering Facebook to
Disclose Content on Myanmar Genocide.”
[51] Hanai, “Conflict Minerals Regulation and Mechanism
Changes in the DR Congo,” 5.
[52] Hanai, 1.
[53] Kwet, “Digital Ecosocialism: Breaking the Power of
Big Tech - Longreads.”
[54] Kwet.
[55] Muldoon, “Data-Owning Democracy or Digital
Socialism?,” 2.
[56] Morozov, “Silicon Valley Likes to Promise ‘Digital
Socialism’ – but It Is Selling a Fairytale.
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58
 07

Photo from ABC news

‘Ghost of Empire’: Is Australian Foreign Aid

Neo-Colonial?
Written by Kuba Kudera Johnson

I
In 1992, former Australian prime minister
Paul Keating gave an address where he
stated that the ‘ghost of empire’ was
constraining attempts by Australia to culturally
adapt itself into a meaningful, independent, and
firmly non-colonial member of the Asia-Pacific.[1]
Foreign aid policy has historically been observed
as a tool of domestic political interest and neo-
colonialism by academics, activists, politicians, and
practitioners.[2] This article will aim to examine
to what extent Keating’s ‘ghost of empire’ still
haunts aid policy – is Australian foreign aid neo-
colonial?
The article will first provide an overview of
developments in aid levels since the 1990s and
how it is distributed, with historical context to
suggest why this is the case. Three major factors
threatening or actively contributing to neo-
colonial approaches to aid will be highlighted and
analysed. The first of these is the role of cultural
attitudes and ignorance in Australia, focusing on
the views of the political elite, the public, the role
of multiculturalism, and the fear of an ‘Asian
invasion’. Secondly, the consistent growth of the
defence and intelligence sectors will be explored
as a factor contributing to the co-opting of aid
and its demotion as a priority of foreign policy.
Finally, the aspects of neo-colonialism relevant to
high dependency and neglect of aid will be
examined. The article will assess if and how the
current government is addressing these factors.
A Brief Overview of Developments in
Australian Foreign Aid and the Historical
Context
Australian Overseas Development Aid (ODA)
contributions have been relatively low compared
to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) nations since the
1990s, however with notable changes in levels of
spending under different administrations.[3]
Under the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Keating
government from 1991-96, ODA plateaued at
0.31% of gross national income (GNI).[4] The
1996 election of Liberal-National coalition (LNP)
prime minister John Howard led to a rapid
decline of ODA to 0.24% of GNI by 2000 with a
slight

59
 'Ghost of Empire'
increase to 0.28% by 2006 - in line with the
support to Indonesia during the 2004 tsunami.[5]
[6] The later ALP Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard
governments from 2007 to 2013 saw a return to
Keating administration levels of ODA, with it
plateauing at 0.32% of GNI by 2012.[7] The return
of the LNP in 2013 saw successive governments
rapidly reduce foreign aid spending as a
percentage of GNI from the 2015-16 budget
onwards.[8] By the 2020-21 budget, foreign aid
spending reached a historic low of 0.20% of GNI.
[9] Strikingly, this placed Australia well below the
OECD Development Assistance Committee
Average of 0.32% and far below other countries
that have undergone recent cuts in foreign aid
spending such as the United Kingdom – with its
ODA at 0.5% of GNI.[10] The election of an ALP
government in 2022, led by Anthony Albanese,
resulted in the announcement in the October
2022-23 budget of $1.4bn of extra funding over
four years for ODA.[11] Despite this and the ALP’s
commitment to reach ODA spending of 0.5% of
GNI without a deadline, estimates show that ODA
spending is still set to reduce to 0.17% of GNI by
2025.[12] Therefore, it is clear that Australian
foreign aid spending has remained low relative to
other OECD nations over the last 30 years.
Equally, both the LNP and ALP show different
approaches to foreign aid levels – reflecting
differences in how both view the role of the state
and public expenditure.
It is important in the context of this article,
and to understand Australian foreign aid
generally, to assess where this aid is directed and
what historical explanations there may be.
Overall, most Australian foreign aid is directed
toward two broad regions: the Pacific and South-
East Asia, with ODA commitments of $1.85bn and
$1.15bn in 2022 respectively.[13] Further
disaggregating this, it becomes clear that there
are individual nations that receive significantly
more aid than others in both regions. In the
Pacific, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the
Solomon Islands receive the most aid at around
$596mn and $161mn respectively.[14] In South-
East Asia, Indonesia receives $299mn and Timor-
Leste receives $105mn, with both receiving
significantly more aid than other countries in that
region.[15] There is robust literature to support
the idea that foreign aid is often directed for
political purposes, especially in the context of
decolonisation.[16]
60
This is notable when it is considered that
Australia’s former colony PNG receives the most
Australian aid contributions compared with any
other country.[17] When analysing the Lowy
Institute’s Pacific Aid map, it is immediately
apparent that Australian aid is predominant in
the region.[18] This is not only due to Australia’s
relative wealth in Oceania but also its historical
connection to the Pacific Islands as being
responsible for their security during the cold war,
as agreed with the US, and a shared history of
being former constituents of the British Empire.
[19] In South-East Asia, Australia faced a unique
position after decolonisation of improving
relations, as a nation increasingly independent
from Britain, with newly independent states
whilst still being perceived as a strongly Anglo-
Saxon nation. Close cooperation with the US and
the United Kingdom in situations such as the
formation of Malaysia and the Indonesian
invasion of Timor-Leste only strengthened this
perception.[20] Aid to the major South-East
Asian recipients Indonesia and Timor-Leste has
historically been controversial with numerous
scandals relating to the use or co-opting of
Australian aid programmes. However, Australian
aid is far less significant in the region when
compared with the contributions of other
nations.
With this overview, it is clear that domestic
politics and policy, foreign aid distribution, and
historical context are important to understanding
how neo-colonialism impacts Australian foreign
aid policy.
The Impact of Ignorance and Cultural
Attitudes
Simone Dietrich, a professor at the University of
Geneva, and Richard Moore, a former deputy
director general at AusAID, have both
highlighted the powerful role that politicians and
senior bureaucrats have in 2determining foreign
aid policy - often without public interest or
knowledge of their choices.[21] Therefore, it can
be naturally expected that the prejudices and
cultural attitudes of the political elite will have a
significant impact on foreign aid policy, thus
determining whether it is formulated under a
neo-colonial lens. Several examples of incidents
demonstrating ignorance and insensitivity by
Australian politicians about the politics and
 'Ghost of Empire'

Photo from Ghetty Images

Photo by Deb Dowd • unsplash.com

[...] it can be naturally expected that the prejudices and cultural attitudes of
the political elite will have a significant impact on foreign aid policy, thus
determining whether it is formulated under a neo-colonial lens.

culture of Australian aid recipients demonstrate
this link. Some of the most notable examples have
arisen from the actions of successive Australian
Prime Ministers. In 2008, Kevin Rudd proposed
an ‘Asia-Pacific Community’ without consulting
neighbouring countries.[22] Later in 2011, Julia
Gillard abruptly banned live exports to Indonesia.
[23] Additionally, she proposed processing
migrants in Timor-Leste without consulting the
nation’s government.[24] Tony Abbott’s ‘stop the
boats’ action unilaterally turned back refugee
boats in Indonesian waters.[25] During trade
negotiations with Indonesia in 2017, a sudden
anti-dumping measure was imposed against
Indonesian paper imports.[26] In 2018, Scott
Morrison, like several other prime ministers
before him, did not consult with Indonesia, the
largest Muslim nation in the world and a nation
that holds a pro-Palestine position, when he
proposed moving the Australian embassy to West
Jerusalem – seemingly just to boost the LNP’s
chances in a by-election.[27] Additionally,
Australian Prime Ministers have been seen to 2
be
insensitive and arrogant about Pacific Island
concerns about climate change, with one Pacific
prime minister stating that he was stunned by the
‘shut up and take the money approach by
Morrison in his refusal to register Pacific Island
climate concerns at a meeting of Pacific leaders.
[28] The bellicose approach to aid demonstrated
by Morrison is one of the clearest examples of
how ignorance and prejudice towards recipients
of aid can lead to damaging neo-colonial
approaches to foreign aid. Dietrich and Moore’s
conclusion that aid policy is almost entirely
determined by senior politicians and bureaucrats
is therefore not reassuring when they have
demonstrated they are barely more enlightened
in their actions than the wider public regarding

61
 'Ghost of Empire'
the culture and politics of recipient countries. In
fact, the wider public may be more literate in its
understanding of neighbouring nations
considering the increasing cultural diversity of
Australia, with 24% of the country being of non-
European or indigenous heritage.[29] The
current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Penny Wong
embraces the idea of Australia as being of the
‘Indo-Pacific’ and made Keating-esque rejections
of the ‘ghost of empire’ by publicly resisting
British influence in the Indo-Pacific.[30]
However, the meagre 6% representation of non-
European and indigenous people in Parliament
means that the face Australian leaders present to
aid recipient countries is “white, male, impatient,
and easily offended”.[31]
Although Dietrich and Moore note the limited
impact of the public on foreign aid policy, it is still
relevant to assess the cultural attitudes amongst
the wider population of Australia. This is because
the attitudes held by the general population will
still have some impact on the approach of
politicians, albeit limited. Additionally, part of the
reason the public has minimal impact on foreign
aid policy, as stated by Moore and Dietrich, is
because there is substantial disinterest – which is
worth exploring as potentially contributing to
neo-colonial aid approaches.[32] Unfortunately,
despite being increasingly diverse, there are many
indications that Australian society holds outdated
views of its neighbouring countries - many of
which receive Australian aid. Sean Dorney, a
former correspondent for the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) covering PNG,
stated that the media’s limited and often
misleading coverage leads Australians to view
PNG reductively.[33] The BBC report stating that
70% of PNG women will be raped in their lifetime
is a striking example of what Dorney describes as
“exaggerated and poor coverage”.[34] The poor
coverage of countries that receive Australian aid,
especially PNG as the top receiver of aid, is not
conducive to an environment of accountability for
any neo-colonial approaches politicians or
bureaucrats may take. Demonstrably, this is an
issue in the closed tender $423mn contract
awarded to a small Australian company to manage
Manus Island facilities, a situation echoing the
concept of ‘boomerang aid’ whereby aid is used to
benefit domestic firms.[35] Another issue acutely
affecting Australia and its ability to understand its
62
neighbours is the poor degree of proficiency in
Asian languages and limited programmes for
learning such languages. Australia is far off
Keating’s ambitions of an Australia able to
properly engage with countries such as Indonesia.
One study documented that merely 1000 students
finish school with decent Indonesian language
skills, despite around 191,000 students
undertaking some study of Indonesian from
kindergarten to Year 12.[36] Similar issues affect
research and higher education with multiple
Australian universities discontinuing standalone
Indonesian language programmes. Gerry van
Klinken, an Emeritus professor at the University
of Queensland, noted a negative trend in
Indonesian studies.[37] These trends further
threaten public indifference or endorsement of
neo-colonial approaches to foreign aid as
Australians lack the skills to properly understand
the culture and politics of neighbouring nations
that receive aid, allowing for outdated Anglo-
spheric views to live on. Finally, there is the issue
of actively neo-colonial views held by some in the
public regarding foreign aid. Jennifer Rayner, an
economic policy advisor inPhoto by Renting
Indonesia, C• how
notes unsplash.com
perceptions of neighbouring countries are in
some cases still based on narratives presented in
the 1970s.[38] This encourages the perception of
Australia as the wealthy benefactor to the poor
dependent neighbours.[39] The perception
completely ignores the different development
levels that countries face in their need for aid and
fosters a damagingly insular view that may
encourage governments to reduce or neglect aid
(such as the 2013-2022 LNP governments) based
on the idea that it is ‘feeding a corrupt third
world’.[40] Therefore, it is clear that poor
understanding and prejudices towards aid
recipient nations amongst the general public have
the damaging effect of enabling politicians and
bureaucrats to adopt neo-colonial approaches to
aid as they are free of the fear
2 of accountability.
It is worth examining whether the increasing
diversity of Australia is having any tangible impact
on cultural attitudes and perspectives towards
neighbouring countries and whether this would
impact foreign aid policy. After the 2022 election,
Penny Wong’s ascent to the position of Foreign
Minister of Australia as a woman of mixed
heritage seemingly demonstrated a significant
move away from an Anglo-Saxon-dominated
 'Ghost of Empire'
political space. Her confident speeches in Bahasa
Indonesian, and Malay on overseas trips and her
rejection of British neo-colonial approaches to
Indopacific diplomacy through reference to her
family’s experience of colonialism displayed
convincingly how diversity could reduce the
prominence of neo-colonial approaches to foreign
policy.[41]However, Wong remains an exception
to the rule in Australian politics and policy. In an
article for Australian Foreign Affairs, journalist
Aarti Betigeri laments how a significant increase
in the Asian population in Australia has failed to
materialise into corresponding political
representation.[42] This poor representation
inhibits a move away from neo-colonial
approaches to foreign aid as unrepresentative
politics will fail to consider the insight of those
who have personal connections with recipient
states.[43] Director of the International Security
Program at the Lowy Institute, Sam Roggeveen,
argues for an increased Indonesian diaspora in
order to boost relations with Indonesia and
improve Australia’s case for being a credible part
of the Indopacific.[44] However, it is hard to see
how this and other further changes in the
demography of Australia would have an impact if
there isn’t corresponding representation.
Therefore, although Australia is an increasingly
multicultural society, the impact of this on
foreign aid policy has remained notably limited.
The fear of ‘Asian invasion’ has remained
prevalent throughout Australian history and
culture – this fear could act as another source of
neo-colonial foreign aid policy. The historian
David Walker has described how fear of an Asian
invader has persisted throughout Australian
popular culture through the publication of many
influential fiction and non-fiction books.[45]
Books such as Red Zone and The Reckoning: The Day
Australia Fell help contribute to a paranoia about
Asian countries; a paranoia that has political
impacts such as Senator Pauline Hanson’s speech
where she talked of Australia being “swamped by
Asians”.[46]This paranoia will only contribute to
prejudiced views of recipient states, in turn
maintaining neo-colonial foreign aid approaches
that view countries as being almost inherently a
threat to Australia. Former defence minister Peter
Dutton’s statement to “prepare for war” shortly
after the signed security deal between the
Solomon Islands and China displays
63
The fear of ‘Asian invasion’
has remained prevalent
throughout Australian history
and culture – this fear could
act as another source of neo-
colonial foreign aid policy.
how easily the fear of ‘Asian invasion’ can
translate into neo-colonial views towards
recipient states which dismisses their sovereignty
– with the subtext that aid should buy loyalty to
Australian policy objectives.[47] It is concerning
to note that it is unlikely that Morrison and
Dutton would have accused the ALP of being
“China’s pick” during the 2022 election if they did
not believe there was still an audience
Photo for this
by Renting sort
C• unsplash.com
of hyperbolic rhetoric.[48] It is even more
unfortunate to note that the younger Australian
generation in politics is displaying a more ‘hard-
line’ approach to China which may colour foreign
aid approaches in a security-centric and likely
neo-colonial lens.[49] It could be argued that the
younger generation's stance displays that fear of
China is not an inherently colonial position, as it
is a more modern perspective, separate from fears
of ‘Asian invasion’, that has developed in lieu of a
more assertive China. However, even if this is the
case, it is important to consider how this will
increasingly frame aid policy as a tool to counter
China in recipient states. This could lead to neo-
colonial approaches where aid is viewed as a way
to reduce the flexibility and agency of recipient
states in their foreign affairs via dependence on
Australian aid. Therefore, fears of an ‘Asian
invasion’, recently manifesting through fears of
Chinese influence, threaten to further make aid
neo-colonial in how recipient states are viewed
but also how they are treated – as dependents
that can have their foreign policy agency
purchased by Australian aid. Unfortunately, such
approaches are already in motion in aid policy;
with Morrison’s ‘Pacific
 'Ghost of Empire'
'Step-Up' being specifically aimed at countering
Chinese influence.[50]
Defence and Security Beats Aid and
Diplomacy
In the book States, Markets, and Foreign Aid,
Dietrich argued that institutions play a pivotal
role in the formation of foreign aid policy and aid
delivery.[51] Therefore, it is reasonable to assess if
Australian government institutions play a role in
precluding or allowing neo-colonial approaches
to foreign aid. Notably, Dietrich observes how
domestic priorities, and the role of other
institutions may constrain or impact aid agencies.
In Australia, most notably since the election of the
LNP Abbott government, there has been a
significant shift away from foreign aid and
diplomacy to a focus on defence and intelligence.
By 2022, after a 7.4% nominal increase in defence
spending, spending on defence as a percentage of
GDP stood at 2.11% whilst that of aid was at a
mere 0.2%.[52] The consistent increases in
funding for intelligence services and the Malcolm
Turnbull established Home Affairs have placed
intelligence as well as defence at the centre of
foreign policy.[53] Even the first budget of the
Albanese government in 2022 oversaw an increase
of $100mn in spending for the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), despite an
apparent refocus by Wong on foreign aid.[54]The
extent of neglect to foreign aid and its
corresponding ministry has meant that the 2022
$1.4bn aid boost barely makes up for the cut in
real terms since 2013.[55] The neglect of the
ministry responsible for foreign aid, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),
leaves it now severely lacking capacity- with some
warning that it could be reduced to doing little
more than organising ministerial visits and
consular administration. With no budget boost in
2022, there should be concern over how DFAT
will properly ensure the aid budget is deployed
effectively and sensitively.[56] The merging of
DFAT with the now obsolete AusAID in 2013
clearly displays this dramatically reduced focus on
aid.[57] The weakness and poor capacity of DFAT
and its foreign aid budget, compared to defence
and intelligence, is cause for concern. Not only
does this situation somewhat automatically give
aid and diplomacy a secondary role to security but
64
that also risks aid being co-opted for the aims of
the defence and intelligence institutions. Some
evidence for this is provided by the unexpected
negative reaction of the defence and intelligence
community to Turnbull’s large cuts to aid in 2018,
displaying that they had gotten used to an aid
programme suited to their interests.[58]
Although, this could be seen as being on the
contrary; a vindication that defence and
intelligence desires a stronger independent aid
programme. However, past co-opting of aid for
intelligence activities suggests a less transparent
motivation.[59] The following paragraphs will
provide examples of this in Timor-Leste,
Indonesia, and the Pacific where Australian
defence and intelligence institutions have co-
opted aid to make it a neo-colonial instrument,
rather than one for promoting development.
Australia’s relations with Timor-Leste
demonstrate clearly how defence and intelligence
institutions can co-opt foreign aid for their own
interests. Firstly, the invasion of Timor-Leste was
supported by Australia, which continued to
provide significant amounts of foreign aid to
Indonesia and covertly supported Indonesia’s
actions.[60]Indonesia’s stance on Timor-Leste was
generally supported from the premiership of
Gough Whitlam until the Timor-Leste
independence referendum.[61] In this way,
Australian policy regarding Timor-Leste had long
been defined by defence and intelligence. Some
have resisted the idea of Australia being
responsible for this situation and instead have
criticised the deleterious role of European
colonial powers and US foreign policy.[62]
However, even if this was the case it was only after
Timor-Leste’s independence that intelligence
fully made use of aid for their own aims. Firstly,
former foreign affairs minister Alexander Downer
completely prioritised the maintenance of the
Timor Gap Treaty over large Australian aid
programmes supporting the transition to
independence.[63] This treaty had been part of
the motivation for Australia’s support for
Indonesian occupation of the area.[64] This
prioritisation already displayed that aid was being
viewed as a lesser concern compared with
maintaining the previous division of the Timor
Sea that according to international law unfairly
benefitted Australia.[65] The most egregious
misuse of aid occurred
 'Ghost of Empire'
in 2004 when the Australian Secret Intelligence
Service (ASIS) used the guise of an Australian aid
programme to bug government offices in Dili, the
capital of Timor-Leste.[66] The Australian
government used this information to secure a
very favourable renegotiation of the Timor Gap
treaty.[67] The possible infiltration of Woodside,
the Australian petroleum company with offices in
Dili, by Australian intelligence displays how
widespread the intelligence community’s
influence was with less funding than they possess
today.[68] This episode demonstrates how it is
entirely feasible for other government institutions
to appropriate aid programmes for their own, in
this case, neo-colonial interests. However, even
more concerning was the response of the
government after this spying scandal was
revealed. Although the Gillard government
initially revealed the situation, the subsequent
Abbott government led the prosecution of
Bernard Collaery and retired ASIS agent Witness
K for “conspiring to reveal classified
information”.[69] A writer on the topic, Kim
McGrath, stated that “opportunities for an
operative to challenge […] an immoral or illegal
act are limited and likely to be career-ending”.
[70] This very poor oversight of an expanding and
increasingly centralised security service creates a
high risk that aid programmes will be misused for
neo-colonial objectives – without the knowledge
of and accountability from those outside these
intelligence institutions.
Australia’s relations with Indonesia, like with
Timor-Leste, demonstrate a concerning
willingness of the security services to engage in
what McGrath described as “immoral or illegal”
acts.[71] Declassified documents have shown that
Australia used Radio Australia to spread
Indonesian military propaganda in 1965 –
encouraging the massacre of hundreds of
thousands of suspected communists.[72] A non-
governmental organisation held the International
People’s Tribunal in the Hague in 2015 in which it
ruled that international complicity and false
propaganda were amongst ten gross human rights
violations exhibited in Indonesia following
Suharto’s coup – displaying that Australia is
strongly viewed as complicit by some legal
practitioners and activists.[73] The use of Radio
Australia in such a way shows a willingness to
misuse other institutions and
65
engage in unethical behaviour in relations with
Indonesia that has persisted into the last decade.
The 2013 Australia-Indonesia spying scandal
began once the Guardian and ABC revealed that
Australian intelligence had attempted to monitor
the former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono’s phone.[74] The absence of any
apology or recourse from Australia presented a
striking lack of accountability.[75] These
examples highlight the issue of security services
manipulating other institutions and their lack of
accountability, with potentially deleterious effects
for the aim of a non-colonial foreign aid policy.
Although some experts highlight the strong
mutual trust with Indonesia on issues such as
security and encouraging aid, as seen during the
2004 tsunami, the influence of intelligence looms
large over the anaemic DFAT and Australian aid.
[76]
Australian relations with the Pacific Island
states have not experienced similar controversies
surrounding direct intervention by security
services through aid to influence their politics.
Part of this reason may be that Australia has
patronisingly considered the Pacific States to be a
part of its ‘backyard’ and therefore acts with a
more stably favourable environment in terms of
intelligence and defence.[77] However, equally
important is that the Australian security sector
has shaped aid to reflect its interests in countering
China and maintaining its dominant position in
the region. Jenny Hayward-Jones of the Lowy
Institute has observed how Australian aid has
become too focused on security and governance,
partly as a result of Australia lobbying to make
foreign aid and policy in the Pacific reflect its
interests over those of the Pacific states.[78] This
was clearly displayed in the deployment of
Australian Federal Police to Bougainville at the
request of PNG after a violent rebellion.[79]
Morrison’s ‘Pacific Step-Up’ strongly reflected the
interests of defence by providing billions of
Australian dollars for patrol boats, defence
colleges, and the redevelopment of a naval base
on Manus in PNG.[80] It is clear how the relative
weakness of DFAT and Australian ODA allows for
defence and intelligence to completely dominate
the agenda and direction of aid – not just to
manipulate its programmes in covert operations.
This, along with the examples
 'Ghost of Empire'

Photo by Erin Gleeson • flickr.com

The predominance in the provision of aid to a country can bear some risks in
terms of creating an unequal relationship, where the dependency of the recipient
gives the donor significant leverage....giving [aid] is, among other things, an
expression of power – especially between states”

previously provided illustrates a strong risk of a predominant in an entire region: the South
neo-colonial approach to aid. Pacific.[82] Although the region is sometimes
described as a collection of ‘small island states’,
Neo-Colonial Aspects to Predominance the combined Pacific Islands Exclusive Economic
Zone is three times the size of China, thus
and Neglect of Aid Provision
representing a significant geographic zone and
The predominance in the provision of aid to a
sovereign area for one country to be the
country can bear some risks in terms of creating
dominant aid provider to.[83] Hayward-Jones
an unequal relationship, where the dependency of
describes the effect of this aid on diplomacy as
the recipient gives the donor significant leverage.
leading to “conversations based on the
Hugh White, a defence analyst, observes that
assumption that the Australian holds leverage
“giving [aid] is, among other things, an
that the Pacific islander does not”.[84] With
expression of power – especially between states”.
Australia having other ‘soft power’ influences in
[81] This form of relationship could be misused by
the region such as the use of the Australian dollar,
the donor in a neo-colonial fashion. Whilst
high viewership of Australian broadcasting and
Australia doesn’t command this dominance in aid
sport, and strong presence of Australian
provision in South-East Asia, it is uniquely

66
 'Ghost of Empire'
firms, it is clear to see how aid negotiations could
be overshadowed by Australia’s already strong
influence.[85] The view of aid officials as being
“on the same level as MPs” in the Pacific furthers
Dietrich’s point that ‘bypass’ forms of aid delivery
- which Australia uses partly due to a greatly
diminished capacity - can undermine citizen
confidence in elected leaders, stagnating
indigenous development.[86] Therefore,
Australia’s dominance in aid provision to the
Pacific Islands has a potential neo-colonial aspect
in terms of giving Australia significant leverage
and potentially undermining development by
maintaining this dependency.
Although dominance in aid provision can be
seen as inherently neo-colonial and unfavourable,
it can also be suggested that neglect of both aid
provision and responsiveness to the specific needs
of recipients can manifest as a neo-colonial
approach to aid. It can represent a belief that
recipient states will simply have to fall into line
with Australia’s priorities as they are poorer and
dependent on existing aid programmes. The
“shut up and take the money” approach by
Morrison in a Pacific leaders’ conference, in
which he completely dismissed the climate
concerns of Pacific Island leaders reflects a
particularly clear example of this patronising
attitude that views Australia as the natural
regional leader.[87]However, the solution to the
issue of neglected aid levels must also not fall into
the trap of thinking along neo-colonial lines,
viewing aid simply as a tool of influence and
leverage. This has been a problem reflected in the
arguments of some who suggest raising aid levels
to counter China or to reassert Australian
influence – rather than to improve development.
[88] One argument by John Blaxland called for
the creation of a grand compact for the Pacific to
permanently deal with this issue of neglect,
claiming that if Australia took responsibility for
many governance tasks, it would address issues
faced by the Pacific Islands.[89] Although
Blaxland dismissed rebuttals that this would be
neo-colonial, it seems unclear that even if
Australia took legal responsibility for certain
aspects of Pacific Island governance it would stop
neglecting the region.[90] In terms of South-East
Asia, it seems less likely that there is a similar risk
of dominant aid, however, neo-colonial
approaches could still lead to unfocused and
67
ineffective aid, focused on the impossible aim of
influencing foreign policies of countries not
reliant on Australia.[91] Therefore, it is clear that
either neglect or dominance of aid provision can
have neo-colonial aspects and that solutions to
solve neglect can also risk neo-colonial
approaches.
Conclusion – Is the Current Labor
Government Addressing these Issues?
In this article, several key issues that have resulted
in and risk neo-colonial foreign aid policy were
highlighted. A political and public sphere
woefully ignorant of recipient states, a dominant
security sector, and the issue of aid levels all
contribute and risk further contributing to neo-
colonial aid approaches. Unfortunately, these
problems have only worsened over the last decade
with a negative trend in the study of Asian culture
and languages, a considerable climb in funding
for defence and intelligence at the expense of aid,
and a complete disregard for Pacific climate
concerns. However, the 2022 election, although a
peak for ‘Asian invasion’ rhetoric, also brought in
a new government with a seemingly different
approach to the LNP governments of the last
decade. Wong’s ascent to the role of foreign
minister marked a victory for the representation
of Australia’s multicultural society. However,
more notably it gave power to an adept politician
who has clearly and publicly stated aims to move
away from US-led, security-obsessed foreign
policy towards one of increased focus on aid,
diplomacy, and that thinks of Australia as part of
the Asia-Pacific.[92] Wong’s successful
achievement of a $1.4bn boost for aid in the 2022-
23 budget, with a notable increase for South-East
Asia, displays her seriousness about her stated
aims.[93] An equally positive development has
been Anthony Albanese’s shift away from
Morrison’s anglosphere security focussed
approach (AUKUS being an example of this) to
one that more actively engages neighbours and
recipients of foreign aid.[94] The new prime
minister’s first overseas visit was to Indonesia
where he was received warmly by Indonesian
President Joko Widodo with an extremely well-
planned reception of Albanese.[95] Although
Albanese’s difficulties in saying a simple
Indonesian phrase at the visit highlights
Australia’s persistent lack of cultural engagement
 'Ghost of Empire'
A political and public sphere
woefully ignorant of recipient
states, a dominant security sector,
and the issue of aid levels all
contribute and risk further
contributing to neo-colonial aid
approaches. Unfortunately, these
problems have only worsened over
the last decade with a negative
trend in the study of Asian culture
and languages, a considerable
climb in funding for defence and
intelligence at the expense of aid,
and a complete disregard for Pacific
climate concerns.
with its neighbours and Wong’s aid boost doesn’t
make up for previous years of cuts in real terms,
their approach departs significantly from the past.
[96] Additionally, the Albanese government has
taken important steps to signal its commitment to
help address the climate concerns of the Pacific
Islands. After nearly a decade of no climate
legislation, September 2022 saw the passing of the
Climate Change Act that enshrined a large
emissions reduction target for 2030.[97] In March
2023, Australia co-sponsored a UN general
assembly bid by Vanuatu to get the International
Court of Justice to rule on the legal consequences
of causing environmental harm.[98] Merely the
statement that Australia “recognises that climate
change is the greatest threat to [..] our closest
neighbours in the Indo-Pacific” made by DFAT is
a significant departure from the past.[99] The
positive shift away from the thinking displayed
under the previous Labor government in 2013 a
year into the Albanese administration’s term
provides some hope for a move away from neo-
colonial approaches to aid. However, they will
need strong political will to address the
fundamental
68
challenges of cultural attitudes deeply seated in
Australian political and public consciousness, the
mammoth defence, and intelligence institutions
and problems inherent in different aid levels –
issues that the seemingly unstoppable security
focus on China may only worsen. In this way, neo-
colonial approaches persist in Australian foreign
aid policy and may worsen if the new Labor
government lacks the motivation or strength to
address their fundamental origins.
In creating this article the Foreign Minister and the
Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade were asked
for comment. A DFAT director writing on behalf of the
Foreign Minister responded to a request for comment by
stating that “The Government is committed to an
effective, targeted and generous development program
that advances our interests in a peaceful, stable and
prosperous Indo-Pacific. We are committed to working
in partnership with our neighbours to address their
development needs and priorities.”
Endnotes
[1] Walker, "Significant Other: Anxieties About Australia’s
Asian Future,." Chapter 2.
[2] Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign Aid.
[3] Clare, “Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget:
Budget Review 2022–23 Index”.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Gyngell, "Testing Ground: A New Statecraft for South-
East Asia." Chapter 2.
[7] Clare, “Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget:
Budget Review 2022–23 Index”
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Clare, “Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget:
Budget Review 2022–23 Index”; OECD, “Official
development assistance (ODA)”.
[11] Commonwealth of Australia, “Budget Measures:
Budget Paper No. 2”.
[12] Hurst, “Foreign aid gets $1.4bn budget boost but
Australia still among least generous in OECD”; Clare,
“Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget: Budget
Review 2022–23 Index”.
[13] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian
Official Development Assistance budget summary 2022-
23”.
[14] Figures cited in this article linked to Australian federal
budgets are in Australian dollars; Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, “Australian Official Development
Assistance budget summary 2022-23”.
[15] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian
Official Development Assistance budget summary 2022-
23”.
[16] Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign Aid.
 'Ghost of Empire'
[17] Ibid.; Dorney, "The Papua New Guinea Awakening:
Inside the forgotten colony,." Chapter 5.
[18] Lowy Institute, “Lowy Institute Pacific Aid Map”
[19] Morgan, "Ripple Effect: The cost of our Pacific
neglect,." Chapter 3.
[20] Gyngell, "Testing Ground: A New Statecraft for
South-East Asia,." Chapter 2.
[21] Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign Aid; Moore,
"Review of ‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma:
Humanitarian Aspirations Confront Democratic
Legitimacy',." Chapter 9.
[22] Teo, "Can Australia Be One of Us? The view from
Asia,." Chapter 5.
[23] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[24] Megalogenis, "The Rookie PMs: How Canberra’s
Leadership Circus is Damaging Ties with Asia,." Chapter 4.
[25] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[26] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3. Ibid.
[27] Megalogenis, "The Rookie PMs: How Canberra’s
Leadership Circus is Damaging Ties with Asia." Chapter 4.
[28] Rudd, The Avoidable War.
[29] Megalogenis, "The Rookie PMs: How Canberra’s
Leadership Circus is Damaging Ties with Asia." Chapter 4.
[30] Harris, “Penny Wong tells Britain to confront its
colonial past.”
[31] Megalogenis, "The Rookie PMs: How Canberra’s
Leadership Circus is Damaging Ties with Asia." Chapter 4.
[32] Moore, "Review of ‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma:
Humanitarian Aspirations Confront Democratic
Legitimacy'." Chapter 9; Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign
Aid.
[33] Dorney, "The Papua New Guinea Awakening: Inside
the forgotten colony." Chapter 5.
[34] BBC, “Port Moresby: The world's most dangerous city
to be a woman?"
[35] Dorney, "The Papua New Guinea Awakening: Inside
the forgotten colony." Chapter 5.
[36] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[37] Klinken; Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is
Indonesia leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[38] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[39] Rayner, "The View From Australia: Is Indonesia
leaving us behind?" Chapter 3.
[40] Klinken.
[41] Doogue, "Penny Wong: Testing Herself and Australia."
Chapter 6; Harris, “Penny Wong tells Britain to confront
its colonial past.”
[42] Betigeri, "New Wave: Australia’s nation-changing
Indian diaspora." Chapter 3.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Roggeveen, "The Fix: The Case for a Larger
Indonesian Diaspora." Chapter 6.
[45] Walker, "Significant Other: Anxieties About
Australia’s Asian Future." Chapter 2.
69
[46] Perlez, "Review of 'Red Zone' and 'China Panic'."
Chapter 8; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Scrap
multiculturalism, Pauline Hanson declares.”
[47] Thompson, “‘Reality of our time’: Dutton warns
Australians to prepare for war.”; Moore, "Review of
‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma: Humanitarian
Aspirations Confront Democratic Legitimacy'." Chapter 9.
[48] The Guardian, “Scott Morrison calls Labor MP a
'Manchurian candidate' in extraordinary scenes in
parliament”; Hurst, “Peter Dutton has plumbed new and
dangerous depths by suggesting China is backing Labor”.
[49] Dziedzic, "Young Guns: Is a generation gap fuelling
Australia’s China debate?" Chapter 6.
[50] Morgan, "Ripple Effect: The cost of our Pacific
neglect." Chapter 3.
[51] Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign Aid.
[52] Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “The cost of
Defence ASPI defence budget brief 2022–2023.”; Clare,
“Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget: Budget
Review 2022–23 Index”.
[53] Walters, "Spies, China and Megabytes: Inside the
overhaul of Australia’s intelligence agencies." Chapter 3.
[54] Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,
“Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Entity
resources and planned performance.”; Commonwealth of
Australia, “Budget Measures: Budget Paper No. 2”;
Commonwealth of Australia, “Portfolio Budget Statements
2022-23 Budget Related Paper No. 1. 10 Home Affairs
Portfolio”.
[55] Clare, “Parliament of Australia: Foreign Aid Budget:
Budget Review 2022–23 Index”
[56] Tyler, "The Fix: How to Rebuild Australia’s Diplomatic
Capacity." Chapter 7.
[57] Moore, "Review of ‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma:
Humanitarian Aspirations Confront Democratic
Legitimacy'." Chapter 9.
[58] Grigg et al, “Defence establishment frowns on
proposed Australian aid cuts.”
[59] Grigg et al, “Defence establishment frowns on
proposed Australian aid cuts.”
[60] McGrath, "Drawing the Line: Witness K and the ethics
of spying." Chapter 4.; Bayuni, "The View From Indonesia:
Dispatch from an indifferent neighbour." Chapter 4.
[61] Curran, "Seeing China Coming: Behind Keating’s pact
with Indonesia." Chapter 6.
[62] Greenlees, "Review of ‘A Narrative of Denial:
Australia and the Indonesian Violation of East Timor’."
Chapter 10.
[63] McGrath, "Drawing the Line: Witness K and the ethics
of spying." Chapter 4.
[64] McGrath, "Drawing the Line: Witness K and the ethics
of spying." Chapter 4.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Walden, "Review of ‘The Jakarta Method."
 'Ghost of Empire'
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ruby, "Silent Partners: US bases in Australia." Chapter
3.
[75] Bayuni, "The View From Indonesia: Dispatch from an
indifferent neighbour." Chapter 4.
[76] Bayuni, "The View From Indonesia: Dispatch from an
indifferent neighbour." Chapter 4.; Farmer, "Review of
‘Common Enemies: Crime, Policy and Politics in
Australia–Indonesia Relations’." Chapter 8.
[77] Moore, "Review of ‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Dilemma:
Humanitarian Aspirations Confront Democratic
Legitimacy'." Chapter 9.
[78] Hayward-Jones, "Cross Purposes: Why is Australia’s
Pacific influence waning?" Chapter 3.
[79] Bohane, "Bougainville’s Quest for Independence: A
special report on the referendum." Chapter 6.
[80] Hayward-Jones, "Cross Purposes: Why is Australia’s
Pacific influence waning?" Chapter 3.
[81] Roggeveen, "The Fix: The Case for a Larger
Indonesian Diaspora." Chapter 6.
[82] Strangio, "Red Flags: China’s expanding footprint in
South-East Asia." Chapter 3.; Hayward-Jones, "Cross
Purposes: Why is Australia’s Pacific influence waning?"
Chapter 3.
[83] Marshall, “The Power of Geography”; Rudd, The
Avoidable War.
[84] Hayward-Jones, "Cross Purposes: Why is Australia’s
Pacific influence waning?" Chapter 3.
[85] Hayward-Jones, "Cross Purposes: Why is Australia’s
Pacific influence waning?" Chapter 3.
[86] Ibid.; Dietrich, States, Markets and Foreign Aid.
[87] Rudd, The Avoidable War; Morgan, "Ripple Effect: The
cost of our Pacific neglect." Chapter 3.
[88] Bergin et al, "The Fix: How Australia Can Boost
Business Ties with the Pacific." Chapter 6.
[89] Blaxland, "The Fix: Developing a Grand Compact for
the Pacific." Chapter 6.
[90] Blaxland, "The Fix: Developing a Grand Compact for
the Pacific." Chapter 6.
[91] Le, "The Fix: How Australia Can Supercharge Its
Digital Engagement with South-East Asia." Chapter 6;
Middleton, "Blind Spot: Why Australia needs a South-East
Asia step-up." Chapter 4.
[92] Wong, "The End of Orthodoxy: Australia in a Post-
Pandemic World." Chapter 6.
[93] Commonwealth of Australia, “Budget Measures:
Budget Paper No. 2”.
[94] Mahbubani, "Australia’s Choice: Can it be a bridge to
Asia?" Chapter 5.
[95] Prime Minister of Australia, "Press Conference
Transcript: Jakarta 6 June 2022."
[96] Prime Minister of Australia, "Press Conference
Transcript: Jakarta 6 June 2022."
[97] Australian Government, “Climate Change Act 2022”.
[98] Hurst, “Australia joins Vanuatu bid for international
court to rule on obligation to prevent climate harm”.
[99] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian
Official Development Assistance budget summary 2022-
23”.
70
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72

Decolonization from Theory to Practice:
Museums Must Show Us Our History
Written by Chaaru Jain
M
useums have long been institutions
that play a crucial role in preserving
and interpreting cultural heritage.
However, their history is also
intertwined with colonialism and the exploitation
of Indigenous cultures and peoples. In recent
years, there has been growing recognition of the
need to address this legacy and to work towards
decolonizing museums. However, what this could
look like in practice, or how this theory can be
translated into practice is often ambiguous.
Decolonization involves a radical rethinking of the
role and purpose of museums, and a steadfast
commitment to promoting inclusion, diversity,
and cultural understanding. This paper will
73
08
Photo by Andrew Neel • unsplash.com
examine and review various theoretical
approaches that surround decolonial practices in
the curation of a museum that deals with artifacts
and histories from the colonial past. Current and
evolving dialogue on postcolonial representation
in museums as public spaces will be explored,
outlining some best practices in terms of curating
exhibitions that have globalized audiences.
To better understand the decolonization
movement within the field of museology, Michael
Ralph Trouillot’s Silencing the Past- Power and the
Production of History is a useful guide. Trouillot
asserts that “human beings participate in history
both as actors and as narrators”.[1] The overlap
between ‘what actually happened’ and ‘
 Decolonization from Theory to Practice
that which is said to have happened’ is attributed
to the fluidity of boundaries between socio-
historical processes and our knowledge of them.
[2] The scale of agriculture is so large that the
cropland and pastures cover around half of the
inhabitable land on Earth (WWF, n.d.). However,
the reality is more concerning given that there
would be a global population growth of up to 9
billion people by 2050, meaning that in the future,
a 70% increase in the agricultural production of
food would be required. On top of that, it is
anticipated that the global middle class will
substantially expand, indicating an increase in
demand and consumption of resource-intensive
foods such as meat, cheese and eggs (Benton,
2016). The distinction between the historical
process and historical knowledge, Trouillot
expounds, was manufactured by positivist
historians of the 19th century to gain credibility
and “scientific professionalism”.[3] Within
Western scholarship, they intended to self-fashion
their role as those who “reveal the past, discover
or at least approximate the truth”.[4] In this
format, power relations have seldom been
questioned, and history has become a story
narrated from the perspective of the victors. The
Curator Emerita of the Museum of Vancouver,
Lynn Maranda, states that the museum is a
construct of this very Western scholarship that
embodies a “colonial fact” by confining the exotic
and unfamiliar since the European countries’ “Age
of Discovery” launched in the 18th century.[5]
Trouillot argues that this Western approach to
historical narratives led to non-Westerners to
finding themselves disadvantaged from the start.
Were incomparable, indigenous objects were to
meet the historian’s criteria, leading to the
denigration of the “Other’s” intellectuality, and
thus, a proof of their inferiority.[6] Traditional
museum settings are given the duty to carry out
immense provenance research, and according to
Margareta van Oswald, this research process leads
to “the symbolic geographies and hierarchies of
knowledge production that are sustained between
the Global North and South”.[7] After the
unveiling of the disproportionate access to
resources, the same hierarchies are further
reproduced during the analysis and research of
provenance histories.[8] To further the
understanding of this knowledge production, he
74
tackles the tension between the individual and the
collective, where life histories start with the birth
of the individual but cannot be viewed without an
added layer of the collective that holds its own
past.[9] This collective remembering informs the
decision-making process behind the construction
of history, but Trouillot reminds us of the dilemma
that “the constructed past itself is constitutive of
the collectivity”.[10] This collective reproduces an
already accepted history, adjuring questions about
the power held by some narratives over others.
This prejudiced process shifts how that power is
contrived and what leads to the different versions
of the same story.
The concepts explored above reverberate
Bhambra’s argument, which argues that the
ideological formation of the historian has an
impact on the manner in which they narrate
history. The one-sidedness of history can be
rectified if the concrete production of narratives is
probed with more of these questions, studying
“the social process and narratives about that
process” instead of isolating the meaning of
history to illustrations or texts.[11] Trouillot
further observes that history is accessed, and in
turn produced, primarily outside the classroom by
the average public through “celebrations, site and
museum visits, movies, national holidays, and
primary school books” followed by verification,
modification and interrogation by scholars during
primary research.[12] In this way, museums
holding anthropology collections face the concern
of appropriately representing a community, most
often belonging to the cultural “Other,” especially
as they hold the status of a site for knowledge
production and dissemination by experts.[13]
In the following section, some best practices
that have been circulating through the community
regarding what decolonizing the museum could
look like will be explored. In their article on
“Decolonial AestheSis: Colonial
Wounds/Decolonial Healings”, Walter Mignolo
and Rolando Vasquez present the existing
discourse on “the struggles that arise when […]
challenging the hegemonic normativity of modern
aestheTics” whose origins can be traced back to
the very beginning of colonial times.[14] E.H.
Gombrich reverberates this struggle when
designating the task of the museum to offer their
 Decolonization from Theory to Practice
audience both prodesse and delectare, “a problem
with no easy solution”.[15] In light of this, it is
worth noting Ann Laura Stoler’s suggestion of
understanding and weaving Levi-Strauss’s
anthropological views into curatorial procedures
to be accommodating to the ‘unwritten’ alongside
the written with the aim of providing more
comprehensive narratives.[16] Stoler argues that
this ‘unwritten’ leads to the identification of
“imperial dispositions of changing imperial orders
[…] which are key to understanding what it took
to live a colonial life, to live in and off empire and
was reflective of its practices”.[17] The intricacies
to these characteristics lie in the ‘unwritten’ which
were so due to either having been common
knowledge, “gone without saying or […], or could
not yet be articulated, or because it could not be
said”.[18] In order to initiate this modification to
allow for museum knowledge frameworks and
epistemologies to embrace the ‘unwritten,’
Margareta von Oswald’s suggests
“reconceptualising the storing, ordering, and
digital documentation of collections […] and,
thus, to redefine the collections themselves.”[19]
This step would further stimulate discussions on
positionality, reflection on the narratives of
history being presented by the institution, and
help locate the voices that may hitherto have been
silent.
Museums as institutions need to “recognize
the ‘cultural continuum’ and be reflective of
living cultures rather than just Indigenous
cultures of the past”.[20] In accord, Iris van Huis
advocates for interventions such as partnerships
that incorporate “other ideas and perspectives, to
other ways of ‘seeing’ and ‘doing’, and to listening
other ‘voices’ would allow for a platform for
postcolonial narratives to be expressed over
ethno-nationalist ones.[21] These would also
provide “[…] better control over aspects of
museum activity that aim to present Indigenous
lifeways and thought” through the inclusion of
histories of agency and resistance otherwise often
silenced or reserved for those holding power in
colonial history.[22] It is essential to shed past
mindsets to move towards normalizing decolonial
ideologies, a derivative of “us (settlers)
understanding how and what to give up and, give
back in order to ensure the preconditions required
for unmetaphorized “decolonization (land
back)”[23] Through inviting Indigenous
75
communities to the forefront of museums’
undertakings, an indigenized space can be created
where they are not required to conform or curtain
to the normative expectations and standards set
by institutions that long-held superiority and
privilege.[24] Truly including the indigenous
communities would ensure the “promotion of
cultural production of indigenous peoples from a
position of prominence in all aspects including
the curation, graphic design, visual identity,
mediation activities, public events for the
elaboration of materials, the works of art […]”.
[25] By means of accepting Indigenous modes of
thinking, juxtaposing the written and the
‘unwritten,’ deliberating on appropriate
terminologies, mapping individual and collective
positionalities which allow space for assessing
reality and power structures, as well as building
long-term partnerships, active decolonization of
our own thinking rather than decolonizing
museums.[26] Another tool that can be employed
in the attempt to decolonize museums would be to
include segments that encourage visitors to be
reflective of colonial histories that have
authorized museums as institutions and the
collections it has resultingly exhibited resultantly.
[27]
Another suggestion is put forth by Sophie
Walsh, which is the concept of community
museums that offer globalized audiences and
postcolonial communities a space to “represent
their identities to the world”.[28] By embodying
the qualities of tourism and educational spaces,
these museums would be managed by
communities themselves in order to rectify
previous “colonial mistakes” arising from
traditional non-indigenous curators in
“encyclopedic museums” who lacked the ability to
collaborate with the indigenous communities.[29]
This opens up spaces for the (hi)stories of the
colonized to be given the previously inaccessible
focus leading to opportunities for the community
museum itself to conduct crucial research on
decolonization.[30] These spaces can also be seen
as institutions to preserve narratives and promote
‘glocal’ connections.[31] Concordantly, Csilla E.
Areies and Magdalena Wróblewska emphasize the
importance of championing empathy which is not
possible without including members of the
 Museums as institutions need to “recognize the ‘cultural continuum’ and be
reflective of living cultures rather than just Indigenous cultures of the past”.
In accord, Iris van Huis advocates for interventions such as partnerships
that incorporate “other ideas and perspectives, to other ways of ‘seeing’ and
‘doing’, and to listening other ‘voices’ would allow for a platform for
postcolonial narratives to be expressed over ethno-nationalist ones.

Photo by Dhruv Mehra • unsplash.com

 Decolonization from Theory to Practice
community in the museum teams at all levels,
alongside efforts to highlight distinct biographies
over-generalizations, moderate discussions
respectfully, and conduct diversity trainings as
required.[32] Through these direct connections
within communities, emotive exhibitions can be
created to foster safe spaces where “experiencing,
processing and discussing feelings” is encouraged.
[33] For museum visitors, engaging and visiting
these museums can in itself be an act of
decoloniality.[34]
In conclusion, decolonizing museums is a
complex and ongoing process that requires a deep
commitment to acknowledging and rectifying the
harm caused by colonialism, and to creating more
inclusive and diverse cultural spaces. Through a
combination of practical steps, museums can work
towards a more equitable and respectful
representation of Indigenous cultures and
histories. These include but are not limited to
accepting concepts like that of community
museums, revising policies keeping in mind
preceding power imbalances, focusing on creating
strong partnerships with Indigenous communities
and upholding decolonizing and indigenizing
principles. The journey towards decolonization
requires museums to engage in self-reflection,
open-mindedness, and collaboration with
Indigenous communities to ensure that their
perspectives and cultural heritage are honored
and accurately represented. Ultimately,
decolonizing museums will contribute to showing
us the multifaceted histories that we share in
today’s globalized world instead of a one-sided
narrative.
Endnotes
1] Trouillot and Carby, “The Power in the Story,” 2.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid, 5.
[5] Lähdesmäki, “Conflicts and Reconciliation”, Stoler,
“Prologue in Two Parts”, and Maranda, “Decolonization
within the Museum”.
[6] Trouillot and Carby, “The Power in the Story,” 6-27.
[7] Oswald and Tinius, “Troubling Colonial Epistemologies
in Berlin’s Ethnologisches Museum,” 120-123.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Trouillot and Carby, “The Power in the Story,” 16.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Bhambra, “Historical Sociology, Modernity, and
Postcolonial Critique,” 657-8..
77
[12] Trouillot and Carby, “The Power in the Story,” 20.
[13] Maranda, “Decolonization within the Museum,” 183-
187
[14] Mignolo and Vasquez, “Decolonial AestheSis”.
AestheTics is considered to be a product of colonial power
that began to be circulated at the start of the sixteenth
century which over time was shaped into the theoretical
premise for the appreciation of “beauty or good taste” at a
global scale. Slowly, aesThetics colonized aestheSis which
also included the ability to sense and perceive beauty. The
authors conclude that “[…] if aestheTics is indeed
modern/colonial aestheTics and a normativity that
colonized the senses, decolonial aestheSis has become the
critique and artistic practices that aim to decolonize the
senses, that is, to liberate them from the regulations of
modern, postmodern, and altermodern aestheTics.”
[1] Gombrich, “The Museum: Past, Present and Future,”
450. The author borrows the terms prodesse and delectare
from Horace;s Ars poetica which states, “aut prodesse volunt,
aut delectare custodes” literally translating to “either they
want to benefit or to please”. The museum, an “improving
institution” is therefore tasked with striking a balance
between providing an informative experience alongside a
delightful one catering to the audience’s aesthsis
[16] Stoler, “Prologue in Two Parts,” 3. Although Ann
Laura Stoler begins by disputing Levi Strauss’ statement:
“Ethnology is especially interested in what is not written”
(Structural Anthropology, 1958), she goes on to admit that
anthropology is a careful reading and piecing together the
puzzle of both the unwritten and the written, where the
former may not necessarily contain “hidden messages” but
rather hold contextual information.
[17] Ibid., 3.
[18] Ibid., 3.
[19] Oswald and Tinius, “Troubling Colonial
Epistemologies in Berlin’s Ethnologisches Museum,” 124.
[20] Maranda, “Decolonization within the Museum,” 188.
[21] Maranda, “Decolonization within the Museum,” 189,
and Huis, “Contesting Cultural Heritage,” 217-243.
[22] Ibid., and Huis, “Contesting Cultural Heritage,” 224-
237.
[23] Philips, “Teaching Decolonizing and Indigenizing
Curatorial and Museum Practices” 113.
[24] Maranda, 187, and Philips, 114.
[25] Pitman, Decolonising the Museum, 38.
[26] Philips, “Teaching Decolonizing and Indigenizing
Curatorial and Museum Practices,” 120.
[27] Southwood, “Dust, History and Politics”.
[28] Walsh, “The Role of Community Museums in Museum
Decolonization,” 35
[29] Ibid., 38.
[30]Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Areies and Wroblewska, “Practicing Decoloniality in
Museums,” 52-58.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 101.
 Decolonization from Theory to Practice

References
Ariese, Csilla E, and Magdalena Wróblewska. ‘Practicing
Decoloniality in Museums: A Guide with Global
Examples’, 2021.
Bhambra, Gurminder K. ‘Historical Sociology, Modernity,
and Postcolonial Critique’. The American Historical
Review 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 653–62.
https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.116.3.653.
Gombrich, E. H. ‘The Museum: Past, Present and Future’.
Critical Inquiry 3, no. 3 (1977): 449–70.
Huis, Iris van. ‘Contesting Cultural Heritage: Decolonizing
the Tropenmuseum as an Intervention in the
Dutch/European Memory Complex’. In Dissonant
Heritages and Memories in Contemporary Europe,
edited by Tuuli Lähdesmäki, Luisa Passerini, and
Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus, 215–46. Palgrave Studies
in Cultural Heritage and Conflict. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11464-0.
Lähdesmäki, Tuuli. ‘Conflicts and Reconciliation in the
Postmillennial Heritage-Policy Discourses of the
Council of Europe and the European Union’. In
Dissonant Heritages and Memories in Contemporary
Europe, edited by Luisa Passerini, Sigrid Kaasik-
Krogerus, and Iris van Huis, 25–50. Palgrave
Studies in Cultural Heritage and Conflict. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11464-0.
Maranda, Lynn. ‘Decolonization within the Museum’.
ICOFOM Study Series, no. 49–2 (31 December
2021): 180–95.
https://doi.org/10.4000/iss.3863.
Mignolo, Walter, and Rolando Vasquez. ‘Decolonial
AestheSis: Colonial Wounds/Decolonial
HealingsSocial Text’. Social Text Journal, 15 July
2013.
https://decolonialaesthesiscreativelab2018.files.
wordpress.com/2018/02/decolonial-
healings_walter-mignolo.pdf.
Oswald, Margareta von, and Jonas Tinius, eds. ‘Troubling
Colonial Epistemologies in Berlin’s
Ethnologisches Museum’. In Across Anthropology:
Troubling Colonial Legacies, Museums, and the
Curatorial. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2020.
Phillips, Laura. ‘Teaching Decolonizing and Indigenizing
Curatorial and Museum Practices’: Museum
Worlds 10, no. 1 (1 July 2022): 112–31.
https://doi.org/10.3167/armw.2022.100109.
Pitman, Thea. Decolonising the Museum: The Curation of
Indigenous Contemporary Art in Brazil. Boydell &
Brewer, 2021.
Southwood, Helen. “Dust, History, and Politics: Assigning
Meanings to Objects at Marischal Museum, 1980-
2000”. In Journal of Museum Ethnography, no. 19
(March 2007): 121-134.
Stoler, Ann Laura. ‘Prologue in Two Parts’. In Along the
Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial
Common Sense. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2009.
78
 09

Photo by Thomas Ronveaux • pexels.com

Decolonizing the In-Between: Unmasking

Colonial Legacies in Central and Eastern
Europe
Written by Veronika Blazkova

“Paradoxically, the postsocialist people have acquired the problematic human status they occupy today not
through race but through a poorly representable semi-alterity. They have become the off-White Blacks of the new
global world—looking and behaving too similar to the Same, yet remaining essentially Others.”[1]

T
his essay introduces how orientalizing
representations and hierarchies have
shaped the centuries-long project of
“inventing Eastern Europe,” focusing on
the Czech Republic.[2] Why is it relevant to
examine decoloniality in post-communist Central
Europe, and what are some of the main discussion
points?
Inspecting decolonization in the Czech
Republic would contribute to taming the widely
held beliefs of Czech people regarding their
“colonial innocence” and the idea that racism is a
concept only relevant to be addressed by the
major imperialist empires.[3] This essay aims to
increase awareness of the dynamics in which
countries without colonies were assumed
colonially innocent.[4]
The paper begins by justifying postcolonial
analysis in the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) context and outlines current discussions.
Then, it uses Edward Said's concept of
Orientalism and the postcolonial framework to
examine the historical implications of the Czech
Republic's inclusion in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, the Eastern Bloc, and the European
Union (EU). Orientalism is a framework that
analyzes how the “Occident” (seen as the West)
has, through discursive practices, differentiated

79
 Decolonizing the In-Between
itself from the “Orient” (seen as the East),
perpetuating “powerful cultural hegemony.” In
the CEE's case, such hegemony allowed groups
politically dominant to define those seen as
weaker through the narrative of barbarity,
infantility, and backwardness.[5] Orientalism
helps to analyze the Western gaze and the West-
East hegemonic relations, which have entrenched
hierarchies between the “Occidental” Western
core and the “Oriental” CEE (semi-)periphery.[6]
However, this essay argues that the position
of the CEE is more complex, as it has participated
in imperial networks and knowledge production
and orientalized other groups leading to “nesting
orientalism.”[7] Hence, this essay aims to
interrogate the intricate issue of colonial
exceptionalism of countries without colonies and
their complicity as semi-peripheries within the
global hierarchy. It hopes to support the
discussion of decolonization in the overlooked
context of the CEE and contribute to a better
comprehension of the broader dynamics of
cultural colonialism and dependency.[8]
Section I: Postcolonialism and Western
Gaze
“The omnipresent, although invisible,
shadow of empires has undoubtedly left its
destructive, pernicious traces not only on the
antipodes but also on Central and Eastern
Europe. (...) Shaping reactions and
attitudes, ways of thinking and of perceiving
reality, influencing not only all aspects of
daily life, but also morality. The imprint of
subjugation has been stamped everywhere on
the region and is hard to erase. But can it be
described?”[9]
Why have the postcolonial scholars mostly failed
to acknowledge the presence of “identity
colonization” within the post-communism
discourse? This section aims to give a clear sense
of the previous research on postcolonial analysis
and binarism in the context of the CEE and the
Czech Republic. Furthermore, it shows the
80
benefits of the postcolonial analysis in a region
labeled as having experienced cultural
colonization.
Firstly, the tendency to overlook the potential
of non-capitalist societies to engage in imperialist
activities is likely due to a bias.[10] The binary
definition of colonialism in postcolonial theory as
the domination of the “Global South” by the
“Global North” erases the complexities of
colonial histories in regions like the CEE.[11]
However, this does not acknowledge that multiple
forms of colonialism existed beyond the Western
imperialist model. This binary definition creates
an “inaccurate geography and timeline of recent
colonialism” by oversimplifying complex
historical processes.[12]So far, the only outlier to
this dichotomy has been Ireland, which has
accumulated substantial academic literature
examining its colonial experience.[13] Hence, it
was the only European country that stood as an
exception to the binary ‘First World-Third World’
postcolonial model for a long time.[14] This essay
will discuss the consequences of this by examining
the CEE through the postcolonial lens and
challenging the assumptions of Czech colonial
innocence and exceptionalism.
Creating post-communist studies was expected
to enhance the understanding of the CEE context.
However, this has yet to be the view of CEE
scholars. As the Polish academic Hana Červinková
argues, while postcolonial theory stems from
indigenous critique, the post-communist
discourse by Western scholars has constructed
CEE in an orientalist way.[15]This has contributed
to an “inaccurate geography and timeline of
recent colonialism.”[16] Thus, using
postcolonialism in a post-communist context
could result in a more nuanced understanding of
the diversity of experiences under imperial
expansion and domination.[17] As such, the post-
communist discourse has favored using the
postcolonial lens since the mid-1990s.[18] They
call to recognize the domination of the CEE by
Russia and/or the Soviet Union as a “testimony to
both open and camouflaged colonial
procedures.”[19] While highlighting the
similarities and differences between the post-
communist and postcolonial discourses, the CEE-
based scholars created concepts more applicable
to their context.
 Decolonizing the In-Between
This essay introduces several of those, including
nesting orientalism, colonial innocence, and
exceptionalism, as well as the imperial syndrome
and European dividend. Overall, scholars have
shown that countries that have been part of the
USSR or the Eastern Bloc share several features of
suppression and imperial domination with
countries previously colonized by Western
powers.[20]
Applying the postcolonial methodology to
analyze the CEE sheds light on several features
such as subalternity, peripheralization, and forms
of silencing by the dominant discourses which the
post-socialist Other shares with the postcolonial
subaltern.[21] Such analysis does not argue that
the USSR or the Eastern Bloc is a “classical
postcolonial case.” [22] Simply, it recognizes that
CEE has features that would benefit from
postcolonial analysis.[23] For example,
throughout history, the Czech Republic was
considered part of the peripheral margins.[24]
Using narrative and rhetoric tools, the Western
cultural gaze has imagined the Czechs in a way
that somewhat mirrored “the oriental, the
colonial, the native.” [25] Examining the
historical cases of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
the Carpathian Ruthenia, and the post-1989
transition period, this essay will show ample
evidence justifying the validity and usefulness of
applying postcolonial theory in this context.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire's Periphery
The Austro-Hungarian Empire hardly resembled
the other imperialistic empires in the extent of
exploitation, yet it profited from colonialism
through less obvious means. For example,
compared to Britain or France, the Empire had
only one “formal colony” of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which the Ottoman Empire annexed in 1878.[26]
However, outwardly, the Empire actively aided
during the Boxer Rebellion. In exchange for not
insisting on African territories at the Berlin
Conference of 1884-1885, it gained “trading
concessions and unimpeded access to nearly all
European ports in the continent.”[27] While not
colonizing in the “classical” sense, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire still benefited through their
external imperial relations.[28] Furthermore,
within the lands or parts controlled by the
Empire, the Habsburgs used the political strategy
81
of “cultural” or “inner” colonization.[29] Their
politics of Germanization aimed to achieve
“complete cultural and linguistic unity” within
the highly ethnic-culturally diverse regions, which
also had “strong disintegrative tendencies.”[30]
Groups such as the Czechs (here meaning people
situated in the regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and
Silesia) were culturally and politically under the
hegemonic thumb of Austrians, Germans, and
Hungarians from 1867 until 1918.[31]
However, since the mid-18th century, the
national revival (Národní obrození) has, among
other factors, spearheaded the Czech push-back
against the Habsburg Germanization and
hegemony. The creation of the “First Republic” of
Czechoslovakia in 1918 allowed Czechs to regain
their cultural and linguistic sovereignty outside of
foreign hegemonic power structures – at least
until the 1938 Munich agreement, which handed
Czechoslovakia over to Germany or the 1968
invasion of Soviet tanks, re-establishing the
communist rule in Czechoslovakia until 1989.[32]
Sharing a similar fate, it is no surprise that along
with the Czech Republic, the wider CEE region
has mainly been studied in terms of its “subaltern
status” in connection to the dominating powers of
Germany, Austria, and Russia.[33] Upon
examining the historical background of the Czech
Republic, it is understandable why most would see
it as the exploited “periphery” rather than the
colonizer.[34]
Western Gaze and Diapers
Moreover, the tendency of the West to
orientalize, even outright “barbarize” the East,
tracing back to the so-called period of
Enlightenment in Europe, has significantly
defined CEE's position within the global
hierarchy.[35] Larry Wolff outlines this in
Inventing Eastern Europe, illustrating how travelers
and writers have overwhelmingly perceived
Eastern Europe as the “exotic, half-oriental,
backward others.”[36] It was the home of:
"The Hungarian, striding stiffly, with his fur-lined
dolman, his close-fitting trousers reaching almost to
his ankles, and his long pigtail; or the round-headed
Pole with his monkish haircut and flowing sleeves:
both nations die in their boots – Armenians,
 Decolonizing the In-Between
Wallachians, and Moldavians, with their half-
Oriental costumes, are not uncommon – The Serbians
with their twisted moustaches (...). The Polish Jews,
all swathed in black, their faces bearded and their
hair all twisted in knots, resemble scarecrows: a living
satire of the Chosen Race – Bohemian peasants with
their long boots; Hungarian and Transylvanian
waggoners with sheepskin greatcoats."[37]
These modes of othering are not limited to
the so-called period of Enlightenment and have
followed the region well until the Cold War and
the post-1989 transition period. As a mode of
othering, the geopolitical border of the Iron
Curtain “set a clear-cut division,” spatially
incarcerating the Other.[38] Inscribed into the
mental map, the Iron Curtain bordered the divide
between two systems, where one tribe is the
“civilized” us and those on the Eastern side the
exotic “uncivilized” Others.[39] This gave a
certain kind of order, and when the Iron Curtain
crumbled and the “spatially incarcerated” Others
were free, “uncertainty, confusion, and symbolic
disorder” within Europe followed.[40] The
situation needed a quick response that would not
shatter the prevailing Western hegemony.[41] As
such, the West supported CEE towards adjusting
and adopting a position within a new system ruled
by the “free market and liberal democracy.”[42]
The rhetorics surrounding the 1990s
transition period illustrate the prevailing Western
gaze. Analysts note an overwhelming number of
infantilizing metaphors of “immaturity and
childhood” used in the Western jargon when
describing post-socialist societies and their
transition.[43] Seeing the irony of the situation,
Croatian philosopher Boris Buden notes how the
post-communist countries are: “One day (...)
being celebrated for toppling totalitarian
regimes, only to be declared “still in diapers”
politically the next.”[44] The West's use of a
discourse presuming the “racial inferiority and
backwardness” of CEE was an apparent attempt to
place the West into the more rational and
experienced parental role.[45]Infantilizing
metaphors served the West to naturally re-
establish its hegemony. There is no type of
domination as “self-evident as the one between a
child and a guardian, no mastery so innocent and
justifiable as that over children.”[46]
82
Thus, the Western approach forced the post-
communist countries back into their metaphorical
diapers, re-establishing the power hierarchy
between the center and the periphery.[47]
However, is the situation truly black and
white, both center and periphery, so clearly
defined? Can the Czech Republic be considered
colonially innocent and exempt from the need for
a decolonial analysis? The second section discusses
further the related complexities, showing how the
“in-between” region occupies a position better
described as a semi-periphery due to its less-than-
innocent involvement.
Section II: Czech Colonial Innocence and
Exceptionalism
How can we reflect on the topic of
decolonization in a region seen as a part of
the European modernity project, yet one
that simultaneously is not recognized as “an
agent of colonialism?”[48] This question is
crucial for this essay and any effort to
decolonize the CEE since historical evidence
shows how the Czech lands and people are
not “so easily disentangled from the wider
history of European colonialism.”[49]
The strong and persisting belief in
Czech colonial exceptionalism has been
primarily due to the lack of Czech colonies.
However, historical accounts showcase
individual Czechs implicitly supporting and
entrenching the imperialistic power of the
Empire. After all, people from CEE, such as
the Czechs or Poles, took roles within the
imperial Austro-Hungarian government and
helped to govern the Empire's “less
modern” regions.[50] That the Czechs
somewhat accepted the Habsburg presence
and associated opportunities reflected in the
significant number of Czechs who traveled
and migrated within the Empire during that
period.[51] Similarly, their engagement
with imperial knowledge production is
evident, considering that when visiting
imperial empires or encountering “imperial
networks,” scientists or missionaries
 Decolonizing the In-Between
would experience the “imperial cloud” of
knowledge and values.[52] Czechs were
documented to be involved in such scientific
exhibitions and overall tied to imperial
infrastructure.[53]
Moreover, Czechs enjoyed certain privileges
due to their place as subjects of a great European
Empire.[54] On the one hand, these were limited,
considering the orientalizing tales spun about the
East during Enlightenment. However, when they
traveled, their position and identities as
Christians/Jews and Europeans still shaped their
expectations and privileges, which would “not
have been at odds with views held in nineteenth-
century Paris, Brussels or London.”[55] Thus, to
be colonially complicit, a country does not need to
own colonies; simply adopting imperial racialized
views and disseminating them is enough.[56]
Therefore, the Czech colonial complicity is
the “ambiguous” position of countries without
colonies subjected to hegemonic power while
simultaneously striving for a position within the
system.[57] Not merely outsiders to the colonial
projects, such countries desired to be “heard in
the hegemonic Western discourses.”[58]
83
Photo from ABC news
Photo by Dropolto • pixabay.com
While the West orientalized the East, the latter
was aware of how the racialized gaze placed them
in an inferior position.[59] In turn, the CEE
would reassure itself of its civilized nature by
orientalizing others.[60] They used the “Western
gaze” on their more Eastern, less “civilized”
neighboring countries, attempting to avoid
association with the barbaric East.
These realities make the previously clear-looking
waters of Czech colonial innocence much less
straightforward. Hence, Section III further
discusses the forms of Czech colonial complicity,
examining “nesting orientalism” and its resulting
privileges.
Section III: Abduction of the CEE and
Peripheral Hierarchies
This section argues that the Central European
semi-periphery needed an image of “maturity”
and “modernity” to (re)gain a higher position
within the West-dominated hierarchy, which they
tacitly accepted.[61] Their attempt to distance
themselves from their communist history and
prove their place by earning EU and NATO
memberships
 Decolonizing the In-Between
illustrates this. Yet, in some ways, this altered but
ultimately did not overthrow the prevailing power
dynamics.[62]
Central Europe's Imperial Syndrome
To distance themselves from the negative
associations with Eastern Europe, the CEE
countries have strategically downplayed their
connection with countries such as Russia and
emphasized their Central European identity.[63]
Such an attitude is present in the older
generations, shaped by their distaste towards
rhetorics resembling the communist regime. The
communist regime's propaganda pitted the “evil,
racist West against the virtuous, oppressed
South,” prompting those opposing the
government to further identify with the West.[64]
A famous essay by Milan Kundera from 1984, “The
Tragedy of Central Europe,” illustrates this
perspective, believing that Central Europe held a
position at the center of Western culture and lost
it only due to being kidnapped.[65] The
foundation of Kundera's argument, the “tragedy,”
can be understood as a “post-subaltern-imperial
syndrome” fearing the loss of its “European
dividend.”[66]
The syndrome relies on the precarious
position of countries without colonies.[67]
Although unhappy with their place as “service
states” within the “colonial matrix of power,” they
work to keep this position from fear of failing
even lower within the “hierarchy of
humanity.”[68] The “European dividend”
represents the geopolitical privileges granted
based on the country's or society's place within the
European hierarchy.[69] Due to their
geographical location and “(relative) whiteness,”
the (non-Romany) Central East Europeans are
promised access to Europe's political, economic,
and cultural privileges.[70] However, these
privileges are conditional on their willingness to
maintain Eurocentric and capitalist attributes and
recognize the European powerhouse, even
though this system has marginalized and
orientalized them.[71] Although the CEE
countries have long admired and tried to model
themselves after the West, even perpetuating
Western hierarchies through nesting orientalism,
the West has not recognized them as equal
partners; they continue to occupy a peripheral,
non-hegemonic European position.[72]
84
The foundation of Kundera's
argument, the “tragedy,” can
be understood as a “post-
subaltern-imperial syndrome”
fearing the loss of its
“European dividend.”
Nesting Orientalism
By adopting the Western gaze, the CEE has
contributed to “nesting Orientalism,”
entrenching the hierarchy of Orientals. Such a
hierarchy is reproduced by the CEE using the
Western gaze onto countries too Eastern to be
seen as “civilized” by even this “less civilized”
region. Czech authors supported the growth of
their defensive nationalism through othering of
internal minorities (e.g., Roma and Jews),
external (e.g., Turks), as well as other non-
Europeans farther away.[73] The Czech “nesting
orientalism” is also seen during their involvement
with the interwar Subcarpathian Rus, the
“uncultured east of [their] republic.” [74]
Integrated with Czechoslovakia in 1918, the
territories of Subcarpathian Rus were compared
by Czech authors on a similar developmental level
to a “part of darkest Africa.”[75] Using the typical
language of European orientalism, Czechs saw
themselves as able to bring “order, discipline,
Western European democracy, and culture” to a
land they judged as full of “oriental chaos and
disorder.”[76] This view helped the new
Czechoslovak Republic to reaffirm its position
within the global hierarchy. Moreover, it served
its aspiring political goals and cultural identity.
[77] Using language similar to the Western post-
transition infantilizing discourse, the Czechs
described their role in this region as a parent to
the “child-like Rusyns,” establishing their position
as a modern savior.[78]
While Czechs did not have colonies in the
classical sense and remained at the European
periphery, they recognized that the gradation of
“Orients” constructs hierarchies.[79] Their semi-
colonial, ethnocentric, and nationalistic
descriptions of the Subcarpathian Rus showcase
how they employed nesting orientalism to at least
increase their position within the hierarchy.
 Decolonizing the In-Between

In certain instances, Czechs have been perceived

as “less white and privileged,” while other times
they are seen as “more white and privileged.”[88]
This depends on the context and the hierarchical
In certain instances, Czechs position of the other within the comparison. For
have been perceived as “less example, considering historical instances of
Czech and Slovak migration, those in the USA
white and privileged,” while before 1924 have been described as “less ‘white’
than the ‘old stock’ Anglo-Saxon.” [89] Any
other times they are seen as further works on decolonization in this region
“more white and privileged.” should tackle the topics of race and whiteness, as
they remain widely under-discussed. Further, CEE
decolonization debates should avoid postcolonial
binarism and build upon the complexities
The European Club and Being “Flexibly
associated with the semi-periphery, such as the
Raced”
interplay between colonial complicity, the
In his 2020 case for Czech decolonization, political
imperial syndrome, and assumed colonial
scientist Pavel Barša argues that since the 1989
exceptionalism.
Velvet Revolution, the country's goal has been to
return to its “rightful place” in the West.[80]
Conclusion
Indeed, the CEE's historical narrative and political
This work hoped to disprove the myth that the
agenda are full of aspirations to be included in the
CEE is exempt from colonialism, racism, and the
“European club” while simultaneously fearing
need for decolonization.
being left behind the borders of the “real
The first section of this essay establishes how the
Europe.” [81] The vehement refusal of the
postcolonial analysis improves our understanding
Visegrad countries to comply with the European
of the CEE's cultural colonization and explores
Commission's refugee quota agreement during
the use of orientalizing metaphors in
the 2015 crisis seems to oppose this return to
(re)establishing the cultural hegemony of the
Europe. However, this and similar actions related
West since the Enlightenment and, more recently,
to othering and identity are the CEE's attempt to
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Section II
be the one to draw the periphery borders and
challenges the notion of Czech “colonial
protect their unstable position.[82]
innocence” and demonstrates how the region has
To reaffirm their Europeanness, the CEE
been complicit in colonial projects. Finally, in
countries need another outsider. To Anikó Imre,
Section III, this essay shows how, through
whiteness and the “unspoken insistence” on it by
“nesting orientalism,” the Czech narrative
the CEE nations in the context of the post-socialist
attempts to frame itself as rightfully belonging to
transition is “one of the most effective and least
the European core, ensuring that someone
recognized means of asserting their
remains below them within the hierarchical
Europeanness.”[83] The many locals who view
ladder of backwardness.
colonization and race as irrelevant to the CEE
This paper challenges Czech “colonial
context sustain this invisibility.[84] Thus, it is
exceptionalism” by examining historical cases of
fairly typical to hear CEE people stating, “I hate
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech
Gypsies, but I am not a racist,” without perceiving
management of the Subcarpathian Rus, the Czech
any contradictions.[85] The dynamics and
post-communism transition, and accession to the
privileges of race and whiteness remain topics
EU. This essay calls to decolonize the Czech
mostly kept outside of the local discussion.[86]
institutional space and urges readers to re-
However, some initial analysis has begun,
examine the role of countries without colonies in
considering the implications of seeing the (non-
perpetuating imperial and colonial projects.
Roma) Czechs as “flexibly raced.” [87]

85
 Decolonizing the In-Between

[27] Ibid.
Endnotes [28] Ibid.
[1] Madina Tlostanova, “Postcolonial Theory, the
29] Marijan Bobinac, “Cultural Transfer in the Habsburg
Decolonial Option and Postsocialist Writing,” in
Empire. Croatia and German-Language Culture from a
Postcolonial Europe? Essays on Post-Communist Literatures and
Postcolonial Perspective,” in (Post-) Colonialism Across
Cultures, ed. Dobrota Pucherová and Róbert Gáfrik
Europe: Transcultural History and National Memory, ed. Dirk
(Leiden: BRILL, 2015), 29.
Göttsche and Axel Dunker (Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag,
2] Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case
2014), 306.
of Former Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 917.
[30] Ibid., 306.
3] Matthew Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe:
[31] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 6.
Czech Art and the Question of ‘Colonial Innocence’,”
[32] Ibid., 2.
Visual Resources 37, no. 1 (March 2021): 7.
[33] Ibid.
[4] Filip Herza, “Colonial Exceptionalism: Post-colonial
[34] Ibid.
Scholarship and Race in Czech and Slovak
[35] Ibid.
Historiography,” Slovenský národopis / Slovak Ethnology
[36] Ibid.
68, no. 2 (2020): 178.
[37] Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of
[5] Michal Buchowski, “The Specter of Orientalism in
Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Redwood City:
Europe: From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother,”
Stanford University Press, 1994), 114.
Anthropological Quarterly 79, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 463;
[38] Buchowski, “The Specter of Orientalism in Europe,”
Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms,” 917.
465.
[6] Buchowski, “The Specter of Orientalism in Europe,”
[39] Ibid.
463.
[40] Ibid.
[7] Buchowski, “The Specter of Orientalism in Europe,”
[41] Ibid.
463.
[42] Ibid.
[8] Barbara Lüthi, “Colonialism without Colonies in
[43] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 35.
Europe: Defining Lines,” in Central Europe and the Non-
[44] Ibid.
European World in the Long 19th Century, ed. Markéta
[45] Ibid., 40.
Křížová and Jitka Malečková (Frank & Timme GmbH,
[46] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 35.
2022), 36.
[47] Ibid., 40.
[9] Aleksander Fiut, “In the Shadow of Empires: Post-
[48] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 2.
colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe - Why Not?,”
[49] Ibid.
Teksty Drugie 1 (2014): 35.
[50] Ibid., 6.
[10] Tlostanova, “Postcolonial Theory,” 14.
[51] Ibid., 12.
[11] Dobrota Pucherová and Róbert Gáfrik, “Introduction:
[52] Lüthi, “Colonialism without Colonies,” 209.
Which Postcolonial Europe?,” in Postcolonial Europe?
[53] Ibid.
Essays on Post-Communist Literatures and Cultures
[54] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 7.
(Leiden: BRILL, 2015), 14.
[55] Ibid.
[12] Bogdan Ștefănescu, “The Postcommunist Supplement:
[56] Lüthi, “Colonialism without Colonies,” 213.
The Revision of Postcolonial Theory from the East
[57] Ibid., 211.
European Quarter,” American, British and Canadian
[58] Ibid., 205.
Studies 38, no. 1 (2022): 141.
[59] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 33.
[13] Iveta Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity:
[60] Lüthi, “Colonialism without Colonies,” 213.
Postcolonial Theory and the European Dividend,” in Czech
[61] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 35.
Feminisms: Perspectives on Gender in East Central Europe,
[62] Ibid.
ed. Iveta Jusová and Jirina Šiklová (Bloomington: Indiana
[63] Ibid., 37.
University Press, 2016), 40.
[64] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 4.
[14] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 40.
[65] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[66] Tlostanova, “Postcolonial Theory,” 31.
[16] Ștefănescu, “The Postcommunist Supplement,” 141.
[67] Ibid., 30.
[17] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[18] Pucherová and Gáfrik, “Introduction,” 12.
[69] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 41.
[19] Fiut, “In the Shadow of Empires,” 36.
[70] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 41.
[20] Pucherová and Gáfrik, “Introduction,” 12.
[71] Ibid.
[21] Tlostanova, “Postcolonial Theory,” 29.
[72] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 28.
[73] Markéta Křížová, “Noble and Ignoble Savages and
[23] Tlostanova, “Postcolonial Theory,” 28.
Their Scientific “Colonization” in the Making of the
[24] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 39.
Nation,” in Central Europe and the Non-European World
[25] Ibid.
in the Long 19th Century, ed. Jitka Malečková (Frank &
[26] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 6
Timme GmbH, 2022), 162.

86
 Decolonizing the In-Between
[74] Wlodzimierz Borodziej, Stanislav Holubec, and
Joachim Puttkamer, “We bring order, discipline, Western
European democracy, and culture to this land of former
oriental chaos and disorder,” in Mastery and Lost Illusions:
Space and Time in the Modernization of Eastern and
Central Europe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co
KG, 2014), 238.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 248.
[77] Lüthi, “Colonialism without Colonies,” 210.
[78] Borodziej, Holubec, and Puttkamer, “We bring order,
discipline,” 240
[79] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 41.
[80] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 4.
[81] Lars Jensen, “Postcolonial Europe Regionalized,” in
Postcolonial Europe (London: Routledge, 2020), 79.
[82] Rampley, “Decolonizing Central Europe,” 4.
[83] Anikó Imre, “Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern
Europe: The Time of the Gypsies, The End of Race,” in
Postcolonial Whiteness: A Critical Reader on Race and
Empire, ed. Alfred J. Lopez (State University of New York
Press, 2012), 82.
[84] Imre, “Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe,”
80.
[85] Imre, “Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe,”
83.
[86] Ibid., 80.
[87] Jusová, “Situating the Czech Identity,” 41.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Filip Herza, “Colonial Exceptionalism,” 183.
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Empire. Croatia and German-Language Culture
from a Postcolonial Perspective." In
(Post-)Colonialism Across Europe: Transcultural
History and National Memory, edited by Dirk
Göttsche and Axel Dunker. Bielefeld: Aisthesis
Verlag, 2014.
Borodziej, Wlodzimierz, Stanislav Holubec, and Joachim
Puttkamer. “We bring order, discipline, Western
European democracy, and culture to this land of
former oriental chaos and disorder.” In Mastery
and Lost Illusions: Space and Time in the
Modernization of Eastern and Central Europe. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2014.
Buchowski, Michal. "The Specter of Orientalism in Europe:
From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother."
Anthropological Quarterly 79, no. 3 (Summer 2006),
463-482. doi:10.1353/anq.2006.0032.
Fiut, Aleksander. "In the Shadow of Empires: Post-
colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe - Why
Not?" Teksty Drugie 1 (2014), 34-40.
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Herza, Filip. "Colonial Exceptionalism: Post-colonial
Scholarship and Race in Czech and Slovak
Historiography." Slovenský národopis / Slovak
Ethnology 68, no. 2 (2020), 175-187.
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Imre, Anikó. "Whiteness in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe."
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and Empire, edited by Alfred J. Lopez, 79-97. State
University of New York Press, 2012.
Jensen, Lars. "Postcolonial Europe Regionalized." In
Postcolonial Europe, 1st ed. London: Routledge,
2020.
Jusová, Iveta. "Situating the Czech Identity: Postcolonial
Theory and “the European Dividend.”" In Czech
Feminisms: Perspectives on Gender in East Central
Europe, edited by Iveta Jusová and Jirina Šiklová,
29-45. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2016. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005w2f.5.
Křížová, Markéta. "Noble and Ignoble Savages and Their
Scientific “Colonization” in the Making of the
Nation." In Central Europe and the Non-European
World in the Long 19th Century, edited by Jitka
Malečková, 135-163. Frank & Timme GmbH, 2022.
Lüthi, Barbara. "Colonialism without Colonies in Europe:
Defining Lines." In Central Europe and the Non-
European World in the Long 19th Century, edited by
Markéta Křížová and Jitka Malečková. Frank &
Timme GmbH, 2022.
Pucherová, Dobrota, and Róbert Gáfrik. "Introduction:
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Cultures, 11-24. Leiden: BRILL, 2015.
Rampley, Matthew. "Decolonizing Central Europe: Czech
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 In loving memory of our dear friend and
former Head of Research - Nur Ayça Demir

Much like her name, our Nur (who we all called Ayça), was a light. She was a light in the
classroom, in cafés, in phone and Zoom calls, and essentially anywhere at all. She lit up spaces
by the sheer force of her intelligence, her wit, and her ever-loving will to engage in an
interesting conversation.

Following the news of her loss, many of us her fellow classmates and former teachers
gathered to recall the woman that Ayça was. She was unique, and fascinating, and very odd
but in the best way possible. It seemed that all of us had positive things to tell of her and kind
memories. That’s not very common, is it? For so many people to remember a single person so
fondly. But there we were, going on and on about how angry and sad we were to lose Ayça.
And how happy and grateful we were to have had her.

Our time with Ayça may have been limited and far too short, but it was filled with lessons. We
learned what a true passion for learning was, and how transformative reading (a lot) could
be. In leaving, Ayça also taught us to hold each other closer, to love each other more
expressly and clearly, and to cherish the friends and family around us.

We all love you, Ayça, and hope you’re having a ball wherever you are.

On women and loss

The world does not afford to

lose women like us
Women who fight for higher
purposes
For a better world
Against all odds
Overcomers and overlovers
Creators
Brave and defient
Whose love transforms

Who else is capable of always

fighting for a better world
against all odds and be
healers at the same time?

Rest in power, girl

88
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